Remove unnecessary files
This commit is contained in:
Jan F. Chadima
parent
3fdf10cdb4
commit
395eb16df8
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -1,446 +0,0 @@
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diff -up openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.mls openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac
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--- openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.mls 2010-03-01 15:24:27.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac 2010-03-01 15:24:28.000000000 +0100
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@@ -3360,6 +3360,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
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SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
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LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
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AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
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+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setkeycreatecon)
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LIBS="$save_LIBS"
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fi ]
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)
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diff -up openssh-5.4p1/misc.c.mls openssh-5.4p1/misc.c
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--- openssh-5.4p1/misc.c.mls 2010-01-10 00:31:12.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-5.4p1/misc.c 2010-03-01 15:24:28.000000000 +0100
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@@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ char *
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colon(char *cp)
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{
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int flag = 0;
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+ int start = 1;
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if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
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return (0);
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@@ -436,8 +437,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
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return (cp+1);
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if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
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return (cp);
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- if (*cp == '/')
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- return (0);
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+ if (start) {
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+ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
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+ if (*cp == '/')
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+ return (0);
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+ if (*cp != '.')
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+ start = 0;
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+ }
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}
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return (0);
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}
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diff -up openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
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--- openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls 2010-03-01 15:24:27.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2010-03-01 15:25:50.000000000 +0100
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@@ -35,13 +35,24 @@
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#include "key.h"
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#include "hostfile.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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+#include "xmalloc.h"
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#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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#include <selinux/selinux.h>
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#include <selinux/flask.h>
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+#include <selinux/context.h>
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#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
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+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
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+#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
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+
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+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
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+#include <libaudit.h>
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+#include <unistd.h>
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+#endif
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extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
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+extern int inetd_flag;
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+extern int rexeced_flag;
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/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
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int
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@@ -57,17 +68,173 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
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return (enabled);
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}
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+/* Send audit message */
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+static int
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+send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
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+ security_context_t selected_context)
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+{
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+ int rc=0;
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+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
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+ char *msg = NULL;
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+ int audit_fd = audit_open();
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+ security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
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+ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
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+ rc = -1;
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+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
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+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
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+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
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+ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
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+ error("Error connecting to audit system.");
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+ return rc;
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+ }
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+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
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+ error("Error translating default context.");
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+ default_raw = NULL;
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+ }
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+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
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+ error("Error translating selected context.");
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+ selected_raw = NULL;
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+ }
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+ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
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+ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
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+ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
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+ error("Error allocating memory.");
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
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+ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
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+ error("Error sending audit message.");
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ rc = 0;
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+ out:
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+ free(msg);
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+ freecon(default_raw);
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+ freecon(selected_raw);
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+ close(audit_fd);
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+#endif
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+ return rc;
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+}
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+
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+static int
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+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
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+{
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+ struct av_decision avd;
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+ int retval;
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+ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
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+
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+ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
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+ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
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+ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ return 1;
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+}
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+
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+static int
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+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
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+ security_context_t *sc) {
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+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
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+ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
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+ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his
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+ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
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+ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
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+#endif
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+ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
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+ *sc = NULL;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
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+ context_t con;
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+ char *type=NULL;
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+ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
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+ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
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+ role);
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ con = context_new(*sc);
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+ if (!con) {
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ context_role_set(con, role);
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+ context_type_set(con, type);
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+ freecon(*sc);
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+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
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+ context_free(con);
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+ if (!*sc)
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
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+ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
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+ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */
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+ context_t con;
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+ security_context_t obtained_raw;
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+ security_context_t requested_raw;
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+ con = context_new(*sc);
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+ if (!con) {
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ context_range_set(con, lvl);
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+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
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+ context_free(con);
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
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+ freecon(obtained_raw);
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+ context_free(con);
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+
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+ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
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+ obtained_raw, requested_raw);
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+ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
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+ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
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+ freecon(requested_raw);
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+ freecon(obtained_raw);
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+ freecon(*sc);
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+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
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+ context_free(con);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+ freecon(requested_raw);
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+ freecon(obtained_raw);
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+ context_free(con);
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ return 0;
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+ out:
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+ freecon(*sc);
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+ *sc = NULL;
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+ return -1;
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+}
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+
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/* Return the default security context for the given username */
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-static security_context_t
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-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
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+static int
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+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
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+ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
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{
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- security_context_t sc = NULL;
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char *sename, *lvl;
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+ const char *reqlvl = NULL;
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char *role = NULL;
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- int r = 0;
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+ int r = -1;
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+ context_t con = NULL;
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+
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+ *default_sc = NULL;
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+ *user_sc = NULL;
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+ if (the_authctxt) {
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+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
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+ char *slash;
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+ role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
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+ if ((slash = strchr(role, '/')) != NULL) {
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+ *slash = '\0';
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+ reqlvl = slash + 1;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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- if (the_authctxt)
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- role=the_authctxt->role;
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#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
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if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
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sename = NULL;
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@@ -75,38 +242,63 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
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}
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#else
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sename = pwname;
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- lvl = NULL;
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+ lvl = "";
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#endif
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if (r == 0) {
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#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
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- if (role != NULL && role[0])
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- r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc);
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- else
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- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
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+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
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#else
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- if (role != NULL && role[0])
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- r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
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- else
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- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
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+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
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#endif
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}
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- if (r != 0) {
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- switch (security_getenforce()) {
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- case -1:
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- fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
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- "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
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- case 0:
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- error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
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- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
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- break;
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- default:
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- fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
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- "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
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- __func__, pwname);
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+ if (r == 0) {
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+ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
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+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
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+ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
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+
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+ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
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+ fatal("failed to allocate security context");
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+
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+ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
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+ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
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+ reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
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+ freecon(sshdsc);
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+ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
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+ /* we actually don't change level */
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+ reqlvl = "";
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+
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+ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
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+ }
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+
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+ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
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+ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
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+
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+ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
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+ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
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+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
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+ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
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+ default_level_sc = *default_sc;
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+ }
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+ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
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+ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
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+ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
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+ } else {
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+ r = -1;
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+ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
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+ }
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+ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
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+ freecon(default_level_sc);
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+ }
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+ } else {
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+ *user_sc = *default_sc;
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}
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}
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+ if (r != 0) {
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+ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
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+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
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+ }
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#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
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if (sename != NULL)
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@@ -114,14 +306,20 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
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if (lvl != NULL)
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xfree(lvl);
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#endif
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+ if (role != NULL)
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+ xfree(role);
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+ if (con)
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+ context_free(con);
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- return (sc);
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+ return (r);
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}
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/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
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void
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ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
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{
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+ int r = 0;
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+ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
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security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
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if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
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@@ -129,22 +327,45 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn
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debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
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- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
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- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
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+ r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
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+ if (r >= 0) {
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+ r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
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+ if (r < 0) {
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+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
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+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
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+ }
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+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
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+ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
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+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
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+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ }
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+ if (user_ctx == NULL) {
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+ user_ctx = default_ctx;
|
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+ }
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+ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
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+ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
|
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+ a failure */
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+ send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
|
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+ }
|
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+ if (r < 0) {
|
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switch (security_getenforce()) {
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case -1:
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fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
|
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case 0:
|
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- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
|
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- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
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+ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
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+ __func__);
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break;
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default:
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- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
|
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- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
|
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+ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
|
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+ __func__);
|
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}
|
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}
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- if (user_ctx != NULL)
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+ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
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freecon(user_ctx);
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+ if (default_ctx != NULL)
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+ freecon(default_ctx);
|
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|
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debug3("%s: done", __func__);
|
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}
|
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@@ -162,7 +383,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
|
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|
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debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
|
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|
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- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
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+ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) {
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+ error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
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+ goto out;
|
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+ }
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/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
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diff -up openssh-5.4p1/session.c.mls openssh-5.4p1/session.c
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--- openssh-5.4p1/session.c.mls 2010-01-12 09:51:48.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-5.4p1/session.c 2010-03-01 15:24:28.000000000 +0100
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@@ -1559,10 +1559,6 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
|
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|
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if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
|
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fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
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-
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-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
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-#endif
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}
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static void
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diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c.mls openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c
|
||||
--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c.mls 2010-03-01 15:24:27.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c 2010-03-01 15:24:28.000000000 +0100
|
||||
@@ -1987,6 +1987,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
|
||||
restore_uid();
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
||||
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
||||
if (options.use_pam) {
|
||||
do_pam_setcred(1);
|
||||
@ -1,384 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.pka openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
|
||||
--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.pka 2010-03-09 08:01:05.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2010-03-09 08:07:15.000000000 +0100
|
||||
@@ -187,27 +187,15 @@ done:
|
||||
|
||||
/* return 1 if user allows given key */
|
||||
static int
|
||||
-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
|
||||
+user_search_key_in_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
|
||||
const char *reason;
|
||||
int found_key = 0;
|
||||
- FILE *f;
|
||||
u_long linenum = 0;
|
||||
Key *found;
|
||||
char *fp;
|
||||
|
||||
- /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
|
||||
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- debug("trying public key file %s", file);
|
||||
- f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (!f) {
|
||||
- restore_uid();
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
found_key = 0;
|
||||
found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -278,8 +266,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
- restore_uid();
|
||||
- fclose(f);
|
||||
key_free(found);
|
||||
if (!found_key)
|
||||
debug2("key not found");
|
||||
@@ -327,13 +313,153 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
|
||||
+/* return 1 if user allows given key */
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ FILE *f;
|
||||
+ int found_key = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
|
||||
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ debug("trying public key file %s", file);
|
||||
+ f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (f) {
|
||||
+ found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, file, key, pw);
|
||||
+ fclose(f);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ restore_uid();
|
||||
+ return found_key;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/* return 1 if user allows given key */
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+user_key_via_agent_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ FILE *f;
|
||||
+ int found_key = 0;
|
||||
+ char *pubkey_agent_string = NULL;
|
||||
+ char *tmp_pubkey_agent_string = NULL;
|
||||
+ char *progname;
|
||||
+ char *cp;
|
||||
+ struct passwd *runas_pw;
|
||||
+ struct stat st;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (options.pubkey_agent == NULL || options.pubkey_agent[0] != '/')
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* get the run as identity from config */
|
||||
+ runas_pw = (options.pubkey_agent_runas == NULL)? pw
|
||||
+ : getpwnam (options.pubkey_agent_runas);
|
||||
+ if (!runas_pw) {
|
||||
+ error("%s: getpwnam(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
|
||||
+ options.pubkey_agent_runas, strerror(errno));
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Temporarily use the specified uid. */
|
||||
+ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0)
|
||||
+ temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pubkey_agent_string = percent_expand(options.pubkey_agent,
|
||||
+ "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Test whether agent can be modified by non root user */
|
||||
+ tmp_pubkey_agent_string = xstrdup (pubkey_agent_string);
|
||||
+ progname = strtok (tmp_pubkey_agent_string, WHITESPACE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ debug3("%s: checking program '%s'", __func__, progname);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (stat (progname, &st) < 0) {
|
||||
+ error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
|
||||
+ progname, strerror(errno));
|
||||
+ goto go_away;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
|
||||
+ error("bad ownership or modes for pubkey agent \"%s\"",
|
||||
+ progname);
|
||||
+ goto go_away;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
|
||||
+ error("pubkey agent \"%s\" is not a regular file",
|
||||
+ progname);
|
||||
+ goto go_away;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
|
||||
+ * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ do {
|
||||
+ if ((cp = strrchr(progname, '/')) == NULL)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ *cp = '\0';
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ debug3("%s: checking component '%s'", __func__, progname);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (stat(progname, &st) != 0) {
|
||||
+ error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
|
||||
+ progname, strerror(errno));
|
||||
+ goto go_away;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
|
||||
+ error("bad ownership or modes for pubkey agent path component \"%s\"",
|
||||
+ progname);
|
||||
+ goto go_away;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
|
||||
+ error("pubkey agent path component \"%s\" is not a directory",
|
||||
+ progname);
|
||||
+ goto go_away;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ } while (0);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* open the pipe and read the keys */
|
||||
+ f = popen (pubkey_agent_string, "r");
|
||||
+ if (!f) {
|
||||
+ error("%s: popen (\"%s\", \"r\"): %s", __func__,
|
||||
+ pubkey_agent_string, strerror (errno));
|
||||
+ goto go_away;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, options.pubkey_agent, key, pw);
|
||||
+ pclose (f);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+go_away:
|
||||
+ if (tmp_pubkey_agent_string)
|
||||
+ xfree (tmp_pubkey_agent_string);
|
||||
+ if (pubkey_agent_string)
|
||||
+ xfree (pubkey_agent_string);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0)
|
||||
+ restore_uid();
|
||||
+ return found_key;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/* check whether given key is in <pkey_agent or .ssh/authorized_keys* */
|
||||
int
|
||||
user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int success;
|
||||
char *file;
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT
|
||||
+ success = user_key_via_agent_allowed2(pw, key);
|
||||
+ if (success >= 0)
|
||||
+ return success;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
|
||||
diff -up openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.pka openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac
|
||||
--- openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.pka 2010-03-09 08:01:04.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac 2010-03-09 08:01:05.000000000 +0100
|
||||
@@ -1323,6 +1323,18 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
|
||||
esac ]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
+# Check whether user wants pubkey agent support
|
||||
+PKA_MSG="no"
|
||||
+AC_ARG_WITH(pka,
|
||||
+ [ --with-pka Enable pubkey agent support],
|
||||
+ [
|
||||
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
|
||||
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT], 1, [Enable pubkey agent support])
|
||||
+ PKA_MSG="yes"
|
||||
+ fi
|
||||
+ ]
|
||||
+)
|
||||
+
|
||||
dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
|
||||
AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \
|
||||
arc4random \
|
||||
@@ -4206,6 +4218,7 @@ echo " Linux audit support
|
||||
echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
|
||||
echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
|
||||
echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
|
||||
+echo " PKA support: $PKA_MSG"
|
||||
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
|
||||
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
|
||||
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
|
||||
diff -up openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c.pka openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c
|
||||
--- openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c.pka 2010-03-09 08:01:04.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c 2010-03-09 09:04:57.000000000 +0100
|
||||
@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
|
||||
options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
|
||||
options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
|
||||
options->chroot_directory = NULL;
|
||||
+ options->pubkey_agent = NULL;
|
||||
+ options->pubkey_agent_runas = NULL;
|
||||
options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
|
||||
options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
|
||||
options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -315,6 +317,7 @@ typedef enum {
|
||||
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
|
||||
sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
|
||||
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys,
|
||||
+ sPubkeyAgent, sPubkeyAgentRunAs,
|
||||
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
|
||||
} ServerOpCodes;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -437,6 +440,13 @@ static struct {
|
||||
{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
||||
{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
||||
{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
||||
+#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT
|
||||
+ { "pubkeyagent", sPubkeyAgent, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
||||
+ { "pubkeyagentrunas", sPubkeyAgentRunAs, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ { "pubkeyagent", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
||||
+ { "pubkeyagentrunas", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1345,6 +1355,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
|
||||
charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file;
|
||||
goto parse_filename;
|
||||
|
||||
+ case sPubkeyAgent:
|
||||
+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
|
||||
+ if (*activep && options->pubkey_agent == NULL)
|
||||
+ options->pubkey_agent = xstrdup(cp + len);
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ case sPubkeyAgentRunAs:
|
||||
+ charptr = &options->pubkey_agent_runas;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
|
||||
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
|
||||
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
case sDeprecated:
|
||||
logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
|
||||
filename, linenum, arg);
|
||||
@@ -1438,6 +1462,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
|
||||
M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
|
||||
M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication);
|
||||
M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
|
||||
+ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_agent);
|
||||
+ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_agent_runas);
|
||||
M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
|
||||
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
|
||||
M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
|
||||
@@ -1683,6 +1709,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
|
||||
dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
|
||||
dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
|
||||
dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
|
||||
+ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAgent, o->pubkey_agent);
|
||||
+ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAgentRunAs, o->pubkey_agent_runas);
|
||||
|
||||
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
|
||||
dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
|
||||
diff -up openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h.pka openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h
|
||||
--- openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h.pka 2010-03-09 08:01:04.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h 2010-03-09 09:05:29.000000000 +0100
|
||||
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
char *chroot_directory;
|
||||
char *revoked_keys_file;
|
||||
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
|
||||
+ char *pubkey_agent;
|
||||
+ char *pubkey_agent_runas;
|
||||
} ServerOptions;
|
||||
|
||||
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
|
||||
diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0.pka openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0
|
||||
--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0.pka 2010-03-09 08:01:04.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0 2010-03-09 09:07:35.000000000 +0100
|
||||
@@ -352,7 +352,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
|
||||
KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication,
|
||||
MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication,
|
||||
PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin,
|
||||
- PubkeyAuthentication, RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication,
|
||||
+ PubkeyAuthentication, PubkeyAgent, PubkeyAgentRunAs,
|
||||
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication,
|
||||
X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost.
|
||||
|
||||
MaxAuthTries
|
||||
@@ -467,6 +468,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
|
||||
this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be
|
||||
refused for all users.
|
||||
|
||||
+ PubkeyAgent
|
||||
+ Specifies which agent is used for lookup of the user's public
|
||||
+ keys. Empty string means to use the authorized_keys file. By
|
||||
+ default there is no PubkeyAgent set. Note that this option has
|
||||
+ an effect only with PubkeyAuthentication switched on.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ PubkeyAgentRunAs
|
||||
+ Specifies the user under whose account the PubkeyAgent is run.
|
||||
+ Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized
|
||||
+ is used.
|
||||
+
|
||||
RhostsRSAAuthentication
|
||||
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication to-
|
||||
gether with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The
|
||||
diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5.pka openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5
|
||||
--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5.pka 2010-03-09 08:01:04.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5 2010-03-09 09:06:40.000000000 +0100
|
||||
@@ -618,6 +618,9 @@ Available keywords are
|
||||
.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
|
||||
.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
|
||||
.Cm MaxSessions ,
|
||||
+.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
|
||||
+.Cm PubkeyAgent ,
|
||||
+.Cm PubkeyAgentRunAs ,
|
||||
.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
|
||||
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
|
||||
.Cm PermitOpen ,
|
||||
@@ -819,6 +822,16 @@ Specifies a list of revoked public keys.
|
||||
Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
|
||||
Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
|
||||
be refused for all users.
|
||||
++.It Cm PubkeyAgent
|
||||
++Specifies which agent is used for lookup of the user's public
|
||||
++keys. Empty string means to use the authorized_keys file.
|
||||
++By default there is no PubkeyAgent set.
|
||||
++Note that this option has an effect only with PubkeyAuthentication
|
||||
++switched on.
|
||||
++.It Cm PubkeyAgentRunAs
|
||||
++Specifies the user under whose account the PubkeyAgent is run. Empty
|
||||
++string (the default value) means the user being authorized is used.
|
||||
++.Dq
|
||||
.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
|
||||
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
|
||||
with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.
|
||||
diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.pka openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config
|
||||
--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.pka 2010-03-09 08:01:04.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config 2010-03-09 08:01:06.000000000 +0100
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
|
||||
#RSAAuthentication yes
|
||||
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
|
||||
#AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
|
||||
+#PubkeyAgent none
|
||||
+#PubkeyAgentRunAs nobody
|
||||
|
||||
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
|
||||
#RhostsRSAAuthentication no
|
||||
@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up openssh-5.5p1/session.c.stderr openssh-5.5p1/session.c
|
||||
--- openssh-5.5p1/session.c.stderr 2010-04-26 10:35:35.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssh-5.5p1/session.c 2010-04-26 10:41:11.000000000 +0200
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
|
||||
#include <arpa/inet.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
+#include <fcntl.h>
|
||||
#include <grp.h>
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
|
||||
#include <paths.h>
|
||||
@@ -447,6 +448,9 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
|
||||
#ifdef USE_PIPES
|
||||
int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (s == NULL)
|
||||
+ fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
|
||||
if (pipe(pin) < 0) {
|
||||
error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
@@ -458,33 +462,59 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
|
||||
close(pin[1]);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (pipe(perr) < 0) {
|
||||
- error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
- close(pin[0]);
|
||||
- close(pin[1]);
|
||||
- close(pout[0]);
|
||||
- close(pout[1]);
|
||||
- return -1;
|
||||
+ if (s->is_subsystem) {
|
||||
+ if ((perr[1] = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) {
|
||||
+ error("%s: open(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
|
||||
+ strerror(errno));
|
||||
+ close(pin[0]);
|
||||
+ close(pin[1]);
|
||||
+ close(pout[0]);
|
||||
+ close(pout[1]);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ perr[0] = -1;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ if (pipe(perr) < 0) {
|
||||
+ error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__,
|
||||
+ strerror(errno));
|
||||
+ close(pin[0]);
|
||||
+ close(pin[1]);
|
||||
+ close(pout[0]);
|
||||
+ close(pout[1]);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
int inout[2], err[2];
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (s == NULL)
|
||||
+ fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
|
||||
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) {
|
||||
error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) {
|
||||
- error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
- close(inout[0]);
|
||||
- close(inout[1]);
|
||||
- return -1;
|
||||
+ if (s->is_subsystem) {
|
||||
+ if ((err[0] = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) {
|
||||
+ error("%s: open(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
|
||||
+ strerror(errno));
|
||||
+ close(inout[0]);
|
||||
+ close(inout[1]);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ err[1] = -1;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) {
|
||||
+ error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__,
|
||||
+ strerror(errno));
|
||||
+ close(inout[0]);
|
||||
+ close(inout[1]);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
- if (s == NULL)
|
||||
- fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
|
||||
-
|
||||
session_proctitle(s);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Fork the child. */
|
||||
@@ -496,13 +526,15 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
|
||||
close(pin[1]);
|
||||
close(pout[0]);
|
||||
close(pout[1]);
|
||||
- close(perr[0]);
|
||||
+ if (perr[0] != -1)
|
||||
+ close(perr[0]);
|
||||
close(perr[1]);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
close(inout[0]);
|
||||
close(inout[1]);
|
||||
close(err[0]);
|
||||
- close(err[1]);
|
||||
+ if (err[1] != -1)
|
||||
+ close(err[1]);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
case 0:
|
||||
@@ -536,7 +568,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
|
||||
close(pout[1]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Redirect stderr. */
|
||||
- close(perr[0]);
|
||||
+ if (perr[0] != -1)
|
||||
+ close(perr[0]);
|
||||
if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0)
|
||||
perror("dup2 stderr");
|
||||
close(perr[1]);
|
||||
@@ -547,7 +580,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
|
||||
* seem to depend on it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
close(inout[1]);
|
||||
- close(err[1]);
|
||||
+ if (err[1] != -1)
|
||||
+ close(err[1]);
|
||||
if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */
|
||||
perror("dup2 stdin");
|
||||
if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
|
||||
@@ -595,10 +629,6 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
|
||||
close(perr[1]);
|
||||
|
||||
if (compat20) {
|
||||
- if (s->is_subsystem) {
|
||||
- close(perr[0]);
|
||||
- perr[0] = -1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], 0);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Enter the interactive session. */
|
||||
@@ -615,10 +645,7 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
|
||||
* handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (compat20) {
|
||||
- session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1],
|
||||
- s->is_subsystem ? -1 : err[1], 0);
|
||||
- if (s->is_subsystem)
|
||||
- close(err[1]);
|
||||
+ session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1], 0);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
|
||||
/* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user