SOURCES/opensc-0.23.0-cache-offsets.patch

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-From bff98ff078a99e6864ba1a598fd7dc9af4a9476b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 13:23:04 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] cache: Honor the file offset when writing cache
-
-When the reads are not consecutive, avoid caching anything after the gaps.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
----
- src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c
-index 6ebe35a8af..61af35fc5a 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c
-@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ int sc_pkcs15_cache_file(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
- {
- 	char fname[PATH_MAX];
- 	int r;
-+	long len;
- 	FILE *f;
- 	size_t c;
- 
-@@ -202,22 +203,33 @@ int sc_pkcs15_cache_file(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
- 	if (r != 0)
- 		return r;
- 
--	f = fopen(fname, "wb");
-+	f = fopen(fname, "ab");
- 	/* If the open failed because the cache directory does
- 	 * not exist, create it and a re-try the fopen() call.
- 	 */
- 	if (f == NULL && errno == ENOENT) {
- 		if ((r = sc_make_cache_dir(p15card->card->ctx)) < 0)
- 			return r;
--		f = fopen(fname, "wb");
-+		f = fopen(fname, "ab");
- 	}
- 	if (f == NULL)
- 		return 0;
- 
-+	/* we opened the file for appending so we should be at the end of file.
-+	 * The ftell() will give use the length of the file */
-+	len = ftell(f);
-+	if (len > path->index) {
-+		/* override previous cache records on this location */
-+		fseek(f, path->index, SEEK_SET);
-+	} else if (path->index > len) {
-+		/* We miss some bytes so we will not cache this chunk */
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	c = fwrite(buf, 1, bufsize, f);
- 	fclose(f);
- 	if (c != bufsize) {
--		sc_log(p15card->card->ctx, 
-+		sc_log(p15card->card->ctx,
- 			 "fwrite() wrote only %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u bytes",
- 			 c);
- 		unlink(fname);
-
-From 0875c69295ef28b45fb682b37cede58fc36b7a1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 19:17:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pkcs15-cache: Avoid fd leaks and check return values
-
-CID 401725
-CID 401726
-
-Thanks coverity
----
- src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c
-index 61af35fc5a..bae5797fe2 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cache.c
-@@ -220,9 +220,14 @@ int sc_pkcs15_cache_file(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
- 	len = ftell(f);
- 	if (len > path->index) {
- 		/* override previous cache records on this location */
--		fseek(f, path->index, SEEK_SET);
-+		r = fseek(f, path->index, SEEK_SET);
-+		if (r != 0) {
-+			fclose(f);
-+			return 0;
-+		}
- 	} else if (path->index > len) {
- 		/* We miss some bytes so we will not cache this chunk */
-+		fclose(f);
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
-

SOURCES/opensc-0.23.0-constant-time-pkcs1.patch

@@ -1,485 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/common/Makefile.am b/src/common/Makefile.am
-index 5153428dc..9ecbffe8f 100644
---- a/src/common/Makefile.am
-+++ b/src/common/Makefile.am
-@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ dist_noinst_DATA = \
- 	LICENSE.compat_getopt compat_getopt.txt \
- 	compat_getopt_main.c \
- 	README.compat_strlcpy compat_strlcpy.3
--noinst_HEADERS = compat_strlcat.h compat_strlcpy.h compat_strnlen.h compat_getpass.h compat_getopt.h simclist.h libpkcs11.h libscdl.h
-+noinst_HEADERS = compat_strlcat.h compat_strlcpy.h compat_strnlen.h compat_getpass.h \
-+	compat_getopt.h simclist.h libpkcs11.h libscdl.h constant-time.h
- 
- AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/src
- 
-@@ -43,7 +44,8 @@ TIDY_FILES = \
- 	compat_report_rangecheckfailure.c \
- 	compat___iob_func.c \
- 	simclist.c simclist.h \
--	libpkcs11.c libscdl.c
-+	libpkcs11.c libscdl.c \
-+	constant-time.h
- 
- check-local:
- 	if [ -x "$(CLANGTIDY)" ]; then clang-tidy -config='' -header-filter=.* $(TIDY_FILES) -- $(TIDY_FLAGS); fi
-diff --git a/src/common/constant-time.h b/src/common/constant-time.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..40c3e500c2
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/common/constant-time.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
-+/* Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/include/internal/constant_time.h */
-+
-+#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_H
-+#define CONSTANT_TIME_H
-+
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#if !defined(inline)
-+#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L
-+#define constant_inline inline
-+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2
-+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2
-+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
-+#define constant_inline __inline
-+#else
-+#define constant_inline
-+#endif
-+#else			       /* use what caller wants as inline  may be from config.h */
-+#define constant_inline inline /* inline */
-+#endif
-+
-+/*-
-+ * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true
-+ * and 0 for false. For example,
-+ *      if (a < b) {
-+ *        c = a;
-+ *      } else {
-+ *        c = b;
-+ *      }
-+ * can be written as
-+ *      unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b);
-+ *      c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b);
-+ */
-+
-+static constant_inline unsigned int
-+value_barrier(unsigned int a)
-+{
-+	volatile unsigned int r = a;
-+	return r;
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline size_t
-+value_barrier_s(size_t a)
-+{
-+	volatile size_t r = a;
-+	return r;
-+}
-+
-+/* MSB */
-+static constant_inline size_t
-+constant_time_msb_s(size_t a)
-+{
-+	return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline unsigned int
-+constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
-+{
-+	return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
-+}
-+
-+/* Select */
-+static constant_inline unsigned int
-+constant_time_select(unsigned int mask, unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
-+{
-+	return (value_barrier(mask) & a) | (value_barrier(~mask) & b);
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline unsigned char
-+constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
-+{
-+	return (unsigned char)constant_time_select(mask, a, b);
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline size_t
-+constant_time_select_s(size_t mask, size_t a, size_t b)
-+{
-+	return (value_barrier_s(mask) & a) | (value_barrier_s(~mask) & b);
-+}
-+
-+/* Zero */
-+static constant_inline unsigned int
-+constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a)
-+{
-+	return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline size_t
-+constant_time_is_zero_s(size_t a)
-+{
-+	return constant_time_msb_s(~a & (a - 1));
-+}
-+
-+/* Comparison*/
-+static constant_inline size_t
-+constant_time_lt_s(size_t a, size_t b)
-+{
-+	return constant_time_msb_s(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b)));
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline unsigned int
-+constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
-+{
-+	return constant_time_msb(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b)));
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline unsigned int
-+constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
-+{
-+	return ~constant_time_lt(a, b);
-+}
-+
-+/* Equality*/
-+
-+static constant_inline unsigned int
-+constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
-+{
-+	return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline size_t
-+constant_time_eq_s(size_t a, size_t b)
-+{
-+	return constant_time_is_zero_s(a ^ b);
-+}
-+
-+static constant_inline unsigned int
-+constant_time_eq_i(int a, int b)
-+{
-+	return constant_time_eq((unsigned int)a, (unsigned int)b);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* CONSTANT_TIME_H */
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/internal.h b/src/libopensc/internal.h
-index 74014235a..13eccfa1a 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/internal.h
-+++ b/src/libopensc/internal.h
-@@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ int sc_pkcs1_strip_01_padding(struct sc_context *ctx, const u8 *in_dat, size_t i
- 		u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len);
- int sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(struct sc_context *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len,
- 		u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len);
-+int sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const u8 *data,
-+		unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len);
- int sc_pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(unsigned int *algorithm,
- 		const u8 *in_dat, size_t in_len, u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len);
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/padding.c b/src/libopensc/padding.c
-index ca47733a4e..ddb3061134 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/padding.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/padding.c
-@@ -32,10 +32,13 @@
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- 
-+#include "common/constant-time.h"
- #include "internal.h"
- 
- /* TODO doxygen comments */
- 
-+#define SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE 11
-+
- /*
-  * Prefixes for pkcs-v1 signatures
-  */
-@@ -144,44 +147,82 @@ sc_pkcs1_strip_01_padding(struct sc_cont
- }
- 
- 
--/* remove pkcs1 BT02 padding (adding BT02 padding is currently not
-- * needed/implemented) */
-+/* Remove pkcs1 BT02 padding (adding BT02 padding is currently not
-+ * needed/implemented) in constant-time.
-+ * Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c#L171 */
- int
--sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(sc_context_t *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *out, size_t *out_len)
-+sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const u8 *data, unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len)
- {
--	unsigned int	n = 0;
--
-+	unsigned int i = 0;
-+	u8 *msg, *msg_orig = NULL;
-+	unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
-+	unsigned int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, len = 0;
- 	LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
--	if (data == NULL || len < 3)
-+
-+	if (data == NULL || data_len <= 0 || data_len > n || n < SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE)
- 		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
- 
--	/* skip leading zero byte */
--	if (*data == 0) {
--		data++;
--		len--;
-+	msg = msg_orig = calloc(n, sizeof(u8));
-+	if (msg == NULL)
-+		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * We can not check length of input data straight away and still we need to read
-+	 * from input even when the input is not as long as needed to keep the time constant.
-+	 * If data has wrong size, it is padded by zeroes from left and the following checks
-+	 * do not pass.
-+	 */
-+	len = data_len;
-+	for (data += len, msg += n, i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-+		mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(len);
-+		len -= 1 & mask;
-+		data -= 1 & mask;
-+		*--msg = *data & mask;
-+	}
-+	// check first byte to be 0x00
-+	good = constant_time_is_zero(msg[0]);
-+	// check second byte to be 0x02
-+	good &= constant_time_eq(msg[1], 2);
-+
-+	// find zero byte after random data in padding
-+	found_zero_byte = 0;
-+	for (i = 2; i < n; i++) {
-+		unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(msg[i]);
-+		zero_index = constant_time_select(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index);
-+		found_zero_byte |= equals0;
- 	}
--	if (data[0] != 0x02)
--		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
--	/* skip over padding bytes */
--	for (n = 1; n < len && data[n]; n++)
--		;
--	/* Must be at least 8 pad bytes */
--	if (n >= len || n < 9)
--		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
--	n++;
--	if (out == NULL)
--		/* just check the padding */
--		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
- 
--	/* Now move decrypted contents to head of buffer */
--	if (*out_len < len - n)
--		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
--	*out_len = len - n;
--	memmove(out, data + n, *out_len);
-+	// zero_index stands for index of last found zero
-+	good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
-+
-+	// start of the actual message in data
-+	msg_index = zero_index + 1;
-+
-+	// length of message
-+	mlen = data_len - msg_index;
-+
-+	// check that message fits into out buffer
-+	good &= constant_time_ge(*out_len, mlen);
-+
-+	// move the result in-place by |num|-SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
-+	*out_len = constant_time_select(constant_time_lt(n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len),
-+			n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len);
-+	for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
-+		mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE - mlen), 0);
-+		for (i = SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE; i < n - msg_index; i++)
-+			msg[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, msg[i + msg_index], msg[i]);
-+	}
-+	// move message into out buffer, if good
-+	for (i = 0; i < *out_len; i++) {
-+		unsigned int msg_index;
-+		// when out is longer than message in data, use some bogus index in msg
-+		mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
-+		msg_index = constant_time_select(mask, i + SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, 0); // to now overflow msg buffer
-+		out[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, msg[msg_index], out[i]);
-+	}
- 
--	sc_log(ctx, "stripped output(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u): %s", len - n,
--	       sc_dump_hex(out, len - n));
--	LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, len - n);
-+	free(msg_orig);
-+	return constant_time_select(good, mlen, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
- }
- 
- /* add/remove DigestInfo prefix */
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c
-index a019af460f..f7ee819d65 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c
-@@ -286,12 +286,14 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decipher(struct sc_pkcs15_
- 
- 	/* Strip any padding */
- 	if (pad_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) {
--		size_t s = r;
--		r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(ctx, out, s, out, &s);
--		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Invalid PKCS#1 padding");
-+		unsigned int s = r;
-+		unsigned int key_size = (unsigned int)alg_info->key_length;
-+		r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(ctx, key_size / 8, out, s, out, &s);
-+		/* for keeping PKCS#1 v1.5 depadding constant-time, do not log error here */
- 	}
- 
--	LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
-+	/* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */
-+	return r;
- }
- 
- /* derive one key from another. RSA can use decipher, so this is for only ECDH
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c
-index f75a3dbaec..632681df63 100644
---- a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
-  * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
-  */
- 
-+#include "common/constant-time.h"
- #include "config.h"
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -4174,7 +4175,8 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_se
- 	struct pkcs15_fw_data *fw_data = NULL;
- 	struct pkcs15_prkey_object *prkey;
- 	unsigned char decrypted[512]; /* FIXME: Will not work for keys above 4096 bits */
--	int	buff_too_small, rv, flags = 0, prkey_has_path = 0;
-+	int rv, flags = 0, prkey_has_path = 0;
-+	CK_ULONG mask, good, rv_pkcs11;
- 
- 	sc_log(context, "Initiating decryption.");
- 
-@@ -4246,27 +4248,54 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_se
- 	rv = sc_pkcs15_decipher(fw_data->p15_card, prkey->prv_p15obj, flags,
- 			pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, decrypted, sizeof(decrypted));
- 
--	if (rv < 0 && !sc_pkcs11_conf.lock_login && !prkey_has_path)
-+	/* skip for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding prevent side channel attack */
-+	if (!(flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) &&
-+			rv < 0 && !sc_pkcs11_conf.lock_login && !prkey_has_path)
- 		if (reselect_app_df(fw_data->p15_card) == SC_SUCCESS)
- 			rv = sc_pkcs15_decipher(fw_data->p15_card, prkey->prv_p15obj, flags,
- 					pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, decrypted, sizeof(decrypted));
- 
- 	sc_unlock(p11card->card);
- 
--	sc_log(context, "Decryption complete. Result %d.", rv);
-+	sc_log(context, "Decryption complete.");
- 
--	if (rv < 0)
-+	/* Handle following code in constant-time
- 		return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt");
-+	 * to prevent Marvin attack for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. */
- 
--	buff_too_small = (*pulDataLen < (CK_ULONG)rv);
--	*pulDataLen = rv;
--	if (pData == NULL_PTR)
--		return CKR_OK;
--	if (buff_too_small)
--		return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
--	memcpy(pData, decrypted, *pulDataLen);
--
--	return CKR_OK;
-+	/* only padding error must be handled in constant-time way,
-+	 * other error can be returned straight away */
-+	if ((~constant_time_eq_i(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING) & constant_time_lt_s(sizeof(decrypted), (size_t)rv)))
-+		return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt");
-+	
-+	/* check rv for padding error */
-+	good = ~constant_time_eq_i(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
-+	rv_pkcs11 = sc_to_cryptoki_error(SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING, "C_Decrypt");
-+	rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(good, CKR_OK, rv_pkcs11);
-+
-+	if (pData == NULL_PTR) {
-+		/* set length only if no error */
-+		*pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen);
-+		/* return error only if original rv < 0 */
-+		return rv_pkcs11;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* check whether *pulDataLen < rv and set return value for small output buffer */
-+	mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(*pulDataLen, rv);
-+	rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(mask, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, rv_pkcs11);
-+	good &= ~mask;
-+
-+	/* move everything from decrypted into out buffer constant-time, if rv is ok */
-+	for (CK_ULONG i = 0; i < *pulDataLen; i++) { /* iterate over whole pData to not disclose real depadded length */
-+		CK_ULONG msg_index;
-+		mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(i, sizeof(decrypted));		    /* i should be in the bounds of decrypted */
-+		mask &= constant_time_lt_s(i, constant_time_select_s(good, rv, 0)); /* check that is in bounds of depadded message */
-+		msg_index = constant_time_select_s(mask, i, 0);
-+		pData[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, decrypted[msg_index], pData[i]);
-+	}
-+	*pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen);
-+	/* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */
-+	return rv_pkcs11;
- }
-
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c b/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c
-index 03495265a4..d3f0434231 100644
---- a/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- 
-+#include "common/constant-time.h"
- #include "sc-pkcs11.h"
- 
- /* Also used for verification data */
-@@ -1089,7 +1090,9 @@ sc_pkcs11_decr(struct sc_pkcs11_session
- 	rv = op->type->decrypt(op, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
- 	                       pData, pulDataLen);
- 
--	if (rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && pData != NULL)
-+	/* terminate session for any return value except CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
-+	 * perform check in time side-channel free way to prevent Marvin attack */
-+	if (!constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) && pData != NULL)
- 		session_stop_operation(session, SC_PKCS11_OPERATION_DECRYPT);
- 
- 	return rv;
-
-
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
-index f04c0b4c56..b023911213 100644
---- a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
-@@ -926,7 +926,8 @@ CK_RV C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
- 		rv = reset_login_state(session->slot, rv);
- 	}
- 
--	sc_log(context, "C_Decrypt() = %s", lookup_enum ( RV_T, rv ));
-+	/* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */
-+	sc_log(context, "C_Decrypt() finished");
- 	sc_pkcs11_unlock();
- 	return rv;
- }
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs11/misc.c b/src/pkcs11/misc.c
-index 5ca1176b1d..1d893d6181 100644
---- a/src/pkcs11/misc.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs11/misc.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- 
-+#include "common/constant-time.h"
- #include "sc-pkcs11.h"
- 
- #define DUMP_TEMPLATE_MAX	32
-@@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ CK_RV reset_login_state(struct sc_pkcs11_slot *slot, CK_RV rv)
- 			slot->p11card->framework->logout(slot);
- 		}
- 
--		if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN) {
-+		if (constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN)) {
- 			slot->login_user = -1;
- 			pop_all_login_states(slot);
- 		}
-

SOURCES/opensc-0.23.0-pin-bypass.patch

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-From 868f76fb31255fd3fdacfc3e476452efeb61c3e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frank Morgner <frankmorgner@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 12:27:23 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fixed PIN authentication bypass
-
-If two processes are accessing a token, then one process may leave the
-card usable with an authenticated PIN so that a key may sign/decrypt any
-data. This is especially the case if the token does not support a way of
-resetting the authentication status (logout).
-
-We have some tracking of the authentication status in software via
-PKCS#11, Minidriver (os-wise) and CryptoTokenKit, which is why a
-PIN-prompt will appear even though the card may technically be unlocked
-as described in the above example. However, before this change, an empty
-PIN was not verified (likely yielding an error during PIN-verification),
-but it was just checked whether the PIN is authenticated. This defeats
-the purpose of the PIN verification, because an empty PIN is not the
-correct one. Especially during OS Logon, we don't want that kind of
-shortcut, but we want the user to verify the correct PIN (even though
-the token was left unattended and authentication at the computer).
-
-This essentially reverts commit e6f7373ef066cfab6e3162e8b5f692683db23864.
----
- src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c | 13 -------------
- 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
-index 80a185fecd..393234efe4 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
-@@ -307,19 +307,6 @@ sc_pkcs15_verify_pin(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card, struct sc_pkcs15_object *pi
- 		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_PIN_REFERENCE);
- 	auth_info = (struct sc_pkcs15_auth_info *)pin_obj->data;
- 
--	/*
--	 * if pin cache is disabled, we can get here with no PIN data.
--	 * in this case, to avoid error or unnecessary pin prompting on pinpad,
--	 * check if the PIN has been already verified and the access condition
--	 * is still open on card.
--	 */
--	if (pinlen == 0) {
--	    r = sc_pkcs15_get_pin_info(p15card, pin_obj);
--
--	    if (r == SC_SUCCESS && auth_info->logged_in == SC_PIN_STATE_LOGGED_IN)
--		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
--	}
--
- 	r = _validate_pin(p15card, auth_info, pinlen);
- 
- 	if (r)
-
-From 80cc5d30635f0d2c92b5099c0f9dc680d0ffce2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 11:13:08 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pkcs15init: Check login status before asking for a pin
-
-The original code block from e6f7373 is still needed when pkcs15init
-layer checks ACLs for PKCS#15 objects, but it should be kept out of
-the libopensc, which is used for more authentication code paths
-and can be used for PIN bypass.
----
- src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c  |  1 +
- src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
-index 393234efe..b26e57236 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
-@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ sc_pkcs15_verify_pin(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card, struct sc_pkcs15_object *pi
- 		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_PIN_REFERENCE);
- 	auth_info = (struct sc_pkcs15_auth_info *)pin_obj->data;
- 
-+	/* Check the provided pin matches pin requirements */
- 	r = _validate_pin(p15card, auth_info, pinlen);
- 
- 	if (r)
-diff --git a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c
-index 9148b83b5..cca11d1f1 100644
---- a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c
-@@ -3958,6 +3958,22 @@ sc_pkcs15init_verify_secret(struct sc_profile *profile, struct sc_pkcs15_card *p
- 
- found:
- 	if (pin_obj)   {
-+		/*
-+		 * If pin cache is disabled or the reader is using pinpad, we can get here
-+		 * with no PIN data. This is ok as we can not asynchronously invoke the prompt
-+		 * (unless the pinpad is in use).
-+		 * In this case, check if the PIN has been already verified and
-+		 * the access condition is still open on card.
-+		 */
-+		if (pinsize == 0) {
-+			r = sc_pkcs15_get_pin_info(p15card, pin_obj);
-+			/* update local copy of auth info */
-+			memcpy(&auth_info, pin_obj->data, sizeof(auth_info));
-+
-+			if (r == SC_SUCCESS && auth_info.logged_in == SC_PIN_STATE_LOGGED_IN)
-+				LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
-+		}
-+
- 		r = sc_pkcs15_verify_pin(p15card, pin_obj, use_pinpad || pinsize == 0 ? NULL : pinbuf, use_pinpad ? 0 : pinsize);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Cannot validate pkcs15 PIN");
- 	}
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/opensc-0.23.0-pkcs15init.patch

@@ -1,855 +0,0 @@
-From 245efe608d083fd4e4ec96793fdefd218e26fde7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2023 13:54:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pkcs15: Avoid buffer overflow when getting last update
-
-Thanks oss-fuzz
-
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=60769
----
- src/libopensc/pkcs15.c | 16 +++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15.c
-index eb7fc6afc..4215b733a 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15.c
-@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ sc_pkcs15_get_lastupdate(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card)
- 	struct sc_context *ctx  = p15card->card->ctx;
- 	struct sc_file *file = NULL;
- 	struct sc_asn1_entry asn1_last_update[C_ASN1_LAST_UPDATE_SIZE];
--	unsigned char *content, last_update[32];
-+	unsigned char *content, last_update[32] = {0};
- 	size_t lupdate_len = sizeof(last_update) - 1;
- 	int r, content_len;
- 	size_t size;
-@@ -569,9 +569,11 @@ sc_pkcs15_get_lastupdate(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card)
- 	if (r < 0)
- 		return NULL;
- 
--	p15card->tokeninfo->last_update.gtime = strdup((char *)last_update);
--	if (!p15card->tokeninfo->last_update.gtime)
--		return NULL;
-+	if (asn1_last_update[0].flags & SC_ASN1_PRESENT) {
-+		p15card->tokeninfo->last_update.gtime = strdup((char *)last_update);
-+		if (!p15card->tokeninfo->last_update.gtime)
-+			return NULL;
-+	}
- done:
- 	sc_log(ctx, "lastUpdate.gtime '%s'", p15card->tokeninfo->last_update.gtime);
- 	return p15card->tokeninfo->last_update.gtime;
-2.41.0
-
-From 440ca666eff10cc7011901252d20f3fc4ea23651 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2023 13:41:36 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] setcos: Avoid buffer underflow
-
-Thanks oss-fuzz
-
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=60672
----
- src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c
-index 1b56afe6d..1907b47f9 100644
---- a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c
-@@ -349,6 +349,10 @@ setcos_create_key(sc_profile_t *profile, sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
- 
- 	/* Replace the path of instantiated key template by the path from the object data. */
-         memcpy(&file->path, &key_info->path, sizeof(file->path));
-+	if (file->path.len < 2) {
-+		sc_file_free(file);
-+		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Invalid path");
-+	}
-         file->id = file->path.value[file->path.len - 2] * 0x100
- 		+ file->path.value[file->path.len - 1];
- 
--- 
-2.41.0
-
-From 41d61da8481582e12710b5858f8b635e0a71ab5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 10:13:57 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] oberthur: Avoid buffer overflow
-
-Thanks oss-fuzz
-
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=60650
----
- src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-oberthur.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-oberthur.c b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-oberthur.c
-index ad2cabd53..c441ab1e7 100644
---- a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-oberthur.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-oberthur.c
-@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ cosm_create_key(struct sc_profile *profile, struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
- 	if (object->type != SC_PKCS15_TYPE_PRKEY_RSA)
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "Create key failed: RSA only supported");
- 
-+	if (key_info->path.len < 2)
-+		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID, "The path needs to be at least to bytes long");
-+
- 	sc_log(ctx,  "create private key ID:%s",  sc_pkcs15_print_id(&key_info->id));
- 	/* Here, the path of private key file should be defined.
- 	 * Nevertheless, we need to instantiate private key to get the ACLs. */
--- 
-2.41.0
-
-
-From 88880db0307a07e33cf2e1592bb029e9c170dfea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= <vhanulik@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 15:48:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pkcs15-pubkey: free DER value when parsing public key fails
-
-The der value might be allocated in asn1_decode_entry()
-but it is not released when errror occurs.
-
-Thanks OSS-Fuzz
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=59615
----
- src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c
-index 4a0ddffbe..7107c47cb 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c
-@@ -351,6 +351,8 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decode_pukdf_entry(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
- err:
- 	if (r < 0) {
- 		sc_pkcs15_free_pubkey_info(info);
-+		if (der->len)
-+			free(der->value);
- 	}
- 
- 	LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
--- 
-2.41.0
-
-From 638a5007a5d240d6fa901aa822cfeef94fe36e85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= <vhanulik@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 12:20:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pkcs15-pubkey.c: Avoid double-free
-
-Thanks OSS-Fuzz
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=60616
----
- src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c
-index 7107c47cb..49b514968 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c
-@@ -351,8 +351,12 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decode_pukdf_entry(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
- err:
- 	if (r < 0) {
- 		sc_pkcs15_free_pubkey_info(info);
--		if (der->len)
-+		if (der->len) {
- 			free(der->value);
-+			/* der points to obj->content */
-+			obj->content.value = NULL;
-+			obj->content.len = 0;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
--- 
-2.41.0
-From c449a181a6988cc1e8dc8764d23574e48cdc3fa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= <vhanulik@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:14:51 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pkcs15-cflex: check path length to prevent underflow
-
-Thanks OSS-Fuzz
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=58932
----
- src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-cflex.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-cflex.c b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-cflex.c
-index d06568073..ce1d48e62 100644
---- a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-cflex.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-cflex.c
-@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ cflex_delete_file(sc_profile_t *profile, sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card, sc_file_t *d
-         int             r = 0;
-         /* Select the parent DF */
-         path = df->path;
-+		if (path.len < 2) {
-+			return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
-+		}
-         path.len -= 2;
-         r = sc_select_file(p15card->card, &path, &parent);
-         if (r < 0)
--- 
-2.41.0
-
-From 5631e9843c832a99769def85b7b9b68b4e3e3959 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Veronika Hanulikova <xhanulik@fi.muni.cz>
-Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2023 16:07:38 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Check length of string before making copy
-
-Thanks OSS-Fuzz
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=55851
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=55998
----
- src/pkcs15init/profile.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs15init/profile.c b/src/pkcs15init/profile.c
-index 2b793b028..3bad1e853 100644
---- a/src/pkcs15init/profile.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs15init/profile.c
-@@ -1575,7 +1575,10 @@ do_acl(struct state *cur, int argc, char **argv)
- 	while (argc--) {
- 		unsigned int	op, method, id;
- 
-+		if (strlen(*argv) >= sizeof(oper))
-+			goto bad;
- 		strlcpy(oper, *argv++, sizeof(oper));
-+
- 		if ((what = strchr(oper, '=')) == NULL)
- 			goto bad;
- 		*what++ = '\0';
-@@ -2288,6 +2291,9 @@ get_authid(struct state *cur, const char *value,
- 		return get_uint(cur, value, type);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (strlen(value) >= sizeof(temp))
-+		return 1;
-+
- 	n = strcspn(value, "0123456789x");
- 	strlcpy(temp, value, (sizeof(temp) > n) ? n + 1 : sizeof(temp));
- 
--- 
-2.41.0
-
-From e7f81d86dcdc751f4737f4b29a99bfc54d29c5c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frank Morgner <frankmorgner@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2022 00:45:31 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] muscle: prevent out of bounds write
-
-fixes https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=53631
----
- src/libopensc/muscle.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/muscle.c b/src/libopensc/muscle.c
-index 7af279a0a..61a4ec24d 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/muscle.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/muscle.c
-@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int msc_zero_object(sc_card_t *card, msc_id objectId, size_t dataLength)
- {
- 	u8 zeroBuffer[MSC_MAX_APDU];
- 	size_t i;
--	size_t max_write_unit = MSC_MAX_SEND - 9; /* - 9 for object ID+length */
-+	size_t max_write_unit = MIN(MSC_MAX_APDU, MSC_MAX_SEND - 9); /* - 9 for object ID+length */
- 
- 	memset(zeroBuffer, 0, max_write_unit);
- 	for(i = 0; i < dataLength; i += max_write_unit) {
--- 
-2.41.0
-
-From df5a176bfdf8c52ba89c7fef1f82f6f3b9312bc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Veronika Hanulikova <xhanulik@fi.muni.cz>
-Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 11:47:34 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Check array bounds
-
-Thanks OSS-Fuzz
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=54312
----
- src/libopensc/muscle.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/muscle.c b/src/libopensc/muscle.c
-index 61a4ec24d..9d01e0c11 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/muscle.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/muscle.c
-@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ int msc_partial_update_object(sc_card_t *card, msc_id objectId, int offset, cons
- 	sc_apdu_t apdu;
- 	int r;
- 
-+	if (dataLength + 9 > MSC_MAX_APDU)
-+		return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
-+
- 	sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x54, 0x00, 0x00);
- 	apdu.lc = dataLength + 9;
- 	if (card->ctx->debug >= 2)
--- 
-2.41.0
-
-From 578aed8391ef117ca64a9e0cba8e5c264368a0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frank Morgner <frankmorgner@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2022 00:27:18 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] sc_pkcs15init_rmdir: prevent out of bounds write
-
-fixes https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=53927
----
- src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c
-index 91cee3731..3df03c6e1 100644
---- a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-lib.c
-@@ -685,6 +685,8 @@ sc_pkcs15init_rmdir(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card, struct sc_profile *profile,
- 
- 		path = df->path;
- 		path.len += 2;
-+		if (path.len > SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE)
-+			return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
- 
- 		nfids = r / 2;
- 		while (r >= 0 && nfids--) {
--- 
-2.41.0
-
-From 4013a807492568bf9907cfb3df41f130ac83c7b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2023 10:53:46 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] setcos: Avoid writing behind the path buffer end
-
-The path->value buffer is fixed to 16 bytes so it is not always possible
-to append 2 more bytes. Doing so overruns the buffer, writing into the
-ACL block, crashing during the cleanup.
-
-Thanks oss-fuzz
-
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=64181
----
- src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c
-index 70a28048b..1eeeda064 100644
---- a/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c
-+++ b/src/pkcs15init/pkcs15-setcos.c
-@@ -287,6 +287,10 @@ setcos_new_file(sc_profile_t *profile, sc_card_t *card,
- 	file->id += num;
- 	p = &file->path;
- 	*p = profile->df_info->file->path;
-+	if (p->len + 2 > SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE) {
-+		sc_file_free(file);
-+		return SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
-+	}
- 	p->value[p->len++] = (u8) (file->id / 256);
- 	p->value[p->len++] = (u8) (file->id % 256);
- 
--- 
-2.42.0
-
-From 8fc2c20c3f895569eeb58328bb882aec07325d3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 17:48:27 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] iasecc: Avoid another buffer overflow
-
-thanks oss-fuzz
-
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=63949
----
- src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c | 9 +++++++--
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c b/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-index a41c3c2d3..86032f5a8 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ iasecc_parse_acls(struct sc_card *card, struct iasecc_sdo_docp *docp, int flags)
- {
- 	struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
- 	struct iasecc_extended_tlv *acls = &docp->acls_contact;
--	int ii, offs;
-+	int ii;
-+	size_t offs;
- 	unsigned char mask = 0x40;
- 
- 	if (flags)
-@@ -56,8 +57,12 @@ iasecc_parse_acls(struct sc_card *card, struct iasecc_sdo_docp *docp, int flags)
- 	docp->amb = *(acls->value + 0);
- 	memset(docp->scbs, 0xFF, sizeof(docp->scbs));
- 	for (ii=0, offs = 1; ii<7; ii++, mask >>= 1)
--		if (mask & docp->amb)
-+		if (mask & docp->amb) {
-+			if (offs >= acls->size) {
-+				LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+			}
- 			docp->scbs[ii] = *(acls->value + offs++);
-+		}
- 
- 	sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_parse_docp() SCBs %02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X",
- 			docp->scbs[0],docp->scbs[1],docp->scbs[2],docp->scbs[3],
--- 
-2.42.0
-
-From 83b9129bd3cfc6ac57d5554e015c3df85f5076dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 08:57:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] iassecc: Verify buffer lengths before use
-
-Thanks oss-fuzz
-
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=63163
----
- src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c b/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-index 3eeb03b91..a6e6c2677 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
- #include "iasecc.h"
- #include "iasecc-sdo.h"
- 
--static int iasecc_parse_size(unsigned char *data, size_t *out);
-+static int iasecc_parse_size(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t *out);
- 
- 
- static int
-@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ iasecc_se_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, stru
- 	LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
- 
- 	if (*data == IASECC_SDO_TEMPLATE_TAG)   {
--		size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 1, &size);
-+		size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 1, data_len - 1, &size);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, size_size, "parse error: invalid size data of IASECC_SDO_TEMPLATE");
- 
- 		data += size_size + 1;
-@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ iasecc_se_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, stru
- 		if ((*(data + 1) & 0x7F) != IASECC_SDO_CLASS_SE)
- 			 LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
- 
--		size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 3, &size);
-+		size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 3, data_len - 3, &size);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, size_size, "parse error: invalid SDO SE data size");
- 
- 		if (data_len != size + size_size + 3)
-@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ iasecc_se_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, stru
- 		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
- 	}
- 
--	size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 1, &size);
-+	size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 1, data_len - 1, &size);
- 	LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, size_size, "parse error: invalid size data");
- 
- 	if (data_len != size + size_size + 1)
-@@ -387,17 +387,17 @@ iasecc_se_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, stru
- 
- 
- static int
--iasecc_parse_size(unsigned char *data, size_t *out)
-+iasecc_parse_size(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t *out)
- {
--	if (*data < 0x80)   {
-+	if (*data < 0x80 && data_len > 0) {
- 		*out = *data;
- 		return 1;
- 	}
--	else if (*data == 0x81)   {
-+	else if (*data == 0x81 && data_len > 1) {
- 		*out = *(data + 1);
- 		return 2;
- 	}
--	else if (*data == 0x82)   {
-+	else if (*data == 0x82 && data_len > 2) {
- 		*out = *(data + 1) * 0x100 + *(data + 2);
- 		return 3;
- 	}
-@@ -407,14 +407,18 @@ iasecc_parse_size(unsigned char *data, size_t *out)
- 
- 
- static int
--iasecc_parse_get_tlv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, struct iasecc_extended_tlv *tlv)
-+iasecc_parse_get_tlv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, struct iasecc_extended_tlv *tlv)
- {
- 	struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
- 	size_t size_len, tag_len;
- 
- 	memset(tlv, 0, sizeof(*tlv));
- 	sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_parse_get_tlv() called for tag 0x%X", *data);
-+	if (data_len < 1)
-+		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
- 	if ((*data == 0x7F) || (*data == 0x5F))   {
-+		if (data_len < 2)
-+			LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
- 		tlv->tag = *data * 0x100 + *(data + 1);
- 		tag_len = 2;
- 	}
-@@ -424,8 +428,11 @@ iasecc_parse_get_tlv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, struct iasecc_ex
- 	}
- 
- 	sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_parse_get_tlv() tlv->tag 0x%X", tlv->tag);
--	size_len = iasecc_parse_size(data + tag_len, &tlv->size);
-+	size_len = iasecc_parse_size(data + tag_len, data_len - tag_len, &tlv->size);
- 	LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, size_len, "parse error: invalid size data");
-+	if (tag_len + size_len + tlv->size > data_len) {
-+		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+	}
- 
- 	tlv->value = calloc(1, tlv->size);
- 	if (!tlv->value)
-@@ -452,7 +459,7 @@ iasecc_parse_chv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, str
- 	while(offs < data_len)   {
- 		struct iasecc_extended_tlv tlv;
- 
--		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, &tlv);
-+		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, data_len - offs, &tlv);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "iasecc_parse_chv() get and parse TLV error");
- 
- 		sc_log(ctx,
-@@ -486,7 +493,7 @@ iasecc_parse_prvkey(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
- 	while(offs < data_len)   {
- 		struct iasecc_extended_tlv tlv;
- 
--		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, &tlv);
-+		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, data_len - offs, &tlv);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "iasecc_parse_prvkey() get and parse TLV error");
- 
- 		sc_log(ctx,
-@@ -516,7 +523,7 @@ iasecc_parse_pubkey(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
- 	while(offs < data_len)   {
- 		struct iasecc_extended_tlv tlv;
- 
--		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, &tlv);
-+		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, data_len - offs, &tlv);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "iasecc_parse_pubkey() get and parse TLV error");
- 
- 		sc_log(ctx,
-@@ -554,7 +561,7 @@ iasecc_parse_keyset(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
- 	while(offs < data_len)   {
- 		struct iasecc_extended_tlv tlv;
- 
--		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, &tlv);
-+		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, data_len - offs, &tlv);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "iasecc_parse_keyset() get and parse TLV error");
- 
- 		sc_log(ctx,
-@@ -586,7 +593,7 @@ iasecc_parse_docp(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, st
- 	while(offs < data_len)   {
- 		struct iasecc_extended_tlv tlv;
- 
--		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, &tlv);
-+		rv = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data + offs, data_len - offs, &tlv);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "iasecc_parse_get_tlv() get and parse TLV error");
- 
- 		sc_log(ctx,
-@@ -641,7 +648,7 @@ iasecc_parse_docp(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, st
- 
- 
- static int
--iasecc_sdo_parse_data(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, struct iasecc_sdo *sdo)
-+iasecc_sdo_parse_data(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, struct iasecc_sdo *sdo)
- {
- 	struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
- 	struct iasecc_extended_tlv tlv;
-@@ -650,7 +657,7 @@ iasecc_sdo_parse_data(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, struct iasecc_s
- 	LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
- 	sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_sdo_parse_data() class %X; ref %X", sdo->sdo_class, sdo->sdo_ref);
- 
--	tlv_size = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data, &tlv);
-+	tlv_size = iasecc_parse_get_tlv(card, data, data_len, &tlv);
- 	LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, tlv_size, "parse error: get TLV");
- 
- 	sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_sdo_parse_data() tlv.tag 0x%X", tlv.tag);
-@@ -735,7 +742,7 @@ iasecc_sdo_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, str
- 	LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
- 
- 	if (*data == IASECC_SDO_TEMPLATE_TAG)   {
--		size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 1, &size);
-+		size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 1, data_len - 1, &size);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, size_size, "parse error: invalid size data of IASECC_SDO_TEMPLATE");
- 
- 		data += size_size + 1;
-@@ -754,7 +761,7 @@ iasecc_sdo_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, str
- 	if (sdo->sdo_ref != (*(data + 2) & 0x3F))
- 		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
- 
--	size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 3, &size);
-+	size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 3, data_len - 3, &size);
- 	LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, size_size, "parse error: invalid size data");
- 
- 	if (data_len != size + size_size + 3)
-@@ -766,7 +773,7 @@ iasecc_sdo_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, str
- 
- 	offs = 3 + size_size;
- 	for (; offs < data_len;)   {
--		rv = iasecc_sdo_parse_data(card, data + offs, sdo);
-+		rv = iasecc_sdo_parse_data(card, data + offs, data_len - offs, sdo);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "parse error: invalid SDO data");
- 
- 		offs += rv;
-@@ -812,7 +819,7 @@ iasecc_sdo_allocate_and_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t
- 	if (data_len == 3)
- 		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
- 
--	size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 3, &size);
-+	size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 3, data_len - 3, &size);
- 	LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, size_size, "parse error: invalid size data");
- 
- 	if (data_len != size + size_size + 3)
-@@ -824,7 +831,7 @@ iasecc_sdo_allocate_and_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t
- 
- 	offs = 3 + size_size;
- 	for (; offs < data_len;)   {
--		rv = iasecc_sdo_parse_data(card, data + offs, sdo);
-+		rv = iasecc_sdo_parse_data(card, data + offs, data_len - offs, sdo);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "parse error: invalid SDO data");
- 
- 		offs += rv;
-@@ -1222,7 +1229,7 @@ iasecc_sdo_parse_card_answer(struct sc_context *ctx, unsigned char *data, size_t
- 
- 	memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
- 	for (offs=0; offs<data_len; )   {
--		size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 1, &size);
-+		size_size = iasecc_parse_size(data + 1, data_len - 1, &size);
- 
- 		if (*(data + offs) == IASECC_CARD_ANSWER_TAG_DATA )   {
- 			if (size > sizeof(out->data))
-@@ -1293,7 +1300,7 @@ iasecc_docp_copy(struct sc_context *ctx, struct iasecc_sdo_docp *in, struct iase
- 	int rv;
- 
- 	LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
--	if (!in || !out) 
-+	if (!in || !out)
- 		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
- 
- 	memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct iasecc_sdo_docp));
--- 
-2.42.0
-
-From fbda61d0d276dc98b9d1d1e6810bbd21d19e3859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 13:23:18 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] iasecc: Avoid buffer overflow with invalid data
-
-Thanks oss-fuzz
-
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=63587
----
- src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c b/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-index 1e01c0df5..479b3c23b 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-@@ -371,15 +371,15 @@ iasecc_se_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, stru
- static int
- iasecc_parse_size(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t *out)
- {
--	if (*data < 0x80 && data_len > 0) {
-+	if (data_len > 0 && *data < 0x80) {
- 		*out = *data;
- 		return 1;
- 	}
--	else if (*data == 0x81 && data_len > 1) {
-+	else if (data_len > 1 && *data == 0x81) {
- 		*out = *(data + 1);
- 		return 2;
- 	}
--	else if (*data == 0x82 && data_len > 2) {
-+	else if (data_len > 2 && *data == 0x82) {
- 		*out = *(data + 1) * 0x100 + *(data + 2);
- 		return 3;
- 	}
--- 
-2.42.0
-
-From 2a4921ab23fd0853f327517636c50de947548161 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= <vhanulik@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2023 14:40:21 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] iasecc: Check length of data when parsing crt
-
-Thanks OSS-Fuzz
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=61797
----
- src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c | 9 +++++++--
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c b/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-index b3e567dd5..3eeb03b91 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.c
-@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ iasecc_sdo_free(struct sc_card *card, struct iasecc_sdo *sdo)
- 
- 
- static int
--iasecc_crt_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, struct iasecc_se_info *se)
-+iasecc_crt_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, struct iasecc_se_info *se)
- {
- 	struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
- 	struct sc_crt crt;
-@@ -212,11 +212,16 @@ iasecc_crt_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, struct iasecc_se_inf
- 
- 	sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_crt_parse(0x%X) called", *data);
- 
-+	if (data_len < 2)
-+		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+
- 	memset(&crt, 0, sizeof(crt));
- 	crt.tag = *(data + 0);
- 	len = *(data + 1);
- 
- 	for(offs = 2; offs < len + 2; offs += 3)   {
-+		if ((size_t) offs + 2 >= data_len)
-+			LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
- 		sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_crt_parse(0x%X) CRT %X -> %X", *data, *(data + offs), *(data + offs + 2));
- 		if (*(data + offs) == IASECC_CRT_TAG_USAGE)   {
- 			crt.usage = *(data + offs + 2);
-@@ -368,7 +373,7 @@ iasecc_se_parse(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, stru
- 
- 	offs = 1 + size_size;
- 	for (; offs < data_len;)   {
--		rv = iasecc_crt_parse(card, data + offs, se);
-+		rv = iasecc_crt_parse(card, data + offs, data_len - offs, se);
- 		LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "parse error: invalid SE data");
- 
- 		offs += rv;
--- 
-2.42.0
-
-From 6085994384a7171c5c68f6718d9db10ed77c5af1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= <vhanulik@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 13:56:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] card-entersafe.c: Free modulus buffer in case of error
-
-Thanks OSS-Fuzz
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=60680
----
- src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c b/src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c
-index eb31f7146..168894abd 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c
-@@ -1423,12 +1423,18 @@ static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
- 		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
- 
- 	p=rbuf;
--	if (*p!='E')
-+	if (*p!='E') {
-+		free(data->modulus);
-+		data->modulus = NULL;
- 		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+	}
- 	p+=2+p[1];
- 	/* N */
--	if (*p!='N')
-+	if (*p!='N') {
-+		free(data->modulus);
-+		data->modulus = NULL;
- 		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+	}
- 	++p;
- 	if(*p++>0x80)
- 	{
--- 
-2.42.0
-
-From 50f0985f6343eeac4044661d56807ee9286db42c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2023 19:08:39 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] entersafe: Avoid buffer overflow during keygen
-
-Thanks oss-fuzz
-
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=63104
----
- src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c b/src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c
-index 168894abd..feb9ebe18 100644
---- a/src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c
-+++ b/src/libopensc/card-entersafe.c
-@@ -1374,8 +1374,9 @@ static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
- 	int	r;
- 	size_t len = data->key_length >> 3;
- 	sc_apdu_t apdu;
--	u8 rbuf[300];
-+	u8 rbuf[300] = {0};
- 	u8 sbuf[4],*p;
-+	size_t plen = 0;
- 
- 	SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
- 
-@@ -1418,40 +1419,49 @@ static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
- 	LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
- 	LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe get pukey failed");
- 
--	data->modulus = malloc(len);
--	if (!data->modulus)
--		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
--
--	p=rbuf;
--	if (*p!='E') {
--		free(data->modulus);
--		data->modulus = NULL;
-+	p = rbuf;
-+	plen = apdu.resplen;
-+	if (*p != 'E') {
- 		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
- 	}
--	p+=2+p[1];
-+	if ((size_t)(p - rbuf) + 2 + p[1] >= plen) {
-+		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+	}
-+	p += 2 + p[1];
- 	/* N */
--	if (*p!='N') {
--		free(data->modulus);
--		data->modulus = NULL;
-+	if (*p != 'N') {
-+		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+	}
-+	if ((size_t)(p - rbuf) + 2 >= plen) {
- 		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
- 	}
- 	++p;
--	if(*p++>0x80)
-+	if (*p++ > 0x80)
- 	{
--		 u8 len_bytes=(*(p-1))&0x0f;
--		 size_t module_len=0;
--		 while(len_bytes!=0)
-+		u8 len_bytes = (*(p - 1)) & 0x0f;
-+		size_t module_len = 0;
-+		if ((size_t)(p - rbuf) + len_bytes >= plen) {
-+			SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+		}
-+		 while (len_bytes != 0)
- 		 {
--			  module_len=module_len<<8;
--			  module_len+=*p++;
-+			  module_len = module_len << 8;
-+			  module_len += *p++;
- 			  --len_bytes;
- 		 }
- 	}
- 
--	entersafe_reverse_buffer(p,len);
--	memcpy(data->modulus,p,len);
-+	if ((p - rbuf) + len >= plen) {
-+		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
-+	}
- 
--	SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
-+	data->modulus = malloc(len);
-+	if (!data->modulus)
-+		SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
-+	entersafe_reverse_buffer(p, len);
-+	memcpy(data->modulus, p, len);
-+
-+	SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_SUCCESS);
- }
- 
- static int entersafe_get_serialnr(sc_card_t *card, sc_serial_number_t *serial)
--- 
-2.42.0
-

SPECS/opensc.spec

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 
 Name:           opensc
 Version:        0.20.0
-Release:        8%{?dist}
+Release:        6%{?dist}
 Summary:        Smart card library and applications
 
 Group:          System Environment/Libraries
@@ -54,33 +54,7 @@ Patch18:        opensc-0.20.0-CVE-2023-2977.patch
 # 295f399304644e6b0acde267ac410d0aae4a1aee
 # ca01aa7a8edc8280a5ceadebb472c2e3c198d8c2
 Patch19:        opensc-0.20.0-reader-removal.patch
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/bff98ff078a99e6864ba1a598fd7dc9af4a9476b
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/0875c69295ef28b45fb682b37cede58fc36b7a1a
-Patch20:        %{name}-0.23.0-cache-offsets.patch
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/868f76fb31255fd3fdacfc3e476452efeb61c3e7
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/80cc5d30635f0d2c92b5099c0f9dc680d0ffce2f
-Patch21:        %{name}-0.23.0-pin-bypass.patch
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/245efe608d083fd4e4ec96793fdefd218e26fde7
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/440ca666eff10cc7011901252d20f3fc4ea23651
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/41d61da8481582e12710b5858f8b635e0a71ab5e
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/88880db0307a07e33cf2e1592bb029e9c170dfea
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/638a5007a5d240d6fa901aa822cfeef94fe36e85
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/c449a181a6988cc1e8dc8764d23574e48cdc3fa6
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/5631e9843c832a99769def85b7b9b68b4e3e3959
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/e7f81d86dcdc751f4737f4b29a99bfc54d29c5c9
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/df5a176bfdf8c52ba89c7fef1f82f6f3b9312bc1
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/578aed8391ef117ca64a9e0cba8e5c264368a0ec
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/013a807492568bf9907cfb3df41f130ac83c7b9
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/fc2c20c3f895569eeb58328bb882aec07325d3b
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/3b9129bd3cfc6ac57d5554e015c3df85f5076dc
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/bda61d0d276dc98b9d1d1e6810bbd21d19e3859
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/a4921ab23fd0853f327517636c50de947548161
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/085994384a7171c5c68f6718d9db10ed77c5af1
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/0f0985f6343eeac4044661d56807ee9286db42c
-Patch22:        %{name}-0.23.0-pkcs15init.patch
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948
-# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/3016
-Patch23:        %{name}-0.23.0-constant-time-pkcs1.patch
+
 
 BuildRequires:  pcsc-lite-devel
 BuildRequires:  readline-devel
@@ -122,10 +96,6 @@ every software/card that does so, too.
 %patch17 -p1 -b .idprime
 %patch18 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-2977
 %patch19 -p1 -b .reader-removal
-%patch20 -p1 -b .cache-offsets
-%patch21 -p1 -b .pin-bypass
-%patch22 -p1 -b .pkcs15init
-%patch23 -p1 -b .constant-time-pkcs1.5
 
 cp -p src/pkcs15init/README ./README.pkcs15init
 cp -p src/scconf/README.scconf .
@@ -284,15 +254,6 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Feb 08 2024 Veronika Hanulikova <vhanulik@redhat.com> - 0.20.0-8
-- Fix CVE-2023-5992: Side-channel leaks while stripping encryption PKCS#1.5 padding
-
-* Thu Nov 30 2023 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 0.20.0-7
-- Fix file caching with different offsets (RHEL-4077)
-- Fix CVE-2023-40660: Potential PIN bypass
-- Fix CVE-2023-40661: Dynamic analyzers reports in pkcs15init
-- Fix CVE-2023-5992: Marvin: Side-channel leaks while stripping encryption PKCS#1.5 padding
-
 * Tue Jul 11 2023 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 0.20.0-6
 - Fix introduced issues tagged by coverity (RHEL-765)