libssh/CVE-2026-59844.patch
Pavol Žáčik a97adc51f9
Backport CVE patches from 0.11.5
Resolves: RHEL-215674
Resolves: RHEL-215675
Resolves: RHEL-215676
Resolves: RHEL-215677
Resolves: RHEL-215678
Resolves: RHEL-215679
Resolves: RHEL-215680

Assisted-by: Ymir
2026-07-30 12:22:19 +02:00

43 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff

From 0647bf3cc06e4bac01596b4f8ca8e00ee4148ca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Pavol=20=C5=BD=C3=A1=C4=8Dik?= <pzacik@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2026 18:05:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-59844 sftpserver: cap accepted values of len in
SSH_FXP_READ
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The client-provided length is directly used in
a malloc in process_read(), so not restricting it
leads to allocations bounded only by UINT32_MAX.
The new cap is the same as the one currently used
by OpenSSH.
Signed-off-by: Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6dba2e06f0713c04ad5eca7d4315d0104be7e627)
---
src/sftpserver.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/sftpserver.c b/src/sftpserver.c
index b3349e16..34bea3d9 100644
--- a/src/sftpserver.c
+++ b/src/sftpserver.c
@@ -105,6 +105,14 @@ sftp_client_message sftp_get_client_message(sftp_session sftp) {
sftp_client_message_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
+ if (msg->len > MAX_PACKET_LEN - 1024) {
+ ssh_set_error(session,
+ SSH_FATAL,
+ "Too large SSH_FXP_READ length: %" PRIu32,
+ msg->len);
+ sftp_client_message_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
break;
case SSH_FXP_WRITE:
rc = ssh_buffer_unpack(payload,