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Unpatch Red Hat help message

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This commit is contained in:
Koichiro Iwao 2026-05-20 00:16:22 +00:00 committed by root
commit 50ff6876f0
8 changed files with 2325 additions and 124 deletions
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503
openssh-10.0-mlkem-nist-fips.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,503 @@
diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
index 4e611dc39..b5f4cc685 100644
--- a/compat.c
+++ b/compat.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "match.h"
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
/* determine bug flags from SSH protocol banner */
void
@@ -148,8 +149,9 @@ char *
compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *p)
{
char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
+ int mlkem_available = is_mlkem768_available();
- if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
+ if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0 && mlkem_available == 2)
return xstrdup(p);
debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
@@ -164,6 +166,25 @@ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *p)
free(cp);
cp = cp2;
}
+ if (mlkem_available == 2)
+ return cp ? cp : xstrdup(p);
+ if (mlkem_available == 1 && FIPS_mode()) {
+ if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
+ "mlkem768x25519-sha256")) == NULL)
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ free(cp);
+ cp = cp2;
+ }
+ if (mlkem_available == 0) {
+ if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
+ "mlkem768x25519-sha256,"
+ "mlkem768nistp256-sha256,"
+ "mlkem1024nistp384-sha384")) == NULL)
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ free(cp);
+ cp = cp2;
+ }
+
if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp);
diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
index 2e6db5bf9..b78e55b69 100644
--- a/compat.h
+++ b/compat.h
@@ -62,4 +62,5 @@ struct ssh;
void compat_banner(struct ssh *, const char *);
char *compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *, const char *);
+int is_mlkem768_available(void);
#endif
diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
index a728e0b38..9b852e8ab 100644
--- a/kex-names.c
+++ b/kex-names.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/fips.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
#endif
#include "kex.h"
@@ -113,14 +113,27 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[]
{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
};
+/*
+ * 0 - unavailable
+ * 1 - available in non-FIPS mode
+ * 2 - available always
+ */
-static int is_mlkem768_available()
+int is_mlkem768_available()
{
static int is_fetched = -1;
if (is_fetched == -1) {
- EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
- is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
+ EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = NULL;
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+ is_fetched = (mlkem768 == NULL) ? 0 : 2;
+ if (is_fetched == 0 && FIPS_mode() == 1) {
+ mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", "provider=default,-fips");
+ is_fetched = (mlkem768 == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+ }
EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
return is_fetched;
@@ -131,13 +148,32 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct kexalg *k;
+ int x25519mlkem_available = 0, nistmlkem_available = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * FIPS provider can provide ML-KEMs and then all hybrids are available
+ * Otherwise only NIST hybrids are available
+ * */
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ if (is_mlkem768_available() == 2) {
+ x25519mlkem_available = 1;
+ nistmlkem_available = 1;
+ } else if (is_mlkem768_available() == 1) {
+ nistmlkem_available = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (is_mlkem768_available() > 0) {
+ x25519mlkem_available = 1;
+ nistmlkem_available = 1;
+ }
+ }
for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- if ( (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
- || strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0
- || strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0)
- && !is_mlkem768_available())
+ if ( (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0 && x25519mlkem_available == 0)
+ || (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0 && nistmlkem_available == 0)
+ || (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0 && nistmlkem_available == 0))
continue;
+
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(k->name);
@@ -168,12 +204,30 @@ static const struct kexalg *
kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct kexalg *k;
+ int x25519mlkem_available = 0, nistmlkem_available = 0;
- if ( (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
- || strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0
- || strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0)
- && !is_mlkem768_available())
- return NULL;
+ /*
+ * FIPS provider can provide ML-KEMs and then all hybrids are available
+ * Otherwise only NIST hybrids are available
+ * */
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ if (is_mlkem768_available() == 2) {
+ x25519mlkem_available = 1;
+ nistmlkem_available = 1;
+ } else if (is_mlkem768_available() == 1) {
+ nistmlkem_available = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (is_mlkem768_available() > 0) {
+ x25519mlkem_available = 1;
+ nistmlkem_available = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0 && x25519mlkem_available == 0)
+ || (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0 && nistmlkem_available == 0)
+ || (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0 && nistmlkem_available == 0))
+ return NULL;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
@@ -292,8 +295,16 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
- if (FIPS_mode())
- error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ if ((strcmp(p, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0)
+ || (strcmp(p, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0)
+ || (strcmp(p, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0)) {
+ debug("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ else
+ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
+ }
else
error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
free(s);
diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
index 6e910f84f..4bc3f9faf 100644
--- a/kexgen.c
+++ b/kexgen.c
@@ -133,27 +133,23 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ EVP_KEM *mlkem = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+ if (mlkem == NULL) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ EVP_KEM_free(mlkem);
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
+ }
} else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
}
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
- if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768nistp256 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- } else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(kex);
- }
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
- if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem1024nistp384 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- } else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(kex);
- }
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -239,30 +235,27 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ EVP_KEM *mlkem = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+ if (mlkem == NULL) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ EVP_KEM_free(mlkem);
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+ &shared_secret);
+ }
} else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
&shared_secret);
}
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
- if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768nistp256 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- } else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(kex, server_blob,
&shared_secret);
- }
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
- if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem1024nistp384 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- } else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(kex, server_blob,
&shared_secret);
- }
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -398,30 +391,27 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ EVP_KEM *mlkem = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+ if (mlkem == NULL) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ EVP_KEM_free(mlkem);
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+ }
} else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
&server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
}
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
- if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768nistp256 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- } else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
&server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
- }
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
- if (FIPS_mode()) {
- logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem1024nistp384 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- } else {
r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
&server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
- }
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
index 463d18771..e32edb077 100644
--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
@@ -48,10 +48,15 @@
#ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
#include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#define FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ "provider=default,-fips"
+
static int
mlkem_keypair_gen(const char *algname, unsigned char *pubkeybuf, size_t pubkey_size,
unsigned char *privkeybuf, size_t privkey_size)
@@ -62,6 +67,14 @@ mlkem_keypair_gen(const char *algname, unsigned char *pubkeybuf, size_t pubkey_s
size_t got_pub_size = pubkey_size, got_priv_size = privkey_size;
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, algname, NULL);
+
+ if (ctx == NULL && FIPS_mode()) {
+ /* We have filtered x25519 + ML-KEM in FIPS mode earlier
+ * so if we are in FIPS mode and ML-KEM is not available with default propq,
+ * we can fetch it from the default provider */
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, algname, FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ);
+ }
+
if (ctx == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
@@ -121,6 +134,7 @@ mlkem_encap_secret(const char *mlkem_alg, const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secre
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t outlen, expected_outlen, publen, secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+ int fips_fallback = 0;
if (strcmp(mlkem_alg, "mlkem768") == 0) {
outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
@@ -135,12 +149,17 @@ mlkem_encap_secret(const char *mlkem_alg, const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secre
pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, mlkem_alg, NULL,
pubkeybuf, publen);
+ if (pkey == NULL && FIPS_mode()) {
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, mlkem_alg, FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ,
+ pubkeybuf, publen);
+ fips_fallback = 1;
+ }
if (pkey == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
}
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, fips_fallback ? FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ : NULL);
if (ctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &expected_outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
@@ -182,15 +201,21 @@ mlkem_decap_secret(const char *algname,
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+ int fips_fallback = 0;
pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, algname,
NULL, privkeybuf, privkey_len);
+ if (pkey == NULL && FIPS_mode()) {
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, algname,
+ FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ, privkeybuf, privkey_len);
+ fips_fallback = 1;
+ }
if (pkey == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
}
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, fips_fallback ? FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ : NULL);
if (ctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrapped_len) <= 0
@@ -744,6 +769,48 @@ nist_pkey_keygen(size_t pub_key_len)
return pkey;
}
+static size_t decompress_pub_key(void *pub, size_t compressed_len, size_t decompressed_len)
+{
+ EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ int group_nid = NID_undef;
+
+ switch (compressed_len) {
+ case NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN:
+ group_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ break;
+ case NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN:
+ group_nid = NID_secp384r1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(group_nid);
+ if (ctx == NULL || group == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ point = EC_POINT_new(group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, point, pub, compressed_len, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, pub, decompressed_len, ctx);
+
+err:
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ EC_GROUP_free(group);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return len;
+}
+
static int
get_uncompressed_ec_pubkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)
{
@@ -757,16 +824,25 @@ get_uncompressed_ec_pubkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)
if (EVP_PKEY_set_params(pkey, params) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_get_octet_string_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
- NULL, 0, &required_len) <= 0) {
+ buf, buf_len, &required_len) <= 0) {
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
- if (required_len != buf_len)
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_get_octet_string_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
- buf, required_len, &out_len) <= 0) {
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if (required_len != buf_len) {
+ /* Red Hat certified FIPS provider ignores OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT
+ * We may have to perform the conversion manually */
+ if (len2curve_name(required_len) == len2curve_name(buf_len)) {
+ out_len = decompress_pub_key(buf, required_len, buf_len);
+ if (out_len != buf_len) {
+ debug_f("Error decompressing the compressed public key");
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug_f("Unexpected length of uncompressed public key: expected %d, got %d", buf_len, required_len);
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
}
return 0;
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
index 3e0ec6826..007347fc3 100644
--- a/myproposal.h
+++ b/myproposal.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
"sntrup761x25519-sha512," \
"sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com," \
"mlkem768x25519-sha256," \
+ "mlkem768nistp256-sha256," \
+ "mlkem1024nistp384-sha384," \
"curve25519-sha256," \
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
@@ -97,6 +99,8 @@
"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
+ "mlkem768nistp256-sha256," \
+ "mlkem1024nistp384-sha384," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \

987
openssh-10.0-mlkem-nist.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,987 @@
diff --git a/crypto_api.h b/crypto_api.h
index 8bbc3a08a..6940bbf0e 100644
--- a/crypto_api.h
+++ b/crypto_api.h
@@ -58,4 +58,8 @@ int crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk);
#define crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES 1088
#define crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES 32
+#define crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES 1568
+#define crypto_kem_mlkem1024_SECRETKEYBYTES 3168
+#define crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES 1568
+
#endif /* crypto_api_h */
diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
index 36a953ab2..a728e0b38 100644
--- a/kex-names.c
+++ b/kex-names.c
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
#ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
{ KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256, KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256, 0,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ { KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256, KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256, 0,
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ { KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384, KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384, 0,
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
#endif
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
@@ -129,7 +133,9 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+ if ( (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+ || strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0
+ || strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0)
&& !is_mlkem768_available())
continue;
if (ret != NULL)
@@ -163,7 +169,9 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct kexalg *k;
- if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+ if ( (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+ || strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0
+ || strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0)
&& !is_mlkem768_available())
return NULL;
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index ce6a7b818..efaf5749c 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ EVP_PKEY_free(kex->ec_hybrid_client_key);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 48f3bb875..50a461ddb 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
#define KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512 "sntrup761x25519-sha512"
#define KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512_OLD "sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com"
#define KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256 "mlkem768x25519-sha256"
+#define KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256 "mlkem768nistp256-sha256"
+#define KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384 "mlkem1024nistp384-sha384"
#define COMP_NONE 0
#define COMP_DELAYED 2
@@ -110,6 +112,8 @@ enum kex_exchange {
KEX_C25519_SHA256,
KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256,
+ KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256,
+ KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384,
#ifdef GSSAPI
KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
@@ -206,6 +210,9 @@ struct kex {
u_char sntrup761_client_key[crypto_kem_sntrup761_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* KEM */
u_char mlkem768_client_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* KEM */
struct sshbuf *client_pub;
+ /* FIXME */
+ EVP_PKEY *ec_hybrid_client_key; /* NIST hybrids */
+ u_char mlkem1024_client_key[crypto_kem_mlkem1024_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* ML-KEM 1024 + NIST */
};
int kex_name_valid(const char *);
@@ -287,6 +294,18 @@ int kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
int kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
struct sshbuf **);
+int kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(struct kex *);
+int kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **);
+int kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **);
+
+int kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(struct kex *);
+int kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **);
+int kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **);
+
int kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *);
int kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *, BIGNUM *, struct sshbuf *);
diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
index eecdceba2..6e910f84f 100644
--- a/kexgen.c
+++ b/kexgen.c
@@ -139,6 +139,22 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
}
break;
+ case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768nistp256 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(kex);
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem1024nistp384 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(kex);
+ }
+ break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
@@ -230,6 +246,24 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
&shared_secret);
}
break;
+ case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768nistp256 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(kex, server_blob,
+ &shared_secret);
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem1024nistp384 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(kex, server_blob,
+ &shared_secret);
+ }
+ break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
@@ -283,6 +317,8 @@ out:
sizeof(kex->sntrup761_client_key));
explicit_bzero(kex->mlkem768_client_key,
sizeof(kex->mlkem768_client_key));
+ explicit_bzero(kex->mlkem1024_client_key,
+ sizeof(kex->mlkem1024_client_key));
sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
free(signature);
sshbuf_free(tmp);
@@ -369,6 +405,24 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
&server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
}
break;
+ case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768nistp256 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem1024nistp384 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+ }
+ break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
index 670049dcd..463d18771 100644
--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
@@ -53,14 +53,15 @@
#include <stdio.h>
static int
-mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
+mlkem_keypair_gen(const char *algname, unsigned char *pubkeybuf, size_t pubkey_size,
+ unsigned char *privkeybuf, size_t privkey_size)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+ size_t got_pub_size = pubkey_size, got_priv_size = privkey_size;
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, algname, NULL);
if (ctx == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
@@ -72,17 +73,23 @@ mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, NULL, &got_pub_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, NULL, &got_priv_size) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (privkey_size != got_priv_size || pubkey_size != got_pub_size) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
}
- if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
- || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &got_pub_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &got_priv_size) <= 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
}
+
ret = 0;
err:
@@ -94,16 +101,40 @@ mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
}
static int
-mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
+mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
+{
+ return mlkem_keypair_gen("mlkem768", pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
+ privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem1024_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
+{
+ return mlkem_keypair_gen("mlkem1024", pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
+ privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_SECRETKEYBYTES);
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem_encap_secret(const char *mlkem_alg, const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
- secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+ size_t outlen, expected_outlen, publen, secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+
+ if (strcmp(mlkem_alg, "mlkem768") == 0) {
+ outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+ publen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ } else if (strcmp(mlkem_alg, "mlkem1024") == 0) {
+ outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+ publen = crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ } else
+ return r;
- pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
- pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+ expected_outlen = outlen;
+
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, mlkem_alg, NULL,
+ pubkeybuf, publen);
if (pkey == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
@@ -112,9 +143,9 @@ mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
if (ctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &expected_outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
- || outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
+ || outlen != expected_outlen) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
}
@@ -130,16 +161,30 @@ mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
}
static int
-mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
+mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
+{
+ return mlkem_encap_secret("mlkem768", pubkeybuf, secret, out);
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem1024_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
+{
+ return mlkem_encap_secret("mlkem1024", pubkeybuf, secret, out);
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem_decap_secret(const char *algname,
+ const u_char *privkeybuf, size_t privkey_len,
+ const u_char *wrapped, size_t wrapped_len,
+ u_char *secret)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
- secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+ size_t secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
- pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
- privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, algname,
+ NULL, privkeybuf, privkey_len);
if (pkey == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
@@ -148,7 +193,7 @@ mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *s
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
if (ctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrapped_len) <= 0
|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto err;
@@ -165,6 +210,20 @@ mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *s
return r;
}
+static int
+mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
+{
+ return mlkem_decap_secret("mlkem768", privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES,
+ wrapped, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES, secret);
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem1024_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
+{
+ return mlkem_decap_secret("mlkem1024", privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_SECRETKEYBYTES,
+ wrapped, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES, secret);
+}
+
int
kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
{
@@ -341,7 +400,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t need;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
+ struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc;
*server_blobp = NULL;
*shared_secretp = NULL;
@@ -550,6 +609,468 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
return r;
#endif
}
+
+#define NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN 33
+#define NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN 65
+#define NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN 49
+#define NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN 97
+#define NIST_BUF_MAX_SIZE NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN
+
+static const char ec256[] = "P-256";
+static const char ec384[] = "P-384";
+static const char *len2curve_name(size_t len)
+{
+ switch (len) {
+ case NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN:
+ case NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN:
+ return ec256;
+ break;
+ case NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN:
+ case NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN:
+ return ec384;
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *
+buf2nist_key(const unsigned char *pub_key_buf, size_t pub_key_len)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3];
+ const char *curve_name = len2curve_name(pub_key_len);
+
+ if (curve_name == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, curve_name, 0);
+ params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, (void *)pub_key_buf, pub_key_len);
+ params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return pkey;
+
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_nist_shared_key_ext(EVP_PKEY *priv_key,
+ const u_char *pub_key_buf, size_t pub_key_len, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL;
+ size_t shared_secret_len = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_key = buf2nist_key(pub_key_buf, pub_key_len);
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (peer_key == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, priv_key, NULL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto end;
+
+ if ((EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) <= 0)
+ || EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peer_key) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &shared_secret_len) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ shared_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(shared_secret_len);
+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, shared_secret, &shared_secret_len) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, shared_secret, shared_secret_len)) != 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ r = 0;
+
+end:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(peer_key);
+ if (shared_secret)
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(shared_secret, shared_secret_len);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *
+nist_pkey_keygen(size_t pub_key_len)
+{
+ const char *curve_name = len2curve_name(pub_key_len);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+
+ if (curve_name == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL);
+ if (!pctx)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, curve_name, 0);
+ params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(pctx, params) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return pkey;
+}
+
+static int
+get_uncompressed_ec_pubkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+ size_t required_len = 0, out_len = 0;
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT,
+ "uncompressed", 0);
+ params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set_params(pkey, params) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_get_octet_string_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+ NULL, 0, &required_len) <= 0) {
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (required_len != buf_len)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_octet_string_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+ buf, required_len, &out_len) <= 0) {
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+/* nist_bytes_len should always be uncompressed */
+static int
+kex_kem_mlkem_nist_keypair(struct kex *kex, size_t mlkem_bytes_len, size_t nist_bytes_len)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ u_char *cp = NULL;
+ size_t need;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_char *client_key = NULL;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ need = mlkem_bytes_len + nist_bytes_len;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (mlkem_bytes_len == crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
+ client_key = kex->mlkem768_client_key;
+ r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, client_key);
+ }
+
+ if (mlkem_bytes_len == crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
+ client_key = kex->mlkem1024_client_key;
+ r = mlkem1024_keypair_gen(cp, client_key);
+ }
+
+ if (client_key == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key mlkemXXX:", cp, mlkem_bytes_len);
+#endif
+ cp += mlkem_bytes_len;
+ if ((kex->ec_hybrid_client_key = nist_pkey_keygen(nist_bytes_len)) == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = get_uncompressed_ec_pubkey(kex->ec_hybrid_client_key, cp, nist_bytes_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key NIST:", cp, nist_bytes_len);
+#endif
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ kex->client_pub = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_kem_mlkem_nist_enc(struct kex *kex, const char *nist_curve,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ const u_char *client_pub;
+ u_char server_pub[NIST_BUF_MAX_SIZE];
+ u_char enc_out[crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES];
+ u_char secret[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+ EVP_PKEY *server_key = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t client_buf_len, mlkem_buf_len, ecdh_buf_len, server_key_len, enc_out_len;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ *server_blobp = NULL;
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ client_buf_len = sshbuf_len(client_blob);
+ /* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
+ if (strcmp(nist_curve, "P-256") == 0) {
+ if (crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES > client_buf_len)
+ return r;
+
+ ecdh_buf_len = client_buf_len - crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ if (ecdh_buf_len != NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN &&
+ ecdh_buf_len != NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN)
+ return r;
+ mlkem_buf_len = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ enc_out_len = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+ server_key_len = NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN;
+ } else if (strcmp(nist_curve, "P-384") == 0) {
+ if (crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES > client_buf_len)
+ return r;
+
+ ecdh_buf_len = client_buf_len - crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ if (ecdh_buf_len != NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN &&
+ ecdh_buf_len != NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN)
+ return r;
+ mlkem_buf_len = crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ enc_out_len = crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+ server_key_len = NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN;
+ } else
+ return r;
+
+ client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key mlkem:", client_pub, mlkem_buf_len);
+ dump_digest("client public key NIST:", client_pub + mlkem_buf_len, ecdh_buf_len);
+#endif
+
+ /* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+ /* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
+ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = (mlkem_buf_len == crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) ?
+ mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, secret, enc_out) :
+ mlkem1024_encap_secret(client_pub, secret, enc_out);
+
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
+ server_key = nist_pkey_keygen(server_key_len);
+
+ if ((r = get_uncompressed_ec_pubkey(server_key, server_pub, server_key_len) != 0) ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, secret, sizeof(secret))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc_out, enc_out_len) != 0)||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, server_key_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* append ECDH shared key */
+ client_pub += mlkem_buf_len;
+ if ((r = kex_nist_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, ecdh_buf_len, buf)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server public NIST:", server_pub, server_key_len);
+ dump_digest("server cipher text:", enc_out, enc_out_len);
+ dump_digest("server kem key:", secret, sizeof(secret));
+ dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ /* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+ ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *server_blobp = server_blob;
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ server_blob = NULL;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(server_key);
+ explicit_bzero(enc_out, sizeof(enc_out));
+ explicit_bzero(secret, sizeof(secret));
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_kem_mlkem_nist_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp,
+ size_t mlkem_len)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+ int r;
+ size_t nist_len;
+
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) < mlkem_len) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nist_len = sshbuf_len(server_blob) - mlkem_len;
+
+ switch (mlkem_len) {
+ case crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES:
+ if (nist_len != NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN
+ && nist_len != NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ case crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES:
+ if (nist_len != NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN
+ && nist_len != NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
+ server_pub = ciphertext + mlkem_len;
+ /* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, mlkem_len);
+ dump_digest("server public key NIST:", server_pub, nist_len);
+#endif
+ r = (mlkem_len == crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) ?
+ mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap) :
+ mlkem1024_decap_secret(kex->mlkem1024_client_key, ciphertext, decap);
+
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = kex_nist_shared_key_ext(kex->ec_hybrid_client_key, server_pub,
+ nist_len, buf)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
+ hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
+ dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+ ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+ return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_keypair(kex, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN);
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_enc(kex, "P-256", client_blob, server_blobp, shared_secretp);
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_dec(kex, server_blob, shared_secretp,
+ crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+ return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_keypair(kex, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES, NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN);
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_enc(kex, "P-384", client_blob, server_blobp, shared_secretp);
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_dec(kex, server_blob, shared_secretp,
+ crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
+}
+
#else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
int
kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
@@ -571,4 +1092,39 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
{
return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
}
+
+int kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(struct kex *)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(struct kex *)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
#endif /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 58fbac9df..75413ce71 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -2009,6 +2009,8 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
index 09016aead..2baf9a7a0 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
@@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits)
server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key;
server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key;
server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign;
@@ -211,6 +213,8 @@ kex_tests(void)
do_kex("diffie-hellman-group1-sha1");
# ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
do_kex("mlkem768x25519-sha256");
+ do_kex("mlkem768nistp256-sha256");
+ do_kex("mlkem1024nistp384-sha384");
# endif /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
# ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
do_kex("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com");
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
index 9f76ad225..8660088b7 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_client;
ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper);
/*
* do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until
diff --git a/ssh_api.c b/ssh_api.c
index 7bdcee148..d20b03a00 100644
--- a/ssh_api.c
+++ b/ssh_api.c
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key;
ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key;
ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign;
@@ -154,6 +156,8 @@ ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key;
}
*sshp = ssh;
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 5beae1c10..6d9f1238b 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -347,6 +347,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
diff -up openssh-9.9p1-build/openssh-9.9p1/sshd-session.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1-build/openssh-9.9p1/sshd-session.c
--- a/sshd-session.c.xxx 2025-11-03 12:07:44.196167561 +0100
+++ b/sshd-session.c 2025-11-03 12:08:26.809214111 +0100
@@ -1659,6 +1659,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;

131
openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
View File

@ -268,9 +268,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h.xxx openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h
--- openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h.xxx 2025-08-04 15:02:15.895341244 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h 2025-08-04 15:02:54.826304548 +0200
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
+#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
+
#include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
typedef struct {
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx 2025-08-04 14:58:08.908229826 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c 2025-08-04 15:07:59.942477440 +0200
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
#include <vis.h>
#endif
@ -280,75 +295,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
@@ -274,6 +277,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
if (options.gss_keyex) {
- /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
- * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-
- if (options.gss_server_identity) {
- gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
- } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
- gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
- /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
- * and can not use DNS on that socket */
- if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
- free(gss_host);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
+ options.gss_keyex = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
+ match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+
+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+ * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+ free(gss_host);
+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ }
+ } else {
gss_host = xstrdup(host);
}
- } else {
- gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- }
- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
- if (gss) {
- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
- "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-
- /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
- * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
- "%s,null", orig);
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ if (gss) {
+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+
+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "%s,null", orig);
+ }
/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
* client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
@@ -293,7 +299,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
}
}
#endif
gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
+ free(gss_kex_filtered);
+
if (gss) {
debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
@ -393,36 +360,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
/*
* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
* unmounted if desired.
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
--- a/sshd-session.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
+++ b/sshd-session.c 2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
@@ -2506,10 +2513,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
orig = NULL;
- if (options.gss_keyex)
- gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
- else
- gss = NULL;
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
+ options.gss_keyex = 0;
+ } else {
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+ }
+ }
if (gss && orig)
xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200

120
openssh-9.9p1-canonical-match-user.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/auth.c b/auth.c
--- a/auth.c 2025-10-29 09:57:20.440640281 +0100
+++ b/auth.c 2025-10-29 09:57:54.747956792 +0100
@@ -476,8 +476,12 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
u_int i;
ci = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
- ci->user = user;
- ci->user_invalid = getpwnam(user) == NULL;
+ pw = getpwnam(user);
+ if (pw != NULL && options.canonical_match_user)
+ ci->user = pw->pw_name;
+ else
+ ci->user = user;
+ ci->user_invalid = pw == NULL;
parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
log_verbose_reset();
diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
--- a/servconf.c 2025-10-29 09:57:20.502465586 +0100
+++ b/servconf.c 2025-10-29 09:57:54.748205464 +0100
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->unused_connection_timeout = -1;
options->sshd_session_path = NULL;
options->refuse_connection = -1;
+ options->canonical_match_user = -1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
@@ -526,6 +527,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->sshd_session_path = xstrdup(_PATH_SSHD_SESSION);
if (options->refuse_connection == -1)
options->refuse_connection = 0;
+ if (options->canonical_match_user == -1)
+ options->canonical_match_user = 0;
assemble_algorithms(options);
@@ -609,7 +612,7 @@ typedef enum {
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
sRequiredRSASize, sChannelTimeout, sUnusedConnectionTimeout,
- sSshdSessionPath, sRefuseConnection,
+ sSshdSessionPath, sRefuseConnection, sCanonicalMatchUser,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
@@ -798,6 +801,7 @@ static struct {
{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "refuseconnection", sRefuseConnection, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "canonicalmatchuser", sCanonicalMatchUser, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
@@ -2807,6 +2811,11 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
goto parse_multistate;
+ case sCanonicalMatchUser:
+ intptr = &options->canonical_match_user;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
case sDeprecated:
case sIgnore:
case sUnsupported:
@@ -3028,6 +3037,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
M_CP_INTOPT(unused_connection_timeout);
M_CP_INTOPT(refuse_connection);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(canonical_match_user);
/*
* The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
@@ -3368,6 +3378,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sRefuseConnection, o->refuse_connection);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sCanonicalMatchUser, o->canonical_match_user);
/* string arguments */
dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
--- a/servconf.h 2025-10-29 09:57:20.503199202 +0100
+++ b/servconf.h 2025-10-29 09:57:54.749236422 +0100
@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ typedef struct {
char *sshd_session_path;
int refuse_connection;
+
+ int canonical_match_user;
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
--- a/sshd_config.5 2025-10-29 09:57:20.503465608 +0100
+++ b/sshd_config.5 2025-10-29 09:57:54.749544972 +0100
@@ -1384,6 +1384,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
.Cm PubkeyAuthOptions ,
.Cm RefuseConnection ,
+.Cm CanonicalMatchUser ,
.Cm RekeyLimit ,
.Cm RevokedKeys ,
.Cm RDomain ,
@@ -1828,6 +1829,13 @@ are enabled.
This option is only really useful in a
.Cm Match
block.
+.It Cm CanonicalMatchUser
+Some password databases allow users to define aliases for their username.
+This directive indicates that
+.Xr sshd 8
+should attempt to first obtain a canonical username from a password database before evaluating a
+.Cm Match User
+conditional block.
.It Cm RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or received
before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum

42
openssh-9.9p1-fips-gss.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
diff -up openssh-9.9p1-build/openssh-9.9p1/gss-genr.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1-build/openssh-9.9p1/gss-genr.c
--- a/gss-genr.c.xxx 2025-09-01 17:15:41.070677784 +0200
+++ b/gss-genr.c 2025-09-01 17:31:20.376362078 +0200
@@ -149,19 +149,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
(*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX * ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_MD *md5 = NULL; /* Here we don't use MD5 for crypto purposes */
+ unsigned int md_size = sizeof(digest);
deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
- (r = ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2)) != 0 ||
- (r = ssh_digest_update(md,
- gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
- gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
- (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ if ((md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, "MD5", "provider=default,-fips")) == NULL)
+ fatal_fr(r, "MD5 fetch failed");
+ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ EVP_MD_free(md5);
+ fatal_fr(r, "digest ctx failed");
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md5) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, deroid, 2) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+ gss_supported->elements[i].length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, digest, &md_size) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_free(md5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
- ssh_digest_free(md);
- md = NULL;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_free(md5); md5 = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL;
encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)
* 2);

437
openssh-9.9p1-scp-traversing.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/regress/scp3.sh b/regress/scp3.sh
--- a/regress/scp3.sh 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
+++ b/regress/scp3.sh 2025-10-29 16:00:59.815068193 +0100
@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ tid="scp3"
COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
DIR=${COPY}.dd
DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
+DIFFOPT="-rN"
+
+# Figure out if diff does not understand "-N"
+if ! diff -N ${SRC}/scp.sh ${SRC}/scp.sh 2>/dev/null; then
+ DIFFOPT="-r"
+fi
maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd
@@ -63,6 +69,15 @@ for mode in scp sftp ; do
echo b > ${COPY2}
$SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${DATA} hostA:${COPY} hostB:${COPY2}
cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
+
+ # scp /blah/.. is only supported via the sftp protocol.
+ # Original protocol scp just refuses it.
+ test $mode != sftp && continue
+ verbose "$tag: recursive .."
+ forest
+ $SCP $scpopts -r hostA:${DIR}/subdir/.. hostB:${DIR2} || \
+ fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
scpclean
diff --color -ruNp a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
--- a/regress/scp.sh 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
+++ b/regress/scp.sh 2025-10-29 16:00:59.810765653 +0100
@@ -199,6 +199,19 @@ for mode in scp sftp ; do
echo b > ${COPY2}
$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2}
cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
+
+ # scp /blah/.. is only supported via the sftp protocol.
+ # Original protocol scp just refuses it.
+ test $mode != sftp && continue
+ verbose "$tag: recursive local .. to remote dir"
+ forest
+ $SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR}/subdir/.. somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+ verbose "$tag: recursive remote .. to local dir"
+ forest
+ $SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR}/subdir/.. ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
scpclean
diff --color -ruNp a/regress/sftp-cmds.sh b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
--- a/regress/sftp-cmds.sh 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
+++ b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh 2025-10-29 16:00:59.813392901 +0100
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
tid="sftp commands"
+DIFFOPT="-rN"
+# Figure out if diff does not understand "-N"
+if ! diff -N ${SRC}/sftp-cmds.sh ${SRC}/sftp-cmds.sh 2>/dev/null; then
+ DIFFOPT="-r"
+fi
+
# test that these files are readable!
for i in `(cd /bin;echo l*)`
do
@@ -24,207 +30,246 @@ SPACECOPY_ARG="${COPY}\ this\ has\ space
# File with glob metacharacters
GLOBMETACOPY="${COPY} [metachar].txt"
+sftpserver() {
+ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+sftpserver_with_stdout() {
+ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1
+}
+
+forest() {
+ rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ rm -rf ${COPY}.dd2
+ mkdir -p ${COPY}.dd/a ${COPY}.dd/b ${COPY}.dd/c ${COPY}.dd/a/d
+ echo 'A' > ${COPY}.dd/a/A
+ echo 'B' > ${COPY}.dd/a/B
+ echo 'C' > ${COPY}.dd/a/C
+ echo 'D' > ${COPY}.dd/a/D
+}
+
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
mkdir ${COPY}.dd
verbose "$tid: lls"
-printf "lcd ${OBJ}\nlls\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+printf "lcd ${OBJ}\nlls\n" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
grep copy.dd >/dev/null || fail "lls failed"
verbose "$tid: lls w/path"
-echo "lls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+echo "lls ${OBJ}" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
grep copy.dd >/dev/null || fail "lls w/path failed"
verbose "$tid: ls"
-echo "ls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "ls failed"
+echo "ls ${OBJ}" | sftpserver || fail "ls failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: shell"
-echo "!echo hi there" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+echo "!echo hi there" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
egrep '^hi there$' >/dev/null || fail "shell failed"
verbose "$tid: pwd"
-echo "pwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "pwd failed"
+echo "pwd" | sftpserver || fail "pwd failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: lpwd"
-echo "lpwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "lpwd failed"
+echo "lpwd" | sftpserver || fail "lpwd failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: quit"
-echo "quit" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "quit failed"
+echo "quit" | sftpserver || fail "quit failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: help"
-echo "help" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "help failed"
+echo "help" | sftpserver || fail "help failed"
# XXX always successful
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: get"
-echo "get $DATA $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get $DATA $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: get quoted"
-echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
cp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY}
verbose "$tid: get filename with quotes"
-echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get with quotes"
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} ${COPY}
rm -f "$SPACECOPY" ${COPY}
cp $DATA "$SPACECOPY"
verbose "$tid: get filename with spaces"
-echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after get with spaces"
rm -f "$GLOBMETACOPY" ${COPY}
cp $DATA "$GLOBMETACOPY"
verbose "$tid: get filename with glob metacharacters"
-echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "get failed"
+echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} "$GLOBMETACOPY" || \
fail "corrupted copy after get with glob metacharacters"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: get to directory"
-echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob get to directory"
-echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
done
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: get to local dir"
-printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget $DATA\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget $DATA\n" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob get to local dir"
-printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget /bin/l*\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget /bin/l*\n" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
done
+forest
+verbose "$tid: get recursive absolute"
+echo "get -R ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+verbose "$tid: get recursive relative src"
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\n get -R . ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "get failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+verbose "$tid: get relative .."
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd/b\n get -R .. ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "get failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+mkdir ${COPY}.dd2
+verbose "$tid: get recursive relative .."
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd/b\n lcd ${COPY}.dd2\n get -R ..\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "get failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: put"
-echo "put $DATA $COPY" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+echo "put $DATA $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
verbose "$tid: put filename with quotes"
-echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put with quotes"
rm -f "$SPACECOPY"
verbose "$tid: put filename with spaces"
-echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after put with spaces"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: put to directory"
-echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "put failed"
+echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob put to directory"
-echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "put failed"
+echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
done
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: put to local dir"
-printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput $DATA\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "put failed"
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput $DATA\n" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob put to local dir"
-printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput /bin/l*\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "put failed"
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput /bin/l*\n" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
done
+forest
+verbose "$tid: put recursive absolute"
+echo "put -R ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+verbose "$tid: put recursive relative src"
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\n put -R . ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "put failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+verbose "$tid: put recursive .."
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd/b\n put -R .. ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "put failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+mkdir ${COPY}.dd2
+verbose "$tid: put recursive .. relative"
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd/b\n cd ${COPY}.dd2\n put -R ..\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "put failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
verbose "$tid: rename"
-echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "rename failed"
+echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | sftpserver || fail "rename failed"
test -f ${COPY}.1 || fail "missing file after rename"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted copy after rename"
verbose "$tid: rename directory"
-echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd2
+echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || \
fail "rename directory failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd && fail "oldname exists after rename directory"
test -d ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "missing newname after rename directory"
verbose "$tid: ln"
-echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln failed"
+echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "ln failed"
test -f ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln"
cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after ln"
verbose "$tid: ln -s"
rm -f ${COPY}.2
-echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln -s failed"
+echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "ln -s failed"
test -h ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln -s"
verbose "$tid: cp"
rm -f ${COPY}.2
-echo "cp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "cp failed"
+echo "cp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "cp failed"
cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after cp"
verbose "$tid: mkdir"
-echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "mkdir failed"
+echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "mkdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after mkdir"
# XXX do more here
verbose "$tid: chdir"
-echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "chdir failed"
+echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "chdir failed"
verbose "$tid: rmdir"
-echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "rmdir failed"
+echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "rmdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.1 && fail "present directory after rmdir"
verbose "$tid: lmkdir"
-echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "lmkdir failed"
+echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "lmkdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after lmkdir"
# XXX do more here
verbose "$tid: lchdir"
-echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "lchdir failed"
+echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "lchdir failed"
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
rm -rf ${QUOTECOPY} "$SPACECOPY" "$GLOBMETACOPY"
diff --color -ruNp a/scp.c b/scp.c
--- a/scp.c 2025-10-29 15:49:51.795813258 +0100
+++ b/scp.c 2025-10-29 16:00:59.817393000 +0100
@@ -1362,6 +1362,10 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+ /* Special handling for source of '..' */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ filename = "."; /* Upload to dest, not dest/.. */
+
/*
* No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
* the expansions
@@ -1635,6 +1639,10 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
goto out;
}
+ /* Special handling for destination of '..' */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */
+
if (dst_is_dir)
abs_dst = sftp_path_append(dst, filename);
else
diff --color -ruNp a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
--- a/sftp.c 2025-10-29 15:49:51.796907436 +0100
+++ b/sftp.c 2025-10-29 16:00:59.819803948 +0100
@@ -687,6 +687,10 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
goto out;
}
+ /* Special handling for dest of '..' */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */
+
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
if (local_is_dir(dst)) {
abs_dst = sftp_path_append(dst, filename);
@@ -781,6 +785,9 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
err = -1;
goto out;
}
+ /* Special handling for source of '..' */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ filename = "."; /* Upload to dest, not dest/.. */
free(abs_dst);
abs_dst = NULL;

122
openssh-9.9p1-sshd-no-delegate-credentials.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
index 5c0491cf1..e2c501d0c 100644
--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
@@ -509,6 +509,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
int
ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
{
+ if (options.gss_deleg_creds == 0) {
+ debug_f("delegate credential is disabled, doing nothing");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
} else
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index aab653244..02a9888c9 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->gss_authentication=-1;
options->gss_keyex = -1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
@@ -403,6 +404,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->gss_keyex = 0;
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
@@ -598,7 +601,8 @@ typedef enum {
sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssDelegateCreds,
+ sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
@@ -690,6 +694,7 @@ static struct {
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", sGssDelegateCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -700,6 +705,7 @@ static struct {
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1713,6 +1719,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sGssDelegateCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case sGssStrictAcceptor:
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -3359,6 +3369,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 7c41df417..6bfdf6305 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ typedef struct {
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* If true, accept delegated GSS credentials */
int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
int gss_store_rekey;
char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
index 49349bb30..e798f4df5 100644
--- a/sshd_config.0
+++ b/sshd_config.0
@@ -453,6 +453,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
cache on logout. The default is yes.
+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Accept delegated credentials on the server side. The default is yes.
+
GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI
acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to yes then the
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 90ab87edd..8c677bfd0 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -733,6 +733,9 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+Accept delegated credentials on the server side. The default is
+.CM yes .
.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
access control. Further details are described in

107
openssh.spec
View File

@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
Name: openssh
Version: %{openssh_ver}
Release: 14%{?dist}.alma.1
Release: 23%{?dist}.alma.1
URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
@ -214,23 +214,33 @@ Patch1025: openssh-9.9p1-non-supported-keys-err-msg.patch
Patch1026: openssh-9.9p1-bad-hostkey.patch
# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/500
Patch1027: openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
#
Patch1028: openssh-9.9p1-fips-gss.patch
#upstream 6432b9f6a216d0f5fb43df500e9bc30bebb3f58b
#upstream 4f14ca8633a2c8c0a1a19165663421f0ab32f6ab
Patch1029: openssh-9.9p1-scp-traversing.patch
Patch1030: openssh-9.9p1-canonical-match-user.patch
Patch1031: openssh-10.0-mlkem-nist.patch
# upstream 35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043
Patch1028: openssh-9.9p1-reject-cntrl-chars-in-username.patch
Patch1032: openssh-9.9p1-reject-cntrl-chars-in-username.patch
# upstream 43b3bff47bb029f2299bacb6a36057981b39fdb0
Patch1029: openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch
Patch1033: openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch
Patch1034: openssh-9.9p1-sshd-no-delegate-credentials.patch
Patch1035: openssh-10.0-mlkem-nist-fips.patch
# upstream 487e8ac146f7d6616f65c125d5edb210519b833a
Patch1030: openssh-9.9p1-scp-clear-setuid.patch
Patch1036: openssh-9.9p1-scp-clear-setuid.patch
# upstream c805b97b67c774e0bf922ffb29dfbcda9d7b5add
Patch1031: openssh-9.9p1-mux-askpass-check.patch
Patch1037: openssh-9.9p1-mux-askpass-check.patch
# upstream fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa
Patch1032: openssh-9.9p1-ecdsa-incomplete-application.patch
Patch1038: openssh-9.9p1-ecdsa-incomplete-application.patch
# upstream fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa
Patch1033: openssh-9.9p1-authorized-keys-principles-option.patch
Patch1039: openssh-9.9p1-authorized-keys-principles-option.patch
# upstream 76685c9b09a66435cd2ad8373246adf1c53976d3
# upstream 0a0ef4515361143cad21afa072319823854c1cf6
# upstream 607bd871ec029e9aa22e632a22547250f3cae223
# upstream 1340d3fa8e4bb122906a82159c4c9b91584d65ce
Patch1034: openssh-9.9p1-proxyjump-username-validity-checks.patch
Patch1040: openssh-9.9p1-proxyjump-username-validity-checks.patch
License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
Requires: /sbin/nologin
@ -423,13 +433,19 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
%patch -P 1025 -p1 -b .non-supported-keys-err-msg
%patch -P 1026 -p1 -b .bad-hostkey
%patch -P 1027 -p1 -b .gss-indicators
%patch -P 1028 -p1 -b .reject-cntrl-chars-in-username
%patch -P 1029 -p1 -b .reject-null-char-in-url-string
%patch -P 1030 -p1 -b .scp-clear-setuid
%patch -P 1031 -p1 -b .mux-askpass-check
%patch -P 1032 -p1 -b .ecdsa-incomplete-application
%patch -P 1033 -p1 -b .authorized-keys-principles-option
%patch -P 1034 -p1 -b .proxyjump-username-validity-checks
%patch -P 1028 -p1 -b .gss-fips
%patch -P 1029 -p1 -b .scp-traversing
%patch -P 1030 -p1 -b .canonical-match-user
%patch -P 1031 -p1 -b .mlkem-nist
%patch -P 1032 -p1 -b .reject-cntrl-chars-in-username
%patch -P 1033 -p1 -b .reject-null-char-in-url-string
%patch -P 1034 -p1 -b .sshd-nogsscreds
%patch -P 1035 -p1 -b .mlkem-nist-fips
%patch -P 1036 -p1 -b .scp-clear-setuid
%patch -P 1037 -p1 -b .mux-askpass-check
%patch -P 1038 -p1 -b .ecdsa-incomplete-application
%patch -P 1039 -p1 -b .authorized-keys-principles-option
%patch -P 1040 -p1 -b .proxyjump-username-validity-checks
%patch -P 100 -p1 -b .coverity
@ -710,35 +726,72 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/sshtest/sk-dummy.so
%changelog
* Mon May 04 2026 Koichiro Iwao <meta@almalinux.org> - 9.9p1-14.alma.1
* Wed May 20 2026 Koichiro Iwao <meta@almalinux.org> - 9.9p1-23.alma.1
- Unpatch Red Hat help message
* Mon Apr 13 2026 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-14
* Mon Apr 13 2026 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-23
- CVE-2026-35385: Fix privilege escalation via scp legacy protocol
when not in preserving file mode
Resolves: RHEL-164738
Resolves: RHEL-164739
- CVE-2026-35388: Add connection multiplexing confirmation for proxy-mode
multiplexing sessions
Resolves: RHEL-166237
Resolves: RHEL-166238
- CVE-2026-35387: Fix incomplete application of PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
and HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms with regard to ECDSA keys
Resolves: RHEL-166221
Resolves: RHEL-166222
- CVE-2026-35414: Fix mishandling of authorized_keys principals option
Resolves: RHEL-166189
Resolves: RHEL-166190
- CVE-2026-35386: Add validation rules to usernames and hostnames
set for ProxyJump/-J on the commandline
Resolves: RHEL-166205
Resolves: RHEL-166206
* Mon Mar 16 2026 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-13
* Thu Mar 26 2026 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-22
- Version bump
* Mon Mar 16 2026 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-21
- CVE-2026-3497: Fix information disclosure or denial of service due
to uninitialized variables in gssapi-keyex
Resolves: RHEL-155811
Resolves: RHEL-155812
* Mon Dec 08 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-12
* Wed Feb 25 2026 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-20
- Provide a way to skip unsupported ML-KEM hybrid algorithms in FIPS mode
Resolves: RHEL-151579
* Thu Dec 11 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-19
- Support of hybrid MLKEM key exchange methods in FIPS mode
Resolves: RHEL-125929
* Fri Dec 05 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-18
- Adding a mechanism to disable GSSAPIDelegateCredentials in sshd_config
Resolves: RHEL-5281
* Fri Dec 05 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-17
- CVE-2025-61984: Reject usernames with control characters
Resolves: RHEL-128397
Resolves: RHEL-128399
- CVE-2025-61985: Reject URL-strings with NULL characters
Resolves: RHEL-128387
Resolves: RHEL-128388
* Mon Nov 03 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-16
- Implement mlkem768nistp256-sha256 and mlkem1024nistp384-sha384 KEX methods
Resolves: RHEL-70824
* Mon Oct 27 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-15
- Fix implicit destination path selection when source path ends with ".."
Resolves: RHEL-118406
- Canonicalize username when matching a user
Resolves: RHEL-101440
* Mon Sep 15 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-14
- Relax GSS Kex restriction in FIPS mode
Resolves: RHEL-91181
* Mon Sep 01 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-13
- Allow non-cryptographical use of MD5 in GSS Kex in FIPS mode
Related: RHEL-91181
* Mon Aug 04 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-12
- Relax GSS Kex restriction in FIPS mode
Resolves: RHEL-91181
* Fri Jul 18 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-11
- Move the redhat help message to debug1 log level