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16 changed files with 2606 additions and 470 deletions

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38
.gitignore vendored
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opencryptoki-2.3.1.tar.gz SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.22.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-2.3.2.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-2.3.3.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-2.4.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-2.4.1.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-2.4.2.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-2.4.3.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-2.4.3.1-tar.gz
/opencryptoki-v3.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-v3.1.tgz
/opencryptoki-v3.2.tgz
/opencryptoki-v3.3.tgz
/opencryptoki-v3.4.tgz
/opencryptoki-v3.4.1.tgz
/opencryptoki-3.5.tgz
/opencryptoki-3.5.1.tgz
/opencryptoki-3.6.2.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.7.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.8.2.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.9.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.10.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.11.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.11.1.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.12.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.12.1.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.13.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.14.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.15.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.15.1.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.16.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.17.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.18.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.19.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.21.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.22.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.23.0.tar.gz
/opencryptoki-3.24.0.tar.gz

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/tier1-tests-on-x86_64-with-swtok:
summary: opencryptoki Tier1 tests on x86_64 with swtok
tag:
- Tier1
discover:
url: https://src.fedoraproject.org/tests/opencryptoki.git
filter: "tag:Tier1"
how: fmf
test:
- "Sanity/.*"
- "Regression/.*"
execute:
how: tmt
/sw-token-package-update:
summary: perform opencryptoki package update on a configured SW token
prepare:
- how: shell
order: 90
script:
- dnf -y downgrade 'opencryptoki*'
discover:
url: https://src.fedoraproject.org/tests/opencryptoki.git
how: fmf
test:
- /Update/initialized-sw-token/setup
- /Update/dnf-update-opencryptoki
- /Update/initialized-sw-token/test
execute:
how: tmt

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diff -up opencryptoki-3.11.0/configure.ac.me opencryptoki-3.11.0/configure.ac
--- opencryptoki-3.11.0/configure.ac.me 2019-01-30 17:10:19.660952694 +0100
+++ opencryptoki-3.11.0/configure.ac 2019-01-30 17:13:54.150089964 +0100
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ AC_SUBST([OPENLDAP_LIBS])
dnl Define custom variables
-lockdir=$localstatedir/lock/opencryptoki
+lockdir=/run/lock/opencryptoki
AC_SUBST(lockdir)
logdir=$localstatedir/log/opencryptoki

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diff -up opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in.me opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in
--- opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in.me 2023-05-16 20:50:08.128841932 +0200
+++ opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in 2023-05-16 21:19:35.208570589 +0200
@@ -22,17 +22,17 @@ PrivateUsers=no
PrivateNetwork=no
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK
IPAddressDeny=any
-ProtectClock=yes
+#ProtectClock=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
+#ProtectKernelLogs=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
-ProtectHostname=yes
-ProtectProc=default
+#ProtectHostname=yes
+#ProtectProc=default
ProtectSystem=strict
-ReadWritePaths=@localstatedir@
-ProcSubset=all
+ReadWritePaths=@localstatedir@ /run
+#ProcSubset=all
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
RestrictNamespaces=yes

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@ -1,28 +1,23 @@
diff -up opencryptoki-3.24.0/Makefile.am.me opencryptoki-3.24.0/Makefile.am diff -up opencryptoki-3.21.0/Makefile.am.me opencryptoki-3.21.0/Makefile.am
--- opencryptoki-3.24.0/Makefile.am.me 2024-09-12 12:53:05.023882913 +0200 --- opencryptoki-3.21.0/Makefile.am.me 2023-05-15 17:01:04.932616030 +0200
+++ opencryptoki-3.24.0/Makefile.am 2024-09-12 12:55:34.366644836 +0200 +++ opencryptoki-3.21.0/Makefile.am 2023-05-15 17:00:45.732131601 +0200
@@ -51,20 +51,8 @@ include tools/tools.mk @@ -39,15 +39,8 @@ include tools/tools.mk
include doc/doc.mk include doc/doc.mk
install-data-hook: install-data-hook:
-if AIX
- lsgroup $(pkcs_group) > /dev/null || $(GROUPADD) -a pkcs11
- lsuser $(pkcsslotd_user) > /dev/null || $(USERADD) -g $(pkcs_group) -d $(DESTDIR)$(RUN_PATH)/opencryptoki -c "Opencryptoki pkcsslotd user" $(pkcsslotd_user)
-else
- getent group $(pkcs_group) > /dev/null || $(GROUPADD) -r $(pkcs_group) - getent group $(pkcs_group) > /dev/null || $(GROUPADD) -r $(pkcs_group)
- getent passwd $(pkcsslotd_user) >/dev/null || $(USERADD) -r -g $(pkcs_group) -d $(RUN_PATH)/opencryptoki -s /sbin/nologin -c "Opencryptoki pkcsslotd user" $(pkcsslotd_user) - getent passwd $(pkcsslotd_user) >/dev/null || $(USERADD) -r -g $(pkcs_group) -d /run/opencryptoki -s /sbin/nologin -c "Opencryptoki pkcsslotd user" $(pkcsslotd_user)
-endif $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)/run/opencryptoki/
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(RUN_PATH)/opencryptoki/ - $(CHOWN) $(pkcsslotd_user):$(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)/run/opencryptoki/
- $(CHOWN) $(pkcsslotd_user):$(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)$(RUN_PATH)/opencryptoki/ - $(CHGRP) $(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)/run/opencryptoki/
- $(CHGRP) $(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)$(RUN_PATH)/opencryptoki/ - $(CHMOD) 0710 $(DESTDIR)/run/opencryptoki/
- $(CHMOD) 0710 $(DESTDIR)$(RUN_PATH)/opencryptoki/
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki
- $(CHGRP) $(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki - $(CHGRP) $(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki
- $(CHMOD) 0770 $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki - $(CHMOD) 0770 $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki
if ENABLE_LIBRARY if ENABLE_LIBRARY
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/opencryptoki/stdll $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/opencryptoki/stdll
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/pkcs11 $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/pkcs11
@@ -117,7 +105,7 @@ if ENABLE_EP11TOK @@ -100,7 +93,7 @@ if ENABLE_EP11TOK
endif endif
if ENABLE_P11SAK if ENABLE_P11SAK
test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || true test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || true
@ -31,12 +26,12 @@ diff -up opencryptoki-3.24.0/Makefile.am.me opencryptoki-3.24.0/Makefile.am
endif endif
if ENABLE_ICATOK if ENABLE_ICATOK
cd $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/opencryptoki/stdll && \ cd $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/opencryptoki/stdll && \
@@ -168,7 +156,7 @@ endif @@ -151,7 +144,7 @@ endif
if ENABLE_DAEMON if ENABLE_DAEMON
test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || true test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || true
test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/usr/sbin/pkcsslotd/opencryptoki.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf || true test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/usr/sbin/pkcsslotd/opencryptoki.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf || true
- test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 640 -o root -g $(pkcs_group) -T $(srcdir)/doc/strength-example.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || true - test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 640 -o root -g $(pkcs_group) -T $(srcdir)/doc/strength-example.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || true
+ test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 640 -o root -T $(srcdir)/doc/strength-example.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || true + test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 640 -o root -T $(srcdir)/doc/strength-example.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || true
endif endif
if !AIX
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)/etc/ld.so.conf.d $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)/etc/ld.so.conf.d
echo "$(libdir)/opencryptoki" >\

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commit f931d6e47bf2fb26aa9cf52e231d13edc1c837a1
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue Dec 12 17:16:56 2023 +0100
COMMON: Update rsa_parse_block_type_2() to not leak the message length
Take the implementation of OpenSSL function RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2()
in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c instead of ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(), since
the latter leaks the message size.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
index 326c5795..7bab1a84 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "constant_time.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
CK_BBOOL is_rsa_mechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
{
@@ -293,13 +294,16 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
CK_BYTE *out_data,
CK_ULONG *out_data_len)
{
- unsigned int ok = 0, found, zero;
- size_t zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen;
- size_t i, j;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *em = NULL;
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, equals0;
+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
+ int out_len = *out_data_len;
+ int rsa_size = in_data_len;
/*
* The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
- * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
*
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
@@ -324,55 +328,86 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
* section 7.2.2.
*/
- if (in_data_len < 11) {
+ if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_FUNCTION_FAILED));
return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
}
- ok = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[0]);
- ok &= constant_time_eq(in_data[1], 2);
+ em = malloc(rsa_size);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* in_data_len is always equal to rsa_size */
+ memcpy(em, in_data, rsa_size);
+
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
/* scan over padding data */
- found = 0;
- for (i = 2; i < in_data_len; i++) {
- zero = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[i]);
+ found_zero_byte = 0;
+ for (i = 2; i < rsa_size; i++) {
+ equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
- zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found & zero, i, zero_index);
- found |= zero;
+ zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+ i, zero_index);
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
}
/*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |enc_msg|.
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
- ok &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
/*
* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
*/
msg_index = zero_index + 1;
- mlen = in_data_len - msg_index;
+ mlen = rsa_size - msg_index;
/*
* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
*/
- ok &= constant_time_ge(*out_data_len, mlen);
+ good &= constant_time_ge(out_len, mlen);
/*
- * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
- * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
- * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
- * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
- * the value of |good|
+ * Move the result in-place by |rsa_size|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen|
+ * bytes to the left.
+ * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to
+ * |out_data|. Otherwise leave |out_data| unchanged.
+ * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+ * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+ * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+ * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+ * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
*/
- for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < in_data_len && j < *out_data_len; i++, j++)
- out_data[j] = constant_time_select_8(ok, in_data[i], out_data[j]);
+ out_len = constant_time_select_int(
+ constant_time_lt(rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, out_len),
+ rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE,
+ out_len);
+ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
+ msg_index <<= 1) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(
+ msg_index & (rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
+ for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < rsa_size - msg_index; i++)
+ em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
+ mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+ out_data[i] = constant_time_select_8(
+ mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], out_data[i]);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(em, rsa_size);
+ free(em);
- *out_data_len = j;
+ *out_data_len = constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, 0);
- return constant_time_select_int(ok, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
}
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,

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@ -0,0 +1,737 @@
commit 5f1a4f8641306ee192b70c8a32c9ee8a0fe9be5f
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon Jan 15 12:53:37 2024 +0100
common: Add support for implicit rejection for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 de-padding
Implicit rejection returns a pseudo random message in case the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
padding is incorrect, but returns no error. The pseudo random message is based
on static secret data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext, so
that the attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
instead of the result of decryption and de-padding.
The implicit rejection algorithm is the same as used by OpenSSL.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/COPYRIGHTS b/COPYRIGHTS
index 2bb3dffe..21b6b702 100644
--- a/COPYRIGHTS
+++ b/COPYRIGHTS
@@ -12,19 +12,29 @@ For code originating from OpenSSL:
* Note that in OpenSSL the file crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c does no longer
* exist, it was removed with commit https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4209ce68d8fe8b1506494efa03d378d05baf9ff8
* - usr/lib/common/constant_time.h: Copied unchanged from OpenSSL from
- include/internal/constant_time.h
+ * include/internal/constant_time.h
* - The implementation of function rsa_parse_block_type_2() in
* usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
* ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
* See comment in function rsa_parse_block_type_2() for a list of changes.
+ * - The implementation of function openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk() in
+ * usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
+ * derive_kdk() in crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c and is slightly modified to fit to
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in function
+ * openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk() for a list of changes.
+ * - The implementation of function openssl_specific_rsa_prf() in
+ * usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
+ * ossl_rsa_prf() in crypto/rsa/rsapk1.c and is slightly modified to fit to
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in function
+ * openssl_specific_rsa_prf() for a list of changes.
* - The implementation of function decode_eme_oaep() in
* usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
* RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1() in crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c and is
* slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in
* function decode_eme_oaep() for a list of changes.
*
- * Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").
* You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the OpenSSL source distribution
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h b/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
index a88b57d0..29496d99 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
+++ b/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
@@ -731,7 +731,8 @@ CK_RV rsa_format_block(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
CK_BYTE *out_data,
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type);
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type,
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen);
CK_RV get_mgf_mech(CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *mech);
@@ -3179,6 +3180,14 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac_update(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *in_data,
CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac_final(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *signature,
CK_ULONG *sig_len, CK_BBOOL sign);
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
+ const CK_BYTE *in, CK_ULONG inlen,
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen);
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_prf(CK_BYTE *out, CK_ULONG outlen,
+ const char *label, CK_ULONG labellen,
+ const CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen,
+ uint16_t bitlen);
+
#include "tok_spec_struct.h"
extern token_spec_t token_specific;
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
index 9983fcb3..da515289 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
@@ -1154,6 +1154,7 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
CK_RV rc;
CK_BYTE out[MAX_RSA_KEYLEN];
CK_ULONG modulus_bytes;
+ unsigned char kdk[SHA256_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
modulus_bytes = in_data_len;
@@ -1163,7 +1164,16 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
goto done;
}
- rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_2);
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(tokdata, key_obj,
+ in_data, in_data_len,
+ kdk, sizeof(kdk));
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_DEVEL("openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk failed\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_2,
+ kdk, sizeof(kdk));
done:
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
@@ -1254,7 +1264,7 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_verify(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *sess,
}
rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, &out_data_len,
- PKCS_BT_1);
+ PKCS_BT_1, NULL, 0);
if (rc == CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID));
return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
@@ -1318,7 +1328,8 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_verify_recover(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
return rc;
}
- rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_1);
+ rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_1,
+ NULL, 0);
if (rc == CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID));
return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
@@ -4983,3 +4994,388 @@ done:
ctx->context = NULL;
return rv;
}
+
+static CK_RV calc_rsa_priv_exp(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
+ CK_BYTE *priv_exp, CK_ULONG priv_exp_len)
+{
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *modulus = NULL, *pub_exp = NULL;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *prime1 = NULL, *prime2 = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+ BIGNUM *n, *e, *p, *q, *d;
+ CK_RV rc;
+
+ UNUSED(tokdata);
+
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new();
+ if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_secure_new failed\n");
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Get modulus a BIGNUM */
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_MODULUS,
+ &modulus);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_MODULUS\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ n = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
+ if (n == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(modulus->pValue, modulus->ulValueLen, n) == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for modulus\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ BN_set_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* Get public exponent a BIGNUM */
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
+ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, &pub_exp);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ e = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
+ if (e == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(pub_exp->pValue, pub_exp->ulValueLen, e) == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for public exponent\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ BN_set_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* Get prime1 a BIGNUM */
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_PRIME_1,
+ &prime1);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIME_1\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ p = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
+ if (p == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(prime1->pValue, prime1->ulValueLen, p) == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for prime1\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ BN_set_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* Get prime2 a BIGNUM */
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_PRIME_2,
+ &prime2);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIME_2\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ q = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
+ if (q == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(prime2->pValue, prime2->ulValueLen, q) == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for prime2\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ BN_set_flags(q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ d = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
+ if (d == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get failed to get d\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ BN_set_flags(d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /*
+ * phi(n) = (p - 1 )(q - 1) = n - p - q + 1
+ * d = e ^{-1} mod phi(n).
+ */
+ if (BN_copy(d, n) == NULL ||
+ BN_sub(d, d, p) == 0 ||
+ BN_sub(d, d, q) == 0 ||
+ BN_add_word(d, 1) == 0 ||
+ BN_mod_inverse(d, e, d, bn_ctx) == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to calculate private key part d\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(d, priv_exp, priv_exp_len) <= 0) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_bn2binpad failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+done:
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
+ const CK_BYTE *in, CK_ULONG inlen,
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
+{
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *priv_exp_attr = NULL, *modulus = NULL;
+ CK_BYTE *priv_exp = NULL, *buf = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ size_t md_len;
+ unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ CK_RV rc;
+
+ /*
+ * The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
+ * derive_kdk() in crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c and is slightly modified to fit to
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment.
+ * Changes include:
+ * - Different variable and define names.
+ * - Usage of TRACE_ERROR to report errors and issue debug messages.
+ * - Different return codes.
+ * - Different code to get the private key component 'd'.
+ * - Use of the EVP APIs instead of the internal APIs for Digest and HMAC
+ * operations.
+ */
+
+ if (kdklen != SHA256_HASH_SIZE) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("KDK length is wrong\n");
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ }
+
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_MODULUS,
+ &modulus);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_MODULUS\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ buf = calloc(1, modulus->ulValueLen);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to allocate a buffer for private exponent\n");
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
+ CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, &priv_exp_attr);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_exp_attr == NULL) {
+ rc = calc_rsa_priv_exp(tokdata, key_obj, buf, modulus->ulValueLen);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("calc_rsa_priv_exp failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ priv_exp = buf;
+ } else {
+ if (priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen < modulus->ulValueLen) {
+ memcpy(buf + modulus->ulValueLen - priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen,
+ priv_exp_attr->pValue, priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen);
+ priv_exp = buf;
+ } else {
+ priv_exp = (CK_BYTE *)priv_exp_attr->pValue +
+ priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen - modulus->ulValueLen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
+ * synthetically generated, which means that the padding check failed
+ */
+ md = EVP_sha256();
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_sha256 failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_Digest(priv_exp, modulus->ulValueLen, d_hash, NULL,
+ md, NULL) <= 0) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_Digest failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash));
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() failed.\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_MD_CTX_create() failed.\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) != 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (inlen < modulus->ulValueLen) {
+ memset(buf, 0, modulus->ulValueLen - inlen);
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, buf, modulus->ulValueLen - inlen)!= 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, in, inlen) != 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ md_len = kdklen;
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, kdk, &md_len) != 1 ||
+ md_len != kdklen) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = CKR_OK;
+
+out:
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ free(buf);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (mdctx != NULL)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_prf(CK_BYTE *out, CK_ULONG outlen,
+ const char *label, CK_ULONG labellen,
+ const CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen,
+ uint16_t bitlen)
+{
+ CK_RV rc;
+ CK_ULONG pos;
+ uint16_t iter = 0;
+ unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)];
+ unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
+ unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_HASH_SIZE];
+ size_t md_len;
+
+ /*
+ * The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
+ * ossl_rsa_prf() in crypto/rsa/rsapk1.c and is slightly modified to fit to
+ * the providers environment.
+ * Changes include:
+ * - Different variable and define names.
+ * - Usage of TRACE_ERROR report errors and issue debug messages.
+ * - Different return codes.
+ * - Use of the EVP API instead of the internal APIs for HMAC operations.
+ */
+
+ if (kdklen != SHA256_HASH_SIZE) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("invalid kdklen\n");
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ }
+ if (outlen * 8 != bitlen) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("invalid outlen\n");
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ }
+
+ be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+ be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff;
+
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, kdk, kdklen);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() failed.\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_MD_CTX_create() failed.\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
+ * synthetically generated, which means that the padding check failed
+ */
+ for (pos = 0; pos < outlen; pos += SHA256_HASH_SIZE, iter++) {
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) != 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
+ be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) != 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, (unsigned char *)label, labellen) != 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) != 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC
+ * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last
+ * unaligned block
+ */
+ md_len = SHA256_HASH_SIZE;
+ if (pos + SHA256_HASH_SIZE > outlen) {
+ md_len = sizeof(hmac_out);
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, hmac_out, &md_len) != 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(out + pos, hmac_out, outlen - pos);
+ } else {
+ md_len = outlen - pos;
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, out + pos, &md_len) != 1) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = CKR_OK;
+
+out:
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (mdctx != NULL)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
index 7bab1a84..7dc9589a 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
@@ -289,21 +289,34 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_1(CK_BYTE *in_data,
return rc;
}
+#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
+
static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
CK_BYTE *out_data,
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len)
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len,
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
{
- int i;
- unsigned char *em = NULL;
- unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, equals0;
- int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
- int out_len = *out_data_len;
- int rsa_size = in_data_len;
+ unsigned int good = 0, found_zero_byte, equals0;
+ size_t zero_index = 0, msg_index;
+ unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
+ int synthetic_length;
+ uint16_t len_candidate;
+ unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
+ uint16_t len_mask;
+ uint16_t max_sep_offset;
+ int synth_msg_index = 0;
+ size_t i, j;
+ CK_RV rc;
+
+ if (kdk == NULL || kdklen == 0) {
+ TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_ARGUMENTS_BAD));
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ }
/*
* The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
- * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
*
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
@@ -328,27 +341,67 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
* section 7.2.2.
*/
- if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
+ if (in_data_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_FUNCTION_FAILED));
return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
}
- em = malloc(rsa_size);
- if (em == NULL) {
- TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
+ /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail. */
+ synthetic = calloc(1, in_data_len);
+ if (synthetic == NULL) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to allocate synthetic buffer");
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
- /* in_data_len is always equal to rsa_size */
- memcpy(em, in_data, rsa_size);
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_prf(synthetic, in_data_len, "message", 7,
+ kdk, kdklen, in_data_len * 8);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* decide how long the random message should be */
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_prf(candidate_lengths,
+ sizeof(candidate_lengths),
+ "length", 6, kdk, kdklen,
+ MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES *
+ sizeof(len_candidate) * 8);
+ if (rc != CKR_OK)
+ goto out;
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
- good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+ /*
+ * max message size is the size of the modulus size minus 2 bytes for
+ * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding
+ */
+ len_mask = max_sep_offset = in_data_len - 2 - 8;
+ /*
+ * we want a mask so let's propagate the high bit to all positions less
+ * significant than it
+ */
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
+
+ synthetic_length = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
+ i += sizeof(len_candidate)) {
+ len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) |
+ candidate_lengths[i + 1];
+ len_candidate &= len_mask;
+
+ synthetic_length = constant_time_select_int(
+ constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset),
+ len_candidate, synthetic_length);
+ }
+
+ synth_msg_index = in_data_len - synthetic_length;
+
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(in_data[1], 2);
/* scan over padding data */
found_zero_byte = 0;
- for (i = 2; i < rsa_size; i++) {
- equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+ for (i = 2; i < in_data_len; i++) {
+ equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[i]);
zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
i, zero_index);
@@ -356,7 +409,7 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
}
/*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |in_data|.
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
@@ -367,53 +420,41 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
*/
msg_index = zero_index + 1;
- mlen = rsa_size - msg_index;
/*
- * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+ * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit
+ * into the |out_data|, since that would leak information, return the
+ * synthetic message instead
*/
- good &= constant_time_ge(out_len, mlen);
+ good &= constant_time_ge(*out_data_len, in_data_len - msg_index);
+
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index);
/*
- * Move the result in-place by |rsa_size|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen|
- * bytes to the left.
- * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to
- * |out_data|. Otherwise leave |out_data| unchanged.
- * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
- * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
- * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
- * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
- * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
+ * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
+ * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
+ * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
+ * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
+ * the value of |good|
*/
- out_len = constant_time_select_int(
- constant_time_lt(rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, out_len),
- rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE,
- out_len);
- for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
- msg_index <<= 1) {
- mask = ~constant_time_eq(
- msg_index & (rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
- for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < rsa_size - msg_index; i++)
- em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
- mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
- out_data[i] = constant_time_select_8(
- mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], out_data[i]);
- }
+ for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < in_data_len && j < *out_data_len;
+ i++, j++)
+ out_data[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, in_data[i], synthetic[i]);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(em, rsa_size);
- free(em);
+ *out_data_len = j;
- *out_data_len = constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, 0);
+out:
+ if (synthetic != NULL)
+ free(synthetic);
- return constant_time_select_int(good, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
+ return rc;
}
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
CK_BYTE *out_data,
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type)
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type,
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
{
switch (type) {
case PKCS_BT_1:
@@ -421,7 +462,7 @@ CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
out_data, out_data_len);
case PKCS_BT_2:
return rsa_parse_block_type_2(in_data, in_data_len,
- out_data, out_data_len);
+ out_data, out_data_len, kdk, kdklen);
}
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;

View File

@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
commit e2b496f58a84c2f537667655fe08a0d4923f0c70
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri Jan 12 09:36:27 2024 +0100
Constant time fixes for C_Decrypt return code handling
Return code handling of C_Decrypt, C_DecryptUpdate, and C_DecryptFinal must
be performed in a constant time manner for RSA mechanisms. Otherwise it
may cause a timing side channel that may be used to perform a Bleichenbacher
style attack.
Handling of error situations with CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or size-query calls,
where the output buffer is NULL and the required size of the output buffer
is to be returned, do not need to be performed in constant time, since
these cases are shortcut anyway, and the result is only dependent on the
modulus size of the RSA key (which is public information anyway).
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/new_host.c b/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
index 8a1e8723..bbb0f601 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
+++ b/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
#include "trace.h"
#include "slotmgr.h"
#include "attributes.h"
+#include "constant_time.h"
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
#include "../api/policy.h"
@@ -2345,6 +2346,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -2377,11 +2379,19 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt(tokdata, sess, length_only, &sess->decr_ctx,
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, pData,
pulDataLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt() failed.\n");
done:
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}
@@ -2404,6 +2414,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -2436,11 +2447,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, length_only,
&sess->decr_ctx, pEncryptedPart,
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
done:
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}
@@ -2462,6 +2480,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -2493,11 +2512,19 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, length_only, &sess->decr_ctx,
pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
done:
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
index 073b349f..6d08b95e 100644
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
@@ -9552,10 +9552,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt_final(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
rc);
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
- } else {
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ } else {
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ }
}
done:
@@ -9611,10 +9613,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
rc);
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
- } else {
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ } else {
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ }
}
done:
@@ -9676,10 +9680,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt_update(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
rc);
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
- } else {
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ } else {
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
+ }
}
done:
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
index 55e34c18..299a1d3c 100644
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include "slotmgr.h"
#include "attributes.h"
#include "ep11_specific.h"
+#include "constant_time.h"
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
#include "../api/policy.h"
@@ -2466,6 +2467,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -2513,17 +2515,29 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
length_only, sess->decr_ctx.key,
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
pData, pulDataLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_single() failed.\n");
} else {
rc = ep11tok_decrypt(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
pData, pulDataLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt() failed.\n");
}
done:
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}
@@ -2545,6 +2559,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
{
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -2596,11 +2611,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
rc = ep11tok_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedPart,
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
done:
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}
@@ -2622,6 +2644,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -2670,10 +2693,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
}
rc = ep11tok_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
done:
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}
diff --git a/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c b/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
index 6c419750..d8064559 100644
--- a/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
+++ b/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
#include "slotmgr.h"
#include "attributes.h"
#include "icsf_specific.h"
+#include "constant_time.h"
+
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
#include "../api/policy.h"
@@ -1768,6 +1770,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -1801,11 +1804,19 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
rc = icsftok_decrypt(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
pData, pulDataLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt() failed.\n");
done:
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}
@@ -1827,6 +1838,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
{
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -1857,11 +1869,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
rc = icsftok_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedPart,
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
done:
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}
@@ -1883,6 +1902,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
SESSION *sess = NULL;
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
@@ -1915,10 +1935,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
length_only = TRUE;
rc = icsftok_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ if (mask)
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
done:
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (mask) {
if (sess)
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
commit d756ba1ec270a289950e66398c7e8be59c4a594d
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri Feb 9 14:07:34 2024 +0100
COMMON: Fix implicit rejection with RSA keys with empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT
An RSA key object that has no CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT may either don't have that
attribute at all, or may have an empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT attribute.
Both situations should be handed the same, and the private exponent of the
key needs to be calculated from the other key components.
Note that RSA key objects generated with a current soft or ICA token will
always have a valid CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT attribute, since this is provided
during key generation.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
index da515289..14c82e2d 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
@@ -5160,7 +5160,8 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, &priv_exp_attr);
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE) {
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE &&
+ rc != CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID) {
TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT\n");
goto out;
}

View File

@ -1,40 +1,47 @@
Name: opencryptoki Name: opencryptoki
Summary: Implementation of the PKCS#11 (Cryptoki) specification v3.0 Summary: Implementation of the PKCS#11 (Cryptoki) specification v3.0
Version: 3.24.0 Version: 3.22.0
Release: 2%{?dist} Release: 3%{?dist}
License: CPL-1.0 License: CPL
Group: System Environment/Base
URL: https://github.com/opencryptoki/opencryptoki URL: https://github.com/opencryptoki/opencryptoki
Source0: https://github.com/opencryptoki/%{name}/archive/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz Source0: https://github.com/opencryptoki/%{name}/archive/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
# fix install problem in buildroot # bz#1373833, change tmpfiles snippets from /var/lock/* to /run/lock/*
Patch1: opencryptoki-3.24.0-p11sak.patch Patch1: opencryptoki-3.11.0-lockdir.patch
# add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf
Patch2: opencryptoki-3.21.0-p11sak.patch
# comment some unsupported sandbox options and add /run to ReadWritePaths to exclude
# /run directory from being made read-only on rhel8
Patch3: opencryptoki-3.21-sandboxing.patch
# upstream patches # upstream patches
Patch2: opencryptoki-3.24.0-compile-error-due-to-incompatible-pointer-types.patch # CVE-2024-0914 opencryptoki: timing side-channel in handling of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padded ciphertexts
Patch3: opencryptoki-3.24.0-resource-leaks.patch Patch20: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part1.patch
Patch21: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part2.patch
Patch22: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part3.patch
Patch23: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part4.patch
Patch24: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part5.patch
Requires(pre): coreutils Requires(pre): coreutils diffutils
Requires: (selinux-policy >= 38.1.14-1 if selinux-policy-targeted) Requires: (selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-121 if selinux-policy-targeted)
BuildRequires: gcc gcc-c++ BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.1.1 BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.1.1
%if 0%{?tmptok}
BuildRequires: trousers-devel BuildRequires: trousers-devel
%endif
BuildRequires: openldap-devel BuildRequires: openldap-devel
BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool
BuildRequires: bison flex BuildRequires: bison flex
BuildRequires: systemd-devel
BuildRequires: libcap-devel BuildRequires: libcap-devel
BuildRequires: expect BuildRequires: expect
BuildRequires: make BuildRequires: make
BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
%ifarch s390 s390x %ifarch s390 s390x
BuildRequires: libica-devel >= 3.3 BuildRequires: libica-devel >= 3.3
# for /usr/include/libudev.h
BuildRequires: systemd-devel
%endif %endif
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: %{name}(token) Requires: %{name}(token)
Requires(post): systemd diffutils Requires(post): systemd
Requires(preun): systemd Requires(preun): systemd
Requires(postun): systemd Requires(postun): systemd
@ -49,8 +56,9 @@ This package contains the Slot Daemon (pkcsslotd) and general utilities.
%package libs %package libs
Summary: The run-time libraries for opencryptoki package Group: System Environment/Libraries
Requires(pre): shadow-utils Summary: The run-time libraries for opencryptoki package
Requires(pre): shadow-utils
%description libs %description libs
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
@ -64,8 +72,9 @@ functional.
%package devel %package devel
Summary: Development files for openCryptoki Group: Development/Libraries
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Summary: Development files for openCryptoki
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
%description devel %description devel
This package contains the development header files for building This package contains the development header files for building
@ -73,10 +82,11 @@ opencryptoki and PKCS#11 based applications
%package swtok %package swtok
Summary: The software token implementation for opencryptoki Group: System Environment/Libraries
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Summary: The software token implementation for opencryptoki
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token) Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token)
%description swtok %description swtok
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
@ -89,10 +99,11 @@ without any specific cryptographic hardware.
%package tpmtok %package tpmtok
Summary: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) device support for opencryptoki Group: System Environment/Libraries
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Summary: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) device support for opencryptoki
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token) Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token)
%description tpmtok %description tpmtok
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
@ -105,10 +116,11 @@ Trusted Platform Module (TPM) devices in the opencryptoki stack.
%package icsftok %package icsftok
Summary: ICSF token support for opencryptoki Group: System Environment/Libraries
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Summary: ICSF token support for opencryptoki
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token) Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token)
%description icsftok %description icsftok
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
@ -120,11 +132,13 @@ This package brings the necessary libraries and files to support
ICSF token in the opencryptoki stack. ICSF token in the opencryptoki stack.
%ifarch s390 s390x
%package icatok %package icatok
Summary: ICA cryptographic devices (clear-key) support for opencryptoki Group: System Environment/Libraries
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Summary: ICA cryptographic devices (clear-key) support for opencryptoki
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token) Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token)
%description icatok %description icatok
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
@ -138,10 +152,11 @@ cryptographic hardware such as IBM 4764 or 4765 that uses the
"accelerator" or "clear-key" path. "accelerator" or "clear-key" path.
%package ccatok %package ccatok
Summary: CCA cryptographic devices (secure-key) support for opencryptoki Group: System Environment/Libraries
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Summary: CCA cryptographic devices (secure-key) support for opencryptoki
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token) Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token)
%description ccatok %description ccatok
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
@ -155,10 +170,11 @@ cryptographic hardware such as IBM 4764 or 4765 that uses the
"co-processor" or "secure-key" path. "co-processor" or "secure-key" path.
%package ep11tok %package ep11tok
Summary: EP11 cryptographic devices (secure-key) support for opencryptoki Group: System Environment/Libraries
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Summary: CCA cryptographic devices (secure-key) support for opencryptoki
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token) Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}(token)
%description ep11tok %description ep11tok
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
@ -170,6 +186,7 @@ This package brings the necessary libraries and files to support EP11
tokens in the opencryptoki stack. The EP11 token is a token that uses tokens in the opencryptoki stack. The EP11 token is a token that uses
the IBM Crypto Express adapters (starting with Crypto Express 4S adapters) the IBM Crypto Express adapters (starting with Crypto Express 4S adapters)
configured with Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) firmware. configured with Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) firmware.
%endif
%prep %prep
@ -179,29 +196,48 @@ configured with Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) firmware.
%build %build
./bootstrap.sh ./bootstrap.sh
%configure --with-systemd=%{_unitdir} --enable-testcases \ %configure --with-systemd=%{_unitdir} \
--with-pkcsslotd-user=pkcsslotd --with-pkcs-group=pkcs11 \ --with-pkcsslotd-user=pkcsslotd --with-pkcs-group=pkcs11 \
%if 0%{?tpmtok}
--enable-tpmtok \
%else
--disable-tpmtok \
%endif
%ifarch s390 s390x %ifarch s390 s390x
--enable-icatok --enable-ccatok --enable-ep11tok --enable-pkcsep11_migrate --enable-icatok --enable-ccatok --enable-ep11tok --enable-pkcsep11_migrate
%else %else
--disable-icatok --enable-ccatok --disable-ep11tok --disable-pkcsep11_migrate --enable-pkcscca_migrate --disable-icatok --disable-ccatok --disable-ep11tok --disable-pkcsep11_migrate --disable-pkcscca_migrate
%endif %endif
%make_build CHGRP=/bin/true make %{?_smp_mflags} CHGRP=/bin/true
%install %install
%make_install CHGRP=/bin/true make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT CHGRP=/bin/true
# Remove unwanted cruft
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/%{name}/*.la
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/%{name}/stdll/*.la
%post libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%post swtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%post tpmtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%post icsftok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%ifarch s390 s390x
%post icatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%post ccatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%post ep11tok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%endif
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%postun swtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%postun tpmtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%postun icsftok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%ifarch s390 s390x
%postun icatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%postun ccatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%postun ep11tok -p /sbin/ldconfig
%endif
%pre %pre
# don't touch opencryptoki.conf even if it is unchanged due to new tokversion # don't touch opencryptoki.conf even if it is unchanged due to new tokversion
# backup config file. bz#2044179 # backup config file
%global cfile /etc/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf %global cfile /etc/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf
%global csuffix .rpmsave.XyoP %global csuffix .rpmsave.XyoP
if test $1 -gt 1 && test -f %{cfile} ; then if test $1 -gt 1 && test -f %{cfile} ; then
@ -224,7 +260,7 @@ fi
%systemd_post pkcsslotd.service %systemd_post pkcsslotd.service
if test $1 -eq 1; then if test $1 -eq 1; then
%tmpfiles_create %{name}.conf %tmpfiles_create
fi fi
%preun %preun
@ -233,6 +269,8 @@ fi
%postun %postun
%systemd_postun_with_restart pkcsslotd.service %systemd_postun_with_restart pkcsslotd.service
%triggerun -- opencryptoki < 3.21.0-1
/usr/bin/systemctl daemon-reload
%files %files
%doc ChangeLog FAQ README.md %doc ChangeLog FAQ README.md
@ -251,13 +289,11 @@ fi
%{_sbindir}/pkcsslotd %{_sbindir}/pkcsslotd
%{_sbindir}/pkcsstats %{_sbindir}/pkcsstats
%{_sbindir}/pkcshsm_mk_change %{_sbindir}/pkcshsm_mk_change
%{_sbindir}/pkcstok_admin
%{_mandir}/man1/p11sak.1* %{_mandir}/man1/p11sak.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcstok_migrate.1* %{_mandir}/man1/pkcstok_migrate.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcsconf.1* %{_mandir}/man1/pkcsconf.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcsstats.1* %{_mandir}/man1/pkcsstats.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcshsm_mk_change.1* %{_mandir}/man1/pkcshsm_mk_change.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcstok_admin.1*
%{_mandir}/man5/policy.conf.5* %{_mandir}/man5/policy.conf.5*
%{_mandir}/man5/strength.conf.5* %{_mandir}/man5/strength.conf.5*
%{_mandir}/man5/%{name}.conf.5* %{_mandir}/man5/%{name}.conf.5*
@ -298,13 +334,11 @@ fi
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/swtok/ %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/swtok/
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/swtok/TOK_OBJ/ %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/swtok/TOK_OBJ/
%if 0%{?tmptok}
%files tpmtok %files tpmtok
%doc doc/README.tpm_stdll %doc doc/README.tpm_stdll
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_tpm.* %{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_tpm.*
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_TPM.so %{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_TPM.so
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/tpm/ %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/tpm/
%endif
%files icsftok %files icsftok
%doc doc/README.icsf_stdll %doc doc/README.icsf_stdll
@ -320,7 +354,6 @@ fi
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_ICA.so %{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_ICA.so
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/lite/ %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/lite/
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/lite/TOK_OBJ/ %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/lite/TOK_OBJ/
%endif
%files ccatok %files ccatok
%doc doc/README.cca_stdll %doc doc/README.cca_stdll
@ -332,7 +365,6 @@ fi
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/ccatok/ %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/ccatok/
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/ccatok/TOK_OBJ/ %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/ccatok/TOK_OBJ/
%ifarch s390 s390x
%files ep11tok %files ep11tok
%doc doc/README.ep11_stdll %doc doc/README.ep11_stdll
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/ep11tok.conf %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/ep11tok.conf
@ -349,223 +381,196 @@ fi
%changelog %changelog
* Thu Nov 07 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.24.0-2
- Fix resource leak
Related: RHEL-50064
* Tue Oct 22 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.24.0-1
- Resolves: RHEL-50064, update to 3.24.0
- Resolves: RHEL-50063, opencryptoki CCA Token support for x86_64 and ppc64le
- Resolves: RHEL-50058, openCryptoki CCA token support of Dilithium
- Resolves: RHEL-50056, openCryptoki cca token SHA3 support
- Resolves: RHEL-50057, openCryptoki cca token RSA OAEP v2.1 support
* Wed May 22 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.23.0-1
- Resolves: RHEL-23671, ep11 token: support protected keys for extractable keys
- Resolves: RHEL-23672, ep11 token support for FIPS 2021-session bound EP11 keys
- Resolves: RHEL-23673, update to 3.23.0
* Fri Feb 16 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-3 * Fri Feb 16 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-3
- Fix implicit rejection with RSA keys with empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT - Fix implicit rejection with RSA keys with empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT
Related: RHEL-22792 Related: RHEL-22791
* Thu Feb 08 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-2 * Thu Feb 08 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-2
- timing side-channel in handling of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padded ciphertexts (Marvin) - timing side-channel in handling of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padded ciphertexts (Marvin)
Resolves: RHEL-22792 Resolves: RHEL-22791
* Tue Nov 21 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-1 * Thu Nov 23 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-1
- Resolves: RHEL-11412, rebase to 3.22.0 - Resolves: RHEL-11413, update to 3.22.0
- Resolves: RHEL-10569, openCryptoki for PKCS #11 3.0
* Fri Jul 14 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-8 * Tue Jul 18 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-9
- Resolves: #2222592, p11sak tool: slot option does not accept argument 0 for slot index 0 - Resolves: #2223588, FTBFS
- Resolves: #2222596, p11sak fails as soon as there reside non-key objects
* Tue Jul 18 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-8
- Related: #2222595, add triggerun to reload daemon
* Fri Jul 14 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-7
- Resolves: #2222595, p11sak tool: slot option does not accept argument 0 for slot index 0
- Resolves: #2222594, p11sak fails as soon as there reside non-key objects
* Tue Jul 04 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-6
- add workaround for segfault in PEM_write_bio() on OpenSSL 1.1.1
Related: #2159741
* Tue Jun 13 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-5 * Tue Jun 13 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-5
- add requirement on selinux-policy >= 38.1.14-1 for pkcsslotd policy sandboxing - add requirement on selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-121 for pkcsslotd policy sandboxing
Related: #2160061 Related: #2159697
* Fri May 26 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-4 * Thu May 25 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-4
- add verify attributes for opencryptoki.conf to ignore the verification - add verify attributes for opencryptoki.conf to ignore the verification
Related: #2159697
Related: #2160061
* Mon May 22 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-3 * Mon May 22 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-3
- Resolves: #2110497, concurrent MK rotation for cca token - pkcsstats: Fix handling of user name
- Resolves: #2110498, concurrent MK rotation for ep11 token - p11sak: Fix user confirmation prompt behavior when stdin is closed
- Resolves: #2110499, ep11 token: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS Related: #2159697
- Resolves: #2111010, cca token: protected key support
- Resolves: #2160061, rebase to 3.21.0 * Tue May 16 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-2
- Resolves: #2160105, pkcsslotd hardening - add missing /var/lib/opencryptoki/HSM_MK_CHANGE
- Resolves: #2160107, p11sak support Dilithium and Kyber keys - disable unsupported sandbox options and add /run to ReadWritePaths to exclude
- Resolves: #2160109, ica and soft tokens: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS /run directory from being made read-only on rhel8
Related: #2159697
* Mon May 15 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-1
- Resolves: #1984865, ep11 and cca: support concurrent HSM master key changes
- Resolves: #2110500, ep11 token: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS
- Resolves: #2111011, cca token: protected key support
- Resolves: #2159697, update to 3.21.0
- Resolves: #2159740, pkcsslotd hardening
- Resolves: #2159741, p11sak support Dilithium and Kyber keys
- Resolves: #2159742, ica and soft tokens: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS
* Mon Jan 30 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-2 * Mon Jan 30 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-2
- Resolves: #2044182, Support of ep11 token for new IBM Z Hardware (IBM z16) - Resolves: #2043856, Support of ep11 token for new IBM Z Hardware (IBM z16)
* Tue Oct 11 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-1 * Tue Nov 01 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-1
- Resolves: #2126294, opencryptoki fails after generating > 500 RSA keys - Resolves: #2126612, opencryptoki fails after generating > 500 RSA keys
- Resolves: #2110314, rebase to 3.19.0 - Resolves: #2110315, rebase to 3.19.0
- Resolves: #2110989, openCryptoki key generation with expected MKVP only on CCA and EP11 tokens - Resolves: #2110990, openCryptoki key generation with expected MKVP only on CCA and EP11 tokens
- Resolves: #2110476, openCryptoki ep11 token: master key consistency - Resolves: #2110477, openCryptoki ep11 token: master key consistency
- Resolves: #2018458, openCryptoki ep11 token: vendor specific key derivation - Resolves: #1984871, openCryptoki ep11 token: vendor specific key derivation
* Fri Jul 29 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-4 * Mon Aug 01 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-3
- Related: #2044179, do not touch opencryptoki.conf if it is in place already and even if it is unchanged - Related: #2043854, do not touch opencryptoki.conf if it is in place already and even if it is unchanged
- Resolves: #2112785, EP11: Fix C_GetMechanismList returning CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
* Tue Jun 07 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-3 * Tue Jun 07 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-2
- Related: #2044179, fix json output - Related: #2043854, fix json output
* Mon May 09 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-2 * Tue May 24 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-1
- Related: #2044179, add missing strength.conf - Resolves: #2043845, rebase to 3.18.0
- Resolves: #2043854, add crypto counters
- Resolves: #2043855, support crypto profiles
* Mon May 09 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-1 * Fri Apr 15 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-4
- Resolves: #2044179, rebase to 3.18.0 - Resolves: #2066762, Dilithium support not available
- Resolves: #2068091, pkcsconf -t failed with Segmentation fault in FIPS mode
- Resolves: #2066763, Dilithium support not available
- Resolves: #2064697, OpenSSL 3.0 Compatibility for IBM Security Libraries and Tools
- Resolves: #2044181, support crypto profiles
- Resolves: #2044180, add crypto counters
* Tue May 03 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-6 * Mon Jan 17 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-3
- Resolves: #2066763, Dilithium support not available - Resolves: #2040677, API: Unlock GlobMutex if user and group check fails
* Mon Mar 14 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-5 * Tue Nov 09 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-2
- Resolves: #2064697, ICA/EP11: Support libica version 4 - Related: #1984993, add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf
* Mon Jan 17 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-4 * Tue Oct 19 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-1
- Resolves: #2040678, API: Unlock GlobMutex if user and group check fails - Resolves: #1984993, rebase to 3.17.0
- Resolves: #1984870, openCryptoki key management tool
* Sat Dec 04 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-3 * Mon Sep 13 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-6
- Related: #2015888, added missing patch pkcsslotd-pidfile - Fix: Could not open /run/lock/opencryptoki/LCK..APIlock
* Wed Nov 24 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-2 * Thu Aug 19 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-5
- Related: #2015888, add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf - Resolves: #1987256, pkcstok_migrate leaves options with multiple strings in opencryptoki.conf options without double-quotes
* Wed Nov 03 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-1 * Fri Jul 16 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-4
- Resolves: #2015888, rebase to 3.17.0 - Resolves: #1964304, Fix detection if pkcsslotd is still running
- Resolves: #2017720, openCryptoki key management tool
* Thu Aug 26 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-12 * Tue Jun 15 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-3
- Related: #1989138, Support for OpenSSL 3.0 - Related: #1919223, add conditional requirement
* Mon Aug 23 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-11 * Fri Jun 11 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-2
- Resolves: #1989138, Support for OpenSSL 3.0 - Related: #1919223, add requirement on selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-70 for using ipsec
* Thu Aug 19 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-10 * Tue Jun 01 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-1
- Resolves: #1987186, pkcstok_migrate leaves options with multiple strings in opencryptoki.conf options without double-quotes - Resolves: #1919223, rebase to 3.16.0
- Resolves: #1922195, Event Notification Support
* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-9 - Resolves: #1959936, Soft token does not check if an EC key is valid
- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags - Resolves: #1851104, import and export of secure key objects
Related: rhbz#1991688 - Resolves: #1851106, openCryptoki ep11 token: protected key support
- Resolves: #1851107, openCryptoki ep11 token: support attribute bound keys
* Wed Jul 28 2021 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-8
- Rebuild to pick up OpenSSL 3.0 Beta ABI (#1984097)
* Fri Jul 16 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-7
- Resolves: #1974365, Fix detection if pkcsslotd is still running
* Fri Jun 25 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-6
- Resolves: #1974693, pkcsslotd PIDfile below legacy directory /var/run/
* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-5
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
Related: rhbz#1971065
* Tue Jun 15 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-4
- Related: #1924120, add conditional requirement on new selinux-policy
* Mon May 17 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-3
- Resolves: #1959894, Soft token does not check if an EC key is valid
- Resolves: #1924120, Event Notification Support
* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-2
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
* Wed Mar 31 2021 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.16.0-1
- Rebase to 3.16.0
* Tue Mar 02 2021 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> - 3.15.1-6
- Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros
See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583.
* Fri Feb 12 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-5 * Fri Feb 12 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-5
- Added upstream patch, a slot ID has nothing to do with the number of slots - Resolves: #1928120, Fix problem with C_Get/SetOperationState and digest contexts
* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.15.1-4 * Fri Feb 12 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-4
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild - Resolves: #1927745, pkcscca migration fails with usr/sb2 is not a valid slot ID
* Tue Dec 22 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-3 * Thu Nov 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-3
- Drop tpm1.2 support by default - Resolves: #1902022
Fix compiling with c++
Added error message handling for p11sak remove-key command
* Tue Dec 22 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-2 * Thu Nov 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-2
- Fix compiling with c++ - Related: #1847433, Added error message handling for p11sak remove-key command
- Added error message handling for p11sak remove-key command
- Add BR on make
* Mon Nov 02 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-1 * Mon Nov 02 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-1
- Rebase to 3.15.1 - Related: #1847433
upstream fixes:
- Free generated key in all error cases
- CCA: Zeroize key buffer to avoid CCA 8/32 error
- Do not delete the map-btree entry if destroying an object is not allowed
- Remove now unused header timeb.h
- TESTCASES: Use FIPS conforming keys for 3DES CBC-MAC test vectors
- Fix buffer overrun in C_CopyObject
- TPM: Fix double free in openssl_gen_key
* Mon Oct 19 2020 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.15.0-1 * Mon Oct 19 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.0-1
- Rebase to 3.15.0 - Resolves: #1847433, rebase to 3.15.0
- Resolves: #1851105, PKCS #11 3.0 - baseline provider support
- Resolves: #1851108, openCryptoki ep11 token: enhanced functionality
- Resolves: #1851109, openCryptoki key management tool: key deletion function
* Tue Jul 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.14.0-6 * Mon Jul 06 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-5
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild - Related: #1853420, more fixes
* Tue Jul 14 2020 Tom Stellard <tstellar@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-5 * Fri Jul 03 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-4
- Use make macros - Resolves: #1853420, endian issue
- https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/UseMakeBuildInstallMacro
* Wed Jul 08 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-4 * Mon Jun 15 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-3
- added PIN conversion tool - Resolves: #1780294, PIN conversion tool
* Wed Jul 01 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-3 * Tue May 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-2
- upstream fix - handle early error cases in C_Initialize - Related: #1780293, fix regression, segfault in C_SetPin
* Wed May 27 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-2 * Tue May 19 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-1
- fix regression, segfault in C_SetPin - Resolves: #1723863 - ep11 token: Enhanced Support
- Resolves: #1780285 - ep11 token: Support for new IBM Z hardware z15
- Resolves: #1780293 - rebase to 3.14.0
- Resolves: #1800549 - key management tool: list keys function
-Resolves: #1800555 - key management tool: random key generation function
* Fri May 15 2020 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.14.0-1 * Fri Dec 13 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.1-2
- Rebase to 3.14.0 - Resolves: #1782445, EP11: Fix EC-uncompress buffer length
* Fri Mar 06 2020 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.13.0-1 * Thu Nov 28 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.1-1
- Rebase to 3.13.0 - Resolves: #1777313, rebase to 3.12.1
* Mon Feb 03 2020 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.12.1-3 * Tue Nov 12 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.0-1
- fix build with gcc 10 - Resolves: #1726243, rebase to 3.12.0
* Wed Jan 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.12.1-2 * Mon Aug 26 2019 Dan Horák <dhorak@redhat.com> - 3.11.1-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild - Resolves: #1739433, ICA HW token missing after the package update
* Wed Nov 27 2019 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.12.1-1 * Mon May 06 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.1-1
- Rebase to 3.12.1 - Resolves: #1706140, rebase to 3.11.1
* Wed Nov 13 2019 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.12.0-1 * Tue Mar 26 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-3
- Rebase to 3.12.0 - Resolves: #1667941, 3des tests failures due to FIPS incompatible test scenarios
- Resolves: #1651731, ep11 token: enhanced IBM z14 functions
- Resolves: #1651732, ep11 token: support m_*Single functions from ep11 lib
- Resolves: #1525407, use CPACF hashes in ep11 token
- Resolves: #1651238, rebase to 3.11.0
- Resolves: #1682530, gating
* Sun Sep 22 2019 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.11.1-1 * Fri Dec 14 2018 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.10.0-3
- Rebase to 3.11.1 - Resolves: #1657683, can't establish libica token in FIPS mode
- Resolves: #1652856, EP11 token fails when using Strict-Session mode or VHSM-Mode
* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.11.0-5 * Thu Oct 25 2018 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.10.0-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild - Resolves: #1602641, covscan
* Thu Mar 28 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-4
- enable testcase by default
- fix URL
* Tue Feb 19 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-3
- Resolved #1063763 - opencryptoki tools should inform the user that he is not in pkcs11 group
* Fri Feb 01 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.11.0-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
* Thu Jan 31 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-1
- Updated to 3.11.0
- Resolved #1341079 - Failed to create directory or subvolume "/var/lock/opencryptoki"
- Ported root's group membership's patch for 3.11.0
* Fri Jul 13 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.10.0-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
* Tue Jun 12 2018 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.10.0-1 * Tue Jun 12 2018 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.10.0-1
- Rebase to 3.10.0 - Rebase to 3.10.0

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@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
--- !Policy
product_versions:
- rhel-*
decision_context: osci_compose_gate
rules:
- !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build.tier0.functional}
- !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.beaker-tier1.functional}

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@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
commit e58d2086cf9268a1dd2431c64c6bcdd74c2c3233
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon Sep 16 09:16:03 2024 +0200
COMMON: Fix compile error due to incompatible pointer types
usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c:4751:36: error: passing argument 2 of
'get_sha_size' from incompatible pointer type [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
4751 | rc = get_sha_size(digest_mech, &mac_len);
usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c:4851:36: error: passing argument 2 of
'get_sha_size' from incompatible pointer type [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
4851 | rc = get_sha_size(digest_mech, &mac_len);
Closes: https://github.com/opencryptoki/opencryptoki/issues/809
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
index 296b5e0a..500b6f91 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
@@ -4731,6 +4731,7 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *in_data,
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL general = FALSE;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE digest_mech;
+ CK_ULONG mac_len2;
if (!ctx || !ctx->context) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
@@ -4748,11 +4749,12 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *in_data,
return rc;
}
- rc = get_sha_size(digest_mech, &mac_len);
+ rc = get_sha_size(digest_mech, &mac_len2);
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s get_sha_size failed\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
+ mac_len = mac_len2;
mdctx = (EVP_MD_CTX *) ctx->context;
@@ -4833,6 +4835,7 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac_final(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *signature,
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL general = FALSE;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE digest_mech;
+ CK_ULONG mac_len2;
if (!ctx || !ctx->context)
return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
@@ -4848,11 +4851,12 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac_final(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *signature,
return rc;
}
- rc = get_sha_size(digest_mech, &mac_len);
+ rc = get_sha_size(digest_mech, &mac_len2);
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
TRACE_ERROR("%s get_sha_size failed\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
+ mac_len = mac_len2;
if (signature == NULL) {
if (sign) {

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@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
commit 66a18ffa057565b6bf292e50969ea27ce33b394c
Author: Than Ngo <than@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Oct 29 13:41:23 2024 +0100
Fix resource leak
1. Defect type: RESOURCE_LEAK
4. opencryptoki-3.24.0/usr/sbin/pkcscca/pkcscca.c:740:5: alloc_fn: Storage is returned from allocation function "malloc".
5. opencryptoki-3.24.0/usr/sbin/pkcscca/pkcscca.c:740:5: var_assign: Assigning: "new_key->opaque_attr" = storage returned from "malloc(attrs[0].ulValueLen)".
7. opencryptoki-3.24.0/usr/sbin/pkcscca/pkcscca.c:748:5: noescape: Resource "new_key->opaque_attr" is not freed or pointed-to in "memcpy". [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
9. opencryptoki-3.24.0/usr/sbin/pkcscca/pkcscca.c:752:9: leaked_storage: Freeing "new_key" without freeing its pointer field "opaque_attr" leaks the storage that "opaque_attr" points to.
750| if (!new_key->label) {
751| print_error("Malloc of %lu bytes failed!", attrs[2].ulValueLen + 1);
752|-> free(new_key);
753| return 2;
754| }
2. Defect type: RESOURCE_LEAK
15. opencryptoki-3.24.0/usr/lib/common/mech_ec.c:1140:5: alloc_arg: "object_mgr_create_skel" allocates memory that is stored into "temp_obj".
21. opencryptoki-3.24.0/usr/lib/common/mech_ec.c:1182:5: leaked_storage: Variable "temp_obj" going out of scope leaks the storage it points to.
1180| free(derived_key);
1181|
1182|-> return rc;
1183| }
1184|
Signed-off-by: Than Ngo <than@redhat.com>
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_dh.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_dh.c
index b59ed852..79ac5b4d 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_dh.c
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_dh.c
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ CK_RV dh_pkcs_derive(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
TRACE_ERROR("template_update_attribute failed\n");
free(new_attr);
+ object_free(temp_obj);
+ temp_obj = NULL;
return rc;
}
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_ec.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_ec.c
index be8f5218..b062dbfb 100644
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_ec.c
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_ec.c
@@ -1152,6 +1152,8 @@ CK_RV ecdh_pkcs_derive(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *sess,
TRACE_ERROR("template_update_attribute failed\n");
free(value_attr);
free(vallen_attr);
+ object_free(temp_obj);
+ temp_obj = NULL;
goto end;
}
@@ -1160,6 +1162,8 @@ CK_RV ecdh_pkcs_derive(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *sess,
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
TRACE_ERROR("template_update_attribute failed\n");
free(vallen_attr);
+ object_free(temp_obj);
+ temp_obj = NULL;
goto end;
}
}
diff --git a/usr/sbin/pkcscca/pkcscca.c b/usr/sbin/pkcscca/pkcscca.c
index ffbe3311..a3756c14 100644
--- a/usr/sbin/pkcscca/pkcscca.c
+++ b/usr/sbin/pkcscca/pkcscca.c
@@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ int add_key(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs, struct key **keys)
new_key->label = malloc(attrs[2].ulValueLen + 1);
if (!new_key->label) {
print_error("Malloc of %lu bytes failed!", attrs[2].ulValueLen + 1);
+ free(new_key->opaque_attr);
free(new_key);
return 2;
}

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@ -1 +0,0 @@
SHA512 (opencryptoki-3.24.0.tar.gz) = 5a01c44cfd6b1a7021fabf5d0dda8871a8f569377f689109819c992fe4259764023bd76373b08040f1d01264567fceaeff2c43f2852c37f3a48450fe61c96ce7