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import CS opensc-0.20.0-8.el8

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This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2024-02-26 06:54:26 +00:00
parent 7c06243f93
commit 9cb13bfdf0
2 changed files with 239 additions and 167 deletions
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400
SOURCES/opensc-0.23.0-constant-time-pkcs1.patch
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@ -24,48 +24,64 @@ index 5153428dc..9ecbffe8f 100644
if [ -x "$(CLANGTIDY)" ]; then clang-tidy -config='' -header-filter=.* $(TIDY_FILES) -- $(TIDY_FLAGS); fi
diff --git a/src/common/constant-time.h b/src/common/constant-time.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f70251f5d
index 0000000000..40c3e500c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/constant-time.h
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/* Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/include/internal/constant_time.h */
+
+#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_H
+# define CONSTANT_TIME_H
+#define CONSTANT_TIME_H
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(inline)
+# if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L
+# define constant_inline inline
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+# define constant_inline __inline__
+# elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+# define constant_inline __inline
+# else
+# define constant_inline
+# endif
+#else /* use what caller wants as inline may be from config.h */
+# define constant_inline inline /* inline */
+#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L
+#define constant_inline inline
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+#define constant_inline __inline
+#else
+#define constant_inline
+#endif
+#else /* use what caller wants as inline may be from config.h */
+#define constant_inline inline /* inline */
+#endif
+
+static constant_inline unsigned int value_barrier(unsigned int a)
+/*-
+ * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true
+ * and 0 for false. For example,
+ * if (a < b) {
+ * c = a;
+ * } else {
+ * c = b;
+ * }
+ * can be written as
+ * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b);
+ * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b);
+ */
+
+static constant_inline unsigned int
+value_barrier(unsigned int a)
+{
+ volatile unsigned int r = a;
+ return r;
+ volatile unsigned int r = a;
+ return r;
+}
+
+static constant_inline size_t value_barrier_s(size_t a)
+static constant_inline size_t
+value_barrier_s(size_t a)
+{
+ volatile size_t r = a;
+ return r;
+ volatile size_t r = a;
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* MSB */
+static constant_inline size_t constant_time_msb_s(size_t a)
+static constant_inline size_t
+constant_time_msb_s(size_t a)
+{
+ return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
+ return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
+}
+
+static constant_inline unsigned int
@ -87,9 +103,10 @@ index 000000000..f70251f5d
+ return (unsigned char)constant_time_select(mask, a, b);
+}
+
+static constant_inline size_t constant_time_select_s(size_t mask, size_t a, size_t b)
+static constant_inline size_t
+constant_time_select_s(size_t mask, size_t a, size_t b)
+{
+ return (value_barrier_s(mask) & a) | (value_barrier_s(~mask) & b);
+ return (value_barrier_s(mask) & a) | (value_barrier_s(~mask) & b);
+}
+
+/* Zero */
@ -99,15 +116,17 @@ index 000000000..f70251f5d
+ return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));
+}
+
+static constant_inline size_t constant_time_is_zero_s(size_t a)
+static constant_inline size_t
+constant_time_is_zero_s(size_t a)
+{
+ return constant_time_msb_s(~a & (a - 1));
+ return constant_time_msb_s(~a & (a - 1));
+}
+
+/* Comparison*/
+static constant_inline size_t constant_time_lt_s(size_t a, size_t b)
+static constant_inline size_t
+constant_time_lt_s(size_t a, size_t b)
+{
+ return constant_time_msb_s(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b)));
+ return constant_time_msb_s(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b)));
+}
+
+static constant_inline unsigned int
@ -130,12 +149,19 @@ index 000000000..f70251f5d
+ return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
+}
+
+static constant_inline size_t constant_time_eq_s(size_t a, size_t b)
+static constant_inline size_t
+constant_time_eq_s(size_t a, size_t b)
+{
+ return constant_time_is_zero_s(a ^ b);
+ return constant_time_is_zero_s(a ^ b);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONSTANT_TIME_H */
+static constant_inline unsigned int
+constant_time_eq_i(int a, int b)
+{
+ return constant_time_eq((unsigned int)a, (unsigned int)b);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONSTANT_TIME_H */
diff --git a/src/libopensc/internal.h b/src/libopensc/internal.h
index 74014235a..13eccfa1a 100644
--- a/src/libopensc/internal.h
@ -148,16 +174,17 @@ index 74014235a..13eccfa1a 100644
+ unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len);
int sc_pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(unsigned int *algorithm,
const u8 *in_dat, size_t in_len, u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len);
diff --git a/src/libopensc/padding.c b/src/libopensc/padding.c
index 283746699..ceb2a1e21 100644
index ca47733a4e..ddb3061134 100644
--- a/src/libopensc/padding.c
+++ b/src/libopensc/padding.c
@@ -33,9 +33,12 @@
@@ -32,10 +32,13 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "internal.h"
+#include "common/constant-time.h"
#include "internal.h"
/* TODO doxygen comments */
@ -166,24 +193,36 @@ index 283746699..ceb2a1e21 100644
/*
* Prefixes for pkcs-v1 signatures
*/
@@ -184,6 +187,84 @@ sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(sc_context_t *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *out
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, len - n);
@@ -144,44 +147,82 @@ sc_pkcs1_strip_01_padding(struct sc_cont
}
+/* Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c#L171 */
+int
-/* remove pkcs1 BT02 padding (adding BT02 padding is currently not
- * needed/implemented) */
+/* Remove pkcs1 BT02 padding (adding BT02 padding is currently not
+ * needed/implemented) in constant-time.
+ * Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c#L171 */
int
-sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(sc_context_t *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *out, size_t *out_len)
+sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const u8 *data, unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len)
+{
{
- unsigned int n = 0;
-
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+ u8 *msg = NULL;
+ u8 *msg, *msg_orig = NULL;
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
+ unsigned int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, len = 0;
+ LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
- if (data == NULL || len < 3)
+
+ if (data == NULL || data_len <= 0 || data_len > n || n < SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE)
+ LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
+
+ msg = calloc(n, sizeof(u8));
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
- /* skip leading zero byte */
- if (*data == 0) {
- data++;
- len--;
+ msg = msg_orig = calloc(n, sizeof(u8));
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
+
@ -211,8 +250,25 @@ index 283746699..ceb2a1e21 100644
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(msg[i]);
+ zero_index = constant_time_select(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index);
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+ }
+
}
- if (data[0] != 0x02)
- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
- /* skip over padding bytes */
- for (n = 1; n < len && data[n]; n++)
- ;
- /* Must be at least 8 pad bytes */
- if (n >= len || n < 9)
- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
- n++;
- if (out == NULL)
- /* just check the padding */
- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
- /* Now move decrypted contents to head of buffer */
- if (*out_len < len - n)
- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
- *out_len = len - n;
- memmove(out, data + n, *out_len);
+ // zero_index stands for index of last found zero
+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+
@ -222,14 +278,12 @@ index 283746699..ceb2a1e21 100644
+ // length of message
+ mlen = data_len - msg_index;
+
+ // check that there is a message after padding
+ good &= constant_time_ge(mlen, 1);
+ // check that message fits into out buffer
+ good &= constant_time_ge(*out_len, mlen);
+
+ // move the result in-place by |num|-SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+ *out_len = constant_time_select(constant_time_lt(n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len),
+ n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len);
+ n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len);
+ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE - mlen), 0);
+ for (i = SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE; i < n - msg_index; i++)
@ -243,19 +297,21 @@ index 283746699..ceb2a1e21 100644
+ msg_index = constant_time_select(mask, i + SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, 0); // to now overflow msg buffer
+ out[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, msg[msg_index], out[i]);
+ }
+
+ free(msg);
- sc_log(ctx, "stripped output(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u): %s", len - n,
- sc_dump_hex(out, len - n));
- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, len - n);
+ free(msg_orig);
+ return constant_time_select(good, mlen, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
+}
+
}
/* add/remove DigestInfo prefix */
static int sc_pkcs1_add_digest_info_prefix(unsigned int algorithm,
const u8 *in, size_t in_len, u8 *out, size_t *out_len)
diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c
index 7c3a39432..b5e492fe2 100644
index a019af460f..f7ee819d65 100644
--- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c
+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c
@@ -308,12 +308,13 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decipher(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
@@ -286,12 +286,14 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decipher(struct sc_pkcs15_
/* Strip any padding */
if (pad_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) {
@ -263,34 +319,47 @@ index 7c3a39432..b5e492fe2 100644
- r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(ctx, out, s, out, &s);
- LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Invalid PKCS#1 padding");
+ unsigned int s = r;
+ unsigned int key_size = alg_info->key_length;
+ unsigned int key_size = (unsigned int)alg_info->key_length;
+ r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(ctx, key_size / 8, out, s, out, &s);
+ /* for keeping PKCS#1 v1.5 depadding constant-time, do not log error here */
}
- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
+ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */
+ return r;
}
/* derive one key from another. RSA can use decipher, so this is for only ECDH
diff --git a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c
index 809cd72d9..9c75759a0 100644
index f75a3dbaec..632681df63 100644
--- a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c
+++ b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include "libopensc/cardctl.h"
#include "ui/notify.h"
#include "common/compat_strnlen.h"
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
+#include "common/constant-time.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#else
@@ -4603,15 +4604,51 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, void *obj,
#include "config.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -4174,7 +4175,8 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_se
struct pkcs15_fw_data *fw_data = NULL;
struct pkcs15_prkey_object *prkey;
unsigned char decrypted[512]; /* FIXME: Will not work for keys above 4096 bits */
- int buff_too_small, rv, flags = 0, prkey_has_path = 0;
+ int rv, flags = 0, prkey_has_path = 0;
+ CK_ULONG mask, good, rv_pkcs11;
sc_log(context, "Initiating decryption.");
@@ -4246,27 +4248,54 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_se
rv = sc_pkcs15_decipher(fw_data->p15_card, prkey->prv_p15obj, flags,
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, decrypted, sizeof(decrypted));
- if (rv < 0 && !sc_pkcs11_conf.lock_login && !prkey_has_path)
+ if (!((flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) && constant_time_eq_s(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING)) &&
+ /* skip for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding prevent side channel attack */
+ if (!(flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) &&
+ rv < 0 && !sc_pkcs11_conf.lock_login && !prkey_has_path)
if (reselect_app_df(fw_data->p15_card) == SC_SUCCESS)
rv = sc_pkcs15_decipher(fw_data->p15_card, prkey->prv_p15obj, flags,
@ -299,66 +368,111 @@ index 809cd72d9..9c75759a0 100644
sc_unlock(p11card->card);
- sc_log(context, "Decryption complete. Result %d.", rv);
+ /* Handle buffer after PKCS#1 v1.5 depadding constant-time */
+ if (flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) {
+ CK_ULONG mask, good, rv_pkcs11;
+
+ sc_log(context, "Decryption complete.");
+ /* only padding error must be handled in constant-time way */
+ if ((~constant_time_eq_s(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING) & constant_time_lt_s(sizeof(decrypted), rv)))
+ return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt");
+
+ /* check rv for error */
+ good = ~constant_time_eq_s(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
+ rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(good, CKR_OK, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
+ if (pData == NULL_PTR) {
+ /* set length only if rv good */
+ *pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen);
+ /* return error only if original rv < 0 */
+ return rv_pkcs11;
+ }
+
+ /* check whether *pulDataLen < rv and set return value accordingly */
+ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(*pulDataLen, rv);
+ rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(mask, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, rv_pkcs11);
+ good &= ~mask;
+ sc_log(context, "Decryption complete.");
+ /* move everything from decrypted into out buffer, if rv is ok */
+ for (CK_ULONG i = 0; i < *pulDataLen; i++) { /* iterate over whole pData to not disclose real depadded length */
+ CK_ULONG msg_index;
+ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(i, sizeof(decrypted)); /* i should be in the bounds of decrypted */
+ mask &= constant_time_lt_s(i, constant_time_select_s(good, rv, 0)); /* check that is in bounds of depadded message */
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_s(mask, i, 0);
+ pData[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, decrypted[msg_index], pData[i]);
+ }
- if (rv < 0)
+ /* Handle following code in constant-time
return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt");
+ * to prevent Marvin attack for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. */
- buff_too_small = (*pulDataLen < (CK_ULONG)rv);
- *pulDataLen = rv;
- if (pData == NULL_PTR)
- return CKR_OK;
- if (buff_too_small)
- return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- memcpy(pData, decrypted, *pulDataLen);
-
- return CKR_OK;
+ /* only padding error must be handled in constant-time way,
+ * other error can be returned straight away */
+ if ((~constant_time_eq_i(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING) & constant_time_lt_s(sizeof(decrypted), (size_t)rv)))
+ return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt");
+
+ /* check rv for padding error */
+ good = ~constant_time_eq_i(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
+ rv_pkcs11 = sc_to_cryptoki_error(SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING, "C_Decrypt");
+ rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(good, CKR_OK, rv_pkcs11);
+
+ if (pData == NULL_PTR) {
+ /* set length only if no error */
+ *pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen);
+ /* return error only if original rv < 0 */
+ return rv_pkcs11;
+ }
+
+ sc_log(context, "Decryption complete. Result %d.", rv);
if (rv < 0)
return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt");
@@ -4622,7 +4659,6 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, void *obj,
if (buff_too_small)
return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
memcpy(pData, decrypted, *pulDataLen);
-
return CKR_OK;
+ /* check whether *pulDataLen < rv and set return value for small output buffer */
+ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(*pulDataLen, rv);
+ rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(mask, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, rv_pkcs11);
+ good &= ~mask;
+
+ /* move everything from decrypted into out buffer constant-time, if rv is ok */
+ for (CK_ULONG i = 0; i < *pulDataLen; i++) { /* iterate over whole pData to not disclose real depadded length */
+ CK_ULONG msg_index;
+ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(i, sizeof(decrypted)); /* i should be in the bounds of decrypted */
+ mask &= constant_time_lt_s(i, constant_time_select_s(good, rv, 0)); /* check that is in bounds of depadded message */
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_s(mask, i, 0);
+ pData[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, decrypted[msg_index], pData[i]);
+ }
+ *pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen);
+ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */
+ return rv_pkcs11;
}
diff --git a/src/pkcs11/misc.c b/src/pkcs11/misc.c
index 5ca1176b1..2893b2bf3 100644
--- a/src/pkcs11/misc.c
+++ b/src/pkcs11/misc.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
diff --git a/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c b/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c
index 03495265a4..d3f0434231 100644
--- a/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c
+++ b/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "sc-pkcs11.h"
+#include "common/constant-time.h"
#include "sc-pkcs11.h"
/* Also used for verification data */
@@ -1089,7 +1090,9 @@ sc_pkcs11_decr(struct sc_pkcs11_session
rv = op->type->decrypt(op, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
pData, pulDataLen);
- if (rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && pData != NULL)
+ /* terminate session for any return value except CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
+ * perform check in time side-channel free way to prevent Marvin attack */
+ if (!constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) && pData != NULL)
session_stop_operation(session, SC_PKCS11_OPERATION_DECRYPT);
return rv;
diff --git a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
index f04c0b4c56..b023911213 100644
--- a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
+++ b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
@@ -926,7 +926,8 @@ CK_RV C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
rv = reset_login_state(session->slot, rv);
}
- sc_log(context, "C_Decrypt() = %s", lookup_enum ( RV_T, rv ));
+ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */
+ sc_log(context, "C_Decrypt() finished");
sc_pkcs11_unlock();
return rv;
}
diff --git a/src/pkcs11/misc.c b/src/pkcs11/misc.c
index 5ca1176b1d..1d893d6181 100644
--- a/src/pkcs11/misc.c
+++ b/src/pkcs11/misc.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include "common/constant-time.h"
#include "sc-pkcs11.h"
#define DUMP_TEMPLATE_MAX 32
@@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ CK_RV reset_login_state(struct sc_pkcs11_slot *slot, CK_RV rv)
slot->p11card->framework->logout(slot);
}
@ -368,50 +482,4 @@ index 5ca1176b1..2893b2bf3 100644
slot->login_user = -1;
pop_all_login_states(slot);
}
diff --git a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
index f04c0b4c5..93cc319c2 100644
--- a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
+++ b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c
@@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
rv = reset_login_state(session->slot, rv);
}
- sc_log(context, "C_Decrypt() = %s", lookup_enum ( RV_T, rv ));
+ sc_log(context, "C_Decrypt()");
sc_pkcs11_unlock();
return rv;
}
diff --git a/src/libopensc/padding.c b/src/libopensc/padding.c
index ceb2a1e21..c2cc58d47 100644
--- a/src/libopensc/padding.c
+++ b/src/libopensc/padding.c
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int
sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const u8 *data, unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len)
{
unsigned int i = 0;
- u8 *msg = NULL;
+ u8 *msg, *msg_orig = NULL;
unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
unsigned int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, len = 0;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const
if (data == NULL || data_len <= 0 || data_len > n || n < SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
- msg = calloc(n, sizeof(u8));
+ msg = msg_orig = calloc(n, sizeof(u8));
if (msg == NULL)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const
out[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, msg[msg_index], out[i]);
}
- free(msg);
+ free(msg_orig);
return constant_time_select(good, mlen, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING);
}
--
2.43.0

6
SPECS/opensc.spec
View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Name: opensc
Version: 0.20.0
Release: 7%{?dist}
Release: 8%{?dist}
Summary: Smart card library and applications
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ Patch21: %{name}-0.23.0-pin-bypass.patch
# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/0f0985f6343eeac4044661d56807ee9286db42c
Patch22: %{name}-0.23.0-pkcs15init.patch
# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948
# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/3016
Patch23: %{name}-0.23.0-constant-time-pkcs1.patch
BuildRequires: pcsc-lite-devel
@ -283,6 +284,9 @@ fi
%changelog
* Thu Feb 08 2024 Veronika Hanulikova <vhanulik@redhat.com> - 0.20.0-8
- Fix CVE-2023-5992: Side-channel leaks while stripping encryption PKCS#1.5 padding
* Thu Nov 30 2023 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 0.20.0-7
- Fix file caching with different offsets (RHEL-4077)
- Fix CVE-2023-40660: Potential PIN bypass