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2
.gitignore
vendored
2
.gitignore
vendored
@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
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SOURCES/blank-key3.db
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SOURCES/blank-key3.db
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SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
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SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
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SOURCES/nss-3.101.tar.gz
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SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz
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@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
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7f78b5bcecdb5005e7b803604b2ec9d1a9df2fb5 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
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7f78b5bcecdb5005e7b803604b2ec9d1a9df2fb5 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
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f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
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bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
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90f6f1d5440e7cc72cd27f2ecf2e8f3f680a00aa SOURCES/nss-3.101.tar.gz
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3719dd97c8ec9cb04aa61e6aca41b129b4adc004 SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz
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@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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/*
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* Vendors should replace this header file with the file containing those
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* algorithms which have NIST algorithm Certificates.
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*/
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/* handle special cases. Classes require existing code to already be
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* in place for that class */
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typedef enum {
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SFTKFIPSNone = 0,
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SFTKFIPSDH, /* allow only specific primes */
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SFTKFIPSECC, /* not just keys but specific curves */
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SFTKFIPSAEAD, /* single shot AEAD functions not allowed in FIPS mode */
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SFTKFIPSRSAPSS, /* make sure salt isn't too big */
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SFTKFIPSPBKDF2, /* handle pbkdf2 FIPS restrictions */
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SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck, /* check the output of TLS prf functions */
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SFTKFIPSChkHash, /* make sure the base hash of KDF functions is FIPS */
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SFTKFIPSChkHashTls, /* make sure the base hash of TLS KDF functions is FIPS */
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SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800, /* make sure the base hash of SP-800-108 KDF functions is FIPS */
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} SFTKFIPSSpecialClass;
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/* set according to your security policy */
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#define SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN 8
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typedef struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList;
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struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr {
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
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CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
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CK_ULONG step;
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SFTKFIPSSpecialClass special;
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size_t offset;
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};
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SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
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/* A sample set of algorithms to allow basic testing in our continous
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* testing infrastructure. The vendor version should replace this with
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* a version that matches their algorithm testing and security policy */
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/* NOTE, This looks a lot like the PKCS #11 mechanism list in pkcs11.c, it
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* differs in the following ways:
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* 1) the addition of step and class elements to help restrict
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* the supported key sizes and types.
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* 2) The mechanism flags are restricted to only those that map to
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* fips approved operations.
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* 3) All key sizes are in bits, independent of mechanism.
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* 4) You can add more then one entry for the same mechanism to handle
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* multiple descrete keys where the MIN/MAX/STEP semantics doesn't apply
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* or where different operations have different key requirements.
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* This table does not encode all the modules legal FIPS semantics, only
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* those semantics that might possibly change due to algorithms dropping
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* of the security policy late in the process. */
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/* handy common flag types */
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#define CKF_KPG CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR
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#define CKF_GEN CKF_GENERATE
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#define CKF_SGN (CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY)
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#define CKF_ENC (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT )
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#define CKF_ECW (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
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#define CKF_WRP (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
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#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
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#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
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#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
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#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
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#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
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/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
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* limits */
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#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
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#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
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#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
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#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
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#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
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#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
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#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 8192 /* min, max */
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#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
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#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
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#define EC_FB_STEP 1 /* key limits handled by special operation */
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#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
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#define AES_FB_STEP 64
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{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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/* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
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{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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/* -------------------- Diffie Hellman Operations --------------------- */
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{ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
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{ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
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/* -------------------- Elliptic Curve Operations --------------------- */
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{ CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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/* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
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/* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
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{ CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
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{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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/* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
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{ CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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/* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
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{ CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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/* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
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{ CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck, offsetof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
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{ CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
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offsetof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
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{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
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offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
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{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
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offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
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/* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
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{ CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
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offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
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{ CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
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offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
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{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
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/* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations ------------------- */
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{ CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
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offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
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{ CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
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offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
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{ CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
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offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
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/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
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{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
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offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
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{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
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offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
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/* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations ------------------- */
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{ CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSPBKDF2 },
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/* the deprecated mechanisms, don't use for some reason we are supposed
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* to set the FIPS indicators on these (sigh) */
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{ CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck },
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{ CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
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offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
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{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
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offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
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{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
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offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
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};
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const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);
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File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
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diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
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--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems 2024-06-11 13:09:25.956760476 -0700
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+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2024-06-11 13:09:52.837067481 -0700
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@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
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{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
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{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
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{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
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+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-REQUIRE-EMS"), SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
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+
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};
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static const oidValDef smimeKxOptList[] = {
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diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h
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--- ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
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||||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h 2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -202,4 +202,10 @@ struct PK11GenericObjectStr {
|
|
||||||
/* This mask includes all CK_FLAGs with an equivalent CKA_ attribute. */
|
|
||||||
#define CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS 0x000e7b00UL
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+/* this oid value could change values if it's added after other new
|
|
||||||
+ * upstream oids. We protect applications by hiding the define in a private
|
|
||||||
+ * header file that only NSS sees. Currently it's only available through
|
|
||||||
+ * the policy code */
|
|
||||||
+#define SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
#endif /* _SECMODTI_H_ */
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2023-06-12 17:18:35.130938525 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
|
|
||||||
#include "pk11func.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "secmod.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "blapi.h"
|
|
||||||
+#include "secmodti.h" /* until SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS is upstream */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -3480,6 +3481,29 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *s
|
|
||||||
CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
|
|
||||||
unsigned int master_params_len;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ /* if we are using TLS and we aren't using the extended master secret,
|
|
||||||
+ * and SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS policy is true, fail. The caller will
|
|
||||||
+ * send and alert (eventually). In the RSA Server case, the alert
|
|
||||||
+ * won't happen until Finish time because the upper level code
|
|
||||||
+ * can't tell a difference between this failure and an RSA decrypt
|
|
||||||
+ * failure, so it will proceed with a faux key */
|
|
||||||
+ if (isTLS) {
|
|
||||||
+ PRUint32 policy;
|
|
||||||
+ SECStatus rv;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */
|
|
||||||
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, &policy);
|
|
||||||
+ /* we only look at the policy if we can fetch it. */
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX) {
|
|
||||||
+ /* just set the error, we don't want to map any errors
|
|
||||||
+ * set by NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy here */
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
if (isTLS12) {
|
|
||||||
if (isDH)
|
|
||||||
master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems ./lib/util/secoid.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems 2024-06-11 13:11:28.078155282 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/util/secoid.c 2024-06-11 13:12:58.511188172 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -1890,6 +1890,12 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
|
|
||||||
ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC, "RC2-64-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
|
||||||
ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC, "RC2-128-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
|
||||||
ODE(SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA, "ECDH", CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
|
|
||||||
+ /* we need it for the policy code. */
|
|
||||||
+ ODE(SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1,
|
|
||||||
+ "TLS Require EMS", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table
|
|
||||||
@@ -2198,6 +2204,10 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* turn off NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL by default */
|
|
||||||
xOids[SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY].notPolicyFlags = NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL;
|
|
||||||
+ /* turn off TLS REQUIRE EMS by default */
|
|
||||||
+ xOids[SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1].notPolicyFlags = ~0;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
envVal = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT");
|
|
||||||
if (envVal)
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems ./lib/util/secoidt.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems 2024-06-11 13:16:13.212411967 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h 2024-06-11 13:16:48.098810434 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ typedef enum {
|
|
||||||
SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC = 385,
|
|
||||||
SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC = 386,
|
|
||||||
SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA = 387,
|
|
||||||
+ /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
|
|
||||||
+ /* give it an obscure name here */
|
|
||||||
+ SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 388,
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SEC_OID_TOTAL
|
|
||||||
} SECOidTag;
|
|
||||||
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -213,27 +213,31 @@
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
#ifdef NSS_X64
|
|
||||||
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_AVX2
|
|
||||||
if (avx2_support()) {
|
|
||||||
Hacl_Chacha20_Vec256_chacha20_encrypt_256(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
|
|
||||||
+ return;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_SSE3
|
|
||||||
if (ssse3_support() && sse4_1_support() && avx_support()) {
|
|
||||||
Hacl_Chacha20_Vec128_chacha20_encrypt_128(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
|
|
||||||
+ return;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
|
|
||||||
!defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
|
|
||||||
if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
|
|
||||||
chacha20vsx(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
|
|
||||||
- } else
|
|
||||||
+ return;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
Hacl_Chacha20_chacha20_encrypt(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
|
|
||||||
+ return;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
@@ -449,20 +453,18 @@
|
|
||||||
(uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
|
|
||||||
(uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
|
|
||||||
goto finish;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
- else
|
|
||||||
#elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
|
|
||||||
!defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
|
|
||||||
if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
|
|
||||||
Chacha20Poly1305_vsx_aead_encrypt(
|
|
||||||
(uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
|
|
||||||
(uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
|
|
||||||
goto finish;
|
|
||||||
- } else
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
Hacl_Chacha20Poly1305_32_aead_encrypt(
|
|
||||||
(uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
|
|
||||||
(uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c b/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@
|
|
||||||
pkix_pl_lifecycle_ObjectTableUpdate(int *objCountTable);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PRInt32 parallelFnInvocationCount;
|
|
||||||
#endif /* PKIX_OBJECT_LEAK_TEST */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
-static PRBool usePKIXValidationEngine = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+static PRBool usePKIXValidationEngine = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* FUNCTION: CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation
|
|
||||||
* DESCRIPTION:
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/nss/nssinit.c b/lib/nss/nssinit.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/nss/nssinit.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/nss/nssinit.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -762,13 +762,13 @@
|
|
||||||
PKIX_MINOR_VERSION, &actualMinorVersion, &plContext);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (pkixError != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
- char *ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY");
|
|
||||||
+ char *ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY");
|
|
||||||
if (ev && ev[0]) {
|
|
||||||
- CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation(PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation(PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/tests/all.sh b/tests/all.sh
|
|
||||||
--- a/tests/all.sh
|
|
||||||
+++ b/tests/all.sh
|
|
||||||
@@ -141,17 +141,22 @@
|
|
||||||
########################################################################
|
|
||||||
run_cycle_standard()
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
TEST_MODE=STANDARD
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY="1"
|
|
||||||
+ export NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
TESTS="${ALL_TESTS}"
|
|
||||||
TESTS_SKIP="libpkix pkits"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE:-"sql"}
|
|
||||||
export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
run_tests
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
############################ run_cycle_pkix ############################
|
|
||||||
# run test suites with PKIX enabled
|
|
||||||
########################################################################
|
|
||||||
@@ -165,13 +170,10 @@
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
HOSTDIR="${HOSTDIR}/pkix"
|
|
||||||
mkdir -p "${HOSTDIR}"
|
|
||||||
init_directories
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY="1"
|
|
||||||
- export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
TESTS="${ALL_TESTS}"
|
|
||||||
TESTS_SKIP="cipher dbtests sdr crmf smime merge multinit"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
export -n NSS_SSL_RUN
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/tests/common/init.sh b/tests/common/init.sh
|
|
||||||
--- a/tests/common/init.sh
|
|
||||||
+++ b/tests/common/init.sh
|
|
||||||
@@ -138,12 +138,12 @@
|
|
||||||
echo "NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL=${NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL}"
|
|
||||||
echo "NSS_SSL_TESTS=\"${NSS_SSL_TESTS}\""
|
|
||||||
echo "NSS_SSL_RUN=\"${NSS_SSL_RUN}\""
|
|
||||||
echo "NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE}"
|
|
||||||
echo "export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE"
|
|
||||||
- echo "NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY}"
|
|
||||||
- echo "export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY"
|
|
||||||
+ echo "NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY}"
|
|
||||||
+ echo "export NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY"
|
|
||||||
echo "init_directories"
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Exit shellfunction to clean up at exit (error, regular or signal)
|
|
||||||
Exit()
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
|
||||||
--- a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
|
||||||
+++ b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
|
||||||
@@ -960,13 +960,12 @@
|
|
||||||
ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp()
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
#verbose="-v"
|
|
||||||
html_head "Check that OCSP doesn't break if we disable sha1 $NORM_EXT - server $SERVER_MODE/client $CLIENT_MODE"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
|
|
||||||
- NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY="1"
|
|
||||||
- export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
|
|
||||||
+ PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
|
|
||||||
+ unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
testname=""
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if [ ! -f "${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt" ] ; then
|
|
||||||
html_failed "${SCRIPTNAME}: ${P_R_SERVERDIR} is not initialized"
|
|
||||||
@@ -987,16 +986,14 @@
|
|
||||||
grep 12276 ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy.out
|
|
||||||
RET=$?
|
|
||||||
html_msg $RET $RET_EXP "${testname}" \
|
|
||||||
"produced a returncode of $RET, expected is $RET_EXP"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- if [ "${PKIX_SAVE}" = "unset" ]; then
|
|
||||||
- unset NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
|
|
||||||
- else
|
|
||||||
- NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${PKIX_SAVE}
|
|
||||||
- export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
|
|
||||||
+ if [ "{PKIX_SAVE}" != "unset" ]; then
|
|
||||||
+ export NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY=${PKIX_SAVE}
|
|
||||||
fi
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
cp ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt.sav ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
html "</TABLE><BR>"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
|
|
||||||
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech 2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn 2024-06-12 13:30:25.699047788 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
|
|
||||||
tls_protect.cc \
|
|
||||||
tls_psk_unittest.cc \
|
|
||||||
tls_subcerts_unittest.cc \
|
|
||||||
- tls_ech_unittest.cc \
|
|
||||||
tls_xyber_unittest.cc \
|
|
||||||
$(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
|
|
||||||
$(NULL)
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c 2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -4415,17 +4415,23 @@ ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
SSLExp_EnableTls13GreaseEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
|
||||||
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
|
||||||
if (!ss) {
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch = enabled;
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint8 size)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
|
||||||
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
|
||||||
if (!ss || size == 0) {
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
@@ -4439,28 +4445,42 @@ SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc
|
|
||||||
ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
SSLExp_EnableTls13BackendEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
|
||||||
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
|
||||||
if (!ss) {
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch = enabled;
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
|
||||||
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
|
||||||
if (!ss) {
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = enabled;
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_md ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_md 2024-06-11 12:41:35.054654990 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2024-06-11 12:46:25.347979894 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -329,14 +329,11 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
|
|
||||||
static const oidValDef hashOptList[] = {
|
|
||||||
/* Hashes */
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD2"), SEC_OID_MD2,
|
|
||||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
|
|
||||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
|
|
||||||
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD4"), SEC_OID_MD4,
|
|
||||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
|
|
||||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
|
|
||||||
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD5"), SEC_OID_MD5,
|
|
||||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
|
|
||||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
|
|
||||||
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("SHA1"), SEC_OID_SHA1,
|
|
||||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
|
|
||||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.no_md ./lib/util/secoid.c
|
|
||||||
diff -r 699541a7793b lib/util/secoid.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/util/secoid.c Tue Jun 16 23:03:22 2020 +0000
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/util/secoid.c Thu Jun 25 14:33:09 2020 +0200
|
|
||||||
@@ -2042,6 +2042,19 @@
|
|
||||||
int i;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for (i = 1; i < SEC_OID_TOTAL; i++) {
|
|
||||||
+ switch (i) {
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_MD2:
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_MD4:
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_MD5:
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD2_AND_DES_CBC:
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC:
|
|
||||||
+ continue;
|
|
||||||
+ default:
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
if (oids[i].desc && strstr(arg, oids[i].desc)) {
|
|
||||||
xOids[i].notPolicyFlags = notEnable |
|
|
||||||
(xOids[i].notPolicyFlags & ~(DEF_FLAGS));
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt
|
|
||||||
--- ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt 2024-06-19 11:15:46.666728170 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -91,21 +91,21 @@
|
|
||||||
0 18 allow_all disallow=rc2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC4 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC SHA-1 disallow rc2 (read), RC4 and RC2
|
|
||||||
# integrity policy check the various has based controls.
|
|
||||||
# NOTE: md4, md2, and md5 are turned off by policy by default for encrypting
|
|
||||||
-# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=all or allow=mdX on the
|
|
||||||
+# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=mdX/pkcs12 on the
|
|
||||||
# encryption side. These tests purposefully tests that the default fails to encrypt
|
|
||||||
# but succeeds when decrypting.
|
|
||||||
27 x allow=tls allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Use default policy with multiple hashes
|
|
||||||
- 0 0 allow=all allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
|
|
||||||
- 0 0 allow=all allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
|
|
||||||
- 28 x disallow=sha1_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
|
|
||||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
|
|
||||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
|
|
||||||
+ 28 x disallow=sha1_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
|
|
||||||
27 x disallow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on write
|
|
||||||
- 29 x disallow=sha256_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
|
|
||||||
- 0 19 allow=all disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
|
|
||||||
- 0 18 allow=all disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
|
|
||||||
- 0 17 allow=all disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
|
|
||||||
- 0 0 allow=all disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
|
|
||||||
- 0 0 allow=all disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
|
|
||||||
- 0 0 allow=all disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
|
|
||||||
+ 29 x disallow=sha256_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
|
|
||||||
+ 0 19 allow=all:md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
|
|
||||||
+ 0 18 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
|
|
||||||
+ 0 17 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
|
|
||||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
|
|
||||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
|
|
||||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
|
|
||||||
0 0 allow=all allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
|
|
||||||
29 x disallow=hmac-sha256 allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
|
|
||||||
0 18 allow=all disallow=hmac-sha256 AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
|
|
||||||
@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.dbm ./tests/ec/ectest.sh
|
|
||||||
--- ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.dbm 2024-06-18 14:53:51.201438651 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/ec/ectest.sh 2024-06-18 14:56:09.993993637 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -45,12 +45,20 @@ ectest_genkeydb_test()
|
|
||||||
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
||||||
return $?
|
|
||||||
fi
|
|
||||||
+ if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
|
||||||
curves=( \
|
|
||||||
"curve25519" \
|
|
||||||
"secp256r1" \
|
|
||||||
"secp384r1" \
|
|
||||||
"secp521r1" \
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
+ else
|
|
||||||
+ curves=( \
|
|
||||||
+ "secp256r1" \
|
|
||||||
+ "secp384r1" \
|
|
||||||
+ "secp521r1" \
|
|
||||||
+ )
|
|
||||||
+ fi
|
|
||||||
for curve in "${curves[@]}"; do
|
|
||||||
echo "Test $curve key generation using certutil ..."
|
|
||||||
certutil -G -d "${HOSTDIR}" -k ec -q $curve -f "${R_PWFILE}" -z ${NOISE_FILE}
|
|
||||||
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.rsa_disable_test ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
|
|
||||||
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.rsa_disable_test 2024-06-19 11:17:10.261637015 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2024-06-19 11:18:22.797425628 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
|
|
||||||
# compatibility reasons
|
|
||||||
# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
|
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
|
|
||||||
- 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
|
|
||||||
+ 0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
|
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
|
||||||
0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
|
||||||
# test default settings
|
|
||||||
@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c.no_p12_smime_policy ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c.no_p12_smime_policy 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c 2024-07-17 11:26:00.334836451 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static pkcs12SuiteMap pkcs12SuiteMaps[]
|
|
||||||
static PRBool
|
|
||||||
sec_PKCS12Allowed(SECOidTag alg, PRUint32 needed)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
|
||||||
PRUint32 policy;
|
|
||||||
SECStatus rv;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ sec_PKCS12Allowed(SECOidTag alg, PRUint3
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PRBool
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c.no_p12_smime_policy ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c.no_p12_smime_policy 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c 2024-07-17 11:27:04.716617111 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ smime_get_policy_tag_from_key_length(SEC
|
|
||||||
PRBool
|
|
||||||
smime_allowed_by_policy(SECOidTag algtag, PRUint32 neededPolicy)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
|
||||||
PRUint32 policyFlags;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* some S/MIME algs map to the same underlying KEA mechanism,
|
|
||||||
@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ smime_allowed_by_policy(SECOidTag algtag
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_EXPORT_ALGORITHM);
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -485,6 +487,7 @@ smime_init_once(void *arg)
|
|
||||||
return PR_FAILURE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
|
||||||
/* At initialization time, we need to set up the defaults. We first
|
|
||||||
* look to see if the system or application has set up certain algorithms
|
|
||||||
* by policy. If they have set up values by policy we'll only allow those
|
|
||||||
@@ -497,6 +500,11 @@ smime_init_once(void *arg)
|
|
||||||
PORT_Free(tags);
|
|
||||||
tags = NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ /* just initialize the old maps */
|
|
||||||
+ rv = SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
+ tagCount = 0;
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (tagCount == 0)) {
|
|
||||||
/* No algorithms have been enabled by policy (either by the system
|
|
||||||
* or by the application, we then will use the traditional default
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./smime/smime.sh.no_p12_smime_policy ./smime/smime.sh
|
|
||||||
--- ./tests/smime/smime.sh.no_p12_smime_policy 2024-07-17 12:27:36.262106070 -0
|
|
||||||
700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/smime/smime.sh 2024-07-17 12:29:08.251207306 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -872,8 +872,8 @@ smime_init
|
|
||||||
smime_main
|
|
||||||
smime_data_tb
|
|
||||||
smime_p7
|
|
||||||
-if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
|
||||||
- smime_policy
|
|
||||||
-fi
|
|
||||||
+#if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
|
||||||
+# smime_policy
|
|
||||||
+#fi
|
|
||||||
smime_cleanup
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./tools/tools.sh.no_p12_smime_policy ./tools/tools.sh
|
|
||||||
--- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.no_p12_smime_policy 2024-07-17 12:27:36.262106070 -0
|
|
||||||
700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh 2024-07-17 12:28:32.418778346 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ tools_p12()
|
|
||||||
tools_p12_import_pbmac1_samples
|
|
||||||
if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
|
||||||
tools_p12_import_rsa_pss_private_key
|
|
||||||
- tools_p12_policy
|
|
||||||
+#tools_p12_policy
|
|
||||||
fi
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy 2024-06-12 14:44:24.680338868 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2024-06-12 14:44:48.368609356 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
|
|
||||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("CURVE25519"), SEC_OID_CURVE25519,
|
|
||||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
|
|
||||||
- { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00, 0 },
|
|
||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00,
|
|
||||||
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
|
||||||
/* ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curves (characteristic two field) */
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB163V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1,
|
|
||||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
|
|
||||||
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh
|
|
||||||
--- ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend 2023-11-15 13:17:50.651020458 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh 2023-11-15 13:18:57.091608850 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ dbtest_main()
|
|
||||||
RARRAY=($dtime)
|
|
||||||
TIMEARRAY=(${RARRAY[1]//./ })
|
|
||||||
echo "${TIMEARRAY[0]} seconds"
|
|
||||||
- test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt 5
|
|
||||||
+ test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt ${NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME-5}
|
|
||||||
ret=$?
|
|
||||||
html_msg ${ret} 0 "certutil dump keys with explicit default trust flags"
|
|
||||||
fi
|
|
||||||
@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators 2024-06-12 13:38:15.995811284 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2024-06-12 13:41:30.008188930 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
|
|
||||||
context->blockSize = 0;
|
|
||||||
context->maxLen = 0;
|
|
||||||
context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
|
|
||||||
- operation, key);
|
|
||||||
+ operation, key, 0);
|
|
||||||
*contextPtr = context;
|
|
||||||
return CKR_OK;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
|
|
||||||
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
|
|
||||||
/* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
|
|
||||||
* key length against fips requirements */
|
|
||||||
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
|
|
||||||
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key, 0);
|
|
||||||
session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
|
|
||||||
sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
|
||||||
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -6020,7 +6020,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
|
||||||
return crv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
|
|
||||||
- privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
|
|
||||||
+ privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey, 0);
|
|
||||||
publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
|
||||||
session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
|
||||||
sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
|
||||||
@@ -7220,6 +7220,10 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
|
||||||
return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ if (!params->bExpand) {
|
|
||||||
+ keySize = hashLen;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
|
|
||||||
* sensitiveCheck */
|
|
||||||
if (sourceKey != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -7269,7 +7273,8 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
|
||||||
mech.pParameter = params;
|
|
||||||
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
|
|
||||||
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
|
|
||||||
- CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
|
|
||||||
+ CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
|
|
||||||
+ keySize);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
|
|
||||||
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
|
||||||
@@ -7336,7 +7341,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
|
||||||
/* HKDF-Expand */
|
|
||||||
if (!params->bExpand) {
|
|
||||||
okm = prk;
|
|
||||||
- keySize = genLen = hashLen;
|
|
||||||
+ genLen = hashLen;
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
|
|
||||||
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
|
|
||||||
@@ -7583,7 +7588,8 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
|
||||||
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
|
|
||||||
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
|
|
||||||
+ keySize);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
switch (mechanism) {
|
|
||||||
/* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators 2024-06-12 13:38:15.988811198 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -979,7 +979,8 @@ CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIB
|
|
||||||
/* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
|
|
||||||
* FIPS security policy */
|
|
||||||
PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
|
|
||||||
- CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
|
|
||||||
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source,
|
|
||||||
+ CK_ULONG targetKeySize);
|
|
||||||
/* add validation objects to the slot */
|
|
||||||
CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators 2024-06-12 13:38:15.990811223 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -2336,7 +2336,7 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
|
|
||||||
static CK_ULONG
|
|
||||||
sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
- CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
|
||||||
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
|
|
||||||
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
|
|
||||||
CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
|
|
||||||
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
|
|
||||||
@@ -2398,13 +2398,29 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
|
|
||||||
return keyLength;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+PRBool
|
|
||||||
+sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
|
|
||||||
+{
|
|
||||||
+ switch (hash) {
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA384:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA512:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+}
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
|
|
||||||
* handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
|
|
||||||
* would have to be coded here before they can be added to the table */
|
|
||||||
static PRBool
|
|
||||||
sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
|
|
||||||
- SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source)
|
|
||||||
+ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
|
|
||||||
+ CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
switch (mechInfo->special) {
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
|
|
||||||
@@ -2464,10 +2480,15 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
if (hashObj == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ /* cap the salt for legacy keys */
|
|
||||||
+ if ((keyLength <= 1024) && (pss->sLen > 63)) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ /* cap the salt for based on the hash */
|
|
||||||
if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
|
|
||||||
/* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
|
|
||||||
@@ -2492,6 +2513,13 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
|
|
||||||
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
|
|
||||||
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
|
|
||||||
+ + mechInfo->offset));
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -2502,7 +2530,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PRBool
|
|
||||||
sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
|
|
||||||
- SFTKObject *source)
|
|
||||||
+ SFTKObject *source, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
#ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
@@ -2534,13 +2562,17 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
|
|
||||||
SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
|
|
||||||
/* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
|
|
||||||
* approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
|
|
||||||
- if (((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
|
|
||||||
- (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
|
|
||||||
- (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
- (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
- ((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
|
|
||||||
+ if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
|
|
||||||
+ (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
|
|
||||||
+ (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
+ (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
+ (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
|
|
||||||
+ ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
|
|
||||||
+ ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
+ (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
+ ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
|
|
||||||
((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
|
|
||||||
- sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source))) {
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@ -1,490 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.639360404 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
|
|
||||||
PRBool
|
|
||||||
KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
- mp_int p, q, y, r;
|
|
||||||
+ mp_int p, q, y, r, psub1;
|
|
||||||
mp_err err;
|
|
||||||
int cmp = 1; /* default is false */
|
|
||||||
if (!Y || !prime || !subPrime) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -456,13 +456,30 @@ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, S
|
|
||||||
MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
|
|
||||||
MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
|
|
||||||
MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
|
|
||||||
+ MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y));
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
|
|
||||||
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
|
|
||||||
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*prime, &p);
|
|
||||||
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*subPrime, &q);
|
|
||||||
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*Y, &y);
|
|
||||||
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1));
|
|
||||||
+ /*
|
|
||||||
+ * We check that the public value isn't zero (which isn't in the
|
|
||||||
+ * group), one (subgroup of order one) or p-1 (subgroup of order 2). We
|
|
||||||
+ * also check that the public value is less than p, to avoid being fooled
|
|
||||||
+ * by values like p+1 or 2*p-1.
|
|
||||||
+ * This check is required by SP-800-56Ar3. It's also done in derive,
|
|
||||||
+ * but this is only called in various FIPS cases, so put it here to help
|
|
||||||
+ * reviewers find it.
|
|
||||||
+ */
|
|
||||||
+ if (mp_cmp_d(&y, 1) <= 0 ||
|
|
||||||
+ mp_cmp(&y, &psub1) >= 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ err = MP_BADARG;
|
|
||||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
/* compute r = y**q mod p */
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &q, &p, &r));
|
|
||||||
/* compare to 1 */
|
|
||||||
@@ -472,6 +489,7 @@ cleanup:
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&q);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&y);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&r);
|
|
||||||
+ mp_clear(&psub1);
|
|
||||||
if (err) {
|
|
||||||
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2024-06-12 13:06:35.410551333 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#include "prprf.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "prenv.h"
|
|
||||||
+#include "prerror.h"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
|
|
||||||
#define BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMech, typeSize) (!pMech->pParameter || pMech->ulParameterLen < typeSize)
|
|
||||||
@@ -4882,6 +4883,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
|
|
||||||
* handle the base object stuff
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
|
|
||||||
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
|
|
||||||
+ * key length against fips requirements */
|
|
||||||
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
|
|
||||||
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
|
|
||||||
sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
|
||||||
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
|
||||||
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
|
||||||
@@ -4889,9 +4894,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
|
|
||||||
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
|
|
||||||
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
|
|
||||||
- * fips requirements */
|
|
||||||
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
|
|
||||||
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
*phKey = key->handle;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -5199,60 +5201,68 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (isDerivable) {
|
|
||||||
SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
|
|
||||||
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
|
|
||||||
PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
|
|
||||||
- CK_RV crv2;
|
|
||||||
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
|
|
||||||
- CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
|
|
||||||
- CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
|
|
||||||
- CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
- CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
|
|
||||||
- { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
|
|
||||||
- { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
|
|
||||||
- { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
|
|
||||||
- { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
|
|
||||||
- };
|
|
||||||
- CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
|
|
||||||
- CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
|
|
||||||
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lowPrivKey = NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem *lowPubValue = NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem item;
|
|
||||||
+ SECStatus rv;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
|
|
||||||
- /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
|
|
||||||
- * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
|
|
||||||
- * the validity of the key */
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
+ /* FIPS 140-3 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key
|
|
||||||
+ * by recalculating the public can an compare it to our own public
|
|
||||||
+ * key. */
|
|
||||||
+ lowPrivKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, keyType, &crv);
|
|
||||||
+ if (lowPrivKey == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ /* recalculate the public key from the private key */
|
|
||||||
switch (keyType) {
|
|
||||||
- case CKK_DH:
|
|
||||||
- mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
|
|
||||||
- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
|
||||||
- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
- mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
|
|
||||||
- mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
|
||||||
- break;
|
|
||||||
- case CKK_EC:
|
|
||||||
- mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
|
|
||||||
- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
|
|
||||||
- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
- ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
|
|
||||||
- ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
|
|
||||||
- ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
|
|
||||||
- ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
|
||||||
- ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
|
|
||||||
- mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
|
|
||||||
- mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
|
|
||||||
- break;
|
|
||||||
- default:
|
|
||||||
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKK_DH:
|
|
||||||
+ rv = DH_Derive(&lowPrivKey->u.dh.base, &lowPrivKey->u.dh.prime,
|
|
||||||
+ &lowPrivKey->u.dh.privateValue, &item, 0);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&item);
|
|
||||||
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&item, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKK_EC:
|
|
||||||
+ rv = EC_NewKeyFromSeed(&lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPriv,
|
|
||||||
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.data,
|
|
||||||
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.len);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ /* make sure it has the same encoding */
|
|
||||||
+ if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
|
|
||||||
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
|
|
||||||
+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
|
|
||||||
+ } else {
|
|
||||||
+ lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
|
|
||||||
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
|
|
||||||
+ /* clear out our generated private key */
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ default:
|
|
||||||
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
|
|
||||||
- if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
- sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
|
|
||||||
- return crv;
|
|
||||||
+ /* now compare new public key with our already generated key */
|
|
||||||
+ if ((pubAttribute == NULL) || (lowPubValue == NULL) ||
|
|
||||||
+ (pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen != lowPubValue->len) ||
|
|
||||||
+ (PORT_Memcmp(pubAttribute->attrib.pValue, lowPubValue->data,
|
|
||||||
+ lowPubValue->len) != 0)) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (pubAttribute) sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
|
|
||||||
+ if (lowPubValue) SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
|
|
||||||
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
|
|
||||||
* only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
|
|
||||||
* full validation */
|
|
||||||
@@ -5260,44 +5270,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
|
|
||||||
SECItem pubKey;
|
|
||||||
SECItem prime;
|
|
||||||
SECItem subPrime;
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem base;
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem generator;
|
|
||||||
const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
|
|
||||||
pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
|
||||||
- prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
|
|
||||||
- prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
|
|
||||||
+ base.data = prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ base.len = prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
|
|
||||||
crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
|
|
||||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
goto done;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
|
|
||||||
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &base, privateKey, CKA_BASE);
|
|
||||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
+ goto done;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
/* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
|
|
||||||
- if (subPrime.len == 0) {
|
|
||||||
- /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
|
|
||||||
- * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
|
|
||||||
- * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
|
|
||||||
- subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
|
|
||||||
- if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
+ /* do we have a known prime ? */
|
|
||||||
+ subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, &generator, isFIPS);
|
|
||||||
+ if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (subPrime.len == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ /* if not a known prime, subprime must be supplied */
|
|
||||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
+ goto done;
|
|
||||||
+ } else {
|
|
||||||
+ /* not a known prime, check for primality of prime
|
|
||||||
+ * and subPrime */
|
|
||||||
+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&prime)) {
|
|
||||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
+ goto done;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&subPrime)) {
|
|
||||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
+ goto done;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ /* if we aren't using a defined group, make sure base is in the
|
|
||||||
+ * subgroup. If it's not, then our key could fail or succeed sometimes.
|
|
||||||
+ * This makes the failure reliable */
|
|
||||||
+ if (!KEA_Verify(&base, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
|
|
||||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
|
|
||||||
+ } else {
|
|
||||||
+ /* we're using a known group, make sure we are using the known generator for that group */
|
|
||||||
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&generator, &base) != 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
goto done;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ if (subPrime.len != 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ /* we have a known prime and a supplied subPrime,
|
|
||||||
+ * make sure the subPrime matches the subPrime for
|
|
||||||
+ * the known Prime */
|
|
||||||
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(subPrimePtr, &subPrime) != 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
+ goto done;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
|
|
||||||
- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
done:
|
|
||||||
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&base, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* clean up before we return */
|
|
||||||
sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
|
|
||||||
- crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
|
|
||||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
return crv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
- return crv2;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return CKR_OK;
|
|
||||||
@@ -5925,8 +5969,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
|
||||||
* created and linked.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
|
|
||||||
- sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
|
||||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
|
||||||
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
|
||||||
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
|
|
||||||
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
|
||||||
@@ -5968,6 +6012,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
|
||||||
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
|
|
||||||
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
|
||||||
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
|
|
||||||
@@ -5977,6 +6022,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
|
||||||
/* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
|
|
||||||
privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
|
|
||||||
publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
|
||||||
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
|
|
||||||
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
|
|
||||||
@@ -8610,7 +8657,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
|
|
||||||
* checks. */
|
|
||||||
- subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
|
|
||||||
+ subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, NULL, isFIPS);
|
|
||||||
if (subPrime == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
SECItem dhSubPrime;
|
|
||||||
/* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
|
|
||||||
@@ -8792,6 +8839,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
|
||||||
secretlen = tmp.len;
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
secretlen = keySize;
|
|
||||||
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
|
|
||||||
&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
|
|
||||||
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
|
|
||||||
/* dh verify functions */
|
|
||||||
/* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
|
|
||||||
* it's subprime value */
|
|
||||||
-const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
|
|
||||||
+const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
|
|
||||||
/* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
|
|
||||||
SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
|
|
||||||
/* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -2409,15 +2409,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
switch (mechInfo->special) {
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
|
|
||||||
SECItem dhPrime;
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem dhBase;
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem dhGenerator;
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool val = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
|
|
||||||
CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
|
|
||||||
source, CKA_PRIME);
|
|
||||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhBase, source, CKA_BASE);
|
|
||||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, &dhGenerator, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ val = (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ if (val && (SECITEM_CompareItem(&dhBase, &dhGenerator) != 0)) {
|
|
||||||
+ val = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
- return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhBase, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
+ return val;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSNone:
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
|
|
||||||
(unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+/* generator for all the groups is 2 */
|
|
||||||
+static const unsigned char generator_2_data[] = { 2 };
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+static const SECItem generator_2 =
|
|
||||||
+ { siBuffer,
|
|
||||||
+ (unsigned char *)generator_2_data,
|
|
||||||
+ sizeof(generator_2_data) };
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
const SECItem *
|
|
||||||
-sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
|
|
||||||
+sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *g, PRBool isFIPS)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
/* use the length to decide which primes to check */
|
|
||||||
switch (dhPrime->len) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -6741,56 +6750,67 @@ sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PR
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_ike_1536;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case 2048 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_2048,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_tls_2048)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_tls_2048;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_2048,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_ike_2048)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_ike_2048;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case 3072 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_3072,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_tls_3072)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_tls_3072;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_3072,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_ike_3072)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_ike_3072;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case 4096 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_4096,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_tls_4096)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_tls_4096;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_4096,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_ike_4096)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_ike_4096;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case 6144 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_6144,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_tls_6144)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_tls_6144;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_6144,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_ike_6144)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_ike_6144;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case 8192 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_8192,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_tls_8192)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_tls_8192;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_8192,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(prime_ike_8192)) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
||||||
return &subprime_ike_8192;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
|
||||||
goto fail;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
+ /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
|
|
||||||
+ * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
|
|
||||||
+ if (!params->bRekey) {
|
|
||||||
+ outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
|
|
||||||
inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
|
||||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c 2024-09-06 18:05:27.808338289 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static const SEC_ASN1Template NSSCMSKeyA
|
|
||||||
{ SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT |
|
|
||||||
SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 1,
|
|
||||||
offsetof(NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfo, ukm),
|
|
||||||
- SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_OctetStringTemplate) },
|
|
||||||
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_PointerToOctetStringTemplate) },
|
|
||||||
{ SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
|
|
||||||
offsetof(NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfo, keyEncAlg),
|
|
||||||
SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h 2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_RSA_OAEP(SECKE
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
extern SECStatus
|
|
||||||
NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert, PK11SymKey *key,
|
|
||||||
- SECItem *encKey, PRBool genUkm, SECItem *ukm,
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem *encKey, PRBool genUkm, SECItem **ukm,
|
|
||||||
SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECItem *originatorPubKey, void *wincx);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PK11SymKey *
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c 2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -292,9 +292,15 @@ Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(PLArenaPool *p
|
|
||||||
unsigned char suppPubInfo[4] = { 0 };
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SI.keyInfo = keyInfo;
|
|
||||||
- SI.entityUInfo.type = ukm->type;
|
|
||||||
- SI.entityUInfo.data = ukm->data;
|
|
||||||
- SI.entityUInfo.len = ukm->len;
|
|
||||||
+ if (ukm) {
|
|
||||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.type = ukm->type;
|
|
||||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.data = ukm->data;
|
|
||||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.len = ukm->len;
|
|
||||||
+ } else {
|
|
||||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.type = siBuffer;
|
|
||||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.data = NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.len = 0;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SI.suppPubInfo.type = siBuffer;
|
|
||||||
SI.suppPubInfo.data = suppPubInfo;
|
|
||||||
@@ -322,7 +328,7 @@ Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(PLArenaPool *p
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert,
|
|
||||||
PK11SymKey *bulkkey, SECItem *encKey,
|
|
||||||
- PRBool genUkm, SECItem *ukm,
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool genUkm, SECItem **ukmp,
|
|
||||||
SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECItem *pubKey,
|
|
||||||
void *wincx)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
@@ -337,10 +343,11 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArena
|
|
||||||
SECAlgorithmID keyWrapAlg;
|
|
||||||
SECOidTag keyEncAlgtag;
|
|
||||||
SECItem keyWrapAlg_params, *keyEncAlg_params, *SharedInfo;
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem *ukm = *ukmp;
|
|
||||||
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyDerivationType, keyWrapMech;
|
|
||||||
CK_ULONG kdf;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- if (genUkm && (ukm->len != 0 || ukm->data != NULL)) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (genUkm && (ukm != NULL)) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -427,17 +434,17 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArena
|
|
||||||
* contain 512 bits for Diffie-Hellman key agreement. */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (genUkm) {
|
|
||||||
- ukm->type = siBuffer;
|
|
||||||
- ukm->len = 64;
|
|
||||||
- ukm->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, ukm->len);
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
- if (ukm->data == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
+ ukm = SECITEM_AllocItem(poolp, NULL, 64);
|
|
||||||
+ if (ukm == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ ukm->type = siBuffer;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(ukm->data, ukm->len);
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ *ukmp = ukm; /* return it */
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SharedInfo = Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(poolp, &keyWrapAlg,
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c 2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_UnwrapBulkKey(NSSCM
|
|
||||||
parameters = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg.parameters);
|
|
||||||
enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey);
|
|
||||||
oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
|
|
||||||
- ukm = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm);
|
|
||||||
+ ukm = ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK:
|
|
||||||
algid = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmst.h.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmst.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmst.h.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmst.h 2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ typedef struct NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedK
|
|
||||||
struct NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfoStr {
|
|
||||||
SECItem version;
|
|
||||||
NSSCMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey originatorIdentifierOrKey;
|
|
||||||
- SECItem ukm; /* optional */
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem *ukm; /* optional */
|
|
||||||
SECAlgorithmID keyEncAlg;
|
|
||||||
NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedKey **recipientEncryptedKeys;
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
|
||||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
|
||||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
|
||||||
@@ -371,16 +371,21 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
|
|
||||||
// Fail to connect with a weak RSA key.
|
|
||||||
TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
|
|
||||||
Reset(kPssDelegatorId);
|
|
||||||
EnsureTlsSetup();
|
|
||||||
static const SSLSignatureScheme kSchemes[] = {ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
|
|
||||||
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
|
|
||||||
client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
|
|
||||||
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 keySizeFlags;
|
|
||||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &keySizeFlags));
|
|
||||||
+ // turn off the signing key sizes so we actually test the ssl tests
|
|
||||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
|
|
||||||
+ NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG ));
|
|
||||||
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
|
||||||
// save the MIN POLICY length.
|
|
||||||
PRInt32 minRsa;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
|
|
||||||
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
|
|
||||||
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
|
|
||||||
NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
|
|
||||||
@@ -408,16 +413,17 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
|
|
||||||
client_->EnableDelegatedCredentials();
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
|
|
||||||
client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
|
|
||||||
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
|
|
||||||
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
|
||||||
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, keySizeFlags));
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
|
|
||||||
public:
|
|
||||||
ReplaceDCSigScheme(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& a)
|
|
||||||
: TlsHandshakeFilter(a, {ssl_hs_certificate_verify}) {}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
protected:
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -1134,22 +1134,31 @@ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SE
|
|
||||||
return 0;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* interpret modulus length as key strength */
|
|
||||||
switch (privk->keyType) {
|
|
||||||
case rsaKey:
|
|
||||||
case rsaPssKey:
|
|
||||||
case rsaOaepKey:
|
|
||||||
- /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
|
|
||||||
- * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
|
|
||||||
- bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
|
|
||||||
- if (bitSize == -1) {
|
|
||||||
- bitSize = 0;
|
|
||||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
|
||||||
+ CKA_MODULUS, NULL, ¶ms);
|
|
||||||
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
|
|
||||||
+ /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
|
|
||||||
+ * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary. This
|
|
||||||
+ * method is less percise because it returns bytes instead
|
|
||||||
+ * bits, so we only do it if we can't get the modulus */
|
|
||||||
+ bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
|
|
||||||
+ if (bitSize == -1) {
|
|
||||||
+ return 0;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return bitSize;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(¶ms);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
|
|
||||||
return bitSize;
|
|
||||||
case dsaKey:
|
|
||||||
case fortezzaKey:
|
|
||||||
case dhKey:
|
|
||||||
case keaKey:
|
|
||||||
rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
|
||||||
CKA_PRIME, NULL, ¶ms);
|
|
||||||
if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -1277,27 +1277,39 @@ ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *h
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
goto done;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
|
|
||||||
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
|
|
||||||
int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 optval;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SECItem *params = NULL;
|
|
||||||
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
|
|
||||||
SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
|
|
||||||
(unsigned char *)&pssParams,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(pssParams) };
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (signatureLen <= 0) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
goto done;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ /* since we are calling PK11_SignWithMechanism directly, we need to check the
|
|
||||||
+ * key policy ourselves (which is already checked in SGN_Digest */
|
|
||||||
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
|
|
||||||
+ if ((rv == SECSuccess) &&
|
|
||||||
+ ((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG)) {
|
|
||||||
+ rv = SECKEY_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType, SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
|
|
||||||
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ goto done; /* error code already set */
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
|
|
||||||
buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
|
|
||||||
if (!buf->data)
|
|
||||||
goto done; /* error code was set. */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (useRsaPss) {
|
|
||||||
pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/lib/util/nsshash.c b/lib/util/nsshash.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/util/nsshash.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/util/nsshash.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -102,16 +102,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashTy
|
|
||||||
SECOidTag
|
|
||||||
HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag hmacOid)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
SECOidTag hashOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
switch (hmacOid) {
|
|
||||||
/* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
|
|
||||||
/* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5:
|
|
||||||
+ hashOid = SEC_OID_MD5;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1:
|
|
||||||
hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA1;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224:
|
|
||||||
hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA224;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA256;
|
|
||||||
@@ -145,16 +148,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag
|
|
||||||
SECOidTag
|
|
||||||
HASH_GetHMACOidTagByHashOidTag(SECOidTag hashOid)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
SECOidTag hmacOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
switch (hashOid) {
|
|
||||||
/* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
|
|
||||||
/* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
|
|
||||||
+ case SEC_OID_MD5:
|
|
||||||
+ hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
case SEC_OID_SHA1:
|
|
||||||
hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case SEC_OID_SHA224:
|
|
||||||
hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case SEC_OID_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
|
|
||||||
@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -1710,20 +1710,26 @@ PK11_ParamToAlgid(SECOidTag algTag, SECI
|
|
||||||
case CKM_BATON_ECB96:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_BATON_CBC128:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_BATON_COUNTER:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE:
|
|
||||||
- newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
|
|
||||||
- SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
|
|
||||||
- if (newParams == NULL)
|
|
||||||
- break;
|
|
||||||
+ /* if no parameters have been supplied, then encode a NULL params
|
|
||||||
+ */
|
|
||||||
+ if (param && param->len > 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
|
|
||||||
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
|
|
||||||
+ if (newParams == NULL)
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ } else {
|
|
||||||
+ newParams = NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
rv = SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
if (newParams)
|
|
||||||
SECITEM_FreeItem(newParams, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -765,45 +765,53 @@ sec_pkcs5CreateAlgorithmID(SECOidTag alg
|
|
||||||
* algorithm is). We use choose this algorithm oid based on the
|
|
||||||
* cipherAlgorithm to determine what this should be (MAC1 or PBES2).
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
if (algorithm == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2) {
|
|
||||||
/* choose mac or pbes */
|
|
||||||
algorithm = sec_pkcs5v2_get_pbe(cipherAlgorithm);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/* set the PKCS5v2 specific parameters */
|
|
||||||
if (keyLength == 0) {
|
|
||||||
- SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
|
|
||||||
if (hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
|
|
||||||
keyLength = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
keyLength = sec_pkcs5v2_default_key_length(cipherAlgorithm);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (keyLength <= 0) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* currently SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 is the default */
|
|
||||||
if (prfAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
|
|
||||||
prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id */
|
|
||||||
- cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
|
|
||||||
- PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
|
|
||||||
- if (!cipherParams) {
|
|
||||||
- goto loser;
|
|
||||||
+ /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id, if cipher
|
|
||||||
+ * is an HMAC, the cipherParams should be NULL */
|
|
||||||
+ if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
|
|
||||||
+ cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
|
|
||||||
+ PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
|
|
||||||
+ if (!cipherParams) {
|
|
||||||
+ goto loser;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ } else {
|
|
||||||
+ cipherParams = NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PORT_Memset(&pbeV2_param, 0, sizeof(pbeV2_param));
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rv = PK11_ParamToAlgid(cipherAlgorithm, cipherParams,
|
|
||||||
poolp, &pbeV2_param.cipherAlgId);
|
|
||||||
- SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ if (cipherParams) {
|
|
||||||
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* generate the parameter */
|
|
||||||
pbe_param = sec_pkcs5_create_pbe_parameter(pbeAlgorithm, salt, iteration,
|
|
||||||
keyLength, prfAlg);
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/util/secalgid.c b/lib/util/secalgid.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/util/secalgid.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/util/secalgid.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -50,17 +50,18 @@ SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(PLArenaPool *arena
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &id->algorithm, &oiddata->oid))
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if ((secoid_IsRSAPKCS1(which)) ||
|
|
||||||
- (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL)) {
|
|
||||||
+ (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL) /* ||
|
|
||||||
+ (HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(which) != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) */) {
|
|
||||||
add_null_param = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
add_null_param = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (params) {
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* I am specifically *not* enforcing the following assertion
|
|
||||||
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix 2024-09-06 17:58:39.905517185 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c 2024-09-06 17:59:19.568985976 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ sec_pkcs12_integrity_key(PK11SlotInfo *s
|
|
||||||
*hmacMech = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hmacAlg);
|
|
||||||
/* pkcs12v2 hmac uses UTF8 rather than unicode */
|
|
||||||
if (!sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(NULL, &utf8Pw, pwitem,
|
|
||||||
- PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
|
|
||||||
+ PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
|
|
||||||
return NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
symKey = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, prfAlgid, &utf8Pw, PR_FALSE, pwarg);
|
|
||||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
||||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy 2023-06-21 08:54:54.802785229 +0200
|
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy 2021-06-03 10:08:49.988118880 -0700
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2023-06-21 08:58:24.748282499 +0200
|
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2021-06-03 10:16:26.059935708 -0700
|
||||||
@@ -395,12 +395,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
|
@@ -391,12 +391,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
|
||||||
/* Signatures */
|
/* Signatures */
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
|
||||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||||
@ -14,24 +14,21 @@ diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
|||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0},
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0},
|
||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE, 0},
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE, 0},
|
||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, 0},
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, 0},
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("ED25519"), SEC_OID_ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY,
|
|
||||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
|
||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
typedef struct {
|
typedef struct {
|
||||||
@@ -416,7 +413,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
|
@@ -412,7 +409,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
|
||||||
{ macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
|
{ macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
|
||||||
{ cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
|
{ cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
|
||||||
{ kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
|
{ kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
|
||||||
{ smimeKxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(smimeKxOptList), "SMIME-KX", PR_TRUE },
|
|
||||||
- { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_FALSE },
|
- { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_FALSE },
|
||||||
+ { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_TRUE },
|
+ { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_TRUE },
|
||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[] = {
|
static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[] = {
|
||||||
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
|
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.policy_revert ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
|
||||||
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy 2023-06-21 09:00:17.720181306 +0200
|
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.policy_revert 2020-11-04 10:31:20.837715397 -0800
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2023-06-21 09:00:55.637501208 +0200
|
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2020-11-04 10:33:19.598357223 -0800
|
||||||
@@ -193,7 +193,9 @@
|
@@ -193,7 +193,9 @@
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=hmac-sha1:sha256:rsa-pkcs:rsa:des-ede3-cbc:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly Narrow
|
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=hmac-sha1:sha256:rsa-pkcs:rsa:des-ede3-cbc:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly Narrow
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
|
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
|
||||||
@ -40,6 +37,6 @@ diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
|
|||||||
+# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
|
+# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
|
||||||
+# compatibility reasons
|
+# compatibility reasons
|
||||||
+# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
|
+# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
|
# test default settings
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
|
# NOTE: tstclient will attempt to overide the defaults, so we detect we
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
# were successful by locking in our settings
|
||||||
@ -26,20 +26,6 @@ diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.orig ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
|
|||||||
if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
|
if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
|
||||||
char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
|
char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
--- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.no_pkcs12_macpbe_default 2024-07-18 08:26:35.7732
|
|
||||||
48450 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c 2024-07-18 08:27:05.796595554 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -1165,10 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- /* in FIPS mode default to encoding with pkcs5v2 for the MAC */
|
|
||||||
- if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
|
|
||||||
- hash = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
if (pk12util.options[opt_Mac].activated) {
|
|
||||||
char *hashString = pk12util.options[opt_Mac].arg;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig ./tests/tools/tools.sh
|
diff -up ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig ./tests/tools/tools.sh
|
||||||
--- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig 2021-06-15 17:06:27.650564449 -0700
|
--- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig 2021-06-15 17:06:27.650564449 -0700
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh 2021-06-15 17:07:59.934117192 -0700
|
+++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh 2021-06-15 17:07:59.934117192 -0700
|
||||||
@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia ./doc/pk12util.xml
|
|
||||||
--- ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia 2022-01-26 09:46:39.794919455 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./doc/pk12util.xml 2022-01-26 09:54:58.277019760 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ Certificate Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<refsection id="encryption">
|
|
||||||
<title>Password Encryption</title>
|
|
||||||
- <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 3-key triple DES for private key encryption. When not in FIPS mode, PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 40-bit RC4 is used for certificate encryption. When in FIPS mode, there is no certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
|
|
||||||
+ <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using AES-256-CBC for private key encryption and AES-128-CBC for certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
|
|
||||||
<para>The private key is always protected with strong encryption by default.</para>
|
|
||||||
<para>Several types of ciphers are supported.</para>
|
|
||||||
<variablelist>
|
|
||||||
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ Certificate Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
|
|
||||||
<listitem>
|
|
||||||
<itemizedlist>
|
|
||||||
<listitem><para>PBES2 with AES-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"AES-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"AES-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"AES-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
|
|
||||||
+ <listitem><para>PBES2 with CAMELLIA-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"CAMELLIA-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"CAMELLIA-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"CAMELLIA-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
|
|
||||||
</itemizedlist>
|
|
||||||
</listitem>
|
|
||||||
</varlistentry>
|
|
||||||
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
|
||||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
|
||||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
|
||||||
@@ -15,13 +15,22 @@
|
|
||||||
#include "gtest_utils.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "tls_agent.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "tls_connect.h"
|
|
||||||
+#define LTO
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
namespace nss_test {
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+#ifndef LTO
|
|
||||||
+// sigh this construction breaks LTO
|
|
||||||
const std::string kEcdsaDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorEcdsa256;
|
|
||||||
const std::string kRsaeDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsae2048;
|
|
||||||
const std::string kPssDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsaPss2048;
|
|
||||||
const std::string kDCId = TlsAgent::kServerEcdsa256;
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+#define kEcdsaDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorEcdsa256
|
|
||||||
+#define kRsaeDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsae2048
|
|
||||||
+#define kPssDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsaPss2048
|
|
||||||
+#define kDCId TlsAgent::kServerEcdsa256
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
const SSLSignatureScheme kDCScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256;
|
|
||||||
const PRUint32 kDCValidFor = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 /* 1 week (seconds) */;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
3411
SOURCES/nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
Normal file
3411
SOURCES/nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
170
SOURCES/nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch
Normal file
170
SOURCES/nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -4272,16 +4272,17 @@ CreateTrust(void)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
NSSLOWCERTTrust *trust = NULL;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
nsslowcert_LockFreeList();
|
||||||
|
trust = trustListHead;
|
||||||
|
if (trust) {
|
||||||
|
trustListCount--;
|
||||||
|
trustListHead = trust->next;
|
||||||
|
+ trust->next = NULL;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
PORT_Assert(trustListCount >= 0);
|
||||||
|
nsslowcert_UnlockFreeList();
|
||||||
|
if (trust) {
|
||||||
|
return trust;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return PORT_ZNew(NSSLOWCERTTrust);
|
||||||
|
@@ -5155,19 +5156,21 @@ done:
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRBool
|
||||||
|
nsslowcert_hasTrust(NSSLOWCERTCertTrust *trust)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
if (trust == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
- return !((trust->sslFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
|
||||||
|
- (trust->emailFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
|
||||||
|
- (trust->objectSigningFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN));
|
||||||
|
+ /* if we only have CERTDB__USER and CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN bits, then
|
||||||
|
+ * we don't have a trust record. */
|
||||||
|
+ return !(((trust->sslFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
|
||||||
|
+ ((trust->emailFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
|
||||||
|
+ ((trust->objectSigningFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* This function has the logic that decides if another person's cert and
|
||||||
|
* email profile from an S/MIME message should be saved. It can deal with
|
||||||
|
* the case when there is no profile.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
static SECStatus
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -119,47 +119,79 @@ sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(CK_ATTRI
|
||||||
|
case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
|
||||||
|
case CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS:
|
||||||
|
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
-
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* convert a native ULONG to a database ulong. Database ulong's
|
||||||
|
* are all 4 byte big endian values.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
void
|
||||||
|
sftk_ULong2SDBULong(unsigned char *data, CK_ULONG value)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
int i;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
|
||||||
|
data[i] = (value >> (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP) & 0xff;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* convert a database ulong back to a native ULONG. (reverse of the above
|
||||||
|
- * function.
|
||||||
|
+ * function).
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
static CK_ULONG
|
||||||
|
sftk_SDBULong2ULong(unsigned char *data)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
int i;
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG value = 0;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
|
||||||
|
value |= (((CK_ULONG)data[i]) << (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return value;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+/* certain trust records are default values, which are the values
|
||||||
|
+ * returned if the signature check fails anyway.
|
||||||
|
+ * In those cases, we can skip the signature check. */
|
||||||
|
+PRBool
|
||||||
|
+sftkdb_isNullTrust(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template)
|
||||||
|
+{
|
||||||
|
+ switch (template->type) {
|
||||||
|
+ case CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH:
|
||||||
|
+ case CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH:
|
||||||
|
+ case CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION:
|
||||||
|
+ case CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING:
|
||||||
|
+ if (template->ulValueLen != SDB_ULONG_SIZE) {
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (sftk_SDBULong2ULong(template->pValue) ==
|
||||||
|
+ CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN) {
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
|
||||||
|
+ if (template->ulValueLen != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (*((unsigned char *)(template->pValue)) == 0) {
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ default:
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* fix up the input templates. Our fixed up ints are stored in data and must
|
||||||
|
* be freed by the caller. The new template must also be freed. If there are no
|
||||||
|
* CK_ULONG attributes, the orignal template is passed in as is.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
|
||||||
|
sftkdb_fixupTemplateIn(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template, int count,
|
||||||
|
unsigned char **dataOut, int *dataOutSize)
|
||||||
|
@@ -410,17 +442,18 @@ sftkdb_fixupTemplateOut(CK_ATTRIBUTE *te
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* copy the plain text back into the template */
|
||||||
|
PORT_Memcpy(template[i].pValue, plainText->data, plainText->len);
|
||||||
|
template[i].ulValueLen = plainText->len;
|
||||||
|
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(plainText, PR_TRUE);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
/* make sure signed attributes are valid */
|
||||||
|
- if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)
|
||||||
|
+ && !sftkdb_isNullTrust(&ntemplate[i])) {
|
||||||
|
SECStatus rv;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV local_crv;
|
||||||
|
SECItem signText;
|
||||||
|
SECItem plainText;
|
||||||
|
unsigned char signData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
signText.data = signData;
|
||||||
|
signText.len = sizeof(signData);
|
||||||
|
@@ -2387,16 +2420,18 @@ sftkdb_mergeObject(SFTKDBHandle *handle,
|
||||||
|
crv = (*source->sdb_GetAttributeValue)(source, id,
|
||||||
|
ptemplate, max_attributes);
|
||||||
|
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
goto loser;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
objectType = sftkdb_getULongFromTemplate(CKA_CLASS, ptemplate,
|
||||||
|
max_attributes);
|
||||||
|
+/*printf(" - merging object Type 0x%08lx id=0x%08lx updateID=%s\n", objectType, id,
|
||||||
|
+ handle->updateID?handle->updateID: "<NULL>");*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* Update Object updates the object template if necessary then returns
|
||||||
|
* whether or not we need to actually write the object out to our target
|
||||||
|
* database.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
if (!handle->updateID) {
|
||||||
|
crv = sftkdb_CreateObject(arena, handle, target, &newID,
|
||||||
522
SOURCES/nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch
Normal file
522
SOURCES/nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,522 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff --git a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -3870,17 +3870,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||||
|
rv = blapi_selftest(modesToTest, numModesToTest, inoff, outoff,
|
||||||
|
encrypt, decrypt);
|
||||||
|
PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
|
||||||
|
return rv == SECSuccess ? 0 : 1;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* Do FIPS self-test */
|
||||||
|
if (bltest.commands[cmd_FIPS].activated) {
|
||||||
|
- CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
|
||||||
|
+ CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE);
|
||||||
|
fprintf(stdout, "CK_RV: %ld.\n", ckrv);
|
||||||
|
PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
|
||||||
|
if (ckrv == CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -318,23 +318,25 @@ static PRBool verbose = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
int
|
||||||
|
main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
CK_C_GetFunctionList pC_GetFunctionList;
|
||||||
|
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgs;
|
||||||
|
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgsRerun; /* rerun selftests */
|
||||||
|
CK_SLOT_ID *pSlotList = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG slotID = 0; /* slotID == 0 for FIPSMODE */
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CK_UTF8CHAR *pwd = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG pwdLen = 0;
|
||||||
|
char *moduleSpec = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ char *moduleSpecRerun = NULL;
|
||||||
|
char *configDir = NULL;
|
||||||
|
char *dbPrefix = NULL;
|
||||||
|
char *disableUnload = NULL;
|
||||||
|
PRBool doForkTests = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PLOptStatus os;
|
||||||
|
PLOptState *opt = PL_CreateOptState(argc, argv, "nvhf:Fd:p:");
|
||||||
|
while (PL_OPT_EOL != (os = PL_GetNextOpt(opt))) {
|
||||||
|
@@ -458,18 +460,23 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||||
|
initArgs.CreateMutex = NULL;
|
||||||
|
initArgs.DestroyMutex = NULL;
|
||||||
|
initArgs.LockMutex = NULL;
|
||||||
|
initArgs.UnlockMutex = NULL;
|
||||||
|
initArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
|
||||||
|
moduleSpec = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
|
||||||
|
"keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags= ",
|
||||||
|
configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
|
||||||
|
+ moduleSpecRerun = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
|
||||||
|
+ "keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags=forcePOST ",
|
||||||
|
+ configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
|
||||||
|
initArgs.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpec;
|
||||||
|
initArgs.pReserved = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ initArgsRerun = initArgs;
|
||||||
|
+ initArgsRerun.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpecRerun;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*DebugBreak();*/
|
||||||
|
/* FIPSMODE invokes FC_Initialize as pFunctionList->C_Initialize */
|
||||||
|
/* NSS cryptographic module library initialization for the FIPS */
|
||||||
|
/* Approved mode when FC_Initialize is envoked will perfom */
|
||||||
|
/* software integrity test, and power-up self-tests before */
|
||||||
|
/* FC_Initialize returns */
|
||||||
|
crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
|
||||||
|
@@ -705,17 +712,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||||
|
PKM_Error("PKM_HybridMode failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
|
||||||
|
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
|
||||||
|
goto cleanup;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (doForkTests) {
|
||||||
|
/* testing one more C_Initialize / C_Finalize to exercise getpid()
|
||||||
|
* fork check code */
|
||||||
|
- crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
|
||||||
|
+ crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgsRerun);
|
||||||
|
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
PKM_LogIt("C_Initialize succeeded\n");
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
PKM_Error("C_Initialize failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
|
||||||
|
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
|
||||||
|
goto cleanup;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
crv = pFunctionList->C_Finalize(NULL);
|
||||||
|
@@ -741,16 +748,19 @@ cleanup:
|
||||||
|
free(configDir);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (dbPrefix) {
|
||||||
|
free(dbPrefix);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (moduleSpec) {
|
||||||
|
PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpec);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+ if (moduleSpecRerun) {
|
||||||
|
+ PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpecRerun);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
||||||
|
FreeLibrary(hModule);
|
||||||
|
#else
|
||||||
|
disableUnload = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_UNLOAD");
|
||||||
|
if (!disableUnload) {
|
||||||
|
PR_UnloadLibrary(lib);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapii.h b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/freebl/blapii.h
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
|
||||||
|
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ typedef SECStatus (*freeblAeadFunc)(void
|
||||||
|
void *params, unsigned int paramsLen,
|
||||||
|
const unsigned char *aad, unsigned int aadLen,
|
||||||
|
unsigned int blocksize);
|
||||||
|
typedef void (*freeblDestroyFunc)(void *cx, PRBool freeit);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
|
||||||
|
-SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly);
|
||||||
|
+SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly, PRBool rerun);
|
||||||
|
PRBool BL_POSTRan(PRBool freeblOnly);
|
||||||
|
#endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#if defined(XP_UNIX) && !defined(NO_FORK_CHECK)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
extern PRBool bl_parentForkedAfterC_Initialize;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#define SKIP_AFTER_FORK(x) \
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapit.h b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/freebl/blapit.h
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
|
||||||
|
@@ -223,16 +223,21 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* If we arbitrarily set p = 10^-18 (1 chance in trillion trillion operation)
|
||||||
|
* we get GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS = -(-18)/.301 -1 = 59 (.301 = log10 2)
|
||||||
|
* GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS should be at least 59, call it a round 64. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
* the variable IV size for TLS is 64 bits, which explains why it's not safe
|
||||||
|
* to use a random value for the nonce in TLS. */
|
||||||
|
#define GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS 64
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+/* flag to tell BLAPI_Verify* to rerun the post and integrity tests */
|
||||||
|
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG '\377' /* 0xff, 255 invalide code for UFT8/ASCII */
|
||||||
|
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING "\377" /* The above as a C string */
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/***************************************************************************
|
||||||
|
** Opaque objects
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
struct DESContextStr;
|
||||||
|
struct RC2ContextStr;
|
||||||
|
struct RC4ContextStr;
|
||||||
|
struct RC5ContextStr;
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -2211,29 +2211,37 @@ bl_startup_tests(void)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* this is called from the freebl init entry points that controll access to
|
||||||
|
* all other freebl functions. This prevents freebl from operating if our
|
||||||
|
* power on selftest failed.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
SECStatus
|
||||||
|
-BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only)
|
||||||
|
+BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only, PRBool rerun)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||||
|
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
|
||||||
|
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
|
||||||
|
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||||
|
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, freebl
|
||||||
|
* will always fail because of the test below
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
if (!self_tests_freebl_ran) {
|
||||||
|
bl_startup_tests();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#endif
|
||||||
|
+ if (rerun) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* reset the flags */
|
||||||
|
+ self_tests_freebl_ran = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ self_tests_freebl_success = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ bl_startup_tests();
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
/* if the general self tests succeeded, we're done */
|
||||||
|
if (self_tests_success) {
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
/* standalone freebl can initialize */
|
||||||
|
if (freebl_only && self_tests_freebl_success) {
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -55,17 +55,17 @@ NSSLOW_Init(void)
|
||||||
|
#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
|
||||||
|
(void)FREEBL_InitStubs();
|
||||||
|
#endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
|
||||||
|
/* make sure the FIPS product is installed if we are trying to
|
||||||
|
* go into FIPS mode */
|
||||||
|
if (nsslow_GetFIPSEnabled()) {
|
||||||
|
- if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
||||||
|
post_failed = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
return NULL;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#endif
|
||||||
|
post_failed = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -282,52 +282,62 @@ readItem(PRFileDesc *fd, SECItem *item)
|
||||||
|
PORT_Free(item->data);
|
||||||
|
item->data = NULL;
|
||||||
|
item->len = 0;
|
||||||
|
return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
-static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self);
|
||||||
|
+static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static PRBool
|
||||||
|
-blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self)
|
||||||
|
+blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
PRBool result = PR_FALSE; /* if anything goes wrong,
|
||||||
|
* the signature does not verify */
|
||||||
|
/* find our shared library name */
|
||||||
|
char *shName = PR_GetLibraryFilePathname(name, addr);
|
||||||
|
if (!shName) {
|
||||||
|
goto loser;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
- result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self);
|
||||||
|
+ result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self, rerun);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
loser:
|
||||||
|
if (shName != NULL) {
|
||||||
|
PR_Free(shName);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return result;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRBool
|
||||||
|
BLAPI_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE);
|
||||||
|
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ if (name && *name == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
|
||||||
|
+ name++;
|
||||||
|
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE, rerun);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRBool
|
||||||
|
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
- return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE);
|
||||||
|
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ if (shName && *shName == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
|
||||||
|
+ shName++;
|
||||||
|
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE, rerun);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static PRBool
|
||||||
|
-blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self)
|
||||||
|
+blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
char *checkName = NULL;
|
||||||
|
PRFileDesc *checkFD = NULL;
|
||||||
|
PRFileDesc *shFD = NULL;
|
||||||
|
void *hashcx = NULL;
|
||||||
|
const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
|
||||||
|
SECItem signature = { 0, NULL, 0 };
|
||||||
|
SECItem hash;
|
||||||
|
@@ -346,17 +356,17 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
|
||||||
|
unsigned char hashBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
|
||||||
|
hash.data = hashBuf;
|
||||||
|
hash.len = sizeof(hashBuf);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
|
||||||
|
* integrity checks to prevent any token going into FIPS mode. */
|
||||||
|
- if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE, rerun) != SECSuccess)) {
|
||||||
|
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (!shName) {
|
||||||
|
goto loser;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* figure out the name of our check file */
|
||||||
|
@@ -536,17 +546,17 @@ BLAPI_VerifySelf(const char *name)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
if (name == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* If name is NULL, freebl is statically linked into softoken.
|
||||||
|
* softoken will call BLAPI_SHVerify next to verify itself.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE);
|
||||||
|
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#else /* NSS_FIPS_DISABLED */
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRBool
|
||||||
|
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -684,22 +684,25 @@ sftk_fips_HKDF_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* This function is called at dll load time, the code tha makes this
|
||||||
|
* happen is platform specific on defined above.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
-static void
|
||||||
|
-sftk_startup_tests(void)
|
||||||
|
+void sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PRBool rerun)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
SECStatus rv;
|
||||||
|
- const char *libraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
|
||||||
|
-
|
||||||
|
+ /*const char *nlibraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
|
||||||
|
+ const char *rlibraryName = BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME; */
|
||||||
|
+ const char *libraryName = rerun ?
|
||||||
|
+ BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME :
|
||||||
|
+ SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_ran);
|
||||||
|
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_success);
|
||||||
|
sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE; /* just in case */
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* need to initiallize the oid library before the RSA tests */
|
||||||
|
rv = SECOID_Init();
|
||||||
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
@@ -746,35 +749,46 @@ sftk_startup_tests(void)
|
||||||
|
rv = sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests();
|
||||||
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+static void
|
||||||
|
+sftk_startup_tests(void)
|
||||||
|
+{
|
||||||
|
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_FALSE);
|
||||||
|
+}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* this is called from nsc_Common_Initizialize entry points that gates access
|
||||||
|
* to * all other pkcs11 functions. This prevents softoken operation if our
|
||||||
|
* power on selftest failed.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
CK_RV
|
||||||
|
-sftk_FIPSEntryOK()
|
||||||
|
+sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||||
|
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
|
||||||
|
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
|
||||||
|
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||||
|
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, softken
|
||||||
|
* will always fail because of the test below
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
if (!sftk_self_tests_ran) {
|
||||||
|
sftk_startup_tests();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#endif
|
||||||
|
+ if (rerun) {
|
||||||
|
+ sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_TRUE);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
if (!sftk_self_tests_success) {
|
||||||
|
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#else
|
||||||
|
#include "pkcs11t.h"
|
||||||
|
CK_RV
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -524,25 +524,32 @@ fc_log_init_error(CK_RV crv)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* FC_Initialize initializes the PKCS #11 library. */
|
||||||
|
CK_RV
|
||||||
|
FC_Initialize(CK_VOID_PTR pReserved)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
const char *envp;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV crv;
|
||||||
|
+ PRBool rerun;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if ((envp = PR_GetEnv("NSS_ENABLE_AUDIT")) != NULL) {
|
||||||
|
sftk_audit_enabled = (atoi(envp) == 1);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+ /* if we have the forcePOST flag on, rerun the integrity checks */
|
||||||
|
+ /* we need to know this before we fully parse the arguments in
|
||||||
|
+ * nsc_CommonInitialize, so read it now */
|
||||||
|
+ rerun = sftk_RawArgHasFlag("flags", "forcePost", pReserved);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/* At this point we should have already done post and integrity checks.
|
||||||
|
* if we haven't, it probably means the FIPS product has not been installed
|
||||||
|
- * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode */
|
||||||
|
- crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
|
||||||
|
+ * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode. This
|
||||||
|
+ * also forces the tests to be rerun if forcePOST is set. */
|
||||||
|
+ crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(rerun);
|
||||||
|
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
fc_log_init_error(crv);
|
||||||
|
return crv;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
sftk_ForkReset(pReserved, &crv);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||||
|
@@ -869,16 +869,17 @@ extern CK_RV sftk_MechAllowsOperation(CK
|
||||||
|
* acquiring a reference to the keydb from the slot */
|
||||||
|
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *sftk_FindKeyByPublicKey(SFTKSlot *slot, SECItem *dbKey);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* parameter parsing functions
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
CK_RV sftk_parseParameters(char *param, sftk_parameters *parsed, PRBool isFIPS);
|
||||||
|
void sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params);
|
||||||
|
+PRBool sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* narrow objects
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
SFTKSessionObject *sftk_narrowToSessionObject(SFTKObject *);
|
||||||
|
SFTKTokenObject *sftk_narrowToTokenObject(SFTKObject *);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -244,8 +244,21 @@ sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params)
|
||||||
|
FREE_CLEAR(params->configdir);
|
||||||
|
FREE_CLEAR(params->secmodName);
|
||||||
|
FREE_CLEAR(params->man);
|
||||||
|
FREE_CLEAR(params->libdes);
|
||||||
|
FREE_CLEAR(params->tokens);
|
||||||
|
FREE_CLEAR(params->updatedir);
|
||||||
|
FREE_CLEAR(params->updateID);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+PRBool
|
||||||
|
+sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved)
|
||||||
|
+{
|
||||||
|
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *init_args = (CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *)pReserved;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* if we don't have any params, the flag isn't set */
|
||||||
|
+ if ((!init_args || !init_args->LibraryParameters)) {
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ return NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag(entry, flag, (const char *)init_args->LibraryParameters);
|
||||||
|
+}
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/softoken.h b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/softoken.h
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
|
||||||
|
@@ -52,17 +52,17 @@ extern unsigned char *CBC_PadBuffer(PLAr
|
||||||
|
unsigned int inlen, unsigned int *outlen,
|
||||||
|
int blockSize);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/****************************************/
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
** Power-Up selftests are required for FIPS.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
/* make sure Power-up selftests have been run. */
|
||||||
|
-extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(void);
|
||||||
|
+extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
** make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
unsigned long sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
** FIPS 140-2 auditing
|
||||||
@ -160,19 +160,178 @@ diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
|
|||||||
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
|
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||||
+endif
|
+endif
|
||||||
+
|
+
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h b/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
|
||||||
|
@@ -49,33 +49,46 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[]
|
||||||
|
#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
|
||||||
|
#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
|
||||||
|
#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
|
||||||
|
#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
|
||||||
|
#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
|
||||||
|
/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
|
||||||
|
* limits */
|
||||||
|
#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
|
||||||
|
-#define RSA_FB_STEP 1024
|
||||||
|
+#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
|
||||||
|
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
|
||||||
|
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
|
||||||
|
#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
|
||||||
|
#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
|
||||||
|
#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
|
||||||
|
#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
|
||||||
|
#define EC_FB_STEP 1 /* key limits handled by special operation */
|
||||||
|
#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
|
||||||
|
#define AES_FB_STEP 64
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
/* ------------------------- DSA Operations --------------------------- */
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_DSA, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
@@ -95,76 +108,73 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[]
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
|
||||||
|
/* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
|
||||||
|
/* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_AES_MAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96, { 96, 96, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC, { 128, 128, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
/* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 128, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 128, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 192, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 192, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 256, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 256, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
/* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 8, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
/* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 224, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 128, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 192, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 256, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 8, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 8, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
/* sigh, is this algorithm really tested. ssl doesn't seem to have a
|
||||||
|
* way of turning the extension off */
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 8, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
/* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations ------------------- */
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
/* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations ------------------- */
|
||||||
|
- { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 1, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
+ { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA224_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 224, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 256, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA384_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||||
|
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA512_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 512, 512, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone }
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||||
@@ -1766,16 +1766,20 @@ sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
|
@@ -1765,27 +1765,29 @@ SECStatus
|
||||||
|
sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
SECItem *result;
|
||||||
|
SECItem inKey;
|
||||||
|
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter pbe_params;
|
||||||
unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
|
unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
|
||||||
unsigned char keyLen = 64;
|
unsigned char keyLen = 64;
|
||||||
char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
|
char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
|
||||||
- static const unsigned char saltData[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
|
- static const unsigned char saltData[] =
|
||||||
|
- { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
|
||||||
+ static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
|
+ static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
|
||||||
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
|
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
|
||||||
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
|
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
|
||||||
+ };
|
+ };
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
|
static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
|
||||||
- 0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
|
- 0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
|
||||||
- 0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
|
- 0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
|
||||||
@ -193,6 +352,11 @@ diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
|||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
sftk_PBELockInit();
|
sftk_PBELockInit();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
inKey.data = (unsigned char *)inKeyData;
|
||||||
|
inKey.len = sizeof(TEST_KEY) - 1;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pbe_params.salt.data = (unsigned char *)saltData;
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||||
|
|||||||
23
SOURCES/nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch
Normal file
23
SOURCES/nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/ssl/authcert.c b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/ssl/authcert.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -201,16 +201,19 @@ NSS_GetClientAuthData(void *arg,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* otherwise look through the cache based on usage
|
||||||
|
* if chosenNickname is set, we ignore the expiration date */
|
||||||
|
if (certList == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
certList = CERT_FindUserCertsByUsage(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
|
||||||
|
certUsageSSLClient,
|
||||||
|
PR_FALSE, chosenNickName == NULL,
|
||||||
|
pw_arg);
|
||||||
|
+ if (certList == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
/* filter only the certs that meet the nickname requirements */
|
||||||
|
if (chosenNickName) {
|
||||||
|
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByNickname(certList, chosenNickName,
|
||||||
|
pw_arg);
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
int nnames = 0;
|
||||||
|
char **names = ssl_DistNamesToStrings(caNames, &nnames);
|
||||||
|
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByCANames(certList, nnames, names,
|
||||||
22
SOURCES/nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch
Normal file
22
SOURCES/nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -565,17 +565,17 @@ struct KDFCacheItemStr {
|
||||||
|
int iterations;
|
||||||
|
int keyLen;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
typedef struct KDFCacheItemStr KDFCacheItem;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* Bug 1606992 - Cache the hash result for the common case that we're
|
||||||
|
* asked to repeatedly compute the key for the same password item,
|
||||||
|
* hash, iterations and salt. */
|
||||||
|
-#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 3
|
||||||
|
+#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 150
|
||||||
|
static struct {
|
||||||
|
PZLock *lock;
|
||||||
|
struct {
|
||||||
|
KDFCacheItem common;
|
||||||
|
int ivLen;
|
||||||
|
PRBool faulty3DES;
|
||||||
|
} cacheKDF1;
|
||||||
|
struct {
|
||||||
21
SOURCES/nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch
Normal file
21
SOURCES/nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password 2022-07-20 14:15:45.081009438 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c 2022-07-20 14:19:40.856546963 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -968,15 +968,14 @@ sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(PLAre
|
||||||
|
if (zeroTerm) {
|
||||||
|
/* unicode adds two nulls at the end */
|
||||||
|
if (toUnicode) {
|
||||||
|
- if ((dest->len >= 2) &&
|
||||||
|
- (dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2])) {
|
||||||
|
+ if ((dest->len < 2) || dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2]) {
|
||||||
|
/* we've already allocated space for these new NULLs */
|
||||||
|
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 2 <= bufferSize);
|
||||||
|
dest->len += 2;
|
||||||
|
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = dest->data[dest->len - 2] = 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
/* ascii/utf-8 adds just 1 */
|
||||||
|
- } else if ((dest->len >= 1) && dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
|
||||||
|
+ } else if (!dest->len || dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
|
||||||
|
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 1 <= bufferSize);
|
||||||
|
dest->len++;
|
||||||
|
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = 0;
|
||||||
685
SOURCES/nss-3.79-rhel-8-fips-signature-policy.patch
Normal file
685
SOURCES/nss-3.79-rhel-8-fips-signature-policy.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,685 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -up ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.sign_policy ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.023785628 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "sechash.h"
|
||||||
|
#endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
-#define MAX_KEY_LEN 512
|
||||||
|
+#define MAX_KEY_LEN 1024
|
||||||
|
#define PATH_LEN 150
|
||||||
|
#define BUFF_SIZE 150
|
||||||
|
#define UID_BITS 800
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.sign_policy ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc
|
||||||
|
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "secerr.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "sechash.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "pk11_signature_test.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "blapit.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha224-vectors.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha256-vectors.h"
|
||||||
|
@@ -109,7 +110,11 @@ class Pkcs11RsaPkcs1WycheproofTest
|
||||||
|
* Use 6 as the invalid value since modLen % 16 must be zero.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding) {
|
||||||
|
- const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = 736;
|
||||||
|
+#define RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH 736
|
||||||
|
+/* if our minimum supported key length is big enough to handle
|
||||||
|
+ * our largest Hash function, we can't test a short length */
|
||||||
|
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH
|
||||||
|
+ const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH;
|
||||||
|
const size_t kRsaKeyBits = 752;
|
||||||
|
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kMsg{'T', 'E', 'S', 'T'};
|
||||||
|
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kSha512DigestInfo{
|
||||||
|
@@ -209,6 +214,9 @@ TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding)
|
||||||
|
SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512,
|
||||||
|
nullptr);
|
||||||
|
EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||||
|
+#else
|
||||||
|
+ GTEST_SKIP();
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, RequireNullParameter) {
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.sign_policy ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
||||||
|
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "prtime.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "secerr.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "ssl.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "nss.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "blapit.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#include "gtest_utils.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "tls_agent.h"
|
||||||
|
@@ -348,9 +350,14 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
|
||||||
|
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
||||||
|
ASSERT_TRUE(slot);
|
||||||
|
PK11RSAGenParams rsaparams;
|
||||||
|
- // The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
|
||||||
|
- // 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
|
||||||
|
+// The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
|
||||||
|
+// 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
|
||||||
|
+#define RSA_WEAK_KEY 528
|
||||||
|
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
||||||
|
rsaparams.keySizeInBits = 528;
|
||||||
|
+#else
|
||||||
|
+ rsaparams.keySizeInBits = RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1;
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
rsaparams.pe = 65537;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Bug 1012786: PK11_GenerateKeyPair can fail if there is insufficient
|
||||||
|
@@ -390,6 +397,18 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
|
||||||
|
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
|
||||||
|
client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
|
||||||
|
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
|
||||||
|
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
||||||
|
+ // save the MIN POLICY length.
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 minRsa;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
|
||||||
|
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
|
||||||
|
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
|
||||||
|
+ NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
|
||||||
|
+#else
|
||||||
|
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, 2048));
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey dc_priv;
|
||||||
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey dc_pub;
|
||||||
|
@@ -412,6 +431,9 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
|
||||||
|
auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
|
||||||
|
client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
|
||||||
|
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
|
||||||
|
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
||||||
|
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength
|
||||||
|
extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
+** Return the strength of the private key in bits
|
||||||
|
+*/
|
||||||
|
+extern unsigned SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
** Return the length of the signature in bytes
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
extern unsigned SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#ifndef _KEYI_H_
|
||||||
|
#define _KEYI_H_
|
||||||
|
+#include "secerr.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
|
||||||
|
/* NSS private functions */
|
||||||
|
@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ SECStatus sec_DecodeRSAPSSParamsToMechan
|
||||||
|
const SECItem *params,
|
||||||
|
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *mech);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+/* make sure the key length matches the policy for keyType */
|
||||||
|
+SECStatus seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength,
|
||||||
|
+ SECErrorCodes error);
|
||||||
|
SEC_END_PROTOS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#endif /* _KEYHI_H_ */
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "secdig.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "prtime.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "keyi.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "nss.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
|
||||||
|
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_IntegerTemplate)
|
||||||
|
@@ -1042,6 +1043,62 @@ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SEC
|
||||||
|
return bitSize;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+unsigned
|
||||||
|
+SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk)
|
||||||
|
+{
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned bitSize = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attribute = CKT_INVALID_TYPE;
|
||||||
|
+ SECItem params;
|
||||||
|
+ SECStatus rv;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (!privk) {
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
||||||
|
+ return 0;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* interpret modulus length as key strength */
|
||||||
|
+ switch (privk->keyType) {
|
||||||
|
+ case rsaKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case rsaPssKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case rsaOaepKey:
|
||||||
|
+ /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
|
||||||
|
+ * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
|
||||||
|
+ bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
|
||||||
|
+ if (bitSize == -1) {
|
||||||
|
+ bitSize = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ return bitSize;
|
||||||
|
+ case dsaKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case fortezzaKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case dhKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case keaKey:
|
||||||
|
+ attribute = CKA_PRIME;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case ecKey:
|
||||||
|
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
||||||
|
+ CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, ¶ms);
|
||||||
|
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
|
||||||
|
+ return 0;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ bitSize = SECKEY_ECParamsToKeySize(¶ms);
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
|
||||||
|
+ return bitSize;
|
||||||
|
+ default:
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
||||||
|
+ return 0;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_Assert(attribute != CKT_INVALID_TYPE);
|
||||||
|
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
||||||
|
+ attribute, NULL, ¶ms);
|
||||||
|
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
||||||
|
+ return 0;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(¶ms);
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
|
||||||
|
+ return bitSize;
|
||||||
|
+}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/* returns signature length in bytes (not bits) */
|
||||||
|
unsigned
|
||||||
|
SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
|
||||||
|
@@ -1212,6 +1269,51 @@ SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(const SECKEYPublicK
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
+ * Check that a given key meets the policy limits for the given key
|
||||||
|
+ * size.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+SECStatus
|
||||||
|
+seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength, SECErrorCodes error)
|
||||||
|
+{
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 opt = -1;
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 optVal;
|
||||||
|
+ SECStatus rv;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ switch (keyType) {
|
||||||
|
+ case rsaKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case rsaPssKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case rsaOaepKey:
|
||||||
|
+ opt = NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case dsaKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case fortezzaKey:
|
||||||
|
+ opt = NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case dhKey:
|
||||||
|
+ case keaKey:
|
||||||
|
+ opt = NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case ecKey:
|
||||||
|
+ opt = NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case nullKey:
|
||||||
|
+ default:
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_Assert(opt != -1);
|
||||||
|
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(opt, &optVal);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
+ return rv;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (optVal < keyLength) {
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(error);
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
+}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
* Use the private key to find a public key handle. The handle will be on
|
||||||
|
* the same slot as the private key.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "pk11func.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "secerr.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "keyi.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "nss.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
struct SGNContextStr {
|
||||||
|
SECOidTag signalg;
|
||||||
|
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
|
||||||
|
SECOidTag hashalg, signalg;
|
||||||
|
KeyType keyType;
|
||||||
|
PRUint32 policyFlags;
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
|
||||||
|
SECStatus rv;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* OK, map a PKCS #7 hash and encrypt algorithm into
|
||||||
|
@@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
|
||||||
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
|
||||||
|
return NULL;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
|
||||||
|
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
|
||||||
|
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
|
||||||
|
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
+ return NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
|
||||||
|
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashalg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
|
||||||
|
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
|
||||||
|
@@ -467,9 +479,20 @@ SGN_Digest(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
|
||||||
|
SGNDigestInfo *di = 0;
|
||||||
|
SECOidTag enctag;
|
||||||
|
PRUint32 policyFlags;
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
result->data = 0;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
|
||||||
|
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(privKey->keyType,
|
||||||
|
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(privKey),
|
||||||
|
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
|
||||||
|
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(algtag, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
|
||||||
|
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "secdig.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "secerr.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "keyi.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "nss.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
** Recover the DigestInfo from an RSA PKCS#1 signature.
|
||||||
|
@@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
|
||||||
|
unsigned int sigLen;
|
||||||
|
KeyType type;
|
||||||
|
PRUint32 policyFlags;
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* make sure the encryption algorithm matches the key type */
|
||||||
|
/* RSA-PSS algorithm can be used with both rsaKey and rsaPssKey */
|
||||||
|
@@ -476,7 +478,16 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
|
||||||
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH);
|
||||||
|
return NULL;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
-
|
||||||
|
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG) {
|
||||||
|
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
|
||||||
|
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(key),
|
||||||
|
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
+ return NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
/* check the policy on the encryption algorithm */
|
||||||
|
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(encAlg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
|
||||||
|
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.sign_policy ./lib/freebl/blapit.h
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/freebl/blapit.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
|
||||||
|
* These values come from the initial key size limits from the PKCS #11
|
||||||
|
* module. They may be arbitrarily adjusted to any value freebl supports.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
-#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 128
|
||||||
|
+#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1023 /* 128 */
|
||||||
|
#define RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
|
||||||
|
#define RSA_MAX_EXPONENT_BITS 64
|
||||||
|
#define DH_MIN_P_BITS 128
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/nss/nss.h.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nss.h
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/nss/nss.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/nss/nss.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -302,6 +302,28 @@ SECStatus NSS_UnregisterShutdown(NSS_Shu
|
||||||
|
#define NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS 0x00d /* lock default values */
|
||||||
|
#define NSS_DEFAULT_SSL_LOCK 1 /* lock the ssl default values */
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+/* NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY controls what kinds of operations are subject to
|
||||||
|
+ * the NSS_XXX_MIN_KEY_SIZE values.
|
||||||
|
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS sets and clears all the flags to the input
|
||||||
|
+ * value
|
||||||
|
+ * On get it returns all the flags
|
||||||
|
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS sets only the flags=1 in theinput value and
|
||||||
|
+ * does not affect the other flags
|
||||||
|
+ * On get it returns all the flags
|
||||||
|
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS clears only the flags=1 in the input
|
||||||
|
+ * value and does not affect the other flags
|
||||||
|
+ * On get it returns all the compliment of all the flags
|
||||||
|
+ * (cleared flags == 1) */
|
||||||
|
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS 0x00e
|
||||||
|
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS 0x00f
|
||||||
|
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS 0x010
|
||||||
|
+/* currently defined flags */
|
||||||
|
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG 1
|
||||||
|
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG 2
|
||||||
|
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG 4
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+#define NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE 0x011
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* Set and get global options for the NSS library.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct nssOps {
|
||||||
|
PRInt32 dtlsVersionMaxPolicy;
|
||||||
|
PRInt32 pkcs12DecodeForceUnicode;
|
||||||
|
PRInt32 defaultLocks;
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 keySizePolicyFlags;
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 eccMinKeySize;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
|
||||||
|
@@ -37,7 +39,9 @@ static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
|
||||||
|
1,
|
||||||
|
0xffff,
|
||||||
|
PR_FALSE,
|
||||||
|
- 0
|
||||||
|
+ 0,
|
||||||
|
+ NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG,
|
||||||
|
+ SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SECStatus
|
||||||
|
@@ -78,6 +82,18 @@ NSS_OptionSet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 val
|
||||||
|
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
|
||||||
|
nss_ops.defaultLocks = value;
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
|
||||||
|
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags = value;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
|
||||||
|
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags |= value;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
|
||||||
|
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags &= ~value;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
|
||||||
|
+ nss_ops.eccMinKeySize = value;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
||||||
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
@@ -119,6 +135,16 @@ NSS_OptionGet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 *va
|
||||||
|
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
|
||||||
|
*value = nss_ops.defaultLocks;
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
|
||||||
|
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
|
||||||
|
+ *value = nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
|
||||||
|
+ *value = ~nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
|
||||||
|
+ *value = nss_ops.eccMinKeySize;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@
|
||||||
|
* happens because NSS used to count bit lengths incorrectly. */
|
||||||
|
#define SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS 1023
|
||||||
|
#define SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS 1023
|
||||||
|
+/* not really used by SSL, but define it here for consistency */
|
||||||
|
+#define SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS 256
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.sign_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -78,15 +78,14 @@ pk11_KeyExchange(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_
|
||||||
|
if (privKeyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
||||||
|
PK11RSAGenParams rsaParams;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- if (symKeyLength > 53) /* bytes */ {
|
||||||
|
- /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 512 bits long,
|
||||||
|
+ if (symKeyLength > 120) /* bytes */ {
|
||||||
|
+ /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 1024 bits long,
|
||||||
|
** and that's too costly. Don't even try.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CANNOT_MOVE_SENSITIVE_KEY);
|
||||||
|
goto rsa_failed;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
- rsaParams.keySizeInBits =
|
||||||
|
- (symKeyLength > 21 || symKeyLength == 0) ? 512 : 256;
|
||||||
|
+ rsaParams.keySizeInBits = 1024;
|
||||||
|
rsaParams.pe = 0x10001;
|
||||||
|
privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN,
|
||||||
|
&rsaParams, &pubKey, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE, symKey->cx);
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.sign_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:35.004785510 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -427,12 +427,21 @@ static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[]
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.3"), 0x304 },
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+static const optionFreeDef keySizeFlagsList[] = {
|
||||||
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SSL"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG },
|
||||||
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SIGN"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG },
|
||||||
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-VERIFY"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG },
|
||||||
|
+};
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
static const optionFreeDef freeOptList[] = {
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* Restrictions for asymetric keys */
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("RSA-MIN"), NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("DH-MIN"), NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA-MIN"), NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
|
||||||
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECC-MIN"), NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
|
||||||
|
+ /* what operations doe the key size apply to */
|
||||||
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-FLAGS"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS },
|
||||||
|
/* constraints on SSL Protocols */
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MIN"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MAX"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY },
|
||||||
|
@@ -540,6 +549,7 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
|
||||||
|
*result = val;
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+ /* handle any ssl strings */
|
||||||
|
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sslOptList); i++) {
|
||||||
|
if (policyValueLength == sslOptList[i].name_size &&
|
||||||
|
PORT_Strncasecmp(sslOptList[i].name, policyValue,
|
||||||
|
@@ -548,7 +558,29 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
- return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+ /* handle key_size flags. Each flag represents a bit, which
|
||||||
|
+ * gets or'd together. They can be separated by , | or + */
|
||||||
|
+ val = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ while (*policyValue) {
|
||||||
|
+ PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keySizeFlagsList); i++) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (PORT_Strncasecmp(keySizeFlagsList[i].name, policyValue,
|
||||||
|
+ keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size) == 0) {
|
||||||
|
+ val |= keySizeFlagsList[i].option;
|
||||||
|
+ found = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
+ policyValue += keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size;
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (!found) {
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (*policyValue == ',' || *policyValue == '|' || *policyValue == '+') {
|
||||||
|
+ policyValue++;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ *result = val;
|
||||||
|
+ return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* Policy operations:
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.sign_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:34.998785473 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -7409,6 +7409,8 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
|
||||||
|
unsigned dh_p_bits;
|
||||||
|
unsigned dh_g_bits;
|
||||||
|
PRInt32 minDH;
|
||||||
|
+ PRInt32 optval;
|
||||||
|
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SSL3Hashes hashes;
|
||||||
|
SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
||||||
|
@@ -7419,8 +7421,13 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
|
||||||
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
goto loser; /* malformed. */
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH);
|
||||||
|
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH)
|
||||||
|
+ : SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
if (rv != SECSuccess || minDH <= 0) {
|
||||||
|
minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
@@ -11411,13 +11418,20 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
|
||||||
|
SECStatus rv;
|
||||||
|
PRUint32 minKey;
|
||||||
|
PRInt32 optval;
|
||||||
|
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
|
||||||
|
switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) {
|
||||||
|
case rsaKey:
|
||||||
|
case rsaPssKey:
|
||||||
|
case rsaOaepKey:
|
||||||
|
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
|
||||||
|
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
|
||||||
|
+ : SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
|
||||||
|
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
@@ -11426,7 +11440,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
case dsaKey:
|
||||||
|
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
|
||||||
|
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
|
||||||
|
+ : SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
|
||||||
|
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
@@ -11435,7 +11450,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
case dhKey:
|
||||||
|
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
|
||||||
|
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
|
||||||
|
+ : SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
|
||||||
|
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
@@ -11444,9 +11460,15 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
case ecKey:
|
||||||
|
- /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we only
|
||||||
|
- * support curves we like. */
|
||||||
|
- minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
|
||||||
|
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
|
||||||
|
+ : SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
|
||||||
|
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
|
||||||
|
+ } else {
|
||||||
|
+ /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we
|
||||||
|
+ * only support curves we like. */
|
||||||
|
+ minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.sign_policy ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt
|
||||||
|
--- ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
|
||||||
|
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=dtls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=2048:RSA-MIN=2048 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Standard policy
|
||||||
|
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:des-ede3-cbc:rc4:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:DHE-DSS:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=tls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=1023:RSA-MIN=1023 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Legacy policy
|
||||||
|
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Reduced policy
|
||||||
|
+0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=KEY-SIZE-SSL,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Valid key size
|
||||||
|
+2 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=UNKNOWN,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-FAIL.*unknown.* Invalid key size
|
||||||
|
2 disallow=ALL_allow=dtls-version-min=:dtls-version-max= NSS-POLICY-FAIL Missing value
|
||||||
|
2 disallow=ALL_allow=RSA-MIN=whatever NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid value
|
||||||
|
2 disallow=ALL_allow=flower NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid identifier
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.sign_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
|
||||||
|
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2022-06-20 16:50:08.958742135 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@
|
||||||
|
# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
|
||||||
|
# compatibility reasons
|
||||||
|
# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
|
||||||
|
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
|
||||||
|
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
|
||||||
|
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
||||||
|
+ 0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
# test default settings
|
||||||
|
# NOTE: tstclient will attempt to overide the defaults, so we detect we
|
||||||
|
# were successful by locking in our settings
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh.sign_policy ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh
|
||||||
|
--- ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh.sign_policy 2022-06-22 08:43:55.905407738 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh 2022-06-22 08:43:58.837426779 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ dbupgrade_main()
|
||||||
|
echo $i
|
||||||
|
if [ -d $i ]; then
|
||||||
|
echo "upgrading db $i"
|
||||||
|
- ${BINDIR}/certutil -G -g 512 -d sql:$i -f ${PWFILE} -z ${NOISE_FILE} 2>&1
|
||||||
|
+ ${BINDIR}/certutil -G -g 1024 -d sql:$i -f ${PWFILE} -z ${NOISE_FILE} 2>&1
|
||||||
|
html_msg $? 0 "Upgrading $i"
|
||||||
|
else
|
||||||
|
echo "skipping db $i"
|
||||||
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -146,16 +146,38 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CHECK_FORK();
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* make sure we're legal */
|
|
||||||
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
|
|
||||||
if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
|
||||||
return crv;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ if (context->isFIPS && (contextType == SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
|
|
||||||
+ if ((pParameter == NULL) || (ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS))) {
|
|
||||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ } else {
|
|
||||||
+ CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
|
|
||||||
+ switch (p->ivGenerator) {
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
|
|
||||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
|
|
||||||
+ if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
|
|
||||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ default:
|
|
||||||
+ if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
|
|
||||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
if (!pOuttext) {
|
|
||||||
*pulOuttextLen = ulIntextLen;
|
|
||||||
return CKR_OK;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
rv = (*context->aeadUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pOuttext, &outlen,
|
|
||||||
maxout, pIntext, ulIntextLen,
|
|
||||||
pParameter, ulParameterLen,
|
|
||||||
pAssociatedData, ulAssociatedDataLen);
|
|
||||||
@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test 2024-01-18 08:34:45.936944401 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c 2024-01-18 09:20:57.555980326 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -1816,38 +1816,39 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
/* DH Known P (2048-bits) */
|
|
||||||
static const PRUint8 dh_known_P[] = {
|
|
||||||
- 0xc2, 0x79, 0xbb, 0x76, 0x32, 0x0d, 0x43, 0xfd,
|
|
||||||
- 0x1b, 0x8c, 0xa2, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x6d, 0xef,
|
|
||||||
- 0xf8, 0x1a, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xa2, 0xf5, 0x73, 0x2b,
|
|
||||||
- 0xdb, 0x1a, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x90, 0xeb, 0xe7, 0x8e,
|
|
||||||
- 0x5f, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0xb6, 0x61, 0x89, 0xd1, 0x03,
|
|
||||||
- 0xb0, 0x5f, 0x91, 0xe4, 0xd2, 0x82, 0x90, 0xfc,
|
|
||||||
- 0x3c, 0x49, 0x69, 0x59, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x6a, 0x85,
|
|
||||||
- 0x71, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x72, 0x5a, 0x45, 0xad, 0x01,
|
|
||||||
- 0x6f, 0x82, 0xae, 0xec, 0x91, 0x08, 0x2e, 0x7c,
|
|
||||||
- 0x64, 0x93, 0x46, 0x1c, 0x68, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x03,
|
|
||||||
- 0x28, 0x1d, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x46, 0xf0,
|
|
||||||
- 0xc9, 0xdb, 0x99, 0x95, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4d, 0xd5,
|
|
||||||
- 0x1a, 0x78, 0x92, 0x51, 0x89, 0x72, 0x28, 0x7f,
|
|
||||||
- 0x20, 0x70, 0x41, 0x49, 0xa2, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xf9,
|
|
||||||
- 0x78, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x5d, 0xfa, 0xdb, 0x57,
|
|
||||||
- 0xd4, 0x71, 0xdf, 0x66, 0xe3, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x70,
|
|
||||||
- 0xa4, 0x21, 0x44, 0x6a, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x30, 0x2c,
|
|
||||||
- 0x9c, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x57, 0xc8, 0x24, 0x34, 0x2d,
|
|
||||||
- 0x7a, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xc2, 0x5f, 0xab, 0x64, 0x2e,
|
|
||||||
- 0xaa, 0x28, 0x32, 0x95, 0x42, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0xcc,
|
|
||||||
- 0xdf, 0xfd, 0x22, 0xc8, 0x56, 0x84, 0xc1, 0x62,
|
|
||||||
- 0x15, 0xb2, 0x77, 0x86, 0x81, 0xfc, 0xa5, 0x12,
|
|
||||||
- 0x3c, 0xca, 0x28, 0x17, 0x8f, 0x03, 0x16, 0x6e,
|
|
||||||
- 0xb8, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x1b, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfd, 0x8b,
|
|
||||||
- 0xb6, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0xf7, 0x47, 0x41, 0xc5, 0x2b,
|
|
||||||
- 0x37, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x68, 0xda, 0x1c, 0x55,
|
|
||||||
- 0x44, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x07, 0x11, 0x3b,
|
|
||||||
- 0x5f, 0x00, 0x84, 0xb4, 0xc4, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0x97,
|
|
||||||
- 0x29, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xab, 0xfc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x34,
|
|
||||||
- 0xe4, 0xc7, 0x81, 0x52, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x27, 0x3c,
|
|
||||||
- 0xa6, 0x70, 0x3f, 0x4a, 0x54, 0xda, 0xdd, 0x60,
|
|
||||||
- 0x26, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x45, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x6f
|
|
||||||
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97,
|
|
||||||
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static const PRUint8 dh_known_Y_1[] = {
|
|
||||||
@@ -1893,10 +1894,10 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static const PRUint8 dh_known_hash_result[] = {
|
|
||||||
- 0x93, 0xa2, 0x89, 0x1c, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xbf,
|
|
||||||
- 0xa7, 0xdf, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x82, 0xfb, 0x87, 0x81,
|
|
||||||
- 0x09, 0x47, 0xf3, 0x9f, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x3f,
|
|
||||||
- 0x8e, 0x5e, 0x06, 0xca, 0x30, 0xa7, 0xaf, 0x10
|
|
||||||
+ 0x40, 0xe3, 0x7a, 0x34, 0x83, 0x2d, 0x94, 0x57,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x99, 0x3d, 0x66, 0xec, 0x54, 0xdf, 0x82, 0x4a,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x37, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xbc, 0x54, 0xe5,
|
|
||||||
+ 0x5e, 0x63, 0xd3, 0x46, 0x4e, 0xa3, 0xe2, 0x8a
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* DH variables. */
|
|
||||||
@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2 2024-01-19 09:21:19.632889660 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -7090,7 +7090,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
|
||||||
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
|
|
||||||
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
|
|
||||||
CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
|
|
||||||
- keySize);
|
|
||||||
+ keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
|
|
||||||
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
|
||||||
@@ -7404,7 +7404,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
|
|
||||||
- keySize);
|
|
||||||
+ keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
switch (mechanism) {
|
|
||||||
/* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2 2024-01-19 09:21:19.633889670 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2024-01-19 09:28:00.082843565 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -2393,20 +2393,43 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PRBool
|
|
||||||
-sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
|
|
||||||
+sftk_checkFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash, PRBool allowSmall, PRBool allowCMAC)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
switch (hash) {
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC:
|
|
||||||
+ return allowCMAC;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA_1:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA224:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
|
|
||||||
+ return allowSmall;
|
|
||||||
case CKM_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_SHA384:
|
|
||||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
|
|
||||||
case CKM_SHA512:
|
|
||||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+PRBool
|
|
||||||
+sftk_checkKeyLength(CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG min,
|
|
||||||
+ CK_ULONG max, CK_ULONG step)
|
|
||||||
+{
|
|
||||||
+ if (keyLength > max) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (keyLength < min ) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (((keyLength - min) % step) != 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+}
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
|
|
||||||
* handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
|
|
||||||
@@ -2416,6 +2439,8 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
|
|
||||||
CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool allowSmall = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool allowCMAC = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
switch (mechInfo->special) {
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
|
|
||||||
SECItem dhPrime;
|
|
||||||
@@ -2482,7 +2507,11 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
+ /* Our code makes sure pss->hashAlg matches the explicit
|
|
||||||
+ * hash in the mechanism, and only mechanisms with approved
|
|
||||||
+ * hashes are included, so no need to check pss->hashAlg
|
|
||||||
+ * here */
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
|
|
||||||
/* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
|
|
||||||
@@ -2508,12 +2537,28 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
|
|
||||||
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800:
|
|
||||||
+ allowCMAC = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
|
|
||||||
+ allowSmall = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHashTls:
|
|
||||||
if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
|
|
||||||
- + mechInfo->offset));
|
|
||||||
+ return sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
|
|
||||||
+ + mechInfo->offset), allowSmall, allowCMAC);
|
|
||||||
+ case SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck:
|
|
||||||
+ if (mech->mechanism != CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
|
|
||||||
+ /* unless the mechnism has a built-in hash, check the hash */
|
|
||||||
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (!sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
|
|
||||||
+ + mechInfo->offset), PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -2558,13 +2603,11 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
|
|
||||||
* approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
|
|
||||||
if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
|
|
||||||
(opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
|
|
||||||
- (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
- (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
- (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
|
|
||||||
- ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
|
|
||||||
- ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
- (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
|
||||||
- ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_checkKeyLength(keyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
|
|
||||||
+ mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step) &&
|
|
||||||
+ ((targetKeyLength == 0) || (mechs->special == SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck)
|
|
||||||
+ || sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
|
|
||||||
+ mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step)) &&
|
|
||||||
((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
|
|
||||||
sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2 2024-01-19 09:21:19.634889680 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c 2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -157,16 +157,25 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
|
|
||||||
switch (p->ivGenerator) {
|
|
||||||
+ default:
|
|
||||||
case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
|
|
||||||
context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
|
|
||||||
- if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
|
|
||||||
+ if ((p->ulIvLen < 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
|
|
||||||
+ (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
|
|
||||||
context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
- default:
|
|
||||||
- if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
|
|
||||||
+ if ((p->ulIvLen != 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
|
|
||||||
+ (p->ulIvFixedBits != 32)) {
|
|
||||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
|
|
||||||
+ if ((p->ulIvFixedBits < 32) ||
|
|
||||||
+ ((p->ulIvLen*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - p->ulIvFixedBits) < 32)) {
|
|
||||||
context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
|
|
||||||
PORT_Memcpy(iv + AES_KEY_WRAP_BLOCK_SIZE, input, inputLen);
|
|
||||||
rv = AES_Encrypt(&cx->aescx, output, pOutputLen, maxOutputLen, iv,
|
|
||||||
outLen);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
|
|
||||||
PORT_ZFree(newBuf, paddedInputLen);
|
|
||||||
/* a little overkill, we only need to clear out the length, but this
|
|
||||||
* is easier to verify we got it all */
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -631,12 +631,12 @@ AESKeyWrap_DecryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
|
|
||||||
loser:
|
|
||||||
/* if we failed, make sure we don't return any data to the user */
|
|
||||||
if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (output == newBuf)) {
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(newBuf, 0, paddedLen);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(newBuf, paddedLen);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* clear out CSP sensitive data from the heap and stack */
|
|
||||||
if (allocBuf) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_ZFree(allocBuf, paddedLen);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/blapii.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/blapii.h 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@ PRBool ppc_crypto_support();
|
|
||||||
#ifdef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
|
|
||||||
#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)
|
|
||||||
#else
|
|
||||||
-#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size) \
|
|
||||||
- { \
|
|
||||||
- volatile char _stkclr[stack_size]; \
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset((void *)&_stkclr[0], 0, stack_size); \
|
|
||||||
+#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size) \
|
|
||||||
+ { \
|
|
||||||
+ volatile char _stkclr[stack_size]; \
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero((void *)&_stkclr[0], stack_size); \
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/drbg.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/drbg.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ prng_initEntropy(void)
|
|
||||||
SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block));
|
|
||||||
SHA256_End(&ctx, globalrng->previousEntropyHash, NULL,
|
|
||||||
sizeof(globalrng->previousEntropyHash));
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof(block));
|
|
||||||
SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
return PR_SUCCESS;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ prng_getEntropy(PRUint8 *buffer, size_t
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
out:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(hash, 0, sizeof hash);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof block);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hash, sizeof hash);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof block);
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *r
|
|
||||||
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry);
|
|
||||||
SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof data);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(thisHash, sizeof thisHash);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
|
|
||||||
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter, (sizeof rng->reseed_counter) - 1, carry);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* if the prng failed, don't return any output, signal softoken */
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(H, 0, sizeof H);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(H, sizeof H);
|
|
||||||
if (!rng->isValid) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_Memset(returned_bytes, 0, no_of_returned_bytes);
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/dsa.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/dsa.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
|
|
||||||
err = MP_OKAY;
|
|
||||||
signature->len = dsa_signature_len;
|
|
||||||
cleanup:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&p);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&q);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&g);
|
|
||||||
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ DSA_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
|
|
||||||
rv = dsa_SignDigest(key, signature, digest, kSeed);
|
|
||||||
} while (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM &&
|
|
||||||
--retries > 0);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(kSeed, 0, sizeof kSeed);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(kSeed, sizeof kSeed);
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ DSA_VerifyDigest(DSAPublicKey *key, cons
|
|
||||||
verified = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
cleanup:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, sizeof localDigestData);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, sizeof localDigestData);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&p);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&q);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&g);
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/gcm.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/gcm.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ gcmHash_Final(gcmHashContext *ghash, uns
|
|
||||||
rv = SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
cleanup:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(T, 0, sizeof(T));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(T, sizeof(T));
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -596,15 +596,15 @@ GCM_CreateContext(void *context, freeblC
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
||||||
gcm->ctr_context_init = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
return gcm;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
loser:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
||||||
if (ghash && ghash->mem) {
|
|
||||||
void *mem = ghash->mem;
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(ghash, 0, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(ghash, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
|
|
||||||
PORT_Free(mem);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (gcm) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -682,11 +682,11 @@ gcm_InitCounter(GCMContext *gcm, const u
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
loser:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
|
|
||||||
if (freeCtr) {
|
|
||||||
CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ GCM_DecryptUpdate(GCMContext *gcm, unsig
|
|
||||||
if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(tag, intag, tagBytes) != 0) {
|
|
||||||
/* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
|
|
||||||
/* finish the decryption */
|
|
||||||
return CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
|
|
||||||
inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
||||||
@@ -1159,10 +1159,10 @@ GCM_DecryptAEAD(GCMContext *gcm, unsigne
|
|
||||||
/* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
|
|
||||||
CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
|
|
||||||
/* finish the decryption */
|
|
||||||
rv = CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
|
|
||||||
inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ MAC(unsigned char *mdOut,
|
|
||||||
hashObj->end(mdState, mdOut, mdOutLen, mdOutMax);
|
|
||||||
hashObj->destroy(mdState, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(lengthBytes, 0, sizeof lengthBytes);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(hmacPad, 0, sizeof hmacPad);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(firstBlock, 0, sizeof firstBlock);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(macOut, 0, sizeof macOut);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(lengthBytes, sizeof lengthBytes);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hmacPad, sizeof hmacPad);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(firstBlock, sizeof firstBlock);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(macOut, sizeof macOut);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ intel_aes_gcmInitCounter(intel_AES_GCMCo
|
|
||||||
void
|
|
||||||
intel_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
|
|
||||||
if (freeit) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_Free(gcm);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ ppc_aes_gcmInitCounter(ppc_AES_GCMContex
|
|
||||||
void
|
|
||||||
ppc_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(ppc_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
|
|
||||||
if (freeit) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_Free(gcm);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/pqg.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/pqg.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ cleanup:
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&a);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&z);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&two_length_minus_1);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
|
|
||||||
if (err) {
|
|
||||||
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
|
||||||
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ cleanup:
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&c);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&c0);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&one);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
|
|
||||||
if (err) {
|
|
||||||
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
|
||||||
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ makePfromQandSeed(
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&c, 1, &c)); /* c -= 1 */
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&X, &c, P)); /* P = X - c */
|
|
||||||
cleanup:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(V_j, 0, sizeof V_j);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(V_j, sizeof V_j);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&W);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&X);
|
|
||||||
mp_clear(&c);
|
|
||||||
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ makeGfromIndex(HASH_HashType hashtype,
|
|
||||||
/* step 11.
|
|
||||||
* return valid G */
|
|
||||||
cleanup:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof(data));
|
|
||||||
if (hashcx) {
|
|
||||||
hashobj->destroy(hashcx, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ AES_DestroyContext(AESContext *cx, PRBoo
|
|
||||||
cx->worker_cx = NULL;
|
|
||||||
cx->destroy = NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(cx, 0, sizeof(AESContext));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(cx, sizeof(AESContext));
|
|
||||||
if (freeit) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_Free(mem);
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsa.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero 2023-11-22 14:41:24.066840894 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/rsa.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
|
|
||||||
/* 2. Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) */
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &psub1));
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(q, 1, &qsub1));
|
|
||||||
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
|
|
||||||
if (needPublicExponent || needPrivateExponent) {
|
|
||||||
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
|
|
||||||
/* 3. Compute d = e**-1 mod(phi) */
|
|
||||||
/* or e = d**-1 mod(phi) as necessary */
|
|
||||||
if (needPublicExponent) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -165,6 +165,15 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
|
|
||||||
goto cleanup;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ /* make sure we weren't passed in a d or e = 1 mod phi */
|
|
||||||
+ /* just need to check d, because if one is = 1 mod phi, they both are */
|
|
||||||
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &phi, &tmp));
|
|
||||||
+ if (mp_cmp_d(&tmp, 2) <= 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
|
||||||
+ rv = SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/* 4. Compute exponent1 = d mod (p-1) */
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &psub1, &tmp));
|
|
||||||
MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent1, key->arena);
|
|
||||||
@@ -1152,6 +1161,8 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(RSAPriv
|
|
||||||
/* Perform a public key operation v = m ** e mod n */
|
|
||||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(m, &e, &n, &v));
|
|
||||||
if (mp_cmp(&v, c) != 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ /* this error triggers a fips fatal error lock */
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
|
||||||
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
cleanup:
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -977,14 +977,14 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
|
|
||||||
/* now create the hmac key */
|
|
||||||
hmac = HMAC_Create(hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
if (hmac == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
|
|
||||||
return NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
HMAC_Begin(hmac);
|
|
||||||
HMAC_Update(hmac, input, inputLen);
|
|
||||||
rv = HMAC_Finish(hmac, keyHash, &keyLen, sizeof(keyHash));
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
|
|
||||||
HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
return NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
|
|
||||||
* reuse the original context allocated above so we don't
|
|
||||||
* need to allocate and free another one */
|
|
||||||
rv = HMAC_ReInit(hmac, hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
return NULL;
|
|
||||||
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ rsa_HMACPrf(HMACContext *hmac, const cha
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
PORT_Memcpy(output, hmacLast, left);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(hmacLast, 0, sizeof(hmacLast));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hmacLast, sizeof(hmacLast));
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ rsa_GetErrorLength(HMACContext *hmac, in
|
|
||||||
outLength = PORT_CT_SEL(PORT_CT_LT(candidate, maxLegalLen),
|
|
||||||
candidate, outLength);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(out, sizeof(out));
|
|
||||||
return outLength;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyDSACheck(PRFileDesc *shFD,
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* verify the hash against the check file */
|
|
||||||
rv = DSA_VerifyDigest(key, signature, &hash);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
|
|
||||||
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyHMACCheck(PRFileDesc *shFD
|
|
||||||
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
result = SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(signature, &hash);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
|
|
||||||
return result;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
|
|
||||||
#ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
|
|
||||||
DSAPublicKey key;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(&key, sizeof(key));
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
|
|
||||||
@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
|
|
||||||
shFD = NULL;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
loser:
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(&header, 0, sizeof header);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(&header, sizeof header);
|
|
||||||
if (checkName != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_Free(checkName);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ loser:
|
|
||||||
/* clear out state so it's not left on the stack */
|
|
||||||
if (cx)
|
|
||||||
HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(state, sizeof(state));
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c 2023-11-22 14:44:15.519400684 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
|
|
||||||
return;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
|
|
||||||
- PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(bytes, sizeof bytes);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero 2023-11-22 14:41:24.069840921 -0800
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -5092,7 +5092,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
|
|
||||||
if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) &&
|
|
||||||
(PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_Free(signature);
|
|
||||||
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero ./lib/util/secport.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/util/secport.h 2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
|
|
||||||
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
|
|
||||||
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#include <ctype.h>
|
|
||||||
+/* ask for Annex K for memset_s. will set the appropriate #define
|
|
||||||
+ * if Annex K is supported */
|
|
||||||
+#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
|
|
||||||
#include <string.h>
|
|
||||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
|
||||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
||||||
@@ -182,6 +185,39 @@ SEC_END_PROTOS
|
|
||||||
#endif /*SUNOS4*/
|
|
||||||
#define PORT_Memset memset
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+/* there are cases where the compiler optimizes away our attempt to clear
|
|
||||||
+ * out our stack variables. There are multiple solutions for this problem,
|
|
||||||
+ * but they aren't universally accepted on all platforms. This attempts
|
|
||||||
+ * to select the best solution available given our os, compilier, and libc */
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef __STDC_LIB_EXT1__
|
|
||||||
+/* if the os implements C11 annex K, use memset_s */
|
|
||||||
+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) memset_s(p, n, 0, n)
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef XP_WIN
|
|
||||||
+/* windows has a secure zero funtion */
|
|
||||||
+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) SecureZeroMemory(p, n)
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+/* _DEFAULT_SORUCE == BSD source in GCC based environments
|
|
||||||
+ * if other environmens support explicit_bzero, their defines
|
|
||||||
+ * should be added here */
|
|
||||||
+#if defined(_DEFAULT_SOURCE) || defined(_BSD_SOURCE)
|
|
||||||
+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) explicit_bzero(p, n)
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+/* if the os doesn't support one of the above, but does support
|
|
||||||
+ * memset_explicit, you can add the definition for memset with the
|
|
||||||
+ * appropriate define check here */
|
|
||||||
+/* define an explicitly implementated Safe zero if the OS
|
|
||||||
+ * doesn't provide one */
|
|
||||||
+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) \
|
|
||||||
+ if (p != NULL) { \
|
|
||||||
+ volatile unsigned char *__vl = (unsigned char *)p; \
|
|
||||||
+ size_t __nl = n; \
|
|
||||||
+ while (__nl--) *__vl++ = 0; \
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+#endif /* no explicit_bzero */
|
|
||||||
+#endif /* no windows SecureZeroMemory */
|
|
||||||
+#endif /* no memset_s */
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
#define PORT_Strcasecmp PL_strcasecmp
|
|
||||||
#define PORT_Strcat strcat
|
|
||||||
#define PORT_Strchr strchr
|
|
||||||
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator 2023-08-03 10:50:37.067109367 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2023-08-03 11:41:55.641541953 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -2429,7 +2429,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSECC:
|
|
||||||
/* we've already handled the curve selection in the 'getlength'
|
|
||||||
- * function */
|
|
||||||
+ * function */
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
case SFTKFIPSAEAD: {
|
|
||||||
if (mech->ulParameterLen == 0) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -2463,6 +2463,29 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
|
|
||||||
+ /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
|
|
||||||
+ * (independent of keysize).
|
|
||||||
+ * 1. iteration count must be at least 1000.
|
|
||||||
+ * 2. salt must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).
|
|
||||||
+ * 3. password must match the length specified in the SP
|
|
||||||
+ */
|
|
||||||
+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkdf2 = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)
|
|
||||||
+ mech->pParameter;
|
|
||||||
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pbkdf2)) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (pbkdf2->iterations < 1000) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (pbkdf2->ulSaltSourceDataLen < 16) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (*(pbkdf2->ulPasswordLen) < SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/freebl/Makefile
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/Makefile.ppc_no_init 2024-06-03 14:12:24.216755903 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/Makefile 2024-06-03 14:11:36.464234903 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ endif
|
|
||||||
ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
|
|
||||||
EXTRA_SRCS += gcm-ppc.c
|
|
||||||
ifdef USE_64
|
|
||||||
- DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
+# DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
PPC_ABI := $(shell $(CC) -dM -E - < /dev/null | awk '$$2 == "_CALL_ELF" {print $$3}')
|
|
||||||
ifeq ($(PPC_ABI),2)
|
|
||||||
ASFILES += sha512-p8.s
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/softoken/Makefile
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init 2024-06-03 14:12:44.664979003 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/Makefile 2024-06-03 14:10:26.703473806 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/config.mk
|
|
||||||
ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
endif
|
|
||||||
-ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
|
|
||||||
-ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
|
|
||||||
-ifdef USE_64
|
|
||||||
- DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
-endif # USE_64
|
|
||||||
-endif # ppc
|
|
||||||
-endif # Linux
|
|
||||||
+#ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
|
|
||||||
+#ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
|
|
||||||
+#ifdef USE_64
|
|
||||||
+# DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
+#endif # USE_64
|
|
||||||
+#endif # ppc
|
|
||||||
+#endif # Linux
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#######################################################################
|
|
||||||
32
SOURCES/nss-disable-dc.patch
Normal file
32
SOURCES/nss-disable-dc.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.orig ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
|
||||||
|
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.orig 2021-06-02 15:40:48.677355426 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn 2021-06-02 15:42:31.248977261 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
|
||||||
|
tls_filter.cc \
|
||||||
|
tls_protect.cc \
|
||||||
|
tls_psk_unittest.cc \
|
||||||
|
- tls_subcerts_unittest.cc \
|
||||||
|
tls_ech_unittest.cc \
|
||||||
|
$(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
|
||||||
|
$(NULL)
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.orig ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.orig 2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c 2021-06-02 15:40:48.676355420 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 wh
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS:
|
||||||
|
- ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials = val;
|
||||||
|
+ /* disable it for now */
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
case SSL_ENABLE_NPN:
|
||||||
|
@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRIn
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS:
|
||||||
|
- ssl_defaults.enableDelegatedCredentials = val;
|
||||||
|
+ /* disable it for now */
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
case SSL_ENABLE_NPN:
|
||||||
41
SOURCES/nss-disable-md5.patch
Normal file
41
SOURCES/nss-disable-md5.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -r 699541a7793b lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2021-04-16 14:43:41.668835607 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2021-04-16 14:43:50.585888411 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -324,11 +324,11 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
|
||||||
|
static const oidValDef hashOptList[] = {
|
||||||
|
/* Hashes */
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD2"), SEC_OID_MD2,
|
||||||
|
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||||
|
+ 0 },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD4"), SEC_OID_MD4,
|
||||||
|
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||||
|
+ 0 },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD5"), SEC_OID_MD5,
|
||||||
|
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||||
|
+ 0 },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("SHA1"), SEC_OID_SHA1,
|
||||||
|
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("SHA224"), SEC_OID_SHA224,
|
||||||
|
diff -r 699541a7793b lib/util/secoid.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/util/secoid.c Tue Jun 16 23:03:22 2020 +0000
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/util/secoid.c Thu Jun 25 14:33:09 2020 +0200
|
||||||
|
@@ -2042,6 +2042,19 @@
|
||||||
|
int i;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for (i = 1; i < SEC_OID_TOTAL; i++) {
|
||||||
|
+ switch (i) {
|
||||||
|
+ case SEC_OID_MD2:
|
||||||
|
+ case SEC_OID_MD4:
|
||||||
|
+ case SEC_OID_MD5:
|
||||||
|
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
||||||
|
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
||||||
|
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
||||||
|
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD2_AND_DES_CBC:
|
||||||
|
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC:
|
||||||
|
+ continue;
|
||||||
|
+ default:
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
if (oids[i].desc && strstr(arg, oids[i].desc)) {
|
||||||
|
xOids[i].notPolicyFlags = notEnable |
|
||||||
|
(xOids[i].notPolicyFlags & ~(DEF_FLAGS));
|
||||||
189
SPECS/nss.spec
189
SPECS/nss.spec
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||||||
%global nspr_build_version 4.35.0-1
|
%global nspr_build_version 4.34.0-3
|
||||||
%global nspr_release -1
|
%global nspr_release -3
|
||||||
%global nspr_version 4.35.0
|
%global nspr_version 4.34.0
|
||||||
%global nss_version 3.101.0
|
%global nss_version 3.79.0
|
||||||
%global unsupported_tools_directory %{_libdir}/nss/unsupported-tools
|
%global unsupported_tools_directory %{_libdir}/nss/unsupported-tools
|
||||||
%global saved_files_dir %{_libdir}/nss/saved
|
%global saved_files_dir %{_libdir}/nss/saved
|
||||||
%global dracutlibdir %{_prefix}/lib/dracut
|
%global dracutlibdir %{_prefix}/lib/dracut
|
||||||
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
|
|||||||
Summary: Network Security Services
|
Summary: Network Security Services
|
||||||
Name: nss
|
Name: nss
|
||||||
Version: %{nss_version}
|
Version: %{nss_version}
|
||||||
Release: 7%{?dist}
|
Release: 10%{?dist}
|
||||||
License: MPLv2.0
|
License: MPLv2.0
|
||||||
URL: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
|
URL: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
|
||||||
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
|
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
|
||||||
@ -109,11 +109,6 @@ Source25: key3.db.xml
|
|||||||
Source26: key4.db.xml
|
Source26: key4.db.xml
|
||||||
Source27: secmod.db.xml
|
Source27: secmod.db.xml
|
||||||
Source28: nss-p11-kit.config
|
Source28: nss-p11-kit.config
|
||||||
# fips algorithms are tied to the red hat validation, others
|
|
||||||
# will have their own validation
|
|
||||||
Source30: fips_algorithms.h
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#Source50: NameConstraints_Certs.tar
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# To inject hardening flags for DSO
|
# To inject hardening flags for DSO
|
||||||
Patch1: nss-dso-ldflags.patch
|
Patch1: nss-dso-ldflags.patch
|
||||||
@ -129,82 +124,49 @@ Patch1: nss-dso-ldflags.patch
|
|||||||
# Once the buildroot aha been bootstrapped the patch may be removed
|
# Once the buildroot aha been bootstrapped the patch may be removed
|
||||||
# but it doesn't hurt to keep it.
|
# but it doesn't hurt to keep it.
|
||||||
Patch4: iquote.patch
|
Patch4: iquote.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#
|
|
||||||
# RHEL-8 specific patches not in RHEL-9
|
|
||||||
#
|
|
||||||
# To revert the change in:
|
# To revert the change in:
|
||||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=818686
|
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=818686
|
||||||
Patch10: nss-sysinit-userdb.patch
|
Patch9: nss-sysinit-userdb.patch
|
||||||
# Disable nss-sysinit test which is solely to test the above change
|
# Disable nss-sysinit test which is solely to test the above change
|
||||||
Patch11: nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch
|
Patch10: nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# For compatibility reasons, we stick with the old PKCS #11 2.40
|
# For compatibility reasons, we stick with the old PKCS #11 2.40
|
||||||
# definition of CK_GCM_PARAMS:
|
# definition of CK_GCM_PARAMS:
|
||||||
%if 0%{?fedora} < 34
|
%if 0%{?fedora} < 34
|
||||||
%if 0%{?rhel} < 9
|
%if 0%{?rhel} < 9
|
||||||
Patch12: nss-gcm-param-default-pkcs11v2.patch
|
Patch20: nss-gcm-param-default-pkcs11v2.patch
|
||||||
%endif
|
%endif
|
||||||
%endif
|
%endif
|
||||||
# Local patch for TLS_ECDHE_{ECDSA|RSA}_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphers
|
|
||||||
Patch13: rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch
|
|
||||||
# Local patch: ignore rsa, rsa-pss, ecdsa policies until crypto-policies
|
|
||||||
# is updated.
|
|
||||||
Patch14: nss-3.101-disable-signature-policies.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch15: nss-3.101-el8-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch
|
|
||||||
# Local patch: disable tests that require external reference so brew completes
|
|
||||||
Patch16: nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch
|
|
||||||
# Local patch: restore old pkcs 12 defaults on old version of rhel
|
|
||||||
Patch17: nss-3.101-el8-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
|
|
||||||
# Local Patch: restore expired distrusted certs for now
|
|
||||||
Patch18: nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch
|
|
||||||
# Local Patch: update fipsdefaults to AES
|
|
||||||
Patch19: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch
|
|
||||||
# Local Patch: curve25519 keys can't be stored in dbm databases,
|
|
||||||
# only rhel-8 has dbm databases left, don't try to store
|
|
||||||
# curve25519 keys in the dbm database.
|
|
||||||
Patch20: nss-3.101-ec-dbm-test.patch
|
|
||||||
# end of RHEL-8 specific patches
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# RHEL-specific shared with RHEL-9
|
|
||||||
Patch30: nss-3.101-extend-db-dump-time.patch
|
|
||||||
# Local patch: disable MD5 (also MD2 and MD4) completely
|
# Local patch: disable MD5 (also MD2 and MD4) completely
|
||||||
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1849938
|
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1849938
|
||||||
Patch32: nss-3.101-disable-md5.patch
|
Patch25: nss-disable-md5.patch
|
||||||
Patch34: nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
|
# Local patch for TLS_ECDHE_{ECDSA|RSA}_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphers
|
||||||
Patch35: nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
|
Patch30: rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch
|
||||||
Patch36: nss-3.101-disable-ech.patch
|
# Local patch: disable Delegated Credentials
|
||||||
|
Patch35: nss-disable-dc.patch
|
||||||
# patches that expect to be upstreamed
|
# Local patch: ignore rsa, rsa-pss, ecdsa policies until crypto-policies
|
||||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1767883
|
# is updated.
|
||||||
Patch50: nss-3.79-fips.patch
|
Patch40: nss-3.66-disable-signature-policies.patch
|
||||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836781
|
# Local patch: disable tests that require external reference so brew completes
|
||||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836925
|
Patch45: nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch
|
||||||
Patch51: nss-3.101-fips-review.patches
|
# Local patch: restore old pkcs 12 defaults on old version of rhel
|
||||||
Patch52: nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch
|
Patch50: nss-3.66-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
|
||||||
|
# Local Patch: restore expired distrusted certs for now
|
||||||
# ems policy. needs to upstream
|
Patch51: nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch
|
||||||
Patch60: nss-3.101-add-ems-policy.patch
|
# Local Patch: update fipsdefaults to AES
|
||||||
Patch70: nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch
|
Patch52: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch
|
||||||
Patch71: nss-3.101-fips-indicators.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch72: nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch73: nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch74: nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch75: nss-3.90-ppc_no_init.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch76: nss-3.101-enable-kyber-policy.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch78: nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch80: nss-3.101-el8-no-p12-smime-policy.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch81: nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch
|
|
||||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1905691
|
|
||||||
Patch82: nss-3.101-chacha-timing-fix.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch83: nss-3.101-add-certificate-compression-test.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch84: nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-pbkdf1-encoding.patch
|
|
||||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=676100
|
|
||||||
Patch85: nss-3.101-fix-cms-abi-break.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch86: nss-3.101-long-pwd-fix.patch
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#revert patches
|
|
||||||
Patch300: nss-3.101-default-libpkix.patch
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1774659
|
||||||
|
Patch60: nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch61: nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch
|
||||||
|
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1774654
|
||||||
|
Patch63: nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch
|
||||||
|
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1767883
|
||||||
|
Patch64: nss-3.79-rhel-8-fips-signature-policy.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch65: nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch66: nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch67: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch68: nss-3.79-fips.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%description
|
%description
|
||||||
Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
|
Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
|
||||||
@ -334,20 +296,9 @@ Header and library files for doing development with Network Security Services.
|
|||||||
%prep
|
%prep
|
||||||
%autosetup -N -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version}
|
%autosetup -N -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version}
|
||||||
pushd nss
|
pushd nss
|
||||||
%autopatch -M 299 -p1
|
%autopatch -p1
|
||||||
%patch -P 300 -p1 -R
|
|
||||||
popd
|
popd
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# copy the fips_algorithms.h for this release
|
|
||||||
# this file is release specific and matches what
|
|
||||||
# each vendors claim in their own FIPS certification
|
|
||||||
cp %{SOURCE30} nss/lib/softoken/
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#update expired test certs
|
|
||||||
#pushd nss
|
|
||||||
#tar xvf %{SOURCE50}
|
|
||||||
#popd
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247353
|
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247353
|
||||||
find nss/lib/libpkix -perm /u+x -type f -exec chmod -x {} \;
|
find nss/lib/libpkix -perm /u+x -type f -exec chmod -x {} \;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -547,10 +498,6 @@ export USE_64=1
|
|||||||
# disabled by the system policy.
|
# disabled by the system policy.
|
||||||
export NSS_IGNORE_SYSTEM_POLICY=1
|
export NSS_IGNORE_SYSTEM_POLICY=1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%ifarch i686 ppcle64
|
|
||||||
export NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME=10
|
|
||||||
%endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# enable the following line to force a test failure
|
# enable the following line to force a test failure
|
||||||
# find ./nss -name \*.chk | xargs rm -f
|
# find ./nss -name \*.chk | xargs rm -f
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -904,13 +851,11 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
|||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/ciferfam.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/ciferfam.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/eccutil.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/eccutil.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/hasht.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/hasht.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/kyber.h
|
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssb64.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssb64.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssb64t.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssb64t.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nsshash.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/nsslocks.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssilock.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssilock.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssilckt.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssilckt.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nsslocks.h
|
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssrwlk.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssrwlk.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssrwlkt.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssrwlkt.h
|
||||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssutil.h
|
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssutil.h
|
||||||
@ -999,63 +944,7 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%changelog
|
%changelog
|
||||||
* Wed Sep 4 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-7
|
* Thu Aug 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-11
|
||||||
- fix cms abi breakage
|
|
||||||
- fix long password issue on pbmac encodings
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Thu Aug 1 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-6
|
|
||||||
- fix param encoding in pkcs12 pbamac encoding
|
|
||||||
- add support for certificate compression in selfserv and tstclient
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Wed Jul 24 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-3
|
|
||||||
- Fix missing and inaccurate key length checks
|
|
||||||
- Fix chacha timing issue
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Wed Jul 17 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-2
|
|
||||||
- Fix MD-5 decode issue in pkcs #12
|
|
||||||
- turn off policy processing for pkcs12 and smime
|
|
||||||
- update the restore defaults for pkcs12
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Tue Jun 18 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-1
|
|
||||||
- Rebase to NSS 3.101
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Wed Apr 10 2024 Frantisek Krenzelok <krenzelok.frantisek@gmail.com> - 3.90.0-7
|
|
||||||
- Allow for shorter ecdsa signatures by padding them to full length
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Tue Jan 23 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-6
|
|
||||||
- Fix ecc DER wrapping.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Wed Jan 17 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-5
|
|
||||||
- Pick up validated constant time implementations of p256, p384, and p521
|
|
||||||
from upsream
|
|
||||||
- More Fips indicator changes
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Wed Dec 6 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-4
|
|
||||||
- FIPS review changes
|
|
||||||
- add PORT_SafeZero to avoid compiler optimizing a way zeroing memory.
|
|
||||||
- update the indicators for this release
|
|
||||||
- allow hashing of longer than int32 values in a single PKCS #11 call.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Tue Nov 21 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-3.1
|
|
||||||
- Fix expired certs in tests
|
|
||||||
- Fix CVE-2023-5388
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Thu Aug 3 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-3
|
|
||||||
- add indicators for pbkdf2
|
|
||||||
- add camellia to pkcs12 doc files
|
|
||||||
- fix ems policy bug
|
|
||||||
- disable ech
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Thu Jul 27 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-2
|
|
||||||
- fix the change log
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Thu Jul 27 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-1
|
|
||||||
- rebase to NSS 3.90
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Wed Mar 8 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-11
|
|
||||||
- Fix CVE-2023-0767
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Thu Aug 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-10
|
|
||||||
- Fix QA found failures:
|
- Fix QA found failures:
|
||||||
- remove extra '+' from sslpolicy.txt file causing test error values
|
- remove extra '+' from sslpolicy.txt file causing test error values
|
||||||
- only use GRND_RANDOM if the kernel is in FIPS mode.
|
- only use GRND_RANDOM if the kernel is in FIPS mode.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user