Compare commits
No commits in common. "c8" and "c9-beta" have entirely different histories.
2
.gitignore
vendored
2
.gitignore
vendored
@ -1 +1 @@
|
||||
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.22.0.tar.gz
|
||||
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23.0.tar.gz
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||||
|
1
.opencryptoki.metadata
Normal file
1
.opencryptoki.metadata
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1 @@
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||||
0d70d0a5170a79fc358107d07a62bea1b476e0cc SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23.0.tar.gz
|
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
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diff -up opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in.me opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in
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||||
--- opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in.me 2023-05-16 20:50:08.128841932 +0200
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+++ opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in 2023-05-16 21:19:35.208570589 +0200
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@@ -22,17 +22,17 @@ PrivateUsers=no
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PrivateNetwork=no
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK
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IPAddressDeny=any
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-ProtectClock=yes
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+#ProtectClock=yes
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ProtectKernelTunables=yes
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ProtectKernelModules=yes
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-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
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+#ProtectKernelLogs=yes
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ProtectControlGroups=yes
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||||
ProtectHome=yes
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||||
-ProtectHostname=yes
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-ProtectProc=default
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+#ProtectHostname=yes
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+#ProtectProc=default
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ProtectSystem=strict
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||||
-ReadWritePaths=@localstatedir@
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||||
-ProcSubset=all
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+ReadWritePaths=@localstatedir@ /run
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+#ProcSubset=all
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MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
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RestrictRealtime=yes
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RestrictNamespaces=yes
|
50
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-01.patch
Normal file
50
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-01.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
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commit 2d68f8626d15b9697a29a377a63bbdf35b42ee36
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Author: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
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Date: Tue Feb 13 16:20:06 2024 +0100
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EP11 pkey option: add new PKEY_MODE parms to ep11 config file
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Add two new parameter values ENABLE4EXTR and ENABLE4ALL to the ep11token
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PKEY_MODE config option. Older ep11 card firmware enforces the restriction that
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keys can not have CKA_EXTRACTABLE=true and CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE=true at
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the same time. With newer card firmware this restriction is removed and a new
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control point is introduced to allow checking for this feature.
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Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
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diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11tok.conf b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11tok.conf
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index 19c9963f..afe237b9 100644
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--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11tok.conf
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+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11tok.conf
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@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
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# disabled and additional hardware and firmware prerequisites are met. AES-XTS
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# is not supported via the EP11 coprocessor itself.
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#
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-# PKEY_MODE DISABLED | DEFAULT | ENABLE4NONEXTR
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+# PKEY_MODE DISABLED | DEFAULT | ENABLE4NONEXTR | ENABLE4EXTR | ENABLE4ALL
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#
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# DISABLED : Protected key support disabled. All key operations
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# are performed via EP11 coprocessor, even if a
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@@ -119,6 +119,22 @@
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# but not CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE, new keys get
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# CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE=true internally.
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#
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+# Control point 75 (XCP_CPB_ALLOW_COMBINED_EXTRACT) must be enabled for all
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||||
+# APQNs accessible by the token for the following parameters.
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+#
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||||
+# ENABLE4EXTR : If the application did not specify
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+# CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE in its template, new keys
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||||
+# of any type with CKA_EXTRACTABLE=true get
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||||
+# CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE=true and a protected key
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+# is automatically created at first use of the key.
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+#
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||||
+# ENABLE4ALL : If the application did not specify
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||||
+# CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE in its template, new keys
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||||
+# of any type, regardless of the CKA_EXTRACTABLE
|
||||
+# attribute, get CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE=true and
|
||||
+# a protected key is automatically created at first
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+# use of the key.
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||||
+#
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||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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||||
#
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# Specify the expected wrapping key verification pattern. When specified, all
|
222
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-02.patch
Normal file
222
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-02.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
|
||||
commit a6192bb9c3263fb691da87b3a1ed5f66f887b09a
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||||
Author: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
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||||
Date: Tue Feb 13 16:35:53 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
EP11 pkey option: handle new PKEY_MODE parms for new objects
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
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||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
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||||
index d5964a9c..d1efd8c5 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
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@@ -1239,6 +1239,33 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_check_aes_xts(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||
return CKR_OK;
|
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}
|
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|
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+CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(TEMPLATE *tmpl)
|
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+{
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+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *pkey_attr = NULL;
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+ CK_BBOOL btrue = CK_TRUE;
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+ CK_RV ret;
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+
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+ if (!template_attribute_find(tmpl, CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE, &pkey_attr)) {
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+ ret = build_attribute(CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE, &btrue,
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+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL), &pkey_attr);
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+ if (ret != CKR_OK) {
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+ TRACE_ERROR("build_attribute failed with ret=0x%lx\n", ret);
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ ret = template_update_attribute(tmpl, pkey_attr);
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+ if (ret != CKR_OK) {
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+ TRACE_ERROR("update_attribute failed with ret=0x%lx\n", ret);
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+ free(pkey_attr);
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+ goto done;
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+ }
|
||||
+ }
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+
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+ ret = CKR_OK;
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||||
+
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+done:
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||||
+ return ret;
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||||
+}
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||||
+
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/**
|
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* This function is called whenever a new object is created. It sets
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* attribute CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE according to the PKEY_MODE token
|
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@@ -1254,7 +1281,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
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CK_ULONG mode, TEMPLATE *tmpl)
|
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{
|
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ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data = tokdata->private_data;
|
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- CK_ATTRIBUTE *pkey_attr = NULL, *ecp_attr = NULL, *sensitive_attr = NULL;
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+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecp_attr = NULL, *sensitive_attr = NULL;
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CK_BBOOL extractable, sensitive, btrue = CK_TRUE;
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CK_BBOOL add_pkey_extractable = CK_FALSE;
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CK_RV ret;
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@@ -1314,23 +1341,62 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
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add_pkey_extractable = CK_TRUE;
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break;
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}
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||||
-
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if (add_pkey_extractable) {
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- if (!template_attribute_find(tmpl, CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE, &pkey_attr)) {
|
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- ret = build_attribute(CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE,
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- (CK_BBOOL *)&btrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL),
|
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- &pkey_attr);
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- if (ret != CKR_OK) {
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- TRACE_ERROR("build_attribute failed with ret=0x%lx\n", ret);
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- goto done;
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- }
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- ret = template_update_attribute(tmpl, pkey_attr);
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- if (ret != CKR_OK) {
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- TRACE_ERROR("update_attribute failed with ret=0x%lx\n", ret);
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- free(pkey_attr);
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- goto done;
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- }
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- }
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+ ret = ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(tmpl);
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+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ break;
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+ case PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4EXTR:
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+ /* If the application did not specify CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE in
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+ * its template, new keys of any type with CKA_EXTRACTABLE=true get
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+ * CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE=true and a protected key is automatically
|
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+ * created at first use of the key.
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+ */
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+ switch (class) {
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+ case CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:
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+ if (template_attribute_get_non_empty(tmpl, CKA_EC_PARAMS, &ecp_attr) == CKR_OK &&
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+ pkey_op_supported_by_cpacf(ep11_data->msa_level, CKM_ECDSA, tmpl))
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+ add_pkey_extractable = CK_TRUE;
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+ /* Note that the explicit parm CKM_ECDSA just tells the
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+ * function that it's not AES here. It covers all EC and ED
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+ * mechs */
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ ret = template_attribute_get_bool(tmpl, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &extractable);
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+ if (ret == CKR_OK && extractable) // Einziger Unterschied: extractable, statt !extractable
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+ add_pkey_extractable = CK_TRUE;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ if (add_pkey_extractable) {
|
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+ ret = ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(tmpl);
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+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ break;
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+ case PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4ALL:
|
||||
+ /* If the application did not specify CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE in
|
||||
+ * its template, new keys of any type, regardless of CKA_EXTRACTABLE,
|
||||
+ * get CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE=true and a protected key is
|
||||
+ * automatically created at first use of the key.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ switch (class) {
|
||||
+ case CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
||||
+ if (template_attribute_get_non_empty(tmpl, CKA_EC_PARAMS, &ecp_attr) == CKR_OK &&
|
||||
+ pkey_op_supported_by_cpacf(ep11_data->msa_level, CKM_ECDSA, tmpl))
|
||||
+ add_pkey_extractable = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
+ /* Note that the explicit parm CKM_ECDSA just tells the
|
||||
+ * function that it's not AES here. It covers all EC and ED
|
||||
+ * mechs */
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ add_pkey_extractable = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (add_pkey_extractable) {
|
||||
+ ret = ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(tmpl);
|
||||
+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
@@ -12188,6 +12254,10 @@ static CK_RV ep11_config_set_pkey_mode(ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data,
|
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ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_DEFAULT;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(strval, "ENABLE4NONEXTR") == 0)
|
||||
ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4NONEXTR;
|
||||
+ else if (strcmp(strval, "ENABLE4EXTR") == 0)
|
||||
+ ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4EXTR;
|
||||
+ else if (strcmp(strval, "ENABLE4ALL") == 0)
|
||||
+ ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4ALL;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s unsupported PKEY mode : '%s'\n", __func__, strval);
|
||||
OCK_SYSLOG(LOG_ERR,"%s: Error: unsupported PKEY mode '%s' "
|
||||
@@ -13252,6 +13322,7 @@ typedef struct cp_handler_data {
|
||||
int first;
|
||||
size_t max_cp_index;
|
||||
CK_BBOOL error;
|
||||
+ CK_BBOOL allow_combined_extract;
|
||||
} cp_handler_data_t;
|
||||
|
||||
static CK_RV control_point_handler(uint_32 adapter, uint_32 domain,
|
||||
@@ -13329,6 +13400,27 @@ static CK_RV control_point_handler(uint_32 adapter, uint_32 domain,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Combined extract is only supported if all APQNs support it */
|
||||
+ if (max_cp_index < XCP_CPB_ALLOW_COMBINED_EXTRACT ||
|
||||
+ (cp[CP_BYTE_NO(XCP_CPB_ALLOW_COMBINED_EXTRACT)] &
|
||||
+ CP_BIT_MASK(XCP_CPB_ALLOW_COMBINED_EXTRACT)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ data->allow_combined_extract = CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (ep11_data->pkey_mode == PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4EXTR ||
|
||||
+ ep11_data->pkey_mode == PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4ALL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Control point setting for adapter %02X.%04X does not "
|
||||
+ "allow combined extract, but PKEY_MODE ENABLE4EXTR or "
|
||||
+ "ENABLE4ALL specified in ep11 token config file.\n",
|
||||
+ adapter, domain);
|
||||
+ OCK_SYSLOG(LOG_ERR,
|
||||
+ "Control point setting for adapter %02X.%04X does not "
|
||||
+ "allow combined extract, but PKEY_MODE ENABLE4EXTR or "
|
||||
+ "ENABLE4ALL specified in ep11 token config file.\n",
|
||||
+ adapter, domain);
|
||||
+ data->error = TRUE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Check FIPS-session related CPs for non-FIPS-session mode */
|
||||
if (!ep11_data->fips_session_mode) {
|
||||
if (max_cp_index >= XCP_CPB_ALLOW_NONSESSION &&
|
||||
@@ -13392,6 +13484,7 @@ static CK_RV get_control_points(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata,
|
||||
* to older cards default to ON. CPs being OFF disable functionality.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
memset(data.combined_cp, 0xff, sizeof(data.combined_cp));
|
||||
+ data.allow_combined_extract = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
data.first = 1;
|
||||
rc = handle_all_ep11_cards(&ep11_data->target_list, control_point_handler,
|
||||
&data);
|
||||
@@ -13410,6 +13503,11 @@ static CK_RV get_control_points(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata,
|
||||
print_control_points(cp, *cp_len, data.max_cp_index);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (data.allow_combined_extract == CK_FALSE)
|
||||
+ __sync_or_and_fetch(&ep11_data->pkey_combined_extract_supported, 0);
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ __sync_or_and_fetch(&ep11_data->pkey_combined_extract_supported, 1);
|
||||
+
|
||||
return data.error ? CKR_DEVICE_ERROR : CKR_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.h b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.h
|
||||
index deb8f45f..16d3c719 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.h
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.h
|
||||
@@ -241,6 +241,8 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
#define PKEY_MODE_DISABLED 0
|
||||
#define PKEY_MODE_DEFAULT 1
|
||||
#define PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4NONEXTR 2
|
||||
+#define PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4EXTR 3
|
||||
+#define PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4ALL 4
|
||||
|
||||
#define PQC_BYTE_NO(idx) (((idx) - 1) / 8)
|
||||
#define PQC_BIT_IN_BYTE(idx) (((idx - 1)) % 8)
|
||||
@@ -278,6 +280,7 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
int fips_session_mode;
|
||||
int optimize_single_ops;
|
||||
int pkey_mode;
|
||||
+ volatile int pkey_combined_extract_supported;
|
||||
volatile int pkey_wrap_supported;
|
||||
int pkey_wrap_support_checked;
|
||||
char pkey_mk_vp[PKEY_MK_VP_LENGTH];
|
62
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-03.patch
Normal file
62
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-03.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
commit 88a01a9c4ba237431d89e3999cd6fdfddd10a51a
|
||||
Author: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu Mar 7 17:42:11 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
EP11 pkey option: handle new PKEY_MODE parms in eligibility check
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
index d1efd8c5..a163587c 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
@@ -1080,6 +1080,26 @@ static CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_session_ok_for_obj(SESSION *session,
|
||||
return CK_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Returns true if the given key object is eligible to get a protected key
|
||||
+ * attribute, false otherwise.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data,
|
||||
+ OBJECT *key_obj)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ if (object_is_attr_bound(key_obj) || !ep11_data->pkey_wrap_supported ||
|
||||
+ !object_is_pkey_extractable(key_obj)) {
|
||||
+ return CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!ep11_data->pkey_combined_extract_supported &&
|
||||
+ object_is_extractable(key_obj)) {
|
||||
+ return CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return CK_TRUE;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Checks if the preconditions for using the related protected key of
|
||||
* the given secure key object are met. The caller of this routine must
|
||||
@@ -1135,6 +1155,8 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_check(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case PKEY_MODE_DEFAULT:
|
||||
case PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4NONEXTR:
|
||||
+ case PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4EXTR:
|
||||
+ case PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4ALL:
|
||||
/* Use existing pkeys, re-create invalid pkeys, and also create new
|
||||
* pkeys for secret/private keys that do not already have one. EC
|
||||
* public keys that are pkey-extractable, can always be used via CPACF
|
||||
@@ -1149,12 +1171,8 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_check(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
if (ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, session) != CKR_OK)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (object_is_extractable(key_obj) ||
|
||||
- !object_is_pkey_extractable(key_obj) ||
|
||||
- object_is_attr_bound(key_obj) ||
|
||||
- !ep11_data->pkey_wrap_supported) {
|
||||
+ if (!ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(ep11_data, key_obj))
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
|
||||
if (template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
|
||||
CKA_IBM_OPAQUE_PKEY,
|
555
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-04.patch
Normal file
555
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-04.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,555 @@
|
||||
commit b9e33fced0654aac939182957bf2eba2eda77872
|
||||
Author: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed Feb 21 13:48:15 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
EP11 pkey option: add NO_PKEY compile option for EP11 token
|
||||
|
||||
On 32-bit s390 platforms, the pkey related assembler code parts won't
|
||||
compile. Therefore, add NO_PKEY compile switches where necessary.
|
||||
The NO_PKEY compile switch is already handled in configure.ac.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
index a163587c..114c4ce1 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@
|
||||
#include <openssl/ec.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "ep11_specific.h"
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
#include "pkey_utils.h"
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
CK_RV ep11tok_get_mechanism_list(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata,
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR mlist,
|
||||
@@ -256,11 +258,13 @@ static const version_req_t reencrypt_single_req_versions[] = {
|
||||
#define NUM_REENCRYPT_SINGLE_REQ (sizeof(reencrypt_single_req_versions) / \
|
||||
sizeof(version_req_t))
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
static const CK_VERSION ibm_cex7p_cpacf_wrap_support = { .major = 7, .minor = 15 };
|
||||
static const version_req_t ibm_cpacf_wrap_req_versions[] = {
|
||||
{ .card_type = 7, .min_firmware_version = &ibm_cex7p_cpacf_wrap_support }
|
||||
};
|
||||
#define NUM_CPACF_WRAP_REQ (sizeof(ibm_cpacf_wrap_req_versions) / sizeof(version_req_t))
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
static const CK_ULONG ibm_cex_ab_ecdh_api_version = 3;
|
||||
static const version_req_t ibm_ab_ecdh_req_versions[] = {
|
||||
@@ -504,6 +508,7 @@ static CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_option_disabled(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata)
|
||||
return CK_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Callback function used by handle_all_ep11_cards() for creating a protected
|
||||
* key via the given APQN (adaper,domain).
|
||||
@@ -1283,6 +1288,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(TEMPLATE *tmpl)
|
||||
done:
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* This function is called whenever a new object is created. It sets
|
||||
@@ -1299,9 +1305,12 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
CK_ULONG mode, TEMPLATE *tmpl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data = tokdata->private_data;
|
||||
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecp_attr = NULL, *sensitive_attr = NULL;
|
||||
- CK_BBOOL extractable, sensitive, btrue = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
- CK_BBOOL add_pkey_extractable = CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *sensitive_attr = NULL;
|
||||
+ CK_BBOOL sensitive, btrue = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecp_attr = NULL;
|
||||
+ CK_BBOOL extractable, add_pkey_extractable = CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
CK_RV ret;
|
||||
|
||||
UNUSED(mode);
|
||||
@@ -1331,6 +1340,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
switch (ep11_data->pkey_mode) {
|
||||
case PKEY_MODE_DISABLED:
|
||||
/* Nothing to do */
|
||||
@@ -1423,6 +1433,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
ret = CKR_OK;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1431,6 +1442,19 @@ done:
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef NO_PKEY
|
||||
+CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hkey, CK_MECHANISM *mech)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ UNUSED(tokdata);
|
||||
+ UNUSED(session);
|
||||
+ UNUSED(hkey);
|
||||
+ UNUSED(mech);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
+
|
||||
static CK_RV check_ab_supported(CK_KEY_TYPE type) {
|
||||
switch(type) {
|
||||
case CKK_AES:
|
||||
@@ -2837,8 +2861,10 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_init(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, CK_SLOT_ID SlotNumber,
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
ep11_data->msa_level = get_msa_level();
|
||||
TRACE_INFO("MSA level = %i\n", ep11_data->msa_level);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (pthread_mutex_init(&ep11_data->raw2key_wrap_blob_mutex, NULL) != 0) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("Initializing Wrap-Blob lock failed.\n");
|
||||
@@ -2847,19 +2873,20 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_init(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, CK_SLOT_ID SlotNumber,
|
||||
}
|
||||
ep11_data->raw2key_wrap_blob_l = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
-
|
||||
if (pthread_mutex_init(&ep11_data->pkey_mutex, NULL) != 0) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("Initializing PKEY lock failed.\n");
|
||||
rc = CKR_CANT_LOCK;
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
if (!ep11tok_pkey_option_disabled(tokdata) &&
|
||||
!ep11_data->fips_session_mode) {
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, NULL);
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
if (ep11_data->vhsm_mode || ep11_data->fips_session_mode) {
|
||||
if (pthread_mutex_init(&ep11_data->session_mutex, NULL) != 0) {
|
||||
@@ -3178,7 +3205,11 @@ static CK_RV import_aes_xts_key(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *sess,
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
goto import_aes_xts_key_end;
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_check_aes_xts(tokdata, aes_xts_key_obj, CKM_AES_XTS);
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s EP11 AES XTS is not supported: rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
goto import_aes_xts_key_end;
|
||||
@@ -4562,10 +4593,12 @@ CK_RV token_specific_object_add(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * sess,
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
/* Ensure the firmware master key verification pattern is available */
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, sess);
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
memset(blob, 0, sizeof(blob));
|
||||
memset(blobreenc, 0, sizeof(blobreenc));
|
||||
@@ -4797,10 +4830,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_generate_key(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
/* Ensure the firmware master key verification pattern is available */
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, session);
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
rc = object_mgr_create_skel(tokdata, session, new_attrs, new_attrs_len,
|
||||
MODE_KEYGEN, CKO_SECRET_KEY, ktype, &key_obj);
|
||||
@@ -4820,7 +4855,11 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_generate_key(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
|
||||
if (mech->mechanism == CKM_AES_XTS_KEY_GEN) {
|
||||
xts = TRUE;
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_check_aes_xts(tokdata, key_obj, mech->mechanism);
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s EP11 AES XTS is not supported: rc=0x%lx\n",
|
||||
__func__, rc);
|
||||
@@ -5812,7 +5851,9 @@ CK_RV token_specific_ec_sign(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
CK_BYTE *out_data, CK_ULONG *out_data_len,
|
||||
OBJECT *key_obj )
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx = &(session->sign_ctx);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
CK_RV rc;
|
||||
size_t keyblobsize = 0;
|
||||
CK_BYTE *keyblob;
|
||||
@@ -5826,6 +5867,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_ec_sign(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_check(tokdata, session, key_obj, &ctx->mech);
|
||||
switch (rc) {
|
||||
case CKR_OK:
|
||||
@@ -5837,6 +5879,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_ec_sign(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
default:
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
|
||||
mech.pParameter = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -5856,7 +5899,9 @@ CK_RV token_specific_ec_sign(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
done:
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -5866,7 +5911,9 @@ CK_RV token_specific_ec_verify(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
CK_BYTE *out_data, CK_ULONG out_data_len,
|
||||
OBJECT *key_obj )
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx = &(session->verify_ctx);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
CK_RV rc;
|
||||
CK_BYTE *spki;
|
||||
size_t spki_len = 0;
|
||||
@@ -5880,6 +5927,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_ec_verify(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_check(tokdata, session, key_obj, &ctx->mech);
|
||||
switch (rc) {
|
||||
case CKR_OK:
|
||||
@@ -5891,6 +5939,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_ec_verify(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
default:
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
|
||||
mech.pParameter = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -5911,7 +5960,9 @@ CK_RV token_specific_ec_verify(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
done:
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -5981,6 +6032,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_reencrypt_single(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* This routine is currently only used when the operation is performed using
|
||||
* a protected key. Therefore we don't have (and don't need) an ep11
|
||||
@@ -6062,6 +6114,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_aes_xts(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
return pkey_aes_xts(key_obj, init_v, in_data, in_data_len,
|
||||
out_data, out_data_len, encrypt, initial, final, iv);
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
struct EP11_KYBER_MECH {
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM mech;
|
||||
@@ -6829,10 +6882,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_derive_key(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
/* Ensure the firmware master key verification pattern is available */
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, session);
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Start creating the key object */
|
||||
rc = object_mgr_create_skel(tokdata, session, new_attrs1, new_attrs1_len,
|
||||
@@ -8554,10 +8609,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_generate_key_pair(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * sess,
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
/* Ensure the firmware master key verification pattern is available */
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, sess);
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now build the skeleton key. */
|
||||
rc = object_mgr_create_skel(tokdata, sess, pPublicKeyTemplate,
|
||||
@@ -9202,6 +9259,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_sign_init(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_check(tokdata, session, key_obj, mech);
|
||||
switch (rc) {
|
||||
case CKR_OK:
|
||||
@@ -9239,6 +9297,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_sign_init(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
free(ep11_sign_state);
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
if (mech->mechanism == CKM_IBM_ECDSA_OTHER) {
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_ecdsa_other_mech_adjust(mech, &mech_ep11);
|
||||
@@ -9340,6 +9399,9 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_sign(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
CK_ULONG in_data_len, CK_BYTE * signature,
|
||||
CK_ULONG * sig_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifdef NO_PKEY
|
||||
+ UNUSED(length_only);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
CK_RV rc;
|
||||
SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx = &session->sign_ctx;
|
||||
size_t keyblobsize = 0;
|
||||
@@ -9355,6 +9417,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_sign(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
if (ctx->pkey_active) {
|
||||
/* Note that Edwards curves in general are not yet supported in
|
||||
* opencryptoki. These two special IBM specific ED mechs are only
|
||||
@@ -9372,6 +9435,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_sign(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
}
|
||||
goto done; /* no ep11 fallback possible */
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
RETRY_SESSION_SINGLE_APQN_START(rc, tokdata)
|
||||
RETRY_UPDATE_BLOB_START(tokdata, target_info,
|
||||
@@ -9394,7 +9458,9 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_sign(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
done:
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
object_put(tokdata, key_obj, TRUE);
|
||||
key_obj = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -9638,6 +9704,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_verify_init(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_check(tokdata, session, key_obj, mech);
|
||||
switch (rc) {
|
||||
case CKR_OK:
|
||||
@@ -9675,6 +9742,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_verify_init(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
free(ep11_sign_state);
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
if (mech->mechanism == CKM_IBM_ECDSA_OTHER) {
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_ecdsa_other_mech_adjust(mech, &mech_ep11);
|
||||
@@ -9787,6 +9855,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_verify(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
if (ctx->pkey_active) {
|
||||
/* Note that Edwards curves in general are not yet supported in
|
||||
* opencryptoki. These two special IBM specific ED mechs are only
|
||||
@@ -9805,6 +9874,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_verify(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
}
|
||||
goto done; /* no ep11 fallback possible */
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
RETRY_SESSION_SINGLE_APQN_START(rc, tokdata)
|
||||
RETRY_UPDATE_BLOB_START(tokdata, target_info,
|
||||
@@ -9827,7 +9897,9 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_verify(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
done:
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
object_put(tokdata, key_obj, TRUE);
|
||||
key_obj = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -10561,6 +10633,7 @@ static CK_RV ep11_ende_crypt_init(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_check(tokdata, session, key_obj, mech);
|
||||
switch (rc) {
|
||||
case CKR_OK:
|
||||
@@ -10604,6 +10677,7 @@ static CK_RV ep11_ende_crypt_init(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
free(ep11_state);
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* ep11_state is allocated large enough to hold 2 times the max state blob.
|
||||
@@ -11150,10 +11224,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_unwrap_key(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
/* Ensure the firmware master key verification pattern is available */
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, session);
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Start creating the key object */
|
||||
rc = object_mgr_create_skel(tokdata, session, new_attrs, new_attrs_len,
|
||||
@@ -11878,6 +11954,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_is_mechanism_supported(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
case CKM_IBM_CPACF_WRAP:
|
||||
if (compare_ck_version(&ep11_data->ep11_lib_version, &ver3) <= 0) {
|
||||
TRACE_INFO("%s Mech '%s' banned due to host library version\n",
|
||||
@@ -11895,6 +11972,7 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_is_mechanism_supported(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
case CKM_IBM_BTC_DERIVE:
|
||||
if (compare_ck_version(&ep11_data->ep11_lib_version, &ver3_1) < 0) {
|
||||
@@ -12268,6 +12346,7 @@ static CK_RV ep11_config_set_pkey_mode(ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data,
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (strcmp(strval, "DISABLED") == 0)
|
||||
ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_DISABLED;
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
else if (strcmp(strval, "DEFAULT") == 0)
|
||||
ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_DEFAULT;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(strval, "ENABLE4NONEXTR") == 0)
|
||||
@@ -12276,6 +12355,7 @@ static CK_RV ep11_config_set_pkey_mode(ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data,
|
||||
ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4EXTR;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(strval, "ENABLE4ALL") == 0)
|
||||
ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4ALL;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
else {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s unsupported PKEY mode : '%s'\n", __func__, strval);
|
||||
OCK_SYSLOG(LOG_ERR,"%s: Error: unsupported PKEY mode '%s' "
|
||||
@@ -12456,7 +12536,11 @@ static CK_RV read_adapter_config_file(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata,
|
||||
sizeof(ep11_data->token_config_filename) - 1] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
ep11_data->target_list.length = 0;
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_DEFAULT;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ ep11_data->pkey_mode = PKEY_MODE_DISABLED;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Default to use default libica library for digests */
|
||||
ep11_data->digest_libica = 1;
|
||||
@@ -14695,10 +14779,12 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attribute_values(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
/* Ensure the firmware master key verification pattern is available */
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, session);
|
||||
if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
node = new_tmpl->attribute_list;
|
||||
while (node) {
|
||||
@@ -14734,6 +14820,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attribute_values(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
case CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE:
|
||||
if (ep11_data->pkey_wrap_supported) {
|
||||
rc = add_to_attribute_array(&attributes, &num_attributes,
|
||||
@@ -14746,6 +14833,7 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attribute_values(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
default:
|
||||
/* Either non-boolean, or read-only */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_stdll.mk b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_stdll.mk
|
||||
index 6a1d68be..e543c514 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_stdll.mk
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_stdll.mk
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ opencryptoki_stdll_libpkcs11_ep11_la_SOURCES = usr/lib/common/asn1.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/common/trace.c usr/lib/common/mech_list.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/common/shared_memory.c usr/lib/common/attributes.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/common/sw_crypt.c usr/lib/common/profile_obj.c \
|
||||
- usr/lib/common/dlist.c usr/lib/common/pkey_utils.c \
|
||||
+ usr/lib/common/dlist.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_session.c \
|
||||
@@ -53,3 +53,8 @@ opencryptoki_stdll_libpkcs11_ep11_la_SOURCES = usr/lib/common/asn1.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/common/pqc_supported.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/hsm_mk_change/hsm_mk_change.c \
|
||||
usr/lib/common/btree.c usr/lib/common/sess_mgr.c
|
||||
+
|
||||
+if !NO_PKEY
|
||||
+opencryptoki_stdll_libpkcs11_ep11_la_SOURCES += \
|
||||
+ usr/lib/common/pkey_utils.c
|
||||
+endif
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/tok_struct.h b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/tok_struct.h
|
||||
index 304e3eb9..17a5bcf0 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/tok_struct.h
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/tok_struct.h
|
||||
@@ -115,8 +115,13 @@ token_spec_t token_specific = {
|
||||
// AES
|
||||
NULL, // aes_key_gen,
|
||||
NULL, // aes_xts_key_gen
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
&token_specific_aes_ecb,
|
||||
&token_specific_aes_cbc,
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ NULL, // aes_ecb
|
||||
+ NULL, // aes_cbc
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
NULL, // aes_ctr
|
||||
NULL, // aes_gcm_init
|
||||
NULL, // aes_gcm
|
||||
@@ -125,8 +130,13 @@ token_spec_t token_specific = {
|
||||
NULL, // aes_ofb
|
||||
NULL, // aes_cfb
|
||||
NULL, // aes_mac
|
||||
+#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
&token_specific_aes_cmac,
|
||||
&token_specific_aes_xts, // aes_xts
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ NULL, // aes_cmac
|
||||
+ NULL, // aes_xts
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
// DSA
|
||||
NULL, // dsa_generate_keypair,
|
||||
NULL, // dsa_sign
|
61
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-05.patch
Normal file
61
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-05.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
||||
commit 0bdcc661e64950e5ea11d950484631ba90e69426
|
||||
Author: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu Mar 7 17:51:40 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
EP11 pkey option: consolidate code parts, no logic change
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
index 114c4ce1..9f855934 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
@@ -1369,11 +1369,6 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
add_pkey_extractable = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (add_pkey_extractable) {
|
||||
- ret = ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(tmpl);
|
||||
- if (ret != CKR_OK)
|
||||
- goto done;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4EXTR:
|
||||
/* If the application did not specify CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE in
|
||||
@@ -1396,11 +1391,6 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
add_pkey_extractable = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (add_pkey_extractable) {
|
||||
- ret = ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(tmpl);
|
||||
- if (ret != CKR_OK)
|
||||
- goto done;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case PKEY_MODE_ENABLE4ALL:
|
||||
/* If the application did not specify CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE in
|
||||
@@ -1421,11 +1411,6 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
add_pkey_extractable = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (add_pkey_extractable) {
|
||||
- ret = ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(tmpl);
|
||||
- if (ret != CKR_OK)
|
||||
- goto done;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("PKEY_MODE %i unsupported.\n", ep11_data->pkey_mode);
|
||||
@@ -1433,6 +1418,12 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (add_pkey_extractable) {
|
||||
+ ret = ep11tok_pkey_add_protkey_attr_to_tmpl(tmpl);
|
||||
+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
||||
ret = CKR_OK;
|
26
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-06.patch
Normal file
26
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-06.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
||||
commit 88761bc4bd560801ec8a18b96cc82586dd719ca3
|
||||
Author: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue Mar 12 17:13:33 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
EP11: add check if protected-key support available at all
|
||||
|
||||
If it is already known that the PKEY wrap is not supported or not
|
||||
functioning (for whatever reason), then don't report the XTS
|
||||
mechanisms as supported.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
index 9f855934..7850e43f 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
@@ -12001,7 +12001,8 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_is_mechanism_supported(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
|
||||
case CKM_AES_XTS:
|
||||
case CKM_AES_XTS_KEY_GEN:
|
||||
- if (ep11tok_pkey_option_disabled(tokdata) || ep11_data->msa_level < 4 ||
|
||||
+ if ((ep11_data->pkey_wrap_support_checked && !ep11_data->pkey_wrap_supported) ||
|
||||
+ ep11tok_pkey_option_disabled(tokdata) || ep11_data->msa_level < 4 ||
|
||||
ep11tok_is_mechanism_supported(tokdata, CKM_IBM_CPACF_WRAP) != CKR_OK ||
|
||||
ep11tok_is_mechanism_supported(tokdata, CKM_AES_KEY_GEN) != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
TRACE_INFO("%s Mech '%s' not suppported\n", __func__,
|
31
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-07.patch
Normal file
31
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-07.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
commit 99b87ff678abfb71ba05741d1942e8ac723110c8
|
||||
Author: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue Mar 12 17:30:36 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
EP11: consider combined-extract for XTS pkey check
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
index 7850e43f..e2c9a77e 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
@@ -1248,14 +1248,15 @@ CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_check_aes_xts(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data = tokdata->private_data;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (ep11tok_is_mechanism_supported(tokdata, type) != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
|
||||
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (object_is_extractable(key_obj) ||
|
||||
- !object_is_pkey_extractable(key_obj) ||
|
||||
- object_is_attr_bound(key_obj)) {
|
||||
+ if (!ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(ep11_data, key_obj)) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Key not eligible for pkey support\n");
|
||||
return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
306
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-08.patch
Normal file
306
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-08.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
|
||||
commit 5b20a1454ca464b07e7686340a579d8b1870e572
|
||||
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed Mar 20 08:44:25 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
EP11: Reject combined extract attribute settings if it is not supported
|
||||
|
||||
In case the control point setting of the adapters do not allow that attributes
|
||||
CKA_EXTRACTABLE and CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE are both true, then reject
|
||||
this with CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.
|
||||
|
||||
The EP11 code would reject that with CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, which for EP11
|
||||
it means that it violates an internal policy (i.e. control point settings),
|
||||
but in PKCS#11 this return code has a totally different meaning. So reject
|
||||
such situations explicitly with the correct return code.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
index e2c9a77e..b5d788bf 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
@@ -1089,20 +1089,23 @@ static CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_session_ok_for_obj(SESSION *session,
|
||||
* Returns true if the given key object is eligible to get a protected key
|
||||
* attribute, false otherwise.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
-CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data,
|
||||
- OBJECT *key_obj)
|
||||
+static CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(
|
||||
+ ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data,
|
||||
+ OBJECT *key_obj)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (object_is_attr_bound(key_obj) || !ep11_data->pkey_wrap_supported ||
|
||||
!object_is_pkey_extractable(key_obj)) {
|
||||
- return CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ep11_data->pkey_combined_extract_supported &&
|
||||
object_is_extractable(key_obj)) {
|
||||
- return CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Combined extract not supported, but CKA_EXTRACTABLE "
|
||||
+ "and CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE are both TRUE\n");
|
||||
+ return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- return CK_TRUE;
|
||||
+ return CKR_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -1176,7 +1179,8 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_check(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
if (ep11tok_pkey_get_firmware_mk_vp(tokdata, session) != CKR_OK)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(ep11_data, key_obj))
|
||||
+ ret = ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(ep11_data, key_obj);
|
||||
+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
if (template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
|
||||
@@ -1218,11 +1222,14 @@ done:
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Wrapper function around ep11tok_pkey_check for the case where we don't
|
||||
* have a key object. This function is called externally from new_host.c.
|
||||
+ * Returns CKR_OK if pkey usage is OK, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED if pkey
|
||||
+ * is not supported, or any other return code in case of an error. In such
|
||||
+ * cases the calling function should itself return with an error, because
|
||||
+ * neither the secure key nor the protected key path will work.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
-CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hkey, CK_MECHANISM *mech)
|
||||
+CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hkey, CK_MECHANISM *mech)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- CK_BBOOL success = CK_FALSE;
|
||||
size_t keyblobsize = 0;
|
||||
CK_BYTE *keyblob;
|
||||
OBJECT *key_obj;
|
||||
@@ -1232,17 +1239,15 @@ CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
READ_LOCK);
|
||||
if (ret != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s no blob ret=0x%lx\n", __func__, ret);
|
||||
- return CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = ep11tok_pkey_check(tokdata, session, key_obj, mech);
|
||||
- if (ret == CKR_OK)
|
||||
- success = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
object_put(tokdata, key_obj, TRUE);
|
||||
key_obj = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
- return success;
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_check_aes_xts(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||
@@ -1255,7 +1260,8 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_check_aes_xts(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(ep11_data, key_obj)) {
|
||||
+ if (ep11tok_pkey_obj_eligible_for_pkey_support(ep11_data,
|
||||
+ key_obj) != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("Key not eligible for pkey support\n");
|
||||
return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1307,10 +1313,10 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
{
|
||||
ep11_private_data_t *ep11_data = tokdata->private_data;
|
||||
CK_ATTRIBUTE *sensitive_attr = NULL;
|
||||
- CK_BBOOL sensitive, btrue = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
+ CK_BBOOL sensitive, extractable, pkey_extractable, btrue = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecp_attr = NULL;
|
||||
- CK_BBOOL extractable, add_pkey_extractable = CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+ CK_BBOOL add_pkey_extractable = CK_FALSE;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
CK_RV ret;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1341,6 +1347,25 @@ CK_RV token_specific_set_attrs_for_new_object(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!ep11_data->pkey_combined_extract_supported) {
|
||||
+ ret = template_attribute_get_bool(tmpl, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &extractable);
|
||||
+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ extractable = FALSE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ret = template_attribute_get_bool(tmpl, CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE,
|
||||
+ &pkey_extractable);
|
||||
+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ pkey_extractable = FALSE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (extractable && pkey_extractable) {
|
||||
+ /* The EP11 call would return CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED in that case */
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Combined extract not supported, but CKA_EXTRACTABLE "
|
||||
+ "and CKA_IBM_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE are both TRUE\n");
|
||||
+ ret = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
#ifndef NO_PKEY
|
||||
switch (ep11_data->pkey_mode) {
|
||||
case PKEY_MODE_DISABLED:
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.h b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.h
|
||||
index 16d3c719..9ba28cb8 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.h
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.h
|
||||
@@ -585,8 +585,8 @@ CK_BBOOL ep11tok_libica_mech_available(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
CK_RV ep11tok_copy_firmware_info(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo);
|
||||
|
||||
-CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hkey, CK_MECHANISM *mech);
|
||||
+CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hkey, CK_MECHANISM *mech);
|
||||
|
||||
CK_RV ep11tok_set_operation_state(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session);
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
index 299a1d3c..f84d0810 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
@@ -2080,9 +2080,15 @@ CK_RV SC_EncryptInit(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
sess->encr_ctx.multi_init = FALSE;
|
||||
sess->encr_ctx.multi = FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, hKey, pMechanism);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
+ /* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED indicates pkey support is not available,
|
||||
+ but the ep11 fallback can be tried */
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if ((ep11tok_optimize_single_ops(tokdata) ||
|
||||
ep11tok_mech_single_only(pMechanism)) &&
|
||||
- !ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, hKey, pMechanism)) {
|
||||
+ rc == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
/* In case of a single part encrypt operation we don't need the
|
||||
* EncryptInit, instead we can use the EncryptSingle which is much
|
||||
* faster. In case of multi-part operations we are doing the EncryptInit
|
||||
@@ -2179,9 +2185,16 @@ CK_RV SC_Encrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, sess->encr_ctx.key,
|
||||
+ &sess->encr_ctx.mech);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
+ /* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED indicates pkey support is not available,
|
||||
+ but the ep11 fallback can be tried */
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if ((ep11tok_optimize_single_ops(tokdata) ||
|
||||
ep11tok_mech_single_only(&sess->encr_ctx.mech)) &&
|
||||
- !ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, sess->encr_ctx.key, &sess->encr_ctx.mech)) {
|
||||
+ rc == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_encrypt_single(tokdata, sess, &sess->encr_ctx.mech,
|
||||
length_only, sess->encr_ctx.key,
|
||||
pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData,
|
||||
@@ -2408,9 +2421,15 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptInit(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
sess->decr_ctx.multi_init = FALSE;
|
||||
sess->decr_ctx.multi = FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, hKey, pMechanism);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
+ /* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED indicates pkey support is not available,
|
||||
+ but the ep11 fallback can be tried */
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if ((ep11tok_optimize_single_ops(tokdata) ||
|
||||
ep11tok_mech_single_only(pMechanism)) &&
|
||||
- !ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, hKey, pMechanism)) {
|
||||
+ rc == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
/* In case of a single part decrypt operation we don't need the
|
||||
* DecryptInit, instead we can use the EncryptSingle which is much
|
||||
* faster. In case of multi-part operations we are doing the DecryptInit
|
||||
@@ -2508,9 +2527,16 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, sess->decr_ctx.key,
|
||||
+ &sess->decr_ctx.mech);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
+ /* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED indicates pkey support is not available,
|
||||
+ but the ep11 fallback can be tried */
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if ((ep11tok_optimize_single_ops(tokdata) ||
|
||||
ep11tok_mech_single_only(&sess->decr_ctx.mech)) &&
|
||||
- !ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, sess->decr_ctx.key, &sess->decr_ctx.mech)) {
|
||||
+ rc == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_decrypt_single(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx.mech,
|
||||
length_only, sess->decr_ctx.key,
|
||||
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
||||
@@ -2992,9 +3018,15 @@ CK_RV SC_SignInit(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
sess->sign_ctx.multi_init = FALSE;
|
||||
sess->sign_ctx.multi = FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, hKey, pMechanism);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
+ /* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED indicates pkey support is not available,
|
||||
+ but the ep11 fallback can be tried */
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if ((ep11tok_optimize_single_ops(tokdata) ||
|
||||
ep11tok_mech_single_only(pMechanism)) &&
|
||||
- !ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, hKey, pMechanism)) {
|
||||
+ rc == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
/* In case of a single part sign operation we don't need the SignInit,
|
||||
* instead we can use the SignSingle which is much faster.
|
||||
* In case of multi-part operations we are doing the SignInit when
|
||||
@@ -3101,9 +3133,16 @@ CK_RV SC_Sign(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, sess->sign_ctx.key,
|
||||
+ &sess->sign_ctx.mech);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
+ /* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED indicates pkey support is not available,
|
||||
+ but the ep11 fallback can be tried */
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if ((ep11tok_optimize_single_ops(tokdata) ||
|
||||
ep11tok_mech_single_only(&sess->sign_ctx.mech)) &&
|
||||
- !ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, sess->sign_ctx.key, &sess->sign_ctx.mech)) {
|
||||
+ rc == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_sign_single(tokdata, sess, &sess->sign_ctx.mech,
|
||||
length_only, sess->sign_ctx.key,
|
||||
pData, ulDataLen, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
|
||||
@@ -3391,9 +3430,15 @@ CK_RV SC_VerifyInit(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
sess->verify_ctx.multi_init = FALSE;
|
||||
sess->verify_ctx.multi = FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, hKey, pMechanism);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
+ /* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED indicates pkey support is not available,
|
||||
+ but the ep11 fallback can be tried */
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if ((ep11tok_optimize_single_ops(tokdata) ||
|
||||
ep11tok_mech_single_only(pMechanism)) &&
|
||||
- !ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, hKey, pMechanism)) {
|
||||
+ rc == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
/* In case of a single part verify operation we don't need the
|
||||
* VerifyInit, instead we can use the VerifySingle which is much
|
||||
* faster. In case of multi-part operations we are doing the VerifyInit
|
||||
@@ -3497,9 +3542,16 @@ CK_RV SC_Verify(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, sess->verify_ctx.key,
|
||||
+ &sess->verify_ctx.mech);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
+ /* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED indicates pkey support is not available,
|
||||
+ but the ep11 fallback can be tried */
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if ((ep11tok_optimize_single_ops(tokdata) ||
|
||||
ep11tok_mech_single_only(&sess->verify_ctx.mech)) &&
|
||||
- !ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(tokdata, sess, sess->verify_ctx.key, &sess->verify_ctx.mech)) {
|
||||
+ rc == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_verify_single(tokdata, sess, &sess->verify_ctx.mech,
|
||||
sess->verify_ctx.key, pData, ulDataLen,
|
||||
pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
|
36
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-09.patch
Normal file
36
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-09.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
commit 4fefcf517133260a7b63049d3a02c9249fe7776c
|
||||
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon Apr 15 09:31:12 2024 +0200
|
||||
|
||||
EP11: Fix compile error with NO_PKEY defined
|
||||
|
||||
Function signature of ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok() has changed, also change the
|
||||
code inside the #ifdef NO_PKEY block.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: cf978b111205b206c7b3c53f424f7085913c00d0
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
index b5d788bf..e9007a16 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
@@ -1460,15 +1460,15 @@ done:
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef NO_PKEY
|
||||
-CK_BBOOL ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hkey, CK_MECHANISM *mech)
|
||||
+CK_RV ep11tok_pkey_usage_ok(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *session,
|
||||
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hkey, CK_MECHANISM *mech)
|
||||
{
|
||||
UNUSED(tokdata);
|
||||
UNUSED(session);
|
||||
UNUSED(hkey);
|
||||
UNUSED(mech);
|
||||
|
||||
- return CK_FALSE;
|
||||
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* NO_PKEY */
|
||||
|
@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
|
||||
commit f931d6e47bf2fb26aa9cf52e231d13edc1c837a1
|
||||
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue Dec 12 17:16:56 2023 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
COMMON: Update rsa_parse_block_type_2() to not leak the message length
|
||||
|
||||
Take the implementation of OpenSSL function RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2()
|
||||
in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c instead of ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(), since
|
||||
the latter leaks the message size.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||
index 326c5795..7bab1a84 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
|
||||
#include "constant_time.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
||||
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
||||
|
||||
CK_BBOOL is_rsa_mechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -293,13 +294,16 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
CK_BYTE *out_data,
|
||||
CK_ULONG *out_data_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- unsigned int ok = 0, found, zero;
|
||||
- size_t zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen;
|
||||
- size_t i, j;
|
||||
+ int i;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *em = NULL;
|
||||
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, equals0;
|
||||
+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
|
||||
+ int out_len = *out_data_len;
|
||||
+ int rsa_size = in_data_len;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||
- * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||
+ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
|
||||
@@ -324,55 +328,86 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
|
||||
* section 7.2.2.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- if (in_data_len < 11) {
|
||||
+ if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_FUNCTION_FAILED));
|
||||
return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- ok = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[0]);
|
||||
- ok &= constant_time_eq(in_data[1], 2);
|
||||
+ em = malloc(rsa_size);
|
||||
+ if (em == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
|
||||
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* in_data_len is always equal to rsa_size */
|
||||
+ memcpy(em, in_data, rsa_size);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
|
||||
+ good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
|
||||
|
||||
/* scan over padding data */
|
||||
- found = 0;
|
||||
- for (i = 2; i < in_data_len; i++) {
|
||||
- zero = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[i]);
|
||||
+ found_zero_byte = 0;
|
||||
+ for (i = 2; i < rsa_size; i++) {
|
||||
+ equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
|
||||
|
||||
- zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found & zero, i, zero_index);
|
||||
- found |= zero;
|
||||
+ zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
|
||||
+ i, zero_index);
|
||||
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |enc_msg|.
|
||||
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
|
||||
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
|
||||
* also fails.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- ok &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
|
||||
+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
|
||||
* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
msg_index = zero_index + 1;
|
||||
- mlen = in_data_len - msg_index;
|
||||
+ mlen = rsa_size - msg_index;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- ok &= constant_time_ge(*out_data_len, mlen);
|
||||
+ good &= constant_time_ge(out_len, mlen);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
- * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
|
||||
- * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
|
||||
- * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
|
||||
- * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
|
||||
- * the value of |good|
|
||||
+ * Move the result in-place by |rsa_size|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen|
|
||||
+ * bytes to the left.
|
||||
+ * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to
|
||||
+ * |out_data|. Otherwise leave |out_data| unchanged.
|
||||
+ * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
|
||||
+ * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
|
||||
+ * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
|
||||
+ * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
|
||||
+ * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < in_data_len && j < *out_data_len; i++, j++)
|
||||
- out_data[j] = constant_time_select_8(ok, in_data[i], out_data[j]);
|
||||
+ out_len = constant_time_select_int(
|
||||
+ constant_time_lt(rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, out_len),
|
||||
+ rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE,
|
||||
+ out_len);
|
||||
+ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
|
||||
+ msg_index <<= 1) {
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(
|
||||
+ msg_index & (rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
|
||||
+ for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < rsa_size - msg_index; i++)
|
||||
+ em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
|
||||
+ mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
|
||||
+ out_data[i] = constant_time_select_8(
|
||||
+ mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], out_data[i]);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(em, rsa_size);
|
||||
+ free(em);
|
||||
|
||||
- *out_data_len = j;
|
||||
+ *out_data_len = constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
- return constant_time_select_int(ok, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
|
||||
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
@ -1,737 +0,0 @@
|
||||
commit 5f1a4f8641306ee192b70c8a32c9ee8a0fe9be5f
|
||||
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon Jan 15 12:53:37 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
common: Add support for implicit rejection for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 de-padding
|
||||
|
||||
Implicit rejection returns a pseudo random message in case the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
|
||||
padding is incorrect, but returns no error. The pseudo random message is based
|
||||
on static secret data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext, so
|
||||
that the attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
|
||||
instead of the result of decryption and de-padding.
|
||||
|
||||
The implicit rejection algorithm is the same as used by OpenSSL.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/COPYRIGHTS b/COPYRIGHTS
|
||||
index 2bb3dffe..21b6b702 100644
|
||||
--- a/COPYRIGHTS
|
||||
+++ b/COPYRIGHTS
|
||||
@@ -12,19 +12,29 @@ For code originating from OpenSSL:
|
||||
* Note that in OpenSSL the file crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c does no longer
|
||||
* exist, it was removed with commit https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4209ce68d8fe8b1506494efa03d378d05baf9ff8
|
||||
* - usr/lib/common/constant_time.h: Copied unchanged from OpenSSL from
|
||||
- include/internal/constant_time.h
|
||||
+ * include/internal/constant_time.h
|
||||
* - The implementation of function rsa_parse_block_type_2() in
|
||||
* usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||
* ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
|
||||
* See comment in function rsa_parse_block_type_2() for a list of changes.
|
||||
+ * - The implementation of function openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk() in
|
||||
+ * usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||
+ * derive_kdk() in crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c and is slightly modified to fit to
|
||||
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in function
|
||||
+ * openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk() for a list of changes.
|
||||
+ * - The implementation of function openssl_specific_rsa_prf() in
|
||||
+ * usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||
+ * ossl_rsa_prf() in crypto/rsa/rsapk1.c and is slightly modified to fit to
|
||||
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in function
|
||||
+ * openssl_specific_rsa_prf() for a list of changes.
|
||||
* - The implementation of function decode_eme_oaep() in
|
||||
* usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||
* RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1() in crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c and is
|
||||
* slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in
|
||||
* function decode_eme_oaep() for a list of changes.
|
||||
*
|
||||
- * Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
+ * Copyright 1999-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").
|
||||
* You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the OpenSSL source distribution
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h b/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
|
||||
index a88b57d0..29496d99 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
|
||||
@@ -731,7 +731,8 @@ CK_RV rsa_format_block(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
|
||||
CK_BYTE *out_data,
|
||||
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type);
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type,
|
||||
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen);
|
||||
|
||||
CK_RV get_mgf_mech(CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *mech);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3179,6 +3180,14 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac_update(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac_final(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *signature,
|
||||
CK_ULONG *sig_len, CK_BBOOL sign);
|
||||
|
||||
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||
+ const CK_BYTE *in, CK_ULONG inlen,
|
||||
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen);
|
||||
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_prf(CK_BYTE *out, CK_ULONG outlen,
|
||||
+ const char *label, CK_ULONG labellen,
|
||||
+ const CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen,
|
||||
+ uint16_t bitlen);
|
||||
+
|
||||
#include "tok_spec_struct.h"
|
||||
extern token_spec_t token_specific;
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||
index 9983fcb3..da515289 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||
@@ -1154,6 +1154,7 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
CK_RV rc;
|
||||
CK_BYTE out[MAX_RSA_KEYLEN];
|
||||
CK_ULONG modulus_bytes;
|
||||
+ unsigned char kdk[SHA256_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
|
||||
|
||||
modulus_bytes = in_data_len;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1163,7 +1164,16 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_2);
|
||||
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(tokdata, key_obj,
|
||||
+ in_data, in_data_len,
|
||||
+ kdk, sizeof(kdk));
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_DEVEL("openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk failed\n");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_2,
|
||||
+ kdk, sizeof(kdk));
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
|
||||
@@ -1254,7 +1264,7 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_verify(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *sess,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, &out_data_len,
|
||||
- PKCS_BT_1);
|
||||
+ PKCS_BT_1, NULL, 0);
|
||||
if (rc == CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID));
|
||||
return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
||||
@@ -1318,7 +1328,8 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_verify_recover(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_1);
|
||||
+ rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_1,
|
||||
+ NULL, 0);
|
||||
if (rc == CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID));
|
||||
return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
||||
@@ -4983,3 +4994,388 @@ done:
|
||||
ctx->context = NULL;
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static CK_RV calc_rsa_priv_exp(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||
+ CK_BYTE *priv_exp, CK_ULONG priv_exp_len)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *modulus = NULL, *pub_exp = NULL;
|
||||
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *prime1 = NULL, *prime2 = NULL;
|
||||
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
|
||||
+ BIGNUM *n, *e, *p, *q, *d;
|
||||
+ CK_RV rc;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UNUSED(tokdata);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new();
|
||||
+ if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_secure_new failed\n");
|
||||
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Get modulus a BIGNUM */
|
||||
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_MODULUS,
|
||||
+ &modulus);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_MODULUS\n");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ n = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||
+ if (n == NULL ||
|
||||
+ BN_bin2bn(modulus->pValue, modulus->ulValueLen, n) == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for modulus\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ BN_set_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Get public exponent a BIGNUM */
|
||||
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
|
||||
+ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, &pub_exp);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT\n");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ e = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||
+ if (e == NULL ||
|
||||
+ BN_bin2bn(pub_exp->pValue, pub_exp->ulValueLen, e) == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for public exponent\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ BN_set_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Get prime1 a BIGNUM */
|
||||
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_PRIME_1,
|
||||
+ &prime1);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIME_1\n");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ p = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||
+ if (p == NULL ||
|
||||
+ BN_bin2bn(prime1->pValue, prime1->ulValueLen, p) == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for prime1\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ BN_set_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Get prime2 a BIGNUM */
|
||||
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_PRIME_2,
|
||||
+ &prime2);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIME_2\n");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ q = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||
+ if (q == NULL ||
|
||||
+ BN_bin2bn(prime2->pValue, prime2->ulValueLen, q) == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for prime2\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ BN_set_flags(q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ d = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||
+ if (d == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get failed to get d\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ BN_set_flags(d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * phi(n) = (p - 1 )(q - 1) = n - p - q + 1
|
||||
+ * d = e ^{-1} mod phi(n).
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (BN_copy(d, n) == NULL ||
|
||||
+ BN_sub(d, d, p) == 0 ||
|
||||
+ BN_sub(d, d, q) == 0 ||
|
||||
+ BN_add_word(d, 1) == 0 ||
|
||||
+ BN_mod_inverse(d, e, d, bn_ctx) == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to calculate private key part d\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(d, priv_exp, priv_exp_len) <= 0) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_bn2binpad failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+done:
|
||||
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||
+ const CK_BYTE *in, CK_ULONG inlen,
|
||||
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *priv_exp_attr = NULL, *modulus = NULL;
|
||||
+ CK_BYTE *priv_exp = NULL, *buf = NULL;
|
||||
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
||||
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
|
||||
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
||||
+ size_t md_len;
|
||||
+ unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ CK_RV rc;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||
+ * derive_kdk() in crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c and is slightly modified to fit to
|
||||
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment.
|
||||
+ * Changes include:
|
||||
+ * - Different variable and define names.
|
||||
+ * - Usage of TRACE_ERROR to report errors and issue debug messages.
|
||||
+ * - Different return codes.
|
||||
+ * - Different code to get the private key component 'd'.
|
||||
+ * - Use of the EVP APIs instead of the internal APIs for Digest and HMAC
|
||||
+ * operations.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (kdklen != SHA256_HASH_SIZE) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("KDK length is wrong\n");
|
||||
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_MODULUS,
|
||||
+ &modulus);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_MODULUS\n");
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ buf = calloc(1, modulus->ulValueLen);
|
||||
+ if (buf == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to allocate a buffer for private exponent\n");
|
||||
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
|
||||
+ CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, &priv_exp_attr);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT\n");
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (priv_exp_attr == NULL) {
|
||||
+ rc = calc_rsa_priv_exp(tokdata, key_obj, buf, modulus->ulValueLen);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("calc_rsa_priv_exp failed\n");
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ priv_exp = buf;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ if (priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen < modulus->ulValueLen) {
|
||||
+ memcpy(buf + modulus->ulValueLen - priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen,
|
||||
+ priv_exp_attr->pValue, priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen);
|
||||
+ priv_exp = buf;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ priv_exp = (CK_BYTE *)priv_exp_attr->pValue +
|
||||
+ priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen - modulus->ulValueLen;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
|
||||
+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
|
||||
+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
|
||||
+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
|
||||
+ * synthetically generated, which means that the padding check failed
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ md = EVP_sha256();
|
||||
+ if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_sha256 failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (EVP_Digest(priv_exp, modulus->ulValueLen, d_hash, NULL,
|
||||
+ md, NULL) <= 0) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_Digest failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash));
|
||||
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() failed.\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_MD_CTX_create() failed.\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) != 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (inlen < modulus->ulValueLen) {
|
||||
+ memset(buf, 0, modulus->ulValueLen - inlen);
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, buf, modulus->ulValueLen - inlen)!= 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, in, inlen) != 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ md_len = kdklen;
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, kdk, &md_len) != 1 ||
|
||||
+ md_len != kdklen) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+out:
|
||||
+ if (buf != NULL)
|
||||
+ free(buf);
|
||||
+ if (pkey != NULL)
|
||||
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||||
+ if (mdctx != NULL)
|
||||
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_prf(CK_BYTE *out, CK_ULONG outlen,
|
||||
+ const char *label, CK_ULONG labellen,
|
||||
+ const CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen,
|
||||
+ uint16_t bitlen)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ CK_RV rc;
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG pos;
|
||||
+ uint16_t iter = 0;
|
||||
+ unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)];
|
||||
+ unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)];
|
||||
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
||||
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
|
||||
+ unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_HASH_SIZE];
|
||||
+ size_t md_len;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||
+ * ossl_rsa_prf() in crypto/rsa/rsapk1.c and is slightly modified to fit to
|
||||
+ * the providers environment.
|
||||
+ * Changes include:
|
||||
+ * - Different variable and define names.
|
||||
+ * - Usage of TRACE_ERROR report errors and issue debug messages.
|
||||
+ * - Different return codes.
|
||||
+ * - Use of the EVP API instead of the internal APIs for HMAC operations.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (kdklen != SHA256_HASH_SIZE) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("invalid kdklen\n");
|
||||
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (outlen * 8 != bitlen) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("invalid outlen\n");
|
||||
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff;
|
||||
+ be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, kdk, kdklen);
|
||||
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() failed.\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_MD_CTX_create() failed.\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
|
||||
+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
|
||||
+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
|
||||
+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
|
||||
+ * synthetically generated, which means that the padding check failed
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ for (pos = 0; pos < outlen; pos += SHA256_HASH_SIZE, iter++) {
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) != 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
|
||||
+ be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) != 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, (unsigned char *)label, labellen) != 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) != 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC
|
||||
+ * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last
|
||||
+ * unaligned block
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ md_len = SHA256_HASH_SIZE;
|
||||
+ if (pos + SHA256_HASH_SIZE > outlen) {
|
||||
+ md_len = sizeof(hmac_out);
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, hmac_out, &md_len) != 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ memcpy(out + pos, hmac_out, outlen - pos);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ md_len = outlen - pos;
|
||||
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, out + pos, &md_len) != 1) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+out:
|
||||
+ if (pkey != NULL)
|
||||
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||||
+ if (mdctx != NULL)
|
||||
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||
index 7bab1a84..7dc9589a 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||
@@ -289,21 +289,34 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_1(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
|
||||
+
|
||||
static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
|
||||
CK_BYTE *out_data,
|
||||
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len)
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len,
|
||||
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- int i;
|
||||
- unsigned char *em = NULL;
|
||||
- unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, equals0;
|
||||
- int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
|
||||
- int out_len = *out_data_len;
|
||||
- int rsa_size = in_data_len;
|
||||
+ unsigned int good = 0, found_zero_byte, equals0;
|
||||
+ size_t zero_index = 0, msg_index;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
|
||||
+ int synthetic_length;
|
||||
+ uint16_t len_candidate;
|
||||
+ unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
|
||||
+ uint16_t len_mask;
|
||||
+ uint16_t max_sep_offset;
|
||||
+ int synth_msg_index = 0;
|
||||
+ size_t i, j;
|
||||
+ CK_RV rc;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (kdk == NULL || kdklen == 0) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_ARGUMENTS_BAD));
|
||||
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||
- * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||
+ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
|
||||
@@ -328,27 +341,67 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
|
||||
* section 7.2.2.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
|
||||
+ if (in_data_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_FUNCTION_FAILED));
|
||||
return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- em = malloc(rsa_size);
|
||||
- if (em == NULL) {
|
||||
- TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
|
||||
+ /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail. */
|
||||
+ synthetic = calloc(1, in_data_len);
|
||||
+ if (synthetic == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to allocate synthetic buffer");
|
||||
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- /* in_data_len is always equal to rsa_size */
|
||||
- memcpy(em, in_data, rsa_size);
|
||||
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_prf(synthetic, in_data_len, "message", 7,
|
||||
+ kdk, kdklen, in_data_len * 8);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* decide how long the random message should be */
|
||||
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_prf(candidate_lengths,
|
||||
+ sizeof(candidate_lengths),
|
||||
+ "length", 6, kdk, kdklen,
|
||||
+ MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES *
|
||||
+ sizeof(len_candidate) * 8);
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
|
||||
- good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * max message size is the size of the modulus size minus 2 bytes for
|
||||
+ * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ len_mask = max_sep_offset = in_data_len - 2 - 8;
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * we want a mask so let's propagate the high bit to all positions less
|
||||
+ * significant than it
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
|
||||
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
|
||||
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
|
||||
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ synthetic_length = 0;
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
|
||||
+ i += sizeof(len_candidate)) {
|
||||
+ len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) |
|
||||
+ candidate_lengths[i + 1];
|
||||
+ len_candidate &= len_mask;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ synthetic_length = constant_time_select_int(
|
||||
+ constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset),
|
||||
+ len_candidate, synthetic_length);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ synth_msg_index = in_data_len - synthetic_length;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[0]);
|
||||
+ good &= constant_time_eq(in_data[1], 2);
|
||||
|
||||
/* scan over padding data */
|
||||
found_zero_byte = 0;
|
||||
- for (i = 2; i < rsa_size; i++) {
|
||||
- equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
|
||||
+ for (i = 2; i < in_data_len; i++) {
|
||||
+ equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[i]);
|
||||
|
||||
zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
|
||||
i, zero_index);
|
||||
@@ -356,7 +409,7 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
|
||||
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |in_data|.
|
||||
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
|
||||
* also fails.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@@ -367,53 +420,41 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
msg_index = zero_index + 1;
|
||||
- mlen = rsa_size - msg_index;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
- * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
|
||||
+ * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit
|
||||
+ * into the |out_data|, since that would leak information, return the
|
||||
+ * synthetic message instead
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- good &= constant_time_ge(out_len, mlen);
|
||||
+ good &= constant_time_ge(*out_data_len, in_data_len - msg_index);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
- * Move the result in-place by |rsa_size|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen|
|
||||
- * bytes to the left.
|
||||
- * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to
|
||||
- * |out_data|. Otherwise leave |out_data| unchanged.
|
||||
- * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
|
||||
- * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
|
||||
- * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
|
||||
- * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
|
||||
- * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
|
||||
+ * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
|
||||
+ * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
|
||||
+ * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
|
||||
+ * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
|
||||
+ * the value of |good|
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- out_len = constant_time_select_int(
|
||||
- constant_time_lt(rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, out_len),
|
||||
- rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE,
|
||||
- out_len);
|
||||
- for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
|
||||
- msg_index <<= 1) {
|
||||
- mask = ~constant_time_eq(
|
||||
- msg_index & (rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
|
||||
- for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < rsa_size - msg_index; i++)
|
||||
- em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
|
||||
- mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
|
||||
- out_data[i] = constant_time_select_8(
|
||||
- mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], out_data[i]);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < in_data_len && j < *out_data_len;
|
||||
+ i++, j++)
|
||||
+ out_data[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, in_data[i], synthetic[i]);
|
||||
|
||||
- OPENSSL_cleanse(em, rsa_size);
|
||||
- free(em);
|
||||
+ *out_data_len = j;
|
||||
|
||||
- *out_data_len = constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, 0);
|
||||
+out:
|
||||
+ if (synthetic != NULL)
|
||||
+ free(synthetic);
|
||||
|
||||
- return constant_time_select_int(good, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
|
||||
CK_BYTE *out_data,
|
||||
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type)
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type,
|
||||
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (type) {
|
||||
case PKCS_BT_1:
|
||||
@@ -421,7 +462,7 @@ CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||
out_data, out_data_len);
|
||||
case PKCS_BT_2:
|
||||
return rsa_parse_block_type_2(in_data, in_data_len,
|
||||
- out_data, out_data_len);
|
||||
+ out_data, out_data_len, kdk, kdklen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
@ -1,387 +0,0 @@
|
||||
commit e2b496f58a84c2f537667655fe08a0d4923f0c70
|
||||
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 12 09:36:27 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
Constant time fixes for C_Decrypt return code handling
|
||||
|
||||
Return code handling of C_Decrypt, C_DecryptUpdate, and C_DecryptFinal must
|
||||
be performed in a constant time manner for RSA mechanisms. Otherwise it
|
||||
may cause a timing side channel that may be used to perform a Bleichenbacher
|
||||
style attack.
|
||||
|
||||
Handling of error situations with CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or size-query calls,
|
||||
where the output buffer is NULL and the required size of the output buffer
|
||||
is to be returned, do not need to be performed in constant time, since
|
||||
these cases are shortcut anyway, and the result is only dependent on the
|
||||
modulus size of the RSA key (which is public information anyway).
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/new_host.c b/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
|
||||
index 8a1e8723..bbb0f601 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
|
||||
#include "trace.h"
|
||||
#include "slotmgr.h"
|
||||
#include "attributes.h"
|
||||
+#include "constant_time.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
|
||||
#include "../api/policy.h"
|
||||
@@ -2345,6 +2346,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -2377,11 +2379,19 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt(tokdata, sess, length_only, &sess->decr_ctx,
|
||||
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, pData,
|
||||
pulDataLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt() failed.\n");
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2404,6 +2414,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -2436,11 +2447,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, length_only,
|
||||
&sess->decr_ctx, pEncryptedPart,
|
||||
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2462,6 +2480,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -2493,11 +2512,19 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
|
||||
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, length_only, &sess->decr_ctx,
|
||||
pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
index 073b349f..6d08b95e 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||
@@ -9552,10 +9552,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt_final(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
|
||||
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
|
||||
rc);
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
@@ -9611,10 +9613,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
|
||||
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
|
||||
rc);
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
@@ -9676,10 +9680,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt_update(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
|
||||
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
|
||||
rc);
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
index 55e34c18..299a1d3c 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
|
||||
#include "slotmgr.h"
|
||||
#include "attributes.h"
|
||||
#include "ep11_specific.h"
|
||||
+#include "constant_time.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
|
||||
#include "../api/policy.h"
|
||||
@@ -2466,6 +2467,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -2513,17 +2515,29 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
length_only, sess->decr_ctx.key,
|
||||
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
||||
pData, pulDataLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_single() failed.\n");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_decrypt(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
||||
pData, pulDataLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt() failed.\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2545,6 +2559,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
{
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -2596,11 +2611,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedPart,
|
||||
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2622,6 +2644,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -2670,10 +2693,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = ep11tok_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c b/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
index 6c419750..d8064559 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
|
||||
#include "slotmgr.h"
|
||||
#include "attributes.h"
|
||||
#include "icsf_specific.h"
|
||||
+#include "constant_time.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
|
||||
#include "../api/policy.h"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1768,6 +1770,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -1801,11 +1804,19 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
|
||||
rc = icsftok_decrypt(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
||||
pData, pulDataLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt() failed.\n");
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1827,6 +1838,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
{
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -1857,11 +1869,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
|
||||
rc = icsftok_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedPart,
|
||||
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1883,6 +1902,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||
@@ -1915,10 +1935,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||
length_only = TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = icsftok_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
|
||||
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ if (mask)
|
||||
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ if (mask) {
|
||||
if (sess)
|
||||
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
|
||||
commit d756ba1ec270a289950e66398c7e8be59c4a594d
|
||||
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Feb 9 14:07:34 2024 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
COMMON: Fix implicit rejection with RSA keys with empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT
|
||||
|
||||
An RSA key object that has no CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT may either don't have that
|
||||
attribute at all, or may have an empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT attribute.
|
||||
Both situations should be handed the same, and the private exponent of the
|
||||
key needs to be calculated from the other key components.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that RSA key objects generated with a current soft or ICA token will
|
||||
always have a valid CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT attribute, since this is provided
|
||||
during key generation.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||
index da515289..14c82e2d 100644
|
||||
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||
@@ -5160,7 +5160,8 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||
|
||||
rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
|
||||
CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, &priv_exp_attr);
|
||||
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE) {
|
||||
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE &&
|
||||
+ rc != CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID) {
|
||||
TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT\n");
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
@ -1,49 +1,51 @@
|
||||
Name: opencryptoki
|
||||
Summary: Implementation of the PKCS#11 (Cryptoki) specification v3.0
|
||||
Version: 3.22.0
|
||||
Release: 3%{?dist}
|
||||
License: CPL
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Base
|
||||
URL: https://github.com/opencryptoki/opencryptoki
|
||||
Source0: https://github.com/opencryptoki/%{name}/archive/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
|
||||
Name: opencryptoki
|
||||
Summary: Implementation of the PKCS#11 (Cryptoki) specification v3.0
|
||||
Version: 3.23.0
|
||||
Release: 1%{?dist}
|
||||
License: CPL
|
||||
URL: https://github.com/opencryptoki/opencryptoki
|
||||
Source0: https://github.com/opencryptoki/%{name}/archive/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
|
||||
# bz#1373833, change tmpfiles snippets from /var/lock/* to /run/lock/*
|
||||
Patch1: opencryptoki-3.11.0-lockdir.patch
|
||||
# add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf
|
||||
Patch2: opencryptoki-3.21.0-p11sak.patch
|
||||
# comment some unsupported sandbox options and add /run to ReadWritePaths to exclude
|
||||
# /run directory from being made read-only on rhel8
|
||||
Patch3: opencryptoki-3.21-sandboxing.patch
|
||||
Patch1: opencryptoki-3.11.0-lockdir.patch
|
||||
# add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf, strength.conf
|
||||
Patch2: opencryptoki-3.21.0-p11sak.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# upstream patches
|
||||
# CVE-2024-0914 opencryptoki: timing side-channel in handling of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padded ciphertexts
|
||||
Patch20: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part1.patch
|
||||
Patch21: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part2.patch
|
||||
Patch22: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part3.patch
|
||||
Patch23: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part4.patch
|
||||
Patch24: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part5.patch
|
||||
# SEC2356-backport
|
||||
Patch100: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-01.patch
|
||||
Patch101: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-02.patch
|
||||
Patch102: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-03.patch
|
||||
Patch103: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-04.patch
|
||||
Patch104: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-05.patch
|
||||
Patch105: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-06.patch
|
||||
Patch106: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-07.patch
|
||||
Patch107: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-08.patch
|
||||
Patch108: opencryptoki-3.23-SEC2356-backport-09.patch
|
||||
|
||||
Requires(pre): coreutils diffutils
|
||||
Requires: (selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-121 if selinux-policy-targeted)
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
|
||||
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.1.1
|
||||
BuildRequires: trousers-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: openldap-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool
|
||||
BuildRequires: bison flex
|
||||
BuildRequires: systemd-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: libcap-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: expect
|
||||
BuildRequires: make
|
||||
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||
BuildRequires: libica-devel >= 3.3
|
||||
Requires(pre): coreutils diffutils
|
||||
Requires: (selinux-policy >= 38.1.14-1 if selinux-policy-targeted)
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
|
||||
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.1.1
|
||||
%if 0%{?tmptok}
|
||||
BuildRequires: trousers-devel
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}(token)
|
||||
Requires(post): systemd
|
||||
Requires(preun): systemd
|
||||
Requires(postun): systemd
|
||||
BuildRequires: openldap-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool
|
||||
BuildRequires: bison flex
|
||||
BuildRequires: systemd-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: libcap-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: expect
|
||||
BuildRequires: make
|
||||
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||
BuildRequires: libica-devel >= 3.3
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}(token)
|
||||
Requires(post): systemd
|
||||
Requires(preun): systemd
|
||||
Requires(postun): systemd
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%description
|
||||
@ -56,7 +58,6 @@ This package contains the Slot Daemon (pkcsslotd) and general utilities.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%package libs
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
Summary: The run-time libraries for opencryptoki package
|
||||
Requires(pre): shadow-utils
|
||||
|
||||
@ -72,7 +73,6 @@ functional.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%package devel
|
||||
Group: Development/Libraries
|
||||
Summary: Development files for openCryptoki
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ opencryptoki and PKCS#11 based applications
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%package swtok
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
Summary: The software token implementation for opencryptoki
|
||||
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
@ -99,7 +98,6 @@ without any specific cryptographic hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%package tpmtok
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
Summary: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) device support for opencryptoki
|
||||
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
@ -116,7 +114,6 @@ Trusted Platform Module (TPM) devices in the opencryptoki stack.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%package icsftok
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
Summary: ICSF token support for opencryptoki
|
||||
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
@ -134,7 +131,6 @@ ICSF token in the opencryptoki stack.
|
||||
|
||||
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||
%package icatok
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
Summary: ICA cryptographic devices (clear-key) support for opencryptoki
|
||||
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
@ -152,7 +148,6 @@ cryptographic hardware such as IBM 4764 or 4765 that uses the
|
||||
"accelerator" or "clear-key" path.
|
||||
|
||||
%package ccatok
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
Summary: CCA cryptographic devices (secure-key) support for opencryptoki
|
||||
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
@ -170,7 +165,6 @@ cryptographic hardware such as IBM 4764 or 4765 that uses the
|
||||
"co-processor" or "secure-key" path.
|
||||
|
||||
%package ep11tok
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
Summary: CCA cryptographic devices (secure-key) support for opencryptoki
|
||||
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
@ -196,44 +190,24 @@ configured with Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) firmware.
|
||||
%build
|
||||
./bootstrap.sh
|
||||
|
||||
%configure --with-systemd=%{_unitdir} \
|
||||
%configure --with-systemd=%{_unitdir} --enable-testcases \
|
||||
--with-pkcsslotd-user=pkcsslotd --with-pkcs-group=pkcs11 \
|
||||
%if 0%{?tpmtok}
|
||||
--enable-tpmtok \
|
||||
%else
|
||||
--disable-tpmtok \
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||
--enable-icatok --enable-ccatok --enable-ep11tok --enable-pkcsep11_migrate
|
||||
%else
|
||||
--disable-icatok --disable-ccatok --disable-ep11tok --disable-pkcsep11_migrate --disable-pkcscca_migrate
|
||||
--disable-icatok --disable-ccatok --disable-ep11tok --disable-pkcsep11_migrate
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
make %{?_smp_mflags} CHGRP=/bin/true
|
||||
%make_build CHGRP=/bin/true
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%install
|
||||
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT CHGRP=/bin/true
|
||||
|
||||
# Remove unwanted cruft
|
||||
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/%{name}/*.la
|
||||
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/%{name}/stdll/*.la
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%post libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%post swtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%post tpmtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%post icsftok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||
%post icatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%post ccatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%post ep11tok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%postun swtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%postun tpmtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%postun icsftok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||
%postun icatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%postun ccatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%postun ep11tok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
%make_install CHGRP=/bin/true
|
||||
|
||||
%pre
|
||||
# don't touch opencryptoki.conf even if it is unchanged due to new tokversion
|
||||
@ -260,7 +234,7 @@ fi
|
||||
|
||||
%systemd_post pkcsslotd.service
|
||||
if test $1 -eq 1; then
|
||||
%tmpfiles_create
|
||||
%tmpfiles_create %{name}.conf
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
%preun
|
||||
@ -269,8 +243,6 @@ fi
|
||||
%postun
|
||||
%systemd_postun_with_restart pkcsslotd.service
|
||||
|
||||
%triggerun -- opencryptoki < 3.21.0-1
|
||||
/usr/bin/systemctl daemon-reload
|
||||
|
||||
%files
|
||||
%doc ChangeLog FAQ README.md
|
||||
@ -334,11 +306,13 @@ fi
|
||||
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/swtok/
|
||||
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/swtok/TOK_OBJ/
|
||||
|
||||
%if 0%{?tmptok}
|
||||
%files tpmtok
|
||||
%doc doc/README.tpm_stdll
|
||||
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_tpm.*
|
||||
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_TPM.so
|
||||
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/tpm/
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
%files icsftok
|
||||
%doc doc/README.icsf_stdll
|
||||
@ -381,196 +355,212 @@ fi
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Wed May 22 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.23.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: RHEL-23671, ep11 token: support protected keys for extractable keys
|
||||
- Resolves: RHEL-23672, ep11 token support for FIPS 2021-session bound EP11 keys
|
||||
- Resolves: RHEL-23673, update to 3.23.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Feb 16 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-3
|
||||
- Fix implicit rejection with RSA keys with empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT
|
||||
Related: RHEL-22791
|
||||
Related: RHEL-22792
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Feb 08 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-2
|
||||
- timing side-channel in handling of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padded ciphertexts (Marvin)
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-22791
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-22792
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Nov 23 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: RHEL-11413, update to 3.22.0
|
||||
* Tue Nov 21 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: RHEL-11412, rebase to 3.22.0
|
||||
- Resolves: RHEL-10569, openCryptoki for PKCS #11 3.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jul 18 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-9
|
||||
- Resolves: #2223588, FTBFS
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jul 18 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-8
|
||||
- Related: #2222595, add triggerun to reload daemon
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 14 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-7
|
||||
- Resolves: #2222595, p11sak tool: slot option does not accept argument 0 for slot index 0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2222594, p11sak fails as soon as there reside non-key objects
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jul 04 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-6
|
||||
- add workaround for segfault in PEM_write_bio() on OpenSSL 1.1.1
|
||||
Related: #2159741
|
||||
* Fri Jul 14 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-8
|
||||
- Resolves: #2222592, p11sak tool: slot option does not accept argument 0 for slot index 0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2222596, p11sak fails as soon as there reside non-key objects
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 13 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-5
|
||||
- add requirement on selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-121 for pkcsslotd policy sandboxing
|
||||
Related: #2159697
|
||||
- add requirement on selinux-policy >= 38.1.14-1 for pkcsslotd policy sandboxing
|
||||
Related: #2160061
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu May 25 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-4
|
||||
* Fri May 26 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-4
|
||||
- add verify attributes for opencryptoki.conf to ignore the verification
|
||||
Related: #2159697
|
||||
|
||||
Related: #2160061
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon May 22 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-3
|
||||
- pkcsstats: Fix handling of user name
|
||||
- p11sak: Fix user confirmation prompt behavior when stdin is closed
|
||||
Related: #2159697
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue May 16 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-2
|
||||
- add missing /var/lib/opencryptoki/HSM_MK_CHANGE
|
||||
- disable unsupported sandbox options and add /run to ReadWritePaths to exclude
|
||||
/run directory from being made read-only on rhel8
|
||||
Related: #2159697
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon May 15 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #1984865, ep11 and cca: support concurrent HSM master key changes
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110500, ep11 token: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS
|
||||
- Resolves: #2111011, cca token: protected key support
|
||||
- Resolves: #2159697, update to 3.21.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2159740, pkcsslotd hardening
|
||||
- Resolves: #2159741, p11sak support Dilithium and Kyber keys
|
||||
- Resolves: #2159742, ica and soft tokens: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110497, concurrent MK rotation for cca token
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110498, concurrent MK rotation for ep11 token
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110499, ep11 token: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS
|
||||
- Resolves: #2111010, cca token: protected key support
|
||||
- Resolves: #2160061, rebase to 3.21.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2160105, pkcsslotd hardening
|
||||
- Resolves: #2160107, p11sak support Dilithium and Kyber keys
|
||||
- Resolves: #2160109, ica and soft tokens: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jan 30 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-2
|
||||
- Resolves: #2043856, Support of ep11 token for new IBM Z Hardware (IBM z16)
|
||||
- Resolves: #2044182, Support of ep11 token for new IBM Z Hardware (IBM z16)
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Nov 01 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #2126612, opencryptoki fails after generating > 500 RSA keys
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110315, rebase to 3.19.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110990, openCryptoki key generation with expected MKVP only on CCA and EP11 tokens
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110477, openCryptoki ep11 token: master key consistency
|
||||
- Resolves: #1984871, openCryptoki ep11 token: vendor specific key derivation
|
||||
* Tue Oct 11 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #2126294, opencryptoki fails after generating > 500 RSA keys
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110314, rebase to 3.19.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110989, openCryptoki key generation with expected MKVP only on CCA and EP11 tokens
|
||||
- Resolves: #2110476, openCryptoki ep11 token: master key consistency
|
||||
- Resolves: #2018458, openCryptoki ep11 token: vendor specific key derivation
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Aug 01 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-3
|
||||
- Related: #2043854, do not touch opencryptoki.conf if it is in place already and even if it is unchanged
|
||||
- Resolves: #2112785, EP11: Fix C_GetMechanismList returning CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
|
||||
* Fri Jul 29 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-4
|
||||
- Related: #2044179, do not touch opencryptoki.conf if it is in place already and even if it is unchanged
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 07 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-2
|
||||
- Related: #2043854, fix json output
|
||||
* Tue Jun 07 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-3
|
||||
- Related: #2044179, fix json output
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue May 24 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #2043845, rebase to 3.18.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2043854, add crypto counters
|
||||
- Resolves: #2043855, support crypto profiles
|
||||
* Mon May 09 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-2
|
||||
- Related: #2044179, add missing strength.conf
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Apr 15 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-4
|
||||
- Resolves: #2066762, Dilithium support not available
|
||||
* Mon May 09 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #2044179, rebase to 3.18.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2068091, pkcsconf -t failed with Segmentation fault in FIPS mode
|
||||
- Resolves: #2066763, Dilithium support not available
|
||||
- Resolves: #2064697, OpenSSL 3.0 Compatibility for IBM Security Libraries and Tools
|
||||
- Resolves: #2044181, support crypto profiles
|
||||
- Resolves: #2044180, add crypto counters
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jan 17 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-3
|
||||
- Resolves: #2040677, API: Unlock GlobMutex if user and group check fails
|
||||
* Tue May 03 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-6
|
||||
- Resolves: #2066763, Dilithium support not available
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Nov 09 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-2
|
||||
- Related: #1984993, add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf
|
||||
* Mon Mar 14 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-5
|
||||
- Resolves: #2064697, ICA/EP11: Support libica version 4
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Oct 19 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #1984993, rebase to 3.17.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #1984870, openCryptoki key management tool
|
||||
* Mon Jan 17 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-4
|
||||
- Resolves: #2040678, API: Unlock GlobMutex if user and group check fails
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Sep 13 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-6
|
||||
- Fix: Could not open /run/lock/opencryptoki/LCK..APIlock
|
||||
* Sat Dec 04 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-3
|
||||
- Related: #2015888, added missing patch pkcsslotd-pidfile
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Aug 19 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-5
|
||||
- Resolves: #1987256, pkcstok_migrate leaves options with multiple strings in opencryptoki.conf options without double-quotes
|
||||
* Wed Nov 24 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-2
|
||||
- Related: #2015888, add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 16 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-4
|
||||
- Resolves: #1964304, Fix detection if pkcsslotd is still running
|
||||
* Wed Nov 03 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #2015888, rebase to 3.17.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #2017720, openCryptoki key management tool
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 15 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-3
|
||||
- Related: #1919223, add conditional requirement
|
||||
* Thu Aug 26 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-12
|
||||
- Related: #1989138, Support for OpenSSL 3.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jun 11 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-2
|
||||
- Related: #1919223, add requirement on selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-70 for using ipsec
|
||||
* Mon Aug 23 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-11
|
||||
- Resolves: #1989138, Support for OpenSSL 3.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 01 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #1919223, rebase to 3.16.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #1922195, Event Notification Support
|
||||
- Resolves: #1959936, Soft token does not check if an EC key is valid
|
||||
- Resolves: #1851104, import and export of secure key objects
|
||||
- Resolves: #1851106, openCryptoki ep11 token: protected key support
|
||||
- Resolves: #1851107, openCryptoki ep11 token: support attribute bound keys
|
||||
* Thu Aug 19 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-10
|
||||
- Resolves: #1987186, pkcstok_migrate leaves options with multiple strings in opencryptoki.conf options without double-quotes
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-9
|
||||
- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
|
||||
Related: rhbz#1991688
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 28 2021 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-8
|
||||
- Rebuild to pick up OpenSSL 3.0 Beta ABI (#1984097)
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 16 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-7
|
||||
- Resolves: #1974365, Fix detection if pkcsslotd is still running
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jun 25 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-6
|
||||
- Resolves: #1974693, pkcsslotd PIDfile below legacy directory /var/run/
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-5
|
||||
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
|
||||
Related: rhbz#1971065
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 15 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-4
|
||||
- Related: #1924120, add conditional requirement on new selinux-policy
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon May 17 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-3
|
||||
- Resolves: #1959894, Soft token does not check if an EC key is valid
|
||||
- Resolves: #1924120, Event Notification Support
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-2
|
||||
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Mar 31 2021 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.16.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.16.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Mar 02 2021 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> - 3.15.1-6
|
||||
- Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros
|
||||
See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583.
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Feb 12 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-5
|
||||
- Resolves: #1928120, Fix problem with C_Get/SetOperationState and digest contexts
|
||||
- Added upstream patch, a slot ID has nothing to do with the number of slots
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Feb 12 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-4
|
||||
- Resolves: #1927745, pkcscca migration fails with usr/sb2 is not a valid slot ID
|
||||
* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.15.1-4
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Nov 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-3
|
||||
- Resolves: #1902022
|
||||
Fix compiling with c++
|
||||
Added error message handling for p11sak remove-key command
|
||||
* Tue Dec 22 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-3
|
||||
- Drop tpm1.2 support by default
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Nov 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-2
|
||||
- Related: #1847433, Added error message handling for p11sak remove-key command
|
||||
* Tue Dec 22 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-2
|
||||
- Fix compiling with c++
|
||||
- Added error message handling for p11sak remove-key command
|
||||
- Add BR on make
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Nov 02 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-1
|
||||
- Related: #1847433
|
||||
upstream fixes:
|
||||
- Free generated key in all error cases
|
||||
- CCA: Zeroize key buffer to avoid CCA 8/32 error
|
||||
- Do not delete the map-btree entry if destroying an object is not allowed
|
||||
- Remove now unused header timeb.h
|
||||
- TESTCASES: Use FIPS conforming keys for 3DES CBC-MAC test vectors
|
||||
- Fix buffer overrun in C_CopyObject
|
||||
- TPM: Fix double free in openssl_gen_key
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.15.1
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Oct 19 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #1847433, rebase to 3.15.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #1851105, PKCS #11 3.0 - baseline provider support
|
||||
- Resolves: #1851108, openCryptoki ep11 token: enhanced functionality
|
||||
- Resolves: #1851109, openCryptoki key management tool: key deletion function
|
||||
* Mon Oct 19 2020 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.15.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.15.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jul 06 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-5
|
||||
- Related: #1853420, more fixes
|
||||
* Tue Jul 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.14.0-6
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 03 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-4
|
||||
- Resolves: #1853420, endian issue
|
||||
* Tue Jul 14 2020 Tom Stellard <tstellar@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-5
|
||||
- Use make macros
|
||||
- https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/UseMakeBuildInstallMacro
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jun 15 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-3
|
||||
- Resolves: #1780294, PIN conversion tool
|
||||
* Wed Jul 08 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-4
|
||||
- added PIN conversion tool
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue May 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-2
|
||||
- Related: #1780293, fix regression, segfault in C_SetPin
|
||||
* Wed Jul 01 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-3
|
||||
- upstream fix - handle early error cases in C_Initialize
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue May 19 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #1723863 - ep11 token: Enhanced Support
|
||||
- Resolves: #1780285 - ep11 token: Support for new IBM Z hardware z15
|
||||
- Resolves: #1780293 - rebase to 3.14.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #1800549 - key management tool: list keys function
|
||||
-Resolves: #1800555 - key management tool: random key generation function
|
||||
* Wed May 27 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-2
|
||||
- fix regression, segfault in C_SetPin
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Dec 13 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.1-2
|
||||
- Resolves: #1782445, EP11: Fix EC-uncompress buffer length
|
||||
* Fri May 15 2020 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.14.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.14.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Nov 28 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.1-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #1777313, rebase to 3.12.1
|
||||
* Fri Mar 06 2020 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.13.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.13.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Nov 12 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.0-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #1726243, rebase to 3.12.0
|
||||
* Mon Feb 03 2020 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.12.1-3
|
||||
- fix build with gcc 10
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Aug 26 2019 Dan Horák <dhorak@redhat.com> - 3.11.1-2
|
||||
- Resolves: #1739433, ICA HW token missing after the package update
|
||||
* Wed Jan 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.12.1-2
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon May 06 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.1-1
|
||||
- Resolves: #1706140, rebase to 3.11.1
|
||||
* Wed Nov 27 2019 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.12.1-1
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.12.1
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Mar 26 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-3
|
||||
- Resolves: #1667941, 3des tests failures due to FIPS incompatible test scenarios
|
||||
- Resolves: #1651731, ep11 token: enhanced IBM z14 functions
|
||||
- Resolves: #1651732, ep11 token: support m_*Single functions from ep11 lib
|
||||
- Resolves: #1525407, use CPACF hashes in ep11 token
|
||||
- Resolves: #1651238, rebase to 3.11.0
|
||||
- Resolves: #1682530, gating
|
||||
* Wed Nov 13 2019 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.12.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.12.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Dec 14 2018 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.10.0-3
|
||||
- Resolves: #1657683, can't establish libica token in FIPS mode
|
||||
- Resolves: #1652856, EP11 token fails when using Strict-Session mode or VHSM-Mode
|
||||
* Sun Sep 22 2019 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.11.1-1
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.11.1
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Oct 25 2018 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.10.0-2
|
||||
- Resolves: #1602641, covscan
|
||||
* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.11.0-5
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Mar 28 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-4
|
||||
- enable testcase by default
|
||||
- fix URL
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Feb 19 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-3
|
||||
- Resolved #1063763 - opencryptoki tools should inform the user that he is not in pkcs11 group
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Feb 01 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.11.0-2
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jan 31 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-1
|
||||
- Updated to 3.11.0
|
||||
- Resolved #1341079 - Failed to create directory or subvolume "/var/lock/opencryptoki"
|
||||
- Ported root's group membership's patch for 3.11.0
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 13 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.10.0-2
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 12 2018 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.10.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to 3.10.0
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user