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openssh/openssh-7.3p1-openssl-1.1.0.patch

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rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/authfd.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/authfd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/authfd.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/authfd.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.429817751 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -207,15 +207,22 @@ deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids
int r, keybits;
u_int32_t bits;
char *comment = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ if ((e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, n)) != 0 ||
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0)) {
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
goto out;
- keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+ }
+ keybits = BN_num_bits(n);
/* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */
if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
@@ -393,15 +400,17 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct s
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
u_char type;
+ const BIGNUM *e, *n;
if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */
@@ -499,15 +508,19 @@ static int
ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
{
int r;
+ const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *q, *p, *iqmp;
+ RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, &d);
+ RSA_get0_factors(key, &p, &q);
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(key, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
/* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
@@ -622,11 +635,13 @@ ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct ssh
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0)
goto out;
} else
#endif
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.400817739 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.430817752 +0100
@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
#else
typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
+# define pthread_create(a, b, c, d) _ssh_compat_pthread_create(a, b, c, d)
+# define pthread_exit(a) _ssh_compat_pthread_exit(a)
+# define pthread_cancel(a) _ssh_compat_pthread_cancel(a)
+# define pthread_join(a, b) _ssh_compat_pthread_join(a, b)
#endif
struct pam_ctxt {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher-3des1.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/cipher-3des1.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher-3des1.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher-3des1.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.430817752 +0100
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
*/
struct ssh1_3des_ctx
{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX k1, k2, k3;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *k1, *k2, *k3;
};
const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, cons
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
if (key == NULL)
return 1;
if (enc == -1)
- enc = ctx->encrypt;
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key;
k2 += 8;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -74,12 +74,19 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, cons
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
else
k1 += 16;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3);
- if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
- EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
- EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
+ c->k1 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ c->k2 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ c->k3 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (c->k1 == NULL || c->k2 == NULL || c->k3 == NULL) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k1);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k2);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k3);
+ free(c);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CipherInit(c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
+ EVP_CipherInit(c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
+ EVP_CipherInit(c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
free(c);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -95,9 +102,9 @@ ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_cha
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
return 0;
- if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
- EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
- EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
+ if (EVP_Cipher(c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
+ EVP_Cipher(c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
+ EVP_Cipher(c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -108,9 +115,9 @@ ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k1);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k2);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k3);
explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
free(c);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -128,13 +135,13 @@ ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int do
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (doset) {
- memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8);
- memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
- memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k1), iv, 8);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k2), iv + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k3), iv + 16, 8);
} else {
- memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8);
- memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8);
- memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8);
+ memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k1), 8);
+ memcpy(iv + 8, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k2), 8);
+ memcpy(iv + 16, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k3), 8);
}
return 0;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -142,17 +149,14 @@ ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int do
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
const EVP_CIPHER *
evp_ssh1_3des(void)
{
- static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
+ EVP_CIPHER *ssh1_3des;
- memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(ssh1_3des));
- ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef;
- ssh1_3des.block_size = 8;
- ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0;
- ssh1_3des.key_len = 16;
- ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init;
- ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup;
- ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc;
- ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH;
- return &ssh1_3des;
+ ssh1_3des = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 8, 16);
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(ssh1_3des, 0);
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_init);
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_cleanup);
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_cbc);
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(ssh1_3des, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH);
+ return ssh1_3des;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher-bf1.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/cipher-bf1.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher-bf1.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher-bf1.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.430817752 +0100
@@ -89,17 +89,28 @@ bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_ch
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
const EVP_CIPHER *
evp_ssh1_bf(void)
{
- static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf;
+ EVP_CIPHER *ssh1_bf;
- memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
- orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher;
- ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef;
+ orig_bf = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(EVP_bf_cbc());
+ /* block_size, length, flags from openssl/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c:638 */
+ ssh1_bf = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 8, 32);
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(ssh1_bf, 8);
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(ssh1_bf, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
- ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init;
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_bf, ssh1_bf_init);
+#else
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_bf,
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(EVP_bf_cbc()));
#endif
- ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher;
- ssh1_bf.key_len = 32;
- return (&ssh1_bf);
+ /* copy methods and parameters from old EVP_BF_cbc()
+ * meth_dup does not allow to change type and key_len */
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(ssh1_bf,
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_bf_cbc()));
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(ssh1_bf,
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_bf_cbc()));
+ /* ASN1 params??? */
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(ssh1_bf, bf_ssh1_cipher);
+ return ssh1_bf;
}
#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_BF) */
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.418817747 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.430817752 +0100
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp,
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, (u_char *)key, (u_char *)iv,
(do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
goto out;
@@ -386,10 +386,6 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp,
goto out;
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
}
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
- if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
- goto out;
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
- }
if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
if ((junk = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL ||
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -621,7 +617,7 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
len, iv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
- memcpy(iv, cc->evp->iv, len);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(cc->evp), len);
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -667,7 +663,7 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
- memcpy(cc->evp->iv, iv, evplen);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(cc->evp), iv, evplen);
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -681,8 +677,8 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
-#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp)->cipher_data
-#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp)->cipher->ctx_size
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(evp)
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(evp))
#endif
int
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ctr-cavstest.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ctr-cavstest.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ctr-cavstest.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.344817716 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ctr-cavstest.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.430817752 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int main (int argc, char *argv[])
usage();
}
- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
c = cipher_by_name(algo);
if (c == NULL) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/dh.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/dh.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/dh.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/dh.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.430817752 +0100
@@ -212,14 +212,15 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
/* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */
int
-dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
{
int i;
int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
int bits_set = 0;
BIGNUM *tmp;
+ const BIGNUM *p;
- if (dh_pub->neg) {
+ if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) {
logit("invalid public DH value: negative");
return 0;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -232,7 +233,8 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
return 0;
}
- if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, p, BN_value_one()) ||
BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */
BN_clear_free(tmp);
logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -243,14 +245,14 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
bits_set++;
- debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+ debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(p));
/*
* if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial
*/
if (bits_set < 4) {
logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)",
- bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+ bits_set, BN_num_bits(p));
return 0;
}
return 1;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -260,9 +262,11 @@ int
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
{
int pbits;
+ const BIGNUM *p, *pub_key;
- if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL ||
- (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 ||
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
+ if (need < 0 || p == NULL ||
+ (pbits = BN_num_bits(p)) <= 0 ||
need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (need < 256)
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -271,10 +275,11 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
* Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
* so double requested need here.
*/
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
- dh->length = MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
- if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 ||
- !dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) {
- BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
+ DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1));
+ if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key)) {
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
}
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
return 0;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -284,15 +290,22 @@ DH *
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
{
DH *dh;
+ BIGNUM *p, *g;
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0 ||
- BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) {
- DH_free(dh);
- return NULL;
- }
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL ||
+ (p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&p, modulus) == 0 ||
+ BN_hex2bn(&g, gen) == 0 ||
+ DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g) == 0)
+ goto err;
return (dh);
+err:
+ DH_free(dh);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
+ return NULL;
}
/*
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -307,8 +320,7 @@ dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulu
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
- dh->p = modulus;
- dh->g = gen;
+ DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen);
return (dh);
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.openssl openssh-7.4p1/dh.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.418817747 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/dh.h 2016-12-23 17:47:36.431817752 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ DH *dh_new_group18(void);
DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int);
int dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
-int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
+int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
u_int dh_estimate(int);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/digest-openssl.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/digest-openssl.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/digest-openssl.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/digest-openssl.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.431817752 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
struct ssh_digest_ctx {
int alg;
- EVP_MD_CTX mdctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
};
struct ssh_digest {
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
size_t
ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
{
- return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(&ctx->mdctx);
+ return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx);
}
struct ssh_digest_ctx *
@@ -119,8 +119,9 @@ ssh_digest_start(int alg)
if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL))
return NULL;
ret->alg = alg;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ret->mdctx);
- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
+ ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ret->mdctx == NULL ||
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_
if (from->alg != to->alg)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx))
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_
int
ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
{
- if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
+ if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ void
ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
free(ctx);
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.419817747 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.431817752 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -218,7 +218,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
"have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
/* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
atexit(RAND_cleanup);
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
if (RAND_status() == 1) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.392817736 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.431817752 +0100
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
char deroid[2];
const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
char *s, *cp, *p;
if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
buffer_init(&buf);
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
oidpos = 0;
s = cp = xstrdup(kex);
for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -122,12 +123,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md);
+ EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, deroid, 2);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md,
gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
gss_supported->elements[i].length);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, NULL);
encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -149,6 +151,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
}
}
free(s);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/includes.h.openssl openssh-7.4p1/includes.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/includes.h.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/includes.h 2016-12-23 17:47:36.431817752 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+#include "libcrypto-compat.h"
#endif
#include "defines.h"
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexdhc.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/kexdhc.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/kexdhc.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kexdhc.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.431817752 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
switch (kex->kex_type) {
@@ -81,21 +82,27 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
goto out;
}
debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
- if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, &input_kex_dh);
r = 0;
out:
+ if (r != 0) {
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ }
return r;
}
@@ -110,6 +117,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, vo
u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
int kout, r;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -169,6 +177,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, vo
#endif
/* calc and verify H */
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
@@ -177,7 +186,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, vo
sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- kex->dh->pub_key,
+ pub_key,
dh_server_pub,
shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexdhs.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/kexdhs.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/kexdhs.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kexdhs.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.431817752 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init);
r = 0;
out:
+ if (r != 0) {
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ }
return r;
}
@@ -102,6 +106,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t se
size_t sbloblen, slen;
size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
int kout, r;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
@@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t se
goto out;
/* calc H */
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
kex->client_version_string,
@@ -172,7 +178,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t se
sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
dh_client_pub,
- kex->dh->pub_key,
+ pub_key,
shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
goto out;
@@ -198,7 +204,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t se
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.419817747 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.431817752 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
int r, bits;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
@@ -120,26 +121,30 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
- if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply);
r = 0;
out:
- if (p)
- BN_clear_free(p);
- if (g)
- BN_clear_free(g);
+ BN_clear_free(p);
+ BN_clear_free(g);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ }
return r;
}
@@ -154,6 +159,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32
u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
int kout, r;
+ const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key;
debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
@@ -220,6 +226,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32
kex->min = kex->max = -1;
/* calc and verify H */
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
if ((r = kexgex_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
@@ -229,8 +237,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32
sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
- kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
- kex->dh->pub_key,
+ p, g,
+ pub_key,
dh_server_pub,
shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.419817747 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.432817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0;
+ const BIGNUM *p, *g;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
@@ -102,9 +103,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
goto out;
}
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
@@ -116,6 +118,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init);
r = 0;
out:
+ if (r != 0) {
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ }
return r;
}
@@ -131,6 +137,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_
size_t sbloblen, slen;
size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
int kout, r;
+ const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key;
if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
@@ -193,6 +200,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_
goto out;
/* calc H */
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
if ((r = kexgex_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
kex->client_version_string,
@@ -201,9 +210,9 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_
sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
- kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
+ p, g,
dh_client_pub,
- kex->dh->pub_key,
+ pub_key,
shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
goto out;
@@ -229,7 +238,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.349817718 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.432817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL;
BIGNUM *g = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *p1, *g1;
u_char *kbuf;
u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
u_char *empty = "";
@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
/* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
/* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
dh_server_pub = BN_new();
@@ -168,7 +170,7 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
send_tok.length);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+ packet_put_bignum2((BIGNUM *)pub_key);
first = 0;
} else {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
@@ -275,13 +277,14 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
(serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
- dh->pub_key, /* e */
+ pub_key, /* e */
dh_server_pub, /* f */
shared_secret, /* K */
hash, &hashlen
);
break;
case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p1, NULL, &g1);
kexgex_hash(
ssh->kex->hash_alg,
ssh->kex->client_version_string,
@@ -290,8 +293,8 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
(serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
min, nbits, max,
- dh->p, dh->g,
- dh->pub_key,
+ p1, g1,
+ pub_key,
dh_server_pub,
shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.349817718 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.432817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
char *mechs;
u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t hashlen;
+ const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key;
/* Initialise GSSAPI */
@@ -122,9 +123,10 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
if (dh == NULL)
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
+ packet_put_bignum2((BIGNUM *)p);
+ packet_put_bignum2((BIGNUM *)g);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
@@ -216,6 +218,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
free(kbuf);
+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
@@ -225,7 +228,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
- dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
+ dh_client_pub, pub_key, shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen
);
break;
@@ -237,9 +240,9 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
NULL, 0,
cmin, nbits, cmax,
- dh->p, dh->g,
+ p, g,
dh_client_pub,
- dh->pub_key,
+ pub_key,
shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen
);
@@ -263,7 +266,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+ packet_put_bignum2((BIGNUM *)pub_key);
packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
if (send_tok.length != 0) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/libcrypto-compat.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/libcrypto-compat.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/libcrypto-compat.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.432817753 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/libcrypto-compat.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.432817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+static void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num)
+{
+ void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ memset(ret, 0, num);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+ /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
+ * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+ */
+ if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+ || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (n != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->n);
+ r->n = n;
+ }
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->e);
+ r->e = e;
+ }
+ if (d != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->d);
+ r->d = d;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+ /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+ */
+ if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+ || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->p);
+ r->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->q);
+ r->q = q;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+ /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+ */
+ if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+ || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+ || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->dmp1);
+ r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+ }
+ if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->dmq1);
+ r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+ }
+ if (iqmp != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->iqmp);
+ r->iqmp = iqmp;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+ const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+ if (n != NULL)
+ *n = r->n;
+ if (e != NULL)
+ *e = r->e;
+ if (d != NULL)
+ *d = r->d;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = r->p;
+ if (q != NULL)
+ *q = r->q;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+ const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+ const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+ if (dmp1 != NULL)
+ *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+ if (dmq1 != NULL)
+ *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+ if (iqmp != NULL)
+ *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d,
+ const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = d->p;
+ if (q != NULL)
+ *q = d->q;
+ if (g != NULL)
+ *g = d->g;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ /* If the fields p, q and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+ */
+ if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+ || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL)
+ || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->p);
+ d->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->q);
+ d->q = q;
+ }
+ if (g != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->g);
+ d->g = g;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d,
+ const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+ if (pub_key != NULL)
+ *pub_key = d->pub_key;
+ if (priv_key != NULL)
+ *priv_key = d->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+ /* If the field pub_key in d is NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. The priv_key field may
+ * be left NULL.
+ */
+ if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pub_key != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->pub_key);
+ d->pub_key = pub_key;
+ }
+ if (priv_key != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->priv_key);
+ d->priv_key = priv_key;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+ if (pr != NULL)
+ *pr = sig->r;
+ if (ps != NULL)
+ *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+ if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+ BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+ sig->r = r;
+ sig->s = s;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+ if (pr != NULL)
+ *pr = sig->r;
+ if (ps != NULL)
+ *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+ if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+ BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+ sig->r = r;
+ sig->s = s;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh,
+ const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = dh->p;
+ if (q != NULL)
+ *q = dh->q;
+ if (g != NULL)
+ *g = dh->g;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. q may remain NULL.
+ */
+ if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+ || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->p);
+ dh->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->q);
+ dh->q = q;
+ }
+ if (g != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->g);
+ dh->g = g;
+ }
+
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ dh->length = BN_num_bits(q);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+ if (pub_key != NULL)
+ *pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+ if (priv_key != NULL)
+ *priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+ /* If the field pub_key in dh is NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. The priv_key field may
+ * be left NULL.
+ */
+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pub_key != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+ dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+ }
+ if (priv_key != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+ dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length)
+{
+ dh->length = length;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->iv;
+}
+
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->iv;
+}
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
+}
+
+static void OPENSSL_clear_free(void *str, size_t num)
+{
+ if (str == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (num)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(str, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
+}
+
+/* This call frees resources associated with the context */
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't assume ctx->md_data was cleaned in EVP_Digest_Final, because
+ * sometimes only copies of the context are ever finalised.
+ */
+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup
+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED))
+ ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx);
+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data
+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE)) {
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx->pctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ RSA_METHOD *ret;
+
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_METHOD));
+
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ memcpy(ret, meth, sizeof(*meth));
+ ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(meth->name);
+ if (ret->name == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name)
+{
+ char *tmpname;
+
+ tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+ if (tmpname == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free((char *)meth->name);
+ meth->name = tmpname;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+ int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding))
+{
+ meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+ int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding))
+{
+ meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa))
+{
+ meth->finish = finish;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ if (meth != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free((char *)meth->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(meth);
+ }
+}
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return (BN_num_bits(r->n));
+}
+
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *dsa)
+{
+ return BN_num_bits(dsa->p);
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+}
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+ if (cipher != NULL) {
+ cipher->nid = cipher_type;
+ cipher->block_size = block_size;
+ cipher->key_len = key_len;
+ }
+ return cipher;
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(cipher);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len)
+{
+ cipher->iv_len = iv_len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ cipher->flags = flags;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ int enc))
+{
+ cipher->init = init;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ size_t inl))
+{
+ cipher->do_cipher = do_cipher;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *))
+{
+ cipher->cleanup = cleanup;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+ int arg, void *ptr))
+{
+ cipher->ctrl = ctrl;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ int enc)
+{
+ return cipher->init;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ size_t inl)
+{
+ return cipher->do_cipher;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
+{
+ return cipher->cleanup;
+}
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+ int type, int arg,
+ void *ptr)
+{
+ return cipher->ctrl;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->encrypt;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/libcrypto-compat.h.openssl openssh-7.4p1/libcrypto-compat.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/libcrypto-compat.h.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.432817753 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/libcrypto-compat.h 2016-12-23 17:47:36.432817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+#ifndef LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+#define LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+#define EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(e) e->ctx_size
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx) ctx->cipher_data
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
+#define RSA_meth_get_finish(meth) meth->finish
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa));
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r);
+int DSA_bits(const DSA *d);
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len);
+void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags);
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ int enc));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ size_t inl));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *));
+int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type,
+ int arg, void *ptr));
+
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ int enc);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ size_t inl);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+ int type, int arg,
+ void *ptr);
+
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(c) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(c)
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#endif /* LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H */
+
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.openssl openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.420817748 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in 2016-12-23 17:47:36.432817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
- platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o auditstub.o
+ platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o auditstub.o libcrypto-compat.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.426817750 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.433817753 +0100
@@ -636,9 +636,12 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
return (0);
} else {
/* Send first bignum */
+ const BIGNUM *p, *g;
+
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
buffer_put_char(m, 1);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, g);
DH_free(dh);
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.433817753 +0100
@@ -70,12 +70,19 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, l
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
void
ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)
{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
/* Enable use of crypto hardware */
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+#endif
OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+#else
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS |
+ OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL);
+#endif
}
#endif
new pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3 release
2017-02-07 14:33:15 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/configure.ac.openssl openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/configure.ac
--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/configure.ac.openssl 2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/configure.ac 2016-12-23 17:47:36.433817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -1829,6 +1829,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
int main(void) { exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); }
]])],
[
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.433817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
struct sshbuf *buf, *pw;
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
char *cp;
+ const BIGNUM *n, *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
TEST_START("load passphrase");
pw = load_text_file("pw");
@@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
a = load_bignum("rsa1_1.param.n");
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a);
+ RSA_get0_key(k1->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(n, a);
BN_free(a);
TEST_DONE();
@@ -109,9 +111,11 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n");
b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p");
c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q");
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a);
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->p, b);
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->q, c);
+ RSA_get0_key(k1->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+ RSA_get0_factors(k1->rsa, &p, &q);
+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(n, a);
+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(p, b);
+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(q, c);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
@@ -200,9 +204,11 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g");
b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv");
c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub");
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->g, a);
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, b);
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->pub_key, c);
+ DSA_get0_pqg(k1->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g);
+ DSA_get0_key(k1->dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(g, a);
+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(priv_key, b);
+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(pub_key, c);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.433817753 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -197,9 +197,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
@@ -207,9 +204,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
@@ -217,8 +211,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
@@ -244,9 +236,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
@@ -255,8 +244,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
@@ -295,18 +282,13 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->n, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->e, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->p, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(kr->rsa->n), 1024);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(RSA_bits(kr->rsa), 1024);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->g, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
@@ -333,9 +315,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA");
@@ -349,8 +328,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA");
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/rsa.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/rsa.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/rsa.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/rsa.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.434817754 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -76,11 +76,14 @@ rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *
{
u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const BIGNUM *e, *n;
- if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
+ RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, NULL);
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(e))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+ olen = BN_num_bytes(n);
if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
@@ -122,8 +125,11 @@ rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM
{
u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const BIGNUM *n;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(key, &n, NULL, NULL);
- olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+ olen = BN_num_bytes(n);
if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
@@ -157,31 +163,42 @@ rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM
return r;
}
-/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
+/* calculate d mod p-1 and d mod q-1 */
int
-rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa)
+rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *iqmp)
{
BIGNUM *aux = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int r;
+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *d;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL;
+
+ RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+ (aux = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
- (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
- (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
- (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0)) {
+ if ((BN_sub(aux, q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+ (BN_mod(dmq1, d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+ (BN_sub(aux, p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+ (BN_mod(dmp1, d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+ (RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp) == 0)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ dmp1 = NULL;
+ dmq1 = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
BN_clear_free(aux);
+ BN_clear_free(dmp1);
+ BN_clear_free(dmq1);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/rsa.h.openssl openssh-7.4p1/rsa.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/rsa.h.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/rsa.h 2016-12-23 17:47:36.434817754 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -21,6 +21,6 @@
int rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
int rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
-int rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *);
+int rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *, BIGNUM *);
#endif /* RSA_H */
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.428817751 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.434817754 +0100
@@ -258,12 +258,12 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ const BIGNUM *r_n, *r_e;
+ RSA_get0_key(id->key->rsa, &r_n, &r_e, NULL);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg,
- BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
- id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
- id->key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ BN_num_bits(r_n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, r_e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, r_n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
#endif
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(Socket
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
struct sshkey *key;
+ BIGNUM *r_n = NULL, *r_e = NULL;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -310,11 +311,16 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(Socket
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge)))
+ if ((r_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (r_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge)) ||
+ RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, r_n, r_e, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(r_n);
+ BN_free(r_e);
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
/* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
if (sshbuf_len(e->request) == 0)
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -450,6 +456,7 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e,
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
u_char *blob;
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
u_int bits;
+ BIGNUM *r_n = NULL, *r_e = NULL;
#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
switch (version) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -459,10 +466,15 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e,
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
return;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ if ((r_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (r_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_n)) != 0 ||
+ RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, r_n, r_e, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(r_n);
+ BN_free(r_e);
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
if (bits != sshkey_size(key))
logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: "
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
@@ -565,23 +577,46 @@ agent_decode_rsa1(struct sshbuf *m, stru
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
{
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL,
+ *iqmp = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
*kp = NULL;
if ((k = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL || (e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (d = BN_new()) == NULL || (iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (q = BN_new()) == NULL || (p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, iqmp)) != 0 ||
/* SSH1 and SSL have p and q swapped */
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || /* p */
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->p)) != 0) /* q */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, q)) != 0 || /* p */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, p)) != 0 || /* q */
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, n, e, d) == 0) {
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ BN_free(iqmp);
goto out;
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ }
+ if (RSA_set0_crt_params(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, iqmp) == 0) {
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ goto out;
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ }
/* Generate additional parameters */
- if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
+ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* enable blinding */
if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect1.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect1.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect1.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect1.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.434817754 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
u_char response[16];
size_t i;
BIGNUM *challenge;
+ const BIGNUM *n;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
/* Get connection to the agent. */
@@ -96,8 +97,9 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
idlist->comments[i]);
/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ RSA_get0_key(idlist->keys[i]->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
- packet_put_bignum(idlist->keys[i]->rsa->n);
+ packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ static int
try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
{
BIGNUM *challenge;
+ const BIGNUM *n;
Key *public, *private;
char buf[300], *passphrase = NULL, *comment, *authfile;
int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit;
@@ -231,8 +234,9 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ RSA_get0_key(public->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
- packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n);
+ packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
@@ -348,15 +352,17 @@ try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char
{
int type;
BIGNUM *challenge;
+ const BIGNUM *n, *e;
debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ RSA_get0_key(host_key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
packet_put_cstring(local_user);
- packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
- packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(n));
+ packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)e);
+ packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
@@ -502,6 +508,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hos
{
int i;
BIGNUM *key;
+ BIGNUM *server_n = NULL, *server_e = NULL,
+ *host_n = NULL, *host_e = NULL;
Key *host_key, *server_key;
int bits, rbits;
int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -522,10 +530,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hos
openssh-7.5p1-1 + 0.10.3-2
2017-03-20 14:55:43 +00:00
if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
bits = packet_get_int();
- packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
- packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
+ if ((server_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (server_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
+ packet_get_bignum(server_e);
+ packet_get_bignum(server_n);
+ RSA_set0_key(server_key->rsa, server_n, server_e, NULL);
- rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n);
+ rbits = BN_num_bits(server_n);
if (bits != rbits) {
logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
"actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -534,10 +546,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hos
openssh-7.5p1-1 + 0.10.3-2
2017-03-20 14:55:43 +00:00
if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
bits = packet_get_int();
- packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+ if ((host_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (host_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
+ packet_get_bignum(host_e);
+ packet_get_bignum(host_n);
+ RSA_set0_key(host_key->rsa, host_n, host_e, NULL);
- rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n);
+ rbits = BN_num_bits(host_n);
if (bits != rbits) {
logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
"actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -553,14 +569,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hos
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
packet_check_eom();
debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
- BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
+ BN_num_bits(server_n), BN_num_bits(host_n));
if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1)
fatal("Host key verification failed.");
client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
- derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id);
+ derive_ssh1_session_id(host_n, server_n, cookie, session_id);
/*
* Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -595,14 +611,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hos
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
* Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
* server (key with smaller modulus first).
*/
- if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) {
+ if (BN_cmp(server_n, host_n) < 0) {
/* Public key has smaller modulus. */
- if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(host_n) <
+ BN_num_bits(server_n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + "
"SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(host_n),
+ BN_num_bits(server_n),
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
}
if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0 ||
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -610,12 +626,12 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hos
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
} else {
/* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
- if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(server_n) <
+ BN_num_bits(host_n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + "
"SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(server_n),
+ BN_num_bits(host_n),
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
}
if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0 ||
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.423817749 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.434817754 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
+ /* XXX free myproposal ?? */
}
/*
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.397817738 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.435817754 +0100
@@ -1369,6 +1369,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const ch
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
char *server_user, *local_user;
local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ free(pw);
server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.422817748 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.435817754 +0100
@@ -532,7 +532,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)){
if (FIPS_mode())
@@ -1247,6 +1249,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
free(cp);
}
free(conn_hash_hex);
+ free(host_arg);
if (config_test) {
dump_client_config(&options, host);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.428817751 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.435817754 +0100
@@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-dss.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh-dss.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-dss.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-dss.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.435817754 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u
size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ const BIGNUM *r, *s;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
@@ -76,15 +77,16 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u
goto out;
}
- rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
- slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
+ DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+ rlen = BN_num_bytes(r);
+ slen = BN_num_bytes(s);
if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
- BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
- BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+ BN_bn2bin(r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+ BN_bn2bin(s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
if (sigp != NULL) {
@@ -137,6 +139,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
@@ -177,16 +180,19 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
/* parse signature */
if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
- (sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) ||
- (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) {
+ if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, r) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, s) == NULL) ||
+ (DSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) == 0)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ r = NULL;
+ s = NULL;
/* sha1 the data */
if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
@@ -207,8 +213,9 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
out:
explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- if (sig != NULL)
- DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ BN_free(r);
+ BN_free(s);
+ DSA_SIG_free(sig);
sshbuf_free(b);
free(ktype);
if (sigblob != NULL) {
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ecdsa.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ecdsa.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ecdsa.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ecdsa.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.436817754 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
size_t len, dlen;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const BIGNUM *r, *s;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
@@ -80,8 +81,9 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->r)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->s)) != 0)
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, r)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, s)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0)
@@ -119,6 +121,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
@@ -147,15 +150,23 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
}
/* parse signature */
- if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->r) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->s) != 0) {
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, r) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, s) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
+ if (ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = NULL;
+ s = NULL;
if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
@@ -180,8 +191,9 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(b);
- if (sig != NULL)
- ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ BN_free(r);
+ BN_free(s);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
free(ktype);
return ret;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.424817749 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c 2016-12-23 17:47:56.652826110 +0100
@@ -275,10 +275,10 @@ sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
+ return RSA_bits(k->rsa);
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
+ return DSA_bits(k->dsa);
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -311,11 +311,17 @@ sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- return k->rsa->d != NULL;
+ case KEY_RSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *d;
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+ return d != NULL;
+ }
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA:
- return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
+ case KEY_DSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
+ return priv_key != NULL;
+ }
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -505,11 +511,7 @@ sshkey_new(int type)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- if (rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(rsa);
+ if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
free(k);
return NULL;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -517,13 +519,7 @@ sshkey_new(int type)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- if (dsa != NULL)
- DSA_free(dsa);
+ if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
free(k);
return NULL;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -563,21 +559,10 @@ sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *k)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-#define bn_maybe_alloc_failed(p) (p == NULL && (p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->d) ||
- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->iqmp) ||
- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->q) ||
- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->p) ||
- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmq1) ||
- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmp1))
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->dsa->priv_key))
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
break;
-#undef bn_maybe_alloc_failed
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
/* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -696,17 +681,31 @@ sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA:
- return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
- BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
+ case KEY_RSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *a_e, *a_n, *b_e, *b_n;
+
+ if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &a_n, &a_e, NULL);
+ RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &b_n, &b_e, NULL);
+ return BN_cmp(a_e, b_e) == 0 && BN_cmp(a_n, b_n) == 0;
+ }
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA:
- return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
- BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
+ case KEY_DSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *a_p, *a_q, *a_g, *a_pub_key;
+ const BIGNUM *b_p, *b_q, *b_g, *b_pub_key;
+
+ if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &a_p, &a_q, &a_g);
+ DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &a_pub_key, NULL);
+ DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &b_p, &b_q, &b_g);
+ DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &b_pub_key, NULL);
+ return BN_cmp(a_p, b_p) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a_q, b_q) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a_g, b_g) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a_pub_key, b_pub_key) == 0;
+ }
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -781,15 +780,21 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, st
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
return ret;
break;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- case KEY_DSA:
- if (key->dsa == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0)
- return ret;
+ case KEY_DSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key;
+
+ if (key->dsa == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+ DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, g)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, pub_key)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -802,13 +807,18 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, st
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
return ret;
break;
# endif
- case KEY_RSA:
- if (key->rsa == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
- return ret;
+ case KEY_RSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+ if (key->rsa == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, e)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, n)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -914,8 +924,13 @@ sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshk
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
- int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
+ const BIGNUM *n, *e;
+ int nlen, elen;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+
+ nlen = BN_num_bytes(n);
+ elen = BN_num_bytes(e);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
if (nlen < 0 || elen < 0 || nlen >= INT_MAX - elen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
@@ -926,8 +941,8 @@ sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshk
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob);
- BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
+ BN_bn2bin(n, blob);
+ BN_bn2bin(e, blob + nlen);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
} else if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1)) != 0)
goto out;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -1290,6 +1305,7 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
struct sshbuf *blob;
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
u_long bits;
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
openssh-7.5p1-1 + 0.10.3-2
2017-03-20 14:55:43 +00:00
if (ret == NULL)
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -1303,12 +1319,21 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
bits == 0 || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Bad bit count... */
/* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
- if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->e)) < 0)
+ if ((e = BN_new()) == NULL || (n = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ BN_free(e);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, e)) < 0)
return r;
- if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->n)) < 0)
+ if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, n)) < 0)
return r;
+ if (RSA_set0_key(ret->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(n);
+ return -1;
+ }
/* validate the claimed number of bits */
- if (BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != (int)bits)
+ if (BN_num_bits(n) != (int)bits)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
*cpp = ep;
retval = 0;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -1473,19 +1498,20 @@ sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
u_int bits = 0;
char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *e, *n;
- if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL ||
- key->rsa->n == NULL) {
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+ if (key->rsa == NULL || e == NULL || n == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
- if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
- (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
+ if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(e)) == NULL ||
+ (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(n)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* size of modulus 'n' */
- if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) {
+ if ((bits = BN_num_bits(n)) <= 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -1819,15 +1845,32 @@ sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
- (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) ||
- (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) ||
- (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) {
- sshkey_free(n);
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: {
+ const BIGNUM *k_p, *k_q, *k_g, *k_pub_key;
+ BIGNUM *n_p = NULL, *n_q = NULL, *n_g = NULL, *n_pub_key = NULL;
+
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &k_p, &k_q, &k_g);
+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &k_pub_key, NULL);
+
+ if (((n_p = BN_dup(k_p)) == NULL) ||
+ ((n_q = BN_dup(k_q)) == NULL) ||
+ ((n_g = BN_dup(k_g)) == NULL) ||
+ (DSA_set0_pqg(n->dsa, n_p, n_q, n_g) == 0)) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ BN_free(n_p);
+ BN_free(n_q);
+ BN_free(n_g);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (((n_pub_key = BN_dup(k_pub_key)) == NULL) ||
+ (DSA_set0_key(n->dsa, n_pub_key, NULL) == 0)) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ BN_free(n_pub_key);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
}
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -1850,13 +1893,22 @@ sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
- (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) {
- sshkey_free(n);
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: {
+ const BIGNUM *k_n, *k_e;
+ BIGNUM *n_n = NULL, *n_e = NULL;
+
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &k_n, &k_e, NULL);
+ if (((n_n = BN_dup(k_n)) == NULL) ||
+ ((n_e = BN_dup(k_e)) == NULL) ||
+ RSA_set0_key(n->rsa, n_n, n_e, NULL) == 0) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ BN_free(n_n);
+ BN_free(n_e);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
}
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -2054,10 +2106,20 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) != 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto out;
+ {
+ BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+ e = BN_new();
+ n = BN_new();
+ if (e == NULL || n == NULL ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, e) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, n) != 0 ||
+ RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(n);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -2075,12 +2137,34 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) != 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto out;
+ {
+ BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key;
+
+ p = BN_new();
+ q = BN_new();
+ g = BN_new();
+ pub_key = BN_new();
+
+ if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL ||
+ pub_key == NULL ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, p) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, q) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, g) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, pub_key) != 0 ||
+ DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, p, q, g) == 0) {
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(pub_key);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, pub_key, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(pub_key);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -2320,26 +2404,53 @@ sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *k, st
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
goto fail;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL ||
- (pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
- (pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto fail;
+ case KEY_RSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *k_e, *k_n;
+ BIGNUM *pk_e = NULL, *pk_n = NULL;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &k_n, &k_e, NULL);
+ if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL ||
+ (pk_e = BN_dup(k_e)) == NULL ||
+ (pk_n = BN_dup(k_n)) == NULL ||
+ RSA_set0_key(pk->rsa, pk_n, pk_e, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(pk_e);
+ BN_free(pk_n);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
}
+ }
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0)
goto fail;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_DSA:
- if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL ||
- (pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL ||
- (pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL ||
- (pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL ||
- (pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto fail;
+ case KEY_DSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *k_p, *k_q, *k_g, *k_pub_key;
+ BIGNUM *pk_p = NULL, *pk_q = NULL, *pk_g = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *pk_pub_key = NULL;
+
+ DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &k_p, &k_q, &k_g);
+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &k_pub_key, NULL);
+
+ if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL ||
+ (pk_p = BN_dup(k_p)) == NULL ||
+ (pk_q = BN_dup(k_q)) == NULL ||
+ (pk_g = BN_dup(k_g)) == NULL ||
+ (pk_pub_key = BN_dup(k_pub_key)) == NULL ||
+ DSA_set0_pqg(pk->dsa, pk_p, pk_q, pk_g) == 0) {
+ BN_free(pk_p);
+ BN_free(pk_q);
+ BN_free(pk_g);
+ BN_free(pk_pub_key);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (DSA_set0_key(pk->dsa, pk_pub_key, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(pk_pub_key);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
}
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -2460,12 +2571,17 @@ sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
/* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: {
+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key;
+
+ DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, p)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, q)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, g)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, pub_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -2477,10 +2593,15 @@ sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
goto out;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->n)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: {
+ const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+ if (e == NULL || n == NULL ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, e)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, n)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -2637,43 +2758,65 @@ sshkey_private_serialize(const struct ss
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
goto out;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- case KEY_RSA:
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ case KEY_RSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *iqmp, *p, *q;
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
+ RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *d, *iqmp, *p, *q;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+ RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q);
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ case KEY_DSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
+
+ DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+ DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, priv_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+ DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, priv_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -2749,18 +2892,51 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ {
+ BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
+
+ p = BN_new();
+ q = BN_new();
+ g = BN_new();
+ pub_key = BN_new();
+ priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL ||
+ pub_key == NULL || priv_key == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, priv_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ((DSA_set0_pqg(k->dsa, p, q, g) == 0)
+ ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) {
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(pub_key);
+ BN_free(priv_key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, pub_key, priv_key) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ BN_free(pub_key);
+ BN_free(priv_key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
break;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: {
+ BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_new();
+
+ if (priv_key == NULL ||
+ (r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, priv_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ((DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, priv_key) == 0)
+ ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) {
+ BN_free(priv_key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
@@ -2819,24 +2995,84 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
- (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ {
+ BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *iqmp, *p, *q;
+
+ n = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ iqmp = BN_new();
+ p = BN_new();
+ q = BN_new();
+
+ if (n == NULL || e == NULL || d == NULL ||
+ iqmp == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ((RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, n, e, d) == 0)
+ ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) {
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa, iqmp)) != 0) {
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
break;
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
- (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
- goto out;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: {
Do not overwrite N and E for RSA-certs in ssh-agent (#1416584)
2017-02-03 10:06:19 +00:00
+ BIGNUM *d, *iqmp, *p, *q;
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+
Do not overwrite N and E for RSA-certs in ssh-agent (#1416584)
2017-02-03 10:06:19 +00:00
+ /* N and E are already set so make sure we will not overwrite them */
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ d = BN_new();
+ iqmp = BN_new();
+ p = BN_new();
+ q = BN_new();
+
Do not overwrite N and E for RSA-certs in ssh-agent (#1416584)
2017-02-03 10:06:19 +00:00
+ if (d == NULL || iqmp == NULL || p == NULL ||
+ q == NULL ||
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ (r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 ||
Do not overwrite N and E for RSA-certs in ssh-agent (#1416584)
2017-02-03 10:06:19 +00:00
+ (r = ((RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, d) == 0)
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) {
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ goto out;
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ }
+ if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa, iqmp) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ free(iqmp);
+ goto out;
+ }
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ }
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3471,6 +3704,7 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshke
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
u_char *cp;
+ const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *q, *p, *iqmp;
/*
* If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3497,10 +3731,13 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshke
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
* format would just give known plaintext).
* Note: q and p are stored in reverse order to SSL.
*/
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->p)) != 0)
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+ RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q);
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, p)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Pad the part to be encrypted to a size that is a multiple of 8. */
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3525,9 +3762,9 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshke
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
goto out;
/* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, e)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
goto out;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3654,6 +3891,7 @@ sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
int r;
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
struct sshbuf *copy = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3683,10 +3921,16 @@ sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
goto out;
/* Read the public key from the buffer. */
- if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->e)) != 0)
+ if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, e)) != 0 ||
+ RSA_set0_key(pub->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
goto out;
+ }
/* Finally, the comment */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(copy, (u_char**)commentp, NULL)) != 0)
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3718,6 +3962,8 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL,
+ *iqmp = NULL;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3753,11 +3999,17 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
goto out;
/* Read the public key and comment from the buffer. */
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* key bits */
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* key bits */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ RSA_set0_key(prv->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
goto out;
+ }
/* Check that it is a supported cipher. */
cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type);
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
@@ -3786,14 +4038,31 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
}
/* Read the rest of the private key. */
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->p)) != 0)
+ if ((d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, p)) != 0 ||
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ (RSA_set0_key(prv->rsa, NULL, NULL, d) == 0)) {
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (RSA_set0_factors(prv->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
+ BN_free(iqmp);
goto out;
+ }
/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
- if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa)) != 0)
+ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa, iqmp)) != 0)
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
+ BN_free(iqmp);
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
goto out;
/* enable blinding */
Avoid double-free in the openssl-1.1.0 patch
2017-06-15 11:41:24 +00:00
@@ -3874,7 +4146,9 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct
case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
+#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
+#endif
case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
@@ -3892,7 +4166,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct
openssh-7.5p1-1 + 0.10.3-2
2017-03-20 14:55:43 +00:00
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
goto out;
}
- if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3861,7 +4124,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
@@ -3873,7 +4136,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.437817755 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -480,40 +480,67 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char
free(type);
switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_DSA:
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->p);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->g);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->q);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+ case KEY_DSA: {
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, p);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, g);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, q);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, pub_key);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, priv_key);
+ if (DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, p, q, g) == 0 ||
+ DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, pub_key, priv_key) == 0) {
+ fatal("failed to set DSA key");
+ }
+ }
break;
- case KEY_RSA:
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
- (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
- (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- e = e1;
- debug("e %lx", e);
- if (e < 30) {
- e <<= 8;
- e += e2;
- debug("e %lx", e);
- e <<= 8;
- e += e3;
+ case KEY_RSA: {
+ BIGNUM *bn_e = NULL, *bn_d = NULL, *bn_n = NULL, *bn_iqmp = NULL, *bn_p = NULL, *bn_q = NULL;
+
+ if ((bn_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (bn_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (bn_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (bn_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (bn_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (bn_q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
+ (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
+ (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ e = e1;
debug("e %lx", e);
+ if (e < 30) {
+ e <<= 8;
+ e += e2;
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ e <<= 8;
+ e += e3;
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(bn_e, e)) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_d);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_n);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_iqmp);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_q);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_p);
+ if (RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, bn_n, bn_e, bn_d) == 0 ||
+ RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, bn_p, bn_q) == 0)
+ fatal("Failed to set RSA parameters");
+ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa, bn_iqmp)) != 0)
+ fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
}
- if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) {
- sshbuf_free(b);
- sshkey_free(key);
- return NULL;
- }
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->d);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->q);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->p);
- if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa)) != 0)
- fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
break;
}
rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
@@ -621,7 +648,7 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k,
identity_file);
}
fclose(fp);
- switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) {
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
@@ -645,7 +672,7 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k,
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
- EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type));
+ EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey));
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
return;
@@ -1683,6 +1710,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc,
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_terminate();
#endif
+ free(ca);
exit(0);
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keyscan.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keyscan.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keyscan.c.openssl 2016-12-23 17:47:36.325817708 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keyscan.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.437817755 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
static struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
u_char type;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL;
if (rsa == NULL) {
if ((rsa = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) {
@@ -213,16 +214,20 @@ keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
sshbuf_reset(msg);
return NULL;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */
+ if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL || (e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */
/* server key */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
/* host key */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->n)) != 0) {
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0 ||
+ RSA_set0_key(rsa->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
buf_err:
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_reset(msg);
return NULL;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.437817755 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -143,12 +143,14 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con
static int
wrap_key(RSA *rsa)
{
- static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa;
+ static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa;
- memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa));
- helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper";
- helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
- RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa);
+ if (helper_rsa == NULL) {
+ helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method());
+ RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper");
+ RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt);
+ }
+ RSA_set_method(rsa, helper_rsa);
return (0);
}
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.437817755 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key {
struct pkcs11_provider *provider;
CK_ULONG slotidx;
int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa);
- RSA_METHOD rsa_method;
+ RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
char *keyid;
int keyid_len;
};
@@ -326,13 +326,21 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *
k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
}
- k11->orig_finish = def->finish;
- memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method));
- k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11";
- k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
- k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt;
- k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish;
- RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method);
+ k11->orig_finish = RSA_meth_get_finish(def);
+ if ((k11->rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(def)) == NULL ||
+ RSA_meth_set1_name(k11->rsa_method, "pkcs11") == 0 ||
+ RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) == 0 ||
+ RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt) == 0 ||
+ RSA_meth_set_finish(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_finish) == 0) {
+ RSA_meth_free(k11->rsa_method);
+ k11->rsa_method = NULL;
+ pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
+ free(k11->keyid);
+ free(k11);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ RSA_set_method(rsa, k11->rsa_method);
RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11);
return (0);
}
@@ -460,6 +468,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p
CK_ULONG nfound;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ const BIGNUM *n, *e;
f = p->function_list;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
@@ -512,10 +521,14 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
error("RSA_new failed");
} else {
- rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
+ BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+
+ rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
- rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
+ rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
+ if (RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL) == 0)
+ error("RSA_set0_key failed");
}
} else {
cp = attribs[2].pValue;
@@ -525,17 +538,18 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p
== NULL) {
error("d2i_X509 failed");
} else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL ||
- evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
- evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY_id(evp) != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
+ EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) {
debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa");
- } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa))
+ } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp)))
== NULL) {
error("RSAPublicKey_dup");
}
if (x509)
X509_free(x509);
}
- if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e &&
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+ if (rsa && n && e &&
pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
key->rsa = rsa;
rebase to openssh-7.4p1-1 * Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
2017-01-02 14:42:13 +00:00
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-rsa.c.openssl openssh-7.4p1/ssh-rsa.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-rsa.c.openssl 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-rsa.c 2016-12-23 17:47:36.437817755 +0100
OpenSSL 1.1.0 compat
2016-10-22 20:47:27 +00:00
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u
hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(alg_ident);
if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+ RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
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