Rebase OpenSSH to 9.8p1

Resolves: RHEL-42635
2024-07-25 12:54:19 +02:00 · 2024-07-25 12:54:19 +02:00 · 089d798931
commit 089d798931
parent 9195080dcb
32 changed files with 2483 additions and 690 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -60,3 +60,5 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz.asc
 /openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@ -237,11 +237,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-serve
 -	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
 +	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
 }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- 	}
+ #endif
 
 	/* New socket pair */
 -	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 #endif
 
 #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
 index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 	demote_sensitive_data();
 
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@ -38,16 +38,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+@@ -600,14 +600,16 @@ static struct {
 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@ -129,3 +129,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
 
 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff -up openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx	2024-07-11 13:51:19.969960781 +0200
+++ openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c	2024-07-11 13:51:30.938231250 +0200
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
@@ -1507,12 +1507,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
 
 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
 SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
 SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
 SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
 SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
 K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
 GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
 
 .SUFFIXES: .lo
 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 
 XMSS_OBJS=\
 	ssh-xmss.o \
@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 extern int inetd_flag;
- extern int rexeced_flag;
 
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag) {
 		use_current = "1";
 	} else {
 		use_current = "";
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 +The default is
 +.Cm yes .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
 .Cm IPQoS ,
 .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
 
 -	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	}
 
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
 	demote_sensitive_data();
@ -109,13 +109,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 	/* Demote the child */
 	if (privsep_chroot) {
 		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+	if (0) {
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
- #else
- 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+ 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
+ 	 * special privileges to begin with.
+ 	 */
+-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
+#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+ 	skip_privdrop = 1;
 #endif
+ 
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
 -
 +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
-+#pragma pop
+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
@ -221,9 +221,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 			return NULL;
 		}
 		/* validate also provider from URI */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
--- a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 	}
 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
 +	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
 +		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
 #endif
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
+	if (ret == 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
 +		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	return ret;
 }
 
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1538,6 +1565,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
 }
 
@ -147,12 +147,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 +	int pparent = paudit[1];
 +	close(paudit[0]);
 +	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
-+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
+	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +#endif
 +
 +	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +	/*
 +	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
 +	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@ -176,7 +175,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
 
 -	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 -	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 -	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 -	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
 	int sock;
 	struct sockaddr_un addr;

-+    if (len <= 0)
-+        return -1;
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return -1;
 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	if (sock == -1) {
 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
--- a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+ #define	NUM_SOCKS	10
 
 /* -- X11 forwarding */
 -/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
-
-    systemd stuff
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
--- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- AC_SUBST([CHANNELLIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants systemd support
-+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
-+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
-+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
-+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
-+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
-+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
-+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
-+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
-+			else
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-+			fi
-+		fi
-+	fi ]
-+)
-+
-+
- # Looking for programs, paths and files
- 
- PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
- echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
- echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
-+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
- echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
- echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e0d4923
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+[Unit]
-+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-+After=network.target
-+
-+[Service]
-+Type=notify
-+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-+KillMode=process
-+Restart=on-failure
-+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
-+
-+[Install]
-+WantedBy=multi-user.target
-+
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
- #include <prot.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
-+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
-+#endif
-+
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@ -129,19 +129,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
 +void
 +audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
 +{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what));
+	mm_audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
 +}
 +
 +void
 +audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
 +{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
+	mm_audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid());
 +}
 +
 +void
 +audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
 +{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
+	mm_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid());
 +}
 +
 # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
 
 void
-@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+@@ -76,49 +176,211 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
 	/* not implemented */
 }
 
@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
 +		if (options.use_pam)
 +			break;
+	/* Fallthrough */
 +	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +{
 +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
 +	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
+	static const char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
 +	char *s;
 +	int audit_fd;
 +
@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +#endif
 +}
 +
-+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+static const char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
 +
 +void
 +audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress,
@ -661,7 +662,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +	}
 +	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
 +			buf, NULL,
-+			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), /*FIXME listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh) */
 +			NULL, 1);
 +	audit_close(audit_fd);
 +	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
@ -733,7 +734,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
+-			mm_audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
 -#endif
 		}
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@ -743,11 +744,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
 	authenticated = 0;
- 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
- 	    chost, key)) &&
-	    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
- 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
+ 	if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+ 	    chost, key) &&
+-	    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+	    mm_hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
 		authenticated = 1;
 
@@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done:
@ -777,12 +778,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
 		/* test for correct signature */
 		authenticated = 0;
- 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
-		    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 		if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) &&
+-		    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+		    mm_user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
 		    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
 		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
+ 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) {
@@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done:
 	return authenticated;
 }
@ -828,7 +829,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
 +    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
 
 /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
- const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
+ int	 auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
@@ -239,6 +241,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
     char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
 int	 auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
@ -915,8 +916,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "audit.h"
 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ /* prototype */
+ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
@@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
 }
 
@ -1108,7 +1109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
 extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
 extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
 
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
 +
 /* State exported from the child */
 static struct sshbuf *child_state;
@ -1241,7 +1242,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
 		sshpam_cleanup();
 #endif
 
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +
 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
 		if (errno != EINTR)
@ -1536,9 +1537,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
 }
 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
@@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
+ 	return &ci;
 }
 
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +void
 +mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
@ -1632,7 +1633,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
 +int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
+ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
@@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 #include "audit.h"
@ -1817,7 +1818,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 extern u_int utmp_len;
 extern int startup_pipe;
 -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
 extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
 extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
 extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
@ -1843,18 +1844,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
 +		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
 	if (command != NULL)
-		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+-		mm_audit_run_command(command);
 +		s->command = xstrdup(command);
 	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
 		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
 
 		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
 			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
-		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+-		mm_audit_run_command(shell);
 +		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
 	}
 +	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
-+		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
 #endif
 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
@ -1863,7 +1864,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 
 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
 -	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 +	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 +	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@ -1923,7 +1924,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +{
 +	if (s->command != NULL) {
 +		if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+			PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command));
+			mm_audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command);
 +		free(s->command);
 +		s->command = NULL;
 +		s->command_handle = -1;
@ -1981,7 +1982,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
@@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
 	 * or if running in monitor.
 	 */
- 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ 	if (mm_is_monitor())
 -		session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
 +		session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session);
 }
@ -2020,25 +2021,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "auth-options.h"
- #include "version.h"
-@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
- 
- /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
-+void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
- static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
- 
- static char *listener_proctitle;
@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
 	num_listen_socks = 0;
 }
@ -2052,11 +2034,41 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 +	return num_listen_socks > 0;
 +}
 +
+ /* Allocate and initialise the children array */
 static void
- close_startup_pipes(void)
- {
-@@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
-	    ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
+ child_alloc(void)
+@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
+ 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ 			    (int) received_sigterm);
+			/* destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); FIXME */
+ 			close_listen_socks();
+ 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ 				unlink(options.pid_file);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
+@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ 
+ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+-void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
+void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
+ static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -377,18 +387,40 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+ 	_exit(EXIT_LOGIN_GRACE);
 }

 -/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
@ -2066,7 +2078,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 + */
 void
 -destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep)
+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
 	u_int i;
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@ -2088,12 +2100,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
 +			if (fp != NULL) {
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+				if (privsep)
-+					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid));
-+				else
-+					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid);
+				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
 +#endif
 +				free(fp);
 +			}
@ -2163,9 +2170,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
@@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
 
- 	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
- 		box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
+ 	box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
 -	pid = fork();
 +	pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
 	if (pid == -1) {
@ -2189,48 +2196,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 
 	reseed_prngs();
 
-@@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void)
-  * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
-  */
- static void
-server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
-+server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
- {
-	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
-	int i, j, ret, npfd;
-@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- 			    (int) received_sigterm);
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
- 			close_listen_socks();
- 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
- 				unlink(options.pid_file);
-@@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
-		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
-+		server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
- 	}
- 
@@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
 
 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 +	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1);
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +
 	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
 	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
-@@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2513,6 +2572,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 void
 cleanup_exit(int i)
 {
 +	static int in_cleanup = 0;
-+	int is_privsep_child;
 +
 +	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
 +	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
@ -2238,24 +2218,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 +	if (in_cleanup)
 +		_exit(i);
 +	in_cleanup = 1;
+ 	extern int auth_attempted; /* monitor.c */
+ 
 	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
- 		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
- 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
-@@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 			}
- 		}
- 	}
-+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
-+	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL)
-+		destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child);
-+	if (the_active_state != NULL)
-+		packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child);
+@@ -2525,7 +2593,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+		_exit(EXIT_AUTH_ATTEMPTED);
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
-	if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+-	if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor())
 +	if (the_active_state != NULL &&
 +	    (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+	    mm_is_monitor())
 		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
 #endif
 	_exit(i);
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@ -1,23 +1,22 @@
 diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
 
 static char *
- format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
 	    ac, av, &f,
 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	uid_swapped = 1;
@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	uid_swapped = 1;
@ -82,14 +81,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #endif
 
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
-extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
 /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 int
@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 
 	if (r == 0) {
 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 
@ -152,7 +150,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 
 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 
-	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
 		use_current = "1";
 	} else {
@ -216,55 +214,45 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
 --- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
 +++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
 
- extern int use_privsep;
 extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 
- void
- platform_pre_listen(void)
+ /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+ int
@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
 	}
 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
 #endif
 }
 
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
+diff -up openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor openssh/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
 
 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
 -static int inetd_flag = 0;
 +int inetd_flag = 0;
 
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
- static int saved_argc;
- 
- /* re-exec */
-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-+int rexeced_flag = 0;
- static int rexec_flag = 1;
- static int rexec_argc = 0;
- static char **rexec_argv;
+ /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+ static int log_stderr = 0;
@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 #endif
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -72,17 +72,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
 
 u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
 void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
- # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ 
@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
@ -361,8 +361,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
@ -393,7 +393,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 	/*
 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
 	 * unmounted if desired.
-@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
+++ b/sshd-session.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -2506,10 +2513,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
 		orig = NULL;
 
@ -475,11 +486,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 		*lenp = 0;
 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
-+		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		}
-+		/* Fallthrough */
+	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	/* Fallthrough */
 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
@ -487,10 +498,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 		*detailsp = NULL;
 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
-+		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		}
+	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
 	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
 +	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
 		return;
 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+ 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
@ -579,9 +579,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
 #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
@ -607,8 +607,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
 +can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
 +user account.
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, &includes, NULL, rexeced_flag);
+ 			    "enabled authentication methods");
+ 	}
 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
 +
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
 # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
 +# problems.
 #UsePAM no
 
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@ -23,20 +23,17 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
 		*style++ = 0;
 
-@@ -314,8 +314,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+@@ -314,7 +314,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
-		if (use_privsep)
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
 +#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+ 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
 +#endif
-+        }
 		userauth_banner(ssh);
 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
@ -50,7 +47,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +	char *micuser;
 	struct sshbuf *b;
 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
+ 	u_char *p;
@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 	mic.value = p;
@ -74,7 +71,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +		free(micuser);
 	free(mic.value);
 
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
 diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 --- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@ -147,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
 +++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
 void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_setcred(void);
 void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
 -int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
 +int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
@ -418,7 +415,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@ -472,7 +469,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@ -678,7 +674,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+		if (inetd_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@ -752,7 +748,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+	if (inetd_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@ -853,8 +849,8 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
 }
 
 diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		restore_uid();
 	}
@ -864,4 +860,4 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
 +#endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);
+ 		do_pam_setcred();
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 .It Cm HostKeyAlias
 Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
 real host name when looking up or saving the host key
-@@ -1232,30 +1229,25 @@
+@@ -1330,6 +1330,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
 and
 .Cm pam .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@ -164,8 +164,11 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
+ their preference order.
+ The selected algorithm will the the first algorithm in this list that
+@@ -1338,28 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
+ .Pp
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
@ -181,6 +184,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
+-.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
@ -191,10 +195,11 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+built-in openssh default set.
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+ .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
@@ -1365,37 +1357,33 @@
 file.
 This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
@ -479,7 +484,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
 .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -1044,20 +1017,25 @@
+@@ -1025,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@ -488,9 +493,12 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+ The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
+@@ -1033,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
@ -506,10 +514,10 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
 The supported algorithms are:
 .Pp
- .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -1089,16 +1067,6 @@
+@@ -1075,16 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
@ -523,7 +531,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
 .It Cm ListenAddress
@@ -1184,21 +1152,26 @@
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
 --- a/Makefile.in
 +++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+ 	kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
 	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
 +	kexgssc.o \
@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
 	sshbuf-io.o
 
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+ 	auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
 	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
- 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+-	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
- 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ regress-prep:
 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
 
@ -41,117 +41,10 @@ diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
 			return 1;
 		break;
 	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-@@ -730,97 +731,6 @@ fakepw(void)
- }
- 
- /*
- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
- * called.
- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
- * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
- */
-
-static char *
-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
-	socklen_t fromlen;
-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-
-	/* Get IP address of client. */
-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-		return xstrdup(ntop);
-	}
-
-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
-		return xstrdup(ntop);
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
-	 */
-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
-		    name, ntop);
-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
-		return xstrdup(ntop);
-	}
-
-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
-	lowercase(name);
-
-	/*
-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
-	 * the domain).
-	 */
-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
-		return xstrdup(ntop);
-	}
-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
-				break;
-	}
-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
-	if (ai == NULL) {
-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
-		return xstrdup(ntop);
-	}
-	return xstrdup(name);
-}
-
-/*
-  * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
-  * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
-  * several times.
 diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
 index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 --- a/auth2-gss.c
 +++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.34 2023/03/31 04:22:27 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
 static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
 static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@ -187,10 +80,10 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 1));
+	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
+	    &gssbuf, &mic)))
+		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+		    authctxt->pw, 1);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	free(mic.value);
@ -201,40 +94,42 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 /*
  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -260,7 +302,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
 
-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+	    authctxt->pw, 1));
+-	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+ 	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1);
 
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
- 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
-@@ -306,7 +349,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -306,7 +349,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
 	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
-		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 0));
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))
+-		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 0);
 	else
 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
 
-@@ -326,6 +370,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -326,6 +370,17 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex = {
 +	"gssapi-keyex",
 +	NULL,
-+	userauth_gsskeyex,
 +	&options.gss_authentication
 +};
+
+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
+	userauth_gsskeyex,
+};
 +
 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- 	"gssapi-with-mic",
- 	NULL,
+ 	&methodcfg_gssapi,
+ 	userauth_gssapi,
 diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
 index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
 --- a/auth2.c
@ -442,15 +337,6 @@ diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
 index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 --- a/gss-genr.c
 +++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
- 
- /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
 #include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "log.h"
@ -735,8 +621,8 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		ctx = &intctx;
 
 	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
-@@ -287,6 +519,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -500,6 +500,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
 	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
 	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
 	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
@ -745,13 +631,13 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
 +
 	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+ 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
 		    NULL);
-@@ -296,10 +532,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+@@ -527,10 +527,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
 			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
 	}
 
-	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
 		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
 
@ -1012,7 +898,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
 +	int res;
 +
-+	res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
+	res = !GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid));
 +	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
 +
 +	return (res);
@ -1158,7 +1044,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -382,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -382,14 +471,85 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
 	return (0);
 }
 
@ -1201,7 +1087,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
 +		return;
 +
-+	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
 +
 +	if (!ok)
 +		return;
@ -1213,11 +1099,6 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
 +	 */
 +#ifdef USE_PAM	
-+	if (!use_privsep) {
-+		debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
 +	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
 + 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
 +	if (ret)
@ -1256,20 +1137,34 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 
 /* Privileged */
 diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
+index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
 --- a/kex.c
 +++ b/kex.c
+@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	free(kex->gss_host);
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
+ 	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
+ 	free(kex->failed_choice);
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
+++ b/kex-names.c
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@
- #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +#endif
 +
- /* prototype */
- static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
- static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ struct kexalg {
+ 	char *name;
+ 	u_int type;
@@ -115,15 +120,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
@ -1332,10 +1227,11 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-@@ -315,6 +349,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
+@@ -315,3 +349,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
+ 	free(ret);
 	return r;
 }
- 
+ 
 +/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
 +int
 +kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names)
@ -1358,20 +1254,6 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 +	free(s);
 +	return 1;
 +}
-+
- /*
-  * Fill out a proposal array with dynamically allocated values, which may
-  * be modified as required for compatibility reasons.
-@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
- 	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
- 	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
- 	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	free(kex->gss_host);
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
- 	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
- 	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
- 	free(kex->failed_choice);
 diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
 index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
 --- a/kex.h
@ -1406,16 +1288,16 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
 	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
 	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
@@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex {
- 
+ int	 kex_nid_from_name(const char *);
 int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
 char	*kex_alg_list(char);
 +char	*kex_gss_alg_list(char);
 char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
- int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
+ int	 kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *);
 +int	 kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
+ int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
 void	 kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
     const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
- void	 kex_proposal_free_entries(char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
@@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
 int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
 int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
@ -2205,7 +2087,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +
 +	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
 +	do {
@ -2282,8 +2164,8 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +			    type);
 +		}
 +
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+		maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags);
 +
 +		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
 +
@ -2319,7 +2201,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
+	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
@ -2409,7 +2291,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +
 +	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
 +	/* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
@ -2431,7 +2313,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
 +		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
 +		    min, nbits, max);
-+	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+	kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
 +	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
 +		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found");
 +		fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found");
@ -2478,8 +2360,8 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +			    type);
 +		}
 +
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+		maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags);
 +
 +		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
 +
@ -2544,7 +2426,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	gssbuf.value = hash;
 +	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
+	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
@ -2873,7 +2755,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 
 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-@@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -1012,6 +1014,59 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
 	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
 	return (authenticated);
 }
@ -2931,6 +2813,8 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +}
 +
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ /*
 diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
 index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
 --- a/monitor_wrap.h
@ -3107,8 +2991,8 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
 #include "digest.h"
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
-     const char *, int);
+ #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+ # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		"sshd"
@@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@ -3141,7 +3025,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -506,6 +518,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
@ -3262,14 +3146,6 @@ diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
 index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
- /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@
 
 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
@ -3523,17 +3399,8 @@ diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
 index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 --- a/sshconnect2.c
 +++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@
- #endif
- 
- /* import */
-extern char *client_version_string;
-extern char *server_version_string;
- extern Options options;
- 
- /*
@@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
+ 	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
 
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@ -3545,8 +3412,8 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
 	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers,
- 	    options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
 	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 +
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@ -3587,7 +3454,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 
 	free(hkalgs);
 
-@@ -224,17 +256,47 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+@@ -224,14 +256,44 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
 # endif
@ -3618,11 +3485,8 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +#endif
 +
 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
+ 	kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
 
- 	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
- 	free(myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
- 	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	/* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
 +	/* ext-info removal above */
@ -3633,9 +3497,9 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +		free(gss);
 +	}
 +#endif
- 	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
- 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@ -3767,6 +3631,20 @@ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
 index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 --- a/sshd.c
 +++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	}
+ 	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
+-	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
+ 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
 	}
 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
@ -3778,16 +3656,6 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
 	sshbuf_free(buf);
 }
-@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		free(fp);
- 	}
- 	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
-	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
-+	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
-+	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
- 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 
 	free(hkalgs);
@ -3838,9 +3706,9 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
 		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+  #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
- # endif
+  #endif
 -#endif
 +# ifdef GSSAPI
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
@ -4036,9 +3904,9 @@ diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h

 int      ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *);
 +int	 ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type);
- int      ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *);
 int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
 int	 ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len);
+ int	 ssh_packet_process_read(struct ssh *, int);
 diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
 --- a/packet.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
 +++ b/packet.c	(date 1703172586447)
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
@ -965,9 +965,9 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.234942360 +0100
@@ -1549,10 +1549,72 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, cha
+ 	idtab->nentries++;
 }
 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 +static char *
 +sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
 +{
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
@ -19,4 +19,4 @@ diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
 +	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
@ -79,12 +79,12 @@ diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
 {
 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
-	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
-+	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
+-	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
+	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
 
 #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-@@ -260,9 +260,21 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+@@ -260,10 +260,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
 
@ -100,8 +100,9 @@ diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
 +			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +	}
 +
- 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers,
- 	    options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
 -	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 +	    filtered_algs);
 
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@ -148,15 +148,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
-@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ do_kex(char *kex)
- {
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
-	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
-+	/* do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); */
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c	2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
@ -196,22 +187,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-
 
 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
-@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
- 	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
-@@ -364,6 +366,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
- 	TEST_DONE();
-+	*/
- 
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c	2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
@ -241,10 +216,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openss
 {
 	size_t len;
 	u_char *sig;
-+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
-+	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
+	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
 +	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
-+		expected = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
 
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
 -	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
@ -277,21 +252,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openss
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:19:23.659513651 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c	2023-01-26 12:20:28.021044803 +0100
-@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ tests(void)
- 	check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("check DSA signature");
- 	check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
- 	TEST_DONE();
-+	*/
- 
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
@ -332,61 +292,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.355711140 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
-@@ -1640,6 +1651,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	Authctxt *authctxt;
- 	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
- 	sigset_t sigmask;
-+	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
- 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
-@@ -1938,6 +1950,33 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		    key = NULL;
- 		    continue;
- 		}
-+		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA_CERT)) {
-+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
-+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
-+		    int res;
-+
-+		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-+		    free(tmp);
-+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
-+			verbose_f("sshd: SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
-+		    	forbid_ssh_rsa = 1;
-+		    }
-+		}
-+		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT)) {
-+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
-+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
-+		    int res;
-+
-+		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-+		    free(tmp);
-+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
-+			logit_f("sshd: ssh-dss is disabled, skipping key file %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
-+			key = NULL;
-+			continue;
-+		    }
-+		}
- 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
- 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
- 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
-@@ -2275,6 +2306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	check_ip_options(ssh);
- 
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
-+
- 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
- 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
- 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
@ -400,3 +305,34 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
 			goto out;
 		}
+diff -up openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx	2024-07-23 15:08:14.794350818 +0200
+++ openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c	2024-07-23 15:40:21.658456636 +0200
+@@ -1305,6 +1305,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
+	{
+		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
+		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
+		if (rsakey == NULL)
+			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
+
+		if (rsakey != NULL) {
+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
+		    int res;
+
+		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		    free(tmp);
+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
+			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
+		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+		    }
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
--- a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
 	size_t klen = 0;
 -	int kout, r;
-+	int kout, r = 0;
+	int r = 0;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
--- a/openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch
--- a/openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 26f366e263e575c4e1a18e2e64ba418f58878b37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 20:22:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Only set PAM_RHOST if the remote host is not "UNKNOWN"
+
+When using sshd's -i option with stdio that is not a AF_INET/AF_INET6
+socket, auth_get_canonical_hostname() returns "UNKNOWN" which is then
+set as the value of PAM_RHOST, causing pam to try to do a reverse DNS
+query of "UNKNOWN", which times out multiple times, causing a
+substantial slowdown when logging in.
+
+To fix this, let's only set PAM_RHOST if the hostname is not "UNKNOWN".
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index e143304e3..39b4e4563 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
+ 		    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ 	}
+-	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
+	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) {
+ 		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
+ 		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
+ 		    sshpam_rhost);
+-- 
+2.44.0
+
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@ -38,13 +38,13 @@
 # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
 %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}

-%global openssh_ver 9.6p1
+%global openssh_ver 9.8p1
 %global openssh_rel 1

 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.5
+Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.0
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ Source17: ssh-agent.socket
 Source19: openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
 Source20: ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
 Source21: ssh-host-keys-migration.service
+Source22: parallel_test.sh
+Source23: parallel_test.Makefile

 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
 Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -122,7 +124,8 @@ Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
 Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
 # Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243)
 Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
-
+# Rewriting OpenSSH GSS KEX to use new packet API
+Patch806: openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch

 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
 Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@ -142,8 +145,6 @@ Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
 Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
 # Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
 Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
-# Help systemd to track the running service
-Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
 # Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level
 Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
 # Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit
@ -199,6 +200,8 @@ Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
 Patch1013: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
 Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch

+Patch1015: openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
+
 License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
 Requires: /sbin/nologin

@ -329,6 +332,7 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
 %patch -P 801 -p1 -b .force_krb
 %patch -P 804 -p1 -b .ccache_name
 %patch -P 805 -p1 -b .k5login
+%patch -P 806 -p1 -b .gsskex-new-api
 # 
 %patch -P 901 -p1 -b .kuserok
 %patch -P 906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote
@ -340,7 +344,6 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
 %patch -P 926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
 %patch -P 939 -p1 -b .s390-dev
 %patch -P 944 -p1 -b .x11max
-%patch -P 948 -p1 -b .systemd
 %patch -P 949 -p1 -b .refactor
 %patch -P 950 -p1 -b .sandbox
 %patch -P 951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
@ -372,6 +375,7 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
 %patch -P 1012 -p1 -b .evp-fips-dh
 %patch -P 1013 -p1 -b .evp-fips-ecdh
 %patch -P 1014 -p1 -b .nosha1hostproof
+%patch -P 1015 -p1 -b .pam-rhost

 %patch -P 100 -p1 -b .coverity

@ -470,10 +474,7 @@ popd
 %endif

 %check
-#to run tests use "--with check"
-%if %{?_with_check:1}%{!?_with_check:0}
-make tests
-%endif
+%{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23}  # ./parallel_tests.sh parallel_tests.Makefile

 %install
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
@ -613,6 +614,7 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %files server
 %dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-session
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
@ -651,6 +653,10 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/sshtest/sk-dummy.so

 %changelog
+* Thu Jul 25 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-1.0
+- Rebase OpenSSH to 9.8p1
+  Resolves: RHEL-42635
+
 * Fri Jul 12 2024 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.5
 - Build OpenSSH without ENGINE API
  Resolves: RHEL-45507
--- a/parallel_test.Makefile
+++ b/parallel_test.Makefile
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# just a Makefile parallel_test.sh uses to run stuff in parallel with make
+%:
+	$(MAKE) -j1 -C .t/$* $*
+
+t-exec-%:
+	$(MAKE) -j1 -C ".t/t-exec-$*" \
+		TEST_SSH_PORT=10$*0 \
+		SKIP_LTESTS="$(shell cat .ltests/not-in/$*)" \
+		BUILDDIR="$(shell pwd)/.t/t-exec-$*" \
+		TEST_SHELL=sh \
+		MAKE=make \
+		TEST_SSH_TRACE=yes \
+		TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL=yes \
+		t-exec \
--- a/parallel_test.sh
+++ b/parallel_test.sh
@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+#!/usr/bin/bash
+set -uexo pipefail
+
+# The custom %check script to run the OpenSSH upstream testsuite in parallel.
+#
+# The upstream testsuite is serial,
+# so the idea here is to split the testsuite into several $PARTS:
+# * file-tests
+# * interop-tests
+# * unit
+# * ltests-00
+# * ltests-01
+# * ...
+# * ltests-23
+# and run them in parallel, using make, each in its own build subtree.
+
+PARALLEL_MAKEFILE=$1
+
+SPLIT=24
+PARTS='file-tests interop-tests unit '
+for ((i = 1; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
+    PARTS+="t-exec-$ii "
+done
+
+# work around a selinux restriction:
+chcon -t unconfined_exec_t ssh-sk-helper || :
+
+# work around something else that only crops up in brew
+export TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1
+
+# create a .test directory to store all our files in:
+mkdir -p .t .ltests/{in,not-in}
+
+# patch testsuite: use different ports to avoid port collisions
+grep -REi 'port=[2-9][0-9]*' regress
+sed -i 's|PORT=4242|PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
+    regress/test-exec.sh*
+sed -i 's|^P=3301  # test port|P=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
+    regress/multiplex.sh*
+sed -i 's|^fwdport=3301|fwdport=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
+    regress/cfgmatch.sh* regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh*
+sed -i 's|^LFWD_PORT=.*|LFWD_PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
+    regress/forward-control.sh*
+sed -i 's|^RFWD_PORT=.*|RFWD_PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 2)|' \
+    regress/forward-control.sh*
+( ! grep -REi 'port=[2-9][0-9]*' regress)  # try to find more of those
+
+# patch testsuite: speed up
+sed -i 's|sleep 1$|sleep .25|' regress/forward-control.sh
+
+# extract LTESTS list to .tests/ltests/all:
+grep -Ex 'tests:[[:space:]]*file-tests t-exec interop-tests extra-tests unit' Makefile
+echo -ne '\necho-ltests:\n\techo ${LTESTS}' >> regress/Makefile
+make -s -C regress echo-ltests | tr ' ' '\n' > .ltests/all
+
+# separate ltests into $SPLIT roughly equal .tests/ltests/in/$ii parts:
+grep -qFx connect .ltests/all
+( ! grep -qFx nonex .ltests/all )
+split -d -a2 --number=l/$SPLIT .ltests/all .ltests/in/
+wc -l .ltests/in/*
+grep -qFx connect .ltests/in/*
+
+# generate the inverses of them --- .ltests/not-in/$ii:
+( ! grep -qFx nonex .ltests/in/* )
+for ((i = 0; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
+    while read -r tname; do
+        if ! grep -qFx "$tname" ".ltests/in/$ii"; then
+            echo -n "$tname " >> ".ltests/not-in/$ii"
+        fi
+    done < .ltests/all
+done
+grep . .ltests/not-in/*
+( ! grep -q ^connect .ltests/not-in/0 )
+for ((i = 1; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
+    grep -q ^connect .ltests/not-in/$ii
+done
+
+# prepare several test directories:
+for PART in $PARTS; do
+    mkdir .t/${PART}
+    cp -ra * .t/${PART}/
+    sed -i "s|abs_top_srcdir=.*|abs_top_srcdir=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
+        .t/${PART}/Makefile
+    sed -i "s|abs_top_builddir=.*|abs_top_builddir=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
+        .t/${PART}/Makefile
+    sed -i "s|^BUILDDIR=.*|BUILDDIR=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
+        .t/${PART}/Makefile
+done
+
+# finally, run tests $PARTS in parallel in their own subtrees:
+time make -f "$PARALLEL_MAKEFILE" -j$(nproc) $PARTS
--- a/5
+++ b/5
@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz) = 0ebf81e39914c3a90d7777a001ec7376a94b37e6024baf3e972c58f0982b7ddef942315f5e01d56c00ff95603b4a20ee561ab918ecc55511df007ac138160509
-SHA512 (openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc) = aec5a5bd6ce480a8e5b5879dc55f8186aec90fe61f085aa92ad7d07f324574aa781be09c83b7443a32848d091fd44fb12c1842d49cee77afc351e550ffcc096d
-SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
+SHA512 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = 95dec2f18e58eb47994f3de4430253e0665e185564b65088ca5f4108870e05feddef8cda8d3c0a4b75f18b98cc2c024df0e27de53b48c1a16da8da483cb8292a
+SHA512 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc) = 4df1f1be2c6ab7f3aebaedd0a773b0e8c8929abb30cd3415873ad55d012cfa113f792e888e5e772dd468c394aeb7e35d62893a514dbc0ab1a03acd79918657f7
 SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21