.fmf/version

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1

.gitignore

@@ -1,6 +1,94 @@
-SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
+blank-cert8.db
-SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
+blank-key3.db
-SOURCES/blank-key3.db
+blank-secmod.db
-SOURCES/blank-key4.db
+blank-cert9.db
-SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
+blank-key4.db
-SOURCES/nss-3.101.tar.gz
+PayPalEE.cert
+TestCA.ca.cert
+TestUser50.cert
+TestUser51.cert
+/PayPalRootCA.cert
+/PayPalICA.cert
+/nss-3.25.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.26.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.27.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.27.2.tar.gz
+/nss-3.28.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.29.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.29.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.30.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.30.2.tar.gz
+/nss-3.31.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.32.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.32.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.33.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.34.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.35.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.36.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.36.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.37.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.37.3.tar.gz
+/nss-3.38.0.tar.gz
+/nss-3.39.tar.gz
+/nss-3.40.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.41.tar.gz
+/nss-3.42.tar.gz
+/nss-3.42.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.43.tar.gz
+/nss-3.44.tar.gz
+/nss-3.44.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.45.tar.gz
+/nss-3.46.tar.gz
+/nss-3.46.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.47.tar.gz
+/nss-3.47.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.48.tar.gz
+/nss-3.49.tar.gz
+/nss-3.49.2.tar.gz
+/nss-3.50.tar.gz
+/nss-3.51.tar.gz
+/nss-3.51.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.52.tar.gz
+/nss-3.53.tar.gz
+/nss-3.54.tar.gz
+/nss-3.55.tar.gz
+/nss-3.56.tar.gz
+/nss-3.57.tar.gz
+/nss-3.58.tar.gz
+/nspr-4.29.tar.gz
+/nss-3.59.tar.gz
+/nss-3.60.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.62.tar.gz
+/nss-3.63.tar.gz
+/nspr-4.30.tar.gz
+/nss-3.65.tar.gz
+/nss-3.67.tar.gz
+/nspr-4.31.tar.gz
+/nss-3.69.tar.gz
+/nspr-4.32.tar.gz
+/nss-3.71.tar.gz
+/nss-3.73.tar.gz
+/nss-3.75.tar.gz
+/nss-3.77.tar.gz
+/nss-3.79.tar.gz
+/nspr-4.34.tar.gz
+/nss-3.81.tar.gz
+/nss-3.83.tar.gz
+/nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.85.tar.gz
+/nss-3.87.tar.gz
+/nss-3.88.1.tar.gz
+/nss-3.89.tar.gz
+/nss-3.89-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.90-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.91-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.92-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.93-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.94-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.95-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.96-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.96.1-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.97-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.101-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+/nss-3.112-with-nspr-4.36.tar.gz
+/nss_compat_test_pkcs12.tar

.nss.metadata

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-d272a7b58364862613d44261c5744f7a336bf177 SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
-b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
-7f78b5bcecdb5005e7b803604b2ec9d1a9df2fb5 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
-f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
-bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
-90f6f1d5440e7cc72cd27f2ecf2e8f3f680a00aa SOURCES/nss-3.101.tar.gz

SOURCES/cert8.db.xml

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
-<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
-  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
-<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
-<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
-]>
-
-<refentry id="cert8.db">
-
-  <refentryinfo>
-    <date>&date;</date>
-    <title>Network Security Services</title>
-    <productname>nss</productname>
-    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
-  </refentryinfo>
-
-  <refmeta>
-    <refentrytitle>cert8.db</refentrytitle>
-    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
-  </refmeta>
-
-  <refnamediv>
-    <refname>cert8.db</refname>
-    <refpurpose>Legacy NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
-  </refnamediv>
-
-<refsection id="description">
-    <title>Description</title>
-    <para><emphasis>cert8.db</emphasis> is an NSS certificate database.</para>
-  <para>This certificate database is in the legacy database format. Consider migrating to cert9.db and key4.db which are the new sqlite-based shared database format with support for concurrent access.
-  </para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>Files</title>
-    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/cert8.db</filename></para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>See also</title>
-    <para>cert9.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5), </para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection id="authors">
-    <title>Authors</title>
-    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
-    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
-  </refsection>
-
-<!-- don't change -->
-  <refsection id="license">
-    <title>LICENSE</title>
-    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-    </para>
-
-  </refsection>
-
-
-</refentry>

SOURCES/key3.db.xml

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
-<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
-  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
-<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
-<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
-]>
-
-<refentry id="key3.db">
-
-  <refentryinfo>
-    <date>&date;</date>
-    <title>Network Security Services</title>
-    <productname>nss</productname>
-    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
-  </refentryinfo>
-
-  <refmeta>
-    <refentrytitle>key3.db</refentrytitle>
-    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
-  </refmeta>
-
-  <refnamediv>
-    <refname>key3.db</refname>
-    <refpurpose>Legacy NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
-  </refnamediv>
-
-<refsection id="description">
-    <title>Description</title>
-    <para><emphasis>key3.db</emphasis> is an NSS certificate database.</para>
-  <para>This is a key database in the legacy database format. Consider migrating to cert9.db and key4.db which  which are the new sqlite-based shared database format with support for concurrent access.
-  </para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>Files</title>
-    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/key3.db</filename></para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>See also</title>
-    <para>cert9.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5), </para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection id="authors">
-    <title>Authors</title>
-    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
-    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
-  </refsection>
-
-<!-- don't change -->
-  <refsection id="license">
-    <title>LICENSE</title>
-    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-    </para>
-
-  </refsection>
-
-
-</refentry>

SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-ems-policy.patch

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
---- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems	2024-06-11 13:09:25.956760476 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2024-06-11 13:09:52.837067481 -0700
-@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
-     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
-     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
-     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
-+    { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-REQUIRE-EMS"), SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
-+
- };
- 
- static const oidValDef smimeKxOptList[] = {
-diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h
---- ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h	2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
-@@ -202,4 +202,10 @@ struct PK11GenericObjectStr {
- /* This mask includes all CK_FLAGs with an equivalent CKA_ attribute. */
- #define CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS 0x000e7b00UL
- 
-+/* this oid value could change values if it's added after other new
-+ * upstream oids. We protect applications by hiding the define in a private
-+ * header file that only NSS sees. Currently it's only available through
-+ * the policy code */
-+#define SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1
-+
- #endif /* _SECMODTI_H_ */
-diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
---- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c	2023-06-12 17:18:35.130938525 -0700
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- #include "pk11func.h"
- #include "secmod.h"
- #include "blapi.h"
-+#include "secmodti.h" /* until SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS is upstream */
- 
- #include <stdio.h>
- 
-@@ -3480,6 +3481,29 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *s
-     CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
-     unsigned int master_params_len;
- 
-+    /* if we are using TLS and we aren't using the extended master secret,
-+     * and SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS policy is true, fail. The caller will
-+     * send and alert (eventually). In the RSA Server case, the alert
-+     * won't happen until Finish time because the upper level code
-+     * can't tell a difference between this failure and an RSA decrypt
-+     * failure, so it will proceed with a faux key */
-+    if (isTLS) {
-+        PRUint32 policy;
-+        SECStatus rv;
-+
-+        /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */
-+        rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, &policy);
-+        /* we only look at the policy if we can fetch it. */
-+        if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-+            if (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX) {
-+                /* just set the error, we don't want to map any errors
-+                 * set by NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy here */
-+                PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
-+                return SECFailure;
-+            }
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-     if (isTLS12) {
-         if (isDH)
-             master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
-diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems ./lib/util/secoid.c
---- ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems	2024-06-11 13:11:28.078155282 -0700
-+++ ./lib/util/secoid.c	2024-06-11 13:12:58.511188172 -0700
-@@ -1890,6 +1890,12 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
-     ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC, "RC2-64-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
-     ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC, "RC2-128-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
-     ODE(SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA, "ECDH", CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
-+
-+    /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
-+    /* we need it for the policy code.  */
-+    ODE(SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1,
-+        "TLS Require EMS", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
-+
- };
-
- /* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table
-@@ -2198,6 +2204,10 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
-
-     /* turn off NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL by default */
-     xOids[SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY].notPolicyFlags = NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL;
-+    /* turn off TLS REQUIRE EMS by default */
-+    xOids[SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1].notPolicyFlags = ~0;
-+
-+
-
-     envVal = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT");
-     if (envVal)
-diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems ./lib/util/secoidt.h
---- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems	2024-06-11 13:16:13.212411967 -0700
-+++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h	2024-06-11 13:16:48.098810434 -0700
-@@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ typedef enum {
-     SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC = 385,
-     SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC = 386,
-     SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA = 387,
-+    /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
-+    /* give it an obscure name here */
-+    SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 388,
- 
-     SEC_OID_TOTAL
- } SECOidTag;

SOURCES/nss-3.101-allow-fips-rsa-oaep.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fipsrsaoaep ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fipsrsaoaep	2024-10-24 09:27:17.971673855 +0200
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-10-24 09:23:35.006352872 +0200
-@@ -2565,6 +2565,16 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-                 }
-             }
-             return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
-+        case SFTKFIPSRSAOAEP:;
-+            CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *rsaoaep = (CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *)
-+                                                mech->pParameter;
-+
-+            HASH_HashType hash_msg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(rsaoaep->hashAlg);
-+            HASH_HashType hash_pad = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(rsaoaep->mgf);
-+            /* message hash and mask generation function must be the same */
-+            if (hash_pad != hash_msg) return PR_FALSE;
-+
-+            return sftk_checkFIPSHash(rsaoaep->hashAlg, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE);
-         default:
-             break;
-     }

SOURCES/nss-3.101-chacha-timing-fix.patch

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
---- a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
-+++ b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
-@@ -213,27 +213,31 @@
- {
- #ifdef NSS_X64
- #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_AVX2
-     if (avx2_support()) {
-         Hacl_Chacha20_Vec256_chacha20_encrypt_256(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
-+        return;
-     }
- #endif
- 
- #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_SSE3
-     if (ssse3_support() && sse4_1_support() && avx_support()) {
-         Hacl_Chacha20_Vec128_chacha20_encrypt_128(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
-+        return;
-     }
- #endif
- 
- #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
-     !defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
-     if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
-         chacha20vsx(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
--    } else
-+        return;
-+    }
- #endif
-     {
-         Hacl_Chacha20_chacha20_encrypt(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
-+        return;
-     }
- }
- #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY */
- 
- SECStatus
-@@ -449,20 +453,18 @@
-             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
-             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
-         goto finish;
-     }
- #endif
--
--    else
- #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
-     !defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
-     if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
-         Chacha20Poly1305_vsx_aead_encrypt(
-             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
-             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
-         goto finish;
--    } else
-+    }
- #endif
-     {
-         Hacl_Chacha20Poly1305_32_aead_encrypt(
-             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
-             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
-

SOURCES/nss-3.101-default-libpkix.patch

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c b/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
---- a/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
-+++ b/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
-@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@
- pkix_pl_lifecycle_ObjectTableUpdate(int *objCountTable);
- 
- PRInt32 parallelFnInvocationCount;
- #endif /* PKIX_OBJECT_LEAK_TEST */
- 
--static PRBool usePKIXValidationEngine = PR_FALSE;
-+static PRBool usePKIXValidationEngine = PR_TRUE;
- #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
- 
- /*
-  * FUNCTION: CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation
-  * DESCRIPTION:
-diff --git a/lib/nss/nssinit.c b/lib/nss/nssinit.c
---- a/lib/nss/nssinit.c
-+++ b/lib/nss/nssinit.c
-@@ -762,13 +762,13 @@
-                                     PKIX_MINOR_VERSION, &actualMinorVersion, &plContext);
- 
-         if (pkixError != NULL) {
-             goto loser;
-         } else {
--            char *ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY");
-+            char *ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY");
-             if (ev && ev[0]) {
--                CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation(PR_TRUE);
-+                CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation(PR_FALSE);
-             }
-         }
- #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
-     }
- 
-diff --git a/tests/all.sh b/tests/all.sh
---- a/tests/all.sh
-+++ b/tests/all.sh
-@@ -141,17 +141,22 @@
- ########################################################################
- run_cycle_standard()
- {
-     TEST_MODE=STANDARD
- 
-+    NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY="1"
-+    export NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
-+
-     TESTS="${ALL_TESTS}"
-     TESTS_SKIP="libpkix pkits"
- 
-     NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE:-"sql"}
-     export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE
- 
-     run_tests
-+
-+    unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
- }
- 
- ############################ run_cycle_pkix ############################
- # run test suites with PKIX enabled
- ########################################################################
-@@ -165,13 +170,10 @@
- 
-     HOSTDIR="${HOSTDIR}/pkix"
-     mkdir -p "${HOSTDIR}"
-     init_directories
- 
--    NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY="1"
--    export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
--
-     TESTS="${ALL_TESTS}"
-     TESTS_SKIP="cipher dbtests sdr crmf smime merge multinit"
- 
-     export -n NSS_SSL_RUN
- 
-diff --git a/tests/common/init.sh b/tests/common/init.sh
---- a/tests/common/init.sh
-+++ b/tests/common/init.sh
-@@ -138,12 +138,12 @@
-         echo "NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL=${NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL}"
-         echo "NSS_SSL_TESTS=\"${NSS_SSL_TESTS}\""
-         echo "NSS_SSL_RUN=\"${NSS_SSL_RUN}\""
-         echo "NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE}"
-         echo "export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE"
--        echo "NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY}"
--        echo "export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY"
-+        echo "NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY}"
-+        echo "export NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY"
-         echo "init_directories"
-     }
- 
- # Exit shellfunction to clean up at exit (error, regular or signal)
-     Exit()
-diff --git a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
---- a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
-+++ b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
-@@ -960,13 +960,12 @@
- ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp()
- {
-   #verbose="-v"
-   html_head "Check that OCSP doesn't break if we disable sha1 $NORM_EXT - server $SERVER_MODE/client $CLIENT_MODE"
- 
--  PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
--  NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY="1"
--  export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
-+  PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
-+  unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
- 
-   testname=""
- 
-   if [ ! -f "${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt" ] ; then
-       html_failed "${SCRIPTNAME}: ${P_R_SERVERDIR} is not initialized"
-@@ -987,16 +986,14 @@
-   grep 12276 ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy.out
-   RET=$?
-   html_msg $RET $RET_EXP "${testname}" \
-            "produced a returncode of $RET, expected is $RET_EXP"
- 
--  if [ "${PKIX_SAVE}" = "unset" ]; then
--      unset NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
--  else
--      NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${PKIX_SAVE}
--      export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
-+  if [ "{PKIX_SAVE}" != "unset" ]; then
-+      export NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY=${PKIX_SAVE}
-   fi
-+
-   cp ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt.sav ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt
- 
-   html "</TABLE><BR>"
- 
- }
-

SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-signature-policies.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
---- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy	2023-06-21 08:54:54.802785229 +0200
-+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2023-06-21 08:58:24.748282499 +0200
-@@ -395,12 +395,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
-     /* Signatures */
-     { CIPHER_NAME("DSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
-       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
--    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
--      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
--    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE,
--      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
--    { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY,
--      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
-+    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0},
-+    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE, 0},
-+    { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, 0},
-     { CIPHER_NAME("ED25519"), SEC_OID_ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY,
-       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
- };
- 
- typedef struct {
-@@ -416,7 +413,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
-     { macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
-     { cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
-     { kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
-     { smimeKxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(smimeKxOptList), "SMIME-KX", PR_TRUE },
--    { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_FALSE },
-+    { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_TRUE },
- };
- 
- static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[] = {
-diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
---- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy	2023-06-21 09:00:17.720181306 +0200
-+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt	2023-06-21 09:00:55.637501208 +0200
-@@ -193,7 +193,9 @@
-   1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=all_allow=hmac-sha1:sha256:rsa-pkcs:rsa:des-ede3-cbc:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly Narrow
-   1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
-   0 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=dsa Disallow DSA Signatures Explicitly
--  1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
-+# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
-+# compatibility reasons
-+#  1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
-   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
-   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
-   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL

SOURCES/nss-3.101-ec-dbm-test.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.dbm ./tests/ec/ectest.sh
---- ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.dbm	2024-06-18 14:53:51.201438651 -0700
-+++ ./tests/ec/ectest.sh	2024-06-18 14:56:09.993993637 -0700
-@@ -45,12 +45,20 @@ ectest_genkeydb_test()
-   if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
-     return $?
-   fi
-+  if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
-   curves=( \
-     "curve25519" \
-     "secp256r1" \
-     "secp384r1" \
-     "secp521r1" \
-   )
-+  else
-+  curves=( \
-+    "secp256r1" \
-+    "secp384r1" \
-+    "secp521r1" \
-+  )
-+  fi
-   for curve in "${curves[@]}"; do
-     echo "Test $curve key generation using certutil ..."
-     certutil -G -d "${HOSTDIR}" -k ec -q $curve -f "${R_PWFILE}" -z ${NOISE_FILE}

SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.rsa_disable_test ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
---- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.rsa_disable_test	2024-06-19 11:17:10.261637015 -0700
-+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt	2024-06-19 11:18:22.797425628 -0700
-@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
- # compatibility reasons
- #  1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
-   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
--  1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
-+  0 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
-   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
-   0 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
- # test default settings

SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-no-p12-smime-policy.patch

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c.no_p12_smime_policy ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c
---- ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c.no_p12_smime_policy	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c	2024-07-17 11:26:00.334836451 -0700
-@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static pkcs12SuiteMap pkcs12SuiteMaps[]
- static PRBool
- sec_PKCS12Allowed(SECOidTag alg, PRUint32 needed)
- {
-+#ifdef notdef
-     PRUint32 policy;
-     SECStatus rv;
- 
-@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ sec_PKCS12Allowed(SECOidTag alg, PRUint3
-         return PR_TRUE;
-     }
-     return PR_FALSE;
-+#else
-+    return PR_TRUE;
-+#endif
- }
- 
- PRBool
-diff -up ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c.no_p12_smime_policy ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c
---- ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c.no_p12_smime_policy	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c	2024-07-17 11:27:04.716617111 -0700
-@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ smime_get_policy_tag_from_key_length(SEC
- PRBool
- smime_allowed_by_policy(SECOidTag algtag, PRUint32 neededPolicy)
- {
-+#ifdef notdef
-     PRUint32 policyFlags;
- 
-     /* some S/MIME algs map to the same underlying KEA mechanism,
-@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ smime_allowed_by_policy(SECOidTag algtag
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_EXPORT_ALGORITHM);
-         return PR_FALSE;
-     }
-+#endif
-     return PR_TRUE;
- }
- 
-@@ -485,6 +487,7 @@ smime_init_once(void *arg)
-         return PR_FAILURE;
-     }
- 
-+#ifdef notdef
-     /* At initialization time, we need to set up the defaults. We first
-      * look to see if the system or application has set up certain algorithms
-      * by policy. If they have set up values by policy we'll only allow those
-@@ -497,6 +500,11 @@ smime_init_once(void *arg)
-         PORT_Free(tags);
-         tags = NULL;
-     }
-+#else
-+    /* just initialize the old maps */
-+    rv = SECSuccess;
-+    tagCount = 0;
-+#endif
-     if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (tagCount == 0)) {
-         /* No algorithms have been enabled by policy (either by the system
-          * or by the application, we then will use the traditional default
-diff -up ./smime/smime.sh.no_p12_smime_policy ./smime/smime.sh
---- ./tests/smime/smime.sh.no_p12_smime_policy	2024-07-17 12:27:36.262106070 -0
-700
-+++ ./tests/smime/smime.sh	2024-07-17 12:29:08.251207306 -0700
-@@ -872,8 +872,8 @@ smime_init
- smime_main
- smime_data_tb
- smime_p7
--if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
--  smime_policy
--fi
-+#if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
-+#  smime_policy
-+#fi
- smime_cleanup
-
-diff -up ./tools/tools.sh.no_p12_smime_policy ./tools/tools.sh
---- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.no_p12_smime_policy	2024-07-17 12:27:36.262106070 -0
-700
-+++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh	2024-07-17 12:28:32.418778346 -0700
-@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ tools_p12()
-   tools_p12_import_pbmac1_samples
-   if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
-     tools_p12_import_rsa_pss_private_key
--    tools_p12_policy
-+#tools_p12_policy
-   fi
- }
-

SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.orig ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
---- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.orig	2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c	2021-06-15 17:05:37.200262345 -0700
-@@ -1031,9 +1031,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
-     char *export_file = NULL;
-     char *dbprefix = "";
-     SECStatus rv;
--    SECOidTag cipher = SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
--    SECOidTag hash = SEC_OID_SHA256;
--    SECOidTag certCipher = SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
-+    SECOidTag cipher = 
-+        SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_3KEY_TRIPLE_DES_CBC;
-+    SECOidTag hash = SEC_OID_SHA1;
-+    SECOidTag certCipher = 
-+        SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_40_BIT_RC2_CBC;
-     int keyLen = 0;
-     int certKeyLen = 0;
-     secuCommand pk12util;
-@@ -1147,6 +1149,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
-         }
-     }
- 
-+    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
-+        certCipher =  SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
-+    }
-     if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
-         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
- 
---- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.no_pkcs12_macpbe_default	2024-07-18 08:26:35.7732
-48450 -0700
-+++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c	2024-07-18 08:27:05.796595554 -0700
-@@ -1165,10 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
-             }
-         }
-     }
--    /* in FIPS mode default to encoding with pkcs5v2 for the MAC */
--    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
--        hash = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
--    }
-     if (pk12util.options[opt_Mac].activated) {
-         char *hashString = pk12util.options[opt_Mac].arg;
- 
-diff -up ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig ./tests/tools/tools.sh
---- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig	2021-06-15 17:06:27.650564449 -0700
-+++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh	2021-06-15 17:07:59.934117192 -0700
-@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@
- "PKCS #5 Password Based Encryption with SHA-1 and DES-CBC"
- 
-   # if we change the defaults in pk12util, update these variables
--  export CERT_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT="AES-128-CBC"
--  export KEY_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT="AES-256-CBC"
--  export HASH_DEFAULT="SHA-256"
-+  export CERT_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT=${pkcs12v2pbeWithSha1And40BitRc2Cbc}
-+  export KEY_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT=${pkcs12v2pbeWithSha1AndTripleDESCBC}
-+  export HASH_DEFAULT="SHA-1"
- 
-   export PKCS5v1_PBE_CIPHERS="${pkcs5pbeWithMD2AndDEScbc},\
- ${pkcs5pbeWithMD5AndDEScbc},\

SOURCES/nss-3.101-enable-kyber-policy.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
---- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy	2024-06-12 14:44:24.680338868 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2024-06-12 14:44:48.368609356 -0700
-@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
-       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
-     { CIPHER_NAME("CURVE25519"), SEC_OID_CURVE25519,
-       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
--    { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00, 0 },
-+    { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00, 
-+      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
-     /* ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curves (characteristic two field) */
-     { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB163V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1,
-       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },

SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-check-ec25519-size.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_check_curver25519 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_check_curver25519	2024-11-11 11:24:25.186654635 +0100
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-11-07 10:26:03.806562274 +0100
-@@ -2356,7 +2356,7 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
-          * key length is CKA_VALUE, which is the default */
-         keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
-     }
--    if (keyType == CKK_EC) {
-+    if (keyType == CKK_EC || keyType == CKK_EC_EDWARDS || keyType == CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY) {
-         SECOidTag curve = sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(source);
-         switch (curve) {
-             case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:

SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-indicators.patch

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.995811284 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-06-12 13:41:30.008188930 -0700
-@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
-     context->blockSize = 0;
-     context->maxLen = 0;
-     context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
--                                           operation, key);
-+                                           operation, key, 0);
-     *contextPtr = context;
-     return CKR_OK;
- }
-@@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
-     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
-     /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
-      * key length against fips requirements */
--    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
-+    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key, 0);
-     session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
-     sftk_FreeSession(session);
-     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
-@@ -6020,7 +6020,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
-         return crv;
-     }
-     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
--    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
-+    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey, 0);
-     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
-     session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
-     sftk_FreeSession(session);
-@@ -7220,6 +7220,10 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
-         return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
-     }
- 
-+    if (!params->bExpand) {
-+        keySize = hashLen;
-+    }
-+
-     /* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
-      * sensitiveCheck */
-     if (sourceKey != NULL) {
-@@ -7269,7 +7273,8 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
-                     mech.pParameter = params;
-                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
-                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
--                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
-+                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
-+                                                       keySize);
-                 }
-                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
-                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
-@@ -7336,7 +7341,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
-     /* HKDF-Expand */
-     if (!params->bExpand) {
-         okm = prk;
--        keySize = genLen = hashLen;
-+        genLen = hashLen;
-     } else {
-         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
-          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
-@@ -7583,7 +7588,8 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
-             return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
-         }
-     }
--    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
-+    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
-+                                       keySize);
- 
-     switch (mechanism) {
-         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.988811198 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
-@@ -979,7 +979,8 @@ CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIB
- /* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
-  * FIPS security policy */
- PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
--                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
-+                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source,
-+                            CK_ULONG targetKeySize);
- /* add validation objects to the slot */
- CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
- 
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.990811223 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
-@@ -2336,7 +2336,7 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
- static CK_ULONG
- sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
- {
--    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
-     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
-     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
-     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
-@@ -2398,13 +2398,29 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
-     return keyLength;
- }
- 
-+PRBool
-+sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
-+{
-+    switch (hash) {
-+        case CKM_SHA256:
-+        case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
-+        case CKM_SHA384:
-+        case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
-+        case CKM_SHA512:
-+        case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
-+            return PR_TRUE;
-+    }
-+    return PR_FALSE;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
-  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
-  * would have to be coded here before they can be added to the table */
- static PRBool
- sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
--                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source)
-+                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
-+                   CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
- {
-     switch (mechInfo->special) {
-         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
-@@ -2464,10 +2480,15 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-             if (hashObj == NULL) {
-                 return PR_FALSE;
-             }
-+            /* cap the salt for legacy keys */
-+            if ((keyLength <= 1024) && (pss->sLen > 63)) {
-+                return PR_FALSE;
-+            }
-+            /* cap the salt for based on the hash */
-             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
-                 return PR_FALSE;
-             }
--            return PR_TRUE;
-+            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
-         }
-         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
-             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
-@@ -2492,6 +2513,13 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-              }
-              return PR_TRUE;
-         }
-+        /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
-+        case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
-+            if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
-+                return PR_FALSE;
-+            }
-+            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
-+                        + mechInfo->offset));
-         default:
-             break;
-     }
-@@ -2502,7 +2530,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
- 
- PRBool
- sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
--                     SFTKObject *source)
-+                     SFTKObject *source, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
- {
- #ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
-     return PR_FALSE;
-@@ -2534,13 +2562,17 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
-         SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
-         /* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
-          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
--        if (((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
--             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
--             (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
--             (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
--             ((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
-+        if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
-+            (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
-+            (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
-+            (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
-+            (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
-+            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
-+             ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
-+             (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
-+             ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
-             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
--             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source))) {
-+             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
-             return PR_TRUE;
-         }
-     }

SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-review.patches

@@ -1,490 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
---- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.639360404 -0700
-@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
- PRBool
- KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
- {
--    mp_int p, q, y, r;
-+    mp_int p, q, y, r, psub1;
-     mp_err err;
-     int cmp = 1; /* default is false */
-     if (!Y || !prime || !subPrime) {
-@@ -456,13 +456,30 @@ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, S
-     MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
-     MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
-     MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
-+    MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
-     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*prime, &p);
-     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*subPrime, &q);
-     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*Y, &y);
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1));
-+    /*
-+     * We check that the public value isn't zero (which isn't in the
-+     * group), one (subgroup of order one) or p-1 (subgroup of order 2). We
-+     * also check that the public value is less than p, to avoid being fooled
-+     * by values like p+1 or 2*p-1.
-+     * This check is required by SP-800-56Ar3. It's also done in derive,
-+     * but this is only called in various FIPS cases, so put it here to help
-+     * reviewers find it.
-+     */
-+    if (mp_cmp_d(&y, 1) <= 0 ||
-+        mp_cmp(&y, &psub1) >= 0) {
-+        err = MP_BADARG;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-     /* compute r = y**q mod p */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &q, &p, &r));
-     /* compare to 1 */
-@@ -472,6 +489,7 @@ cleanup:
-     mp_clear(&q);
-     mp_clear(&y);
-     mp_clear(&r);
-+    mp_clear(&psub1);
-     if (err) {
-         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-         return PR_FALSE;
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-06-12 13:06:35.410551333 -0700
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
- 
- #include "prprf.h"
- #include "prenv.h"
-+#include "prerror.h"
- 
- #define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
- #define BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMech, typeSize) (!pMech->pParameter || pMech->ulParameterLen < typeSize)
-@@ -4882,6 +4883,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
-      * handle the base object stuff
-      */
-     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
-+    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
-+     * key length against fips requirements */
-+    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
-+    session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
-     sftk_FreeSession(session);
-     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
-         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
-@@ -4889,9 +4894,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
-     if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
-         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
-     }
--    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
--     * fips requirements */
--    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
-     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
-         *phKey = key->handle;
-     }
-@@ -5199,60 +5201,68 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
- 
-     if (isDerivable) {
-         SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
--        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
-         PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
--        CK_RV crv2;
--        CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
--        CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
--        CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
--        CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
--        CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
--            { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
--            { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
--            { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
--            { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
--        };
--        CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
--        CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
-+        NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lowPrivKey = NULL;
-+        ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
-+        SECItem *lowPubValue = NULL;
-+        SECItem item;
-+        SECStatus rv;
- 
-         crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
--        /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
--         * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
--         * the validity of the key */
--
-+        /* FIPS 140-3 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key
-+         * by recalculating the public can an compare it to our own public
-+         * key. */
-+        lowPrivKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, keyType, &crv);
-+        if (lowPrivKey == NULL) {
-+            return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
-+        }
-+        /* recalculate the public key from the private key */
-         switch (keyType) {
--            case CKK_DH:
--                mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
--                pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
--                if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
--                    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
--                }
--                mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
--                mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
--                break;
--            case CKK_EC:
--                mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
--                pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
--                if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
--                    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
--                }
--                ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
--                ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
--                ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
--                ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
--                ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
--                mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
--                mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
--                break;
--            default:
--                return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
-+        case CKK_DH:
-+            rv = DH_Derive(&lowPrivKey->u.dh.base, &lowPrivKey->u.dh.prime,
-+                           &lowPrivKey->u.dh.privateValue, &item, 0);
-+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-+                return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-+            }
-+            lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&item);
-+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&item, PR_FALSE);
-+            pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
-+            break;
-+        case CKK_EC:
-+            rv = EC_NewKeyFromSeed(&lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPriv,
-+                                   lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.data,
-+                                   lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.len);
-+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-+                return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-+            }
-+            /* make sure it has the same encoding */
-+            if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
-+                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
-+              lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
-+            } else {
-+              lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
-+                                               SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));;
-+            }
-+            pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
-+            /* clear out our generated private key */
-+            PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
-+            break;
-+        default:
-+            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
-         }
- 
--        crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
--        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
--            sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
--            return crv;
-+        /* now compare new public key with our already generated key */
-+        if ((pubAttribute == NULL) || (lowPubValue == NULL) ||
-+            (pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen != lowPubValue->len) ||
-+            (PORT_Memcmp(pubAttribute->attrib.pValue, lowPubValue->data,
-+                        lowPubValue->len) != 0)) {
-+            if (pubAttribute) sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
-+            if (lowPubValue) SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
-+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
-+            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-         }
-+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
-+
-         /* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
-          * only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
-          * full validation */
-@@ -5260,44 +5270,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
-             SECItem pubKey;
-             SECItem prime;
-             SECItem subPrime;
-+            SECItem base;
-+            SECItem generator;
-             const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
- 
-             pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
-             pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
--            prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
--            prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
-+            base.data = prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
-+            base.len = prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
-             crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
-             if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-                 goto done;
-             }
--            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
-+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &base, privateKey, CKA_BASE);
-+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-+                goto done;
-+            }
-             /* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
--            if (subPrime.len == 0) {
--                /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
--                 * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
--                 * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
--                subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
--                if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
--                    crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-+            /* do we have a known prime ? */
-+            subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, &generator, isFIPS);
-+            if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
-+                if (subPrime.len == 0) {
-+                    /* if not a known prime, subprime must be supplied */
-+                    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-+                    goto done;
-+                } else {
-+                    /* not a known prime, check for primality of prime
-+                     * and subPrime */
-+                    if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&prime)) {
-+                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-+                        goto done;
-+                    }
-+                    if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&subPrime)) {
-+                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-+                        goto done;
-+                    }
-+                    /* if we aren't using a defined group, make sure base is in the
-+                     * subgroup. If it's not, then our key could fail or succeed sometimes.
-+                     * This makes the failure reliable */
-+                    if (!KEA_Verify(&base, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
-+                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-+                    }
-+                }
-+                subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
-+            } else {
-+                /* we're using a known group, make sure we are using the known generator for that group */
-+                if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&generator, &base) != 0) {
-+                    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-                     goto done;
-                 }
-+                if (subPrime.len != 0) {
-+                    /* we have a known prime and a supplied subPrime,
-+                     * make sure the subPrime matches the subPrime for
-+                     * the known Prime */
-+                     if (SECITEM_CompareItem(subPrimePtr, &subPrime) != 0) {
-+                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-+                        goto done;
-+                     }
-+                 }
-             }
-             if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
--                crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-+                crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-             }
-         done:
-+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&base, PR_FALSE);
-             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
-             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
-         }
-         /* clean up before we return */
-         sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
--        crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
-         if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-             return crv;
-         }
--        if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
--            return crv2;
--        }
-     }
- 
-     return CKR_OK;
-@@ -5925,8 +5969,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
-      * created and linked.
-      */
-     crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
--    sftk_FreeSession(session);
-     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
-         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
-         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
-         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
-@@ -5968,6 +6012,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
-     }
- 
-     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
-         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
-         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
-         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
-@@ -5977,6 +6022,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
-     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
-     privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
-     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
-+    session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
-+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
- 
-     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
-     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
-@@ -8610,7 +8657,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
- 
-             /* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
-              * checks. */
--            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
-+            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, NULL, isFIPS);
-             if (subPrime == NULL) {
-                 SECItem dhSubPrime;
-                 /* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
-@@ -8792,6 +8839,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
-                 secretlen = tmp.len;
-             } else {
-                 secretlen = keySize;
-+                key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-                 crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
-                                           &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
-                                           mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
-@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
- /* dh verify functions */
- /* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
-  * it's subprime value */
--const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
-+const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
- /* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
- SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
- /* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
-@@ -2409,15 +2409,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-     switch (mechInfo->special) {
-         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
-             SECItem dhPrime;
-+            SECItem dhBase;
-+            SECItem dhGenerator;
-+            PRBool val = PR_FALSE;
-             const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
-             CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
-                                                source, CKA_PRIME);
-             if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-                 return PR_FALSE;
-             }
--            dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
-+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhBase, source, CKA_BASE);
-+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-+                return PR_FALSE;
-+            }
-+            dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, &dhGenerator, PR_TRUE);
-+            val = (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
-+            if (val && (SECITEM_CompareItem(&dhBase, &dhGenerator) != 0)) {
-+                val = PR_FALSE;
-+            }
-             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
--            return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
-+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhBase, PR_FALSE);
-+            return val;
-         }
-         case SFTKFIPSNone:
-             return PR_FALSE;
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
---- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
-@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
-                                            (unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
-                                            sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
- 
-+/* generator for all the groups is 2 */
-+static const unsigned char generator_2_data[] = { 2 };
-+
-+
-+static const SECItem generator_2 =
-+    { siBuffer,
-+      (unsigned char *)generator_2_data,
-+      sizeof(generator_2_data) };
-+
- /*
-  * verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
-  */
- const SECItem *
--sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
-+sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *g, PRBool isFIPS)
- {
-     /* use the length to decide which primes to check */
-     switch (dhPrime->len) {
-@@ -6741,56 +6750,67 @@ sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PR
-             }
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
-                             sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_ike_1536;
-             }
-             break;
-         case 2048 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_2048,
-                             sizeof(prime_tls_2048)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_tls_2048;
-             }
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_2048,
-                             sizeof(prime_ike_2048)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_ike_2048;
-             }
-             break;
-         case 3072 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_3072,
-                             sizeof(prime_tls_3072)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_tls_3072;
-             }
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_3072,
-                             sizeof(prime_ike_3072)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_ike_3072;
-             }
-             break;
-         case 4096 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_4096,
-                             sizeof(prime_tls_4096)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_tls_4096;
-             }
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_4096,
-                             sizeof(prime_ike_4096)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_ike_4096;
-             }
-             break;
-         case 6144 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_6144,
-                             sizeof(prime_tls_6144)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_tls_6144;
-             }
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_6144,
-                             sizeof(prime_ike_6144)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_ike_6144;
-             }
-             break;
-         case 8192 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_8192,
-                             sizeof(prime_tls_8192)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_tls_8192;
-             }
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_8192,
-                             sizeof(prime_ike_8192)) == 0) {
-+                if (g) *g = generator_2;
-                 return &subprime_ike_8192;
-             }
-             break;
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
---- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
-@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
-             goto fail;
-         }
-     } else {
-+        /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
-+         * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
-+        if (!params->bRekey) {
-+            outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-+        }
-         crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
-                        inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
-         if (crv != CKR_OK) {

SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
---- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
-+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
-@@ -371,16 +371,21 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
- // Fail to connect with a weak RSA key.
- TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
-   Reset(kPssDelegatorId);
-   EnsureTlsSetup();
-   static const SSLSignatureScheme kSchemes[] = {ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
-                                                 ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
-   client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
-   server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
-+  PRInt32 keySizeFlags;
-+  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &keySizeFlags));
-+  // turn off the signing key sizes so we actually test the ssl tests
-+  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
-+            NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG ));
- #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
-   // save the MIN POLICY length.
-   PRInt32 minRsa;
- 
-   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
- #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
-   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
-             NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
-@@ -408,16 +413,17 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
-   client_->EnableDelegatedCredentials();
- 
-   auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
-       client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
-   ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
- #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
-   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
- #endif
-+  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, keySizeFlags));
- }
- 
- class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
-  public:
-   ReplaceDCSigScheme(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& a)
-       : TlsHandshakeFilter(a, {ssl_hs_certificate_verify}) {}
- 
-  protected:
-diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
---- a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
-+++ b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
-@@ -1134,22 +1134,31 @@ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SE
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-     /* interpret modulus length as key strength */
-     switch (privk->keyType) {
-         case rsaKey:
-         case rsaPssKey:
-         case rsaOaepKey:
--            /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
--             * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
--            bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
--            if (bitSize == -1) {
--                bitSize = 0;
-+            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
-+                                    CKA_MODULUS, NULL, &params);
-+            if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
-+                /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
-+                 * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary. This
-+                 * method is less percise because it returns bytes instead
-+                 * bits, so we only do it if we can't get the modulus */
-+                bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
-+                if (bitSize == -1) {
-+                    return 0;
-+                }
-+                return bitSize;
-             }
-+            bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&params);
-+            PORT_Free(params.data);
-             return bitSize;
-         case dsaKey:
-         case fortezzaKey:
-         case dhKey:
-         case keaKey:
-             rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
-                                     CKA_PRIME, NULL, &params);
-             if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
-diff --git a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
---- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-+++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-@@ -1277,27 +1277,39 @@ ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *h
-             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
-             goto done;
-     }
-     PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
- 
-     if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
-         CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
-         int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
-+        PRInt32 optval;
- 
-         SECItem *params = NULL;
-         CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
-         SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
-                                   (unsigned char *)&pssParams,
-                                   sizeof(pssParams) };
- 
-         if (signatureLen <= 0) {
-             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
-             goto done;
-         }
-+        /* since we are calling PK11_SignWithMechanism directly, we need to check the
-+         * key policy ourselves (which is already checked in SGN_Digest */
-+        rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
-+        if ((rv == SECSuccess) &&
-+            ((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG)) {
-+            rv = SECKEY_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType, SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
-+                                       SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
-+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-+                goto done; /* error code already set */
-+            }
-+        }
- 
-         buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
-         buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
-         if (!buf->data)
-             goto done; /* error code was set. */
- 
-         if (useRsaPss) {
-             pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);

SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/lib/util/nsshash.c b/lib/util/nsshash.c
---- a/lib/util/nsshash.c
-+++ b/lib/util/nsshash.c
-@@ -102,16 +102,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashTy
- SECOidTag
- HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag hmacOid)
- {
-     SECOidTag hashOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
- 
-     switch (hmacOid) {
-         /* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
-         /* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
-+        case SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5:
-+            hashOid = SEC_OID_MD5;
-+            break;
-         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1:
-             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA1;
-             break;
-         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224:
-             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA224;
-             break;
-         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256:
-             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA256;
-@@ -145,16 +148,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag
- SECOidTag
- HASH_GetHMACOidTagByHashOidTag(SECOidTag hashOid)
- {
-     SECOidTag hmacOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
- 
-     switch (hashOid) {
-         /* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
-         /* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
-+        case SEC_OID_MD5:
-+            hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5;
-+            break;
-         case SEC_OID_SHA1:
-             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
-             break;
-         case SEC_OID_SHA224:
-             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224;
-             break;
-         case SEC_OID_SHA256:
-             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;

SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-pbkdf1-encoding.patch

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
---- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
-+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
-@@ -1710,20 +1710,26 @@ PK11_ParamToAlgid(SECOidTag algTag, SECI
-         case CKM_BATON_ECB96:
-         case CKM_BATON_CBC128:
-         case CKM_BATON_COUNTER:
-         case CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE:
-         case CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128:
-         case CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128:
-         case CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER:
-         case CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE:
--            newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
--                                           SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
--            if (newParams == NULL)
--                break;
-+            /* if no parameters have been supplied, then encode a NULL params
-+             */
-+            if (param && param->len > 0) {
-+                newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
-+                                               SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
-+                if (newParams == NULL)
-+                    break;
-+            } else {
-+                newParams = NULL;
-+            }
-             rv = SECSuccess;
-             break;
-     }
- 
-     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-         if (newParams)
-             SECITEM_FreeItem(newParams, PR_TRUE);
-         return rv;
-diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
---- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
-+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
-@@ -765,45 +765,53 @@ sec_pkcs5CreateAlgorithmID(SECOidTag alg
-          * algorithm is). We use choose this algorithm oid based on the
-          * cipherAlgorithm to determine what this should be (MAC1 or PBES2).
-          */
-         if (algorithm == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2) {
-             /* choose mac or pbes */
-             algorithm = sec_pkcs5v2_get_pbe(cipherAlgorithm);
-         }
- 
-+        SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
-+
-         /* set the PKCS5v2 specific parameters */
-         if (keyLength == 0) {
--            SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
-             if (hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-                 keyLength = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
-             } else {
-                 keyLength = sec_pkcs5v2_default_key_length(cipherAlgorithm);
-             }
-             if (keyLength <= 0) {
-                 goto loser;
-             }
-         }
-         /* currently SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 is the default */
-         if (prfAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-             prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
-         }
- 
--        /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id */
--        cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
--            PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
--        if (!cipherParams) {
--            goto loser;
-+        /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id, if cipher
-+         * is an HMAC, the cipherParams should be NULL */
-+        if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-+            cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
-+                PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
-+            if (!cipherParams) {
-+                goto loser;
-+            }
-+        } else {
-+            cipherParams = NULL;
-         }
- 
-         PORT_Memset(&pbeV2_param, 0, sizeof(pbeV2_param));
- 
-         rv = PK11_ParamToAlgid(cipherAlgorithm, cipherParams,
-                                poolp, &pbeV2_param.cipherAlgId);
--        SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
-+        if (cipherParams) {
-+            SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
-+        }
-         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-             goto loser;
-         }
-     }
- 
-     /* generate the parameter */
-     pbe_param = sec_pkcs5_create_pbe_parameter(pbeAlgorithm, salt, iteration,
-                                                keyLength, prfAlg);
-diff --git a/lib/util/secalgid.c b/lib/util/secalgid.c
---- a/lib/util/secalgid.c
-+++ b/lib/util/secalgid.c
-@@ -50,17 +50,18 @@ SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(PLArenaPool *arena
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
-         return SECFailure;
-     }
- 
-     if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &id->algorithm, &oiddata->oid))
-         return SECFailure;
- 
-     if ((secoid_IsRSAPKCS1(which)) ||
--        (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL)) {
-+        (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL) /* ||
-+        (HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(which) != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) */) {
-         add_null_param = PR_TRUE;
-     } else {
-         add_null_param = PR_FALSE;
-     }
- 
-     if (params) {
-         /*
-          * I am specifically *not* enforcing the following assertion

SOURCES/nss-3.101-long-pwd-fix.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
---- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix	2024-09-06 17:58:39.905517185 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c	2024-09-06 17:59:19.568985976 -0700
-@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ sec_pkcs12_integrity_key(PK11SlotInfo *s
-         *hmacMech = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hmacAlg);
-         /* pkcs12v2 hmac uses UTF8 rather than unicode */
-         if (!sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(NULL, &utf8Pw, pwitem,
--                                                PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
-+                                                PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
-             return NULL;
-         }
-         symKey = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, prfAlgid, &utf8Pw, PR_FALSE, pwarg);

SOURCES/nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.brew ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh
---- ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.brew	2021-06-12 11:37:46.153265942 -0700
-+++ ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh	2021-06-12 11:39:43.069925034 -0700
-@@ -1641,7 +1641,9 @@ ssl_run_tests()
-             if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
-                 ssl_policy_listsuites
-                 ssl_policy_selfserv
--                ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp
-+                # requires access to external servers, which fails
-+                # when running in brew
-+                #ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp
-                 ssl_policy
-             fi
-             ;;

SOURCES/nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia ./doc/pk12util.xml
---- ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia	2022-01-26 09:46:39.794919455 -0800
-+++ ./doc/pk12util.xml	2022-01-26 09:54:58.277019760 -0800
-@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ Certificate    Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
- 
-   <refsection id="encryption">
-     <title>Password Encryption</title>
--    <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 3-key triple DES for private key encryption. When not in FIPS mode, PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 40-bit RC4 is used for certificate encryption. When in FIPS mode, there is no certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
-+    <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using AES-256-CBC for private key encryption and AES-128-CBC for certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
-     <para>The private key is always protected with strong encryption by default.</para>
-     <para>Several types of ciphers are supported.</para>
-     <variablelist>
-@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ Certificate    Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
-         <listitem>
- 	  <itemizedlist>
- 	    <listitem><para>PBES2 with AES-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"AES-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"AES-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"AES-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
-+	    <listitem><para>PBES2 with CAMELLIA-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"CAMELLIA-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"CAMELLIA-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"CAMELLIA-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
- 	  </itemizedlist>
-         </listitem>
-       </varlistentry>

SOURCES/nss-3.79-fips.patch

@@ -1,578 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/lib/freebl/config.mk b/lib/freebl/config.mk
---- a/lib/freebl/config.mk
-+++ b/lib/freebl/config.mk
-@@ -85,9 +85,13 @@ EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \
- 	$(NULL)
- endif
- endif
- 
- ifeq ($(OS_ARCH), Darwin)
- EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += -dylib_file @executable_path/libplc4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplc4.dylib -dylib_file @executable_path/libplds4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplds4.dylib
- endif
- 
-+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
-+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
- endif
-+
-+endif
-diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
---- a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
-+++ b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
-@@ -20,53 +20,110 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
-     if (!numBytes) {
-         /* error is set */
-         return;
-     }
-     RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
-     PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
- }
- 
-+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
-+#include <sys/random.h>
-+#include "prinit.h"
-+
-+static int rng_grndFlags= 0;
-+static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
-+
-+static PRStatus
-+rng_getKernelFips()
-+{
-+#ifdef LINUX
-+    FILE *f;
-+    char d;
-+    size_t size;
-+
-+    f = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r");
-+    if (!f)
-+        return PR_FAILURE;
-+
-+    size = fread(&d, 1, 1, f);
-+    fclose(f);
-+    if (size != 1)
-+        return PR_SUCCESS;
-+    if (d != '1')
-+        return PR_SUCCESS;
-+    /* if the kernel is in FIPS mode, set the GRND_RANDOM flag */
-+    rng_grndFlags = GRND_RANDOM;
-+#endif /* LINUX */
-+    return PR_SUCCESS;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- size_t
- RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
- {
-+    size_t fileBytes = 0;
-+    unsigned char *buffer = dest;
-+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
-     int fd;
-     int bytes;
--    size_t fileBytes = 0;
--    unsigned char *buffer = dest;
-+#else
-+    PR_CallOnce(&rng_KernelFips, rng_getKernelFips);
-+#endif
- 
- #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (defined(LINUX) && defined(__GLIBC__) && ((__GLIBC__ > 2) || ((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))))
-     int result;
--
-     while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
-         size_t getBytes = maxLen - fileBytes;
-         if (getBytes > GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES) {
-             getBytes = GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES;
-         }
-+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
-+        /* FIP 140-3 requires full kernel reseeding for chained entropy sources
-+         * so we need to use getrandom with GRND_RANDOM.
-+         * getrandom returns -1 on failure, otherwise returns
-+         * the number of bytes, which can be less than getBytes */
-+        result = getrandom(buffer, getBytes, rng_grndFlags);
-+        if (result < 0) {
-+            break;
-+        }
-+        fileBytes += result;
-+        buffer += result;
-+#else
-+        /* get entropy returns 0 on success and always return
-+         * getBytes on success */
-         result = getentropy(buffer, getBytes);
-         if (result == 0) { /* success */
-             fileBytes += getBytes;
-             buffer += getBytes;
-         } else {
-             break;
-         }
-+#endif
-     }
-     if (fileBytes == maxLen) { /* success */
-         return maxLen;
-     }
-+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
-+    /* in FIPS 104-3 we don't fallback, just fail */
-+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-+    return 0;
-+#else
-     /* If we failed with an error other than ENOSYS, it means the destination
-      * buffer is not writeable. We don't need to try writing to it again. */
-     if (errno != ENOSYS) {
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-         return 0;
-     }
-+#endif /*!NSS_FIPS_140_3 */
-+#endif /* platorm has getentropy */
-+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
-     /* ENOSYS means the kernel doesn't support getentropy()/getrandom().
-      * Reset the number of bytes to get and fall back to /dev/urandom. */
-     fileBytes = 0;
--#endif
-     fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
-     if (fd < 0) {
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-         return 0;
-     }
-     while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
-         bytes = read(fd, buffer, maxLen - fileBytes);
-         if (bytes <= 0) {
-@@ -76,9 +133,10 @@ RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
-         buffer += bytes;
-     }
-     (void)close(fd);
-     if (fileBytes != maxLen) {
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-         return 0;
-     }
-     return fileBytes;
-+#endif
- }
-diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
---- a/lib/softoken/config.mk
-+++ b/lib/softoken/config.mk
-@@ -58,8 +58,12 @@ endif
- ifdef NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
- DEFINES += -DNSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
- endif
- 
- ifdef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
- DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID=\"${NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID}\"
- endif
- 
-+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
-+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
-+endif
-+
-diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
---- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
-+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
-@@ -1766,16 +1766,20 @@ sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
-     unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
-     unsigned char keyLen = 64;
-     char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
--    static const unsigned char saltData[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
-+    static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
-+        0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
-+        0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
-+    };
-+
-     static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
--        0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
--        0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
--        0x28, 0x59, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x37,
--        0x18, 0x22, 0xc1, 0x92, 0xd0, 0xfa, 0x72, 0x90,
--        0x2c, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x16, 0xfa,
--        0x8d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x5f, 0x17, 0xb1,
--        0x22, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0x66,
--        0xc6, 0x14, 0xfe, 0x83, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0xc5
-+        0x73, 0x8c, 0xfa, 0x02, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x43, 0xe4,
-+        0x99, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0x7b,
-+        0xc4, 0xda, 0x22, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0xae, 0x23, 0x7a,
-+        0x21, 0x27, 0xbd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc4, 0xe6, 0xc5,
-+        0x33, 0x38, 0x35, 0xe0, 0x68, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x06,
-+        0xad, 0xaf, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x90,
-+        0x17, 0x97, 0x73, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x49, 0xd8,
-+        0x6f, 0x78, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x50, 0x20, 0x55, 0x33
-     };
-
-     sftk_PBELockInit();
-diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
---- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
-+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
-@@ -4609,16 +4609,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
-         goto loser;
-     }
- 
-     /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
-     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
-     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
-     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
- 
-+
-     /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
-     key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
-     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
-         case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
-         case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
-         case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
-         case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
-             checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
-@@ -4812,16 +4813,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
-     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
-     sftk_FreeSession(session);
-     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
-         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
-     }
-     if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
-         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
-     }
-+    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
-+     * fips requirements */
-+    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
-     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
-         *phKey = key->handle;
-     }
- loser:
-     PORT_Memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
-     sftk_FreeObject(key);
-     return crv;
- }
-@@ -5780,16 +5784,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
- 
-     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
-         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
-         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
-         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
-         return crv;
-     }
-+    /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
-+    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
-+    publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
- 
-     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
-     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
-     sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
-     sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
- 
-     return CKR_OK;
- }
-@@ -6990,16 +6997,17 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
-     }
- 
-     /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
-     if (params->bExtract) {
-         CK_BYTE *salt;
-         CK_ULONG saltLen;
-         HMACContext *hmac;
-         unsigned int bufLen;
-+        SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
- 
-         switch (params->ulSaltType) {
-             case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
-                 saltLen = hashLen;
-                 salt = hashbuf;
-                 memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
-                 break;
-             case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
-@@ -7026,29 +7034,54 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
-                 if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
-                     CK_MECHANISM mech;
-                     mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
-                     mech.pParameter = params;
-                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
-                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
-                                                        CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
-                 }
-+                saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
-                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
-                 if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
-                     sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
-                     return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
-                 }
-                 /* save the resulting salt */
-                 salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
-                 saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
-                 break;
-             default:
-                 return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
-                 break;
-         }
-+        /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
-+         * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
-+        if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
-+            PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
-+            /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
-+             * salt */
-+            if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
-+                (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
-+                (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
-+                fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
-+            }
-+            /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
-+            if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
-+                (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
-+                (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
-+                (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
-+                (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
-+                fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
-+            }
-+            if (!fipsOK) {
-+                key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-+            }
-+        }
-+        if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
- 
-         hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
-         if (saltKey_att) {
-             sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
-         }
-         if (saltKey) {
-             sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
-         }
-@@ -7076,16 +7109,40 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
-         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
-          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
-          * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
-          */
-         HMACContext *hmac;
-         CK_BYTE bi;
-         unsigned iterations;
- 
-+        /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
-+         * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
-+        if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
-+            unsigned char *info=&params->pInfo[3];
-+            /* only one case,
-+             *  1) Expand only
-+             *  2) with a key whose source was
-+             *  SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
-+             *  3) source key length == rawHash->length
-+             *  4) Info has tls or dtls
-+             * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
-+             * off the fips indicator */
-+            if (params->bExtract ||
-+               ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
-+                (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
-+               (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
-+               (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
-+               ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
-+               (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
-+               key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-+            }
-+        }
-+        if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
-+
-         genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
-         iterations = genLen / hashLen;
- 
-         if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
-             keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
-             if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
-                 return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
-             }
-@@ -8434,16 +8491,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
- 
-             /* calculate private value - oct */
-             rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
- 
-             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
-             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
- 
-             if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-+                key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
-                 sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
-                 SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
-                 crv = CKR_OK;
-             } else
-                 crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
- 
-             break;
-         }
-@@ -8564,16 +8622,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
-                     }
-                     PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
-                     secret = keyData;
-                 } else {
-                     secret += (secretlen - keySize);
-                 }
-                 secretlen = keySize;
-             }
-+            key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
- 
-             sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
-             PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
-             if (keyData) {
-                 PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
-             }
-             break;
- 
-diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
---- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
-+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
-@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
-  */
- typedef enum {
-     SFTK_DestroyFailure,
-     SFTK_Destroyed,
-     SFTK_Busy
- } SFTKFreeStatus;
- 
- /*
-+ * Source of various objects
-+ */
-+typedef enum {
-+    SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
-+    SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
-+    SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
-+    SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
-+} SFTKSource;
-+
-+/*
-  * attribute values of an object.
-  */
- struct SFTKAttributeStr {
-     SFTKAttribute *next;
-     SFTKAttribute *prev;
-     PRBool freeAttr;
-     PRBool freeData;
-     /*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
-@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
-     CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
-     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
-     int refCount;
-     PZLock *refLock;
-     SFTKSlot *slot;
-     void *objectInfo;
-     SFTKFree infoFree;
-     PRBool isFIPS;
-+    SFTKSource source;
- };
- 
- struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
-     SFTKObject obj;
-     SECItem dbKey;
- };
- 
- struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
-diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
---- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
-+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
-@@ -1090,16 +1090,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
-         sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
-     }
-     sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
- 
-     object->handle = 0;
-     object->next = object->prev = NULL;
-     object->slot = slot;
-     object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
-+    object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
- 
-     object->refCount = 1;
-     sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
-     sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
-     sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
-     sessObject->session = NULL;
-     sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
-     if (!hasLocks)
-@@ -1674,16 +1675,17 @@ fail:
- CK_RV
- sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
- {
-     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
-     SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
-     unsigned int i;
- 
-     destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
-+    destObject->source = srcObject->source;
-     if (src_so == NULL) {
-         return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
-     }
- 
-     PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
-     for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
-         attribute = src_so->head[i];
-         do {
-@@ -2059,16 +2061,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
-     /* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
-      * doesn't exist */
-     crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
-     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-         goto loser;
-     }
-     object->slot = slot;
-     object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
-+    object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
-     object->objectInfo = NULL;
-     object->infoFree = NULL;
-     if (!hasLocks) {
-         object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
-     }
-     if (object->refLock == NULL) {
-         goto loser;
-     }
-@@ -2225,16 +2228,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE 
-             break;
-         case CKA_DERIVE:
-             flags = CKF_DERIVE;
-             break;
-         /* fake attribute to select digesting */
-         case CKA_DIGEST:
-             flags = CKF_DIGEST;
-             break;
-+        /* fake attribute to select key gen */
-+         case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
-+            flags = CKF_GENERATE;
-+            break;
-+        /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
-+        case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
-+            flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
-+            break;
-+        /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
-         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
-             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
-             break;
-         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
-             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
-             break;
-         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
-             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
-@@ -2278,17 +2290,17 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
- }
- 
- /* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
-  * FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
-  * in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
-  * the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
-  * in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
-  * the FIPS indicator code */
--static int
-+static CK_ULONG
- sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
- {
-     CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
-     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
-     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
-     CK_RV crv;
- 
-diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
---- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
-+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
-@@ -58,16 +58,18 @@
- /*
-  * NSS-defined certificate types
-  *
-  */
- #define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
- 
- /* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
- #define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
-+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
-+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
- #define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
- #define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
- #define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
- 
- /*
-  * NSS-defined object attributes
-  *
-  */

SOURCES/nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
---- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults	2022-07-20 13:40:24.152212683 -0700
-+++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c	2022-07-20 13:42:40.031094190 -0700
-@@ -1146,6 +1146,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
-         goto done;
-     }
- 
-+    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
-+        cipher =  SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
-+        certCipher =  SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
-+    }
-+
-     if (pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].activated) {
-         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].arg;
- 
-@@ -1160,9 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
-         }
-     }
- 
--    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
--        certCipher =  SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
--    }
-     if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
-         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
- 

SOURCES/nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch

@@ -1,335 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
---- ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted	2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt	2022-06-24 10:51:32.035207662 -0700
-@@ -7668,6 +7668,187 @@ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_
- CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
- 
- #
-+# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
-+#
-+# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
-+# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
-+# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
-+# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
-+# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
-+# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
-+# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
-+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
-+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
-+CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
-+CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
-+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
-+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
-+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
-+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
-+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
-+END
-+CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
-+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
-+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
-+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
-+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
-+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
-+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
-+END
-+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\002\004\017\377\377\377
-+END
-+CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
-+\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
-+\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
-+\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
-+\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
-+\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
-+\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
-+\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
-+\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
-+\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
-+\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
-+\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
-+\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
-+\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
-+\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
-+\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
-+\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
-+\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
-+\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
-+\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
-+\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
-+\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
-+\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
-+\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
-+\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
-+\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
-+\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
-+\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
-+\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
-+\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
-+\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
-+\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
-+\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
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-+\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
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-+\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
-+\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
-+\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
-+\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
-+\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
-+\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
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-+\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
-+\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
-+\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
-+\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
-+\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
-+\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
-+\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
-+\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
-+\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
-+\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
-+\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
-+\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
-+\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
-+\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
-+\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
-+\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
-+\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
-+\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
-+\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
-+\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
-+\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
-+\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
-+\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
-+\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
-+\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
-+\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
-+\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
-+\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
-+\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
-+\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
-+\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
-+\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
-+\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
-+\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
-+\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
-+\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
-+\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
-+\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
-+\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
-+\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
-+\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
-+\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
-+\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
-+\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
-+\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
-+\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
-+\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
-+\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
-+\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
-+\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
-+\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
-+\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
-+\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
-+\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
-+\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
-+\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
-+\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
-+\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
-+\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
-+\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
-+\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
-+\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
-+\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
-+END
-+
-+# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
-+# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
-+# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
-+# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
-+# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
-+# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
-+# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
-+# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
-+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
-+CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
-+\222\341\102\102
-+END
-+CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
-+END
-+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
-+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
-+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
-+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
-+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
-+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
-+END
-+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\002\004\017\377\377\377
-+END
-+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+
-+#
- # Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
- #
- # Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
-@@ -8161,6 +8342,68 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
- CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
- CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
- 
-+# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
-+# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
-+# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
-+# Not Before: Apr  7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
-+# Not After : Apr  4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
-+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
-+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
-+\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
-+\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
-+\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
-+\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
-+\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
-+\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
-+\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
-+\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
-+\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
-+\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
-+END
-+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\002\004\153\111\322\005
-+END
-+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+
-+# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
-+# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
-+# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
-+# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
-+# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
-+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
-+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
-+\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
-+\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
-+\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
-+\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
-+\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
-+\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
-+\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
-+\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
-+\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
-+\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
-+END
-+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\002\004\153\111\322\006
-+END
-+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+
- #
- # Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
- #
-@@ -8804,6 +9047,74 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
- CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
- CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
- 
-+# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
-+# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
-+# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
-+# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
-+# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
-+# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
-+# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
-+# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
-+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
-+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
-+\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
-+\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
-+\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
-+\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
-+\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
-+\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
-+\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
-+\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
-+\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
-+\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
-+END
-+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\002\002\010\047
-+END
-+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+
-+# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
-+# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
-+# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
-+# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
-+# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
-+# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
-+# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
-+# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
-+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
-+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
-+\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
-+\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
-+\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
-+\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
-+\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
-+\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
-+\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
-+\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
-+\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
-+\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
-+END
-+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-+\002\002\010\144
-+END
-+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-+
- #
- # Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
- #

SOURCES/nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
---- a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
-+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
-@@ -146,16 +146,38 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
- 
-     CHECK_FORK();
- 
-     /* make sure we're legal */
-     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
-     if (crv != CKR_OK)
-         return crv;
- 
-+    if (context->isFIPS && (contextType == SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
-+        if ((pParameter == NULL) || (ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS))) {
-+            context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-+        } else {
-+            CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
-+            switch (p->ivGenerator) {
-+                case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
-+                    context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-+                    break;
-+                case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
-+                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
-+                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-+                    }
-+                    break;
-+                default:
-+                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
-+                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-+                    }
-+            }
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-     if (!pOuttext) {
-         *pulOuttextLen = ulIntextLen;
-         return CKR_OK;
-     }
-     rv = (*context->aeadUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pOuttext, &outlen,
-                                 maxout, pIntext, ulIntextLen,
-                                 pParameter, ulParameterLen,
-                                 pAssociatedData, ulAssociatedDataLen);

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch

@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.632889660 -0800
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
-@@ -7090,7 +7090,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
-                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
-                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
-                                                        CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
--                                                       keySize);
-+                                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
-                 }
-                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
-                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
-@@ -7404,7 +7404,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
-         }
-     }
-     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
--                                       keySize);
-+                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
- 
-     switch (mechanism) {
-         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.633889670 -0800
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-01-19 09:28:00.082843565 -0800
-@@ -2393,20 +2393,43 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
- }
- 
- PRBool
--sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
-+sftk_checkFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash, PRBool allowSmall, PRBool allowCMAC)
- {
-     switch (hash) {
-+        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
-+            return allowCMAC;
-+        case CKM_SHA_1:
-+        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
-+        case CKM_SHA224:
-+        case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
-+            return allowSmall;
-         case CKM_SHA256:
--        case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
-+        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
-         case CKM_SHA384:
--        case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
-+        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
-         case CKM_SHA512:
--        case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
-+        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
-             return PR_TRUE;
-     }
-     return PR_FALSE;
- }
- 
-+PRBool
-+sftk_checkKeyLength(CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG min,
-+                    CK_ULONG max, CK_ULONG step)
-+{
-+     if (keyLength > max) {
-+         return PR_FALSE;
-+     }
-+     if (keyLength < min ) {
-+         return PR_FALSE;
-+     }
-+     if (((keyLength - min) % step) != 0) {
-+         return PR_FALSE;
-+     }
-+     return PR_TRUE;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
-  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
-@@ -2416,6 +2439,8 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-                    SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
-                    CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
- {
-+    PRBool allowSmall = PR_FALSE;
-+    PRBool allowCMAC = PR_FALSE;
-     switch (mechInfo->special) {
-         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
-             SECItem dhPrime;
-@@ -2482,7 +2507,11 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
-                 return PR_FALSE;
-             }
--            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
-+            /* Our code makes sure pss->hashAlg matches the explicit
-+             * hash in the mechanism, and only mechanisms with approved
-+             * hashes are included, so no need to check pss->hashAlg
-+             * here */
-+            return PR_TRUE;
-         }
-         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
-             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
-@@ -2508,12 +2537,28 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-              return PR_TRUE;
-         }
-         /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
-+        case SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800:
-+             allowCMAC = PR_TRUE;
-         case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
-+             allowSmall = PR_TRUE;
-+        case SFTKFIPSChkHashTls:
-             if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
-                 return PR_FALSE;
-             }
--            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
--                        + mechInfo->offset));
-+            return sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
-+                        + mechInfo->offset), allowSmall, allowCMAC);
-+        case SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck:
-+            if (mech->mechanism != CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
-+                /* unless the mechnism has a built-in hash, check the hash */
-+                if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
-+                    return PR_FALSE;
-+                }
-+                if (!sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
-+                        + mechInfo->offset), PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
-+                    return PR_FALSE;
-+                }
-+            }
-+            return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
-         default:
-             break;
-     }
-@@ -2558,13 +2603,11 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
-          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
-         if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
-             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
--            (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
--            (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
--            (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
--            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
--             ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
--             (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
--             ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
-+            sftk_checkKeyLength(keyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
-+                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step) &&
-+            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||  (mechs->special == SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck)
-+             || sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
-+                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step)) &&
-             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
-              sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
-             return PR_TRUE;
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
---- ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.634889680 -0800
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c	2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
-@@ -157,16 +157,25 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
-         } else {
-             CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
-             switch (p->ivGenerator) {
-+                default:
-                 case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
-                     context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-                     break;
-                 case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
--                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
-+                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
-+                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
-                         context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-                     }
-                     break;
--                default:
--                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
-+                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
-+                    if ((p->ulIvLen != 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
-+                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 32)) {
-+                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-+                    }
-+                    break;
-+                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
-+                    if ((p->ulIvFixedBits < 32) ||
-+                       ((p->ulIvLen*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - p->ulIvFixedBits) < 32)) {
-                         context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
-                     }
-             }

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch

@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c
---- ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
-         PORT_Memcpy(iv + AES_KEY_WRAP_BLOCK_SIZE, input, inputLen);
-         rv = AES_Encrypt(&cx->aescx, output, pOutputLen, maxOutputLen, iv,
-                          outLen);
--        PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
-+        PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
-         return rv;
-     }
- 
-@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
-     PORT_ZFree(newBuf, paddedInputLen);
-     /* a little overkill, we only need to clear out the length, but this
-      * is easier to verify we got it all */
--    PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
-     return rv;
- }
- 
-@@ -631,12 +631,12 @@ AESKeyWrap_DecryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
- loser:
-     /* if we failed, make sure we don't return any data to the user */
-     if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (output == newBuf)) {
--        PORT_Memset(newBuf, 0, paddedLen);
-+        PORT_SafeZero(newBuf, paddedLen);
-     }
-     /* clear out CSP sensitive data from the heap and stack */
-     if (allocBuf) {
-         PORT_ZFree(allocBuf, paddedLen);
-     }
--    PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
-     return rv;
- }
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/blapii.h
---- ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/blapii.h	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@ PRBool ppc_crypto_support();
- #ifdef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
- #define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)
- #else
--#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)                    \
--    {                                                    \
--        volatile char _stkclr[stack_size];               \
--        PORT_Memset((void *)&_stkclr[0], 0, stack_size); \
-+#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)                   \
-+    {                                                   \
-+        volatile char _stkclr[stack_size];              \
-+        PORT_SafeZero((void *)&_stkclr[0], stack_size); \
-     }
- #endif
- 
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/drbg.c
---- ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/drbg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ prng_initEntropy(void)
-     SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block));
-     SHA256_End(&ctx, globalrng->previousEntropyHash, NULL,
-                sizeof(globalrng->previousEntropyHash));
--    PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof(block));
-     SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
-     return PR_SUCCESS;
- }
-@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ prng_getEntropy(PRUint8 *buffer, size_t
-     }
- 
- out:
--    PORT_Memset(hash, 0, sizeof hash);
--    PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof block);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(hash, sizeof hash);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof block);
-     return rv;
- }
- 
-@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *r
-         PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry);
-         SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
-     }
--    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
--    PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof data);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(thisHash, sizeof thisHash);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
-     PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter, (sizeof rng->reseed_counter) - 1, carry);
- 
-     /* if the prng failed, don't return any output, signal softoken */
--    PORT_Memset(H, 0, sizeof H);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(H, sizeof H);
-     if (!rng->isValid) {
-         PORT_Memset(returned_bytes, 0, no_of_returned_bytes);
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/dsa.c
---- ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/dsa.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
-     err = MP_OKAY;
-     signature->len = dsa_signature_len;
- cleanup:
--    PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
-     mp_clear(&p);
-     mp_clear(&q);
-     mp_clear(&g);
-@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ DSA_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
-         rv = dsa_SignDigest(key, signature, digest, kSeed);
-     } while (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM &&
-              --retries > 0);
--    PORT_Memset(kSeed, 0, sizeof kSeed);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(kSeed, sizeof kSeed);
-     return rv;
- }
- 
-@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ DSA_VerifyDigest(DSAPublicKey *key, cons
-         verified = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
-     }
- cleanup:
--    PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, sizeof localDigestData);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, sizeof localDigestData);
-     mp_clear(&p);
-     mp_clear(&q);
-     mp_clear(&g);
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/gcm.c
---- ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/gcm.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ gcmHash_Final(gcmHashContext *ghash, uns
-     rv = SECSuccess;
- 
- cleanup:
--    PORT_Memset(T, 0, sizeof(T));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(T, sizeof(T));
-     return rv;
- }
- 
-@@ -596,15 +596,15 @@ GCM_CreateContext(void *context, freeblC
-     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-         goto loser;
-     }
--    PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-     gcm->ctr_context_init = PR_TRUE;
-     return gcm;
- 
- loser:
--    PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-     if (ghash && ghash->mem) {
-         void *mem = ghash->mem;
--        PORT_Memset(ghash, 0, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
-+        PORT_SafeZero(ghash, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
-         PORT_Free(mem);
-     }
-     if (gcm) {
-@@ -682,11 +682,11 @@ gcm_InitCounter(GCMContext *gcm, const u
-         goto loser;
-     }
- 
--    PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
-     return SECSuccess;
- 
- loser:
--    PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
-     if (freeCtr) {
-         CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
-     }
-@@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ GCM_DecryptUpdate(GCMContext *gcm, unsig
-     if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(tag, intag, tagBytes) != 0) {
-         /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
--        PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
-+        PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
-         return SECFailure;
-     }
--    PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
-     /* finish the decryption */
-     return CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
-                       inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-@@ -1159,10 +1159,10 @@ GCM_DecryptAEAD(GCMContext *gcm, unsigne
-         /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
-         CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
--        PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
-+        PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
-         return SECFailure;
-     }
--    PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
-     /* finish the decryption */
-     rv = CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
-                     inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c
---- ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ MAC(unsigned char *mdOut,
-     hashObj->end(mdState, mdOut, mdOutLen, mdOutMax);
-     hashObj->destroy(mdState, PR_TRUE);
- 
--    PORT_Memset(lengthBytes, 0, sizeof lengthBytes);
--    PORT_Memset(hmacPad, 0, sizeof hmacPad);
--    PORT_Memset(firstBlock, 0, sizeof firstBlock);
--    PORT_Memset(macOut, 0, sizeof macOut);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(lengthBytes, sizeof lengthBytes);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(hmacPad, sizeof hmacPad);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(firstBlock, sizeof firstBlock);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(macOut, sizeof macOut);
- 
-     return SECSuccess;
- }
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
---- ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ intel_aes_gcmInitCounter(intel_AES_GCMCo
- void
- intel_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
- {
--    PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
-     if (freeit) {
-         PORT_Free(gcm);
-     }
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c
---- ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ ppc_aes_gcmInitCounter(ppc_AES_GCMContex
- void
- ppc_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(ppc_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
- {
--    PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
-     if (freeit) {
-         PORT_Free(gcm);
-     }
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/pqg.c
---- ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/pqg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
-@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ cleanup:
-     mp_clear(&a);
-     mp_clear(&z);
-     mp_clear(&two_length_minus_1);
--    PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
-     if (err) {
-         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-         rv = SECFailure;
-@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ cleanup:
-     mp_clear(&c);
-     mp_clear(&c0);
-     mp_clear(&one);
--    PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
-     if (err) {
-         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-         rv = SECFailure;
-@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ makePfromQandSeed(
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&c, 1, &c)); /* c -= 1       */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&X, &c, P));   /* P = X - c    */
- cleanup:
--    PORT_Memset(V_j, 0, sizeof V_j);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(V_j, sizeof V_j);
-     mp_clear(&W);
-     mp_clear(&X);
-     mp_clear(&c);
-@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ makeGfromIndex(HASH_HashType hashtype,
- /* step 11.
-      * return valid G */
- cleanup:
--    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof(data));
-     if (hashcx) {
-         hashobj->destroy(hashcx, PR_TRUE);
-     }
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c
---- ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
-@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ AES_DestroyContext(AESContext *cx, PRBoo
-         cx->worker_cx = NULL;
-         cx->destroy = NULL;
-     }
--    PORT_Memset(cx, 0, sizeof(AESContext));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(cx, sizeof(AESContext));
-     if (freeit) {
-         PORT_Free(mem);
-     } else {
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsa.c
---- ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:41:24.066840894 -0800
-+++ ./lib/freebl/rsa.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
-@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
-     /* 2.  Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &psub1));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(q, 1, &qsub1));
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
-     if (needPublicExponent || needPrivateExponent) {
--        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
-         /* 3.  Compute d = e**-1 mod(phi) */
-         /*     or      e = d**-1 mod(phi) as necessary */
-         if (needPublicExponent) {
-@@ -165,6 +165,15 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
-+    /* make sure we weren't passed in a d or e = 1 mod phi */
-+    /* just need to check d, because if one is = 1 mod phi, they both are */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &phi, &tmp));
-+    if (mp_cmp_d(&tmp, 2) <= 0) {
-+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-+        rv = SECFailure;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-     /* 4.  Compute exponent1 = d mod (p-1) */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &psub1, &tmp));
-     MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent1, key->arena);
-@@ -1152,6 +1161,8 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(RSAPriv
-     /* Perform a public key operation v = m ** e mod n */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(m, &e, &n, &v));
-     if (mp_cmp(&v, c) != 0) {
-+        /* this error triggers a fips fatal error lock */
-+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
-         rv = SECFailure;
-     }
- cleanup:
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c
---- ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
-@@ -977,14 +977,14 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
-     /* now create the hmac key */
-     hmac = HMAC_Create(hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
-     if (hmac == NULL) {
--        PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
-+        PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
-         return NULL;
-     }
-     HMAC_Begin(hmac);
-     HMAC_Update(hmac, input, inputLen);
-     rv = HMAC_Finish(hmac, keyHash, &keyLen, sizeof(keyHash));
-     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
--        PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
-+        PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
-         HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
-         return NULL;
-     }
-@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
-      * reuse the original context allocated above so we don't
-      * need to allocate and free another one */
-     rv = HMAC_ReInit(hmac, hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
--    PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
-     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-         HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
-         return NULL;
-@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ rsa_HMACPrf(HMACContext *hmac, const cha
-             return rv;
-         }
-         PORT_Memcpy(output, hmacLast, left);
--        PORT_Memset(hmacLast, 0, sizeof(hmacLast));
-+        PORT_SafeZero(hmacLast, sizeof(hmacLast));
-     }
-     return rv;
- }
-@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ rsa_GetErrorLength(HMACContext *hmac, in
-         outLength = PORT_CT_SEL(PORT_CT_LT(candidate, maxLegalLen),
-                                 candidate, outLength);
-     }
--    PORT_Memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(out, sizeof(out));
-     return outLength;
- }
- 
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c
---- ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
-@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyDSACheck(PRFileDesc *shFD,
- 
-     /* verify the hash against the check file */
-     rv = DSA_VerifyDigest(key, signature, &hash);
--    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
-     return (rv == SECSuccess) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
- }
- #endif
-@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyHMACCheck(PRFileDesc *shFD
-     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-         result = SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(signature, &hash);
-     }
--    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
-     return result;
- }
- 
-@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
- #ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
-     DSAPublicKey key;
- 
--    PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(&key, sizeof(key));
- #endif
- 
-     /* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
-@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
-     shFD = NULL;
- 
- loser:
--    PORT_Memset(&header, 0, sizeof header);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(&header, sizeof header);
-     if (checkName != NULL) {
-         PORT_Free(checkName);
-     }
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c
---- ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
-@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ loser:
-     /* clear out state so it's not left on the stack */
-     if (cx)
-         HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_TRUE);
--    PORT_Memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
--    PORT_Memset(outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(state, sizeof(state));
-+    PORT_SafeZero(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
-     return rv;
- }
- 
-diff -up ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
---- ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
-+++ ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c	2023-11-22 14:44:15.519400684 -0800
-@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
-         return;
-     }
-     RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
--    PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
-+    PORT_SafeZero(bytes, sizeof bytes);
- }
- 
- #ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:41:24.069840921 -0800
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
-@@ -5092,7 +5092,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
-         if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) &&
-             (PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) {
-             PORT_Free(signature);
--            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
-+            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-         }
- 
-         /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
-diff -up ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero ./lib/util/secport.h
---- ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/util/secport.h	2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
-@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <ctype.h>
-+/* ask for Annex K for memset_s. will set the appropriate #define
-+ * if Annex K is supported */
-+#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stddef.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -182,6 +185,39 @@ SEC_END_PROTOS
- #endif /*SUNOS4*/
- #define PORT_Memset memset
- 
-+/* there are cases where the compiler optimizes away our attempt to clear
-+ * out our stack variables. There are multiple solutions for this problem,
-+ * but they aren't universally accepted on all platforms. This attempts
-+ * to select the best solution available given our os, compilier, and libc */
-+#ifdef __STDC_LIB_EXT1__
-+/* if the os implements C11 annex K, use memset_s */
-+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) memset_s(p, n, 0, n)
-+#else
-+#ifdef XP_WIN
-+/* windows has a secure zero funtion */
-+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) SecureZeroMemory(p, n)
-+#else
-+/* _DEFAULT_SORUCE  == BSD source in GCC based environments
-+ * if other environmens support explicit_bzero, their defines
-+ * should be added here */
-+#if defined(_DEFAULT_SOURCE) || defined(_BSD_SOURCE)
-+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) explicit_bzero(p, n)
-+#else
-+/* if the os doesn't support one of the above, but does support
-+ * memset_explicit, you can add the definition for memset with the
-+ * appropriate define check here */
-+/* define an explicitly implementated Safe zero if the OS
-+ * doesn't provide one */
-+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n)                                \
-+    if (p != NULL) {                                       \
-+        volatile unsigned char *__vl = (unsigned char *)p; \
-+        size_t __nl = n;                                   \
-+        while (__nl--) *__vl++ = 0;                        \
-+    }
-+#endif /* no explicit_bzero */
-+#endif /* no windows SecureZeroMemory */
-+#endif /* no memset_s */
-+
- #define PORT_Strcasecmp PL_strcasecmp
- #define PORT_Strcat strcat
- #define PORT_Strchr strchr

SOURCES/nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator	2023-08-03 10:50:37.067109367 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2023-08-03 11:41:55.641541953 -0700
-@@ -2429,7 +2429,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-             return PR_FALSE;
-         case SFTKFIPSECC:
-             /* we've already handled the curve selection in the 'getlength'
--          * function */
-+             * function */
-             return PR_TRUE;
-         case SFTKFIPSAEAD: {
-             if (mech->ulParameterLen == 0) {
-@@ -2463,6 +2463,29 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-             }
-             return PR_TRUE;
-         }
-+        case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
-+            /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
-+             * (independent of keysize).
-+             *    1. iteration count must be at least 1000.
-+             *    2. salt must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).
-+             *    3. password must match the length specified in the SP
-+             */
-+             CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkdf2 = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)
-+                                                    mech->pParameter;
-+             if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pbkdf2)) {
-+                 return PR_FALSE;
-+             }
-+             if (pbkdf2->iterations < 1000) {
-+                 return PR_FALSE;
-+             }
-+             if (pbkdf2->ulSaltSourceDataLen < 16) {
-+                 return PR_FALSE;
-+             }
-+             if (*(pbkdf2->ulPasswordLen) < SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN) {
-+                 return PR_FALSE;
-+             }
-+             return PR_TRUE;
-+        }
-         default:
-             break;
-     }

SOURCES/nss-gcm-param-default-pkcs11v2.patch

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h.aes_gcm_pkcs11_v2 ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h
---- ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h.aes_gcm_pkcs11_v2	2020-05-13 13:44:11.312405744 -0700
-+++ ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h	2020-05-13 13:45:23.951723660 -0700
-@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ typedef struct CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS {
- typedef CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS_PTR;
- 
- /* deprecated #defines. Drop in future NSS releases */
--#ifdef NSS_PKCS11_2_0_COMPAT
-+#ifndef NSS_PKCS11_3_0_STRICT
- 
- /* defines that were changed between NSS's PKCS #11 and the Oasis headers */
- #define CKF_EC_FP CKF_EC_F_P
-@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ typedef CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_GCM_
- #define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID CKT_NSS_VALID
- #define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR
- #else
--/* use the new CK_GCM_PARAMS if NSS_PKCS11_2_0_COMPAT is not defined */
-+/* use the new CK_GCM_PARAMS if NSS_PKCS11_3_0_STRICT is defined */
- typedef struct CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 CK_GCM_PARAMS;
- typedef CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 CK_PTR CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR;
- #endif

SOURCES/nss-p11-kit.config

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-name=p11-kit-proxy
-library=p11-kit-proxy.so
-
-

SOURCES/nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-Index: nss/gtests/manifest.mn
-===================================================================
---- nss.orig/gtests/manifest.mn
-+++ nss/gtests/manifest.mn
-@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ NSS_SRCDIRS = \
- 	smime_gtest \
- 	softoken_gtest \
- 	ssl_gtest \
--	$(SYSINIT_GTEST) \
- 	nss_bogo_shim \
- 	pkcs11testmodule \
- 	$(NULL)

SOURCES/nss-sysinit-userdb.patch

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-Index: nss/lib/sysinit/nsssysinit.c
-===================================================================
---- nss.orig/lib/sysinit/nsssysinit.c
-+++ nss/lib/sysinit/nsssysinit.c
-@@ -36,41 +36,9 @@ testdir(char *dir)
-     return S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode);
- }
- 
--/**
-- * Append given @dir to @path and creates the directory with mode @mode.
-- * Returns 0 if successful, -1 otherwise.
-- * Assumes that the allocation for @path has sufficient space for @dir
-- * to be added.
-- */
--static int
--appendDirAndCreate(char *path, char *dir, mode_t mode)
--{
--    PORT_Strcat(path, dir);
--    if (!testdir(path)) {
--        if (mkdir(path, mode)) {
--            return -1;
--        }
--    }
--    return 0;
--}
--
--#define XDG_NSS_USER_PATH1 "/.local"
--#define XDG_NSS_USER_PATH2 "/share"
--#define XDG_NSS_USER_PATH3 "/pki"
--
- #define NSS_USER_PATH1 "/.pki"
- #define NSS_USER_PATH2 "/nssdb"
--
--/**
-- * Return the path to user's NSS database.
-- * We search in the following dirs in order:
-- * (1) $HOME/.pki/nssdb;
-- * (2) $XDG_DATA_HOME/pki/nssdb if XDG_DATA_HOME is set;
-- * (3) $HOME/.local/share/pki/nssdb (default XDG_DATA_HOME value).
-- * If (1) does not exist, then the returned dir will be set to either
-- * (2) or (3), depending if XDG_DATA_HOME is set.
-- */
--char *
-+static char *
- getUserDB(void)
- {
-     char *userdir = PR_GetEnvSecure("HOME");
-@@ -81,47 +49,22 @@ getUserDB(void)
-     }
- 
-     nssdir = PORT_Alloc(strlen(userdir) + sizeof(NSS_USER_PATH1) + sizeof(NSS_USER_PATH2));
-+    if (nssdir == NULL) {
-+        return NULL;
-+    }
-     PORT_Strcpy(nssdir, userdir);
--    PORT_Strcat(nssdir, NSS_USER_PATH1 NSS_USER_PATH2);
--    if (testdir(nssdir)) {
--        /* $HOME/.pki/nssdb exists */
--        return nssdir;
--    } else {
--        /* either $HOME/.pki or $HOME/.pki/nssdb does not exist */
-+    /* verify it exists */
-+    if (!testdir(nssdir)) {
-         PORT_Free(nssdir);
--    }
--    int size = 0;
--    char *xdguserdatadir = PR_GetEnvSecure("XDG_DATA_HOME");
--    if (xdguserdatadir) {
--        size = strlen(xdguserdatadir);
--    } else {
--        size = strlen(userdir) + sizeof(XDG_NSS_USER_PATH1) + sizeof(XDG_NSS_USER_PATH2);
--    }
--    size += sizeof(XDG_NSS_USER_PATH3) + sizeof(NSS_USER_PATH2);
--
--    nssdir = PORT_Alloc(size);
--    if (nssdir == NULL) {
-         return NULL;
-     }
--
--    if (xdguserdatadir) {
--        PORT_Strcpy(nssdir, xdguserdatadir);
--        if (!testdir(nssdir)) {
--            PORT_Free(nssdir);
--            return NULL;
--        }
--
--    } else {
--        PORT_Strcpy(nssdir, userdir);
--        if (appendDirAndCreate(nssdir, XDG_NSS_USER_PATH1, 0755) ||
--            appendDirAndCreate(nssdir, XDG_NSS_USER_PATH2, 0755)) {
--            PORT_Free(nssdir);
--            return NULL;
--        }
-+    PORT_Strcat(nssdir, NSS_USER_PATH1);
-+    if (!testdir(nssdir) && mkdir(nssdir, 0760)) {
-+        PORT_Free(nssdir);
-+        return NULL;
-     }
--    /* ${XDG_DATA_HOME:-$HOME/.local/share}/pki/nssdb */
--    if (appendDirAndCreate(nssdir, XDG_NSS_USER_PATH3, 0760) ||
--        appendDirAndCreate(nssdir, NSS_USER_PATH2, 0760)) {
-+    PORT_Strcat(nssdir, NSS_USER_PATH2);
-+    if (!testdir(nssdir) && mkdir(nssdir, 0760)) {
-         PORT_Free(nssdir);
-         return NULL;
-     }

SOURCES/rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.1185708_3des nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
---- nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.1185708_3des	2018-12-11 18:28:06.736592552 +0100
-+++ nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c	2018-12-11 18:29:06.273314692 +0100
-@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[s
-  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,      SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
-  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
-  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
-- { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
-- { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
-+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
-+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
-  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,        SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
-  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,          SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
- 

SOURCES/secmod.db.xml

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
-<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
-  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
-<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
-<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
-]>
-
-<refentry id="secmod.db">
-
-  <refentryinfo>
-    <date>&date;</date>
-    <title>Network Security Services</title>
-    <productname>nss</productname>
-    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
-  </refentryinfo>
-
-  <refmeta>
-    <refentrytitle>secmod.db</refentrytitle>
-    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
-  </refmeta>
-
-  <refnamediv>
-    <refname>secmod.db</refname>
-    <refpurpose>Legacy NSS security modules database</refpurpose>
-  </refnamediv>
-
-<refsection id="description">
-    <title>Description</title>
-    <para><emphasis>secmod.db</emphasis> is an NSS security modules database.</para>
-  <para>The security modules database is used to keep track of the NSS security modules. The NSS security modules export their services via the PKCS #11 API which NSS uses as its Services Provider Interface.
-  </para>
-  <para>The command line utility <emphasis>modutil</emphasis> is used for managing PKCS #11 module information both within secmod.db files and within hardware tokens.
-  </para>
-  <para>For new applications the recommended way of tracking security modules is via the pkcs11.txt configuration file used in conjunction the new sqlite-based shared database format for certificate and key databases.
-  </para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>Files</title>
-    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/secmod.db</filename></para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>See also</title>
-    <para>modutil(1), cert8.db(5), cert9.db(5), key3.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5)</para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection id="authors">
-    <title>Authors</title>
-    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
-    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
-  </refsection>
-
-<!-- don't change -->
-  <refsection id="license">
-    <title>LICENSE</title>
-    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-    </para>
-
-  </refsection>
-
-
-</refentry>

ci.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+resultsdb-testcase: separate

fips_algorithms.h

@@ -21,8 +21,17 @@ typedef enum {
     SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,  /* make sure the base hash of TLS KDF functions is FIPS */
     SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,  /* make sure the base hash of SP-800-108 KDF functions is FIPS */
     SFTKFIPSRSAOAEP, /* make sure that both hashes use the same FIPS compliant algorithm */
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_KYBER
+    SFKFIPSMLKEM, /* make sure the keys are only mlkem and not kyber */
+#endif
 } SFTKFIPSSpecialClass;
 
+#ifdef NSS_DISABLE_KYBER
+/* if kyber is disable, we don't need to check that we are using
+ * a kyber key in the ML_KEM code */
+#define SFTKFIPSMLKEM SFTKFIPSNone
+#endif
+
 /* set according to your security policy */
 #define SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN  8
 
@@ -64,6 +73,10 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
 #define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
 #define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
 #define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
+#define CK_ALL_KEY 1, CK_MAX /* key limits are handled by special ops or the 
+                              * implementation itself */
+#define CK_ALL_STEP 1
+
 /* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
  * limits */
 #define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
@@ -87,14 +100,6 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
     { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
-    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
-    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
-    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
     { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
     { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
     { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
@@ -110,6 +115,12 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
     { CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
     { CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
     { CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    /* only allowed keys are implented for ML_DSA */
+    { CKM_ML_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { CK_ALL_KEY, CKF_SGN }, CK_ALL_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_ML_DSA, { CK_ALL_KEY, CKF_SGN },  CK_ALL_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    /* only allowed keys are implented for ML_KEM */
+    { CKM_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { CK_ALL_KEY, CKF_SGN }, CK_ALL_STEP, SFTKFIPSMLKEM },
+    { CKM_ML_KEM, { CK_ALL_KEY, CKF_SGN },  CK_ALL_STEP, SFTKFIPSMLKEM },
     /* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
     /* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
     { CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
@@ -172,6 +183,9 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
     { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSPBKDF2 },
     /* the deprecated mechanisms, don't use for some reason we are supposed
      * to set the FIPS indicators on these (sigh) */
+    /* NOTE: CKM_NSS_ML_KEM_KEY_GEN and the KYBER equivalent does not do
+     * pairwise consistency checks on key gen, so are not FIPS */
+    { CKM_NSS_ML_KEM, { CK_ALL_KEY, CKF_SGN },  CK_ALL_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck },

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+  - rhel-10
+decision_context: osci_compose_gate
+rules:
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build./plans/ci/fips-disabled-buildroot-enabled.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build./plans/ci/fips-disabled-buildroot-disabled.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build./plans/ci/fips-enabled-buildroot-enabled.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build./plans/ci/fips-enabled-buildroot-disabled.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: manual.sst_security_crypto.nss.streamspreadprevent}

nspr-4.36-fix-coverity-loop-issue.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff --git a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
+--- a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
++++ b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
+@@ -2047,35 +2047,43 @@ PR_GetPrefLoopbackAddrInfo(PRNetAddr* re
+   return PR_FAILURE;
+ #else
+ 
+   PRADDRINFO *res, hints;
+   PRStatus rv;
+ 
+   memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 
++  hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+   rv = GETADDRINFO(NULL, tmpBuf, &hints, &res);
+   if (rv == 0) {
+     PRBool result_still_empty = PR_TRUE;
+     PRADDRINFO* ai = res;
+     do {
+       PRNetAddr aNetAddr;
+ 
+       while (ai && ai->ai_addrlen > sizeof(PRNetAddr)) ai = ai->ai_next;
+ 
+-      if (ai) {
+-        /* copy sockaddr to PRNetAddr */
+-        memcpy(&aNetAddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+-        aNetAddr.raw.family = ai->ai_addr->sa_family;
++      if (!ai) {
++          break;
++      }
++
++      /* copy sockaddr to PRNetAddr */
++      memcpy(&aNetAddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
++      aNetAddr.raw.family = ai->ai_addr->sa_family;
+ #  ifdef _PR_INET6
+-        if (AF_INET6 == aNetAddr.raw.family) aNetAddr.raw.family = PR_AF_INET6;
++      if (AF_INET6 == aNetAddr.raw.family) aNetAddr.raw.family = PR_AF_INET6;
+ #  endif
+-        if (ai->ai_addrlen < sizeof(PRNetAddr))
++      if (ai->ai_addrlen < sizeof(PRNetAddr))
+           memset(((char*)result) + ai->ai_addrlen, 0,
+                  sizeof(PRNetAddr) - ai->ai_addrlen);
++      if (result->raw.family == PR_AF_INET) {
++           aNetAddr.inet.port = htons(port);
++      } else {
++           aNetAddr.ipv6.port = htons(port);
+       }
+ 
+       /* If we obtain more than one result, prefer IPv6. */
+       if (result_still_empty || aNetAddr.raw.family == PR_AF_INET6) {
+         memcpy(result, &aNetAddr, sizeof(PRNetAddr));
+       }
+       result_still_empty = PR_FALSE;
+       ai = ai->ai_next;

nspr-config-pc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+diff -up nspr/config/nspr-config.in.flags nspr/config/nspr-config.in
+--- nspr/config/nspr-config.in.flags	2013-05-29 13:46:34.147971410 -0700
++++ nspr/config/nspr-config.in	2013-05-29 14:17:10.990838914 -0700
+@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ if test -z "$includedir"; then
+     includedir=@includedir@
+ fi
+ if test -z "$libdir"; then
+-    libdir=@libdir@
++    libdir=`pkg-config --variable=libdir nspr`
+ fi
+ 
+ if test "$echo_prefix" = "yes"; then
+@@ -136,12 +136,12 @@ if test "$echo_libs" = "yes"; then
+       if test -n "$lib_nspr"; then
+ 	libdirs="$libdirs -lnspr${major_version}"
+       fi
+-      os_ldflags="@LDFLAGS@"
++      os_ldflags=`pkg-config --variable=ldflags nspr`
+       for i in $os_ldflags ; do
+ 	if echo $i | grep \^-L >/dev/null; then
+ 	  libdirs="$libdirs $i"
+         fi
+       done
+-      echo $libdirs @OS_LIBS@
++      echo $libdirs `pkg-config --variable=os_libs nspr`
+ fi      
+ 
+diff -up nspr/config/nspr.pc.in.flags nspr/config/nspr.pc.in
+--- nspr/config/nspr.pc.in.flags	2013-05-29 13:48:15.026643570 -0700
++++ nspr/config/nspr.pc.in	2013-05-29 13:49:47.795202949 -0700
+@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ includedir=@includedir@
+ Name: NSPR
+ Description: The Netscape Portable Runtime
+ Version: @MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@.@MOD_MINOR_VERSION@.@MOD_PATCH_VERSION@
+-Libs: -L@libdir@ -lplds@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lplc@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lnspr@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@
++Libs: -L@libdir@ -lplds@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lplc@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lnspr@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ @OS_LIBS@
+ Cflags: -I@includedir@

nspr-config.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
+  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
+<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
+<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
+]>
+
+<refentry id="nspr-config">
+
+  <refentryinfo>
+    <date>&date;</date>
+    <title>Netscape Portable Runtime</title>
+    <productname>nspr</productname>
+    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
+  </refentryinfo>
+
+  <refmeta>
+    <refentrytitle>nspr-config</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
+  </refmeta>
+
+  <refnamediv>
+    <refname>nspr-config</refname>
+    <refpurpose>Return meta information about nspr libraries</refpurpose>
+  </refnamediv>
+
+  <refsynopsisdiv>
+    <cmdsynopsis>
+      <command>nspr-config</command>
+      <arg><option>--prefix</option></arg>
+      <arg><option>--exec-prefix</option></arg>
+      <arg><option>--includedir</option></arg>
+      <arg><option>--libs</option></arg>
+      <arg><option>--cflags</option></arg>
+      <arg><option>--libdir</option></arg>
+      <arg><option>--version</option></arg>
+    </cmdsynopsis>
+  </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+<refsection id="description">
+    <title>Description</title>
+    <para><command>nspr-config</command> is a shell script which can be used to obtain gcc options for building client pacakges of nspr.</para>
+  </refsection>
+  
+  <refsection>
+    <title>Options</title>
+    
+    <variablelist>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term><option>--prefix</option></term>
+        <listitem><simpara>Returns the top level system directory under which the nspr libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term><option>--exec-prefix</option></term>
+        <listitem><simpara>Returns the top level system directory under which any nspr binaries would be installed.</simpara></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term><option>--includedir</option> <replaceable>count</replaceable></term>
+        <listitem><simpara>Returns the path to the directory were the nspr headers are installed.</simpara></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term><option>--version</option></term>
+        <listitem><simpara>Returns the upstream version of nspr in the form major_version-minor_version-patch_version.</simpara></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term><option>--libs</option></term>
+        <listitem><simpara>Returns the compiler linking flags.</simpara></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term><option>--cflags</option></term>
+        <listitem><simpara>Returns the compiler include flags.</simpara></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term><option>--libdir</option></term>
+        <listitem><simpara>Returns the path to the directory were the nspr libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+    </variablelist>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>Examples</title>
+
+    <para>The following example will query for both include path and linkage flags:
+      <programlisting>
+        /usr/bin/nspr-config --cflags --libs
+      </programlisting>
+    </para>
+
+   
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>Files</title>
+
+    <para><filename>/usr/bin/nspr-config</filename></para>
+
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>See also</title>
+    <para>pkg-config(1)</para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection id="authors">
+    <title>Authors</title>
+    <para>The NSPR liraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
+    <para>
+	Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.
+    </para>
+  </refsection>
+
+<!-- don't change -->
+  <refsection id="license">
+    <title>LICENSE</title>
+    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+    </para>
+  </refsection>
+
+</refentry>
+

nspr-gcc-atomics.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+diff -up ./pr/include/md/_linux.h.gcc-atomics ./pr/include/md/_linux.h
+--- ./pr/include/md/_linux.h.gcc-atomics	2022-09-20 11:23:22.008942926 -0700
++++ ./pr/include/md/_linux.h	2022-09-20 11:34:45.536751340 -0700
+@@ -105,6 +105,15 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if defined(__i386__)
++#if defined(__GNUC__)
++/* Use GCC built-in functions */
++#define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
++#define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
++#define _MD_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(ptr) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
++#define _MD_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(ptr) __sync_sub_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
++#define _MD_ATOMIC_ADD(ptr, i) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, i)
++#define _MD_ATOMIC_SET(ptr, nv) __sync_lock_test_and_set(ptr, nv)
++#else
+ #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
+ #define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
+ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicIncrement(PRInt32 *val);
+@@ -116,6 +125,7 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicAdd(PRInt32
+ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicSet(PRInt32 *val, PRInt32 newval);
+ #define _MD_ATOMIC_SET                _PR_x86_AtomicSet
+ #endif
++#endif
+ 
+ #if defined(__ia64__)
+ #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
+@@ -131,6 +141,15 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_ia64_AtomicSet(PRInt3
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if defined(__x86_64__)
++#if defined(__GNUC__)
++/* Use GCC built-in functions */
++#define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
++#define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
++#define _MD_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(ptr) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
++#define _MD_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(ptr) __sync_sub_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
++#define _MD_ATOMIC_ADD(ptr, i) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, i)
++#define _MD_ATOMIC_SET(ptr, nv) __sync_lock_test_and_set(ptr, nv)
++#else
+ #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
+ #define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
+ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicIncrement(PRInt32 *val);
+@@ -142,6 +161,7 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicAdd(PRIn
+ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicSet(PRInt32 *val, PRInt32 newval);
+ #define _MD_ATOMIC_SET                _PR_x86_64_AtomicSet
+ #endif
++#endif
+ 
+ #if defined(__loongarch__)
+ #if defined(__GNUC__)

nss-3.101-skip-ocsp-if-not-connected.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff -up ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.disable_ocsp_policy ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh
+--- ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.disable_ocsp_policy	2024-07-05 14:18:03.985453657 -0700
++++ ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh	2024-07-05 14:21:59.308250122 -0700
+@@ -968,6 +968,18 @@ ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp()
+   #verbose="-v"
+   html_head "Check that OCSP doesn't break if we disable sha1 $NORM_EXT - server $SERVER_MODE/client $CLIENT_MODE"
+ 
++  # if we are running on a build machine that can't tolerate external
++  # references don't run.
++  vfyserv -o wrong.host.badssl.com -d ${P_R_SERVERDIR} > ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy2.out 2>&1
++  RET=$? ; cat "${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy2.out" 
++  # 5961 reset by peer
++  grep 5961 ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy2.out
++  GRET=$?  ; echo "OCSP: RET=$RET GRET=$GRET"
++  if [ $RET -ne 0 -o $GRET -eq 0  ]; then
++      echo "$SCRIPTNAME: skipping Check that OCSP doesn't break if we disable sha1 $NORM_EXT - server $SERVER_MODE/client $CLIENT_MODE - can't reach external servers"
++      return 0
++  fi
++
+   PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
+   unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
+ 

nss-3.103-unused-cipherwrap2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.unused	2024-08-05 17:56:10.705414972 +0200
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-08-05 18:09:04.681015706 +0200
+@@ -165,10 +165,14 @@ SFTKCipherWrap(AESKeyWrapContext, AESKey
+         mmm##_DestroyContext(ctx, freeit);                                   \
+     }
+ 
++#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+ SFTKCipherWrap2(RC2Context, RC2);
++#endif
+ SFTKCipherWrap2(RC4Context, RC4);
+ SFTKCipherWrap2(DESContext, DES);
++#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED
+ SFTKCipherWrap2(SEEDContext, SEED);
++#endif
+ SFTKCipherWrap2(CamelliaContext, Camellia);
+ SFTKCipherWrap2(AESContext, AES);
+ SFTKCipherWrap2(AESKeyWrapContext, AESKeyWrap);

nss-3.112-disable-ech.patch

@@ -1,14 +1,24 @@
-diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
+diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn b/gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
---- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech	2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
+--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
-+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn	2024-06-12 13:30:25.699047788 -0700
++++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
-@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
+@@ -50,17 +50,16 @@ CPPSRCS = \
+       ssl_staticrsa_unittest.cc \
+       ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc \
+       ssl_v2_client_hello_unittest.cc \
+       ssl_version_unittest.cc \
+       ssl_versionpolicy_unittest.cc \
+       test_io.cc \
+       tls_agent.cc \
+       tls_connect.cc \
+-      tls_ech_unittest.cc \
+       tls_filter.cc \
+       tls_hkdf_unittest.cc \
+       tls_mlkem_unittest.cc \
        tls_protect.cc \
        tls_psk_unittest.cc \
        tls_subcerts_unittest.cc \
--      tls_ech_unittest.cc \
        tls_xyber_unittest.cc \
        $(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
-       $(NULL)
 diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c
 --- ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c	2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700

nss-3.112-disable-md5.patch

@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ diff -r 699541a7793b lib/util/secoid.c
                  if (oids[i].desc && strstr(arg, oids[i].desc)) {
                      xOids[i].notPolicyFlags = notEnable |
                                                (xOids[i].notPolicyFlags & ~(DEF_FLAGS));
-diff -up ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt
+diff -up ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5 ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt
---- ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
+--- ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5	2025-05-23 06:07:49.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt	2024-06-19 11:15:46.666728170 -0700
++++ ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt	2025-06-21 13:46:53.055812187 -0700
-@@ -91,21 +91,21 @@
+@@ -95,21 +95,12 @@
-   0 18 allow_all disallow=rc2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC4 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC SHA-1  disallow rc2 (read), RC4 and RC2
+   0 17 allow_all disallow=rc2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC4 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC SHA-1  disallow rc2 (read), RC4 and RC2
  # integrity policy check the various has based controls.
  #  NOTE: md4, md2, and md5 are turned off by policy by default for encrypting
 -# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=all or allow=mdX on the
@@ -58,24 +58,15 @@ diff -up ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test ./tests/tools/pkcs12pol
 -  0  0 allow=all allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
 -  0  0 allow=all allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
 - 28  x disallow=sha1_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
-+  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
-+  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
-+ 28  x disallow=sha1_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
   27  x disallow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on write
 - 29  x disallow=sha256_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
 -  0 19 allow=all disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
--  0 18 allow=all disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
+-  0 17 allow=all disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 -  0 17 allow=all disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
-+ 29  x disallow=sha256_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
++ 27  x disallow=sha256_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
-+  0 19 allow=all:md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
+   0  0 allow=all allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256 Allow all with hmac
-+  0 18 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
+  29  x disallow=hmac-sha256 allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256 Disallow hmac on write
-+  0 17 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
+   0 17 allow=all disallow=hmac-sha256 AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256 Disallow hmac on read
-+  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
-+  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
-+  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
-   0  0 allow=all allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
-  29  x disallow=hmac-sha256 allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
-   0 18 allow=all disallow=hmac-sha256 AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256

nss-3.112-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,888 @@
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/stubs.c b/lib/freebl/stubs.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/stubs.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/stubs.c
+@@ -485,17 +485,17 @@ PR_GetLibraryFilePathname_stub(const cha
+ extern int
+ PORT_GetError_stub(void)
+ {
+     STUB_SAFE_CALL0(PORT_GetError_Util);
+     return errno;
+ }
+ 
+ extern void
+-PORT_SafeZero(void *p, size_t n)
++PORT_SafeZero_stub(void *p, size_t n)
+ {
+     STUB_SAFE_CALL2(PORT_SafeZero, p, n);
+     /* just use a generic call in the case where we are running
+      * standalone freebl */
+     if (p != NULL) {
+         volatile unsigned char *__vl = (unsigned char *)p;
+         size_t __nl = n;
+         while (__nl--)
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/stubs.h b/lib/freebl/stubs.h
+--- a/lib/freebl/stubs.h
++++ b/lib/freebl/stubs.h
+@@ -22,17 +22,17 @@
+ 
+ #define PORT_Alloc PORT_Alloc_stub
+ #define PORT_ArenaAlloc PORT_ArenaAlloc_stub
+ #define PORT_ArenaZAlloc PORT_ArenaZAlloc_stub
+ #define PORT_Free PORT_Free_stub
+ #define PORT_FreeArena PORT_FreeArena_stub
+ #define PORT_GetError PORT_GetError_stub
+ #define PORT_NewArena PORT_NewArena_stub
+-#define PORT_SaveZero PORT_SaveZero_stub
++#define PORT_SafeZero PORT_SafeZero_stub
+ #define PORT_SetError PORT_SetError_stub
+ #define PORT_ZAlloc PORT_ZAlloc_stub
+ #define PORT_ZFree PORT_ZFree_stub
+ #define PORT_ZAllocAligned PORT_ZAllocAligned_stub
+ #define PORT_ZAllocAlignedOffset PORT_ZAllocAlignedOffset_stub
+ 
+ #define SECITEM_AllocItem SECITEM_AllocItem_stub
+ #define SECITEM_CompareItem SECITEM_CompareItem_stub
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_fips140_3.c b/lib/freebl/unix_fips140_3.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/unix_fips140_3.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/unix_fips140_3.c
+@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
+ {
+     PRUint8 bytes[SYSTEM_RNG_SEED_COUNT];
+     size_t numBytes = RNG_SystemRNG(bytes, SYSTEM_RNG_SEED_COUNT);
+     if (!numBytes) {
+         /* error is set */
+         return;
+     }
+     RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
+-    PORT_SaveZero(bytes, sizeof(bytes));
++    PORT_SafeZero(bytes, sizeof(bytes));
+ }
+ 
+ static unsigned int rng_grndFlags = 0;
+ static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
+ 
+ static PRStatus
+ rng_getKernelFips()
+ {
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+@@ -535,17 +535,17 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
+     context->cipherInfo = NULL;
+     context->hashInfo = NULL;
+     context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
+     context->padDataLength = 0;
+     context->key = key;
+     context->blockSize = 0;
+     context->maxLen = 0;
+     context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
+-                                           operation, key);
++                                           operation, key, 0);
+     *contextPtr = context;
+     return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+ sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism)
+ {
+     switch (mechanism) {
+@@ -4794,16 +4794,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+         goto loser;
+     }
+ 
+     /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
+     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
+     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ 
++
+     /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
+     key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
+     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+         case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
+         case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+         case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
+         case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+             checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
+@@ -4990,16 +4991,20 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+         crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+         goto loser;
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+      * handle the base object stuff
+      */
+     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
++    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
++     * fips requirements */
++    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key, 0);
++    session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
+     sftk_FreeSession(session);
+     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+     }
+     if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+     }
+     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+@@ -6077,18 +6082,18 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+      * handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
+      * If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
+      * created and linked.
+      */
+     crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
+-    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
++        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+         return crv;
+     }
+     if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
+                                   &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+@@ -6120,22 +6125,29 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+                             (PRUint32)hSession, (PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism,
+                             (PRUint32)crv);
+                 sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg);
+             }
+         }
+     }
+ 
+     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
++        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
+         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+         return crv;
+     }
++    /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
++    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey, 0);
++    publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
++    session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
++
++    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
+     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
+     sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+     sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+ 
+     return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -7321,30 +7333,35 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+         return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+     }
+     if ((params->bExpand && keySize == 0) ||
+         (!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) ||
+         (params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) {
+         return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+     }
+ 
++    if (!params->bExpand) {
++        keySize = hashLen;
++    }
++
+     /* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
+      * sensitiveCheck */
+     if (sourceKey != NULL) {
+         crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, canBeData);
+         if (crv != CKR_OK)
+             return crv;
+     }
+ 
+     /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
+     if (params->bExtract) {
+         CK_BYTE *salt;
+         CK_ULONG saltLen;
+         HMACContext *hmac;
+         unsigned int bufLen;
++        SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
+ 
+         switch (params->ulSaltType) {
+             case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
+                 saltLen = hashLen;
+                 salt = hashbuf;
+                 memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
+                 break;
+             case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
+@@ -7369,31 +7386,57 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+                 /* if the base key is not fips, but the salt key is, the
+                  * resulting key can be fips */
+                 if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
+                     CK_MECHANISM mech;
+                     mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
+                     mech.pParameter = params;
+                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
+                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
+-                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
++                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
++                                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
+                 }
++                saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
+                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
+                 if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
+                     sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
+                     return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                 }
+                 /* save the resulting salt */
+                 salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
+                 saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+                 break;
+             default:
+                 return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                 break;
+         }
++        /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
++         * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
++        if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
++            PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
++            /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
++             * salt */
++            if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
++                (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
++                (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
++                fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
++            }
++            /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
++            if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
++                (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
++                (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
++                (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
++                (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
++                fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
++            }
++            if (!fipsOK) {
++                key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++            }
++        }
++        if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
+ 
+         hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
+         if (saltKey_att) {
+             sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
+         }
+         if (saltKey) {
+             sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
+         }
+@@ -7411,26 +7454,50 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+         /* PRK = base key value */
+         prk = sourceKeyBytes;
+         prkLen = sourceKeyLen;
+     }
+ 
+     /* HKDF-Expand */
+     if (!params->bExpand) {
+         okm = prk;
+-        keySize = genLen = hashLen;
++        genLen = hashLen;
+     } else {
+         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
+          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
+          * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
+          */
+         HMACContext *hmac;
+         CK_BYTE bi;
+         unsigned iterations;
+ 
++        /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
++         * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
++        if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
++            unsigned char *info=&params->pInfo[3];
++            /* only one case,
++             *  1) Expand only
++             *  2) with a key whose source was
++             *  SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
++             *  3) source key length == rawHash->length
++             *  4) Info has tls or dtls
++             * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
++             * off the fips indicator */
++            if (params->bExtract ||
++               ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
++                (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
++               (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
++               (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
++               ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
++               (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
++               key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++            }
++        }
++        if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
++
+         genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
+         iterations = genLen / hashLen;
+ 
+         if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
+             keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
+             if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
+                 return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+             }
+@@ -7635,17 +7702,18 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+         /* get the value of the base key */
+         att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
+         if (att == NULL) {
+             sftk_FreeObject(key);
+             sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
+             return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+         }
+     }
+-    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
++    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
++                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
+ 
+     switch (mechanism) {
+         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
+          * will generate the public portion if it doesn't already exist. */
+         case CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV: {
+             NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+             NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+             int error;
+@@ -8797,16 +8865,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+ 
+             /* calculate private value - oct */
+             rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
+ 
+             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
+ 
+             if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++                key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
+                 sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
+                 SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
+                 crv = CKR_OK;
+             } else
+                 crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ 
+             break;
+         }
+@@ -8894,16 +8963,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+                  * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive,
+                  * secret and secretlen are the values we will
+                  * eventually pass as our generated key.
+                  */
+                 secret = tmp.data;
+                 secretlen = tmp.len;
+             } else {
+                 secretlen = keySize;
++                key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+                 crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
+                                           &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
+                                           mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
+                 PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+                 if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                     break;
+                 }
+                 tmp.data = secret;
+@@ -8927,16 +8997,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+                     }
+                     PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
+                     secret = keyData;
+                 } else {
+                     secret += (secretlen - keySize);
+                 }
+                 secretlen = keySize;
+             }
++            key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
+ 
+             sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
+             PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+             if (keyData) {
+                 PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
+             }
+             break;
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
++++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
+  */
+ typedef enum {
+     SFTK_DestroyFailure,
+     SFTK_Destroyed,
+     SFTK_Busy
+ } SFTKFreeStatus;
+ 
+ /*
++ * Source of various objects
++ */
++typedef enum {
++    SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
++    SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
++    SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
++    SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
++} SFTKSource;
++
++/*
+  * attribute values of an object.
+  */
+ struct SFTKAttributeStr {
+     SFTKAttribute *next;
+     SFTKAttribute *prev;
+     PRBool freeAttr;
+     PRBool freeData;
+     /*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
+@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
+     CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
+     int refCount;
+     PZLock *refLock;
+     SFTKSlot *slot;
+     void *objectInfo;
+     SFTKFree infoFree;
+     PRBool isFIPS;
++    SFTKSource source;
+ };
+ 
+ struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
+     SFTKObject obj;
+     SECItem dbKey;
+ };
+ 
+ struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
+@@ -963,15 +974,16 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
+ const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
+ /* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
+ SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
+ /* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
+ CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op);
+ /* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
+  * FIPS security policy */
+ PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+-                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
++                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source,
++                            CK_ULONG targetKeySize);
+ /* add validation objects to the slot */
+ CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
+ 
+ SEC_END_PROTOS
+ 
+ #endif /* _PKCS11I_H_ */
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+@@ -1098,16 +1098,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
+         sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
+     }
+     sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
+ 
+     object->handle = 0;
+     object->next = object->prev = NULL;
+     object->slot = slot;
+     object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
++    object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
+ 
+     object->refCount = 1;
+     sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
+     sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
+     sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
+     sessObject->session = NULL;
+     sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
+     if (!hasLocks)
+@@ -1683,16 +1684,17 @@ fail:
+ CK_RV
+ sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
+ {
+     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+     SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
+     unsigned int i;
+ 
+     destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
++    destObject->source = srcObject->source;
+     if (src_so == NULL) {
+         return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
+     }
+ 
+     PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
+     for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
+         attribute = src_so->head[i];
+         do {
+@@ -2068,16 +2070,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
+     /* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
+      * doesn't exist */
+     crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+         goto loser;
+     }
+     object->slot = slot;
+     object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
++    object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
+     object->objectInfo = NULL;
+     object->infoFree = NULL;
+     if (!hasLocks) {
+         object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
+     }
+     if (object->refLock == NULL) {
+         goto loser;
+     }
+@@ -2234,16 +2237,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE 
+             break;
+         case CKA_DERIVE:
+             flags = CKF_DERIVE;
+             break;
+         /* fake attribute to select digesting */
+         case CKA_DIGEST:
+             flags = CKF_DIGEST;
+             break;
++        /* fake attribute to select key gen */
++         case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
++            flags = CKF_GENERATE;
++            break;
++        /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
++        case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
++            flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
++            break;
++        /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
+         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
+             break;
+         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
+             break;
+         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
+             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
+@@ -2319,20 +2331,20 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
+ }
+ 
+ /* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
+  * FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
+  * in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
+  * the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
+  * in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
+  * the FIPS indicator code */
+-static int
++static CK_ULONG
+ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+ {
+-    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
+     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
+     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
+     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+     CK_RV crv;
+ 
+     /* If we don't have a key, then it doesn't have a length.
+      * this may be OK (say we are hashing). The mech info will
+      * sort this out because algorithms which expect no keys
+@@ -2342,17 +2354,17 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+     }
+ 
+     crv = sftk_GetULongAttribute(source, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+         /* sometimes we're passed a data object, in that case the
+          * key length is CKA_VALUE, which is the default */
+         keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
+     }
+-    if (keyType == CKK_EC) {
++    if (keyType == CKK_EC || keyType == CKK_EC_EDWARDS || keyType == CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY) {
+         SECOidTag curve = sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(source);
+         switch (curve) {
+             case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:
+                 /* change when we start algorithm testing on curve25519 */
+                 return 0;
+             case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
+                 return 256;
+             case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
+@@ -2384,24 +2396,65 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+     attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(source, keyAttribute);
+     if (attribute) {
+         keyLength = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen * 8;
+         sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+     }
+     return keyLength;
+ }
+ 
++PRBool
++sftk_checkFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash, PRBool allowSmall, PRBool allowCMAC)
++{
++    switch (hash) {
++        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
++            return allowCMAC;
++        case CKM_SHA_1:
++        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
++        case CKM_SHA224:
++        case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
++            return allowSmall;
++        case CKM_SHA256:
++        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
++        case CKM_SHA384:
++        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
++        case CKM_SHA512:
++        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
++            return PR_TRUE;
++    }
++    return PR_FALSE;
++}
++
++PRBool
++sftk_checkKeyLength(CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG min,
++                    CK_ULONG max, CK_ULONG step)
++{
++     if (keyLength > max) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     if (keyLength < min ) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     if (((keyLength - min) % step) != 0) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     return PR_TRUE;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
+  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
+  * would have to be coded here before they can be added to the table */
+ static PRBool
+ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+-                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source)
++                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
++                   CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
+ {
++    PRBool allowSmall = PR_FALSE;
++    PRBool allowCMAC = PR_FALSE;
+     switch (mechInfo->special) {
+         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
+             SECItem dhPrime;
+             SECItem dhBase;
+             SECItem dhGenerator;
+             PRBool fipsOk = PR_FALSE;
+             const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
+             CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
+@@ -2451,32 +2504,97 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+             }
+             /* we use the existing hash utilities to find the length of
+              * the hash */
+             hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(
+                 pss->hashAlg));
+             if (hashObj == NULL) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
++            /* cap the salt for legacy keys */
++            if ((keyLength <= 1024) && (pss->sLen > 63)) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            /* cap the salt for based on the hash */
+             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
++            /* Our code makes sure pss->hashAlg matches the explicit
++             * hash in the mechanism, and only mechanisms with approved
++             * hashes are included, so no need to check pss->hashAlg
++             * here */
++            return PR_TRUE;
++        }
++        case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
++            /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
++             * (independent of keysize).
++             *    1. iteration count must be at least 1000.
++             *    2. salt must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).
++             *    3. password must match the length specified in the SP
++             */
++            CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkdf2 = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)
++                                                   mech->pParameter;
++            if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pbkdf2)) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            if (pbkdf2->iterations < 1000) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            if (pbkdf2->ulSaltSourceDataLen < 16) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            if (*(pbkdf2->ulPasswordLen) < SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
+             return PR_TRUE;
+         }
++        /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800:
++             allowCMAC = PR_TRUE;
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
++             allowSmall = PR_TRUE;
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHashTls:
++            if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            return sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
++                        + mechInfo->offset), allowSmall, allowCMAC);
++        case SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck:
++            if (mech->mechanism != CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
++                /* unless the mechnism has a built-in hash, check the hash */
++                if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
++                    return PR_FALSE;
++                }
++                if (!sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
++                        + mechInfo->offset), PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
++                    return PR_FALSE;
++                }
++            }
++            return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
++        case SFTKFIPSRSAOAEP:;
++            CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *rsaoaep = (CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *)
++                                                mech->pParameter;
++
++            HASH_HashType hash_msg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(rsaoaep->hashAlg);
++            HASH_HashType hash_pad = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(rsaoaep->mgf);
++            /* message hash and mask generation function must be the same */
++            if (hash_pad != hash_msg) return PR_FALSE;
++
++            return sftk_checkFIPSHash(rsaoaep->hashAlg, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE);
+         default:
+             break;
+     }
+     /* if we didn't understand the special processing, mark it non-fips */
+     return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+ PRBool
+ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
+-                     SFTKObject *source)
++                     SFTKObject *source, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
+ {
+ #ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
+     return PR_FALSE;
+ #else
+     int i;
+     CK_FLAGS opFlags;
+     CK_ULONG keyLength;
+ 
+@@ -2498,23 +2616,25 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
+     }
+     keyLength = sftk_getKeyLength(source);
+ 
+     /* check against our algorithm array */
+     for (i = 0; i < SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS; i++) {
+         SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
+         /* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
+          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
+-        if (((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
+-             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
+-             (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
+-             (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
+-             ((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
+-            ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
+-             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source))) {
++        if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
++            (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
++            sftk_checkKeyLength(keyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
++                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step) &&
++            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||  (mechs->special == SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck)
++             || sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
++                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step)) &&
++             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
++             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
+             return PR_TRUE;
+         }
+     }
+     return PR_FALSE;
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkike.c b/lib/softoken/sftkike.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/sftkike.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/sftkike.c
+@@ -511,16 +511,22 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+         }
+         /* key as the data */
+         crv = prf_update(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
+                          inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
+         if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+             goto fail;
+         }
+     } else {
++        /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
++         * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
++        if (!params->bRekey) {
++            outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++        }
++
+         crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
+                        inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
+         if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+             goto fail;
+         }
+         if (newKeyValue) {
+             crv = prf_update(&context, newKeyValue->attrib.pValue,
+                              newKeyValue->attrib.ulValueLen);
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+@@ -178,16 +178,48 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
+ 
+     CHECK_FORK();
+ 
+     /* make sure we're legal */
+     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK)
+         return crv;
+ 
++    if (context->isFIPS && (contextType == SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
++        if ((pParameter == NULL) || (ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS))) {
++            context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++        } else {
++            CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
++            switch (p->ivGenerator) {
++                default:
++                case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
++                    context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    break;
++                case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
++                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++                    break;
++                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen != 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
++                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 32)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++                    break;
++                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
++                    if ((p->ulIvFixedBits < 32) ||
++                       ((p->ulIvLen*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - p->ulIvFixedBits) < 32)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++                    break;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (!pOuttext) {
+         *pulOuttextLen = ulIntextLen;
+         return CKR_OK;
+     }
+     rv = (*context->aeadUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pOuttext, &outlen,
+                                 maxout, pIntext, ulIntextLen,
+                                 pParameter, ulParameterLen,
+                                 pAssociatedData, ulAssociatedDataLen);
+diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
++++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+@@ -148,16 +148,18 @@
+ /*
+  * NSS-defined certificate types
+  *
+  */
+ #define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+ 
+ /* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
+ #define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
++#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
++#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
+ #define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
+ #define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
+ #define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
+ 
+ /*
+  * NSS-defined object attributes
+  *
+  */

nss-3.79-distrusted-certs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# User John M. Schanck <jschanck@mozilla.com>
+# Date 1648094761 0
+#      Thu Mar 24 04:06:01 2022 +0000
+# Node ID b722e523d66297fe4bc1fac0ebb06203138eccbb
+# Parent  853b64626b19a46f41f4ba9c684490dc15923c94
+Bug 1751305 - Remove expired explicitly distrusted certificates from certdata.txt. r=KathleenWilson
+
+Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D141919
+
+diff --git a/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt b/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
+--- a/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
++++ b/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
+@@ -7663,197 +7663,16 @@ CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+ \377\377
+ END
+ CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
+ #
+-# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
+-#
+-# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
+-# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
+-# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
+-# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
+-# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
+-# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
+-# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
+-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
+-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
+-CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
+-CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
+-\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
+-\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
+-\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
+-\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
+-\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
+-END
+-CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
+-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
+-\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
+-\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
+-\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
+-\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
+-\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
+-END
+-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\002\004\017\377\377\377
+-END
+-CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
+-\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
+-\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
+-\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
+-\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
+-\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
+-\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
+-\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
+-\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
+-\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
+-\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
+-\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
+-\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
+-\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
+-\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
+-\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
+-\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
+-\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
+-\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
+-\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
+-\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
+-\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
+-\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
+-\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
+-\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
+-\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
+-\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
+-\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
+-\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
+-\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
+-\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
+-\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
+-\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
+-\147\145\102\043\361\066\131\012\035\243\121\310\274\243\224\052
+-\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
+-\266\327\363\243\114\001\165\024\205\170\300\327\212\071\130\205
+-\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
+-\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
+-\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
+-\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
+-\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
+-\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
+-\344\011\152\361\115\106\012\311\135\373\233\117\275\336\373\267
+-\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
+-\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
+-\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
+-\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
+-\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
+-\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
+-\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
+-\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
+-\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
+-\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
+-\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
+-\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
+-\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
+-\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
+-\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
+-\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
+-\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
+-\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
+-\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
+-\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
+-\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
+-\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
+-\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
+-\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
+-\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
+-\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
+-\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
+-\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
+-\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
+-\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
+-\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
+-\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
+-\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
+-\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
+-\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
+-\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
+-\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
+-\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
+-\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
+-\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
+-\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
+-\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
+-\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
+-\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
+-\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
+-\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
+-\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
+-\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
+-\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
+-\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
+-\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
+-\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
+-\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
+-\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
+-\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
+-\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
+-\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
+-\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
+-\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
+-\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
+-\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
+-\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
+-\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
+-END
+-
+-# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
+-# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
+-# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
+-# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
+-# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
+-# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
+-# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
+-# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
+-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
+-CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
+-\222\341\102\102
+-END
+-CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
+-END
+-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
+-\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
+-\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
+-\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
+-\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
+-\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
+-END
+-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\002\004\017\377\377\377
+-END
+-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-
+-#
+ # Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
+ #
+ # Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
+ # Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
+ # Subject: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
+ # Not Valid Before: Fri May 29 05:00:39 2009
+ # Not Valid After : Tue May 29 05:00:39 2029
+ # Fingerprint (SHA-256): 51:3B:2C:EC:B8:10:D4:CD:E5:DD:85:39:1A:DF:C6:C2:DD:60:D8:7B:B7:36:D2:B5:21:48:4A:A4:7A:0E:BE:F6
+@@ -8337,78 +8156,16 @@ END
+ CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+ \002\001\000
+ END
+ CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
+ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
+ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
+-# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
+-# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
+-# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
+-# Not Before: Apr  7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
+-# Not After : Apr  4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
+-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
+-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
+-\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
+-\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
+-\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
+-\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
+-\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
+-\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
+-\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
+-\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
+-\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
+-\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
+-END
+-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\002\004\153\111\322\005
+-END
+-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-
+-# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
+-# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
+-# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
+-# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
+-# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
+-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
+-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
+-\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
+-\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
+-\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
+-\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
+-\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
+-\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
+-\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
+-\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
+-\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
+-\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
+-END
+-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\002\004\153\111\322\006
+-END
+-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-
+ #
+ # Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
+ #
+ # Issuer: CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
+ # Serial Number:57:0a:11:97:42:c4:e3:cc
+ # Subject: CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
+ # Not Valid Before: Thu Sep 22 11:22:02 2011
+ # Not Valid After : Sun Sep 22 11:22:02 2030
+@@ -9042,84 +8799,16 @@ END
+ CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+ \002\001\001
+ END
+ CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
+ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
+ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
+-# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
+-# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
+-# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
+-# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
+-# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
+-# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
+-# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
+-# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
+-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
+-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
+-\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
+-\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
+-\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
+-\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
+-\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
+-\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
+-\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
+-\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
+-\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
+-\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
+-END
+-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\002\002\010\047
+-END
+-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-
+-# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
+-# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
+-# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
+-# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
+-# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
+-# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
+-# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
+-# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
+-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
+-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
+-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
+-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
+-\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
+-\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
+-\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
+-\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
+-\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
+-\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
+-\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
+-\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
+-\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
+-\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
+-END
+-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
+-\002\002\010\144
+-END
+-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+-
+ #
+ # Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
+ #
+ # Issuer: CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
+ # Serial Number: 623603 (0x983f3)
+ # Subject: CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
+ # Not Valid Before: Thu Nov 05 08:35:58 2009
+ # Not Valid After : Mon Nov 05 08:35:58 2029

nss-3.90-ppc_no_init.patch

@@ -34,32 +34,3 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/softoken/Makefile
  
  
  #######################################################################
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/legacydb/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/softoken/legacydb/Makefile
---- ./lib/softoken/legacydb/Makefile.ppc_no_init	2024-11-12 11:51:16.535343581 +0100
-+++ ./lib/softoken/legacydb/Makefile	2024-11-12 12:09:58.968187800 +0100
-@@ -23,16 +23,17 @@ include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/config.mk
- ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
-     DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
- endif
--ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
--ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
--ifdef USE_64
--    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
--endif # USE_64
--endif # ppc
--else # !Linux
-+#ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
-+#ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
-+#ifdef USE_64
-+#    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
-+#endif # USE_64
-+#endif # ppc
-+#else # !Linux
-+ifneq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
-     # turn off no init support everywhere for now
-     DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
--endif # Linux
-+endif # !Linux
- 
- #######################################################################
- # (4) Include "local" platform-dependent assignments (OPTIONAL).      #

nss-no-dbm-man-page.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+diff -up ./doc/certutil.xml.no-dbm ./doc/certutil.xml
+--- ./doc/certutil.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.853386165 -0700
++++ ./doc/certutil.xml	2021-05-29 10:31:15.057058619 -0700
+@@ -205,8 +205,7 @@ If this option is not used, the validity
+           <para><command>certutil</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para>
+           <para>NSS recognizes the following prefixes:</para>
+           <itemizedlist>
+-            <listitem><para><command>sql:</command> requests the newer database</para></listitem>
+-	    <listitem><para><command>dbm:</command> requests the legacy database</para></listitem>
++            <listitem><para><command>sql:</command> requests the sql-lite database</para></listitem>
+           </itemizedlist>
+           <para>If no prefix is specified the default type is retrieved from NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE. If NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE is not set then <command>sql:</command> is the default.</para>
+         </listitem>
+@@ -1205,17 +1204,9 @@ BerkeleyDB. These new databases provide
+ 	</listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
+ 
+-<para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
++<para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. </para>
+ 
+-<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.
+-Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
+-
+-<programlisting>$ certutil -L -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
+-
+-<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
+-<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
+-
+-<para>This line can be set added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent.</para>
++<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.</para>
+ 
+ <itemizedlist>
+ 	<listitem>
+diff -up ./doc/modutil.xml.no-dbm ./doc/modutil.xml
+--- ./doc/modutil.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
++++ ./doc/modutil.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
+@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
+       <varlistentry>
+         <term>-dbdir directory</term>
+ 	  <listitem><para>Specify the database directory in which to access or create security module database files.</para>
+-	<para><command>modutil</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in SQLite format.</para></listitem>
++	<para><command>modutil</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+ 
+       <varlistentry>
+@@ -689,15 +689,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
+ 
+ <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
+ 
+-<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.
+-Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
+-
+-<programlisting>modutil -create -dbdir dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
+-
+-<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
+-<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
+-
+-<para>This line can be added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent for the user.</para>
++<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.  </para> 
+ 
+ <itemizedlist>
+ 	<listitem>
+diff -up ./doc/pk12util.xml.no-dbm ./doc/pk12util.xml
+--- ./doc/pk12util.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
++++ ./doc/pk12util.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
+       <varlistentry>
+         <term>-d directory</term>
+         <listitem><para>Specify the database directory into which to import to or export from certificates and keys.</para>
+-	<para><command>pk12util</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in the SQLite format.</para></listitem>
++	<para><command>pk12util</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+ 
+       <varlistentry>
+@@ -394,15 +394,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
+ 
+ <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
+ 
+-<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type
+-Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
+-
+-<programlisting># pk12util -i /tmp/cert-files/users.p12 -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
+-
+-<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
+-<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
+-
+-<para>This line can be set added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent.</para>
++<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.  </para>
+ 
+ <itemizedlist>
+ 	<listitem>
+diff -up ./doc/signver.xml.no-dbm ./doc/signver.xml
+--- ./doc/signver.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
++++ ./doc/signver.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
+       <varlistentry>
+         <term>-d <emphasis>directory</emphasis></term>
+         <listitem><para>Specify the database directory which contains the certificates and keys.</para>
+-	<para><command>signver</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in the SQLite format.</para></listitem>
++	<para><command>signver</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+         <term>-a</term>
+@@ -155,15 +155,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
+ 
+ <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
+ 
+-<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type
+-Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
+-
+-<programlisting># signver -A -s <replaceable>signature</replaceable> -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
+-
+-<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
+-<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
+-
+-<para>This line can be added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent for the user.</para>
++<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.</para>
+ 
+ <itemizedlist>
+ 	<listitem>

nss-signtool-format.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+diff --git a/cmd/modutil/install.c b/cmd/modutil/install.c
+--- a/cmd/modutil/install.c
++++ b/cmd/modutil/install.c
+@@ -825,17 +825,20 @@ rm_dash_r(char *path)
+ 
+         dir = PR_OpenDir(path);
+         if (!dir) {
+             return -1;
+         }
+ 
+         /* Recursively delete all entries in the directory */
+         while ((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH)) != NULL) {
+-            snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name);
++            if (snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name) >= sizeof(filename)) {
++                PR_CloseDir(dir);
++                return -1;
++            }
+             if (rm_dash_r(filename)) {
+                 PR_CloseDir(dir);
+                 return -1;
+             }
+         }
+ 
+         if (PR_CloseDir(dir) != PR_SUCCESS) {
+             return -1;
+diff --git a/cmd/signtool/util.c b/cmd/signtool/util.c
+--- a/cmd/signtool/util.c
++++ b/cmd/signtool/util.c
+@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ rm_dash_r(char *path)
+         /* Recursively delete all entries in the directory */
+         while ((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH)) != NULL) {
+             snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name);
++            if (snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name
++) >= sizeof(filename)) {
++                errorCount++;
++                PR_CloseDir(dir);
++                return -1;
++            }
+             if (rm_dash_r(filename)) {
+                 PR_CloseDir(dir);
+                 return -1;
+diff --git a/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c b/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
+--- a/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
++++ b/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
+@@ -1530,17 +1530,17 @@ cleanup:
+  */
+ PKIX_Error *
+ PKIX_List_SetItem(
+         PKIX_List *list,
+         PKIX_UInt32 index,
+         PKIX_PL_Object *item,
+         void *plContext)
+ {
+-        PKIX_List *element;
++        PKIX_List *element = NULL;
+ 
+         PKIX_ENTER(LIST, "PKIX_List_SetItem");
+         PKIX_NULLCHECK_ONE(list);
+ 
+         if (list->immutable){
+                 PKIX_ERROR(PKIX_OPERATIONNOTPERMITTEDONIMMUTABLELIST);
+         }
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c b/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
+--- a/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
++++ b/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
+@@ -102,17 +102,17 @@ cleanup:
+  */
+ static PKIX_Error *
+ pkix_pl_OID_Equals(
+         PKIX_PL_Object *first,
+         PKIX_PL_Object *second,
+         PKIX_Boolean *pResult,
+         void *plContext)
+ {
+-        PKIX_Int32 cmpResult;
++        PKIX_Int32 cmpResult = 0;
+ 
+         PKIX_ENTER(OID, "pkix_pl_OID_Equals");
+         PKIX_NULLCHECK_THREE(first, second, pResult);
+ 
+         PKIX_CHECK(pkix_pl_OID_Comparator
+                     (first, second, &cmpResult, plContext),
+                     PKIX_OIDCOMPARATORFAILED);
+ 

nss-softokn-config.in

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ Options:
 Dynamic Libraries:
 	softokn3 - Requires full dynamic linking
 	freebl3  - for internal use only (and glibc for self-integrity check)
-	nssdbm3  - for internal use only
 Dymamically linked
 EOF
 	exit $1

nss-softokn.pc.in

@@ -7,5 +7,5 @@ Name: NSS-SOFTOKN
 Description: Network Security Services Softoken PKCS #11 Module
 Version: %SOFTOKEN_VERSION%
 Requires: nspr >= %NSPR_VERSION%, nss-util >= %NSSUTIL_VERSION%
-Libs: -L${libdir} -lfreebl3 -lnssdbm3 -lsoftokn3
+Libs: -L${libdir} -lfreebl3 -lsoftokn3
 Cflags: -I${includedir}

plans/ci.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/fips-disabled-buildroot-disabled:
+  plan:
+    import:
+      url: https://pkgs.devel.redhat.com/git/tests/nss
+      name: /plans/ci/fips-disabled-buildroot-disabled
+
+/fips-disabled-buildroot-enabled:
+  plan:
+    import:
+      url: https://pkgs.devel.redhat.com/git/tests/nss
+      name: /plans/ci/fips-disabled-buildroot-enabled
+
+/fips-enabled-buildroot-disabled:
+  plan:
+    import:
+      url: https://pkgs.devel.redhat.com/git/tests/nss
+      name: /plans/ci/fips-enabled-buildroot-disabled
+
+/fips-enabled-buildroot-enabled:
+  plan:
+    import:
+      url: https://pkgs.devel.redhat.com/git/tests/nss
+      name: /plans/ci/fips-enabled-buildroot-enabled

plans/gnutls-2way.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+summary: Upstreamed interop-2way tests
+contact: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
+discover:
+  # upstreamed tests (public)
+  - name: interop-gnutls-2way
+    how: fmf
+    url: https://gitlab.com/redhat-crypto/tests/interop.git
+    filter: 'tag: interop-nss & tag: interop-gnutls & tag: interop-2way'
+execute:
+    how: tmt

plans/openssl-2way.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+summary: Upstreamed interop-2way tests
+contact: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
+discover:
+  # upstreamed tests (public)
+  - name: interop-openssl-2way
+    how: fmf
+    url: https://gitlab.com/redhat-crypto/tests/interop.git
+    filter: 'tag: interop-nss & tag: interop-openssl & tag: interop-2way'
+execute:
+    how: tmt

plans/openssl-reneg.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+summary: Upstreamed interop-nss-openssl renegotiation test
+contact: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
+discover:
+  # upstreamed tests (public)
+  - name: interop-openssl-reneg
+    how: fmf
+    url: https://gitlab.com/redhat-crypto/tests/interop.git
+    filter: 'tag: interop-nss & tag: interop-openssl & tag: interop-reneg'
+execute:
+    how: tmt

plans/short-interop-tests.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+summary: Upstreamed interop tests - short tests which do not need to run in parallel
+contact: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
+discover:
+  # upstreamed tests (public)
+  - name: interop-other+nss-fast
+    how: fmf
+    url: https://gitlab.com/redhat-crypto/tests/interop.git
+    filter: 'tag: interop-nss & tag: -interop-slow'
+execute:
+    how: tmt

sources

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+SHA512 (blank-cert9.db) = 2f8eab4c0612210ee47db8a3a80c1b58a0b43849551af78c7da403fda3e3d4e7757838061ae56ccf5aac335cb54f254f0a9e6e9c0dd5920b4155a39264525b06
+SHA512 (blank-key4.db) = 8fedae93af7163da23fe9492ea8e785a44c291604fa98e58438448efb69c85d3253fc22b926d5c3209c62e58a86038fd4d78a1c4c068bc00600a7f3e5382ebe7
+SHA512 (nss_compat_test_pkcs12.tar) = 766af618ef02be5d54aff94651751ec68109a293c0b2782b0d7f6f2c844e41f4414eee5a9f46df2b1c22e0f24c4d85be00217cbcbc2632ac2f51bfa644abc2e6
+SHA512 (nss-3.112-with-nspr-4.36.tar.gz) = a3da1f5cc5a05e7d3d7082312ef6000266ca3a33a9cc61c81d9d54743522d752e7634cd11ff6b6721bde7ee0c3ca92b93c964b34cb1d377462379de075fa3fe1