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ee453ce71d
nss/nss-3.112-fips.patch
Robert Relyea 2a8572a8f9 Resolves: RHEL-103353 
rebase NSS to 3.112
Include mlkem1024 support and ml-dsa support for tls
2025-07-14 09:01:26 -07:00

889 lines
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diff --git a/lib/freebl/stubs.c b/lib/freebl/stubs.c
--- a/lib/freebl/stubs.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/stubs.c
@@ -485,17 +485,17 @@ PR_GetLibraryFilePathname_stub(const cha
extern int
PORT_GetError_stub(void)
{
STUB_SAFE_CALL0(PORT_GetError_Util);
return errno;
}
extern void
-PORT_SafeZero(void *p, size_t n)
+PORT_SafeZero_stub(void *p, size_t n)
{
STUB_SAFE_CALL2(PORT_SafeZero, p, n);
/* just use a generic call in the case where we are running
* standalone freebl */
if (p != NULL) {
volatile unsigned char *__vl = (unsigned char *)p;
size_t __nl = n;
while (__nl--)
diff --git a/lib/freebl/stubs.h b/lib/freebl/stubs.h
--- a/lib/freebl/stubs.h
+++ b/lib/freebl/stubs.h
@@ -22,17 +22,17 @@
#define PORT_Alloc PORT_Alloc_stub
#define PORT_ArenaAlloc PORT_ArenaAlloc_stub
#define PORT_ArenaZAlloc PORT_ArenaZAlloc_stub
#define PORT_Free PORT_Free_stub
#define PORT_FreeArena PORT_FreeArena_stub
#define PORT_GetError PORT_GetError_stub
#define PORT_NewArena PORT_NewArena_stub
-#define PORT_SaveZero PORT_SaveZero_stub
+#define PORT_SafeZero PORT_SafeZero_stub
#define PORT_SetError PORT_SetError_stub
#define PORT_ZAlloc PORT_ZAlloc_stub
#define PORT_ZFree PORT_ZFree_stub
#define PORT_ZAllocAligned PORT_ZAllocAligned_stub
#define PORT_ZAllocAlignedOffset PORT_ZAllocAlignedOffset_stub
#define SECITEM_AllocItem SECITEM_AllocItem_stub
#define SECITEM_CompareItem SECITEM_CompareItem_stub
diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_fips140_3.c b/lib/freebl/unix_fips140_3.c
--- a/lib/freebl/unix_fips140_3.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/unix_fips140_3.c
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
{
PRUint8 bytes[SYSTEM_RNG_SEED_COUNT];
size_t numBytes = RNG_SystemRNG(bytes, SYSTEM_RNG_SEED_COUNT);
if (!numBytes) {
/* error is set */
return;
}
RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
- PORT_SaveZero(bytes, sizeof(bytes));
+ PORT_SafeZero(bytes, sizeof(bytes));
}
static unsigned int rng_grndFlags = 0;
static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
static PRStatus
rng_getKernelFips()
{
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -535,17 +535,17 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
context->cipherInfo = NULL;
context->hashInfo = NULL;
context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
context->padDataLength = 0;
context->key = key;
context->blockSize = 0;
context->maxLen = 0;
context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
- operation, key);
+ operation, key, 0);
*contextPtr = context;
return CKR_OK;
}
static int
sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism)
{
switch (mechanism) {
@@ -4794,16 +4794,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
goto loser;
}
/* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
@@ -4990,16 +4991,20 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
goto loser;
}
/*
* handle the base object stuff
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
+ * fips requirements */
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key, 0);
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
@@ -6077,18 +6082,18 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
}
/*
* handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
* If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
* created and linked.
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
- sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return crv;
}
if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
&cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
@@ -6120,22 +6125,29 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
(PRUint32)hSession, (PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism,
(PRUint32)crv);
sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg);
}
}
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return crv;
}
+ /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
+ privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey, 0);
+ publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return CKR_OK;
}
@@ -7321,30 +7333,35 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
}
if ((params->bExpand && keySize == 0) ||
(!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) ||
(params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) {
return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
}
+ if (!params->bExpand) {
+ keySize = hashLen;
+ }
+
/* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
* sensitiveCheck */
if (sourceKey != NULL) {
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, canBeData);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
return crv;
}
/* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
if (params->bExtract) {
CK_BYTE *salt;
CK_ULONG saltLen;
HMACContext *hmac;
unsigned int bufLen;
+ SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
switch (params->ulSaltType) {
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
saltLen = hashLen;
salt = hashbuf;
memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
break;
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
@@ -7369,31 +7386,57 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
/* if the base key is not fips, but the salt key is, the
* resulting key can be fips */
if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
CK_MECHANISM mech;
mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
mech.pParameter = params;
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
- CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
+ CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
+ keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
}
+ saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* save the resulting salt */
salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
break;
default:
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
+ if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
+ PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
+ /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
+ * salt */
+ if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
+ if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
+ (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
+ (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!fipsOK) {
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
if (saltKey_att) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
}
if (saltKey) {
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
}
@@ -7411,26 +7454,50 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
/* PRK = base key value */
prk = sourceKeyBytes;
prkLen = sourceKeyLen;
}
/* HKDF-Expand */
if (!params->bExpand) {
okm = prk;
- keySize = genLen = hashLen;
+ genLen = hashLen;
} else {
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
* key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
*/
HMACContext *hmac;
CK_BYTE bi;
unsigned iterations;
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
+ if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
+ unsigned char *info=&params->pInfo[3];
+ /* only one case,
+ * 1) Expand only
+ * 2) with a key whose source was
+ * SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
+ * 3) source key length == rawHash->length
+ * 4) Info has tls or dtls
+ * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
+ * off the fips indicator */
+ if (params->bExtract ||
+ ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
+ (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
+ (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
+ (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
+ ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
+ (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
+
genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
iterations = genLen / hashLen;
if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
@@ -7635,17 +7702,18 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
/* get the value of the base key */
att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
}
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
+ keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
switch (mechanism) {
/* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
* will generate the public portion if it doesn't already exist. */
case CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV: {
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
int error;
@@ -8797,16 +8865,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
/* calculate private value - oct */
rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
crv = CKR_OK;
} else
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
@@ -8894,16 +8963,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
* tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive,
* secret and secretlen are the values we will
* eventually pass as our generated key.
*/
secret = tmp.data;
secretlen = tmp.len;
} else {
secretlen = keySize;
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
break;
}
tmp.data = secret;
@@ -8927,16 +8997,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
}
PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
secret = keyData;
} else {
secret += (secretlen - keySize);
}
secretlen = keySize;
}
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
if (keyData) {
PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
}
break;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
*/
typedef enum {
SFTK_DestroyFailure,
SFTK_Destroyed,
SFTK_Busy
} SFTKFreeStatus;
/*
+ * Source of various objects
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
+} SFTKSource;
+
+/*
* attribute values of an object.
*/
struct SFTKAttributeStr {
SFTKAttribute *next;
SFTKAttribute *prev;
PRBool freeAttr;
PRBool freeData;
/*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
int refCount;
PZLock *refLock;
SFTKSlot *slot;
void *objectInfo;
SFTKFree infoFree;
PRBool isFIPS;
+ SFTKSource source;
};
struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
SFTKObject obj;
SECItem dbKey;
};
struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
@@ -963,15 +974,16 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
/* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
/* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op);
/* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
* FIPS security policy */
PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source,
+ CK_ULONG targetKeySize);
/* add validation objects to the slot */
CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
SEC_END_PROTOS
#endif /* _PKCS11I_H_ */
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
@@ -1098,16 +1098,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
}
sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
object->handle = 0;
object->next = object->prev = NULL;
object->slot = slot;
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
object->refCount = 1;
sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
sessObject->session = NULL;
sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
if (!hasLocks)
@@ -1683,16 +1684,17 @@ fail:
CK_RV
sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
{
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
unsigned int i;
destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
+ destObject->source = srcObject->source;
if (src_so == NULL) {
return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
}
PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
attribute = src_so->head[i];
do {
@@ -2068,16 +2070,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
/* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
* doesn't exist */
crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
object->slot = slot;
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
object->objectInfo = NULL;
object->infoFree = NULL;
if (!hasLocks) {
object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
}
if (object->refLock == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
@@ -2234,16 +2237,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE
break;
case CKA_DERIVE:
flags = CKF_DERIVE;
break;
/* fake attribute to select digesting */
case CKA_DIGEST:
flags = CKF_DIGEST;
break;
+ /* fake attribute to select key gen */
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE;
+ break;
+ /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
+ break;
+ /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
break;
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
break;
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
@@ -2319,20 +2331,20 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
}
/* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
* FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
* in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
* the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
* in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
* the FIPS indicator code */
-static int
+static CK_ULONG
sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
{
- CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
CK_RV crv;
/* If we don't have a key, then it doesn't have a length.
* this may be OK (say we are hashing). The mech info will
* sort this out because algorithms which expect no keys
@@ -2342,17 +2354,17 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
}
crv = sftk_GetULongAttribute(source, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
/* sometimes we're passed a data object, in that case the
* key length is CKA_VALUE, which is the default */
keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
}
- if (keyType == CKK_EC) {
+ if (keyType == CKK_EC || keyType == CKK_EC_EDWARDS || keyType == CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY) {
SECOidTag curve = sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(source);
switch (curve) {
case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:
/* change when we start algorithm testing on curve25519 */
return 0;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
return 256;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
@@ -2384,24 +2396,65 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(source, keyAttribute);
if (attribute) {
keyLength = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen * 8;
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
}
return keyLength;
}
+PRBool
+sftk_checkFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash, PRBool allowSmall, PRBool allowCMAC)
+{
+ switch (hash) {
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC:
+ return allowCMAC;
+ case CKM_SHA_1:
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
+ case CKM_SHA224:
+ case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
+ return allowSmall;
+ case CKM_SHA256:
+ case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
+ case CKM_SHA384:
+ case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
+ case CKM_SHA512:
+ case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+sftk_checkKeyLength(CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG min,
+ CK_ULONG max, CK_ULONG step)
+{
+ if (keyLength > max) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (keyLength < min ) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (((keyLength - min) % step) != 0) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
/*
* handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
* handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
* would have to be coded here before they can be added to the table */
static PRBool
sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
- SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source)
+ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
+ CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
{
+ PRBool allowSmall = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool allowCMAC = PR_FALSE;
switch (mechInfo->special) {
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
SECItem dhPrime;
SECItem dhBase;
SECItem dhGenerator;
PRBool fipsOk = PR_FALSE;
const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
@@ -2451,32 +2504,97 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
}
/* we use the existing hash utilities to find the length of
* the hash */
hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(
pss->hashAlg));
if (hashObj == NULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
+ /* cap the salt for legacy keys */
+ if ((keyLength <= 1024) && (pss->sLen > 63)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* cap the salt for based on the hash */
if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
+ /* Our code makes sure pss->hashAlg matches the explicit
+ * hash in the mechanism, and only mechanisms with approved
+ * hashes are included, so no need to check pss->hashAlg
+ * here */
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
+ /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
+ * (independent of keysize).
+ * 1. iteration count must be at least 1000.
+ * 2. salt must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).
+ * 3. password must match the length specified in the SP
+ */
+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkdf2 = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)
+ mech->pParameter;
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pbkdf2)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (pbkdf2->iterations < 1000) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (pbkdf2->ulSaltSourceDataLen < 16) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (*(pbkdf2->ulPasswordLen) < SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
return PR_TRUE;
}
+ /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800:
+ allowCMAC = PR_TRUE;
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
+ allowSmall = PR_TRUE;
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHashTls:
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
+ + mechInfo->offset), allowSmall, allowCMAC);
+ case SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck:
+ if (mech->mechanism != CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
+ /* unless the mechnism has a built-in hash, check the hash */
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
+ + mechInfo->offset), PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
+ case SFTKFIPSRSAOAEP:;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *rsaoaep = (CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *)
+ mech->pParameter;
+
+ HASH_HashType hash_msg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(rsaoaep->hashAlg);
+ HASH_HashType hash_pad = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(rsaoaep->mgf);
+ /* message hash and mask generation function must be the same */
+ if (hash_pad != hash_msg) return PR_FALSE;
+
+ return sftk_checkFIPSHash(rsaoaep->hashAlg, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE);
default:
break;
}
/* if we didn't understand the special processing, mark it non-fips */
return PR_FALSE;
}
#endif
PRBool
sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
- SFTKObject *source)
+ SFTKObject *source, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
{
#ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
return PR_FALSE;
#else
int i;
CK_FLAGS opFlags;
CK_ULONG keyLength;
@@ -2498,23 +2616,25 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
}
keyLength = sftk_getKeyLength(source);
/* check against our algorithm array */
for (i = 0; i < SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS; i++) {
SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
/* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
* approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
- if (((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
- (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
- (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
- (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
- ((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
- ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
- sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source))) {
+ if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
+ (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
+ sftk_checkKeyLength(keyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
+ mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step) &&
+ ((targetKeyLength == 0) || (mechs->special == SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck)
+ || sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
+ mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step)) &&
+ ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
+ sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
return PR_TRUE;
}
}
return PR_FALSE;
#endif
}
/*
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkike.c b/lib/softoken/sftkike.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkike.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkike.c
@@ -511,16 +511,22 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
}
/* key as the data */
crv = prf_update(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto fail;
}
} else {
+ /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
+ * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
+ if (!params->bRekey) {
+ outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto fail;
}
if (newKeyValue) {
crv = prf_update(&context, newKeyValue->attrib.pValue,
newKeyValue->attrib.ulValueLen);
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
@@ -178,16 +178,48 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
return crv;
+ if (context->isFIPS && (contextType == SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
+ if ((pParameter == NULL) || (ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS))) {
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ } else {
+ CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
+ switch (p->ivGenerator) {
+ default:
+ case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
+ if ((p->ulIvLen < 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
+ (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
+ if ((p->ulIvLen != 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
+ (p->ulIvFixedBits != 32)) {
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
+ if ((p->ulIvFixedBits < 32) ||
+ ((p->ulIvLen*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - p->ulIvFixedBits) < 32)) {
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if (!pOuttext) {
*pulOuttextLen = ulIntextLen;
return CKR_OK;
}
rv = (*context->aeadUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pOuttext, &outlen,
maxout, pIntext, ulIntextLen,
pParameter, ulParameterLen,
pAssociatedData, ulAssociatedDataLen);
diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -148,16 +148,18 @@
/*
* NSS-defined certificate types
*
*/
#define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
#define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
#define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
/*
* NSS-defined object attributes
*
*/
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