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import nss-3.79.0-10.el8_6

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This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2022-09-27 07:08:13 -04:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent fed896e694
commit da17e9a459
24 changed files with 6050 additions and 1186 deletions
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3
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
SOURCES/PayPalEE.cert
SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
SOURCES/blank-key3.db
SOURCES/blank-key4.db
SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
SOURCES/nss-3.67.tar.gz
SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz

3
.nss.metadata
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@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
bc5c03643bfa1a5ea8519b8e7e2d7d5e30abea30 SOURCES/PayPalEE.cert
d272a7b58364862613d44261c5744f7a336bf177 SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
7f78b5bcecdb5005e7b803604b2ec9d1a9df2fb5 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
9cccf98f0476905c0d863a6b2cb08a1955482241 SOURCES/nss-3.67.tar.gz
3719dd97c8ec9cb04aa61e6aca41b129b4adc004 SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz

39
SOURCES/nss-3.44-kbkdf-coverity.patch
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@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c.coverity ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c
--- ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c.coverity 2019-12-03 15:33:43.047732312 -0800
+++ ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c 2019-12-03 15:39:40.982578357 -0800
@@ -534,6 +534,10 @@ CK_RV kbkdf_CreateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE
PR_ASSERT(derived_key != NULL);
PR_ASSERT(derived_key->phKey != NULL);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
/* Create the new key object for this additional derived key. */
key = sftk_NewObject(slot);
if (key == NULL) {
@@ -589,7 +593,9 @@ done:
sftk_FreeObject(key);
/* Doesn't do anything. */
- sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (session) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ }
return ret;
}
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c.coverity ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c.coverity 2019-12-03 15:40:06.108848341 -0800
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c 2019-12-03 15:41:04.919480267 -0800
@@ -232,7 +232,9 @@ sftk_MAC_Init(sftk_MACCtx *ctx, CK_MECHA
keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS);
done:
- sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+ if (keyval) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+ }
return ret;
}

24
SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-measure-fix.patch
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@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./coreconf/config.gypi.orig ./coreconf/config.gypi
--- ./coreconf/config.gypi.orig 2020-06-16 15:50:59.000000000 -0700
+++ ./coreconf/config.gypi 2020-10-15 16:05:37.542761192 -0700
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@
'_DEFAULT_SOURCE', # for <endian.h> functions, strdup, realpath, and getentropy
'_BSD_SOURCE', # for the above in glibc <= 2.19
'_POSIX_SOURCE', # for <signal.h>
- 'SQL_MEASURE_USE_TEMP_DIR', # use tmpdir for the access calls
+ 'SDB_MEASURE_USE_TEMP_DIR', # use tmpdir for the access calls
],
}],
[ 'OS=="dragonfly" or OS=="freebsd"', {
diff -up ./coreconf/Linux.mk.orig ./coreconf/Linux.mk
--- ./coreconf/Linux.mk.orig 2020-10-15 16:05:04.794591674 -0700
+++ ./coreconf/Linux.mk 2020-10-15 16:05:37.543761197 -0700
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ifeq ($(USE_PTHREADS),1)
endif
DEFAULT_COMPILER = gcc
-DEFINES += -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DSQL_MEASURE_USE_TEMP_DIR
+DEFINES += -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DSDB_MEASURE_USE_TEMP_DIR
ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Android)
ifndef ANDROID_NDK

16
SOURCES/nss-3.66-fix-gtest-parsing.patch
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@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./tests/common/parsegtestreport.sed.new_gtest ./tests/common/parsegtestreport.sed
--- ./tests/common/parsegtestreport.sed.new_gtest 2021-06-17 16:26:49.361035662 -0700
+++ ./tests/common/parsegtestreport.sed 2021-06-17 16:49:08.512261136 -0700
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
/\<testcase/{
- s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" value_param="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" time="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\)".*$/\3 '\4: \1 \2'/
+ s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" value_param="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" time="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\).*$/\3 '\4: \1 \2'/
t end
s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" time="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\)".*$/\2 '\3: \1'/
t end
+ s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" value_param="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" result="[^"]*" time="[^"]*" timestamp="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\)".*$/\3 '\4: \1 \2'/
+ t end
+ s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" result="[^"]*" time="[^"]*" timestamp="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\)".*$/\2 '\3: \1'/
}
d
: end

86
SOURCES/nss-3.66-no-small-primes.patch
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@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./gtests/softoken_gtest/softoken_dh_vectors.h.orig ./gtests/softoken_gtest/softoken_dh_vectors.h
--- ./gtests/softoken_gtest/softoken_dh_vectors.h.orig 2021-06-02 16:57:50.557008790 -0700
+++ ./gtests/softoken_gtest/softoken_dh_vectors.h 2021-06-02 16:59:52.781735096 -0700
@@ -2872,7 +2872,7 @@ static const DhTestVector DH_TEST_VECTOR
{siBuffer, (unsigned char *)g2, sizeof(g2)},
{siBuffer, NULL, 0},
{siBuffer, NULL, 0},
- IKE_APPROVED,
+ SAFE_PRIME,
CLASS_1536},
{"IKE 2048",
{siBuffer, (unsigned char *)prime_ike_2048, sizeof(prime_ike_2048)},
@@ -2952,7 +2952,7 @@ static const DhTestVector DH_TEST_VECTOR
{siBuffer, (unsigned char *)sub2_prime_ike_1536,
sizeof(sub2_prime_ike_1536)},
{siBuffer, NULL, 0},
- IKE_APPROVED,
+ SAFE_PRIME,
CLASS_1536},
{"IKE 2048 with subprime",
{siBuffer, (unsigned char *)prime_ike_2048, sizeof(prime_ike_2048)},
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.orig ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.orig 2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2021-06-02 16:52:01.196932757 -0700
@@ -5193,7 +5193,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
/* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
* This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
* that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
- subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime);
+ subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime,isFIPS);
if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
goto done;
@@ -8351,7 +8351,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
/* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
* checks. */
- subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime);
+ subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime,isFIPS);
if (subPrime == NULL) {
SECItem dhSubPrime;
/* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.orig ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.orig 2021-06-02 16:52:01.196932757 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2021-06-02 16:52:54.281248207 -0700
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
/* dh verify functions */
/* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
* it's subprime value */
-const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime);
+const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
/* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
/* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.orig ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.orig 2021-06-02 16:54:23.387777705 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2021-06-02 16:54:51.012941866 -0700
@@ -2312,7 +2312,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
- dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime);
+ dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
}
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.orig ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.orig 2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c 2021-06-02 16:52:01.196932757 -0700
@@ -1171,11 +1171,15 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
*/
const SECItem *
-sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime)
+sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
{
/* use the length to decide which primes to check */
switch (dhPrime->len) {
case 1536 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
+ /* don't accept 1536 bit primes in FIPS mode */
+ if (isFIPS) {
+ break;
+ }
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
return &subprime_ike_1536;

325
SOURCES/nss-3.67-cve-2021-43527-test.patch
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@ -1,325 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt b/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIaZzCCCkWgAwIBAgIBATALBgcqhkjOOAQDBQAwMTEvMC0GA1UEAxMmZGVjb2Rl
+RUNvckRTQVNpZ25hdHVyZS10ZXN0Q2FzZS90YXZpc28wHhcNMjEwMTAxMDAwMDAw
+WhcNNDEwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZkZWNvZGVFQ29yRFNBU2lnbmF0
+dXJlLXRlc3RDYXNlL3RhdmlzbzCCCaYwggkaBgcqhkjOOAQBMIIJDQKBgQCqqqqq
+qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq
+qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq
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+7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u
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+7u7u7u7uAoIIAQD/////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////w==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt b/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIXODCCC/WgAwIBAgIBAjApBgkqhkiG9w0BAQowHKACMAChETAPBQAwCwYJYIZI
+AWUDBAIBogMCASAwNzEgMB4GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYRdGF2aXNvQGdvb2dsZS5jb20x
+EzARBgNVBAMTCmJ1ZzE3Mzc0NzAwHhcNMjAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNDAwMTAxMDAw
+MDAwWjA3MSAwHgYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhF0YXZpc29AZ29vZ2xlLmNvbTETMBEGA1UE
+AxMKYnVnMTczNzQ3MDCCCywwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggsZADCCCxQCggsLAMRE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERE
+RERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERQIDAQABMC4G
+CSqGSIb3DQEBCjAhoRowGAYJKoZIhvcNAQEIMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEBCqIDAgEgA4IL
+CwAAxVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVU=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/cert/cert.sh b/tests/cert/cert.sh
--- a/tests/cert/cert.sh
+++ b/tests/cert/cert.sh
@@ -114,16 +114,28 @@ certu()
cert_log "ERROR: ${CU_ACTION} failed $RET"
else
html_passed "${CU_ACTION}"
fi
return $RET
}
+cert_test_vfy()
+{
+ echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Verify large rsa pss signature --------------"
+ echo " vfychain -a Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt"
+ vfychain -a ${QADIR}/cert/Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt
+ html_msg $? 1 "Verify large dsa signature"
+ echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Verify large rsa pss signature --------------"
+ echo " vfychain -a Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt"
+ vfychain -a ${QADIR}/cert/Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt
+ html_msg $? 1 "Verify large rsa pss signature"
+}
+
################################ crlu #################################
# local shell function to call crlutil, also: writes action and options to
# stdout, sets variable RET and writes results to the html file results
########################################################################
crlu()
{
echo "$SCRIPTNAME: ${CU_ACTION} --------------------------"
@@ -2640,11 +2652,13 @@ if [ -z "$NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL" ] ; then
else
echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Skipping CRL Tests"
fi
if [ -n "$DO_DIST_ST" -a "$DO_DIST_ST" = "TRUE" ] ; then
cert_stresscerts
fi
+cert_test_vfy
+
cert_iopr_setup
cert_cleanup

279
SOURCES/nss-3.67-cve-2021-43527.patch
View File

@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c b/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
--- a/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
+++ b/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
@@ -164,6 +164,37 @@
PR_FALSE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
}
+static unsigned int
+checkedSignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
+{
+ unsigned int sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(pubk);
+ if (sigLen == 0) {
+ /* Error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */
+ return sigLen;
+ }
+ unsigned int maxSigLen;
+ switch (pubk->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ maxSigLen = (RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ maxSigLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ maxSigLen = 2 * MAX_ECKEY_LEN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (sigLen > maxSigLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return sigLen;
+}
+
/*
* decode the ECDSA or DSA signature from it's DER wrapping.
* The unwrapped/raw signature is placed in the buffer pointed
@@ -174,38 +205,38 @@
unsigned int len)
{
SECItem *dsasig = NULL; /* also used for ECDSA */
- SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
- if ((algid != SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE) &&
- (algid != SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY)) {
- if (sig->len != len) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
- return SECFailure;
+ /* Safety: Ensure algId is as expected and that signature size is within maxmimums */
+ if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE) {
+ if (len > DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN) {
+ goto loser;
}
-
- PORT_Memcpy(dsig, sig->data, sig->len);
- return SECSuccess;
+ } else if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+ if (len > MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ goto loser;
}
- if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) {
- if (len > MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
- return SECFailure;
- }
+ /* Decode and pad to length */
+ dsasig = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen((SECItem *)sig, len);
+ if (dsasig == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
}
- dsasig = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen((SECItem *)sig, len);
-
- if ((dsasig == NULL) || (dsasig->len != len)) {
- rv = SECFailure;
- } else {
- PORT_Memcpy(dsig, dsasig->data, dsasig->len);
+ if (dsasig->len != len) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE);
+ goto loser;
}
- if (dsasig != NULL)
- SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE);
- if (rv == SECFailure)
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
- return rv;
+ PORT_Memcpy(dsig, dsasig->data, len);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
+ return SECFailure;
}
const SEC_ASN1Template hashParameterTemplate[] =
@@ -281,7 +312,7 @@
sec_DecodeSigAlg(const SECKEYPublicKey *key, SECOidTag sigAlg,
const SECItem *param, SECOidTag *encalgp, SECOidTag *hashalg)
{
- int len;
+ unsigned int len;
PLArenaPool *arena;
SECStatus rv;
SECItem oid;
@@ -466,48 +497,52 @@
cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo = NULL;
rv = SECSuccess;
if (sig) {
- switch (type) {
- case rsaKey:
- rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg,
- &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
- &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
- cx->key,
- sig, wincx);
- break;
- case rsaPssKey:
- sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key);
- if (sigLen == 0) {
- /* error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */
- rv = SECFailure;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ if (type == rsaKey) {
+ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg,
+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
+ cx->key,
+ sig, wincx);
+ } else {
+ sigLen = checkedSignatureLen(key);
+ /* Check signature length is within limits */
+ if (sigLen == 0) {
+ /* error set by checkedSignatureLen */
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if (sigLen > sizeof(cx->u)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ switch (type) {
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ if (sig->len != sigLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(cx->u.buffer, sig->data, sigLen);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
break;
- }
- if (sig->len != sigLen) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ case ecKey:
+ case dsaKey:
+ /* decodeECorDSASignature will check sigLen == sig->len after padding */
+ rv = decodeECorDSASignature(encAlg, sig, cx->u.buffer, sigLen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unreachable */
rv = SECFailure;
- break;
- }
- PORT_Memcpy(cx->u.buffer, sig->data, sigLen);
- break;
- case dsaKey:
- case ecKey:
- sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key);
- if (sigLen == 0) {
- /* error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */
- rv = SECFailure;
- break;
- }
- rv = decodeECorDSASignature(encAlg, sig, cx->u.buffer, sigLen);
- break;
- default:
- rv = SECFailure;
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
- break;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
}
}
- if (rv)
- goto loser;
-
/* check hash alg again, RSA may have changed it.*/
if (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(cx->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
/* error set by HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag */
@@ -650,11 +685,16 @@
switch (cx->key->keyType) {
case ecKey:
case dsaKey:
- dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
- dsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key);
+ dsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key);
if (dsasig.len == 0) {
return SECFailure;
}
+ if (dsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
+
if (sig) {
rv = decodeECorDSASignature(cx->encAlg, sig, dsasig.data,
dsasig.len);
@@ -686,8 +726,13 @@
}
rsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
- rsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key);
+ rsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key);
if (rsasig.len == 0) {
+ /* Error set by checkedSignatureLen */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (rsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (sig) {
@@ -749,7 +794,6 @@
SECStatus rv;
VFYContext *cx;
SECItem dsasig; /* also used for ECDSA */
-
rv = SECFailure;
cx = vfy_CreateContext(key, sig, encAlg, hashAlg, NULL, wincx);
@@ -757,19 +801,25 @@
switch (key->keyType) {
case rsaKey:
rv = verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, digest);
+ /* Error (if any) set by verifyPKCS1DigestInfo */
break;
- case dsaKey:
case ecKey:
+ case dsaKey:
dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
- dsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key);
+ dsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key);
if (dsasig.len == 0) {
+ /* Error set by checkedSignatureLen */
+ rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
- if (PK11_Verify(cx->key, &dsasig, (SECItem *)digest, cx->wincx) !=
- SECSuccess) {
+ if (dsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- } else {
- rv = SECSuccess;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_Verify(cx->key, &dsasig, (SECItem *)digest, cx->wincx);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
}
break;
default:

45
SOURCES/nss-3.67-fix-coverity-issues.patch
View File

@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c.coverity ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c.coverity 2021-06-18 09:36:19.499203028 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c 2021-06-18 09:37:57.993765299 -0700
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM
* of the connection.*/
context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64) {
- if (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack) {
+ if (symKey && (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack)) {
context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE;
}
}
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11hpke.c.coverity ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11hpke.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11hpke.c.coverity 2021-06-18 13:40:05.410644464 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11hpke.c 2021-06-18 13:42:40.627606469 -0700
@@ -1164,8 +1164,6 @@ PK11_HPKE_Seal(HpkeContext *cx, const SE
unsigned char tagBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
size_t tagLen;
unsigned int fixedBits;
- PORT_Assert(cx->baseNonce->len == sizeof(ivOut));
- PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, cx->baseNonce->data, cx->baseNonce->len);
/* aad may be NULL, PT may be zero-length but not NULL. */
if (!cx || !cx->aeadContext ||
@@ -1176,6 +1174,9 @@ PK11_HPKE_Seal(HpkeContext *cx, const SE
return SECFailure;
}
+ PORT_Assert(cx->baseNonce->len == sizeof(ivOut));
+ PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, cx->baseNonce->data, cx->baseNonce->len);
+
tagLen = cx->aeadParams->tagLen;
maxOut = pt->len + tagLen;
fixedBits = (cx->baseNonce->len - 8) * 8;
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.coverity ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.coverity 2021-06-18 09:33:59.633405513 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c 2021-06-18 09:34:20.305523382 -0700
@@ -1411,7 +1411,6 @@ sftk_fips_IKE_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
(outKeySize != sizeof(ike_known_sha256_prf_plus)) ||
(PORT_Memcmp(outKeyData, ike_known_sha256_prf_plus,
sizeof(ike_known_sha256_prf_plus)) != 0)) {
- PORT_ZFree(outKeyData, outKeySize);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}

81
SOURCES/nss-3.67-fix-private-key-mac.patch
View File

@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c.orig ./lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c.orig 2021-06-10 05:33:12.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c 2021-07-01 14:04:34.068596942 -0700
@@ -287,9 +287,12 @@ sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(SFTKDBHandle *ha
}
/* If we are using aes 256, we need to check authentication as well.*/
- if ((type != CKT_INVALID_TYPE) && (cipherValue.alg == SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC)) {
+ if ((type != CKT_INVALID_TYPE) &&
+ (cipherValue.alg == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBES2) &&
+ (cipherValue.param->encAlg == SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC)) {
SECItem signature;
unsigned char signData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
+ CK_RV crv;
/* if we get here from the old legacy db, there is clearly an
* error, don't return the plaintext */
@@ -301,15 +304,28 @@ sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(SFTKDBHandle *ha
signature.data = signData;
signature.len = sizeof(signData);
- rv = sftkdb_GetAttributeSignature(handle, handle, id, type,
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ /* sign sftkdb_GetAttriibuteSignature returns a crv, not an rv */
+ crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeSignature(handle, handle, id, type,
&signature);
- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- goto loser;
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ rv = sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(handle, passKey, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
+ type, *plain, &signature);
}
- rv = sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(handle, passKey, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, type,
- *plain, &signature);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- goto loser;
+ /* handle a bug where old versions of NSS misfiled the signature
+ * attribute on password update */
+ id |= SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE|SFTK_TOKEN_TYPE;
+ signature.len = sizeof(signData);
+ crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeSignature(handle, handle, id, type,
+ &signature);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(handle, passKey, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
+ type, *plain, &signature);
}
}
@@ -1198,6 +1214,7 @@ sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena,
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < privAttrCount; i++) {
// Read the old attribute in the clear.
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE sdbId = id & SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
CK_ATTRIBUTE privAttr = { privAttrTypes[i], NULL, 0 };
CK_RV crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(keydb, id, &privAttr, 1);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
@@ -1222,7 +1239,7 @@ sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena,
plainText.data = privAttr.pValue;
plainText.len = privAttr.ulValueLen;
if (sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(arena, keydb, keydb->db, newKey,
- iterationCount, id, privAttr.type,
+ iterationCount, sdbId, privAttr.type,
&plainText, &result) != SECSuccess) {
return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
@@ -1232,10 +1249,9 @@ sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena,
PORT_Memset(plainText.data, 0, plainText.len);
// Write the newly encrypted attributes out directly.
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newId = id & SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
keydb->newKey = newKey;
keydb->newDefaultIterationCount = iterationCount;
- crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_SetAttributeValue)(keydb->db, newId, &privAttr, 1);
+ crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_SetAttributeValue)(keydb->db, sdbId, &privAttr, 1);
keydb->newKey = NULL;
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
return crv;

63
SOURCES/nss-3.67-fix-sdb-timeout.patch
View File

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sdb.c b/lib/softoken/sdb.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sdb.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sdb.c
@@ -1519,16 +1519,18 @@ sdb_Begin(SDB *sdb)
sqlerr = sqlite3_prepare_v2(sqlDB, BEGIN_CMD, -1, &stmt, NULL);
do {
sqlerr = sqlite3_step(stmt);
if (sqlerr == SQLITE_BUSY) {
PR_Sleep(SDB_BUSY_RETRY_TIME);
}
+ /* don't retry BEGIN transaction*/
+ retry = 0;
} while (!sdb_done(sqlerr, &retry));
if (stmt) {
sqlite3_reset(stmt);
sqlite3_finalize(stmt);
}
loser:
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
@@ -1521,17 +1521,17 @@ sftkdb_DestroyObject(SFTKDBHandle *handl
if (handle == NULL) {
return CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED;
}
db = SFTK_GET_SDB(handle);
objectID &= SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
crv = (*db->sdb_Begin)(db);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
- goto loser;
+ return crv;
}
crv = (*db->sdb_DestroyObject)(db, objectID);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
/* if the database supports meta data, delete any old signatures
* that we may have added */
if ((db->sdb_flags & SDB_HAS_META) == SDB_HAS_META) {
@@ -2456,17 +2456,17 @@ sftkdb_Update(SFTKDBHandle *handle, SECI
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* put the whole update under a transaction. This allows us to handle
* any possible race conditions between with the updateID check.
*/
crv = (*handle->db->sdb_Begin)(handle->db);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
- goto loser;
+ return crv;
}
inTransaction = PR_TRUE;
/* some one else has already updated this db */
if (sftkdb_hasUpdate(sftkdb_TypeString(handle),
handle->db, handle->updateID)) {
crv = CKR_OK;
goto done;

122
SOURCES/nss-3.67-fix-ssl-alerts.patch
View File

@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.alert-fix ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.alert-fix 2021-06-10 05:33:12.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2021-07-06 17:08:25.894018521 -0700
@@ -4319,7 +4319,11 @@ ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(SSLSignatureSch
if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(scheme)) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
- if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(scheme, spkiOid)) {
+ /* if we are purposefully passed SEC_OID_UNKOWN, it means
+ * we not checking the scheme against a potential key, so skip
+ * the call */
+ if ((spkiOid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) &&
+ !ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(scheme, spkiOid)) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (isTls13) {
@@ -4517,7 +4521,8 @@ ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(sslS
}
/* Verify that the signature scheme matches the signing key. */
- if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13)) {
+ if ((spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) ||
+ !ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
@@ -4533,6 +4538,7 @@ ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(sslS
PRBool
ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
{
+ PRBool isSupported = PR_FALSE;
switch (scheme) {
case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
@@ -4552,7 +4558,8 @@ ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignat
case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
- return PR_TRUE;
+ isSupported = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
case ssl_sig_none:
@@ -4560,7 +4567,19 @@ ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignat
case ssl_sig_ed448:
return PR_FALSE;
}
- return PR_FALSE;
+ if (isSupported) {
+ SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme));
+ PRUint32 policy;
+ const PRUint32 sigSchemePolicy=
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX|NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE;
+ /* check hash policy */
+ if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) &&
+ ((policy & sigSchemePolicy) != sigSchemePolicy)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* check algorithm policy */
+ }
+ return isSupported;
}
PRBool
@@ -6533,6 +6552,9 @@ ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss,
}
spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm);
+ if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
/* Now we have to search based on the key type. Go through our preferred
* schemes in order and find the first that can be used. */
@@ -6547,6 +6569,7 @@ ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss,
}
}
+loser:
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
@@ -7700,7 +7723,8 @@ ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocke
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
- if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) {
+ if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
+ (PRBool)ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {;
schemes[numSupported++] = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp;
}
}
@@ -10286,7 +10310,12 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record);
rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ /* unsupported == illegal_parameter, others == handshake_failure. */
+ if (errCode == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ }
+ goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(
ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo);
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc.alert-fix ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc.alert-fix 2021-07-07 11:32:11.634376932 -0700
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc 2021-07-07 11:33:30.595841110 -0700
@@ -428,7 +428,10 @@ TEST_P(TlsExtensionTest12Plus, Signature
}
TEST_P(TlsExtensionTest12Plus, SignatureAlgorithmsTrailingData) {
- const uint8_t val[] = {0x00, 0x02, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00}; // sha-256, rsa
+ // make sure the test uses an algorithm that is legal for
+ // tls 1.3 (or tls 1.3 will through and illegalParameter
+ // instead of a decode error)
+ const uint8_t val[] = {0x00, 0x02, 0x08, 0x09, 0x00}; // sha-256, rsa-pss-pss
DataBuffer extension(val, sizeof(val));
ClientHelloErrorTest(std::make_shared<TlsExtensionReplacer>(
client_, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, extension));

3411
SOURCES/nss-3.79-dbtool.patch Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

170
SOURCES/nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
diff --git a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
--- a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
@@ -4272,16 +4272,17 @@ CreateTrust(void)
{
NSSLOWCERTTrust *trust = NULL;
nsslowcert_LockFreeList();
trust = trustListHead;
if (trust) {
trustListCount--;
trustListHead = trust->next;
+ trust->next = NULL;
}
PORT_Assert(trustListCount >= 0);
nsslowcert_UnlockFreeList();
if (trust) {
return trust;
}
return PORT_ZNew(NSSLOWCERTTrust);
@@ -5155,19 +5156,21 @@ done:
}
PRBool
nsslowcert_hasTrust(NSSLOWCERTCertTrust *trust)
{
if (trust == NULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
- return !((trust->sslFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
- (trust->emailFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
- (trust->objectSigningFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN));
+ /* if we only have CERTDB__USER and CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN bits, then
+ * we don't have a trust record. */
+ return !(((trust->sslFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
+ ((trust->emailFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
+ ((trust->objectSigningFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0));
}
/*
* This function has the logic that decides if another person's cert and
* email profile from an S/MIME message should be saved. It can deal with
* the case when there is no profile.
*/
static SECStatus
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
@@ -119,47 +119,79 @@ sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(CK_ATTRI
case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
case CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS:
return PR_TRUE;
default:
break;
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
-
/*
* convert a native ULONG to a database ulong. Database ulong's
* are all 4 byte big endian values.
*/
void
sftk_ULong2SDBULong(unsigned char *data, CK_ULONG value)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
data[i] = (value >> (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP) & 0xff;
}
}
/*
* convert a database ulong back to a native ULONG. (reverse of the above
- * function.
+ * function).
*/
static CK_ULONG
sftk_SDBULong2ULong(unsigned char *data)
{
int i;
CK_ULONG value = 0;
for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
value |= (((CK_ULONG)data[i]) << (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP);
}
return value;
}
+/* certain trust records are default values, which are the values
+ * returned if the signature check fails anyway.
+ * In those cases, we can skip the signature check. */
+PRBool
+sftkdb_isNullTrust(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template)
+{
+ switch (template->type) {
+ case CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH:
+ case CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH:
+ case CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION:
+ case CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING:
+ if (template->ulValueLen != SDB_ULONG_SIZE) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (sftk_SDBULong2ULong(template->pValue) ==
+ CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
+ if (template->ulValueLen != 1) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (*((unsigned char *)(template->pValue)) == 0) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
/*
* fix up the input templates. Our fixed up ints are stored in data and must
* be freed by the caller. The new template must also be freed. If there are no
* CK_ULONG attributes, the orignal template is passed in as is.
*/
static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
sftkdb_fixupTemplateIn(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template, int count,
unsigned char **dataOut, int *dataOutSize)
@@ -410,17 +442,18 @@ sftkdb_fixupTemplateOut(CK_ATTRIBUTE *te
}
/* copy the plain text back into the template */
PORT_Memcpy(template[i].pValue, plainText->data, plainText->len);
template[i].ulValueLen = plainText->len;
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(plainText, PR_TRUE);
}
/* make sure signed attributes are valid */
- if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)) {
+ if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)
+ && !sftkdb_isNullTrust(&ntemplate[i])) {
SECStatus rv;
CK_RV local_crv;
SECItem signText;
SECItem plainText;
unsigned char signData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
signText.data = signData;
signText.len = sizeof(signData);
@@ -2387,16 +2420,18 @@ sftkdb_mergeObject(SFTKDBHandle *handle,
crv = (*source->sdb_GetAttributeValue)(source, id,
ptemplate, max_attributes);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
objectType = sftkdb_getULongFromTemplate(CKA_CLASS, ptemplate,
max_attributes);
+/*printf(" - merging object Type 0x%08lx id=0x%08lx updateID=%s\n", objectType, id,
+ handle->updateID?handle->updateID: "<NULL>");*/
/*
* Update Object updates the object template if necessary then returns
* whether or not we need to actually write the object out to our target
* database.
*/
if (!handle->updateID) {
crv = sftkdb_CreateObject(arena, handle, target, &newID,

522
SOURCES/nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,522 @@
diff --git a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
--- a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
+++ b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
@@ -3870,17 +3870,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
rv = blapi_selftest(modesToTest, numModesToTest, inoff, outoff,
encrypt, decrypt);
PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
return rv == SECSuccess ? 0 : 1;
}
/* Do FIPS self-test */
if (bltest.commands[cmd_FIPS].activated) {
- CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
+ CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE);
fprintf(stdout, "CK_RV: %ld.\n", ckrv);
PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
if (ckrv == CKR_OK)
return SECSuccess;
return SECFailure;
}
/*
diff --git a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
--- a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
+++ b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
@@ -318,23 +318,25 @@ static PRBool verbose = PR_FALSE;
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
CK_C_GetFunctionList pC_GetFunctionList;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgs;
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgsRerun; /* rerun selftests */
CK_SLOT_ID *pSlotList = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
CK_ULONG slotID = 0; /* slotID == 0 for FIPSMODE */
CK_UTF8CHAR *pwd = NULL;
CK_ULONG pwdLen = 0;
char *moduleSpec = NULL;
+ char *moduleSpecRerun = NULL;
char *configDir = NULL;
char *dbPrefix = NULL;
char *disableUnload = NULL;
PRBool doForkTests = PR_TRUE;
PLOptStatus os;
PLOptState *opt = PL_CreateOptState(argc, argv, "nvhf:Fd:p:");
while (PL_OPT_EOL != (os = PL_GetNextOpt(opt))) {
@@ -458,18 +460,23 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
initArgs.CreateMutex = NULL;
initArgs.DestroyMutex = NULL;
initArgs.LockMutex = NULL;
initArgs.UnlockMutex = NULL;
initArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
moduleSpec = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
"keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags= ",
configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
+ moduleSpecRerun = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
+ "keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags=forcePOST ",
+ configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
initArgs.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpec;
initArgs.pReserved = NULL;
+ initArgsRerun = initArgs;
+ initArgsRerun.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpecRerun;
/*DebugBreak();*/
/* FIPSMODE invokes FC_Initialize as pFunctionList->C_Initialize */
/* NSS cryptographic module library initialization for the FIPS */
/* Approved mode when FC_Initialize is envoked will perfom */
/* software integrity test, and power-up self-tests before */
/* FC_Initialize returns */
crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
@@ -705,17 +712,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
PKM_Error("PKM_HybridMode failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
goto cleanup;
}
if (doForkTests) {
/* testing one more C_Initialize / C_Finalize to exercise getpid()
* fork check code */
- crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
+ crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgsRerun);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
PKM_LogIt("C_Initialize succeeded\n");
} else {
PKM_Error("C_Initialize failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
goto cleanup;
}
crv = pFunctionList->C_Finalize(NULL);
@@ -741,16 +748,19 @@ cleanup:
free(configDir);
}
if (dbPrefix) {
free(dbPrefix);
}
if (moduleSpec) {
PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpec);
}
+ if (moduleSpecRerun) {
+ PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpecRerun);
+ }
#ifdef _WIN32
FreeLibrary(hModule);
#else
disableUnload = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_UNLOAD");
if (!disableUnload) {
PR_UnloadLibrary(lib);
}
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapii.h b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
--- a/lib/freebl/blapii.h
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ typedef SECStatus (*freeblAeadFunc)(void
void *params, unsigned int paramsLen,
const unsigned char *aad, unsigned int aadLen,
unsigned int blocksize);
typedef void (*freeblDestroyFunc)(void *cx, PRBool freeit);
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
-SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly);
+SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly, PRBool rerun);
PRBool BL_POSTRan(PRBool freeblOnly);
#endif
#if defined(XP_UNIX) && !defined(NO_FORK_CHECK)
extern PRBool bl_parentForkedAfterC_Initialize;
#define SKIP_AFTER_FORK(x) \
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapit.h b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
--- a/lib/freebl/blapit.h
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
@@ -223,16 +223,21 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
*
* If we arbitrarily set p = 10^-18 (1 chance in trillion trillion operation)
* we get GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS = -(-18)/.301 -1 = 59 (.301 = log10 2)
* GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS should be at least 59, call it a round 64. NOTE:
* the variable IV size for TLS is 64 bits, which explains why it's not safe
* to use a random value for the nonce in TLS. */
#define GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS 64
+/* flag to tell BLAPI_Verify* to rerun the post and integrity tests */
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG '\377' /* 0xff, 255 invalide code for UFT8/ASCII */
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING "\377" /* The above as a C string */
+
+
/***************************************************************************
** Opaque objects
*/
struct DESContextStr;
struct RC2ContextStr;
struct RC4ContextStr;
struct RC5ContextStr;
diff --git a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
--- a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
@@ -2211,29 +2211,37 @@ bl_startup_tests(void)
}
/*
* this is called from the freebl init entry points that controll access to
* all other freebl functions. This prevents freebl from operating if our
* power on selftest failed.
*/
SECStatus
-BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only)
+BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only, PRBool rerun)
{
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, freebl
* will always fail because of the test below
*/
if (!self_tests_freebl_ran) {
bl_startup_tests();
}
#endif
+ if (rerun) {
+ /* reset the flags */
+ self_tests_freebl_ran = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_freebl_success = PR_FALSE;
+ bl_startup_tests();
+ }
/* if the general self tests succeeded, we're done */
if (self_tests_success) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* standalone freebl can initialize */
if (freebl_only && self_tests_freebl_success) {
return SECSuccess;
}
diff --git a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
--- a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
@@ -55,17 +55,17 @@ NSSLOW_Init(void)
#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
(void)FREEBL_InitStubs();
#endif
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
/* make sure the FIPS product is installed if we are trying to
* go into FIPS mode */
if (nsslow_GetFIPSEnabled()) {
- if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
+ if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
post_failed = PR_TRUE;
return NULL;
}
}
#endif
post_failed = PR_FALSE;
diff --git a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
--- a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
@@ -282,52 +282,62 @@ readItem(PRFileDesc *fd, SECItem *item)
PORT_Free(item->data);
item->data = NULL;
item->len = 0;
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
-static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self);
+static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun);
static PRBool
-blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self)
+blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
{
PRBool result = PR_FALSE; /* if anything goes wrong,
* the signature does not verify */
/* find our shared library name */
char *shName = PR_GetLibraryFilePathname(name, addr);
if (!shName) {
goto loser;
}
- result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self);
+ result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self, rerun);
loser:
if (shName != NULL) {
PR_Free(shName);
}
return result;
}
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr)
{
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE);
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
+ if (name && *name == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
+ name++;
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE, rerun);
}
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
{
- return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE);
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
+ if (shName && *shName == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
+ shName++;
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE, rerun);
}
static PRBool
-blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self)
+blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
{
char *checkName = NULL;
PRFileDesc *checkFD = NULL;
PRFileDesc *shFD = NULL;
void *hashcx = NULL;
const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
SECItem signature = { 0, NULL, 0 };
SECItem hash;
@@ -346,17 +356,17 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
unsigned char hashBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
hash.data = hashBuf;
hash.len = sizeof(hashBuf);
/* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
* integrity checks to prevent any token going into FIPS mode. */
- if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)) {
+ if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE, rerun) != SECSuccess)) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (!shName) {
goto loser;
}
/* figure out the name of our check file */
@@ -536,17 +546,17 @@ BLAPI_VerifySelf(const char *name)
{
if (name == NULL) {
/*
* If name is NULL, freebl is statically linked into softoken.
* softoken will call BLAPI_SHVerify next to verify itself.
*/
return PR_TRUE;
}
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE);
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE);
}
#else /* NSS_FIPS_DISABLED */
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
{
return PR_FALSE;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
@@ -684,22 +684,25 @@ sftk_fips_HKDF_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
/*
* This function is called at dll load time, the code tha makes this
* happen is platform specific on defined above.
*/
-static void
-sftk_startup_tests(void)
+void sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PRBool rerun)
{
SECStatus rv;
- const char *libraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
-
+ /*const char *nlibraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
+ const char *rlibraryName = BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME; */
+ const char *libraryName = rerun ?
+ BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME :
+ SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
+
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_ran);
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_success);
sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_TRUE;
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE; /* just in case */
/* need to initiallize the oid library before the RSA tests */
rv = SECOID_Init();
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@@ -746,35 +749,46 @@ sftk_startup_tests(void)
rv = sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests();
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return;
}
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_TRUE;
}
+static void
+sftk_startup_tests(void)
+{
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_FALSE);
+}
+
/*
* this is called from nsc_Common_Initizialize entry points that gates access
* to * all other pkcs11 functions. This prevents softoken operation if our
* power on selftest failed.
*/
CK_RV
-sftk_FIPSEntryOK()
+sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun)
{
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, softken
* will always fail because of the test below
*/
if (!sftk_self_tests_ran) {
sftk_startup_tests();
}
#endif
+ if (rerun) {
+ sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
+ sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_TRUE);
+ }
if (!sftk_self_tests_success) {
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
return CKR_OK;
}
#else
#include "pkcs11t.h"
CK_RV
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
@@ -524,25 +524,32 @@ fc_log_init_error(CK_RV crv)
}
/* FC_Initialize initializes the PKCS #11 library. */
CK_RV
FC_Initialize(CK_VOID_PTR pReserved)
{
const char *envp;
CK_RV crv;
+ PRBool rerun;
if ((envp = PR_GetEnv("NSS_ENABLE_AUDIT")) != NULL) {
sftk_audit_enabled = (atoi(envp) == 1);
}
+ /* if we have the forcePOST flag on, rerun the integrity checks */
+ /* we need to know this before we fully parse the arguments in
+ * nsc_CommonInitialize, so read it now */
+ rerun = sftk_RawArgHasFlag("flags", "forcePost", pReserved);
+
/* At this point we should have already done post and integrity checks.
* if we haven't, it probably means the FIPS product has not been installed
- * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode */
- crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
+ * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode. This
+ * also forces the tests to be rerun if forcePOST is set. */
+ crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(rerun);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
fc_log_init_error(crv);
return crv;
}
sftk_ForkReset(pReserved, &crv);
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -869,16 +869,17 @@ extern CK_RV sftk_MechAllowsOperation(CK
* acquiring a reference to the keydb from the slot */
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *sftk_FindKeyByPublicKey(SFTKSlot *slot, SECItem *dbKey);
/*
* parameter parsing functions
*/
CK_RV sftk_parseParameters(char *param, sftk_parameters *parsed, PRBool isFIPS);
void sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params);
+PRBool sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved);
/*
* narrow objects
*/
SFTKSessionObject *sftk_narrowToSessionObject(SFTKObject *);
SFTKTokenObject *sftk_narrowToTokenObject(SFTKObject *);
/*
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
@@ -244,8 +244,21 @@ sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params)
FREE_CLEAR(params->configdir);
FREE_CLEAR(params->secmodName);
FREE_CLEAR(params->man);
FREE_CLEAR(params->libdes);
FREE_CLEAR(params->tokens);
FREE_CLEAR(params->updatedir);
FREE_CLEAR(params->updateID);
}
+
+PRBool
+sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved)
+{
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *init_args = (CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *)pReserved;
+
+ /* if we don't have any params, the flag isn't set */
+ if ((!init_args || !init_args->LibraryParameters)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag(entry, flag, (const char *)init_args->LibraryParameters);
+}
diff --git a/lib/softoken/softoken.h b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
--- a/lib/softoken/softoken.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
@@ -52,17 +52,17 @@ extern unsigned char *CBC_PadBuffer(PLAr
unsigned int inlen, unsigned int *outlen,
int blockSize);
/****************************************/
/*
** Power-Up selftests are required for FIPS.
*/
/* make sure Power-up selftests have been run. */
-extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(void);
+extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun);
/*
** make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
*/
unsigned long sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType);
/*
** FIPS 140-2 auditing

742
SOURCES/nss-3.79-fips.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,742 @@
diff --git a/lib/freebl/config.mk b/lib/freebl/config.mk
--- a/lib/freebl/config.mk
+++ b/lib/freebl/config.mk
@@ -85,9 +85,13 @@ EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \
$(NULL)
endif
endif
ifeq ($(OS_ARCH), Darwin)
EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += -dylib_file @executable_path/libplc4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplc4.dylib -dylib_file @executable_path/libplds4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplds4.dylib
endif
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
endif
+
+endif
diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
--- a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
@@ -20,53 +20,110 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
if (!numBytes) {
/* error is set */
return;
}
RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#include "prinit.h"
+
+static int rng_grndFlags= 0;
+static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
+
+static PRStatus
+rng_getKernelFips()
+{
+#ifdef LINUX
+ FILE *f;
+ char d;
+ size_t size;
+
+ f = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+
+ size = fread(&d, 1, 1, f);
+ fclose(f);
+ if (size != 1)
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ if (d != '1')
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ /* if the kernel is in FIPS mode, set the GRND_RANDOM flag */
+ rng_grndFlags = GRND_RANDOM;
+#endif /* LINUX */
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif
+
size_t
RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
{
+ size_t fileBytes = 0;
+ unsigned char *buffer = dest;
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
int fd;
int bytes;
- size_t fileBytes = 0;
- unsigned char *buffer = dest;
+#else
+ PR_CallOnce(&rng_KernelFips, rng_getKernelFips);
+#endif
#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (defined(LINUX) && defined(__GLIBC__) && ((__GLIBC__ > 2) || ((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))))
int result;
-
while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
size_t getBytes = maxLen - fileBytes;
if (getBytes > GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES) {
getBytes = GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES;
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+ /* FIP 140-3 requires full kernel reseeding for chained entropy sources
+ * so we need to use getrandom with GRND_RANDOM.
+ * getrandom returns -1 on failure, otherwise returns
+ * the number of bytes, which can be less than getBytes */
+ result = getrandom(buffer, getBytes, rng_grndFlags);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ fileBytes += result;
+ buffer += result;
+#else
+ /* get entropy returns 0 on success and always return
+ * getBytes on success */
result = getentropy(buffer, getBytes);
if (result == 0) { /* success */
fileBytes += getBytes;
buffer += getBytes;
} else {
break;
}
+#endif
}
if (fileBytes == maxLen) { /* success */
return maxLen;
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+ /* in FIPS 104-3 we don't fallback, just fail */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+ return 0;
+#else
/* If we failed with an error other than ENOSYS, it means the destination
* buffer is not writeable. We don't need to try writing to it again. */
if (errno != ENOSYS) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
+#endif /*!NSS_FIPS_140_3 */
+#endif /* platorm has getentropy */
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
/* ENOSYS means the kernel doesn't support getentropy()/getrandom().
* Reset the number of bytes to get and fall back to /dev/urandom. */
fileBytes = 0;
-#endif
fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
bytes = read(fd, buffer, maxLen - fileBytes);
if (bytes <= 0) {
@@ -76,9 +133,10 @@ RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
buffer += bytes;
}
(void)close(fd);
if (fileBytes != maxLen) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
return fileBytes;
+#endif
}
diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
--- a/lib/softoken/config.mk
+++ b/lib/softoken/config.mk
@@ -58,8 +58,12 @@ endif
ifdef NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
DEFINES += -DNSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
endif
ifdef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID=\"${NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID}\"
endif
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
+endif
+
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h b/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
--- a/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
@@ -49,33 +49,46 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[]
#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
* limits */
#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
-#define RSA_FB_STEP 1024
+#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
+
#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
#define EC_FB_STEP 1 /* key limits handled by special operation */
#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
#define AES_FB_STEP 64
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+
/* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- DSA Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
@@ -95,76 +108,73 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[]
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
/* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
/* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_MAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96, { 96, 96, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC, { 128, 128, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 128, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 128, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 192, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 192, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 256, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 256, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
- { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 8, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 224, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 128, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 192, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 256, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 8, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 8, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* sigh, is this algorithm really tested. ssl doesn't seem to have a
* way of turning the extension off */
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
- { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 8, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations ------------------- */
- { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
- { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations ------------------- */
- { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 1, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA224_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 224, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 256, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA384_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA512_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 512, 512, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone }
};
const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -1765,27 +1765,29 @@ SECStatus
sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
{
SECItem *result;
SECItem inKey;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter pbe_params;
unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
unsigned char keyLen = 64;
char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
- static const unsigned char saltData[] =
- { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
+ static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+ };
static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
- 0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
- 0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
- 0x28, 0x59, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x37,
- 0x18, 0x22, 0xc1, 0x92, 0xd0, 0xfa, 0x72, 0x90,
- 0x2c, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x16, 0xfa,
- 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x5f, 0x17, 0xb1,
- 0x22, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0x66,
- 0xc6, 0x14, 0xfe, 0x83, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0xc5
+ 0x73, 0x8c, 0xfa, 0x02, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x43, 0xe4,
+ 0x99, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0x7b,
+ 0xc4, 0xda, 0x22, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0xae, 0x23, 0x7a,
+ 0x21, 0x27, 0xbd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc4, 0xe6, 0xc5,
+ 0x33, 0x38, 0x35, 0xe0, 0x68, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x06,
+ 0xad, 0xaf, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x90,
+ 0x17, 0x97, 0x73, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x49, 0xd8,
+ 0x6f, 0x78, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x50, 0x20, 0x55, 0x33
};
sftk_PBELockInit();
inKey.data = (unsigned char *)inKeyData;
inKey.len = sizeof(TEST_KEY) - 1;
pbe_params.salt.data = (unsigned char *)saltData;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -4609,16 +4609,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
goto loser;
}
/* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
@@ -4812,16 +4813,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
+ * fips requirements */
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
*phKey = key->handle;
}
loser:
PORT_Memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
@@ -5780,16 +5784,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return crv;
}
+ /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
+ privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
+ publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return CKR_OK;
}
@@ -6990,16 +6997,17 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
}
/* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
if (params->bExtract) {
CK_BYTE *salt;
CK_ULONG saltLen;
HMACContext *hmac;
unsigned int bufLen;
+ SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
switch (params->ulSaltType) {
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
saltLen = hashLen;
salt = hashbuf;
memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
break;
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
@@ -7026,29 +7034,54 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
CK_MECHANISM mech;
mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
mech.pParameter = params;
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
}
+ saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* save the resulting salt */
salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
break;
default:
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
+ if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
+ PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
+ /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
+ * salt */
+ if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
+ if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
+ (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
+ (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!fipsOK) {
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
if (saltKey_att) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
}
if (saltKey) {
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
}
@@ -7076,16 +7109,40 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
* key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
*/
HMACContext *hmac;
CK_BYTE bi;
unsigned iterations;
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
+ if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
+ unsigned char *info=&params->pInfo[3];
+ /* only one case,
+ * 1) Expand only
+ * 2) with a key whose source was
+ * SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
+ * 3) source key length == rawHash->length
+ * 4) Info has tls or dtls
+ * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
+ * off the fips indicator */
+ if (params->bExtract ||
+ ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
+ (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
+ (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
+ (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
+ ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
+ (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
+
genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
iterations = genLen / hashLen;
if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
@@ -8434,16 +8491,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
/* calculate private value - oct */
rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
crv = CKR_OK;
} else
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
@@ -8564,16 +8622,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
}
PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
secret = keyData;
} else {
secret += (secretlen - keySize);
}
secretlen = keySize;
}
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
if (keyData) {
PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
}
break;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
*/
typedef enum {
SFTK_DestroyFailure,
SFTK_Destroyed,
SFTK_Busy
} SFTKFreeStatus;
/*
+ * Source of various objects
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
+} SFTKSource;
+
+/*
* attribute values of an object.
*/
struct SFTKAttributeStr {
SFTKAttribute *next;
SFTKAttribute *prev;
PRBool freeAttr;
PRBool freeData;
/*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
int refCount;
PZLock *refLock;
SFTKSlot *slot;
void *objectInfo;
SFTKFree infoFree;
PRBool isFIPS;
+ SFTKSource source;
};
struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
SFTKObject obj;
SECItem dbKey;
};
struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
@@ -1090,16 +1090,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
}
sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
object->handle = 0;
object->next = object->prev = NULL;
object->slot = slot;
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
object->refCount = 1;
sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
sessObject->session = NULL;
sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
if (!hasLocks)
@@ -1674,16 +1675,17 @@ fail:
CK_RV
sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
{
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
unsigned int i;
destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
+ destObject->source = srcObject->source;
if (src_so == NULL) {
return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
}
PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
attribute = src_so->head[i];
do {
@@ -2059,16 +2061,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
/* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
* doesn't exist */
crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
object->slot = slot;
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
object->objectInfo = NULL;
object->infoFree = NULL;
if (!hasLocks) {
object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
}
if (object->refLock == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
@@ -2225,16 +2228,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE
break;
case CKA_DERIVE:
flags = CKF_DERIVE;
break;
/* fake attribute to select digesting */
case CKA_DIGEST:
flags = CKF_DIGEST;
break;
+ /* fake attribute to select key gen */
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE;
+ break;
+ /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
+ break;
+ /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
break;
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
break;
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
@@ -2278,17 +2290,17 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
}
/* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
* FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
* in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
* the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
* in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
* the FIPS indicator code */
-static int
+static CK_ULONG
sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
{
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
CK_RV crv;
diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -58,16 +58,18 @@
/*
* NSS-defined certificate types
*
*/
#define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
#define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
#define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
/*
* NSS-defined object attributes
*
*/

23
SOURCES/nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
diff --git a/lib/ssl/authcert.c b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
--- a/lib/ssl/authcert.c
+++ b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
@@ -201,16 +201,19 @@ NSS_GetClientAuthData(void *arg,
/* otherwise look through the cache based on usage
* if chosenNickname is set, we ignore the expiration date */
if (certList == NULL) {
certList = CERT_FindUserCertsByUsage(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
certUsageSSLClient,
PR_FALSE, chosenNickName == NULL,
pw_arg);
+ if (certList == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
/* filter only the certs that meet the nickname requirements */
if (chosenNickName) {
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByNickname(certList, chosenNickName,
pw_arg);
} else {
int nnames = 0;
char **names = ssl_DistNamesToStrings(caNames, &nnames);
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByCANames(certList, nnames, names,

22
SOURCES/nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -565,17 +565,17 @@ struct KDFCacheItemStr {
int iterations;
int keyLen;
};
typedef struct KDFCacheItemStr KDFCacheItem;
/* Bug 1606992 - Cache the hash result for the common case that we're
* asked to repeatedly compute the key for the same password item,
* hash, iterations and salt. */
-#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 3
+#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 150
static struct {
PZLock *lock;
struct {
KDFCacheItem common;
int ivLen;
PRBool faulty3DES;
} cacheKDF1;
struct {

25
SOURCES/nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
--- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults 2022-07-20 13:40:24.152212683 -0700
+++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c 2022-07-20 13:42:40.031094190 -0700
@@ -1146,6 +1146,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
goto done;
}
+ if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
+ cipher = SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
+ certCipher = SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
+ }
+
if (pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].activated) {
char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].arg;
@@ -1160,9 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
- if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
- certCipher = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
- }
if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;

21
SOURCES/nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password 2022-07-20 14:15:45.081009438 -0700
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c 2022-07-20 14:19:40.856546963 -0700
@@ -968,15 +968,14 @@ sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(PLAre
if (zeroTerm) {
/* unicode adds two nulls at the end */
if (toUnicode) {
- if ((dest->len >= 2) &&
- (dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2])) {
+ if ((dest->len < 2) || dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2]) {
/* we've already allocated space for these new NULLs */
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 2 <= bufferSize);
dest->len += 2;
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = dest->data[dest->len - 2] = 0;
}
/* ascii/utf-8 adds just 1 */
- } else if ((dest->len >= 1) && dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
+ } else if (!dest->len || dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 1 <= bufferSize);
dest->len++;
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = 0;

335
SOURCES/nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
diff -up ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
--- ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt 2022-06-24 10:51:32.035207662 -0700
@@ -7668,6 +7668,187 @@ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
#
+# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
+#
+# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
+# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
+# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
+# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
+# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
+# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
+# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
+CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
+CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
+END
+CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
+END
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\002\004\017\377\377\377
+END
+CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
+\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
+\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
+\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
+\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
+\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
+\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
+\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
+\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
+\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
+\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
+\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
+\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
+\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
+\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
+\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
+\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
+\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
+\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
+\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
+\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
+\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
+\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
+\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
+\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
+\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
+\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
+\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
+\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
+\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
+\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
+\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
+\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
+\147\145\102\043\361\066\131\012\035\243\121\310\274\243\224\052
+\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
+\266\327\363\243\114\001\165\024\205\170\300\327\212\071\130\205
+\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
+\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
+\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
+\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
+\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
+\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
+\344\011\152\361\115\106\012\311\135\373\233\117\275\336\373\267
+\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
+\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
+\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
+\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
+\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
+\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
+\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
+\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
+\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
+\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
+\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
+\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
+\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
+\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
+\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
+\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
+\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
+\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
+\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
+\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
+\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
+\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
+\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
+\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
+\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
+\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
+\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
+\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
+\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
+\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
+\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
+\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
+\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
+\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
+\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
+\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
+\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
+\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
+\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
+\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
+\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
+\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
+\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
+\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
+\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
+\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
+\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
+\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
+\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
+\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
+\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
+\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
+\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
+\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
+\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
+\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
+\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
+\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
+\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
+\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
+\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
+\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
+\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
+END
+
+# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
+# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
+# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
+# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
+# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
+# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
+# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
+# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
+CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
+\222\341\102\102
+END
+CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
+END
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
+END
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\002\004\017\377\377\377
+END
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+
+#
# Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
#
# Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
@@ -8161,6 +8342,68 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
+# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
+# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
+# Not Before: Apr 7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
+# Not After : Apr 4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
+\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
+\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
+\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
+\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
+\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
+\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
+\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
+\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
+\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
+\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
+END
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\002\004\153\111\322\005
+END
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+
+# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
+# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
+# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
+# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
+# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
+\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
+\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
+\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
+\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
+\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
+\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
+\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
+\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
+\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
+\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
+END
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\002\004\153\111\322\006
+END
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+
#
# Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
#
@@ -8804,6 +9047,74 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
+# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
+# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
+# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
+# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
+# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
+# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
+# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
+\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
+\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
+\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
+\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
+\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
+\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
+\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
+\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
+\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
+\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
+END
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\002\002\010\047
+END
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+
+# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
+# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
+# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
+# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
+# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
+# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
+# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
+# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
+\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
+\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
+\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
+\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
+\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
+\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
+\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
+\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
+\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
+\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
+END
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+\002\002\010\144
+END
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+
#
# Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
#

685
SOURCES/nss-3.79-rhel-8-fips-signature-policy.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,685 @@
diff -up ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.sign_policy ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c
--- ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.023785628 -0700
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
#include "sechash.h"
#endif
-#define MAX_KEY_LEN 512
+#define MAX_KEY_LEN 1024
#define PATH_LEN 150
#define BUFF_SIZE 150
#define UID_BITS 800
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.sign_policy ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "secerr.h"
#include "sechash.h"
#include "pk11_signature_test.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha224-vectors.h"
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha256-vectors.h"
@@ -109,7 +110,11 @@ class Pkcs11RsaPkcs1WycheproofTest
* Use 6 as the invalid value since modLen % 16 must be zero.
*/
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding) {
- const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = 736;
+#define RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH 736
+/* if our minimum supported key length is big enough to handle
+ * our largest Hash function, we can't test a short length */
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH
+ const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH;
const size_t kRsaKeyBits = 752;
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kMsg{'T', 'E', 'S', 'T'};
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kSha512DigestInfo{
@@ -209,6 +214,9 @@ TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding)
SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512,
nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
+#else
+ GTEST_SKIP();
+#endif
}
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, RequireNullParameter) {
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.sign_policy ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
#include "prtime.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "ssl.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
#include "gtest_utils.h"
#include "tls_agent.h"
@@ -348,9 +350,14 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
ASSERT_TRUE(slot);
PK11RSAGenParams rsaparams;
- // The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
- // 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
+// The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
+// 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
+#define RSA_WEAK_KEY 528
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_WEAK_KEY
rsaparams.keySizeInBits = 528;
+#else
+ rsaparams.keySizeInBits = RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1;
+#endif
rsaparams.pe = 65537;
// Bug 1012786: PK11_GenerateKeyPair can fail if there is insufficient
@@ -390,6 +397,18 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
+ // save the MIN POLICY length.
+ PRInt32 minRsa;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
+ NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
+#else
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, 2048));
+#endif
+#endif
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey dc_priv;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey dc_pub;
@@ -412,6 +431,9 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
+#endif
}
class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength
extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
/*
+** Return the strength of the private key in bits
+*/
+extern unsigned SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk);
+
+/*
** Return the length of the signature in bytes
*/
extern unsigned SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#ifndef _KEYI_H_
#define _KEYI_H_
+#include "secerr.h"
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
/* NSS private functions */
@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ SECStatus sec_DecodeRSAPSSParamsToMechan
const SECItem *params,
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *mech);
+/* make sure the key length matches the policy for keyType */
+SECStatus seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength,
+ SECErrorCodes error);
SEC_END_PROTOS
#endif /* _KEYHI_H_ */
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "secdig.h"
#include "prtime.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_IntegerTemplate)
@@ -1042,6 +1043,62 @@ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SEC
return bitSize;
}
+unsigned
+SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk)
+{
+ unsigned bitSize = 0;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attribute = CKT_INVALID_TYPE;
+ SECItem params;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (!privk) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* interpret modulus length as key strength */
+ switch (privk->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
+ * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
+ bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ if (bitSize == -1) {
+ bitSize = 0;
+ }
+ return bitSize;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case fortezzaKey:
+ case dhKey:
+ case keaKey:
+ attribute = CKA_PRIME;
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
+ CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, &params);
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bitSize = SECKEY_ECParamsToKeySize(&params);
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
+ return bitSize;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(attribute != CKT_INVALID_TYPE);
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
+ attribute, NULL, &params);
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&params);
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
+ return bitSize;
+}
+
/* returns signature length in bytes (not bits) */
unsigned
SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
@@ -1212,6 +1269,51 @@ SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(const SECKEYPublicK
}
/*
+ * Check that a given key meets the policy limits for the given key
+ * size.
+ */
+SECStatus
+seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength, SECErrorCodes error)
+{
+ PRInt32 opt = -1;
+ PRInt32 optVal;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ switch (keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ opt = NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case fortezzaKey:
+ opt = NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case dhKey:
+ case keaKey:
+ opt = NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ opt = NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case nullKey:
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(opt != -1);
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(opt, &optVal);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ if (optVal < keyLength) {
+ PORT_SetError(error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
* Use the private key to find a public key handle. The handle will be on
* the same slot as the private key.
*/
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
struct SGNContextStr {
SECOidTag signalg;
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
SECOidTag hashalg, signalg;
KeyType keyType;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
SECStatus rv;
/* OK, map a PKCS #7 hash and encrypt algorithm into
@@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
return NULL;
}
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashalg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
@@ -467,9 +479,20 @@ SGN_Digest(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
SGNDigestInfo *di = 0;
SECOidTag enctag;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
result->data = 0;
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(privKey->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(privKey),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(algtag, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "secdig.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
/*
** Recover the DigestInfo from an RSA PKCS#1 signature.
@@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
unsigned int sigLen;
KeyType type;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
/* make sure the encryption algorithm matches the key type */
/* RSA-PSS algorithm can be used with both rsaKey and rsaPssKey */
@@ -476,7 +478,16 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
-
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(key),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the encryption algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(encAlg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.sign_policy ./lib/freebl/blapit.h
--- ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/blapit.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
* These values come from the initial key size limits from the PKCS #11
* module. They may be arbitrarily adjusted to any value freebl supports.
*/
-#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 128
+#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1023 /* 128 */
#define RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
#define RSA_MAX_EXPONENT_BITS 64
#define DH_MIN_P_BITS 128
diff -up ./lib/nss/nss.h.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nss.h
--- ./lib/nss/nss.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nss.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -302,6 +302,28 @@ SECStatus NSS_UnregisterShutdown(NSS_Shu
#define NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS 0x00d /* lock default values */
#define NSS_DEFAULT_SSL_LOCK 1 /* lock the ssl default values */
+/* NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY controls what kinds of operations are subject to
+ * the NSS_XXX_MIN_KEY_SIZE values.
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS sets and clears all the flags to the input
+ * value
+ * On get it returns all the flags
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS sets only the flags=1 in theinput value and
+ * does not affect the other flags
+ * On get it returns all the flags
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS clears only the flags=1 in the input
+ * value and does not affect the other flags
+ * On get it returns all the compliment of all the flags
+ * (cleared flags == 1) */
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS 0x00e
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS 0x00f
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS 0x010
+/* currently defined flags */
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG 1
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG 2
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG 4
+
+#define NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE 0x011
+
/*
* Set and get global options for the NSS library.
*/
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct nssOps {
PRInt32 dtlsVersionMaxPolicy;
PRInt32 pkcs12DecodeForceUnicode;
PRInt32 defaultLocks;
+ PRInt32 keySizePolicyFlags;
+ PRInt32 eccMinKeySize;
};
static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
@@ -37,7 +39,9 @@ static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
1,
0xffff,
PR_FALSE,
- 0
+ 0,
+ NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG,
+ SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS
};
SECStatus
@@ -78,6 +82,18 @@ NSS_OptionSet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 val
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
nss_ops.defaultLocks = value;
break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags = value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags |= value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags &= ~value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
+ nss_ops.eccMinKeySize = value;
+ break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
rv = SECFailure;
@@ -119,6 +135,16 @@ NSS_OptionGet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 *va
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
*value = nss_ops.defaultLocks;
break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
+ *value = nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
+ *value = ~nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
+ break;
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
+ *value = nss_ops.eccMinKeySize;
+ break;
default:
rv = SECFailure;
}
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@
* happens because NSS used to count bit lengths incorrectly. */
#define SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS 1023
#define SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS 1023
+/* not really used by SSL, but define it here for consistency */
+#define SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS 256
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.sign_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -78,15 +78,14 @@ pk11_KeyExchange(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_
if (privKeyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PK11RSAGenParams rsaParams;
- if (symKeyLength > 53) /* bytes */ {
- /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 512 bits long,
+ if (symKeyLength > 120) /* bytes */ {
+ /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 1024 bits long,
** and that's too costly. Don't even try.
*/
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CANNOT_MOVE_SENSITIVE_KEY);
goto rsa_failed;
}
- rsaParams.keySizeInBits =
- (symKeyLength > 21 || symKeyLength == 0) ? 512 : 256;
+ rsaParams.keySizeInBits = 1024;
rsaParams.pe = 0x10001;
privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN,
&rsaParams, &pubKey, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE, symKey->cx);
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.sign_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:35.004785510 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -427,12 +427,21 @@ static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[]
{ CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.3"), 0x304 },
};
+static const optionFreeDef keySizeFlagsList[] = {
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SSL"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SIGN"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-VERIFY"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG },
+};
+
static const optionFreeDef freeOptList[] = {
/* Restrictions for asymetric keys */
{ CIPHER_NAME("RSA-MIN"), NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
{ CIPHER_NAME("DH-MIN"), NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA-MIN"), NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECC-MIN"), NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ /* what operations doe the key size apply to */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-FLAGS"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS },
/* constraints on SSL Protocols */
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MIN"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY },
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MAX"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY },
@@ -540,6 +549,7 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
*result = val;
return SECSuccess;
}
+ /* handle any ssl strings */
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sslOptList); i++) {
if (policyValueLength == sslOptList[i].name_size &&
PORT_Strncasecmp(sslOptList[i].name, policyValue,
@@ -548,7 +558,29 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
return SECSuccess;
}
}
- return SECFailure;
+ /* handle key_size flags. Each flag represents a bit, which
+ * gets or'd together. They can be separated by , | or + */
+ val = 0;
+ while (*policyValue) {
+ PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keySizeFlagsList); i++) {
+ if (PORT_Strncasecmp(keySizeFlagsList[i].name, policyValue,
+ keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size) == 0) {
+ val |= keySizeFlagsList[i].option;
+ found = PR_TRUE;
+ policyValue += keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (*policyValue == ',' || *policyValue == '|' || *policyValue == '+') {
+ policyValue++;
+ }
+ }
+ *result = val;
+ return SECSuccess;
}
/* Policy operations:
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.sign_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:34.998785473 -0700
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
@@ -7409,6 +7409,8 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
unsigned dh_p_bits;
unsigned dh_g_bits;
PRInt32 minDH;
+ PRInt32 optval;
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_FALSE;
SSL3Hashes hashes;
SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
@@ -7419,8 +7421,13 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
+ }
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv != SECSuccess || minDH <= 0) {
minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
}
@@ -11411,13 +11418,20 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 minKey;
PRInt32 optval;
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_TRUE;
+
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
+ }
ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) {
case rsaKey:
case rsaPssKey:
case rsaOaepKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11426,7 +11440,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case dsaKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11435,7 +11450,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case dhKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11444,9 +11460,15 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case ecKey:
- /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we only
- * support curves we like. */
- minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
+ } else {
+ /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we
+ * only support curves we like. */
+ minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ }
break;
default:
diff -up ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.sign_policy ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt
--- ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=dtls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=2048:RSA-MIN=2048 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Standard policy
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:des-ede3-cbc:rc4:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:DHE-DSS:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=tls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=1023:RSA-MIN=1023 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Legacy policy
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Reduced policy
+0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=KEY-SIZE-SSL,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Valid key size
+2 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=UNKNOWN,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-FAIL.*unknown.* Invalid key size
2 disallow=ALL_allow=dtls-version-min=:dtls-version-max= NSS-POLICY-FAIL Missing value
2 disallow=ALL_allow=RSA-MIN=whatever NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid value
2 disallow=ALL_allow=flower NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid identifier
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.sign_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2022-06-20 16:50:08.958742135 -0700
@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@
# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
# compatibility reasons
# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
+ 0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
+
# test default settings
# NOTE: tstclient will attempt to overide the defaults, so we detect we
# were successful by locking in our settings
diff -up ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh.sign_policy ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh
--- ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh.sign_policy 2022-06-22 08:43:55.905407738 -0700
+++ ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh 2022-06-22 08:43:58.837426779 -0700
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ dbupgrade_main()
echo $i
if [ -d $i ]; then
echo "upgrading db $i"
- ${BINDIR}/certutil -G -g 512 -d sql:$i -f ${PWFILE} -z ${NOISE_FILE} 2>&1
+ ${BINDIR}/certutil -G -g 1024 -d sql:$i -f ${PWFILE} -z ${NOISE_FILE} 2>&1
html_msg $? 0 "Upgrading $i"
else
echo "skipping db $i"

62
SOURCES/nss-539183.patch
View File

@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
--- nss/cmd/httpserv/httpserv.c.539183 2016-05-21 18:31:39.879585420 -0700
+++ nss/cmd/httpserv/httpserv.c 2016-05-21 18:37:22.374464057 -0700
@@ -953,23 +953,23 @@
getBoundListenSocket(unsigned short port)
{
PRFileDesc *listen_sock;
int listenQueueDepth = 5 + (2 * maxThreads);
PRStatus prStatus;
PRNetAddr addr;
PRSocketOptionData opt;
- addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
- addr.inet.ip = PR_INADDR_ANY;
- addr.inet.port = PR_htons(port);
+ if (PR_SetNetAddr(PR_IpAddrAny, PR_AF_INET6, port, &addr) != PR_SUCCESS) {
+ errExit("PR_SetNetAddr");
+ }
- listen_sock = PR_NewTCPSocket();
+ listen_sock = PR_OpenTCPSocket(PR_AF_INET6);
if (listen_sock == NULL) {
- errExit("PR_NewTCPSocket");
+ errExit("PR_OpenTCPSockett");
}
opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
opt.value.non_blocking = PR_FALSE;
prStatus = PR_SetSocketOption(listen_sock, &opt);
if (prStatus < 0) {
PR_Close(listen_sock);
errExit("PR_SetSocketOption(PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking)");
--- nss/cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c.539183 2016-05-21 18:31:39.882585367 -0700
+++ nss/cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c 2016-05-21 18:41:43.092801174 -0700
@@ -1711,23 +1711,23 @@
getBoundListenSocket(unsigned short port)
{
PRFileDesc *listen_sock;
int listenQueueDepth = 5 + (2 * maxThreads);
PRStatus prStatus;
PRNetAddr addr;
PRSocketOptionData opt;
- addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
- addr.inet.ip = PR_INADDR_ANY;
- addr.inet.port = PR_htons(port);
+ if (PR_SetNetAddr(PR_IpAddrAny, PR_AF_INET6, port, &addr) != PR_SUCCESS) {
+ errExit("PR_SetNetAddr");
+ }
- listen_sock = PR_NewTCPSocket();
+ listen_sock = PR_OpenTCPSocket(PR_AF_INET6);
if (listen_sock == NULL) {
- errExit("PR_NewTCPSocket");
+ errExit("PR_OpenTCPSocket error");
}
opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
opt.value.non_blocking = PR_FALSE;
prStatus = PR_SetSocketOption(listen_sock, &opt);
if (prStatus < 0) {
PR_Close(listen_sock);
errExit("PR_SetSocketOption(PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking)");

132
SPECS/nss.spec
View File

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
%global nspr_build_version 4.25.0
%global nspr_version 4.25.0
%global nss_version 3.67.0
%global nspr_build_version 4.34.0-3
%global nspr_release -3
%global nspr_version 4.34.0
%global nss_version 3.79.0
%global unsupported_tools_directory %{_libdir}/nss/unsupported-tools
%global saved_files_dir %{_libdir}/nss/saved
%global dracutlibdir %{_prefix}/lib/dracut
@ -44,13 +45,28 @@ rpm.define(string.format("nss_release_tag NSS_%s_RTM",
string.gsub(rpm.expand("%nss_archive_version"), "%.", "_")))
}
# This is taken from gnutls.spec
%define srpmhash() %{lua:
local files = rpm.expand("%_specdir/nss.spec")
for i, p in ipairs(patches) do
files = files.." "..p
end
for i, p in ipairs(sources) do
files = files.." "..p
end
local sha256sum = assert(io.popen("cat "..files.."| sha256sum"))
local hash = sha256sum:read("*a")
sha256sum:close()
print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
}
Summary: Network Security Services
Name: nss
Version: %{nss_version}
Release: 7%{?dist}
Release: 10%{?dist}
License: MPLv2.0
URL: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
Requires: nss-util >= %{nss_version}
# TODO: revert to same version as nss once we are done with the merge
Requires: nss-softokn%{_isa} >= %{nss_version}
@ -93,12 +109,9 @@ Source25: key3.db.xml
Source26: key4.db.xml
Source27: secmod.db.xml
Source28: nss-p11-kit.config
Source30: PayPalEE.cert
# To inject hardening flags for DSO
Patch1: nss-dso-ldflags.patch
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=617723
Patch2: nss-539183.patch
# This patch uses the GCC -iquote option documented at
# http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Directory-Options.html#Directory-Options
# to give the in-tree headers a higher priority over the system headers,
@ -138,29 +151,22 @@ Patch40: nss-3.66-disable-signature-policies.patch
Patch45: nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch
# Local patch: restore old pkcs 12 defaults on old version of rhel
Patch50: nss-3.66-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
# Local Patch: restore expired distrusted certs for now
Patch51: nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch
# Local Patch: update fipsdefaults to AES
Patch52: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch
# Patches that should be upstreamed, and (hopefully) will disappear next
# rebase
# Need upstream bug
Patch219: nss-3.44-kbkdf-coverity.patch
# no upsteam bug yet
Patch225: nss-3.67-fix-private-key-mac.patch
# no upstream bug yet
Patch229: nss-3.53.1-measure-fix.patch
# no upstream bug yet
Patch230: nss-3.66-no-small-primes.patch
# no upstream bug yet
Patch232: nss-3.66-fix-gtest-parsing.patch
# no upstream bug yet
Patch233: nss-3.67-fix-coverity-issues.patch
# no upstream bug yet
Patch234: nss-3.67-fix-sdb-timeout.patch
# no upstream bug yet
Patch235: nss-3.67-fix-ssl-alerts.patch
Patch300: nss-3.67-cve-2021-43527.patch
Patch301: nss-3.67-cve-2021-43527-test.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1774659
Patch60: nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
Patch61: nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1774654
Patch63: nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1767883
Patch64: nss-3.79-rhel-8-fips-signature-policy.patch
Patch65: nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch
Patch66: nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch
Patch67: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch
Patch68: nss-3.79-fips.patch
%description
Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
@ -203,7 +209,7 @@ Provides: nss-static = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: nss%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: nss-util-devel
Requires: nss-softokn-devel
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
Requires: pkgconfig
BuildRequires: xmlto
@ -224,7 +230,7 @@ low level services.
%package util
Summary: Network Security Services Utilities Library
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
%description util
Utilities for Network Security Services and the Softoken module
@ -232,7 +238,7 @@ Utilities for Network Security Services and the Softoken module
%package util-devel
Summary: Development libraries for Network Security Services Utilities
Requires: nss-util%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
Requires: pkgconfig
%description util-devel
@ -241,7 +247,7 @@ Header and library files for doing development with Network Security Services.
%package softokn
Summary: Network Security Services Softoken Module
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
Requires: nss-util >= %{version}-%{release}
Requires: nss-softokn-freebl%{_isa} >= %{version}-%{release}
@ -278,7 +284,7 @@ Developers should rely only on the officially supported NSS public API.
Summary: Development libraries for Network Security Services
Requires: nss-softokn%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: nss-softokn-freebl-devel%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
Requires: nss-util-devel >= %{version}-%{release}
Requires: pkgconfig
BuildRequires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_build_version}
@ -290,15 +296,12 @@ Header and library files for doing development with Network Security Services.
%prep
%autosetup -N -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version}
pushd nss
%autopatch -p1
%autopatch -p1
popd
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247353
find nss/lib/libpkix -perm /u+x -type f -exec chmod -x {} \;
#update paypal cert (git binary patches don't work with autopatch)
cp %{SOURCE30} nss/tests/libpkix/certs/
%build
export FREEBL_NO_DEPEND=1
@ -312,7 +315,14 @@ export FREEBL_LOWHASH=1
# uncomment if the iquote patch is activated
export IN_TREE_FREEBL_HEADERS_FIRST=1
# FIPS related defines
export NSS_FORCE_FIPS=1
export NSS_FIPS_VERSION="%{name}\ %{version}-%{srpmhash}"
eval $(sed -n 's/^\(\(NAME\|VERSION_ID\)=.*\)/OS_\1/p' /etc/os-release | sed -e 's/ /\\ /g')
export FIPS_MODULE_OS="$OS_NAME\ ${OS_VERSION_ID%%.*}"
export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="${FIPS_MODULE_OS}\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}"
export NSS_FIPS_140_3=1
export NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS=1
# Enable compiler optimizations and disable debugging code
export BUILD_OPT=1
@ -603,7 +613,7 @@ do
done
# Copy the binaries we ship as unsupported
for file in bltest ecperf fbectest fipstest shlibsign atob btoa derdump listsuites ocspclnt pp selfserv signtool strsclnt symkeyutil tstclnt vfyserv vfychain
for file in bltest dbtool ecperf fbectest fipstest shlibsign atob btoa derdump listsuites ocspclnt pp selfserv signtool strsclnt symkeyutil tstclnt validation vfyserv vfychain
do
install -p -m 755 dist/*.OBJ/bin/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{unsupported_tools_directory}
done
@ -728,6 +738,7 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/strsclnt
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/symkeyutil
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/tstclnt
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/validation
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/vfyserv
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/vfychain
# instead of %%{_mandir}/man*/* let's list them explicitly
@ -885,6 +896,7 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
%dir %{saved_files_dir}
%dir %{unsupported_tools_directory}
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/bltest
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/dbtool
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/ecperf
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/fbectest
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/fipstest
@ -932,6 +944,46 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
%changelog
* Thu Aug 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-11
- Fix QA found failures:
- remove extra '+' from sslpolicy.txt file causing test error values
- only use GRND_RANDOM if the kernel is in FIPS mode.
* Fri Aug 5 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-9
- FIPS 140-3 changes
* Wed Jul 13 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-8
- Update fips default for pk12util to AES rather than TDES
- Fix bug in pkcs12 files with null passwords
* Wed Jul 6 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-7
- Better fix for test regressions
* Mon Jun 27 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-6
- fix nss.spec so it works in a rhel-8.1.0 buildroot
* Mon Jun 20 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-5
- FIPS 140-3 changes
- Reject Small RSA keys, 1024 bit keys are marked as FIP OK when verifying, reject
signature keys by policy
- Allow applications to retrigger selftests on demand.
* Fri Jun 17 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-4
- Fix pkgconfig output
* Wed Jun 15 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-3
- NSR Coverity fix changed selfserv from passive to active, change it back
* Sat Jun 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-2
- Fix regressions found in test suites.
* Thu Jun 2 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-1
- Rebase to NSS 3.79
- Set FIPS Module ID
- skip attribute verification on attributes with default values
- don't export trust objects if they are default trust objects from dbm
- add dbtool to nss-tools
* Thu Nov 18 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-7
- Fix CVE 2021 43527