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import UBI openssh-8.0p1-24.el8

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This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2024-05-22 13:26:20 +00:00
parent b6a876a1a7
commit 6d16bfdb3c
8 changed files with 267 additions and 50 deletions
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12
SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
View File

@ -136,18 +136,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun) auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
goto done; goto done;
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
{
if (sshpid > 1) {
kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ (void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
}
_exit(1);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100

52
SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
View File

@ -471,6 +471,47 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c
#include "xmss_fast.h" #include "xmss_fast.h"
@@ -392,7 +394,8 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
{
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL;
- int ret, slen, len;
+ int ret, slen;
+ size_t len;
if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -411,9 +414,10 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto error;
}
- if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
- EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
- EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
+ NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto error;
}
@@ -440,12 +444,13 @@ sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
+ NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto done;
}
- ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
+ ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
switch (ret) {
case 1:
ret = 0;
@@ -1514,6 +1516,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA @@ -1514,6 +1516,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
} }
if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
@ -515,3 +556,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c
if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx 2023-10-30 13:01:59.150952364 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config 2023-10-30 13:02:56.662231354 +0100
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+#In FIPS mode Ed25519 keys are not supported, please comment out the next line
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
# Ciphers and keying

20
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index b66037f1..54538ff9 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -220,9 +220,12 @@ static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
- if (sshpid > 1) {
- kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ pid = sshpid;
+ if (pid > 1) {
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ (void)waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
}
_exit(1);

13
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
index 99c25cd2..574a566e 100644
--- a/msg.c
+++ b/msg.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
return (-1);
}
msg_len = get_u32(buf);
- if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+ if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
return (-1);
}

85
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
View File

@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0b2f6a56 index 00000000..0b2f6a56
--- /dev/null --- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgssc.c +++ b/kexgssc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+/* +/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * + *
@ -1571,7 +1571,7 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; + struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; + struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); + struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
+ u_char *msg; + u_char *msg;
+ int type = 0; + int type = 0;
+ int first = 1; + int first = 1;
@ -1610,8 +1610,10 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ default: + default:
+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); + fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+ } + }
+ if (r != 0) + if (r != 0) {
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ return r; + return r;
+ }
+ +
+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; + token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+ +
@ -1674,11 +1676,16 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ do { + do {
+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); + type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { + if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ size_t tmp_len = 0;
+
+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); + debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+ if (server_host_key_blob) + if (server_host_key_blob)
+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); + fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
+ } + }
+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); + } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+ +
@ -1779,6 +1786,11 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ if (r != 0) + if (r != 0)
+ goto out; + goto out;
+ +
+ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); + hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash( + if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg, + kex->hash_alg,
@ -1848,7 +1860,7 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ size_t hashlen; + size_t hashlen;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; + int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); + struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
+ u_char c; + u_char c;
+ int r; + int r;
+ +
@ -1960,11 +1972,16 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ do { + do {
+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); + type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { + if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ size_t tmp_len = 0;
+
+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); + debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+ if (server_host_key_blob) + if (server_host_key_blob)
+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); + fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
+ } + }
+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); + } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+ +
@ -2040,6 +2057,7 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0)
+ goto out; + goto out;
+ sshbuf_free(buf); + sshbuf_free(buf);
+ buf = NULL;
+ +
+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@ -2048,6 +2066,10 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ +
+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) + if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ goto out; + goto out;
+ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ +
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); + hashlen = sizeof(hash);
@ -2094,6 +2116,7 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+out: +out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob); + sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(empty); + sshbuf_free(empty);
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
@ -2110,7 +2133,7 @@ new file mode 100644
index 00000000..60bc02de index 00000000..60bc02de
--- /dev/null --- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgsss.c +++ b/kexgsss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+/* +/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * + *
@ -2177,7 +2200,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
+ */ + */
+ +
+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; + OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; + Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; + struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
@ -2217,7 +2240,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); + type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ switch(type) { + switch(type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+ if (client_pubkey != NULL) + if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); + fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &recv_tok)) != 0 || + &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
@ -2248,6 +2271,31 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
+ goto out; + goto out;
+ +
+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ + /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+
+ /* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
+ * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
+ * buffer state->incoming_packet
+ */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->peer,
+ kex->my,
+ empty,
+ client_pubkey,
+ server_pubkey,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
+ client_pubkey = NULL;
+
+ break; + break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
@ -2269,7 +2317,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); + fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+ +
+ if (client_pubkey == NULL) + if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
+ fatal("No client public key"); + fatal("No client public key");
+ +
+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
@ -2298,23 +2346,6 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); + fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+ +
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->peer,
+ kex->my,
+ empty,
+ client_pubkey,
+ server_pubkey,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))) + if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); + fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+ +

46
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
--- openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp 2021-09-16 11:37:57.240171687 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h 2021-09-16 11:42:29.183427917 +0200
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
#define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli"
+#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH SSHDIR "/disable_scp"
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh"
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp 2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1 2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
.El
+.Pp
+Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
+.Ar /etc/ssh/disable_scp
+file. If this file exists, when SCP protocol is in use (either remotely or
+via the
+.Fl O
+option), the program will exit.
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Ex -std scp
.Sh SEE ALSO
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp 2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c 2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
@@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
+ {
+ FILE *f = fopen(_PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH, "r");
+ if (f != NULL) {
+ fclose(f);
+ fatal("SCP protocol is forbidden via %s", _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH);
+ }
+ }
+
if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);

33
SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
--- a/auth2.c 8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000 1.166
+++ b/auth2.c 28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_
}
#define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
+#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
static double
user_specific_delay(const char *user)
{
@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start,
struct timespec ts;
double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
+ if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
+ debug3("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
+ "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
+ return;
+ }
+
/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
seconds *= 2;
@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
authenticated = m->userauth(ssh);
}
- if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+ if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);

52
SPECS/openssh.spec
View File

@ -66,14 +66,14 @@
# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
%global openssh_ver 8.0p1 %global openssh_ver 8.0p1
%global openssh_rel 19 %global openssh_rel 24
%global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.3 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.3
%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 7 %global pam_ssh_agent_rel 7
Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
Name: openssh Name: openssh
Version: %{openssh_ver} Version: %{openssh_ver}
Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}.2 Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
#URL1: http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net #URL1: http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net
Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
@ -277,13 +277,21 @@ Patch985: openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
Patch986: openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch Patch986: openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
# Upstream 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6 # Upstream 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6
Patch987: openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch Patch987: openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch
# Upstream 4332b4fe49360679647a8705bc08f4e81323f6b4
Patch988: openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch
# Upstream 89b54900ac61986760452f132bbe3fb7249cfdac
Patch989: openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch
# upsream commit # upsream commit
# b23fe83f06ee7e721033769cfa03ae840476d280 # b23fe83f06ee7e721033769cfa03ae840476d280
Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
#upstream commit 01dbf3d46651b7d6ddf5e45d233839bbfffaeaec
Patch1017: openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
#upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5 #upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5
Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
#upstream commit 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a #upstream commit 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a
Patch1019: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch Patch1019: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
# SCP kill switch
Patch1020: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
License: BSD License: BSD
Group: Applications/Internet Group: Applications/Internet
@ -376,7 +384,7 @@ Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
Group: System Environment/Base Group: System Environment/Base
Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver} Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}.2 Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
License: BSD License: BSD
%description %description
@ -517,6 +525,8 @@ popd
%patch985 -p1 -b .minimize-sha1-use %patch985 -p1 -b .minimize-sha1-use
%patch986 -p1 -b .banner %patch986 -p1 -b .banner
%patch987 -p1 -b .sftp_ipv6 %patch987 -p1 -b .sftp_ipv6
%patch988 -p1 -b .killall
%patch989 -p1 -b .bigsshdconfig
%patch200 -p1 -b .audit %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
@ -525,8 +535,10 @@ popd
%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity %patch100 -p1 -b .coverity
%patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408 %patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408
%patch1017 -p1 -b .limitdelay
%patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795 %patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795
%patch1019 -p1 -b .cve-2023-51385 %patch1019 -p1 -b .cve-2023-51385
%patch1020 -p1 -b .scp-kill-switch
autoreconf autoreconf
pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
@ -812,15 +824,37 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
%endif %endif
%changelog %changelog
* Mon Jan 08 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-19.2 * Tue Feb 06 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-24
- Fix Terrapin attack - Providing a kill switch for scp to deal with CVE-2020-15778
Resolves: RHEL-19762 Resolves: RHEL-22870
* Thu Dec 21 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-19.1 * Fri Jan 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-23
- Fix Terrapin attack - Fix Terrapin attack
Resolves: RHEL-19762 Resolves: RHEL-19308
* Thu Dec 21 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-22
- Fix Terrapin attack
Resolves: RHEL-19308
- Forbid shell metasymbols in username/hostname - Forbid shell metasymbols in username/hostname
Resolves: RHEL-19820 Resolves: RHEL-19788
* Tue Nov 07 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-21
- Using DigestSign/DigestVerify functions for better FIPS compatibility
Resolves: RHEL-5217
* Mon Oct 30 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-20
- Limit artificial delays in sshd while login using AD user
Resolves: RHEL-1684
- Add comment to OpenSSH server config about FIPS-incompatible key
Resolves: RHEL-5221
- Avoid killing all processes on system in case of race condition
Resolves: RHEL-11548
- Avoid sshd_config 256K limit
Resolves: RHEL-5279
- Using DigestSign/DigestVerify functions for better FIPS compatibility
Resolves: RHEL-5217
- Fix GSS KEX causing ssh failures when connecting to WinSSHD
Resolves: RHEL-5321
* Thu Aug 24 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-19 * Thu Aug 24 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-19
- rebuilt - rebuilt