openssh/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch

diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
index 36b9d2f5..6b517db4 100644
--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -119,6 +119,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
 		goto done;
 	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
+		goto done;
+	}
 
 	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
 		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 962fd342..5d59febc 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -175,6 +175,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
 		goto done;
 	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
+		goto done;
+	}
 	key_s = format_key(key);
 	if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
 		ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 7f26c680..42be690b 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
 	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
 	oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
-	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand,
+	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize,
 	oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
 } OpCodes;
 
@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ static struct {
 	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
+	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
 
 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
 };
@@ -2176,6 +2177,10 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
 		break;
 
+	case oRequiredRSASize:
+		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
+		goto parse_int;
+
 	case oDeprecated:
 		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
 		    filename, linenum, keyword);
@@ -2423,6 +2428,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
 	options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
 	options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
+	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2619,6 +2625,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
 #endif
+	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
+		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
 
 	/* Expand KEX name lists */
 	all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
@@ -3308,6 +3316,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
 	dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
+	dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
 
 	/* String options */
 	dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index f647bd42..ffb5ec4f 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ typedef struct {
 
 	char   *known_hosts_command;
 
+	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
+
 	char	*ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
 }       Options;
 
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 29df0463..423772b1 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
 	options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
+	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
 }
 
 /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
@@ -441,6 +442,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
+		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
 
 	assemble_algorithms(options);
 
@@ -517,6 +520,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
 	sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
+	sRequiredRSASize,
 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 
@@ -676,6 +680,8 @@ static struct {
 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
 };
 
@@ -2438,6 +2443,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
 		break;
 
+	case sRequiredRSASize:
+		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
+		goto parse_int;
+
 	case sDeprecated:
 	case sIgnore:
 	case sUnsupported:
@@ -2610,6 +2619,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
 
 	/*
 	 * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
@@ -2874,6 +2884,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
+	dump_cfg_int(sRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
 	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
 
 	/* formatted integer arguments */
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 8a04463e..9346155c 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int	expose_userauth_info;
 	u_int64_t timing_secret;
 	char   *sk_provider;
+	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
 }       ServerOptions;
 
 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 559bf2af..25be53d5 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -516,14 +516,22 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
 }
 
 /*
- * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
- * fatal()ing for others.
+ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
+ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
  */
 static void
-check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
+check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
 {
 	switch (r) {
 	case 0:
+		/* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
+		if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
+		    (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+			free(*k);
+			*k = NULL;
+		}
 		break;
 	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
 	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
@@ -1578,7 +1586,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
 		fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
 	check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
-	    p, "pubkey"); \
+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
 } while (0)
 #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
@@ -1586,7 +1594,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
 		fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
-	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
+	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
 } while (0)
 
 		if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
@@ -2244,7 +2253,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
 		free(cp);
 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
-		    filename, "pubkey");
+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
 		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
 		    public ? public->type : -1);
 		free(options.identity_files[i]);
@@ -2284,7 +2293,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
 			continue;
 		xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
-		    filename, "pubkey");
+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
 		debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
 		    public ? public->type : -1);
 		if (public == NULL) {
@@ -2315,7 +2324,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
 		free(cp);
 
 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
-		    filename, "certificate");
+		    &public, filename, "certificate");
 		debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
 		    public ? public->type : -1);
 		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index f9bd19ea..58fe98db 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
 static int
 verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
 {
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey,
+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
 	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
@@ -1606,6 +1611,13 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id)
 			private = NULL;
 			quit = 1;
 		}
+		if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private,
+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+			debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename);
+			sshkey_free(private);
+			private = NULL;
+			quit = 1;
+		}
 		if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
 		    !(id->key && id->isprivate))
 			maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
@@ -1752,6 +1764,12 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
		close(agent_fd);
	} else {
 		for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
+			if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j],
+			    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+				debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key",
+				    sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j]));
+				continue;
+			}
 			found = 0;
 			TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
 				/*
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 17eee9d8..395ef493 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1870,6 +1870,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 				fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"",
 				    options.host_key_files[i]);
 		}
+		if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey,
+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
+			sshkey_free(pubkey);
+			sshkey_free(key);
+			continue;
+		}
 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
 		sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
 
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index ed2b5dff..77093235 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -2365,18 +2365,24 @@ cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-static int
-check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
+int
+sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *k, int min_size)
 {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+	int nbits;
 
-	RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+	if (k == NULL || k->rsa == NULL ||
+	    (k->type != KEY_RSA && k->type != KEY_RSA_CERT))
+		return 0;
+	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+	nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
+	if (nbits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+	    (min_size > 0 && nbits < min_size))
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	return 0;
 }
-#endif
 
 static int
 sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
@@ -2439,7 +2445,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
 			goto out;
 		}
 		rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
-		if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
+		if ((ret = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0)
 			goto out;
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
 		RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
@@ -3642,7 +3648,7 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
 			goto out;
 		}
 		rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
-		if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
+		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(k, 0)) != 0)
 			goto out;
 		if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
 			goto out;
@@ -4644,7 +4650,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
 			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
+		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(prv, 0)) != 0)
 			goto out;
 	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index 094815e0..be254e6b 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
 int	sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
     int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
 
+int sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *, int);
 /* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
 int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
 
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index b4956aec..e255b9b9 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
 .It RemoteCommand
 .It RemoteForward
 .It RequestTTY
+.It RequiredRSASize
 .It SendEnv
 .It ServerAliveInterval
 .It ServerAliveCountMax
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 24a46460..d1ede18e 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -1634,6 +1634,17 @@ and
 .Fl T
 flags for
 .Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
+.Xr ssh 1
+will accept.
+User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored.
+Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the
+connection to be terminated.
+The default is
+.Cm 1024
+bits.
+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
 .It Cm RevokedHostKeys
 Specifies revoked host public keys.
 Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 867a747d..f5a06637 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -1596,6 +1596,16 @@ is
 .Cm default none ,
 which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
 of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
+.Xr sshd 8
+will accept.
+User and host-based authentication keys smaller than this limit will be
+refused.
+The default is
+.Cm 1024
+bits.
+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
 .It Cm RevokedKeys
 Specifies revoked public keys file, or
 .Cm none