.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SOURCES/libssh-0.9.6.tar.xz
+SOURCES/libssh-0.10.4.tar.xz
 SOURCES/libssh.keyring

.libssh.metadata

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-1b2dd673b58e1eaf20fde45cd8de2197cfab2f78 SOURCES/libssh-0.9.6.tar.xz
+4c48350a0a688ad82080175ed26a2019928a99c4 SOURCES/libssh-0.10.4.tar.xz
 3f2ab0bca02893402ba0ad172a6bd44456a65f86 SOURCES/libssh.keyring

SOURCES/CVE-2023-48795.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 87b93be5a2071be782aa84aa5a91544b18959d5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 4cef5e965a46e9271aed62631b152e4bd23c1e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
 Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:09:57 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 1/4] CVE-2023-48795: client side mitigation
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
  12 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/include/libssh/packet.h b/include/libssh/packet.h
-index 561bba8e..c6fbc3fc 100644
+index 7f10a709..f0c8cb20 100644
 --- a/include/libssh/packet.h
 +++ b/include/libssh/packet.h
-@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_ext_info);
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_ext_info);
  SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init);
  #endif
  
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ index 561bba8e..c6fbc3fc 100644
  int ssh_packet_parse_type(ssh_session session);
  //int packet_flush(ssh_session session, int enforce_blocking);
 diff --git a/include/libssh/session.h b/include/libssh/session.h
-index 64e118ef..3cde0dd4 100644
+index eb14e97a..97936195 100644
 --- a/include/libssh/session.h
 +++ b/include/libssh/session.h
-@@ -80,6 +80,12 @@ enum ssh_pending_call_e {
+@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ enum ssh_pending_call_e {
   * sending it twice during key exchange to simplify the state machine. */
  #define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEXINIT_SENT 4
  
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ index 64e118ef..3cde0dd4 100644
  /* Infinite timeout */
  #define SSH_TIMEOUT_INFINITE -1
 diff --git a/src/curve25519.c b/src/curve25519.c
-index 37654438..6b7b4238 100644
+index 66291b5f..4aeb4756 100644
 --- a/src/curve25519.c
 +++ b/src/curve25519.c
 @@ -335,16 +335,10 @@ static SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_curve25519_reply){
@@ -95,10 +95,10 @@ index 37654438..6b7b4238 100644
      return SSH_PACKET_USED;
  error:
 diff --git a/src/dh-gex.c b/src/dh-gex.c
-index 4a298542..f1880270 100644
+index 91617081..642a88ae 100644
 --- a/src/dh-gex.c
 +++ b/src/dh-gex.c
-@@ -287,15 +287,10 @@ static SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dhgex_reply)
+@@ -297,15 +297,10 @@ static SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dhgex_reply)
      }
  
      /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
@@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ index 4a298542..f1880270 100644
  
      return SSH_PACKET_USED;
 diff --git a/src/dh.c b/src/dh.c
-index c265efcb..1d519c63 100644
+index 011d97b3..e19e43d1 100644
 --- a/src/dh.c
 +++ b/src/dh.c
-@@ -386,16 +386,10 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dh_reply){
+@@ -398,16 +398,10 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dh_reply){
    }
  
    /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ index c265efcb..1d519c63 100644
    session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
    return SSH_PACKET_USED;
  error:
-@@ -532,15 +526,12 @@ int ssh_server_dh_process_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet)
+@@ -551,15 +545,12 @@ int ssh_server_dh_process_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet)
      }
      SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Sent KEX_DH_[GEX]_REPLY");
  
@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@ index e5b11ba9..af80beec 100644
  
    return SSH_PACKET_USED;
 diff --git a/src/ecdh_crypto.c b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
-index a1de27fd..62578c1b 100644
+index 51084b7a..069b1372 100644
 --- a/src/ecdh_crypto.c
 +++ b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
-@@ -323,18 +323,12 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_ecdh_init){
+@@ -619,18 +619,12 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_ecdh_init){
          goto error;
      }
  
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ index a1de27fd..62578c1b 100644
      return SSH_PACKET_USED;
  error:
 diff --git a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
-index d9c41bf9..dd4332d7 100644
+index 235f2904..3d9d426f 100644
 --- a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
 +++ b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
 @@ -372,17 +372,13 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_ecdh_init){
@@ -230,10 +230,10 @@ index d9c41bf9..dd4332d7 100644
      gcry_sexp_release(param);
      gcry_sexp_release(key);
 diff --git a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
-index 718f1522..45251a42 100644
+index cfe017a0..dda73922 100644
 --- a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
 +++ b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
-@@ -300,16 +300,13 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_ecdh_init){
+@@ -318,16 +318,13 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_ecdh_init){
          goto out;
      }
  
@@ -255,10 +255,10 @@ index 718f1522..45251a42 100644
      mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
      if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
 diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
-index 3e5ca6ad..0772cae8 100644
+index b9455d2d..3818297b 100644
 --- a/src/kex.c
 +++ b/src/kex.c
-@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@
+@@ -188,6 +188,9 @@
  
  /* RFC 8308 */
  #define KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT "ext-info-c"
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ index 3e5ca6ad..0772cae8 100644
  
  /* Allowed algorithms in FIPS mode */
  #define FIPS_ALLOWED_CIPHERS "aes256-gcm@openssh.com,"\
-@@ -491,6 +494,27 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit)
+@@ -516,6 +519,27 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit)
                      session->first_kex_follows_guess_wrong ? "wrong" : "right");
      }
  
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ index 3e5ca6ad..0772cae8 100644
      if (server_kex) {
          /*
           * If client sent a ext-info-c message in the kex list, it supports
-@@ -767,21 +791,21 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
+@@ -792,21 +816,21 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
          return SSH_OK;
      }
  
@@ -324,10 +324,10 @@ index 3e5ca6ad..0772cae8 100644
  
      return SSH_OK;
 diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c
-index ca7a03b7..82965fb3 100644
+index eb7eb42a..ea73f9ad 100644
 --- a/src/packet.c
 +++ b/src/packet.c
-@@ -1309,6 +1309,19 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
+@@ -1314,6 +1314,19 @@ ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
              }
  #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
              payloadsize = ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer);
@@ -347,27 +347,7 @@ index ca7a03b7..82965fb3 100644
              session->recv_seq++;
              if (crypto != NULL) {
                  struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher = NULL;
-@@ -1331,7 +1344,19 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
-             SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET,
-                     "packet: read type %hhd [len=%d,padding=%hhd,comp=%d,payload=%d]",
-                     session->in_packet.type, packet_len, padding, compsize, payloadsize);
-+            if (crypto == NULL) {
-+                /* In strict kex, only a few packets are allowed. Taint the session
-+                 * if we received packets that are normally allowed but to be
-+                 * refused if we are in strict kex when KEX is over.
-+                 */
-+                uint8_t type = session->in_packet.type;
- 
-+                if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS &&
-+                    (type < SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT ||
-+                     type > SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) {
-+                    session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
-+                }
-+            }
-             /* Check if the packet is expected */
-             filter_result = ssh_packet_incoming_filter(session);
- 
-@@ -1347,6 +1372,9 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
+@@ -1354,6 +1379,9 @@ ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
                                session->in_packet.type);
                  goto error;
              case SSH_PACKET_UNKNOWN:
@@ -377,7 +357,7 @@ index ca7a03b7..82965fb3 100644
                  ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(session, session->recv_seq - 1);
                  break;
              }
-@@ -1521,7 +1549,33 @@ void ssh_packet_process(ssh_session session, uint8_t type)
+@@ -1529,7 +1557,33 @@ void ssh_packet_process(ssh_session session, uint8_t type)
              SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, "Failed to send unimplemented: %s",
                      ssh_get_error(session));
          }
@@ -411,7 +391,7 @@ index ca7a03b7..82965fb3 100644
  }
  
  /** @internal
-@@ -1829,6 +1883,10 @@ int ssh_packet_send(ssh_session session)
+@@ -1842,6 +1896,10 @@ int ssh_packet_send(ssh_session session)
      if (rc == SSH_OK && type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
          struct ssh_iterator *it;
  
@@ -423,10 +403,10 @@ index ca7a03b7..82965fb3 100644
               it != NULL;
               it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->out_queue)) {
 diff --git a/src/packet_cb.c b/src/packet_cb.c
-index 3e4d5f6d..a08f1d8a 100644
+index 0ecf8771..2f364c26 100644
 --- a/src/packet_cb.c
 +++ b/src/packet_cb.c
-@@ -110,6 +110,18 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_newkeys){
+@@ -115,6 +115,18 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_newkeys){
        goto error;
    }
  
@@ -449,7 +429,7 @@ index 3e4d5f6d..a08f1d8a 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From fd4948255560039b51c2d61f0a62784ed8b6f5a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 0870c8db28be9eb457ee3d4f9a168959d9507efd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
 Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:30:26 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 2/4] CVE-2023-48795: Server side mitigations
@@ -464,10 +444,10 @@ Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
  3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/include/libssh/kex.h b/include/libssh/kex.h
-index 2ace69b6..40da4ef2 100644
+index ede7fa8a..ba98fded 100644
 --- a/include/libssh/kex.h
 +++ b/include/libssh/kex.h
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit);
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit);
  int ssh_send_kex(ssh_session session);
  void ssh_list_kex(struct ssh_kex_struct *kex);
  int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session);
@@ -476,10 +456,10 @@ index 2ace69b6..40da4ef2 100644
  int ssh_verify_existing_algo(enum ssh_kex_types_e algo, const char *name);
  char *ssh_keep_known_algos(enum ssh_kex_types_e algo, const char *list);
 diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
-index 0772cae8..e37c176c 100644
+index 3818297b..9ad671db 100644
 --- a/src/kex.c
 +++ b/src/kex.c
-@@ -738,11 +738,8 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
+@@ -763,11 +763,8 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
  {
      struct ssh_kex_struct *client = &session->next_crypto->client_kex;
      const char *wanted;
@@ -491,7 +471,7 @@ index 0772cae8..e37c176c 100644
  
      /* Skip if already set, for example for the rekey or when we do the guessing
       * it could have been already used to make some protocol decisions. */
-@@ -791,11 +788,33 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
+@@ -816,11 +813,33 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
          return SSH_OK;
      }
  
@@ -529,7 +509,7 @@ index 0772cae8..e37c176c 100644
      if (kex_len >= MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
          /* Overflow */
          return SSH_ERROR;
-@@ -805,9 +824,16 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
+@@ -830,9 +849,16 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
          ssh_set_error_oom(session);
          return SSH_ERROR;
      }
@@ -550,7 +530,7 @@ index 0772cae8..e37c176c 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
-index ed73e7fb..35e84465 100644
+index dc070a73..70b90899 100644
 --- a/src/server.c
 +++ b/src/server.c
 @@ -195,7 +195,13 @@ int server_set_kex(ssh_session session)
@@ -572,7 +552,7 @@ index ed73e7fb..35e84465 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From 03bbbc9e4c93aae2ccdd302d6123e4809be37746 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5846e57538c750c5ce67df887d09fa99861c79c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 12:22:01 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 3/4] CVE-2023-48795: Strip extensions from both kex lists for
@@ -585,10 +565,10 @@ Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
-index e37c176c..eea3604b 100644
+index 9ad671db..fbc70cf4 100644
 --- a/src/kex.c
 +++ b/src/kex.c
-@@ -936,11 +936,19 @@ int ssh_kex_select_methods (ssh_session session)
+@@ -961,11 +961,19 @@ int ssh_kex_select_methods (ssh_session session)
      enum ssh_key_exchange_e kex_type;
      int i;
  
@@ -616,7 +596,7 @@ index e37c176c..eea3604b 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From 768d1ed30cf4b3cb9628254ef3ee24b9c38abdbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 89df759200d31fc79fbbe213d8eda0d329eebf6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 12:47:48 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 4/4] CVE-2023-48795: tests: Adjust calculation to strict kex
@@ -624,11 +604,11 @@ Subject: [PATCH 4/4] CVE-2023-48795: tests: Adjust calculation to strict kex
 Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
 ---
- tests/client/torture_rekey.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+ tests/client/torture_rekey.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/tests/client/torture_rekey.c b/tests/client/torture_rekey.c
-index 13c9a7fe..bfb273af 100644
+index ccd5ae2c..57e03e3f 100644
 --- a/tests/client/torture_rekey.c
 +++ b/tests/client/torture_rekey.c
 @@ -148,6 +148,29 @@ static void torture_rekey_default(void **state)
@@ -681,25 +661,7 @@ index 13c9a7fe..bfb273af 100644
      secret_hash = malloc(c->digest_len);
      assert_non_null(secret_hash);
      memcpy(secret_hash, c->secret_hash, c->digest_len);
-@@ -272,14 +289,10 @@ static void torture_rekey_recv(void **state)
-     sftp_file file;
-     mode_t mask;
- 
--    /* The blocks limit is set correctly */
--    c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
--    assert_int_equal(c->in_cipher->max_blocks, bytes / c->in_cipher->blocksize);
--    assert_int_equal(c->out_cipher->max_blocks, bytes / c->out_cipher->blocksize);
--    /* We should have less encrypted packets than transfered (first are not encrypted) */
--    assert_true(c->out_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->send_seq);
--    assert_true(c->in_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->recv_seq);
-+    sanity_check_session(state);
-     /* Copy the initial secret hash = session_id so we know we changed keys later */
-+    c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
-+    assert_non_null(c);
-     secret_hash = malloc(c->digest_len);
-     assert_non_null(secret_hash);
-     memcpy(secret_hash, c->secret_hash, c->digest_len);
-@@ -464,15 +477,10 @@ static void torture_rekey_different_kex(void **state)
+@@ -468,15 +480,10 @@ static void torture_rekey_different_kex(void **state)
      assert_ssh_return_code(s->ssh.session, rc);
  
      /* The blocks limit is set correctly */
@@ -721,3 +683,47 @@ index 13c9a7fe..bfb273af 100644
 -- 
 2.41.0
 
+diff -up libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c.CVE-2023-48795.patch libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c
+--- libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c.CVE-2023-48795.patch	2024-01-09 05:46:53.064383034 +0100
++++ libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c	2024-01-09 05:48:28.360340184 +0100
+@@ -1345,6 +1345,19 @@ size_t ssh_packet_socket_callback(const
+                     "packet: read type %hhd [len=%d,padding=%hhd,comp=%d,payload=%d]",
+                     session->in_packet.type, packet_len, padding, compsize, payloadsize);
+ 
++            if (crypto == NULL) {
++                /* In strict kex, only a few packets are allowed. Taint the session
++                 * if we received packets that are normally allowed but to be
++                 * refused if we are in strict kex when KEX is over.
++                 */
++                uint8_t type = session->in_packet.type;
++
++                if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS &&
++                    (type < SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT ||
++                     type > SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) {
++                    session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
++                }
++            }
+             /* Check if the packet is expected */
+             filter_result = ssh_packet_incoming_filter(session);
+ 
+diff -up libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c.CVE-2023-48795.patch libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c
+--- libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c.CVE-2023-48795.patch	2024-01-09 18:48:16.684366049 +0100
++++ libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2024-01-09 18:50:49.135897268 +0100
+@@ -290,14 +290,10 @@ static void torture_rekey_recv(void **st
+     mode_t mask;
+     int rc;
+ 
+-    /* The blocks limit is set correctly */
+-    c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
+-    assert_int_equal(c->in_cipher->max_blocks, bytes / c->in_cipher->blocksize);
+-    assert_int_equal(c->out_cipher->max_blocks, bytes / c->out_cipher->blocksize);
+-    /* We should have less encrypted packets than transfered (first are not encrypted) */
+-    assert_true(c->out_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->send_seq);
+-    assert_true(c->in_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->recv_seq);
++    sanity_check_session(state);
+     /* Copy the initial secret hash = session_id so we know we changed keys later */
++    c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
++    assert_non_null(c);
+     secret_hash = malloc(c->digest_len);
+     assert_non_null(secret_hash);
+     memcpy(secret_hash, c->secret_hash, c->digest_len);

SOURCES/CVE-2023-6004.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 11bd6e6ad926a38cd7b9f8308a4c2fd8dfd9200c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From c2c56bacab00766d01671413321d564227aabf19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2023 13:12:47 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_config: Allow multiple '@' in
@@ -6,86 +6,98 @@ Subject: [PATCH 01/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_config: Allow multiple '@' in
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
- tests/unittests/torture_config.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+ tests/unittests/torture_config.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
-index f91112a9..3a5a74bf 100644
+index 406f1985..b7c763af 100644
 --- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
 +++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
-@@ -671,24 +671,40 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state) {
+@@ -995,23 +995,22 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state,
      assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
                          "ssh -W [%h]:%p 2620:52:0::fed");
 
+-    /* In this part, we try various other config files and strings. */
+-
 -    /* Try to create some invalid configurations */
 -    /* Non-numeric port */
+-    config = "Host bad-port\n"
+-             "\tProxyJump jumpbox:22bad22\n";
 +    /* Multiple @ is allowed in second jump */
-     torture_write_file(LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11,
--                       "Host bad-port\n"
--                       "\tProxyJump jumpbox:22bad22\n"
-+                       "Host allowed-hostname\n"
-+                       "\tProxyJump localhost,user@principal.com@jumpbox:22\n"
-                        "");
++    config = "Host allowed-hostname\n"
++             "\tProxyJump localhost,user@principal.com@jumpbox:22\n";
+     if (file != NULL) {
+         torture_write_file(file, config);
+     } else {
+         string = config;
+     }
      torture_reset_config(session);
 -    ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "bad-port");
+-    _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_ERROR);
 +    ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "allowed-hostname");
-     ret = ssh_config_parse_file(session, LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11);
--    assert_ssh_return_code_equal(session, ret, SSH_ERROR);
-+    assert_ssh_return_code(session, ret);
++    _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
 +    assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
-+                        "ssh -J user@principal.com@jumpbox:22 -W [%h]:%p localhost");
++                        "ssh -J user@principal.com@jumpbox:22 -W '[%h]:%p' localhost");
 
 -    /* Too many @ */
+-    config = "Host bad-hostname\n"
 +    /* Multiple @ is allowed */
-     torture_write_file(LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11,
--                       "Host bad-hostname\n"
-+                       "Host allowed-hostname\n"
-                        "\tProxyJump user@principal.com@jumpbox:22\n"
-                        "");
++    config = "Host allowed-hostname\n"
+              "\tProxyJump user@principal.com@jumpbox:22\n";
+     if (file != NULL) {
+         torture_write_file(file, config);
+@@ -1019,7 +1018,24 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state,
+         string = config;
+     }
      torture_reset_config(session);
 -    ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "bad-hostname");
 +    ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "allowed-hostname");
-+    ret = ssh_config_parse_file(session, LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11);
-+    assert_ssh_return_code(session, ret);
++    _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
 +    assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
-+                        "ssh -l user@principal.com -p 22 -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
++                        "ssh -l user@principal.com -p 22 -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
 +
 +    /* In this part, we try various other config files and strings. */
 +
 +    /* Try to create some invalid configurations */
 +    /* Non-numeric port */
-+    torture_write_file(LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11,
-+                       "Host bad-port\n"
-+                       "\tProxyJump jumpbox:22bad22\n"
-+                       "");
++    config = "Host bad-port\n"
++             "\tProxyJump jumpbox:22bad22\n";
++    if (file != NULL) {
++        torture_write_file(file, config);
++    } else {
++        string = config;
++    }
 +    torture_reset_config(session);
 +    ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "bad-port");
-     ret = ssh_config_parse_file(session, LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11);
-     assert_ssh_return_code_equal(session, ret, SSH_ERROR);
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_ERROR);
 
-@@ -752,16 +768,6 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state) {
-     ret = ssh_config_parse_file(session, LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11);
-     assert_ssh_return_code_equal(session, ret, SSH_ERROR);
+     /* Braces mismatch in hostname */
+@@ -1094,18 +1110,6 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state,
+     ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "bad-port-2");
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_ERROR);
 
 -    /* Too many @ in second jump */
--    torture_write_file(LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11,
--                       "Host bad-hostname\n"
--                       "\tProxyJump localhost,user@principal.com@jumpbox:22\n"
--                       "");
+-    config = "Host bad-hostname\n"
+-             "\tProxyJump localhost,user@principal.com@jumpbox:22\n";
+-    if (file != NULL) {
+-        torture_write_file(file, config);
+-    } else {
+-        string = config;
+-    }
 -    torture_reset_config(session);
 -    ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "bad-hostname");
--    ret = ssh_config_parse_file(session, LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11);
--    assert_ssh_return_code_equal(session, ret, SSH_ERROR);
+-    _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_ERROR);
 -
      /* Braces mismatch in second jump */
-     torture_write_file(LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG11,
-                        "Host mismatch\n"
+     config = "Host mismatch\n"
+              "\tProxyJump localhost,[::1:20\n";
 --
 2.41.0
 
 
-From c3234e5f94b96d6e29f0c1c82821c1e3ebb181ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a66b4a6eae6614d200a3625862d77565b96a7cd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2023 11:24:43 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] CVE-2023-6004: config_parser: Allow multiple '@' in
@@ -93,15 +105,16 @@ Subject: [PATCH 02/12] CVE-2023-6004: config_parser: Allow multiple '@' in
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
  src/config_parser.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/config_parser.c b/src/config_parser.c
-index ae2aa2c8..76cca224 100644
+index 0d988fec..cf83e2c5 100644
 --- a/src/config_parser.c
 +++ b/src/config_parser.c
-@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
+@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
      }
 
      /* Username part (optional) */
@@ -114,7 +127,7 @@ index ae2aa2c8..76cca224 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From a5b8bd0d8841296cf71d927824d60f576581243f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 8615c24647f773a5e04203c7459512715d698be1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2023 09:48:52 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] CVE-2023-6004: options: Simplify the hostname parsing
@@ -125,15 +138,16 @@ parsing inside the function of ssh_options_set
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
  src/options.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++------------------------
  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/options.c b/src/options.c
-index b5f951ac..7c03e7ab 100644
+index 6f2c9397..38511455 100644
 --- a/src/options.c
 +++ b/src/options.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
  #include "libssh/session.h"
  #include "libssh/misc.h"
  #include "libssh/options.h"
@@ -141,7 +155,7 @@ index b5f951ac..7c03e7ab 100644
  #ifdef WITH_SERVER
  #include "libssh/server.h"
  #include "libssh/bind.h"
-@@ -490,33 +491,24 @@ int ssh_options_set(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type,
+@@ -515,33 +516,24 @@ int ssh_options_set(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type,
                  ssh_set_error_invalid(session);
                  return -1;
              } else {
@@ -153,7 +167,7 @@ index b5f951ac..7c03e7ab 100644
 +                if (rc != SSH_OK) {
                      return -1;
                  }
--                p = strchr(q, '@');
+-                p = strrchr(q, '@');
 -
 -                SAFE_FREE(session->opts.host);
 -
@@ -194,7 +208,7 @@ index b5f951ac..7c03e7ab 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From efb24b6472e8b87c5832c0590f14e99e82fcdeeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From c6180409677c765e6b9ae2b18a3a7a9671ac1dbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 12:44:16 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] CVE-2023-6004: misc: Add function to check allowed
@@ -205,37 +219,18 @@ allowed because of IPv6 even it is prohibited in domain names.
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
- include/libssh/misc.h |  2 ++
+ include/libssh/misc.h |  3 ++
  src/misc.c            | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)
+ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
 
-diff --git a/include/libssh/misc.h b/include/libssh/misc.h
-index 3cc3b113..a5bee930 100644
---- a/include/libssh/misc.h
-+++ b/include/libssh/misc.h
-@@ -97,4 +97,6 @@ int ssh_mkdirs(const char *pathname, mode_t mode);
- int ssh_quote_file_name(const char *file_name, char *buf, size_t buf_len);
- int ssh_newline_vis(const char *string, char *buf, size_t buf_len);
- 
-+int ssh_check_hostname_syntax(const char *hostname);
-+
- #endif /* MISC_H_ */
 diff --git a/src/misc.c b/src/misc.c
-index 149eb85e..e4239e81 100644
+index 7c478a77..be6ee836 100644
 --- a/src/misc.c
 +++ b/src/misc.c
-@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@
- #define ZLIB_STRING ""
- #endif
- 
-+#define ARPA_DOMAIN_MAX_LEN 63
-+
- /**
-  * @defgroup libssh_misc The SSH helper functions.
-  * @ingroup libssh
-@@ -1734,4 +1736,70 @@ int ssh_newline_vis(const char *string, char *buf, size_t buf_len)
-     return out - buf;
+@@ -1974,4 +1976,70 @@ char *ssh_strerror(int err_num, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+ #endif /* defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_GNU_SOURCE) */
  }
 
 +/**
@@ -309,7 +304,7 @@ index 149eb85e..e4239e81 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From 234ecdf4d9705efa3727a54dcc1ddfe6377c7bf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 9bbb817c0c5434f03613d0783b2ef5f52235b901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 12:45:28 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_misc: Add test for
@@ -317,16 +312,17 @@ Subject: [PATCH 05/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_misc: Add test for
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
  tests/unittests/torture_misc.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 73 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c b/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
-index 0a48abbe..d14f4254 100644
+index 9e346ff8..e682b6d4 100644
 --- a/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
 +++ b/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
-@@ -656,6 +656,78 @@ static void torture_ssh_newline_vis(UNUSED_PARAM(void **state))
-     assert_string_equal(buffer, "a\\nb\\n");
+@@ -760,6 +760,78 @@ static void torture_ssh_strerror(void **state)
+     assert_non_null(out);
  }
 
 +static void torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax(void **state)
@@ -404,10 +400,10 @@ index 0a48abbe..d14f4254 100644
  int torture_run_tests(void) {
      int rc;
      struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
-@@ -678,6 +750,7 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
-         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_newline_vis),
-         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_mkdirs),
+@@ -784,6 +856,7 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
          cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_quote_file_name),
+         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_strreplace),
+         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_strerror),
 +        cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax),
      };
 
@@ -416,7 +412,7 @@ index 0a48abbe..d14f4254 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From 4d7ae19e9cd8c407012b40f3f2eaf480bfb1da7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 22492b69bba22b102342afc574800d354a08e405 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 18:33:56 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] CVE-2023-6004: config_parser: Check for valid syntax of
@@ -427,12 +423,13 @@ The domain name syntax checker is based on RFC1035.
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
- src/config_parser.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+ src/config_parser.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/config_parser.c b/src/config_parser.c
-index 76cca224..87bac5d4 100644
+index cf83e2c5..b8b94611 100644
 --- a/src/config_parser.c
 +++ b/src/config_parser.c
 @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
@@ -441,9 +438,9 @@ index 76cca224..87bac5d4 100644
  #include "libssh/priv.h"
 +#include "libssh/misc.h"
 
- char *ssh_config_get_cmd(char **str)
- {
-@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
+ /* Returns the original string after skipping the leading whitespace
+  * and optional quotes.
+@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
  {
      char *endp = NULL;
      long port_n;
@@ -451,7 +448,7 @@ index 76cca224..87bac5d4 100644
 
      /* Sanitize inputs */
      if (username != NULL) {
-@@ -196,6 +198,14 @@ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
+@@ -224,6 +226,14 @@ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
          if (*hostname == NULL) {
              goto error;
          }
@@ -470,7 +467,7 @@ index 76cca224..87bac5d4 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From 8cf4f4bfda968ab526c1a601ea1030bbaccaba17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From d7467498fd988949edde9c6384973250fd454a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 10:28:47 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_proxycommand: Add test for
@@ -478,15 +475,16 @@ Subject: [PATCH 07/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_proxycommand: Add test for
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
  tests/client/torture_proxycommand.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 53 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/tests/client/torture_proxycommand.c b/tests/client/torture_proxycommand.c
-index c04ff2ab..dc17f3d8 100644
+index 9b8019ca..1bad4ccc 100644
 --- a/tests/client/torture_proxycommand.c
 +++ b/tests/client/torture_proxycommand.c
-@@ -161,6 +161,56 @@ static void torture_options_set_proxycommand_ssh_stderr(void **state)
+@@ -166,6 +166,56 @@ static void torture_options_set_proxycommand_ssh_stderr(void **state)
      assert_int_equal(rc & O_RDWR, O_RDWR);
  }
 
@@ -543,7 +541,7 @@ index c04ff2ab..dc17f3d8 100644
  int torture_run_tests(void) {
      int rc;
      struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
-@@ -176,6 +226,9 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
+@@ -181,6 +231,9 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
          cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_options_set_proxycommand_ssh_stderr,
                                          session_setup,
                                          session_teardown),
@@ -557,22 +555,23 @@ index c04ff2ab..dc17f3d8 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From a0dbe0d556e073804cc549802569577bb24757d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 62d3101c1f76b6891b70c50154e0e934d6b8cb57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 20:11:38 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_misc: Add test for ssh_is_ipaddr
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
  tests/unittests/torture_misc.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c b/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
-index d14f4254..073bc54c 100644
+index e682b6d4..b07392ab 100644
 --- a/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
 +++ b/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
-@@ -728,6 +728,31 @@ static void torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax(void **state)
+@@ -832,6 +832,31 @@ static void torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax(void **state)
      assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
  }
 
@@ -604,9 +603,9 @@ index d14f4254..073bc54c 100644
  int torture_run_tests(void) {
      int rc;
      struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
-@@ -751,6 +776,7 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
-         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_mkdirs),
-         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_quote_file_name),
+@@ -857,6 +882,7 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
+         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_strreplace),
+         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_strerror),
          cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax),
 +        cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_is_ipaddr),
      };
@@ -616,57 +615,35 @@ index d14f4254..073bc54c 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From cdaec0d6273243a03f460cc5ba1a2265b4afb93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From cea841d71c025f9c998b7d5fc9f2a2839df62921 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:26:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 09/12] CVE-2023-6004: misc: Add ipv6 link-local check for an
- ip address
+Subject: [PATCH 09/12] CVE-2023-6004 misc: Add ipv6 link-local check for an ip
+ address
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
- src/CMakeLists.txt | 17 ++++++++++-------
+ src/CMakeLists.txt |  1 +
  src/connect.c      |  2 +-
  src/misc.c         | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+ 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/CMakeLists.txt b/src/CMakeLists.txt
-index a576cf71..fc401793 100644
+index d6245c0d..807313b5 100644
 --- a/src/CMakeLists.txt
 +++ b/src/CMakeLists.txt
-@@ -9,13 +9,6 @@ set(LIBSSH_LINK_LIBRARIES
-   ${LIBSSH_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES}
- )
- 
--if (WIN32)
--  set(LIBSSH_LINK_LIBRARIES
--    ${LIBSSH_LINK_LIBRARIES}
--    ws2_32
--  )
--endif (WIN32)
--
- if (OPENSSL_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES)
-   set(LIBSSH_PRIVATE_INCLUDE_DIRS
-     ${LIBSSH_PRIVATE_INCLUDE_DIRS}
-@@ -93,6 +86,16 @@ if (MINGW AND Threads_FOUND)
-   )
- endif()
- 
-+# This needs to be last for mingw to build
-+# https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/issues/84
-+if (WIN32)
-+  set(LIBSSH_LINK_LIBRARIES
-+    ${LIBSSH_LINK_LIBRARIES}
+@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ endif()
+ if (WIN32)
+   set(LIBSSH_LINK_LIBRARIES
+     ${LIBSSH_LINK_LIBRARIES}
 +    iphlpapi
-+    ws2_32
-+  )
-+endif (WIN32)
-+
- if (BUILD_STATIC_LIB)
-   set(LIBSSH_STATIC_LIBRARY
-     ssh_static
+     ws2_32
+   )
+ endif (WIN32)
 diff --git a/src/connect.c b/src/connect.c
-index ce4d58df..ca62dcf0 100644
+index 57e37e63..15cae644 100644
 --- a/src/connect.c
 +++ b/src/connect.c
 @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int getai(const char *host, int port, struct addrinfo **ai)
@@ -679,7 +656,7 @@ index ce4d58df..ca62dcf0 100644
          SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "host %s matches an IP address", host);
          hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
 diff --git a/src/misc.c b/src/misc.c
-index e4239e81..6f5d2d60 100644
+index be6ee836..7081f12a 100644
 --- a/src/misc.c
 +++ b/src/misc.c
 @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
@@ -698,9 +675,9 @@ index e4239e81..6f5d2d60 100644
 
  #ifdef HAVE_IO_H
  #include <io.h>
-@@ -216,22 +218,37 @@ int ssh_is_ipaddr_v4(const char *str) {
- 
- int ssh_is_ipaddr(const char *str) {
+@@ -222,22 +224,37 @@ int ssh_is_ipaddr_v4(const char *str)
+ int ssh_is_ipaddr(const char *str)
+ {
      int rc = SOCKET_ERROR;
 +    char *s = strdup(str);
 
@@ -739,9 +716,9 @@ index e4239e81..6f5d2d60 100644
      return ssh_is_ipaddr_v4(str);
  }
  #else /* _WIN32 */
-@@ -335,17 +352,32 @@ int ssh_is_ipaddr_v4(const char *str) {
- 
- int ssh_is_ipaddr(const char *str) {
+@@ -343,17 +360,32 @@ int ssh_is_ipaddr_v4(const char *str)
+ int ssh_is_ipaddr(const char *str)
+ {
      int rc = -1;
 +    char *s = strdup(str);
 
@@ -779,7 +756,7 @@ index e4239e81..6f5d2d60 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From 6a8a18c73e73a338283dfbade0a7d83e5cfafe3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 2c492ee179d5caa2718c5e768bab6e0b2b64a8b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:27:31 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_misc: Add tests for ipv6
@@ -787,16 +764,17 @@ Subject: [PATCH 10/12] CVE-2023-6004: torture_misc: Add tests for ipv6
 
 Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 ---
  tests/unittests/torture_misc.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c b/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
-index 073bc54c..f16b766e 100644
+index b07392ab..77166759 100644
 --- a/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
 +++ b/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
 @@ -17,7 +17,14 @@
- #include "misc.c"
+ #include "torture.h"
  #include "error.c"
 
 +#ifdef _WIN32
@@ -810,7 +788,7 @@ index 073bc54c..f16b766e 100644
 
  const char template[] = "temp_dir_XXXXXX";
 
-@@ -730,14 +737,27 @@ static void torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax(void **state)
+@@ -834,14 +841,27 @@ static void torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax(void **state)
 
  static void torture_ssh_is_ipaddr(void **state) {
      int rc;
@@ -842,7 +820,7 @@ index 073bc54c..f16b766e 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From 72f59157e6ccbd4c0bb806690931413169a0886f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 1a02364b5107a4125ea3cb76fcdb6beabaebf3be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 10:32:40 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] Fix regression in IPv6 addresses in hostname parsing
@@ -858,10 +836,10 @@ Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
  4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/include/libssh/config_parser.h b/include/libssh/config_parser.h
-index e974917c..ee647bfb 100644
+index a7dd42a2..ca353432 100644
 --- a/include/libssh/config_parser.h
 +++ b/include/libssh/config_parser.h
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
  #ifndef CONFIG_PARSER_H_
  #define CONFIG_PARSER_H_
 
@@ -870,31 +848,11 @@ index e974917c..ee647bfb 100644
  char *ssh_config_get_cmd(char **str);
 
  char *ssh_config_get_token(char **str);
-@@ -45,13 +47,16 @@ int ssh_config_get_yesno(char **str, int notfound);
-  *                       be stored or NULL if we do not care about the result.
-  * @param[out]  port     Pointer to the location, where the new port will
-  *                       be stored or NULL if we do not care about the result.
-+ * @param[in]   ignore_port Set to true if the we should not attempt to parse
-+ *                       port number.
-  *
-  * @returns     SSH_OK if the provided string is in format of SSH URI,
-  *              SSH_ERROR on failure
-  */
- int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
--        char **username,
--        char **hostname,
--        char **port);
-+                         char **username,
-+                         char **hostname,
-+                         char **port,
-+                         bool ignore_port);
- 
- #endif /* LIBSSH_CONFIG_H_ */
 diff --git a/src/config.c b/src/config.c
-index 54ada276..a813568d 100644
+index c5c40125..273db7c8 100644
 --- a/src/config.c
 +++ b/src/config.c
-@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ ssh_config_parse_proxy_jump(ssh_session session, const char *s, bool do_parsing)
+@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ ssh_config_parse_proxy_jump(ssh_session session, const char *s, bool do_parsing)
          }
          if (parse_entry) {
              /* We actually care only about the first item */
@@ -903,7 +861,7 @@ index 54ada276..a813568d 100644
              /* The rest of the list needs to be passed on */
              if (endp != NULL) {
                  next = strdup(endp + 1);
-@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ ssh_config_parse_proxy_jump(ssh_session session, const char *s, bool do_parsing)
+@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ ssh_config_parse_proxy_jump(ssh_session session, const char *s, bool do_parsing)
              }
          } else {
              /* The rest is just sanity-checked to avoid failures later */
@@ -913,10 +871,10 @@ index 54ada276..a813568d 100644
          if (rv != SSH_OK) {
              goto out;
 diff --git a/src/config_parser.c b/src/config_parser.c
-index 87bac5d4..a2da0a62 100644
+index b8b94611..d4b2d2c3 100644
 --- a/src/config_parser.c
 +++ b/src/config_parser.c
-@@ -134,9 +134,10 @@ int ssh_config_get_yesno(char **str, int notfound)
+@@ -162,9 +162,10 @@ int ssh_config_get_yesno(char **str, int notfound)
  }
 
  int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
@@ -930,7 +888,7 @@ index 87bac5d4..a2da0a62 100644
  {
      char *endp = NULL;
      long port_n;
-@@ -182,12 +183,17 @@ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
+@@ -210,12 +211,17 @@ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
          if (endp == NULL) {
              goto error;
          }
@@ -951,10 +909,10 @@ index 87bac5d4..a2da0a62 100644
      if (tok == endp) {
          /* Zero-length hostnames are not valid */
 diff --git a/src/options.c b/src/options.c
-index 7c03e7ab..0890ff2e 100644
+index 38511455..b3ecffe1 100644
 --- a/src/options.c
 +++ b/src/options.c
-@@ -491,17 +491,11 @@ int ssh_options_set(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type,
+@@ -516,17 +516,11 @@ int ssh_options_set(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type,
                  ssh_set_error_invalid(session);
                  return -1;
              } else {
@@ -978,7 +936,7 @@ index 7c03e7ab..0890ff2e 100644
 2.41.0
 
 
-From 5dc10ff63ca2e8db91abfdccf1d095f5b4261b8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6f1b1e76bb38bc89819132e1810e4301ec9034a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 09:52:18 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] tests: Increase test coverage for IPv6 address parsing
@@ -993,23 +951,15 @@ Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
 (cherry picked from commit 6f6e453d7b0ad4ee6a6f6a1c96a9a6b27821410d)
 ---
  tests/unittests/torture_config.c  | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- tests/unittests/torture_options.c | 22 ++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
+ tests/unittests/torture_options.c | 16 ++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
-index 3a5a74bf..d8097e79 100644
+index b7c763af..26a24215 100644
 --- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
 +++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
-@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
- 
- #define LIBSSH_STATIC
- 
-+#include <errno.h>
- #include "torture.h"
- #include "libssh/options.h"
- #include "libssh/session.h"
-@@ -997,6 +998,53 @@ static void torture_config_match_pattern(void **state)
- 
+@@ -1850,6 +1850,53 @@ static void torture_config_make_absolute_no_sshdir(void **state)
+     torture_config_make_absolute_int(state, 1);
  }
 
 +static void torture_config_parse_uri(void **state)
@@ -1059,22 +1009,23 @@ index 3a5a74bf..d8097e79 100644
 +    SAFE_FREE(hostname);
 +}
 +
- 
- int torture_run_tests(void) {
+ int torture_run_tests(void)
+ {
      int rc;
-@@ -1012,6 +1060,7 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
-         cmocka_unit_test(torture_config_rekey),
-         cmocka_unit_test(torture_config_pubkeyacceptedkeytypes),
-         cmocka_unit_test(torture_config_match_pattern),
-+        cmocka_unit_test(torture_config_parse_uri),
+@@ -1922,6 +1969,8 @@ int torture_run_tests(void)
+                                         setup, teardown),
+         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_config_make_absolute_no_sshdir,
+                                         setup_no_sshdir, teardown),
++        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_config_parse_uri,
++                                        setup, teardown),
      };
 
 
 diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_options.c b/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
-index d0fdaed1..576ca9cd 100644
+index 425d7295..8a5505a1 100644
 --- a/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
 +++ b/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
-@@ -59,12 +59,34 @@ static void torture_options_set_host(void **state) {
+@@ -60,6 +60,20 @@ static void torture_options_set_host(void **state) {
      assert_non_null(session->opts.host);
      assert_string_equal(session->opts.host, "localhost");
 
@@ -1095,20 +1046,67 @@ index d0fdaed1..576ca9cd 100644
      rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "guru@meditation");
      assert_true(rc == 0);
      assert_non_null(session->opts.host);
-     assert_string_equal(session->opts.host, "meditation");
+@@ -67,12 +81,14 @@ static void torture_options_set_host(void **state) {
      assert_non_null(session->opts.username);
      assert_string_equal(session->opts.username, "guru");
-+
+
 +    /* more @ in uri is OK -- it should go to the username */
-+    rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "at@login@hostname");
-+    assert_true(rc == 0);
-+    assert_non_null(session->opts.host);
-+    assert_string_equal(session->opts.host, "hostname");
-+    assert_non_null(session->opts.username);
-+    assert_string_equal(session->opts.username, "at@login");
+     rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "at@login@hostname");
+     assert_true(rc == 0);
+     assert_non_null(session->opts.host);
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.host, "hostname");
+     assert_non_null(session->opts.username);
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.username, "at@login");
++
  }
 
  static void torture_options_set_ciphers(void **state) {
 --
 2.41.0
 
+diff -up libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/config_parser.h.CVE-2023-6004.patch libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/config_parser.h
+--- libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/config_parser.h.CVE-2023-6004.patch	2024-01-08 19:48:48.964006647 +0100
++++ libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/config_parser.h	2024-01-08 19:56:38.850726165 +0100
+@@ -47,13 +47,16 @@ int ssh_config_get_yesno(char **str, int
+  *                       be stored or NULL if we do not care about the result.
+  * @param[out]  port     Pointer to the location, where the new port will
+  *                       be stored or NULL if we do not care about the result.
++ * @param[in]   ignore_port Set to true if the we should not attempt to parse
++ *                       port number.
+  *
+  * @returns     SSH_OK if the provided string is in format of SSH URI,
+  *              SSH_ERROR on failure
+  */
+ int ssh_config_parse_uri(const char *tok,
+-        char **username,
+-        char **hostname,
+-        char **port);
++                         char **username,
++                         char **hostname,
++                         char **port,
++                         bool ignore_port);
+ 
+ #endif /* LIBSSH_CONFIG_H_ */
+diff -up libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/misc.h.CVE-2023-6004.patch libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/misc.h
+--- libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/misc.h.CVE-2023-6004.patch	2024-01-08 19:48:07.422589393 +0100
++++ libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/misc.h	2024-01-08 19:53:33.830867829 +0100
+@@ -99,4 +99,7 @@ int ssh_newline_vis(const char *string,
+ int ssh_tmpname(char *template);
+ 
+ char *ssh_strreplace(const char *src, const char *pattern, const char *repl);
++
++int ssh_check_hostname_syntax(const char *hostname);
++
+ #endif /* MISC_H_ */
+diff -up libssh-0.10.4/src/misc.c.CVE-2023-6004.patch libssh-0.10.4/src/misc.c
+--- libssh-0.10.4/src/misc.c.CVE-2023-6004.patch	2024-01-08 19:48:26.779783823 +0100
++++ libssh-0.10.4/src/misc.c	2024-01-08 19:54:55.209685193 +0100
+@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@
+ #define ZLIB_STRING ""
+ #endif
+ 
++#define ARPA_DOMAIN_MAX_LEN 63
++
+ /**
+  * @defgroup libssh_misc The SSH helper functions.
+  * @ingroup libssh

SOURCES/CVE-2025-4877.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From c9d785835f5b299c31b22be0506a658205c169bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 11:41:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2025-4877 base64: Prevent integer overflow and potential
+ OOB
+
+Set maximum input to 256MB to have safe margin to the 1GB trigger point
+for 32b arch.
+
+The OOB should not be reachable by any internal code paths as most of
+the buffers and strings we use as input for this operation already have
+similar limit and none really allows this much of data.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 00f09acbec55962839fc7837ef14c56fb8fbaf72)
+---
+ src/base64.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/base64.c b/src/base64.c
+index 4148f49c..f42e0e80 100644
+--- a/src/base64.c
++++ b/src/base64.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
+ #include "libssh/priv.h"
+ #include "libssh/buffer.h"
+
++/* Do not allow encoding more than 256MB of data */
++#define BASE64_MAX_INPUT_LEN 256 * 1024 * 1024
++
+ static
+ const uint8_t alphabet[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+                          "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+@@ -274,7 +277,15 @@ uint8_t *bin_to_base64(const uint8_t *source, size_t len)
+ {
+     uint8_t *base64 = NULL;
+     uint8_t *ptr = NULL;
+-    size_t flen = len + (3 - (len % 3)); /* round to upper 3 multiple */
++    size_t flen = 0;
++
++    /* Set the artificial upper limit for the input. Otherwise on 32b arch, the
++     * following line could overflow for sizes larger than SIZE_MAX / 4 */
++    if (len > BASE64_MAX_INPUT_LEN) {
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
++    flen = len + (3 - (len % 3)); /* round to upper 3 multiple */
+     flen = (4 * flen) / 3 + 1;
+
+     base64 = malloc(flen);
+--
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2025-5318.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 9a08a370f68266f92df5a6037bd722041703df27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a49bef98417bdfe302cfb2dc234cfd8e4bd1e38c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 21:18:44 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2025-5318: sftpserver: Fix possible buffer overrun

SOURCES/CVE-2025-5351.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From f9cbbd9359dc17a0388d7b7731546dedb0c34de5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 May 2025 22:43:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2025-5351 pki_crypto: Avoid double-free on low-memory
+ conditions
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+---
+ src/pki_crypto.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/pki_crypto.c b/src/pki_crypto.c
+index b99a6e8c..bde19238 100644
+--- a/src/pki_crypto.c
++++ b/src/pki_crypto.c
+@@ -2023,6 +2023,7 @@ ssh_string pki_publickey_to_blob(const ssh_key key)
+             bignum_safe_free(bn);
+             bignum_safe_free(be);
+             OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++            params = NULL;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+             break;
+         }
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2025-5372.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 155df31305bee839041a04247645ad066ada95ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 14 May 2025 14:07:58 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2025-5372 libgcrypto: Simplify error checking and
- handling of return codes in ssh_kdf()
-
-Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
----
- src/libcrypto.c | 7 +++++--
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libcrypto.c b/src/libcrypto.c
-index 3db75df6..88d93862 100644
---- a/src/libcrypto.c
-+++ b/src/libcrypto.c
-@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ int ssh_kdf(struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto,
-             int key_type, unsigned char *output,
-             size_t requested_len)
- {
-+    int ret = SSH_ERROR;
-     EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
-     int rc;
- 
-@@ -401,10 +402,12 @@ int ssh_kdf(struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto,
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
-+    ret = SSH_OK;
-+
- out:
-     EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
--    if (rc < 0) {
--        return rc;
-+    if (ret < 0) {
-+        return ret;
-     }
-     return 0;
- }
--- 
-2.51.0
-

SOURCES/CVE-2025-5987.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From ec82ef931c5b60618c728c2252086f94f90c05a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 May 2025 22:51:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2025-5987 libcrypto: Correctly detect failures of chacha
+ initialization
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+---
+ src/libcrypto.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libcrypto.c b/src/libcrypto.c
+index 468b63f0..2d0148ad 100644
+--- a/src/libcrypto.c
++++ b/src/libcrypto.c
+@@ -831,9 +831,9 @@ chacha20_poly1305_set_key(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher,
+         SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE, "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failed");
+         goto out;
+     }
+-    ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->header_evp, EVP_chacha20(), NULL,
++    rv = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->header_evp, EVP_chacha20(), NULL,
+                              u8key + CHACHA20_KEYLEN, NULL);
+-    if (ret != 1) {
++    if (rv != 1) {
+         SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE, "EVP_CipherInit failed");
+         goto out;
+     }
+-- 
+2.51.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2025-8114.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 7a76f6e268e4293e64358f65d1c253de5c40f875 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2025 15:17:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2025-8114: Fix NULL pointer dereference after allocation
+ failure
+
+Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 53ac23ded4cb2c5463f6c4cd1525331bd578812d)
+---
+ src/kex.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
+index f71482fd..64aacb9e 100644
+--- a/src/kex.c
++++ b/src/kex.c
+@@ -1494,6 +1494,8 @@ int ssh_make_sessionid(ssh_session session)
+     ssh_log_hexdump("hash buffer", ssh_buffer_get(buf), ssh_buffer_get_len(buf));
+ #endif
+ 
++    /* Set rc for the following switch statement in case we goto error. */
++    rc = SSH_ERROR;
+     switch (session->next_crypto->kex_type) {
+     case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
+     case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
+@@ -1553,6 +1555,7 @@ int ssh_make_sessionid(ssh_session session)
+                session->next_crypto->secret_hash);
+         break;
+     }
++
+     /* During the first kex, secret hash and session ID are equal. However, after
+      * a key re-exchange, a new secret hash is calculated. This hash will not replace
+      * but complement existing session id.
+@@ -1561,6 +1564,7 @@ int ssh_make_sessionid(ssh_session session)
+         session->next_crypto->session_id = malloc(session->next_crypto->digest_len);
+         if (session->next_crypto->session_id == NULL) {
+             ssh_set_error_oom(session);
++            rc = SSH_ERROR;
+             goto error;
+         }
+         memcpy(session->next_crypto->session_id, session->next_crypto->secret_hash,
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2025-8277.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+From a55ed6b67033dace401dc42c312d7b3c0ec740a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2025 18:42:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2025-8277: packet: Adjust packet filter to work when
+ DH-GEX is guessed wrongly
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 4310a696f2d632c6742678077d703d9b9ff3bc0e)
+---
+ src/packet.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c
+index 891d120c..af9a55da 100644
+--- a/src/packet.c
++++ b/src/packet.c
+@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ static enum ssh_packet_filter_result_e ssh_packet_incoming_filter(ssh_session se
+          *   or session_state == SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX
+          * - dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_INIT
+          *   or dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_INIT_SENT (re-exchange)
++         *   or dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_REQUEST_SENT (dh-gex)
+          *   or dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_FINISHED (re-exchange)
+          *
+          * Transitions:
+@@ -313,6 +314,7 @@ static enum ssh_packet_filter_result_e ssh_packet_incoming_filter(ssh_session se
+ 
+         if ((session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT) &&
+             (session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT_SENT) &&
++            (session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_REQUEST_SENT) &&
+             (session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_FINISHED))
+         {
+             rc = SSH_PACKET_DENIED;
+-- 
+2.53.0
+
+
+From 00bdcdc96ca6e367a2a2dd05ff56ca9e6e516f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Francesco Rollo <eferollo@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 16:30:07 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] CVE-2025-8277: Fix memory leak of unused ephemeral key
+ pair after client's wrong KEX guess
+
+Signed-off-by: Francesco Rollo <eferollo@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+(cherry picked from commit ccff22d3787c1355b3f0dcd09fe54d90acc55bf1)
+---
+ src/dh_crypto.c       | 5 +++++
+ src/dh_key.c          | 5 +++++
+ src/ecdh_crypto.c     | 5 +++++
+ src/ecdh_gcrypt.c     | 6 ++++++
+ src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c | 6 ++++++
+ 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/dh_crypto.c b/src/dh_crypto.c
+index 85249bfc..60f35912 100644
+--- a/src/dh_crypto.c
++++ b/src/dh_crypto.c
+@@ -407,6 +407,11 @@ int ssh_dh_init_common(struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto)
+     struct dh_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+     int rc;
+ 
++    /* Cleanup any previously allocated dh_ctx */
++    if (crypto->dh_ctx != NULL) {
++        ssh_dh_cleanup(crypto);
++    }
++
+     ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
+     if (ctx == NULL) {
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+diff --git a/src/dh_key.c b/src/dh_key.c
+index bda54b17..637b1b44 100644
+--- a/src/dh_key.c
++++ b/src/dh_key.c
+@@ -237,6 +237,11 @@ int ssh_dh_init_common(struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto)
+     struct dh_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+     int rc;
+ 
++    /* Cleanup any previously allocated dh_ctx */
++    if (crypto->dh_ctx != NULL) {
++        ssh_dh_cleanup(crypto);
++    }
++
+     ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
+     if (ctx == NULL) {
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+diff --git a/src/ecdh_crypto.c b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
+index 178d9060..c61b6ce4 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh_crypto.c
++++ b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
+@@ -219,6 +219,11 @@ int ssh_client_ecdh_init(ssh_session session){
+       return SSH_ERROR;
+   }
+ 
++  if (session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey != NULL) {
++      EC_KEY_free(session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey);
++      session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = NULL;
++  }
++
+   session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = key;
+   session->next_crypto->ecdh_client_pubkey = client_pubkey;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
+index 722428c2..f49e8eb2 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
++++ b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
+@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ int ssh_client_ecdh_init(ssh_session session)
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Free any previously allocated privkey */
++    if (session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey != NULL) {
++        gcry_sexp_release(session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey);
++        session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = NULL;
++    }
++
+     session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = key;
+     key = NULL;
+     session->next_crypto->ecdh_client_pubkey = client_pubkey;
+diff --git a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
+index 1d9c8f36..d31bfcc7 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
++++ b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ int ssh_client_ecdh_init(ssh_session session)
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Free any previously allocated privkey */
++    if (session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey != NULL) {
++        mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey);
++        SAFE_FREE(session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey);
++    }
++
+     session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = malloc(sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair));
+     if (session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey == NULL) {
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+-- 
+2.53.0
+
+
+From 2bdddb2bd34cdd563de9227d74c5a21784c03d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2025 11:10:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] CVE-2025-8277: ecdh: Free previously allocated pubkeys
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+(cherry picked from commit c9d95ab0c7a52b231bcec09afbea71944ed0d852)
+---
+ src/ecdh_crypto.c | 1 +
+ src/ecdh_gcrypt.c | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ecdh_crypto.c b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
+index c61b6ce4..5694b083 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh_crypto.c
++++ b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
+@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ int ssh_client_ecdh_init(ssh_session session){
+       EC_KEY_free(session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey);
+       session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = NULL;
+   }
++  SSH_STRING_FREE(session->next_crypto->ecdh_client_pubkey);
+ 
+   session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = key;
+   session->next_crypto->ecdh_client_pubkey = client_pubkey;
+diff --git a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
+index f49e8eb2..ee5350cd 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
++++ b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
+@@ -106,9 +106,10 @@ int ssh_client_ecdh_init(ssh_session session)
+         gcry_sexp_release(session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey);
+         session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = NULL;
+     }
+-
+     session->next_crypto->ecdh_privkey = key;
+     key = NULL;
++
++    SSH_STRING_FREE(session->next_crypto->ecdh_client_pubkey);
+     session->next_crypto->ecdh_client_pubkey = client_pubkey;
+     client_pubkey = NULL;
+ 
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2026-0964.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 5be2d4950b4030da2f95299e12905ea9e51dbedf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2025 19:16:44 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-0964 scp: Reject invalid paths received through scp
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+(cherry picked from commit daa80818f89347b4d80b0c5b80659f9a9e55e8cc)
+---
+ src/scp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/scp.c b/src/scp.c
+index 04eb4f1b..a33af16b 100644
+--- a/src/scp.c
++++ b/src/scp.c
+@@ -848,6 +848,22 @@ int ssh_scp_pull_request(ssh_scp scp)
+         size = strtoull(tmp, NULL, 10);
+         p++;
+         name = strdup(p);
++        /* Catch invalid name:
++         *  - empty ones
++         *  - containing any forward slash -- directory traversal handled
++         *    differently
++         *  - special names "." and ".." referring to the current and parent
++         *    directories -- they are not expected either
++         */
++        if (name == NULL || name[0] == '\0' || strchr(name, '/') ||
++            strcmp(name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(name, "..") == 0) {
++            ssh_set_error(scp->session,
++                          SSH_FATAL,
++                          "Received invalid filename: %s",
++                          name == NULL ? "<NULL>" : name);
++            SAFE_FREE(name);
++            goto error;
++        }
+         SAFE_FREE(scp->request_name);
+         scp->request_name = name;
+         if (buffer[0] == 'C') {
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2026-0965.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+From 63079a26261b5ea6736fcdf68077135e7f2c991d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2025 17:33:19 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-0965 config: Do not attempt to read non-regular and
+ too large configuration files
+
+Changes also the reading of known_hosts to use the new helper function
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+(cherry picked from commit a5eb30dbfd8f3526b2d04bd9f0a3803b665f5798)
+---
+ include/libssh/misc.h            |  4 ++
+ include/libssh/priv.h            |  3 ++
+ src/bind_config.c                |  4 +-
+ src/config.c                     |  5 ++-
+ src/dh-gex.c                     |  4 +-
+ src/known_hosts.c                |  2 +-
+ src/knownhosts.c                 |  2 +-
+ src/misc.c                       | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/unittests/torture_config.c | 19 ++++++++
+ 9 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/libssh/misc.h b/include/libssh/misc.h
+index 47a423f2..3452251d 100644
+--- a/include/libssh/misc.h
++++ b/include/libssh/misc.h
+@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
+ #ifndef MISC_H_
+ #define MISC_H_
+ 
++#include <stdio.h>
++
+ /* in misc.c */
+ /* gets the user home dir. */
+ char *ssh_get_user_home_dir(void);
+@@ -102,4 +104,6 @@ char *ssh_strreplace(const char *src, const char *pattern, const char *repl);
+ 
+ int ssh_check_hostname_syntax(const char *hostname);
+ 
++FILE *ssh_strict_fopen(const char *filename, size_t max_file_size);
++
+ #endif /* MISC_H_ */
+diff --git a/include/libssh/priv.h b/include/libssh/priv.h
+index bab761b0..876ea4ed 100644
+--- a/include/libssh/priv.h
++++ b/include/libssh/priv.h
+@@ -434,4 +434,7 @@ bool is_ssh_initialized(void);
+ #define SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX   1024
+ char *ssh_strerror(int err_num, char *buf, size_t buflen);
+ 
++/** The default maximum file size for a configuration file */
++#define SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE 16 * 1024 * 1024
++
+ #endif /* _LIBSSH_PRIV_H */
+diff --git a/src/bind_config.c b/src/bind_config.c
+index 9e4a7fd4..c12f1003 100644
+--- a/src/bind_config.c
++++ b/src/bind_config.c
+@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ local_parse_file(ssh_bind bind,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    f = fopen(filename, "r");
++    f = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE);
+     if (f == NULL) {
+         SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, "Cannot find file %s to load",
+                 filename);
+@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int ssh_bind_config_parse_file(ssh_bind bind, const char *filename)
+      * option to be redefined later by another file. */
+     uint8_t seen[BIND_CFG_MAX] = {0};
+ 
+-    f = fopen(filename, "r");
++    f = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE);
+     if (f == NULL) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+diff --git a/src/config.c b/src/config.c
+index 94b70d58..bf349812 100644
+--- a/src/config.c
++++ b/src/config.c
+@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ local_parse_file(ssh_session session,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    f = fopen(filename, "r");
++    f = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE);
+     if (f == NULL) {
+         SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, "Cannot find file %s to load",
+                 filename);
+@@ -1205,8 +1205,9 @@ int ssh_config_parse_file(ssh_session session, const char *filename)
+     int parsing, rv;
+     bool global = 0;
+ 
+-    f = fopen(filename, "r");
++    f = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE);
+     if (f == NULL) {
++        /* The underlying function logs the reasons */
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/dh-gex.c b/src/dh-gex.c
+index b022f09e..81219586 100644
+--- a/src/dh-gex.c
++++ b/src/dh-gex.c
+@@ -520,9 +520,9 @@ static int ssh_retrieve_dhgroup(char *moduli_file,
+     }
+ 
+     if (moduli_file != NULL)
+-        moduli = fopen(moduli_file, "r");
++        moduli = ssh_strict_fopen(moduli_file, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE);
+     else
+-        moduli = fopen(MODULI_FILE, "r");
++        moduli = ssh_strict_fopen(MODULI_FILE, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE);
+ 
+     if (moduli == NULL) {
+         char err_msg[SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX] = {0};
+diff --git a/src/known_hosts.c b/src/known_hosts.c
+index f660a6f3..ba2ae4d5 100644
+--- a/src/known_hosts.c
++++ b/src/known_hosts.c
+@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static struct ssh_tokens_st *ssh_get_knownhost_line(FILE **file,
+     struct ssh_tokens_st *tokens = NULL;
+ 
+     if (*file == NULL) {
+-        *file = fopen(filename,"r");
++        *file = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE);
+         if (*file == NULL) {
+             return NULL;
+         }
+diff --git a/src/knownhosts.c b/src/knownhosts.c
+index 62777ad2..e4865ac2 100644
+--- a/src/knownhosts.c
++++ b/src/knownhosts.c
+@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int ssh_known_hosts_read_entries(const char *match,
+     FILE *fp = NULL;
+     int rc;
+ 
+-    fp = fopen(filename, "r");
++    fp = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE);
+     if (fp == NULL) {
+         char err_msg[SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX] = {0};
+         SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE, "Failed to open the known_hosts file '%s': %s",
+diff --git a/src/misc.c b/src/misc.c
+index 7bb431b6..6607775e 100644
+--- a/src/misc.c
++++ b/src/misc.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #endif /* _WIN32 */
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -2074,4 +2075,77 @@ int ssh_check_hostname_syntax(const char *hostname)
+     return SSH_OK;
+ }
+ 
++/**
++ * @internal
++ *
++ * @brief Safely open a file containing some configuration.
++ *
++ * Runs checks if the file can be used as some configuration file (is regular
++ * file and is not too large). If so, returns the opened file (for reading).
++ * Otherwise logs error and returns `NULL`.
++ *
++ * @param filename      The path to the file to open.
++ * @param max_file_size Maximum file size that is accepted.
++ *
++ * @returns the opened file or `NULL` on error.
++ */
++FILE *ssh_strict_fopen(const char *filename, size_t max_file_size)
++{
++    FILE *f = NULL;
++    struct stat sb;
++    char err_msg[SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX] = {0};
++    int r, fd;
++
++    /* open first to avoid TOCTOU */
++    fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
++    if (fd == -1) {
++        SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE,
++                "Failed to open a file %s for reading: %s",
++                filename,
++                ssh_strerror(errno, err_msg, SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX));
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
++    /* Check the file is sensible for a configuration file */
++    r = fstat(fd, &sb);
++    if (r != 0) {
++        SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE,
++                "Failed to stat %s: %s",
++                filename,
++                ssh_strerror(errno, err_msg, SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX));
++        close(fd);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++    if ((sb.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG) {
++        SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE,
++                "The file %s is not a regular file: skipping",
++                filename);
++        close(fd);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
++    if ((size_t)sb.st_size > max_file_size) {
++        SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE,
++                "The file %s is too large (%jd MB > %zu MB): skipping",
++                filename,
++                (intmax_t)sb.st_size / 1024 / 1024,
++                max_file_size / 1024 / 1024);
++        close(fd);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
++    f = fdopen(fd, "r");
++    if (f == NULL) {
++        SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE,
++                "Failed to open a file %s for reading: %s",
++                filename,
++                ssh_strerror(r, err_msg, SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX));
++        close(fd);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
++    /* the flcose() will close also the underlying fd */
++    return f;
++}
++
+ /** @} */
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+index 995a5213..70ecfb95 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+@@ -2237,6 +2237,23 @@ static void torture_config_parse_uri(void **state)
+     SAFE_FREE(hostname);
+ }
+ 
++/* Invalid configuration files
++ */
++static void torture_config_invalid(void **state)
++{
++    ssh_session session = *state;
++
++    ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "Bar");
++
++    /* non-regular file -- ignored (or missing on non-unix) so OK */
++    _parse_config(session, "/dev/random", NULL, SSH_OK);
++
++#ifndef _WIN32
++    /* huge file -- ignored (or missing on non-unix) so OK */
++    _parse_config(session, "/proc/kcore", NULL, SSH_OK);
++#endif
++}
++
+ int torture_run_tests(void)
+ {
+     int rc;
+@@ -2323,6 +2340,8 @@ int torture_run_tests(void)
+                                         setup_no_sshdir, teardown),
+         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_config_parse_uri,
+                                         setup, teardown),
++        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_config_invalid,
++                                        setup, teardown),
+     };
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2026-0966.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From e868036a8e496e36cf986e000e050974cc30a0ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 12:09:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2026-0966 misc: Avoid heap buffer underflow in
+ ssh_get_hexa
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 417a095e6749a1f3635e02332061edad3c6a3401)
+---
+ src/misc.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/misc.c b/src/misc.c
+index 6607775e..0cca373a 100644
+--- a/src/misc.c
++++ b/src/misc.c
+@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ char *ssh_get_hexa(const unsigned char *what, size_t len)
+     size_t i;
+     size_t hlen = len * 3;
+ 
+-    if (len > (UINT_MAX - 1) / 3) {
++    if (what == NULL || len < 1 || len > (UINT_MAX - 1) / 3) {
+         return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.53.0
+
+
+From c112289ce14ef29f173d87b6cc507f066d6ca751 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 12:10:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2026-0966 tests: Test coverage for ssh_get_hexa
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 9be83584a56580da5a2f41e47137056dc0249b52)
+---
+ tests/unittests/torture_misc.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c b/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
+index 77166759..4470c358 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_misc.c
+@@ -877,6 +877,36 @@ static void torture_ssh_is_ipaddr(void **state) {
+     assert_int_equal(rc, 0);
+ }
+ 
++static void torture_ssh_get_hexa(void **state)
++{
++    const unsigned char *bin = NULL;
++    char *hex = NULL;
++
++    (void)state;
++
++    /* Null pointer should not crash */
++    bin = NULL;
++    hex = ssh_get_hexa(bin, 0);
++    assert_null(hex);
++
++    /* Null pointer should not crash regardless the length */
++    bin = NULL;
++    hex = ssh_get_hexa(bin, 99);
++    assert_null(hex);
++
++    /* Zero length input is not much useful. Just expect NULL too */
++    bin = (const unsigned char *)"";
++    hex = ssh_get_hexa(bin, 0);
++    assert_null(hex);
++
++    /* Valid inputs */
++    bin = (const unsigned char *)"\x00\xFF";
++    hex = ssh_get_hexa(bin, 2);
++    assert_non_null(hex);
++    assert_string_equal(hex, "00:ff");
++    ssh_string_free_char(hex);
++}
++
+ int torture_run_tests(void) {
+     int rc;
+     struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
+@@ -903,6 +933,7 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
+         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_strerror),
+         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax),
+         cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_is_ipaddr),
++        cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_get_hexa),
+     };
+ 
+     ssh_init();
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2026-0967.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+From a56c4837c9e6db6cfb7e136b0e8b8d90dbc329ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2025 18:48:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-0967 match: Avoid recursive matching (ReDoS)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The specially crafted patterns (from configuration files) could cause
+exhaustive search or timeouts.
+
+Previous attempts to fix this by limiting recursion to depth 16 avoided
+stack overflow, but not timeouts. This is due to the backtracking,
+which caused the exponential time complexity O(N^16) of existing algorithm.
+
+This is code comes from the same function from OpenSSH, where this code
+originates from, which is not having this issue (due to not limiting the number
+of recursion), but will also easily exhaust stack due to unbound recursion:
+
+https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/05bcd0cadf160fd4826a2284afa7cba6ec432633
+
+This is an attempt to simplify the algorithm by preventing the backtracking
+to previous wildcard, which should keep the same behavior for existing inputs
+while reducing the complexity to linear O(N*M).
+
+This fixes the long-term issue we had with fuzzing as well as recently reported
+security issue by Kang Yang.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a411de5ce806e3ea24d088774b2f7584d6590b5f)
+---
+ src/match.c                      | 111 +++++++++++++----------------
+ tests/unittests/torture_config.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/match.c b/src/match.c
+index 3e58f733..896d87cb 100644
+--- a/src/match.c
++++ b/src/match.c
+@@ -43,85 +43,70 @@
+ 
+ #include "libssh/priv.h"
+ 
+-#define MAX_MATCH_RECURSION 16
+-
+-/*
+- * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
+- * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
++/**
++ * @brief Compare a string with a pattern containing wildcards `*` and `?`
++ *
++ * This function is an iterative replacement for the previously recursive
++ * implementation to avoid exponential complexity (DoS) with specific patterns.
++ *
++ * @param[in]  s        The string to match.
++ * @param[in]  pattern  The pattern to match against.
++ *
++ * @return              1 if the pattern matches, 0 otherwise.
+  */
+-static int match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern, size_t limit)
++static int match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
+ {
+-    bool had_asterisk = false;
++    const char *s_star = NULL; /* Position in s when last `*` was met */
++    const char *p_star = NULL; /* Position in pattern after last `*` */
+ 
+-    if (s == NULL || pattern == NULL || limit <= 0) {
++    if (s == NULL || pattern == NULL) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    for (;;) {
+-        /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
+-        if (*pattern == '\0') {
+-            return (*s == '\0');
+-        }
+-
+-        /* Skip all the asterisks and adjacent question marks */
+-        while (*pattern == '*' || (had_asterisk && *pattern == '?')) {
+-            if (*pattern == '*') {
+-                had_asterisk = true;
+-            }
++    while (*s) {
++        /* Case 1: Exact match or '?' wildcard */
++        if (*pattern == *s || *pattern == '?') {
++            s++;
+             pattern++;
++            continue;
+         }
+ 
+-        if (had_asterisk) {
+-            /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
+-            if (!*pattern)
+-                return 1;
+-
+-            /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
+-            if (*pattern != '?') {
+-                /*
+-                 * Look instances of the next character in
+-                 * pattern, and try to match starting from
+-                 * those.
+-                 */
+-                for (; *s; s++)
+-                    if (*s == *pattern && match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1, limit - 1)) {
+-                        return 1;
+-                    }
+-                /* Failed. */
+-                return 0;
+-            }
+-            /*
+-             * Move ahead one character at a time and try to
+-             * match at each position.
++        /* Case 2: '*' wildcard */
++        if (*pattern == '*') {
++            /* Record the position of the star and the current string position.
++             * We optimistically assume * matches 0 characters first.
+              */
+-            for (; *s; s++) {
+-                if (match_pattern(s, pattern, limit - 1)) {
+-                    return 1;
+-                }
+-            }
+-            /* Failed. */
+-            return 0;
+-        }
+-        /*
+-         * There must be at least one more character in the string.
+-         * If we are at the end, fail.
+-         */
+-        if (!*s) {
+-            return 0;
++            p_star = ++pattern;
++            s_star = s;
++            continue;
+         }
+ 
+-        /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
+-        if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s) {
+-            return 0;
++        /* Case 3: Mismatch */
++        if (p_star) {
++            /* If we have seen a star previously, backtrack.
++             * We restore the pattern to just after the star,
++             * but advance the string position (consume one more char for the
++             * star).
++             * No need to backtrack to previous stars as any match of the last
++             * star could be eaten the same way by the previous star.
++             */
++            pattern = p_star;
++            s = ++s_star;
++            continue;
+         }
+ 
+-        /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
+-        s++;
++        /* Case 4: Mismatch and no star to backtrack to */
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    /* Handle trailing stars in the pattern
++     * (e.g., pattern "abc*" matching "abc") */
++    while (*pattern == '*') {
+         pattern++;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* NOTREACHED */
+-    return 0;
++    /* If we reached the end of the pattern, it's a match */
++    return (*pattern == '\0');
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -172,7 +157,7 @@ int match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern,
+     sub[subi] = '\0';
+ 
+     /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
+-    if (match_pattern(string, sub, MAX_MATCH_RECURSION)) {
++    if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
+       if (negated) {
+         return -1;        /* Negative */
+       } else {
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+index 70ecfb95..6dc59e48 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+@@ -1996,80 +1996,138 @@ static void torture_config_match_pattern(void **state)
+     (void) state;
+ 
+     /* Simple test "a" matches "a" */
+-    rv = match_pattern("a", "a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("a", "a");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+ 
+     /* Simple test "a" does not match "b" */
+-    rv = match_pattern("a", "b", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("a", "b");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+ 
+     /* NULL arguments are correctly handled */
+-    rv = match_pattern("a", NULL, MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("a", NULL);
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+-    rv = match_pattern(NULL, "a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern(NULL, "a");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+ 
+     /* Simple wildcard ? is handled in pattern */
+-    rv = match_pattern("a", "?", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("a", "?");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("aa", "?", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("aa", "?");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+     /* Wildcard in search string */
+-    rv = match_pattern("?", "a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("?", "a");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+-    rv = match_pattern("?", "?", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("?", "?");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+ 
+     /* Simple wildcard * is handled in pattern */
+-    rv = match_pattern("a", "*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("a", "*");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("aa", "*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("aa", "*");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+     /* Wildcard in search string */
+-    rv = match_pattern("*", "a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("*", "a");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+-    rv = match_pattern("*", "*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("*", "*");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+ 
+     /* More complicated patterns */
+-    rv = match_pattern("a", "*a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("a", "*a");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("a", "a*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("a", "a*");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("abababc", "*abc", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("abababc", "*abc");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("ababababca", "*abc", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("ababababca", "*abc");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+-    rv = match_pattern("ababababca", "*abc*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("ababababca", "*abc*");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+ 
+     /* Multiple wildcards in row */
+-    rv = match_pattern("aa", "??", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("aa", "??");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("bba", "??a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("bba", "??a");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("aaa", "**a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("aaa", "**a");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("bbb", "**a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION);
++    rv = match_pattern("bbb", "**a");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+ 
+     /* Consecutive asterisks do not make sense and do not need to recurse */
+-    rv = match_pattern("hostname", "**********pattern", 5);
++    rv = match_pattern("hostname", "**********pattern");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+-    rv = match_pattern("hostname", "pattern**********", 5);
++    rv = match_pattern("hostname", "pattern**********");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+-    rv = match_pattern("pattern", "***********pattern", 5);
++    rv = match_pattern("pattern", "***********pattern");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+-    rv = match_pattern("pattern", "pattern***********", 5);
++    rv = match_pattern("pattern", "pattern***********");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+ 
+-    /* Limit the maximum recursion */
+-    rv = match_pattern("hostname", "*p*a*t*t*e*r*n*", 5);
++    rv = match_pattern("hostname", "*p*a*t*t*e*r*n*");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+-    /* Too much recursion */
+-    rv = match_pattern("pattern", "*p*a*t*t*e*r*n*", 5);
++    rv = match_pattern("pattern", "*p*a*t*t*e*r*n*");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* Regular Expression Denial of Service */
++    rv = match_pattern("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
++                       "*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++    rv = match_pattern("ababababababababababababababababababababab",
++                       "*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* A lot of backtracking */
++    rv = match_pattern("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaax",
++                       "a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*ax");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* Test backtracking: *a matches first 'a', fails on 'b', must backtrack */
++    rv = match_pattern("axaxaxb", "*a*b");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* Test greedy consumption with suffix */
++    rv = match_pattern("foo_bar_baz_bar", "*bar");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* Test exact suffix requirement (ensure no partial match acceptance) */
++    rv = match_pattern("foobar_extra", "*bar");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
++
++    /* Test multiple distinct wildcards */
++    rv = match_pattern("a_very_long_string_with_a_pattern", "*long*pattern");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* ? inside a * sequence */
++    rv = match_pattern("abcdefg", "a*c?e*g");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* Consecutive mixed wildcards */
++    rv = match_pattern("abc", "*?c");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* ? at the very end after * */
++    rv = match_pattern("abc", "ab?");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++    rv = match_pattern("abc", "ab*?");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* Consecutive stars should be collapsed or handled gracefully */
++    rv = match_pattern("abc", "a**c");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++    rv = match_pattern("abc", "***");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++
++    /* Empty string handling */
++    rv = match_pattern("", "*");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
++    rv = match_pattern("", "?");
+     assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
++    rv = match_pattern("", "");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 1);
+ 
++    /* Pattern longer than string */
++    rv = match_pattern("short", "short_but_longer");
++    assert_int_equal(rv, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Identity file can be specified multiple times in the configuration
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2026-0968.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+From 7d08a51ec529edc5ccf7978d403ec4ef151e82a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2025 20:59:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2026-0968: sftp: Sanitize input handling in
+ sftp_parse_longname()
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 20856f44c146468c830da61dcbbbaa8ce71e390b)
+---
+ src/sftp.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/sftp.c b/src/sftp.c
+index 60e591f0..70f9ed15 100644
+--- a/src/sftp.c
++++ b/src/sftp.c
+@@ -1289,13 +1289,18 @@ static char *sftp_parse_longname(const char *longname,
+     const char *p, *q;
+     size_t len, field = 0;
+ 
++    if (longname == NULL || longname_field < SFTP_LONGNAME_PERM ||
++        longname_field > SFTP_LONGNAME_NAME) {
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     p = longname;
+     /* Find the beginning of the field which is specified by sftp_longname_field_e. */
+-    while(field != longname_field) {
++    while(*p != '\0' && field != longname_field) {
+         if(isspace(*p)) {
+             field++;
+             p++;
+-            while(*p && isspace(*p)) {
++            while(*p != '\0' && isspace(*p)) {
+                 p++;
+             }
+         } else {
+@@ -1303,8 +1308,13 @@ static char *sftp_parse_longname(const char *longname,
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    /* If we reached NULL before we got our field fail */
++    if (field != longname_field) {
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     q = p;
+-    while (! isspace(*q)) {
++    while (*q != '\0' && !isspace(*q)) {
+         q++;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.53.0
+
+
+From ccedc7907ebe2c1a977b739b85034953de582fb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2025 21:00:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2026-0968 tests: Reproducer for invalid longname data
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 90a5d8f47399e8db61b56793cd21476ff6a528e0)
+---
+ tests/unittests/CMakeLists.txt      |  7 +++
+ tests/unittests/torture_unit_sftp.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 tests/unittests/torture_unit_sftp.c
+
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/unittests/CMakeLists.txt
+index 28458d49..658f14bc 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/CMakeLists.txt
++++ b/tests/unittests/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -95,6 +95,13 @@ if (UNIX AND NOT WIN32)
+     endif (WITH_SERVER)
+ endif (UNIX AND NOT WIN32)
+ 
++if (WITH_SFTP)
++    set(LIBSSH_UNIT_TESTS
++        ${LIBSSH_UNIT_TESTS}
++        torture_unit_sftp
++    )
++endif (WITH_SFTP)
++
+ foreach(_UNIT_TEST ${LIBSSH_UNIT_TESTS})
+     add_cmocka_test(${_UNIT_TEST}
+                     SOURCES ${_UNIT_TEST}.c
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_unit_sftp.c b/tests/unittests/torture_unit_sftp.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..8cdaba8e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_unit_sftp.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++#include "config.h"
++
++#include "sftp.c"
++#include "torture.h"
++
++#define LIBSSH_STATIC
++
++static void test_sftp_parse_longname(void **state)
++{
++    const char *lname = NULL;
++    char *value = NULL;
++
++    /* state not used */
++    (void)state;
++
++    /* Valid example from SFTP draft, page 18:
++     * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-spaghetti-sshm-filexfer/
++     */
++    lname = "-rwxr-xr-x   1 mjos     staff      348911 Mar 25 14:29 t-filexfer";
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_PERM);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "-rwxr-xr-x");
++    free(value);
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_OWNER);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "mjos");
++    free(value);
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_GROUP);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "staff");
++    free(value);
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_SIZE);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "348911");
++    free(value);
++    /* This function is broken further as the date contains space which breaks
++     * the parsing altogether */
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_DATE);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "Mar");
++    free(value);
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_TIME);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "25");
++    free(value);
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_NAME);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "14:29");
++    free(value);
++}
++
++static void test_sftp_parse_longname_invalid(void **state)
++{
++    const char *lname = NULL;
++    char *value = NULL;
++
++    /* state not used */
++    (void)state;
++
++    /* Invalid inputs should not crash
++     */
++    lname = NULL;
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_PERM);
++    assert_null(value);
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_NAME);
++    assert_null(value);
++
++    lname = "";
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_PERM);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "");
++    free(value);
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_NAME);
++    assert_null(value);
++
++    lname = "-rwxr-xr-x   1";
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_PERM);
++    assert_string_equal(value, "-rwxr-xr-x");
++    free(value);
++    value = sftp_parse_longname(lname, SFTP_LONGNAME_NAME);
++    assert_null(value);
++}
++
++int torture_run_tests(void)
++{
++    int rc;
++    const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
++        cmocka_unit_test(test_sftp_parse_longname),
++        cmocka_unit_test(test_sftp_parse_longname_invalid),
++    };
++
++    rc = cmocka_run_group_tests(tests, NULL, NULL);
++    return rc;
++}
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

SOURCES/auth_bypass.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_crypto.c ./src/pki_crypto.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_crypto.c	2023-04-27 12:59:08.463259052 +0200
-+++ ./src/pki_crypto.c	2023-04-27 13:05:24.020610873 +0200
-@@ -2291,8 +2291,12 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/pki_crypto.c ./src/pki_crypto.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/pki_crypto.c	2023-04-27 13:24:03.105744519 +0200
++++ ./src/pki_crypto.c	2023-04-27 13:30:24.016756496 +0200
+@@ -3186,8 +3186,12 @@
      unsigned char *raw_sig_data = NULL;
      unsigned int raw_sig_len;
  
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_crypto.c ./src/pki_crypto.c
  
      if (pubkey == NULL || ssh_key_is_private(pubkey) || input == NULL ||
          signature == NULL || (signature->raw_sig == NULL
-@@ -2307,8 +2311,8 @@
+@@ -3202,8 +3206,8 @@
      }
  
      /* Check if public key and hash type are compatible */
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_crypto.c ./src/pki_crypto.c
          return SSH_ERROR;
      }
  
-@@ -2351,8 +2355,8 @@
+@@ -3248,8 +3252,8 @@
      }
  
      /* Verify the signature */
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_crypto.c ./src/pki_crypto.c
          SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE,
                  "EVP_DigestVerifyInit() failed: %s",
                  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
-@@ -2360,35 +2364,31 @@
+@@ -3257,32 +3261,30 @@
      }
  
  #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTVERIFY
@@ -76,11 +76,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_crypto.c ./src/pki_crypto.c
 -    if (ctx != NULL) {
 -        EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
 -    }
--    if (pkey != NULL) {
--        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
--    }
 +    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
      return rc;
  }
- 

SOURCES/coverity_scan.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+diff --git a/src/dh_crypto.c b/src/dh_crypto.c
+index a847c6a2..1eb94307 100644
+--- a/src/dh_crypto.c
++++ b/src/dh_crypto.c
+@@ -341,8 +341,16 @@ int ssh_dh_set_parameters(struct dh_ctx *ctx,
+             goto done;
+         }
+ 
+-        OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, modulus);
+-        OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, generator);
++        rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, modulus);
++        if (rc != 1) {
++            rc = SSH_ERROR;
++            goto done;
++        }
++        rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, generator);
++        if (rc != 1) {
++            rc = SSH_ERROR;
++            goto done;
++        }
+         params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
+         if (params == NULL) {
+             OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);

SOURCES/covscan23.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/buffer.c ./src/buffer.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/buffer.c	2023-05-03 11:53:48.710217753 +0200
-+++ ./src/buffer.c	2023-05-03 11:58:21.995200990 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/buffer.c ./src/buffer.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/buffer.c	2023-05-03 12:22:40.304114511 +0200
++++ ./src/buffer.c	2023-05-03 12:24:11.578110236 +0200
 @@ -747,7 +747,8 @@
   */
  int ssh_buffer_validate_length(struct ssh_buffer_struct *buffer, size_t len)
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/buffer.c ./src/buffer.c
          return SSH_ERROR;
      }
  
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c	2023-05-03 11:53:48.732217993 +0200
-+++ ./src/gssapi.c	2023-05-03 11:58:21.976200782 +0200
-@@ -437,11 +437,18 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/gssapi.c	2023-05-03 12:22:40.356115078 +0200
++++ ./src/gssapi.c	2023-05-03 12:24:11.566110105 +0200
+@@ -444,11 +444,18 @@
          hexa = ssh_get_hexa(output_token.value, output_token.length);
          SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "GSSAPI: sending token %s",hexa);
          SAFE_FREE(hexa);
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          ssh_packet_send(session);
      }
  
-@@ -846,6 +853,7 @@
+@@ -857,6 +864,7 @@
  }
  
  SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_userauth_gssapi_response){
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
      ssh_string oid_s;
      gss_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
      gss_buffer_desc input_token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-@@ -897,11 +905,15 @@
+@@ -908,11 +916,15 @@
          hexa = ssh_get_hexa(output_token.value, output_token.length);
          SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "GSSAPI: sending token %s", hexa);
          SAFE_FREE(hexa);
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          ssh_packet_send(session);
          session->auth.state = SSH_AUTH_STATE_GSSAPI_TOKEN;
      }
-@@ -963,6 +975,7 @@
+@@ -975,6 +987,7 @@
  }
  
  SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_userauth_gssapi_token_client){
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
      ssh_string token;
      char *hexa;
      OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
-@@ -1015,11 +1028,15 @@
+@@ -1027,11 +1040,15 @@
          hexa = ssh_get_hexa(output_token.value, output_token.length);
          SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "GSSAPI: sending token %s",hexa);
          SAFE_FREE(hexa);
@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          ssh_packet_send(session);
      }
  
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/options.c ./src/options.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/options.c	2021-08-26 14:27:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./src/options.c	2023-05-03 11:58:22.000201044 +0200
-@@ -547,7 +547,9 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/options.c ./src/options.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/options.c	2023-05-03 12:22:40.342114926 +0200
++++ ./src/options.c	2023-05-03 12:24:11.582110280 +0200
+@@ -614,7 +614,9 @@
                  }
                  i = strtol(q, &p, 10);
                  if (q == p) {
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/options.c ./src/options.c
                  }
                  SAFE_FREE(q);
                  if (i <= 0) {
-@@ -743,7 +745,9 @@
+@@ -816,7 +818,9 @@
                  }
                  i = strtol(q, &p, 10);
                  if (q == p) {
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/options.c ./src/options.c
                  }
                  SAFE_FREE(q);
                  if (i < 0) {
-@@ -1818,7 +1822,9 @@
+@@ -2035,7 +2039,9 @@
          }
          i = strtol(q, &p, 10);
          if (q == p) {
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/options.c ./src/options.c
          }
          SAFE_FREE(q);
  
-@@ -1845,7 +1851,9 @@
+@@ -2062,7 +2068,9 @@
          }
          i = strtol(q, &p, 10);
          if (q == p) {
@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/options.c ./src/options.c
          }
          SAFE_FREE(q);
  
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_container_openssh.c ./src/pki_container_openssh.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_container_openssh.c	2023-05-03 11:53:48.713217785 +0200
-+++ ./src/pki_container_openssh.c	2023-05-03 11:58:21.976200782 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/pki_container_openssh.c ./src/pki_container_openssh.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/pki_container_openssh.c	2023-05-03 12:22:40.314114620 +0200
++++ ./src/pki_container_openssh.c	2023-05-03 12:24:11.566110105 +0200
 @@ -630,7 +630,11 @@
              goto error;
          }
@@ -157,10 +157,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/pki_container_openssh.c ./src/pki_container
          kdf_options = ssh_string_new(ssh_buffer_get_len(kdf_buf));
          if (kdf_options == NULL){
              SSH_BUFFER_FREE(kdf_buf);
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/unittests/torture_options.c ./tests/unittests/torture_options.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/unittests/torture_options.c	2021-08-26 14:27:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./tests/unittests/torture_options.c	2023-05-03 11:59:21.726853027 +0200
-@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/unittests/torture_options.c ./tests/unittests/torture_options.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/unittests/torture_options.c	2023-05-03 12:22:40.343114937 +0200
++++ ./tests/unittests/torture_options.c	2023-05-03 12:24:11.587110335 +0200
+@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@
  
      rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_PORT_STR, "five");
      assert_true(rc == -1);
@@ -168,8 +168,8 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/unittests/torture_options.c ./tests/unitt
  
      rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_PORT, NULL);
      assert_true(rc == -1);
-@@ -853,6 +854,26 @@
-     ssh_free(new);
+@@ -1496,6 +1497,26 @@
+     ssh_list_free(awaited_list);
  }
  
 +static void torture_options_set_verbosity (void **state)
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/unittests/torture_options.c ./tests/unitt
  #ifdef WITH_SERVER
  const char template[] = "temp_dir_XXXXXX";
  
-@@ -1107,6 +1128,10 @@
+@@ -1750,6 +1771,10 @@
      rc = ssh_bind_options_set(bind, SSH_BIND_OPTIONS_BINDPORT_STR, "23");
      assert_int_equal(rc, 0);
      assert_int_equal(bind->bindport, 23);
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/unittests/torture_options.c ./tests/unitt
  }
  
  static void torture_bind_options_log_verbosity(void **state)
-@@ -1156,6 +1181,11 @@
+@@ -1799,6 +1824,11 @@
      new_level = ssh_get_log_level();
      assert_int_equal(new_level, SSH_LOG_PACKET);
  
@@ -218,10 +218,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/unittests/torture_options.c ./tests/unitt
      rc = ssh_set_log_level(previous_level);
      assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
  }
-@@ -1643,6 +1673,7 @@
-         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_options_config_host, setup, teardown),
-         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_options_config_match,
+@@ -2297,6 +2327,7 @@
+         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_options_caret_sign,
                                          setup, teardown),
+         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_options_apply, setup, teardown),
 +        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_options_set_verbosity, setup, teardown),
      };
  

SOURCES/covscan23_1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+File ../libssh-0.10.4/.git is a regular file while file ./.git is a directory
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/sftp.c ./src/sftp.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/sftp.c	2023-05-22 12:45:48.383509085 +0200
++++ ./src/sftp.c	2023-05-22 12:54:31.004037650 +0200
+@@ -1755,6 +1755,10 @@
+ int sftp_close(sftp_file file){
+   int err = SSH_NO_ERROR;
+ 
++  if (file == NULL) {
++      return err;
++  }
++
+   SAFE_FREE(file->name);
+   if (file->handle){
+     err = sftp_handle_close(file->sftp,file->handle);
+@@ -1917,7 +1921,7 @@
+ 
+ /* Read from a file using an opened sftp file handle. */
+ ssize_t sftp_read(sftp_file handle, void *buf, size_t count) {
+-  sftp_session sftp = handle->sftp;
++  sftp_session sftp;
+   sftp_message msg = NULL;
+   sftp_status_message status;
+   ssh_string datastring;
+@@ -1926,6 +1930,11 @@
+   uint32_t id;
+   int rc;
+ 
++  if (handle == NULL) {
++      return -1;
++  }
++  sftp = handle->sftp;
++
+   if (handle->eof) {
+     return 0;
+   }
+@@ -2147,7 +2156,7 @@
+ }
+ 
+ ssize_t sftp_write(sftp_file file, const void *buf, size_t count) {
+-  sftp_session sftp = file->sftp;
++  sftp_session sftp;
+   sftp_message msg = NULL;
+   sftp_status_message status;
+   ssh_buffer buffer;
+@@ -2156,6 +2165,11 @@
+   size_t packetlen;
+   int rc;
+ 
++  if (file == NULL) {
++      return -1;
++  }
++  sftp = file->sftp;
++
+   buffer = ssh_buffer_new();
+   if (buffer == NULL) {
+     ssh_set_error_oom(sftp->session);

SOURCES/enable_sk_keys_by_config.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
+index 1155b9c7..528cb182 100644
+--- a/src/kex.c
++++ b/src/kex.c
+@@ -101,12 +101,19 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_ECDH
+ #define ECDH "ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,"
+-#define EC_HOSTKEYS "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
+-#define EC_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHMS "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++#define EC_HOSTKEYS "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
++                    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
++                    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
++#define EC_SK_HOSTKEYS "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,"
++#define EC_FIPS_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGOS "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+                                  "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+                                  "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
++#define EC_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHMS EC_FIPS_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGOS \
++                                 "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+ #else
+ #define EC_HOSTKEYS ""
++#define EC_SK_HOSTKEYS ""
++#define EC_FIPS_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGOS ""
+ #define EC_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHMS ""
+ #define ECDH ""
+ #endif /* HAVE_ECDH */
+@@ -127,16 +134,21 @@
+ 
+ #define HOSTKEYS "ssh-ed25519," \
+                  EC_HOSTKEYS \
++                 "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
++                 EC_SK_HOSTKEYS \
+                  "rsa-sha2-512," \
+                  "rsa-sha2-256," \
+                  "ssh-rsa" \
+                  DSA_HOSTKEYS
+ #define DEFAULT_HOSTKEYS "ssh-ed25519," \
+                          EC_HOSTKEYS \
++                         "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
++                         EC_SK_HOSTKEYS \
+                          "rsa-sha2-512," \
+                          "rsa-sha2-256"
+ 
+ #define PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHMS "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++                              "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+                               EC_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHMS \
+                               "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+                               "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+@@ -186,7 +198,7 @@
+                               "rsa-sha2-512," \
+                               "rsa-sha2-256"
+ 
+-#define FIPS_ALLOWED_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHMS EC_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHMS \
++#define FIPS_ALLOWED_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHMS EC_FIPS_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGOS \
+                                            "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+                                            "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+                                            FIPS_ALLOWED_HOSTKEYS
+diff --git a/src/knownhosts.c b/src/knownhosts.c
+index 1f52dedc..94618fe2 100644
+--- a/src/knownhosts.c
++++ b/src/knownhosts.c
+@@ -480,6 +480,8 @@ static const char *ssh_known_host_sigs_from_hostkey_type(enum ssh_keytypes_e typ
+         return "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa";
+     case SSH_KEYTYPE_ED25519:
+         return "ssh-ed25519";
++    case SSH_KEYTYPE_SK_ED25519:
++        return "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com";
+ #ifdef HAVE_DSA
+     case SSH_KEYTYPE_DSS:
+         return "ssh-dss";
+@@ -494,6 +496,8 @@ static const char *ssh_known_host_sigs_from_hostkey_type(enum ssh_keytypes_e typ
+         return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384";
+     case SSH_KEYTYPE_ECDSA_P521:
+         return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521";
++    case SSH_KEYTYPE_SK_ECDSA:
++        return "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com";
+ #else
+     case SSH_KEYTYPE_ECDSA_P256:
+     case SSH_KEYTYPE_ECDSA_P384:
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_knownhosts_parsing.c b/tests/unittests/torture_knownhosts_parsing.c
+index fffa8296..7fd21f05 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_knownhosts_parsing.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_knownhosts_parsing.c
+@@ -634,7 +634,9 @@ static void torture_knownhosts_algorithms(void **state)
+     bool process_config = false;
+     const char *expect = "ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,"
+                          "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
+-                         "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256";
++                         "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
++                         "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,"
++                         "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com";
+     const char *expect_fips = "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,"
+                               "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256";
+ 
+@@ -669,7 +671,9 @@ static void torture_knownhosts_algorithms_global(void **state)
+     bool process_config = false;
+     const char *expect = "ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,"
+                          "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
+-                         "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256";
++                         "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
++                         "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,"
++                         "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com";
+     const char *expect_fips = "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,"
+                               "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256";
+ 

SOURCES/escape-brackets-in-proxycommand.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From bccb8513fa4a836aef0519d65eb33bb212606fe1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Baag <libssh-git@spam.b2ag.de>
+Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2022 20:55:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] config: Escape brackets in ProxyCommand build from ProxyJump
+
+Missing escaping results in syntax errors in Zsh shell because of square
+brackets getting interpreted as being a pattern for globbing.
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Baag <libssh-git@spam.b2ag.de>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/config.c                     |  2 +-
+ tests/unittests/torture_config.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/config.c b/src/config.c
+index c048418ec..308928429 100644
+--- a/src/config.c
++++ b/src/config.c
+@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ ssh_config_parse_proxy_jump(ssh_session session, const char *s, bool do_parsing)
+     if (hostname != NULL && do_parsing) {
+         char com[512] = {0};
+ 
+-        rv = snprintf(com, sizeof(com), "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s -W [%%h]:%%p %s",
++        rv = snprintf(com, sizeof(com), "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
+                       username ? " -l " : "",
+                       username ? username : "",
+                       port ? " -p " : "",
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+index 31dadae37..5ff20c99a 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static void torture_config_unknown(void **state,
+     /* test corner cases */
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
+-            "ssh -W [%h]:%p many-spaces.com");
++            "ssh -W '[%h]:%p' many-spaces.com");
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.host, "equal.sign");
+ 
+     ret = ssh_config_parse_file(session, "/etc/ssh/ssh_config");
+@@ -945,28 +945,28 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state,
+     torture_reset_config(session);
+     ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "simple");
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
+-    assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand, "ssh -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand, "ssh -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
+ 
+     /* With username */
+     torture_reset_config(session);
+     ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "user");
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
+-                        "ssh -l user -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
++                        "ssh -l user -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
+ 
+     /* With port */
+     torture_reset_config(session);
+     ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "port");
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
+-                        "ssh -p 2222 -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
++                        "ssh -p 2222 -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
+ 
+     /* Two step jump */
+     torture_reset_config(session);
+     ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "two-step");
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
+-                        "ssh -l u1 -p 222 -J u2@second:33 -W [%h]:%p first");
++                        "ssh -l u1 -p 222 -J u2@second:33 -W '[%h]:%p' first");
+ 
+     /* none */
+     torture_reset_config(session);
+@@ -985,14 +985,14 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state,
+     ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "only-jump");
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
+-                        "ssh -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
++                        "ssh -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
+ 
+     /* IPv6 address */
+     torture_reset_config(session);
+     ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "ipv6");
+     _parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
+-                        "ssh -W [%h]:%p 2620:52:0::fed");
++                        "ssh -W '[%h]:%p' 2620:52:0::fed");
+ 
+     /* Multiple @ is allowed in second jump */
+     config = "Host allowed-hostname\n"
+-- 
+GitLab
+

SOURCES/fix_tests.patch

@@ -1,668 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/examples/sshnetcat.c ./examples/sshnetcat.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/examples/sshnetcat.c	2021-08-26 14:27:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./examples/sshnetcat.c	2023-05-02 10:36:00.793381735 +0200
-@@ -233,9 +233,10 @@
- }
- 
- void cleanup_pcap(void);
--void cleanup_pcap(){
-+void cleanup_pcap(void)
-+{
- 	ssh_pcap_file_free(pcap);
--	pcap=NULL;
-+	pcap = NULL;
- }
- #endif
- 
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/init.c ./src/init.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/init.c	2021-03-15 08:11:33.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./src/init.c	2023-05-02 10:36:00.793381735 +0200
-@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
-  *
-  * @see ssh_init()
-  */
--bool is_ssh_initialized() {
-+bool is_ssh_initialized(void) {
- 
-     bool is_initialized = false;
- 
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_auth.c ./tests/client/torture_auth.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_auth.c	2021-08-26 14:27:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./tests/client/torture_auth.c	2023-05-02 10:36:00.815381960 +0200
-@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@
-     assert_non_null(ssh_agent_pidfile);
- 
-     /* kill agent pid */
--    torture_terminate_process(ssh_agent_pidfile);
-+    rc = torture_terminate_process(ssh_agent_pidfile);
-+    assert_return_code(rc, errno);
- 
-     unlink(ssh_agent_pidfile);
- 
-@@ -551,6 +552,7 @@
- 
- static void torture_auth_agent_cert(void **state)
- {
-+#if OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR < 8 || (OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR == 8 && OPENSSH_VERSION_MINOR == 0)
-     struct torture_state *s = *state;
-     ssh_session session = s->ssh.session;
-     int rc;
-@@ -570,6 +572,7 @@
-                              "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com");
-         assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
-     }
-+#endif /* OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR < 8.1 */
- 
-     /* Setup loads a different key, tests are exactly the same. */
-     torture_auth_agent(state);
-@@ -577,6 +580,7 @@
- 
- static void torture_auth_agent_cert_nonblocking(void **state)
- {
-+#if OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR < 8 || (OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR == 8 && OPENSSH_VERSION_MINOR == 0)
-     struct torture_state *s = *state;
-     ssh_session session = s->ssh.session;
-     int rc;
-@@ -596,6 +600,7 @@
-                              "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com");
-         assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
-     }
-+#endif /* OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR < 8.1 */
- 
-     torture_auth_agent_nonblocking(state);
- }
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_rekey.c ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2023-04-28 17:26:41.472315318 +0200
-+++ ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2023-05-02 10:36:00.805381857 +0200
-@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- 
-+#define KEX_RETRY 32
-+
- static uint64_t bytes = 2048; /* 2KB (more than the authentication phase) */
- 
- static int sshd_setup(void **state)
-@@ -190,10 +192,11 @@
-     rc = ssh_userauth_publickey_auto(s->ssh.session, NULL, NULL);
-     assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
- 
--    /* send ignore packets of up to 1KB to trigger rekey */
-+    /* send ignore packets of up to 1KB to trigger rekey. Send little bit more
-+     * to make sure it completes with all different ciphers */
-     memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
-     memset(data, 'A', 128);
--    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
-+    for (i = 0; i < KEX_RETRY; i++) {
-         ssh_send_ignore(s->ssh.session, data);
-         ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 50);
-     }
-@@ -496,9 +499,15 @@
-      * to make sure the rekey it completes with all different ciphers (paddings */
-     memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
-     memset(data, 'A', 128);
--    for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
-+    for (i = 0; i < KEX_RETRY; i++) {
-         ssh_send_ignore(s->ssh.session, data);
--        ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 50);
-+        ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 100);
-+
-+        c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
-+        /* SHA256 len */
-+        if (c->digest_len != 32) {
-+            break;
-+        }
-     }
- 
-     /* The rekey limit was restored in the new crypto to the same value */
-@@ -568,9 +577,15 @@
-      * to make sure the rekey it completes with all different ciphers (paddings */
-     memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
-     memset(data, 'A', 128);
--    for (i = 0; i < 25; i++) {
-+    for (i = 0; i < KEX_RETRY; i++) {
-         ssh_send_ignore(s->ssh.session, data);
--        ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 50);
-+        ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 100);
-+
-+        c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
-+        /* SHA256 len */
-+        if (c->digest_len != 32) {
-+            break;
-+        }
-     }
- 
-     /* Check that the secret hash is different than initially */
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/CMakeLists.txt ./tests/CMakeLists.txt
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/CMakeLists.txt	2021-08-26 14:27:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./tests/CMakeLists.txt	2023-05-02 10:32:03.964511860 +0200
-@@ -153,6 +153,17 @@
-         execute_process(COMMAND ${ID_EXECUTABLE} -u OUTPUT_VARIABLE LOCAL_UID OUTPUT_STRIP_TRAILING_WHITESPACE)
-     endif()
- 
-+    find_program(TIMEOUT_EXECUTABLE
-+                 NAME
-+                    timeout
-+                 PATHS
-+                    /bin
-+                    /usr/bin
-+                    /usr/local/bin)
-+    if (TIMEOUT_EXECUTABLE)
-+        set(WITH_TIMEOUT "1")
-+    endif()
-+
-     # chroot_wrapper
-     add_library(chroot_wrapper SHARED chroot_wrapper.c)
-     set(CHROOT_WRAPPER_LIBRARY ${libssh_BINARY_DIR}/lib/${CMAKE_SHARED_LIBRARY_PREFIX}chroot_wrapper${CMAKE_SHARED_LIBRARY_SUFFIX})
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/pkd/pkd_keyutil.c ./tests/pkd/pkd_keyutil.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/pkd/pkd_keyutil.c	2021-03-15 08:11:33.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./tests/pkd/pkd_keyutil.c	2023-05-02 10:36:00.793381735 +0200
-@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
- #include "pkd_keyutil.h"
- #include "pkd_util.h"
- 
--void setup_rsa_key() {
-+void setup_rsa_key(void) {
-     int rc = 0;
-     if (access(LIBSSH_RSA_TESTKEY, F_OK) != 0) {
-         rc = system_checked(OPENSSH_KEYGEN " -t rsa -q -N \"\" -f "
-@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
-     assert_int_equal(rc, 0);
- }
- 
--void setup_ed25519_key() {
-+void setup_ed25519_key(void) {
-     int rc = 0;
-     if (access(LIBSSH_ED25519_TESTKEY, F_OK) != 0) {
-         rc = system_checked(OPENSSH_KEYGEN " -t ed25519 -q -N \"\" -f "
-@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
- }
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_DSA
--void setup_dsa_key() {
-+void setup_dsa_key(void) {
-     int rc = 0;
-     if (access(LIBSSH_DSA_TESTKEY, F_OK) != 0) {
-         rc = system_checked(OPENSSH_KEYGEN " -t dsa -q -N \"\" -f "
-@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
- }
- #endif
- 
--void setup_ecdsa_keys() {
-+void setup_ecdsa_keys(void) {
-     int rc = 0;
- 
-     if (access(LIBSSH_ECDSA_256_TESTKEY, F_OK) != 0) {
-@@ -71,27 +71,27 @@
-     }
- }
- 
--void cleanup_rsa_key() {
-+void cleanup_rsa_key(void) {
-     cleanup_key(LIBSSH_RSA_TESTKEY);
- }
- 
--void cleanup_ed25519_key() {
-+void cleanup_ed25519_key(void) {
-     cleanup_key(LIBSSH_ED25519_TESTKEY);
- }
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_DSA
--void cleanup_dsa_key() {
-+void cleanup_dsa_key(void) {
-     cleanup_key(LIBSSH_DSA_TESTKEY);
- }
- #endif
- 
--void cleanup_ecdsa_keys() {
-+void cleanup_ecdsa_keys(void) {
-     cleanup_key(LIBSSH_ECDSA_256_TESTKEY);
-     cleanup_key(LIBSSH_ECDSA_384_TESTKEY);
-     cleanup_key(LIBSSH_ECDSA_521_TESTKEY);
- }
- 
--void setup_openssh_client_keys() {
-+void setup_openssh_client_keys(void) {
-     int rc = 0;
- 
-     if (access(OPENSSH_CA_TESTKEY, F_OK) != 0) {
-@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
-     }
- }
- 
--void cleanup_openssh_client_keys() {
-+void cleanup_openssh_client_keys(void) {
-     cleanup_key(OPENSSH_CA_TESTKEY);
-     cleanup_key(OPENSSH_RSA_TESTKEY);
-     cleanup_file(OPENSSH_RSA_TESTKEY "-sha256-cert.pub");
-@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
-     }
- }
- 
--void setup_dropbear_client_rsa_key() {
-+void setup_dropbear_client_rsa_key(void) {
-     int rc = 0;
-     if (access(DROPBEAR_RSA_TESTKEY, F_OK) != 0) {
-         rc = system_checked(DROPBEAR_KEYGEN " -t rsa -f "
-@@ -208,6 +208,6 @@
-     assert_int_equal(rc, 0);
- }
- 
--void cleanup_dropbear_client_rsa_key() {
-+void cleanup_dropbear_client_rsa_key(void) {
-     unlink(DROPBEAR_RSA_TESTKEY);
- }
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/server/torture_server_config.c ./tests/server/torture_server_config.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/server/torture_server_config.c	2021-08-26 14:27:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./tests/server/torture_server_config.c	2023-05-02 10:36:00.815381960 +0200
-@@ -285,9 +285,7 @@
-     assert_non_null(s);
- 
-     rc = torture_terminate_process(s->srv_pidfile);
--    if (rc != 0) {
--        fprintf(stderr, "XXXXXX Failed to terminate sshd\n");
--    }
-+    assert_return_code(rc, errno);
- 
-     unlink(s->srv_pidfile);
- 
-@@ -513,6 +511,12 @@
-         /* Try each algorithm individually */
-         j = 0;
-         while(tokens->tokens[j] != NULL) {
-+            char *cmp = strstr(OPENSSH_CIPHERS, tokens->tokens[j]);
-+            if (cmp == NULL) {
-+                /* This cipher is not supported by the OpenSSH. Skip it */
-+                j++;
-+                continue;
-+            }
-             snprintf(config_content,
-                     sizeof(config_content),
-                     "HostKey %s\nCiphers %s\n",
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/tests_config.h.cmake ./tests/tests_config.h.cmake
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/tests_config.h.cmake	2021-08-26 14:27:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./tests/tests_config.h.cmake	2023-05-02 10:32:03.964511860 +0200
-@@ -66,4 +66,6 @@
- 
- #cmakedefine NC_EXECUTABLE "${NC_EXECUTABLE}"
- #cmakedefine SSHD_EXECUTABLE "${SSHD_EXECUTABLE}"
--#cmakedefine SSH_EXECUTABLE "${SSH_EXECUTABLE}"
-\ No newline at end of file
-+#cmakedefine SSH_EXECUTABLE "${SSH_EXECUTABLE}"
-+#cmakedefine WITH_TIMEOUT ${WITH_TIMEOUT}
-+#cmakedefine TIMEOUT_EXECUTABLE "${TIMEOUT_EXECUTABLE}"
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/torture.c ./tests/torture.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/torture.c	2021-08-26 14:27:44.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./tests/torture.c	2023-05-02 10:36:00.815381960 +0200
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- #include "torture.h"
- #include "torture_key.h"
- #include "libssh/misc.h"
-+#include "libssh/token.h"
- 
- #define TORTURE_SSHD_SRV_IPV4 "127.0.0.10"
- /* socket wrapper IPv6 prefix  fd00::5357:5fxx */
-@@ -250,8 +251,12 @@
- 
-         rc = kill(pid, 0);
-         if (rc != 0) {
--            is_running = 0;
--            break;
-+            /* Process not found */
-+            if (errno == ESRCH) {
-+                is_running = 0;
-+                rc = 0;
-+                break;
-+            }
-         }
-     }
- 
-@@ -260,7 +265,7 @@
-                 "WARNING: The process with pid %u is still running!\n", pid);
-     }
- 
--    return 0;
-+    return rc;
- }
- 
- ssh_session torture_ssh_session(struct torture_state *s,
-@@ -611,6 +616,112 @@
-     *state = s;
- }
- 
-+/**
-+ * @brief Create a libssh server configuration file
-+ *
-+ * It is expected the socket directory to be already created before by calling
-+ * torture_setup_socket_dir().  The created configuration file will be stored in
-+ * the socket directory and the srv_config pointer in the state will be
-+ * initialized.
-+ *
-+ * @param[in] state A pointer to a pointer to an initialized torture_state
-+ *                  structure
-+ */
-+void torture_setup_create_libssh_config(void **state)
-+{
-+    struct torture_state *s = *state;
-+    char ed25519_hostkey[1024] = {0};
-+#ifdef HAVE_DSA
-+    char dsa_hostkey[1024];
-+#endif /* HAVE_DSA */
-+    char rsa_hostkey[1024];
-+    char ecdsa_hostkey[1024];
-+    char sshd_config[2048];
-+    char sshd_path[1024];
-+    const char *additional_config = NULL;
-+    struct stat sb;
-+    const char config_string[]=
-+             "LogLevel DEBUG3\n"
-+             "Port 22\n"
-+             "ListenAddress 127.0.0.10\n"
-+             "%s %s\n"
-+             "%s %s\n"
-+             "%s %s\n"
-+#ifdef HAVE_DSA
-+             "%s %s\n"
-+#endif /* HAVE_DSA */
-+             "%s\n"; /* The space for test-specific options */
-+    bool written = false;
-+    int rc;
-+
-+    assert_non_null(s->socket_dir);
-+
-+    snprintf(sshd_path,
-+             sizeof(sshd_path),
-+             "%s/sshd",
-+             s->socket_dir);
-+
-+    rc = lstat(sshd_path, &sb);
-+    if (rc == 0 ) { /* The directory is already in place */
-+        written = true;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (!written) {
-+        rc = mkdir(sshd_path, 0755);
-+        assert_return_code(rc, errno);
-+    }
-+
-+    snprintf(ed25519_hostkey,
-+             sizeof(ed25519_hostkey),
-+             "%s/sshd/ssh_host_ed25519_key",
-+             s->socket_dir);
-+
-+    snprintf(rsa_hostkey,
-+             sizeof(rsa_hostkey),
-+             "%s/sshd/ssh_host_rsa_key",
-+             s->socket_dir);
-+
-+    snprintf(ecdsa_hostkey,
-+             sizeof(ecdsa_hostkey),
-+             "%s/sshd/ssh_host_ecdsa_key",
-+             s->socket_dir);
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_DSA
-+    snprintf(dsa_hostkey,
-+             sizeof(dsa_hostkey),
-+             "%s/sshd/ssh_host_dsa_key",
-+             s->socket_dir);
-+#endif /* HAVE_DSA */
-+
-+    if (!written) {
-+        torture_write_file(ed25519_hostkey,
-+                           torture_get_openssh_testkey(SSH_KEYTYPE_ED25519, 0));
-+        torture_write_file(rsa_hostkey,
-+                           torture_get_testkey(SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA, 0));
-+        torture_write_file(ecdsa_hostkey,
-+                           torture_get_testkey(SSH_KEYTYPE_ECDSA_P521, 0));
-+#ifdef HAVE_DSA
-+        torture_write_file(dsa_hostkey,
-+                           torture_get_testkey(SSH_KEYTYPE_DSS, 0));
-+#endif /* HAVE_DSA */
-+    }
-+
-+    additional_config = (s->srv_additional_config != NULL ?
-+                         s->srv_additional_config : "");
-+
-+    snprintf(sshd_config, sizeof(sshd_config),
-+            config_string,
-+            "HostKey", ed25519_hostkey,
-+            "HostKey", rsa_hostkey,
-+            "HostKey", ecdsa_hostkey,
-+#ifdef HAVE_DSA
-+            "HostKey", dsa_hostkey,
-+#endif /* HAVE_DSA */
-+            additional_config);
-+
-+    torture_write_file(s->srv_config, sshd_config);
-+}
-+
- static void torture_setup_create_sshd_config(void **state, bool pam)
- {
-     struct torture_state *s = *state;
-@@ -856,21 +967,140 @@
-     return 1;
- }
- 
--void torture_setup_sshd_server(void **state, bool pam)
-+/**
-+ * @brief Run a libssh based server under timeout.
-+ *
-+ * It is expected that the socket directory and libssh configuration file were
-+ * already created before by calling torture_setup_socket_dir() and
-+ * torture_setup_create_libssh_config() (or alternatively setup the state with
-+ * the correct values).
-+ *
-+ * @param[in] state The content of the address pointed by this variable must be
-+ *                  a pointer to an initialized instance of torture_state
-+ *                  structure; it can be obtained by calling
-+ *                  torture_setup_socket_dir() and
-+ *                  torture_setup_create_libssh_config().
-+ * @param[in] server_path  The path to the server executable.
-+ *
-+ * @note This function will use the state->srv_additional_config field as
-+ * additional command line option used when starting the server instead of extra
-+ * configuration file options.
-+ * */
-+void torture_setup_libssh_server(void **state, const char *server_path)
- {
-     struct torture_state *s;
--    char sshd_start_cmd[1024];
-+    char start_cmd[1024];
-+    char timeout_cmd[512];
-+    char env[1024];
-+    char extra_options[1024];
-     int rc;
-+    char *ld_preload = NULL;
-+    const char *force_fips = NULL;
- 
--    torture_setup_socket_dir(state);
--    torture_setup_create_sshd_config(state, pam);
-+    struct ssh_tokens_st *env_tokens;
-+    struct ssh_tokens_st *arg_tokens;
-+
-+    pid_t pid;
-+    ssize_t printed;
-+
-+    s = *state;
-+
-+    /* Get all the wrapper libraries to be pre-loaded */
-+    ld_preload = getenv("LD_PRELOAD");
-+
-+    if (s->srv_additional_config != NULL) {
-+        printed = snprintf(extra_options, sizeof(extra_options), " %s ",
-+                           s->srv_additional_config);
-+        if (printed < 0) {
-+            fail_msg("Failed to print additional config!");
-+        }
-+    } else {
-+        printed = snprintf(extra_options, sizeof(extra_options), " ");
-+        if (printed < 0) {
-+            fail_msg("Failed to print empty additional config!");
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    if (ssh_fips_mode()) {
-+        force_fips = "OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE=1 ";
-+    } else {
-+        force_fips = "";
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Write the environment setting */
-+    printed = snprintf(env, sizeof(env),
-+                       "SOCKET_WRAPPER_DIR=%s "
-+                       "SOCKET_WRAPPER_DEFAULT_IFACE=10 "
-+                       "LD_PRELOAD=%s "
-+                       "%s",
-+                       s->socket_dir, ld_preload, force_fips);
-+    if (printed < 0) {
-+        fail_msg("Failed to print env!");
-+    }
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_TIMEOUT
-+    snprintf(timeout_cmd, sizeof(timeout_cmd),
-+             "%s %s ", TIMEOUT_EXECUTABLE, "5m");
-+#else
-+    timeout_cmd[0] = '\0';
-+#endif
-+
-+    /* Write the start command */
-+    printed = snprintf(start_cmd, sizeof(start_cmd),
-+                       "%s"
-+                       "%s -f%s -v4 -p22 -i%s -C%s%s%s",
-+                       timeout_cmd,
-+                       server_path, s->pcap_file, s->srv_pidfile,
-+                       s->srv_config, extra_options, TORTURE_SSH_SERVER);
-+    if (printed < 0) {
-+        fail_msg("Failed to print start command!");
-+    }
-+
-+    pid = fork();
-+    switch(pid) {
-+    case 0:
-+        env_tokens = ssh_tokenize(env, ' ');
-+        if (env_tokens == NULL || env_tokens->tokens == NULL) {
-+            fail_msg("Failed to tokenize env!");
-+        }
-+
-+        arg_tokens = ssh_tokenize(start_cmd, ' ');
-+        if (arg_tokens == NULL || arg_tokens->tokens == NULL) {
-+            ssh_tokens_free(env_tokens);
-+            fail_msg("Failed to tokenize args!");
-+        }
-+
-+        rc = execve(arg_tokens->tokens[0], (char **)arg_tokens->tokens,
-+                    (char **)env_tokens->tokens);
-+
-+        /* execve returns only in case of error */
-+        ssh_tokens_free(env_tokens);
-+        ssh_tokens_free(arg_tokens);
-+        fail_msg("Error in execve: %s", strerror(errno));
-+    case -1:
-+        fail_msg("Failed to fork!");
-+    default:
-+        /* The parent continues the execution of the tests */
-+        setenv("SOCKET_WRAPPER_DEFAULT_IFACE", "21", 1);
-+        unsetenv("PAM_WRAPPER");
-+
-+        /* Wait until the server is ready to accept connections */
-+        rc = torture_wait_for_daemon(15);
-+        assert_int_equal(rc, 0);
-+        break;
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+static int torture_start_sshd_server(void **state)
-+{
-+    struct torture_state *s = *state;
-+    char sshd_start_cmd[1024];
-+    int rc;
- 
-     /* Set the default interface for the server */
-     setenv("SOCKET_WRAPPER_DEFAULT_IFACE", "10", 1);
-     setenv("PAM_WRAPPER", "1", 1);
- 
--    s = *state;
--
-     snprintf(sshd_start_cmd, sizeof(sshd_start_cmd),
-              SSHD_EXECUTABLE " -r -f %s -E %s/sshd/daemon.log 2> %s/sshd/cwrap.log",
-              s->srv_config, s->socket_dir, s->socket_dir);
-@@ -882,7 +1112,20 @@
-     unsetenv("PAM_WRAPPER");
- 
-     /* Wait until the sshd is ready to accept connections */
--    rc = torture_wait_for_daemon(5);
-+    rc = torture_wait_for_daemon(15);
-+    assert_int_equal(rc, 0);
-+
-+    return SSH_OK;
-+}
-+
-+void torture_setup_sshd_server(void **state, bool pam)
-+{
-+    int rc;
-+
-+    torture_setup_socket_dir(state);
-+    torture_setup_create_sshd_config(state, pam);
-+
-+    rc = torture_start_sshd_server(state);
-     assert_int_equal(rc, 0);
- }
- 
-@@ -922,29 +1165,12 @@
- torture_reload_sshd_server(void **state)
- {
-     struct torture_state *s = *state;
--    pid_t pid;
-     int rc;
- 
--    /* read the pidfile */
--    pid = torture_read_pidfile(s->srv_pidfile);
--    assert_int_not_equal(pid, -1);
--
--    kill(pid, SIGHUP);
--
--    /* 10 ms */
--    usleep(10 * 1000);
--
--    rc = kill(pid, 0);
--    if (rc != 0) {
--        fprintf(stderr,
--                "ERROR: SSHD process %u died during reload!\n", pid);
--        return SSH_ERROR;
--    }
-+    rc = torture_terminate_process(s->srv_pidfile);
-+    assert_return_code(rc, errno);
- 
--    /* Wait until the sshd is ready to accept connections */
--    rc = torture_wait_for_daemon(5);
--    assert_int_equal(rc, 0);
--    return SSH_OK;
-+    return torture_start_sshd_server(state);
- }
- 
- /* @brief: Updates SSHD server configuration with more options and
-@@ -980,9 +1206,7 @@
-     int rc;
- 
-     rc = torture_terminate_process(s->srv_pidfile);
--    if (rc != 0) {
--        fprintf(stderr, "XXXXXX Failed to terminate sshd\n");
--    }
-+    assert_return_code(rc, errno);
- 
-     torture_teardown_socket_dir(state);
- }
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/torture.h ./tests/torture.h
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/torture.h	2021-08-26 14:27:44.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./tests/torture.h	2023-05-02 10:32:03.964511860 +0200
-@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@
- 
- void torture_reset_config(ssh_session session);
- 
-+void torture_setup_create_libssh_config(void **state);
-+
-+void torture_setup_libssh_server(void **state, const char *server_path);
-+
- /*
-  * This function must be defined in every unit test file.
-  */

SOURCES/libssh-0.10.4.tar.xz.asc

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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+=AG91
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

SOURCES/libssh-0.9.6.tar.xz.asc

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
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SOURCES/memory_leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
+From 8795d8912c8a83aaf900c0260e252a35f64eb200 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2022 17:22:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix memory leaks of bignums when openssl >= 3.0
+
+The openssl 3.0 support has introduced some memory leaks at key build as
+OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN duplicates the bignum and does not save the pointer
+itself.
+
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/libssh/dh.h |   2 +-
+ src/dh_crypto.c     |  28 ++---
+ src/pki_crypto.c    | 262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ 3 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 141 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/libssh/dh.h b/include/libssh/dh.h
+index 353dc233..9b9bb472 100644
+--- a/include/libssh/dh.h
++++ b/include/libssh/dh.h
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int ssh_dh_keypair_get_keys(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int peer,
+                             bignum *priv, bignum *pub);
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+ int ssh_dh_keypair_set_keys(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int peer,
+-                            const bignum priv, const bignum pub);
++                            bignum priv, bignum pub);
+
+ int ssh_dh_compute_shared_secret(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int local, int remote,
+                                  bignum *dest);
+diff --git a/src/dh_crypto.c b/src/dh_crypto.c
+index a847c6a2..b578ddec 100644
+--- a/src/dh_crypto.c
++++ b/src/dh_crypto.c
+@@ -154,12 +154,9 @@ int ssh_dh_keypair_get_keys(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int peer,
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+ int ssh_dh_keypair_set_keys(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int peer,
+-                            const bignum priv, const bignum pub)
++                            bignum priv, bignum pub)
+ {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+-    bignum priv_key = NULL;
+-    bignum pub_key = NULL;
+-#else
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+     int rc;
+     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL, *out_params = NULL, *merged_params = NULL;
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+@@ -172,7 +169,11 @@ int ssh_dh_keypair_set_keys(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int peer,
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+     }
+
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
++    (void)DH_set0_key(ctx->keypair[peer], pub, priv);
++
++    return SSH_OK;
++#else
+     rc = EVP_PKEY_todata(ctx->keypair[peer], EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, &out_params);
+     if (rc != 1) {
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+@@ -195,35 +196,22 @@ int ssh_dh_keypair_set_keys(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int peer,
+         rc = SSH_ERROR;
+         goto out;
+     }
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+     if (priv) {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+-        priv_key = priv;
+-#else
+         rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv);
+         if (rc != 1) {
+             rc = SSH_ERROR;
+             goto out;
+         }
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+     }
+     if (pub) {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+-        pub_key = pub;
+-#else
+         rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub);
+         if (rc != 1) {
+             rc = SSH_ERROR;
+             goto out;
+         }
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+     }
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+-    (void)DH_set0_key(ctx->keypair[peer], pub_key, priv_key);
+
+-    return SSH_OK;
+-#else
+     params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
+     if (params == NULL) {
+         rc = SSH_ERROR;
+@@ -248,6 +236,8 @@ int ssh_dh_keypair_set_keys(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int peer,
+
+     rc = SSH_OK;
+ out:
++    bignum_safe_free(priv);
++    bignum_safe_free(pub);
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+     OSSL_PARAM_free(out_params);
+     OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+diff --git a/src/pki_crypto.c b/src/pki_crypto.c
+index 0a5003da..d3359e2d 100644
+--- a/src/pki_crypto.c
++++ b/src/pki_crypto.c
+@@ -1492,18 +1492,18 @@ int pki_privkey_build_dss(ssh_key key,
+                           ssh_string privkey)
+ {
+     int rc;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     BIGNUM *bp, *bq, *bg, *bpub_key, *bpriv_key;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++    OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
++    if (param_bld == NULL) {
++        return SSH_ERROR;
++    }
+ #else
+-    const BIGNUM *pb, *qb, *gb, *pubb, *privb;
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld;
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+-
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     key->dsa = DSA_new();
+     if (key->dsa == NULL) {
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+     }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+     bp = ssh_make_string_bn(p);
+     bq = ssh_make_string_bn(q);
+@@ -1512,9 +1512,11 @@ int pki_privkey_build_dss(ssh_key key,
+     bpriv_key = ssh_make_string_bn(privkey);
+     if (bp == NULL || bq == NULL ||
+         bg == NULL || bpub_key == NULL) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
+         goto fail;
+     }
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     /* Memory management of bp, qq and bg is transferred to DSA object */
+     rc = DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, bp, bq, bg);
+     if (rc == 0) {
+@@ -1532,39 +1534,43 @@ fail:
+     DSA_free(key->dsa);
+     return SSH_ERROR;
+ #else
+-    param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+-    if (param_bld == NULL)
+-        goto err;
+-
+-    pb = ssh_make_string_bn(p);
+-    qb = ssh_make_string_bn(q);
+-    gb = ssh_make_string_bn(g);
+-    pubb = ssh_make_string_bn(pubkey);
+-    privb = ssh_make_string_bn(privkey);
+-
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, pb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, qb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, gb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pubb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, privb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, bp);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, bq);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, bg);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, bpub_key);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, bpriv_key);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
+
+     rc = evp_build_pkey("DSA", param_bld, &(key->key), EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR);
++
++fail:
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++    bignum_safe_free(bp);
++    bignum_safe_free(bq);
++    bignum_safe_free(bg);
++    bignum_safe_free(bpub_key);
++    bignum_safe_free(bpriv_key);
+
+     return rc;
+-err:
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+-    return -1;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+ }
+
+@@ -1574,18 +1580,18 @@ int pki_pubkey_build_dss(ssh_key key,
+                          ssh_string g,
+                          ssh_string pubkey) {
+     int rc;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     BIGNUM *bp = NULL, *bq = NULL, *bg = NULL, *bpub_key = NULL;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++    OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
++    if (param_bld == NULL) {
++        return SSH_ERROR;
++    }
+ #else
+-    const BIGNUM *pb, *qb, *gb, *pubb;
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld;
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+-
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     key->dsa = DSA_new();
+     if (key->dsa == NULL) {
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+     }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+     bp = ssh_make_string_bn(p);
+     bq = ssh_make_string_bn(q);
+@@ -1593,9 +1599,11 @@ int pki_pubkey_build_dss(ssh_key key,
+     bpub_key = ssh_make_string_bn(pubkey);
+     if (bp == NULL || bq == NULL ||
+         bg == NULL || bpub_key == NULL) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
+         goto fail;
+     }
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     /* Memory management of bp, bq and bg is transferred to DSA object */
+     rc = DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, bp, bq, bg);
+     if (rc == 0) {
+@@ -1613,35 +1621,37 @@ fail:
+     DSA_free(key->dsa);
+     return SSH_ERROR;
+ #else
+-    param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+-    if (param_bld == NULL)
+-        goto err;
+-
+-    pb = ssh_make_string_bn(p);
+-    qb = ssh_make_string_bn(q);
+-    gb = ssh_make_string_bn(g);
+-    pubb = ssh_make_string_bn(pubkey);
+-
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, pb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, qb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, gb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pubb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, bp);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, bq);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, bg);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, bpub_key);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
+
+     rc = evp_build_pkey("DSA", param_bld, &(key->key), EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY);
++
++fail:
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++    bignum_safe_free(bp);
++    bignum_safe_free(bq);
++    bignum_safe_free(bg);
++    bignum_safe_free(bpub_key);
+
+     return rc;
+-err:
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+-    return -1;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+ }
+
+@@ -1654,18 +1664,18 @@ int pki_privkey_build_rsa(ssh_key key,
+                           ssh_string q)
+ {
+     int rc;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     BIGNUM *be, *bn, *bd/*, *biqmp*/, *bp, *bq;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++    OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
++    if (param_bld == NULL) {
++        return SSH_ERROR;
++    }
+ #else
+-    const BIGNUM *nb, *eb, *db, *pb, *qb;
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld;
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+-
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     key->rsa = RSA_new();
+     if (key->rsa == NULL) {
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+     }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+     bn = ssh_make_string_bn(n);
+     be = ssh_make_string_bn(e);
+@@ -1675,9 +1685,11 @@ int pki_privkey_build_rsa(ssh_key key,
+     bq = ssh_make_string_bn(q);
+     if (be == NULL || bn == NULL || bd == NULL ||
+         /*biqmp == NULL ||*/ bp == NULL || bq == NULL) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
+         goto fail;
+     }
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     /* Memory management of be, bn and bd is transferred to RSA object */
+     rc = RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, bn, be, bd);
+     if (rc == 0) {
+@@ -1702,41 +1714,49 @@ fail:
+     RSA_free(key->rsa);
+     return SSH_ERROR;
+ #else
+-    param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+-    if (param_bld == NULL)
+-        goto err;
+-
+-    nb = ssh_make_string_bn(n);
+-    eb = ssh_make_string_bn(e);
+-    db = ssh_make_string_bn(d);
+-    pb = ssh_make_string_bn(p);
+-    qb = ssh_make_string_bn(q);
+-
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, nb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, eb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, db);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, bn);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, be);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, bd);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
+
+     rc = evp_build_pkey("RSA", param_bld, &(key->key), EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR);
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++    if (rc != SSH_OK) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
+
+-    rc = EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(key->key, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, pb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
++    rc = EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(key->key, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, bp);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
+
+-    rc = EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(key->key, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, qb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
++    rc = EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(key->key, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, bq);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
+
+-    return rc;
+-err:
++fail:
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+-    return -1;
++    bignum_safe_free(bn);
++    bignum_safe_free(be);
++    bignum_safe_free(bd);
++    bignum_safe_free(bp);
++    bignum_safe_free(bq);
++
++    return rc;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+ }
+
+@@ -1744,25 +1764,27 @@ int pki_pubkey_build_rsa(ssh_key key,
+                          ssh_string e,
+                          ssh_string n) {
+     int rc;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     BIGNUM *be = NULL, *bn = NULL;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++    OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
++    if (param_bld == NULL) {
++        return SSH_ERROR;
++    }
+ #else
+-    const BIGNUM *eb, *nb;
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld;
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+-
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     key->rsa = RSA_new();
+     if (key->rsa == NULL) {
+         return SSH_ERROR;
+     }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+     be = ssh_make_string_bn(e);
+     bn = ssh_make_string_bn(n);
+     if (be == NULL || bn == NULL) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
+         goto fail;
+     }
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+     /* Memory management of bn and be is transferred to RSA object */
+     rc = RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, bn, be, NULL);
+     if (rc == 0) {
+@@ -1774,27 +1796,25 @@ fail:
+     RSA_free(key->rsa);
+     return SSH_ERROR;
+ #else
+-    nb = ssh_make_string_bn(n);
+-    eb = ssh_make_string_bn(e);
+-
+-    param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+-    if (param_bld == NULL)
+-        goto err;
+-
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, nb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
+-    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, eb);
+-    if (rc != 1)
+-        goto err;
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, bn);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
++    rc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, be);
++    if (rc != 1) {
++        rc = SSH_ERROR;
++        goto fail;
++    }
+
+     rc = evp_build_pkey("RSA", param_bld, &(key->key), EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY);
++
++fail:
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++    bignum_safe_free(bn);
++    bignum_safe_free(be);
+
+     return rc;
+-err:
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+-    return -1;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+ }
+
+--
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/null_dereference_rekey.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/curve25519.h ./include/libssh/curve25519.h
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/curve25519.h	2021-03-15 08:11:33.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./include/libssh/curve25519.h	2023-04-27 12:21:30.257820636 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/curve25519.h ./include/libssh/curve25519.h
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/curve25519.h	2022-07-07 15:53:51.000000000 +0200
++++ ./include/libssh/curve25519.h	2023-04-27 14:35:27.030113530 +0200
 @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 
 
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/curve25519.h ./include/libssh/cu
 
  #ifdef WITH_SERVER
  void ssh_server_curve25519_init(ssh_session session);
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/dh-gex.h ./include/libssh/dh-gex.h
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/dh-gex.h	2021-03-15 08:11:33.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./include/libssh/dh-gex.h	2023-04-27 12:21:30.257820636 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/dh-gex.h ./include/libssh/dh-gex.h
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/dh-gex.h	2022-07-07 15:53:51.000000000 +0200
++++ ./include/libssh/dh-gex.h	2023-04-27 14:35:27.030113530 +0200
 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
  #define SRC_DH_GEX_H_
 
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/dh-gex.h ./include/libssh/dh-gex
 
  #ifdef WITH_SERVER
  void ssh_server_dhgex_init(ssh_session session);
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/dh.h ./include/libssh/dh.h
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/dh.h	2021-03-15 08:11:33.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./include/libssh/dh.h	2023-04-27 12:21:30.257820636 +0200
-@@ -63,8 +63,10 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/dh.h ./include/libssh/dh.h
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/dh.h	2023-04-27 14:25:46.353381599 +0200
++++ ./include/libssh/dh.h	2023-04-27 14:36:02.691475297 +0200
+@@ -73,8 +73,10 @@
  ssh_key ssh_dh_get_next_server_publickey(ssh_session session);
  int ssh_dh_get_next_server_publickey_blob(ssh_session session,
                                            ssh_string *pubkey_blob);
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/dh.h ./include/libssh/dh.h
  #ifdef WITH_SERVER
  void ssh_server_dh_init(ssh_session session);
  #endif /* WITH_SERVER */
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/ecdh.h ./include/libssh/ecdh.h
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/ecdh.h	2021-03-15 08:11:33.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./include/libssh/ecdh.h	2023-04-27 12:21:30.257820636 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/ecdh.h ./include/libssh/ecdh.h
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/ecdh.h	2022-07-07 15:53:51.000000000 +0200
++++ ./include/libssh/ecdh.h	2023-04-27 14:35:27.030113530 +0200
 @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
  extern struct ssh_packet_callbacks_struct ssh_ecdh_client_callbacks;
  /* Backend-specific functions.  */
@@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/ecdh.h ./include/libssh/ecdh.h
  int ecdh_build_k(ssh_session session);
 
  #ifdef WITH_SERVER
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/kex.h ./include/libssh/kex.h
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/kex.h	2021-03-15 08:11:33.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./include/libssh/kex.h	2023-04-27 12:21:30.257820636 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/kex.h ./include/libssh/kex.h
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/kex.h	2023-04-27 14:25:46.346381527 +0200
++++ ./include/libssh/kex.h	2023-04-27 14:34:36.438602800 +0200
 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 
  SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit);
@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/kex.h ./include/libssh/kex.h
  void ssh_list_kex(struct ssh_kex_struct *kex);
  int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session);
  int ssh_kex_select_methods(ssh_session session);
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/session.h ./include/libssh/session.h
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/session.h	2021-08-26 14:27:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./include/libssh/session.h	2023-04-27 12:24:04.679475777 +0200
-@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/session.h ./include/libssh/session.h
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/session.h	2023-04-27 14:25:46.361381682 +0200
++++ ./include/libssh/session.h	2023-04-27 14:36:02.692475307 +0200
+@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@
  /* Client successfully authenticated */
  #define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED 2
 
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/session.h ./include/libssh/sessi
  /* codes to use with ssh_handle_packets*() */
  /* Infinite timeout */
  #define SSH_TIMEOUT_INFINITE -1
-@@ -131,10 +136,8 @@
+@@ -138,10 +143,8 @@
      /* Extensions negotiated using RFC 8308 */
      uint32_t extensions;
 
@@ -82,10 +82,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/session.h ./include/libssh/sessi
 -                         the remote host */
 +    ssh_string banner; /* that's the issue banner from the server */
 +    char *discon_msg; /* disconnect message from the remote host */
+     char *disconnect_message; /* disconnect message to be set */
      ssh_buffer in_buffer;
      PACKET in_packet;
-     ssh_buffer out_buffer;
-@@ -158,25 +161,33 @@
+@@ -166,25 +169,33 @@
          uint32_t current_method;
      } auth;
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/session.h ./include/libssh/sessi
 +    struct ssh_crypto_struct *next_crypto;
 
      struct ssh_list *channels; /* linked list of channels */
-     int maxchannel;
+     uint32_t maxchannel;
      ssh_agent agent; /* ssh agent */
 
 -/* keyb interactive data */
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/session.h ./include/libssh/sessi
      struct ssh_kbdint_struct *kbdint;
      struct ssh_gssapi_struct *gssapi;
 
-@@ -193,7 +204,8 @@
+@@ -201,7 +212,8 @@
 
      /* auths accepted by server */
      struct ssh_list *ssh_message_list; /* list of delayed SSH messages */
@@ -134,17 +134,16 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/include/libssh/session.h ./include/libssh/sessi
      void *ssh_message_callback_data;
      ssh_server_callbacks server_callbacks;
      void (*ssh_connection_callback)( struct ssh_session_struct *session);
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/client.c ./src/client.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/client.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.797925403 +0200
-+++ ./src/client.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.680475778 +0200
-@@ -243,10 +243,13 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/client.c ./src/client.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/client.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.339381455 +0200
++++ ./src/client.c	2023-04-27 14:36:02.692475307 +0200
+@@ -246,10 +246,13 @@
   * @warning this function returning is no proof that DH handshake is
   * completed
   */
--static int dh_handshake(ssh_session session) {
--
+-static int dh_handshake(ssh_session session)
 +int dh_handshake(ssh_session session)
-+{
+ {
    int rc = SSH_AGAIN;
 
 +  SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE, "dh_handshake_state = %d, kex_type = %d",
@@ -153,7 +152,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/client.c ./src/client.c
    switch (session->dh_handshake_state) {
      case DH_STATE_INIT:
        switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
-@@ -386,96 +389,102 @@
+@@ -392,96 +395,103 @@
  {
      int rc;
 
@@ -208,10 +207,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/client.c ./src/client.c
 +                          session->serverbanner);
 +            goto error;
 +        }
-+
-+        ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
 
 -            ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
++        ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
++
 +        ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(session);
 +        session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX;
 +        rc = ssh_set_client_kex(session);
@@ -322,15 +321,15 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/client.c ./src/client.c
      ssh_socket_close(session->socket);
      session->alive = 0;
 -    session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
--    SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "%s", ssh_get_error(session));
 +    session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
+     SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "%s", ssh_get_error(session));
 +
  }
 
  /** @internal
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/curve25519.c ./src/curve25519.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/curve25519.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.797925403 +0200
-+++ ./src/curve25519.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.680475778 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/curve25519.c ./src/curve25519.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/curve25519.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
++++ ./src/curve25519.c	2023-04-27 14:35:27.031113541 +0200
 @@ -172,6 +172,11 @@
      return rc;
  }
@@ -352,10 +351,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/curve25519.c ./src/curve25519.c
 
    pubkey_blob = ssh_buffer_get_ssh_string(packet);
    if (pubkey_blob == NULL) {
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/dh.c ./src/dh.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/dh.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.798925404 +0200
-+++ ./src/dh.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.680475778 +0200
-@@ -342,6 +342,11 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/dh.c ./src/dh.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/dh.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
++++ ./src/dh.c	2023-04-27 14:35:27.032113551 +0200
+@@ -352,6 +352,11 @@
    return SSH_ERROR;
  }
 
@@ -367,7 +366,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/dh.c ./src/dh.c
  SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dh_reply){
    struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto=session->next_crypto;
    ssh_string pubkey_blob = NULL;
-@@ -351,7 +356,7 @@
+@@ -361,7 +366,7 @@
    (void)type;
    (void)user;
 
@@ -376,10 +375,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/dh.c ./src/dh.c
 
    rc = ssh_buffer_unpack(packet, "SBS", &pubkey_blob, &server_pubkey,
            &crypto->dh_server_signature);
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/dh-gex.c ./src/dh-gex.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/dh-gex.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.797925403 +0200
-+++ ./src/dh-gex.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.680475778 +0200
-@@ -238,6 +238,11 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/dh-gex.c ./src/dh-gex.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/dh-gex.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
++++ ./src/dh-gex.c	2023-04-27 14:35:27.031113541 +0200
+@@ -248,6 +248,11 @@
      return SSH_PACKET_USED;
  }
 
@@ -391,7 +390,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/dh-gex.c ./src/dh-gex.c
  static SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dhgex_reply)
  {
      struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto=session->next_crypto;
-@@ -248,7 +253,7 @@
+@@ -258,7 +263,7 @@
      (void)user;
      SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY received");
 
@@ -400,9 +399,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/dh-gex.c ./src/dh-gex.c
      rc = ssh_buffer_unpack(packet,
                             "SBS",
                             &pubkey_blob, &server_pubkey,
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/ecdh.c ./src/ecdh.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/ecdh.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.798925404 +0200
-+++ ./src/ecdh.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.680475778 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/ecdh.c ./src/ecdh.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/ecdh.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
++++ ./src/ecdh.c	2023-04-27 14:35:27.032113551 +0200
 @@ -43,6 +43,11 @@
      .user = NULL
  };
@@ -424,10 +423,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/ecdh.c ./src/ecdh.c
    pubkey_blob = ssh_buffer_get_ssh_string(packet);
    if (pubkey_blob == NULL) {
      ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL, "No public key in packet");
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.798925404 +0200
-+++ ./src/gssapi.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.681475778 +0200
-@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/gssapi.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
++++ ./src/gssapi.c	2023-04-27 14:29:22.606512115 +0200
+@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@
                               "indicate mechs",
                               maj_stat,
                               min_stat);
@@ -435,7 +434,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          return SSH_ERROR;
      }
 
-@@ -259,8 +260,10 @@
+@@ -265,8 +266,10 @@
          return SSH_OK;
      }
      /* from now we have room for context */
@@ -447,7 +446,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
 
      name_buf.value = service_name;
      name_buf.length = strlen(name_buf.value) + 1;
-@@ -272,6 +275,7 @@
+@@ -278,6 +281,7 @@
                               "importing name",
                               maj_stat,
                               min_stat);
@@ -455,7 +454,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          return -1;
      }
 
-@@ -338,6 +342,7 @@
+@@ -345,6 +349,7 @@
                           min_stat);
      ptr = malloc(buffer.length + 1);
      if (ptr == NULL) {
@@ -463,7 +462,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          return NULL;
      }
      memcpy(ptr, buffer.value, buffer.length);
-@@ -421,6 +426,7 @@
+@@ -428,6 +433,7 @@
                               "Gssapi error",
                               maj_stat,
                               min_stat);
@@ -471,7 +470,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          ssh_auth_reply_default(session,0);
          ssh_gssapi_free(session);
          session->gssapi=NULL;
-@@ -438,6 +444,9 @@
+@@ -445,6 +451,9 @@
                          (size_t)output_token.length, output_token.value);
          ssh_packet_send(session);
      }
@@ -481,7 +480,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
      if(maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE){
          session->gssapi->state = SSH_GSSAPI_STATE_RCV_MIC;
      }
-@@ -638,7 +647,7 @@
+@@ -648,7 +657,7 @@
  static int ssh_gssapi_match(ssh_session session, gss_OID_set *valid_oids)
  {
      OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat, lifetime;
@@ -490,7 +489,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
      gss_buffer_desc namebuf;
      gss_name_t client_id = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
      gss_OID oid;
-@@ -700,6 +709,7 @@
+@@ -710,6 +719,7 @@
      ret = SSH_OK;
 
  end:
@@ -498,16 +497,16 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
      gss_release_name(&min_stat, &client_id);
      return ret;
  }
-@@ -713,7 +723,7 @@
-  */
- int ssh_gssapi_auth_mic(ssh_session session){
+@@ -724,7 +734,7 @@
+ int ssh_gssapi_auth_mic(ssh_session session)
+ {
      size_t i;
 -    gss_OID_set selected; /* oid selected for authentication */
 +    gss_OID_set selected = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET; /* oid selected for authentication */
      ssh_string *oids = NULL;
      int rc;
      size_t n_oids = 0;
-@@ -790,6 +800,8 @@
+@@ -801,6 +811,8 @@
          SSH_STRING_FREE(oids[i]);
      }
      free(oids);
@@ -516,7 +515,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
      if (rc != SSH_ERROR) {
          return SSH_AUTH_AGAIN;
      }
-@@ -893,6 +905,8 @@
+@@ -904,6 +916,8 @@
          ssh_packet_send(session);
          session->auth.state = SSH_AUTH_STATE_GSSAPI_TOKEN;
      }
@@ -525,7 +524,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
      return SSH_PACKET_USED;
 
  error:
-@@ -921,8 +935,10 @@
+@@ -933,8 +947,10 @@
 
      maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat,session->gssapi->ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
                             &mic_buf, &mic_token_buf);
@@ -537,7 +536,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          ssh_gssapi_log_error(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,
                               "generating MIC",
                               maj_stat,
-@@ -935,8 +951,10 @@
+@@ -947,8 +963,10 @@
                           SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
                           mic_token_buf.length,
                           (size_t)mic_token_buf.length, mic_token_buf.value);
@@ -549,7 +548,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
          ssh_set_error_oom(session);
          return SSH_ERROR;
      }
-@@ -1005,6 +1023,8 @@
+@@ -1017,6 +1035,8 @@
          ssh_packet_send(session);
      }
 
@@ -558,9 +557,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
      if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
          ssh_gssapi_send_mic(session);
          session->auth.state = SSH_AUTH_STATE_GSSAPI_MIC_SENT;
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.798925404 +0200
-+++ ./src/kex.c	2023-04-27 12:24:08.450478574 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/kex.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.368381754 +0200
++++ ./src/kex.c	2023-04-27 14:36:02.692475307 +0200
 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdbool.h>
@@ -569,7 +568,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
  #include "libssh/priv.h"
  #include "libssh/buffer.h"
  #include "libssh/dh.h"
-@@ -305,6 +306,10 @@
+@@ -328,6 +329,10 @@
 
      int is_wrong = 1;
 
@@ -580,7 +579,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
      colon = strchr(client_str, ',');
      if (colon == NULL) {
          client_kex_len = strlen(client_str);
-@@ -331,6 +336,7 @@
+@@ -354,6 +359,7 @@
  SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit)
  {
      int i, ok;
@@ -588,7 +587,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
      int server_kex = session->server;
      ssh_string str = NULL;
      char *strings[SSH_KEX_METHODS] = {0};
-@@ -344,35 +350,67 @@
+@@ -367,35 +373,67 @@
      (void)type;
      (void)user;
 
@@ -666,7 +665,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
              goto error;
          }
      }
-@@ -385,7 +423,8 @@
+@@ -408,7 +446,8 @@
 
          rc = ssh_buffer_add_ssh_string(session->in_hashbuf, str);
          if (rc < 0) {
@@ -676,7 +675,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
              goto error;
          }
 
-@@ -398,14 +437,14 @@
+@@ -421,14 +460,14 @@
          str = NULL;
      }
 
@@ -694,7 +693,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
          }
      }
 
-@@ -419,30 +458,48 @@
+@@ -442,30 +481,48 @@
       * that its value is included when computing the session ID (see
       * 'make_sessionid').
       */
@@ -758,7 +757,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
 
              /* The client supports extension negotiation */
              session->extensions |= SSH_EXT_NEGOTIATION;
-@@ -452,14 +509,14 @@
+@@ -475,14 +532,14 @@
               * by the client and enable the respective extensions to provide
               * correct signature in the next packet if RSA is negotiated
               */
@@ -778,7 +777,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
                      if (is_allowed != NULL) {
                          session->extensions |= SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA512;
                      }
-@@ -469,10 +526,9 @@
+@@ -492,10 +549,9 @@
              ok = ssh_match_group(hostkeys, "rsa-sha2-256");
              if (ok) {
                  /* Check if rsa-sha2-256 is allowed by config */
@@ -792,7 +791,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
                      if (is_allowed != NULL) {
                          session->extensions |= SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA256;
                      }
-@@ -488,7 +544,7 @@
+@@ -511,7 +567,7 @@
                  (session->extensions & SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA512)) {
                  session->extensions &= ~(SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA256 | SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA512);
                  rsa_sig_ext = ssh_find_matching("rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256",
@@ -801,7 +800,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
                  if (rsa_sig_ext == NULL) {
                      goto error; /* should never happen */
                  } else if (strcmp(rsa_sig_ext, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0) {
-@@ -507,24 +563,16 @@
+@@ -530,24 +586,16 @@
                      session->extensions & SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA256 ? "SHA256" : "",
                      session->extensions & SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA512 ? " SHA512" : "");
          }
@@ -832,7 +831,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
      session->ssh_connection_callback(session);
      return SSH_PACKET_USED;
 
-@@ -672,14 +720,18 @@
+@@ -695,14 +743,18 @@
      int i;
      size_t kex_len, len;
 
@@ -853,7 +852,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
      /* Set the list of allowed algorithms in order of preference, if it hadn't
       * been set yet. */
      for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
-@@ -749,15 +801,89 @@
+@@ -772,15 +824,89 @@
      return NULL;
  }
 
@@ -945,7 +944,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
      int i;
 
      /* Here we should drop the  ext-info-c  from the list so we avoid matching.
-@@ -768,52 +894,41 @@
+@@ -791,52 +917,41 @@
      }
 
      for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
@@ -1023,7 +1022,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
              session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX],
              session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
              session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_CRYPT_C_S],
-@@ -830,63 +945,116 @@
+@@ -853,63 +968,116 @@
 
 
  /* this function only sends the predefined set of kex methods */
@@ -1185,7 +1184,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
  }
 
  /*
-@@ -929,7 +1097,7 @@
+@@ -952,7 +1120,7 @@
      }
 
      session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_INIT;
@@ -1194,7 +1193,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
      if (rc < 0) {
          SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "Failed to send kex");
          return rc;
-@@ -1006,33 +1174,6 @@
+@@ -1142,33 +1310,6 @@
          client_hash = session->in_hashbuf;
      }
 
@@ -1228,11 +1227,11 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
      rc = ssh_dh_get_next_server_publickey_blob(session, &server_pubkey_blob);
      if (rc != SSH_OK) {
          goto error;
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/packet.c ./src/packet.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/packet.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.811925413 +0200
-+++ ./src/packet.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.682475779 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c ./src/packet.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.334381403 +0200
++++ ./src/packet.c	2023-04-27 14:34:36.432602740 +0200
 @@ -366,6 +366,11 @@
-          * - session->dh_handhsake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT
+          * - session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT
           * */
 
 +        if (!session->server) {
@@ -1309,7 +1308,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/packet.c ./src/packet.c
  }
 
  /** @internal
-@@ -1928,7 +1944,7 @@
+@@ -1930,7 +1946,7 @@
          memcpy(session->next_crypto->session_id,
                 session->current_crypto->session_id,
                 session_id_len);
@@ -1318,9 +1317,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/packet.c ./src/packet.c
 
          return SSH_OK;
      }
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/packet_cb.c ./src/packet_cb.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/packet_cb.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.799925404 +0200
-+++ ./src/packet_cb.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.682475779 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/packet_cb.c ./src/packet_cb.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/packet_cb.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.334381403 +0200
++++ ./src/packet_cb.c	2023-04-27 14:34:36.428602699 +0200
 @@ -156,6 +156,9 @@
                                    session->next_crypto->digest_len);
      SSH_SIGNATURE_FREE(sig);
@@ -1331,9 +1330,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/packet_cb.c ./src/packet_cb.c
        goto error;
      }
      SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,"Signature verified and valid");
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c	2023-04-27 12:22:39.800925405 +0200
-+++ ./src/server.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.683475780 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/server.c ./src/server.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/server.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.347381537 +0200
++++ ./src/server.c	2023-04-27 14:35:27.041113642 +0200
 @@ -92,7 +92,11 @@
      size_t len;
      int ok;
@@ -1347,7 +1346,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 
      ok = ssh_get_random(server->cookie, 16, 0);
      if (!ok) {
-@@ -335,117 +339,121 @@
+@@ -336,116 +340,119 @@
   * @brief A function to be called each time a step has been done in the
   * connection.
   */
@@ -1363,6 +1362,20 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 -            break;
 -        case SSH_SESSION_STATE_BANNER_RECEIVED:
 -            if (session->clientbanner == NULL) {
+-                goto error;
+-            }
+-            set_status(session, 0.4f);
+-            SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,
+-                    "SSH client banner: %s", session->clientbanner);
+-
+-            /* Here we analyze the different protocols the server allows. */
+-            rc = ssh_analyze_banner(session, 1);
+-            if (rc < 0) {
+-                ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+-                        "No version of SSH protocol usable (banner: %s)",
+-                        session->clientbanner);
+-                goto error;
+-            }
 +    switch (session->session_state) {
 +    case SSH_SESSION_STATE_NONE:
 +    case SSH_SESSION_STATE_CONNECTING:
@@ -1384,11 +1397,16 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 +                          session->clientbanner);
 +            goto error;
 +        }
-+
+
+-            /* from now, the packet layer is handling incoming packets */
+-            ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
 +        /* from now, the packet layer is handling incoming packets */
-+        session->socket_callbacks.data = ssh_packet_socket_callback;
 +        ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
-+
+
+-            ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(session);
+-            set_status(session, 0.5f);
+-            session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX;
+-            if (ssh_send_kex(session, 1) < 0) {
 +        ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(session);
 +        set_status(session, 0.5f);
 +        session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX;
@@ -1405,43 +1423,6 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 +            if (server_set_kex(session) == SSH_ERROR)
                  goto error;
 -            }
--            set_status(session, 0.4f);
--            SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,
--                    "SSH client banner: %s", session->clientbanner);
--
--            /* Here we analyze the different protocols the server allows. */
--            rc = ssh_analyze_banner(session, 1);
--            if (rc < 0) {
--                ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
--                        "No version of SSH protocol usable (banner: %s)",
--                        session->clientbanner);
-+            /* We are in a rekeying, so we need to send the server kex */
-+            if (ssh_send_kex(session) < 0)
-                 goto error;
--            }
-+        }
-+        ssh_list_kex(&session->next_crypto->client_kex); // log client kex
-+        if (ssh_kex_select_methods(session) < 0) {
-+            goto error;
-+        }
-+        if (crypt_set_algorithms_server(session) == SSH_ERROR)
-+            goto error;
-+        set_status(session, 0.8f);
-+        session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH;
-+        break;
-+    case SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH:
-+        if (session->dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_FINISHED) {
- 
--            /* from now, the packet layer is handling incoming packets */
--            session->socket_callbacks.data=ssh_packet_socket_callback;
--            ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
--
--            ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(session);
--            set_status(session, 0.5f);
--            session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX;
--            if (ssh_send_kex(session, 1) < 0) {
--                goto error;
--            }
 -            break;
 -        case SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX:
 -            /* TODO: This state should disappear in favor of get_key handle */
@@ -1457,12 +1438,27 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 -            }
 -            ssh_list_kex(&session->next_crypto->client_kex); // log client kex
 -            if (ssh_kex_select_methods(session) < 0) {
++            /* We are in a rekeying, so we need to send the server kex */
++            if (ssh_send_kex(session) < 0)
+                 goto error;
+-            }
+-            if (crypt_set_algorithms_server(session) == SSH_ERROR)
++        }
++        ssh_list_kex(&session->next_crypto->client_kex); // log client kex
++        if (ssh_kex_select_methods(session) < 0) {
++            goto error;
++        }
++        if (crypt_set_algorithms_server(session) == SSH_ERROR)
++            goto error;
++        set_status(session, 0.8f);
++        session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH;
++        break;
++    case SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH:
++        if (session->dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_FINISHED) {
++
 +            rc = ssh_packet_set_newkeys(session, SSH_DIRECTION_IN);
 +            if (rc != SSH_OK) {
                  goto error;
-             }
--            if (crypt_set_algorithms_server(session) == SSH_ERROR)
--                goto error;
 -            set_status(session,0.8f);
 -            session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH;
 -            break;
@@ -1473,7 +1469,8 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 -                if (rc != SSH_OK) {
 -                    goto error;
 -                }
-+
++            }
+
 +            /*
 +             * If the client supports extension negotiation, we will send
 +             * our supported extensions now. This is the first message after
@@ -1481,7 +1478,6 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 +             */
 +            if (session->extensions & SSH_EXT_NEGOTIATION &&
 +                session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATED) {
- 
                  /*
 -                 * If the client supports extension negotiation, we will send
 -                 * our supported extensions now. This is the first message after
@@ -1561,20 +1557,20 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
  }
 
  /**
-@@ -459,16 +467,17 @@
+@@ -459,16 +466,17 @@
   * @param  user is a pointer to session
   * @returns Number of bytes processed, or zero if the banner is not complete.
   */
--static int callback_receive_banner(const void *data, size_t len, void *user) {
+-static size_t callback_receive_banner(const void *data, size_t len, void *user) {
 -    char *buffer = (char *) data;
 -    ssh_session session = (ssh_session) user;
-+static int callback_receive_banner(const void *data, size_t len, void *user)
++static size_t callback_receive_banner(const void *data, size_t len, void *user)
 +{
 +    char *buffer = (char *)data;
 +    ssh_session session = (ssh_session)user;
      char *str = NULL;
      size_t i;
-     int ret=0;
+     size_t processed = 0;
 
      for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
  #ifdef WITH_PCAP
@@ -1583,7 +1579,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
              ssh_pcap_context_write(session->pcap_ctx,
                                     SSH_PCAP_DIR_IN,
                                     buffer,
-@@ -477,11 +486,11 @@
+@@ -477,11 +485,11 @@
          }
  #endif
          if (buffer[i] == '\r') {
@@ -1597,8 +1593,8 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 
              str = strdup(buffer);
              /* number of bytes read */
-@@ -494,10 +503,11 @@
-             return ret;
+@@ -494,10 +502,11 @@
+             return processed;
          }
 
 -        if(i > 127) {
@@ -1611,7 +1607,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
 
              return 0;
          }
-@@ -525,10 +535,14 @@
+@@ -549,10 +558,14 @@
  }
 
  /* Do the banner and key exchange */
@@ -1629,7 +1625,7 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
      rc = ssh_send_banner(session, 1);
      if (rc < 0) {
          return SSH_ERROR;
-@@ -539,27 +553,28 @@
+@@ -563,27 +576,28 @@
      session->ssh_connection_callback = ssh_server_connection_callback;
      session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_SOCKET_CONNECTED;
      ssh_socket_set_callbacks(session->socket,&session->socket_callbacks);
@@ -1668,9 +1664,9 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/server.c ./src/server.c
  }
 
  /* messages */
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/token.c ./src/token.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/token.c	2021-03-15 08:11:33.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./src/token.c	2023-04-27 12:21:30.260820657 +0200
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/token.c ./src/token.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/token.c	2023-04-27 14:25:46.346381527 +0200
++++ ./src/token.c	2023-04-27 14:34:36.426602679 +0200
 @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
          return NULL;
      }
@@ -1680,10 +1676,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/token.c ./src/token.c
      if (tokens->buffer == NULL) {
          goto error;
      }
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/wrapper.c ./src/wrapper.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/src/wrapper.c	2021-08-26 14:27:44.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./src/wrapper.c	2023-04-27 12:21:30.260820657 +0200
-@@ -147,15 +147,16 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/wrapper.c ./src/wrapper.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/wrapper.c	2022-08-30 13:26:05.000000000 +0200
++++ ./src/wrapper.c	2023-04-27 14:31:16.130584204 +0200
+@@ -150,15 +150,16 @@
    SAFE_FREE(cipher);
  }
 
@@ -1708,10 +1704,24 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/src/wrapper.c ./src/wrapper.c
  }
 
  void crypto_free(struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto)
-diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_rekey.c ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c
---- ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2021-08-26 14:27:44.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2023-04-27 12:24:04.684475780 +0200
-@@ -651,6 +651,92 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2022-09-02 09:56:54.000000000 +0200
++++ ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2023-04-27 14:38:20.352896968 +0200
+@@ -192,10 +192,11 @@
+     rc = ssh_userauth_publickey_auto(s->ssh.session, NULL, NULL);
+     assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
+
+-    /* send ignore packets of up to 1KB to trigger rekey */
++    /* send ignore packets of up to 1KB to trigger rekey. Send little bit more
++     * to make sure it completes with all different ciphers */
+     memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
+     memset(data, 'A', 128);
+-    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
++    for (i = 0; i < KEX_RETRY; i++) {
+         ssh_send_ignore(s->ssh.session, data);
+         ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 50);
+     }
+@@ -671,6 +672,92 @@
  #endif /* WITH_SFTP */
 
 
@@ -1804,12 +1814,10 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_rekey.c ./tests/client/tor
  int torture_run_tests(void) {
      int rc;
      struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
-@@ -671,19 +757,34 @@
-         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_different_kex,
+@@ -704,6 +791,33 @@
                                          session_setup,
                                          session_teardown),
--        /* Note, that this modifies the sshd_config */
-+        /* TODO verify the two rekey are possible and the states are not broken after rekey */
+         /* TODO verify the two rekey are possible and the states are not broken after rekey */
 +
 +        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_different_kex,
 +                                        session_setup,
@@ -1817,25 +1825,22 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_rekey.c ./tests/client/tor
 +        /* Note, that these tests modify the sshd_config so follow-up tests
 +         * might get unexpected behavior if they do not update the server with
 +         * torture_update_sshd_config() too */
-         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_send,
-                                         session_setup,
-                                         session_teardown),
++        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_send,
++                                        session_setup,
++                                        session_teardown),
 +        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_guess_send,
 +                                        session_setup,
 +                                        session_teardown),
 +        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_guess_wrong_send,
 +                                        session_setup,
 +                                        session_teardown),
- #ifdef WITH_SFTP
-         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_recv,
-                                         session_setup_sftp_server,
-                                         session_teardown),
--#endif /* WITH_SFTP */
--        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_different_kex,
++#ifdef WITH_SFTP
++        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_recv,
++                                        session_setup_sftp_server,
++                                        session_teardown),
 +        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_guess_recv,
-                                         session_setup,
-                                         session_teardown),
--        /* TODO verify the two rekey are possible and the states are not broken after rekey */
++                                        session_setup,
++                                        session_teardown),
 +        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_guess_wrong_recv,
 +                                        session_setup,
 +                                        session_teardown),
@@ -1843,3 +1848,14 @@ diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.9.6/tests/client/torture_rekey.c ./tests/client/tor
      };
 
      ssh_init();
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/fuzz/ssh_server_fuzzer.c ./tests/fuzz/ssh_server_fuzzer.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/fuzz/ssh_server_fuzzer.c	2022-07-07 15:53:51.000000000 +0200
++++ ./tests/fuzz/ssh_server_fuzzer.c	2023-04-27 14:28:50.620219301 +0200
+@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@
+     ssh_set_auth_methods(session, SSH_AUTH_METHOD_NONE);
+
+     ssh_callbacks_init(&server_cb);
++    ssh_set_server_callbacks(session, &server_cb);
+
+     rc = ssh_bind_accept_fd(sshbind, session, socket_fds[0]);
+     assert(rc == SSH_OK);

SOURCES/options_apply.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,842 @@
+From 11c0d687a081fe64501e21c95def7f893611d029 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 10:40:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] Add a placehohlder for non-expanded identities
+
+Expanding a string twice could lead to unwanted behaviour.
+This solution creates a ssh_list (`opts.identites_non_exp`) to store the strings
+before expansion and by using ssh_apply it moves the string to the
+`opts.identities`. This way the expanded strings are separated.
+
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/libssh/session.h |  1 +
+ src/options.c            | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ src/session.c            | 23 +++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/libssh/session.h b/include/libssh/session.h
+index d3e5787c..e22b0d67 100644
+--- a/include/libssh/session.h
++++ b/include/libssh/session.h
+@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ struct ssh_session_struct {
+ #endif
+     struct {
+         struct ssh_list *identity;
++        struct ssh_list *identity_non_exp;
+         char *username;
+         char *host;
+         char *bindaddr; /* bind the client to an ip addr */
+diff --git a/src/options.c b/src/options.c
+index 56e09c65..bb085384 100644
+--- a/src/options.c
++++ b/src/options.c
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
+  * @brief Duplicate the options of a session structure.
+  *
+  * If you make several sessions with the same options this is useful. You
+- * cannot use twice the same option structure in ssh_session_connect.
++ * cannot use twice the same option structure in ssh_connect.
+  *
+  * @param src           The session to use to copy the options.
+  *
+@@ -61,13 +61,14 @@
+  *
+  * @returns             0 on success, -1 on error with errno set.
+  *
+- * @see ssh_session_connect()
++ * @see ssh_connect()
+  * @see ssh_free()
+  */
+ int ssh_options_copy(ssh_session src, ssh_session *dest)
+ {
+     ssh_session new;
+     struct ssh_iterator *it = NULL;
++    struct ssh_list *list = NULL;
+     char *id = NULL;
+     int i;
+
+@@ -105,14 +106,15 @@ int ssh_options_copy(ssh_session src, ssh_session *dest)
+     }
+
+     /* Remove the default identities */
+-    for (id = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, new->opts.identity);
++    for (id = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, new->opts.identity_non_exp);
+          id != NULL;
+-         id = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, new->opts.identity)) {
++         id = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, new->opts.identity_non_exp)) {
+         SAFE_FREE(id);
+     }
+     /* Copy the new identities from the source list */
+-    if (src->opts.identity != NULL) {
+-        it = ssh_list_get_iterator(src->opts.identity);
++    list = new->opts.identity_non_exp;
++    it = ssh_list_get_iterator(src->opts.identity_non_exp);
++    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+         while (it) {
+             int rc;
+
+@@ -122,7 +124,7 @@ int ssh_options_copy(ssh_session src, ssh_session *dest)
+                 return -1;
+             }
+
+-            rc = ssh_list_append(new->opts.identity, id);
++            rc = ssh_list_append(list, id);
+             if (rc < 0) {
+                 free(id);
+                 ssh_free(new);
+@@ -130,6 +132,10 @@ int ssh_options_copy(ssh_session src, ssh_session *dest)
+             }
+             it = it->next;
+         }
++
++        /* copy the identity list if there is any already */
++        list = new->opts.identity;
++        it = ssh_list_get_iterator(src->opts.identity);
+     }
+
+     if (src->opts.sshdir != NULL) {
+@@ -331,7 +337,7 @@ int ssh_options_set_algo(ssh_session session,
+  *                Add a new identity file (const char *, format string) to
+  *                the identity list.\n
+  *                \n
+- *                By default identity, id_dsa and id_rsa are checked.\n
++ *                By default id_rsa, id_ecdsa and id_ed25519 files are used.\n
+  *                \n
+  *                The identity used to authenticate with public key will be
+  *                prepended to the list.
+@@ -700,7 +706,11 @@ int ssh_options_set(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type,
+             if (q == NULL) {
+                 return -1;
+             }
+-            rc = ssh_list_prepend(session->opts.identity, q);
++            if (session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_IDENTITY) {
++                rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity_non_exp, q);
++            } else {
++                rc = ssh_list_prepend(session->opts.identity_non_exp, q);
++            }
+             if (rc < 0) {
+                 free(q);
+                 return -1;
+@@ -1202,7 +1212,7 @@ int ssh_options_get_port(ssh_session session, unsigned int* port_target) {
+  *              - SSH_OPTIONS_IDENTITY:
+  *                Get the first identity file name (const char *).\n
+  *                \n
+- *                By default identity, id_dsa and id_rsa are checked.
++ *                By default id_rsa, id_ecdsa and id_ed25519 files are used.
+  *
+  *              - SSH_OPTIONS_PROXYCOMMAND:
+  *                Get the proxycommand necessary to log into the
+@@ -1246,7 +1256,11 @@ int ssh_options_get(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type, char** value)
+             break;
+         }
+         case SSH_OPTIONS_IDENTITY: {
+-            struct ssh_iterator *it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity);
++            struct ssh_iterator *it;
++            it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity);
++            if (it == NULL) {
++                it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity_non_exp);
++            }
+             if (it == NULL) {
+                 return SSH_ERROR;
+             }
+@@ -1541,7 +1555,6 @@ out:
+
+ int ssh_options_apply(ssh_session session)
+ {
+-    struct ssh_iterator *it;
+     char *tmp;
+     int rc;
+
+@@ -1586,15 +1599,17 @@ int ssh_options_apply(ssh_session session)
+         size_t plen = strlen(session->opts.ProxyCommand) +
+                       5 /* strlen("exec ") */;
+
+-        p = malloc(plen + 1 /* \0 */);
+-        if (p == NULL) {
+-            return -1;
+-        }
++        if (strncmp(session->opts.ProxyCommand, "exec ", 5) != 0) {
++            p = malloc(plen + 1 /* \0 */);
++            if (p == NULL) {
++                return -1;
++            }
+
+-        rc = snprintf(p, plen + 1, "exec %s", session->opts.ProxyCommand);
+-        if ((size_t)rc != plen) {
+-            free(p);
+-            return -1;
++            rc = snprintf(p, plen + 1, "exec %s", session->opts.ProxyCommand);
++            if ((size_t)rc != plen) {
++                free(p);
++                return -1;
++            }
+         }
+
+         tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, p);
+@@ -1606,24 +1621,33 @@ int ssh_options_apply(ssh_session session)
+         session->opts.ProxyCommand = tmp;
+     }
+
+-    for (it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity);
+-         it != NULL;
+-         it = it->next) {
+-        char *id = (char *) it->data;
+-        if (strncmp(id, "pkcs11:", 6) == 0) {
++    for (tmp = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, session->opts.identity_non_exp);
++         tmp != NULL;
++         tmp = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, session->opts.identity_non_exp)) {
++        char *id = tmp;
++        if (strncmp(id, "pkcs11:", 6) != 0) {
+             /* PKCS#11 URIs are using percent-encoding so we can not mix
+              * it with ssh expansion of ssh escape characters.
+-             * Skip these identities now, before we will have PKCS#11 support
+              */
+-             continue;
++            tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, id);
++            if (tmp == NULL) {
++                return -1;
++            }
++            free(id);
+         }
+-        tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, id);
+-        if (tmp == NULL) {
++
++        /* use append to keep the order at first call and use prepend
++         * to put anything that comes on the nth calls to the beginning */
++        if (session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_IDENTITY) {
++            rc = ssh_list_prepend(session->opts.identity, tmp);
++        } else {
++            rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity, tmp);
++        }
++        if (rc != SSH_OK) {
+             return -1;
+         }
+-        free(id);
+-        it->data = tmp;
+     }
++    session->opts.exp_flags |= SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_IDENTITY;
+
+     return 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/session.c b/src/session.c
+index 64e54957..34a492e4 100644
+--- a/src/session.c
++++ b/src/session.c
+@@ -118,13 +118,17 @@ ssh_session ssh_new(void)
+     if (session->opts.identity == NULL) {
+         goto err;
+     }
++    session->opts.identity_non_exp = ssh_list_new();
++    if (session->opts.identity_non_exp == NULL) {
++        goto err;
++    }
+
+     id = strdup("%d/id_ed25519");
+     if (id == NULL) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+
+-    rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity, id);
++    rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity_non_exp, id);
+     if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ ssh_session ssh_new(void)
+     if (id == NULL) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+-    rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity, id);
++    rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity_non_exp, id);
+     if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -144,7 +148,7 @@ ssh_session ssh_new(void)
+     if (id == NULL) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+-    rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity, id);
++    rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity_non_exp, id);
+     if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -154,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_session ssh_new(void)
+     if (id == NULL) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+-    rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity, id);
++    rc = ssh_list_append(session->opts.identity_non_exp, id);
+     if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -284,6 +288,17 @@ void ssh_free(ssh_session session)
+       ssh_list_free(session->opts.identity);
+   }
+
++  if (session->opts.identity_non_exp) {
++      char *id;
++
++      for (id = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, session->opts.identity_non_exp);
++           id != NULL;
++           id = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, session->opts.identity_non_exp)) {
++          SAFE_FREE(id);
++      }
++      ssh_list_free(session->opts.identity_non_exp);
++  }
++
+     while ((b = ssh_list_pop_head(struct ssh_buffer_struct *,
+                                   session->out_queue)) != NULL) {
+         SSH_BUFFER_FREE(b);
+--
+2.38.1
+
+
+From 4cb84b99fdb1ffd26c0241f5809e4f67ddd407c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 11:03:30 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] tests: Use opts.identites_non_exp not opts.identities
+
+The configuration of identities are first saved to `opts.identities_non_exp`,
+then moved to `opts.identities` after calling ssh_options_apply and expanding
+the identity strings. These tests are testing against the proper configuration
+
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+---
+ tests/client/torture_auth_pkcs11.c |  2 +-
+ tests/unittests/torture_config.c   |  3 ++-
+ tests/unittests/torture_options.c  | 14 +++++++-------
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/client/torture_auth_pkcs11.c b/tests/client/torture_auth_pkcs11.c
+index ee97bff4..e75fea0e 100644
+--- a/tests/client/torture_auth_pkcs11.c
++++ b/tests/client/torture_auth_pkcs11.c
+@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static void torture_auth_autopubkey(void **state, const char *obj_name, const ch
+
+     rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_IDENTITY, priv_uri);
+     assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
+-    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity->root->data, priv_uri);
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity_non_exp->root->data, priv_uri);
+
+     rc = ssh_connect(session);
+     assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+index 354adc2f..100e68f6 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+@@ -2078,7 +2078,8 @@ static void torture_config_identity(void **state)
+
+     _parse_config(session, NULL, LIBSSH_TESTCONFIG_STRING13, SSH_OK);
+
+-    it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity);
++    /* The identities are first added to this temporary list before expanding */
++    it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity_non_exp);
+     assert_non_null(it);
+     id = it->data;
+     /* The identities are prepended to the list so we start with second one */
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_options.c b/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
+index dc4df383..3be2de8a 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
+@@ -406,12 +406,12 @@ static void torture_options_set_identity(void **state) {
+
+     rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_ADD_IDENTITY, "identity1");
+     assert_true(rc == 0);
+-    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity->root->data, "identity1");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity_non_exp->root->data, "identity1");
+
+     rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_IDENTITY, "identity2");
+     assert_true(rc == 0);
+-    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity->root->data, "identity2");
+-    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity->root->next->data, "identity1");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity_non_exp->root->data, "identity2");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity_non_exp->root->next->data, "identity1");
+ }
+
+ static void torture_options_get_identity(void **state) {
+@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static void torture_options_get_identity(void **state) {
+
+     rc = ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_IDENTITY, "identity2");
+     assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
+-    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity->root->data, "identity2");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity_non_exp->root->data, "identity2");
+     rc = ssh_options_get(session, SSH_OPTIONS_IDENTITY, &identity);
+     assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
+     assert_non_null(identity);
+@@ -867,9 +867,9 @@ static void torture_options_copy(void **state)
+     assert_non_null(new);
+
+     /* Check the identities match */
+-    it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity);
++    it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity_non_exp);
+     assert_non_null(it);
+-    it2 = ssh_list_get_iterator(new->opts.identity);
++    it2 = ssh_list_get_iterator(new->opts.identity_non_exp);
+     assert_non_null(it2);
+     while (it != NULL && it2 != NULL) {
+         assert_string_equal(it->data, it2->data);
+@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ static void torture_options_getopt(void **state)
+                         "aes128-ctr");
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_CRYPT_S_C],
+                         "aes128-ctr");
+-    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity->root->data, "id_rsa");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity_non_exp->root->data, "id_rsa");
+ #ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+     assert_string_equal(session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_COMP_C_S],
+                         "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none");
+--
+2.38.1
+
+
+From cd30217c9032419ebcf722c0bfc6b5ebfa3518d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 16:51:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Add flags for escape expand operation
+
+Calling `ssh_options_apply` more times can result in an unwanted behaviour of
+expanding the escape characters more times. Adding flags to check if the
+expansion was already done on the current string variables.
+
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/libssh/session.h |  7 ++++
+ src/options.c            | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ src/session.c            |  2 +
+ 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/libssh/session.h b/include/libssh/session.h
+index e22b0d67..cf219c2a 100644
+--- a/include/libssh/session.h
++++ b/include/libssh/session.h
+@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ enum ssh_pending_call_e {
+ #define SSH_OPT_FLAG_KBDINT_AUTH 0x4
+ #define SSH_OPT_FLAG_GSSAPI_AUTH 0x8
+
++/* Escape expansion of different variables */
++#define SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_KNOWNHOSTS 0x1
++#define SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS 0x2
++#define SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_PROXYCOMMAND 0x4
++#define SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_IDENTITY 0x8
++
+ /* extensions flags */
+ /* negotiation enabled */
+ #define SSH_EXT_NEGOTIATION     0x01
+@@ -232,6 +238,7 @@ struct ssh_session_struct {
+         char *gss_client_identity;
+         int gss_delegate_creds;
+         int flags;
++        int exp_flags;
+         int nodelay;
+         bool config_processed;
+         uint8_t options_seen[SOC_MAX];
+diff --git a/src/options.c b/src/options.c
+index bb085384..c566244b 100644
+--- a/src/options.c
++++ b/src/options.c
+@@ -730,6 +730,7 @@ int ssh_options_set(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type,
+                     ssh_set_error_oom(session);
+                     return -1;
+                 }
++                session->opts.exp_flags &= ~SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_KNOWNHOSTS;
+             }
+             break;
+         case SSH_OPTIONS_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS:
+@@ -751,6 +752,7 @@ int ssh_options_set(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type,
+                     ssh_set_error_oom(session);
+                     return -1;
+                 }
++                session->opts.exp_flags &= ~SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS;
+             }
+             break;
+         case SSH_OPTIONS_TIMEOUT:
+@@ -1014,6 +1016,7 @@ int ssh_options_set(ssh_session session, enum ssh_options_e type,
+                         return -1;
+                     }
+                     session->opts.ProxyCommand = q;
++                    session->opts.exp_flags &= ~SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_PROXYCOMMAND;
+                 }
+             }
+             break;
+@@ -1572,53 +1575,67 @@ int ssh_options_apply(ssh_session session)
+         }
+     }
+
+-    if (session->opts.knownhosts == NULL) {
+-        tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, "%d/known_hosts");
+-    } else {
+-        tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, session->opts.knownhosts);
+-    }
+-    if (tmp == NULL) {
+-        return -1;
++    if ((session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_KNOWNHOSTS) == 0) {
++        if (session->opts.knownhosts == NULL) {
++            tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, "%d/known_hosts");
++        } else {
++            tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, session->opts.knownhosts);
++        }
++        if (tmp == NULL) {
++            return -1;
++        }
++        free(session->opts.knownhosts);
++        session->opts.knownhosts = tmp;
++        session->opts.exp_flags |= SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_KNOWNHOSTS;
+     }
+-    free(session->opts.knownhosts);
+-    session->opts.knownhosts = tmp;
+
+-    if (session->opts.global_knownhosts == NULL) {
+-        tmp = strdup("/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts");
+-    } else {
+-        tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, session->opts.global_knownhosts);
+-    }
+-    if (tmp == NULL) {
+-        return -1;
++    if ((session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS) == 0) {
++        if (session->opts.global_knownhosts == NULL) {
++            tmp = strdup("/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts");
++        } else {
++            tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session,
++                                         session->opts.global_knownhosts);
++        }
++        if (tmp == NULL) {
++            return -1;
++        }
++        free(session->opts.global_knownhosts);
++        session->opts.global_knownhosts = tmp;
++        session->opts.exp_flags |= SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS;
+     }
+-    free(session->opts.global_knownhosts);
+-    session->opts.global_knownhosts = tmp;
+
+-    if (session->opts.ProxyCommand != NULL) {
+-        char *p = NULL;
+-        size_t plen = strlen(session->opts.ProxyCommand) +
+-                      5 /* strlen("exec ") */;
+
+-        if (strncmp(session->opts.ProxyCommand, "exec ", 5) != 0) {
+-            p = malloc(plen + 1 /* \0 */);
+-            if (p == NULL) {
+-                return -1;
+-            }
++    if ((session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_PROXYCOMMAND) == 0) {
++        if (session->opts.ProxyCommand != NULL) {
++            char *p = NULL;
++            size_t plen = strlen(session->opts.ProxyCommand) +
++                          5 /* strlen("exec ") */;
++
++            if (strncmp(session->opts.ProxyCommand, "exec ", 5) != 0) {
++                p = malloc(plen + 1 /* \0 */);
++                if (p == NULL) {
++                    return -1;
++                }
+
+-            rc = snprintf(p, plen + 1, "exec %s", session->opts.ProxyCommand);
+-            if ((size_t)rc != plen) {
++                rc = snprintf(p, plen + 1, "exec %s", session->opts.ProxyCommand);
++                if ((size_t)rc != plen) {
++                    free(p);
++                    return -1;
++                }
++                tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, p);
+                 free(p);
+-                return -1;
++            } else {
++                tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session,
++                                             session->opts.ProxyCommand);
+             }
+-        }
+
+-        tmp = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, p);
+-        free(p);
+-        if (tmp == NULL) {
+-            return -1;
++            if (tmp == NULL) {
++                return -1;
++            }
++            free(session->opts.ProxyCommand);
++            session->opts.ProxyCommand = tmp;
++            session->opts.exp_flags |= SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_PROXYCOMMAND;
+         }
+-        free(session->opts.ProxyCommand);
+-        session->opts.ProxyCommand = tmp;
+     }
+
+     for (tmp = ssh_list_pop_head(char *, session->opts.identity_non_exp);
+diff --git a/src/session.c b/src/session.c
+index 34a492e4..06f6a26f 100644
+--- a/src/session.c
++++ b/src/session.c
+@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ ssh_session ssh_new(void)
+                           SSH_OPT_FLAG_KBDINT_AUTH |
+                           SSH_OPT_FLAG_GSSAPI_AUTH;
+
++    session->opts.exp_flags = 0;
++
+     session->opts.identity = ssh_list_new();
+     if (session->opts.identity == NULL) {
+         goto err;
+--
+2.38.1
+
+
+From ed58082f9706f2ab3bdeca24f632356b9bc325e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:17:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] torture_options.c: Add identity test for ssh_options_copy
+
+Test if the ssh_options_apply is called on session before ssh_options_copy,
+then `opts.identity` ssh_list will be copied
+
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+---
+ tests/unittests/torture_options.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_options.c b/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
+index 3be2de8a..907cc8df 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
+@@ -918,6 +918,34 @@ static void torture_options_copy(void **state)
+                         sizeof(session->opts.options_seen));
+
+     ssh_free(new);
++
++    /* test if ssh_options_apply was called before ssh_options_copy
++     * the opts.identity list gets copied (percent expanded list) */
++    rv = ssh_options_apply(session);
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rv);
++
++    rv = ssh_options_copy(session, &new);
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rv);
++    assert_non_null(new);
++
++    it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity_non_exp);
++    assert_null(it);
++    it2 = ssh_list_get_iterator(new->opts.identity_non_exp);
++    assert_null(it2);
++
++    it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity);
++    assert_non_null(it);
++    it2 = ssh_list_get_iterator(new->opts.identity);
++    assert_non_null(it2);
++    while (it != NULL && it2 != NULL) {
++        assert_string_equal(it->data, it2->data);
++        it = it->next;
++        it2 = it2->next;
++    }
++    assert_null(it);
++    assert_null(it2);
++
++    ssh_free(new);
+ }
+
+ #define EXECUTABLE_NAME "test-exec"
+--
+2.38.1
+
+
+From 89dd4a927b946d4df5c48073ca25cd843e0acde0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:18:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] torture_options.c: Add test for ssh_options_apply
+
+Test that ssh_options_apply can be called multiple times without expanding
+escape characters more than once. If the options are updated after calling
+ssh_options_apply keep the last options.
+
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+---
+ tests/unittests/torture_options.c | 165 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 165 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_options.c b/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
+index 907cc8df..ea63b45e 100644
+--- a/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_options.c
+@@ -1332,6 +1332,170 @@ static void torture_options_caret_sign(void **state)
+     free(awaited);
+ }
+
++static void torture_options_apply (void **state) {
++    ssh_session session = *state;
++    struct ssh_list *awaited_list = NULL;
++    struct ssh_iterator *it1 = NULL, *it2 = NULL;
++    char *id = NULL;
++    int rc;
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_KNOWNHOSTS,
++                         "%%d/.ssh/known_hosts");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS,
++                         "/etc/%%u/libssh/known_hosts");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_PROXYCOMMAND,
++                         "exec echo \"Hello libssh %%d!\"");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_ADD_IDENTITY,
++                         "%%d/do_not_expand");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_apply(session);
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    /* check that the values got expanded */
++    assert_true(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_KNOWNHOSTS);
++    assert_true(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS);
++    assert_true(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_PROXYCOMMAND);
++    assert_true(ssh_list_count(session->opts.identity_non_exp) == 0);
++    assert_true(ssh_list_count(session->opts.identity) > 0);
++
++    /* should not change anything calling it again */
++    rc = ssh_options_apply(session);
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    /* check that the expansion was done only once */
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.knownhosts, "%d/.ssh/known_hosts");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.global_knownhosts,
++                        "/etc/%u/libssh/known_hosts");
++    /* no exec should be added if there already is one */
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
++                        "exec echo \"Hello libssh %d!\"");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity->root->data,
++                        "%d/do_not_expand");
++
++    /* apply should keep the freshest setting */
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_KNOWNHOSTS,
++                         "hello there");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS,
++                         "lorem ipsum");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_PROXYCOMMAND,
++                         "mission_impossible");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_ADD_IDENTITY,
++                         "007");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_ADD_IDENTITY,
++                         "3");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_ADD_IDENTITY,
++                         "2");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_set(session,
++                         SSH_OPTIONS_ADD_IDENTITY,
++                         "1");
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    /* check that flags show need of escape expansion */
++    assert_false(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_KNOWNHOSTS);
++    assert_false(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS);
++    assert_false(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_PROXYCOMMAND);
++    assert_false(ssh_list_count(session->opts.identity_non_exp) == 0);
++
++    rc = ssh_options_apply(session);
++    assert_ssh_return_code(session, rc);
++
++    /* check that the values got expanded */
++    assert_true(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_KNOWNHOSTS);
++    assert_true(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS);
++    assert_true(session->opts.exp_flags & SSH_OPT_EXP_FLAG_PROXYCOMMAND);
++    assert_true(ssh_list_count(session->opts.identity_non_exp) == 0);
++
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.knownhosts, "hello there");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.global_knownhosts, "lorem ipsum");
++    /* check that the "exec " was added at the beginning */
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand, "exec mission_impossible");
++    assert_string_equal(session->opts.identity->root->data, "1");
++
++    /* check the order of the identity files after double expansion */
++    awaited_list = ssh_list_new();
++    /* append the new data in order */
++    id = strdup("1");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++    id = strdup("2");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++    id = strdup("3");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++    id = strdup("007");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++    id = strdup("%d/do_not_expand");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++    /* append the defaults; this list is copied from ssh_new@src/session.c */
++    id = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, "%d/id_ed25519");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++#ifdef HAVE_ECC
++    id = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, "%d/id_ecdsa");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++#endif
++    id = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, "%d/id_rsa");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++#ifdef HAVE_DSA
++    id = ssh_path_expand_escape(session, "%d/id_dsa");
++    rc = ssh_list_append(awaited_list, id);
++    assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
++#endif
++
++    assert_int_equal(ssh_list_count(awaited_list),
++                     ssh_list_count(session->opts.identity));
++
++    it1 = ssh_list_get_iterator(awaited_list);
++    assert_non_null(it1);
++    it2 = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->opts.identity);
++    assert_non_null(it2);
++    while (it1 != NULL && it2 != NULL) {
++        assert_string_equal(it1->data, it2->data);
++
++        free((void*)it1->data);
++        it1 = it1->next;
++        it2 = it2->next;
++    }
++    assert_null(it1);
++    assert_null(it2);
++
++    ssh_list_free(awaited_list);
++}
++
+ #ifdef WITH_SERVER
+ const char template[] = "temp_dir_XXXXXX";
+
+@@ -2132,6 +2296,7 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
+                                         setup, teardown),
+         cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_options_caret_sign,
+                                         setup, teardown),
++        cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_options_apply, setup, teardown),
+     };
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SERVER
+--
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/pkcs11_test_fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+diff --git a/tests/pkcs11/setup-softhsm-tokens.sh b/tests/pkcs11/setup-softhsm-tokens.sh
+index 532c86a7..9050cea6 100755
+--- a/tests/pkcs11/setup-softhsm-tokens.sh
++++ b/tests/pkcs11/setup-softhsm-tokens.sh
+@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ echo "OBJNAME: $OBJNAME"
+ echo "LOADPUBLIC: $LOADPUBLIC"
+
+ # Create temporary directory for tokens
+-install -d -m 0755 $TESTDIR/db
++install -d -m 0755 "$TESTDIR/db"
+
+ # Create SoftHSM configuration file
+-cat >$TESTDIR/softhsm.conf <<EOF
++cat >"$TESTDIR/softhsm.conf" <<EOF
+ directories.tokendir = $TESTDIR/db
+ objectstore.backend = file
+ log.level = DEBUG
+@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ EOF
+
+ export SOFTHSM2_CONF=$TESTDIR/softhsm.conf
+
+-cat $TESTDIR/softhsm.conf
++cat "$TESTDIR/softhsm.conf"
+
+ #init
+-cmd='softhsm2-util --init-token --label "$OBJNAME" --free --pin 1234 --so-pin 1234'
++cmd="softhsm2-util --init-token --label $OBJNAME --free --pin 1234 --so-pin 1234"
+ eval echo "$cmd"
+-out=$(eval $cmd)
++out=$(eval "$cmd")
+ ret=$?
+ if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then
+     echo "Init token failed"
+@@ -41,10 +41,29 @@ if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then
+     exit 1
+ fi
+
++find_library_path() {
++    echo "$@"
++    for _lib in "$@" ; do
++        if test -f "$_lib" ; then
++            LIBSOFTHSM_PATH="$_lib"
++            echo "Using libsofthsm path: $LIBSOFTHSM_PATH"
++            return
++        fi
++    done
++    echo "libsofthsm2.so not found"
++    exit 1
++}
++
++find_library_path \
++    /usr/lib64/libsofthsm2.so \
++    /usr/lib/libsofthsm2.so \
++    /usr/local/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so \
++    /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so
++
+ #load private key
+-cmd='p11tool --provider /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so --write --load-privkey "$PRIVKEY" --label "$OBJNAME" --login --set-pin=1234 "pkcs11:token="$OBJNAME""'
++cmd="p11tool --provider $LIBSOFTHSM_PATH --write --load-privkey $PRIVKEY --label $OBJNAME --login --set-pin=1234 \"pkcs11:token=$OBJNAME\""
+ eval echo "$cmd"
+-out=$(eval $cmd)
++out=$(eval "$cmd")
+ ret=$?
+ if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then
+    echo "Loading privkey failed"
+@@ -52,15 +71,15 @@ if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then
+    exit 1
+ fi
+
+-cat $PUBKEY
++cat "$PUBKEY"
+
+-ls -l $TESTDIR
++ls -l "$TESTDIR"
+
+-if [ $LOADPUBLIC -ne 0 ]; then
++if [ "$LOADPUBLIC" -ne 0 ]; then
+ #load public key
+-    cmd='p11tool --provider /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so --write --load-pubkey "$PUBKEY" --label "$OBJNAME" --login --set-pin=1234 "pkcs11:token="$OBJNAME""'
++    cmd="p11tool --provider $LIBSOFTHSM_PATH --write --load-pubkey $PUBKEY --label $OBJNAME --login --set-pin=1234 \"pkcs11:token=$OBJNAME\""
+     eval echo "$cmd"
+-    out=$(eval $cmd)
++    out=$(eval "$cmd")
+     ret=$?
+     if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then
+         echo "Loading pubkey failed"
+@@ -69,9 +88,9 @@ if [ $LOADPUBLIC -ne 0 ]; then
+     fi
+ fi
+
+-cmd='p11tool --list-all --login "pkcs11:token="$OBJNAME"" --set-pin=1234'
++cmd="p11tool --list-all --login \"pkcs11:token=$OBJNAME\" --set-pin=1234"
+ eval echo "$cmd"
+-out=$(eval $cmd)
++out=$(eval "$cmd")
+ ret=$?
+ if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then
+     echo "Loging failed"

SOURCES/rekey_test_fixup.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c
+--- ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2023-05-17 10:55:23.384684129 +0200
++++ ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c	2023-05-17 10:56:29.819334665 +0200
+@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@
+     memset(data, 'A', 128);
+     for (i = 0; i < KEX_RETRY; i++) {
+         ssh_send_ignore(s->ssh.session, data);
+-        ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 100);
++        ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 1000);
+ 
+         c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
+         /* SHA256 len */
+@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@
+     memset(data, 'A', 128);
+     for (i = 0; i < KEX_RETRY; i++) {
+         ssh_send_ignore(s->ssh.session, data);
+-        ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 100);
++        ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 1000);
+ 
+         c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
+         /* SHA256 len */

SOURCES/s390x_fix.patch

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c
-index ec4a7203..a81eb8e3 100644
---- a/src/packet.c
-+++ b/src/packet.c
-@@ -1752,10 +1752,12 @@ static bool
- ssh_packet_in_rekey(ssh_session session)
- {
-     /* We know we are rekeying if we are authenticated and the DH
--     * status is not finished
-+     * status is not finished, but we only queue packets until we've
-+     * sent our NEWKEYS.
-      */
-     return (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED) &&
--           (session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_FINISHED);
-+           (session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_FINISHED) &&
-+           (session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT);
- }
- 
- int ssh_packet_send(ssh_session session)

SOURCES/workaround-sshd-failure-rate-limiting.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From f2deda1b970ff3ab469e0838114c93a3d08051d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2024 11:30:15 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] test: Workaround the new OpenSSH failure rate limiting
+
+The new OpenSSH rate limits the failed authentication attempts per source
+address and drops connection when the amount is reached, which is happening
+in our testsuite.
+
+By whitelisting the IP address of the client on the socket wrapper,
+this allows the tests to pass.
+
+https://man.openbsd.org/sshd_config.5#PerSourcePenaltyExemptList
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+---
+ tests/torture.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/torture.c b/tests/torture.c
+index f5a6bcc7..0590ee3d 100644
+--- a/tests/torture.c
++++ b/tests/torture.c
+@@ -771,6 +771,9 @@ static void torture_setup_create_sshd_config(void **state, bool pam)
+              "HostKeyAlgorithms " OPENSSH_KEYS "\n"
+ #if OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR == 8 && OPENSSH_VERSION_MINOR >= 2
+              "CASignatureAlgorithms " OPENSSH_KEYS "\n"
++#endif
++#if (OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR == 9 && OPENSSH_VERSION_MINOR >= 8) || OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR > 9
++             "PerSourcePenaltyExemptList 127.0.0.21\n"
+ #endif
+              "Ciphers " OPENSSH_CIPHERS "\n"
+              "KexAlgorithms " OPENSSH_KEX "\n"
+@@ -801,6 +804,9 @@ static void torture_setup_create_sshd_config(void **state, bool pam)
+              "%s\n" /* Here comes UsePam */
+              "%s" /* The space for test-specific options */
+              "\n"
++#if (OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR == 9 && OPENSSH_VERSION_MINOR >= 8) || OPENSSH_VERSION_MAJOR > 9
++             "PerSourcePenaltyExemptList 127.0.0.21\n"
++#endif
+              "Ciphers "
+                 "aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc,"
+                 "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes128-cbc"
+-- 
+2.51.0
+

SPECS/libssh.spec

@@ -1,56 +1,74 @@
 Name:           libssh
-Version:        0.9.6
-Release:        16%{?dist}
+Version:        0.10.4
+Release:        18%{?dist}
 Summary:        A library implementing the SSH protocol
 License:        LGPLv2+
 URL:            http://www.libssh.org
 
-Source0:        https://www.libssh.org/files/0.9/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
-Source1:        https://www.libssh.org/files/0.9/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
+Source0:        https://www.libssh.org/files/0.10/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
+Source1:        https://www.libssh.org/files/0.10/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
 Source2:        https://cryptomilk.org/gpgkey-8DFF53E18F2ABC8D8F3C92237EE0FC4DCC014E3D.gpg#/%{name}.keyring
 Source3:        libssh_client.config
 Source4:        libssh_server.config
 
-Patch0:         loglevel.patch
-Patch1:         s390x_fix.patch
-Patch2:         null_dereference_rekey.patch
-Patch3:         auth_bypass.patch
-Patch4:         fix_tests.patch
-Patch5:         covscan23.patch
-Patch6:         CVE-2023-48795.patch
-Patch7:         CVE-2023-6004.patch
-Patch8:         CVE-2023-6918.patch
-Patch9:         CVE-2025-5318.patch
-Patch10:        CVE-2025-5372.patch
-
 BuildRequires:  cmake
-BuildRequires:  doxygen
 BuildRequires:  gcc-c++
 BuildRequires:  gnupg2
 BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
+BuildRequires:  openssl-pkcs11
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig
 BuildRequires:  zlib-devel
 BuildRequires:  krb5-devel
 BuildRequires:  libcmocka-devel
-BuildRequires:  openssh-clients
-BuildRequires:  openssh-server
 BuildRequires:  pam_wrapper
 BuildRequires:  socket_wrapper
 BuildRequires:  nss_wrapper
 BuildRequires:  uid_wrapper
+BuildRequires:  openssh-clients
+BuildRequires:  openssh-server
 BuildRequires:  nmap-ncat
+BuildRequires:  softhsm
+BuildRequires:  gnutls-utils
 
-Requires:       crypto-policies
 Requires:       %{name}-config = %{version}-%{release}
+Requires:       crypto-policies
 
 %ifarch aarch64 ppc64 ppc64le s390x x86_64
-Provides: libssh_threads.so()(64bit)
 Provides: libssh_threads.so.4()(64bit)
 %else
-Provides: libssh_threads.so
 Provides: libssh_threads.so.4
 %endif
 
+Patch1: coverity_scan.patch
+Patch2: pkcs11_test_fix.patch
+Patch3: loglevel.patch
+Patch4: plus_sign.patch
+Patch5: memory_leak.patch
+Patch6: options_apply.patch
+Patch7: enable_sk_keys_by_config.patch
+Patch8: null_dereference_rekey.patch
+Patch9: auth_bypass.patch
+Patch10: covscan23.patch
+Patch11: rekey_test_fixup.patch
+Patch12: covscan23_1.patch
+Patch13: CVE-2023-6004.patch
+Patch14: CVE-2023-48795.patch
+Patch15: CVE-2023-6918.patch
+Patch16: escape-brackets-in-proxycommand.patch
+Patch17: CVE-2025-5318.patch
+Patch18: CVE-2025-5987.patch
+Patch19: workaround-sshd-failure-rate-limiting.patch
+Patch20: CVE-2025-4877.patch
+Patch21: CVE-2025-4878.patch
+Patch22: CVE-2025-5351.patch
+Patch23: CVE-2025-8114.patch
+Patch24: CVE-2025-8277.patch
+Patch25: CVE-2026-0964.patch
+Patch26: CVE-2026-0965.patch
+Patch27: CVE-2026-0966.patch
+Patch28: CVE-2026-0967.patch
+Patch29: CVE-2026-0968.patch
+
 %description
 The ssh library was designed to be used by programmers needing a working SSH
 implementation by the mean of a library. The complete control of the client is
@@ -70,7 +88,7 @@ applications that use %{name}.
 %package config
 Summary:        Configuration files for %{name}
 BuildArch:      noarch
-Obsoletes:      %{name} < 0.9.0-1
+Obsoletes:      %{name} < 0.9.0-3
 
 %description config
 The %{name}-config package provides the default configuration files for %{name}.
@@ -80,26 +98,18 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE2} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
 %autosetup -p1
 
 %build
-if test ! -e "obj"; then
-  mkdir obj
-fi
-pushd obj
-
-%cmake .. \
+%cmake \
     -DUNIT_TESTING=ON \
     -DCLIENT_TESTING=ON \
     -DSERVER_TESTING=ON \
+    -DWITH_PKCS11_URI=ON \
     -DGLOBAL_CLIENT_CONFIG="%{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_client.config" \
     -DGLOBAL_BIND_CONFIG="%{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_server.config"
 
-
-%make_build VERBOSE=1
-make docs
-
-popd
+%cmake_build
 
 %install
-make DESTDIR=%{buildroot} install/fast -C obj
+%cmake_install
 install -d -m755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/libssh
 install -m644 %{SOURCE3} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_client.config
 install -m644 %{SOURCE4} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_server.config
@@ -111,7 +121,7 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE4} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_server.config
 # requiring it to continue working.
 #
 pushd %{buildroot}%{_libdir}
-for i in libssh.so.4*;
+for i in libssh.so*;
 do
     _target="${i}"
     _link_name="${i%libssh*}libssh_threads${i##*libssh}"
@@ -125,24 +135,24 @@ popd
 %ldconfig_scriptlets
 
 %check
-pushd obj
-ctest --output-on-failure
-popd
+# Tests are randomly failing when run in parallel
+%global _smp_build_ncpus 1
+%ctest
 
 %files
-%doc AUTHORS BSD ChangeLog README
+%doc AUTHORS BSD CHANGELOG README
 %license COPYING
 %{_libdir}/libssh.so.4*
 %{_libdir}/libssh_threads.so.4*
 
 %files devel
-%doc obj/doc/html
 %{_includedir}/libssh/
 # own this to avoid dep on cmake -- rex
 %dir  %{_libdir}/cmake/
 %{_libdir}/cmake/libssh/
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/libssh.pc
 %{_libdir}/libssh.so
+%{_libdir}/libssh_threads.so
 
 %files config
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/libssh
@@ -150,176 +160,262 @@ popd
 %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_server.config
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Nov 05 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-16
-- Fix CVE-2025-5372
-  Resolves: RHEL-121232
+* Fri Feb 13 2026 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-18
+- Resolves: RHEL-150661
+- Resolves: CVE-2025-4877
+- Resolves: CVE-2025-4878
+- Resolves: CVE-2025-5351
+- Resolves: CVE-2025-8114
+- Resolves: CVE-2025-8277
+- Resolves: CVE-2026-0964
+- Resolves: CVE-2026-0965
+- Resolves: CVE-2026-0966
+- Resolves: CVE-2026-0967
+- Resolves: CVE-2026-0968
 
-* Tue Sep 30 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-15
+* Fri Dec 12 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-17
+- Bump spec to resolve build tagging issues
+
+* Thu Dec 11 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-16
+- Fix CVE-2025-5987
+  Resolves: RHEL-130051
+- Workaround sshd failure rate limiting in tests
+  Resolves: RHEL-135506
+
+* Wed Oct 01 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-15
+- Bump spec to make the 9.7 NVR higher than the 9.6 one
+
+* Tue Sep 30 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-14
 - Fix CVE-2025-5318
-  Resolves: RHEL-111724
+  Resolves: RHEL-111732
 
-* Mon Feb 26 2024 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-14
+* Mon Feb 19 2024 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-13
+- Bump up the version so that the version in 9.3 is lower.
+- Resolves: RHEL-19310, RHEL-19691, RHEL-17245
+
+* Tue Jan 09 2024 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-12
 - Fix CVE-2023-48795 Prefix truncation attack on Binary Packet Protocol (BPP)
 - Fix CVE-2023-6918 Missing checks for return values for digests
 - Fix CVE-2023-6004 ProxyCommand/ProxyJump features allow injection
   of malicious code through hostname
-- Note: version is bumped from 12 to 14 directly, as the z-stream
-  version in 8.9 also has 13. So bumping it to 14, will prevent
-  upgrade conflicts.
-- Resolves:RHEL-19690, RHEL-17244, RHEL-19312
+- Resolves: RHEL-19310, RHEL-19691, RHEL-17245
 
-* Mon May 15 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-12
+* Wed Jun 21 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-11
 - Fix loglevel regression
-- Related: rhbz#2182251, rhbz#2189742
+- Related: rhbz#2182252, rhbz#2189740
 
-* Thu May 04 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-11
-- .fmf/version is needed to run the tests
-- Related: rhbz#2182251, rhbz#2189742
+* Mon May 22 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4.10
+- Fix null dereference issues found by covscan
+- Related: rhbz#2182252, rhbz#2189740
 
-* Wed May 03 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-10
-- Add missing ci.fmf file
-- Related: rhbz#2182251, rhbz#2189742
+* Wed May 10 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-9
+- Fix CVE-2023-1667 and CVE-2023-2283
+- Fix issues found by cosvcan
+- Resolves: rhbz#2182252, rhbz#2189740
 
-* Wed May 03 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-9
-- Fix covscan errors found at gating
-- Related: rhbz#2182251, rhbz#2189742
+* Mon Jan 23 2023 Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-8
++ libssh-0.10.4-8
+- Extended CI to run internal tests in RHEL
+- Related: rhbz#2160080
 
-* Tue May 02 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-8
-- Backport test fixing commits to make the build pass
-- Related: rhbz#2182251, rhbz#2189742
+* Wed Jan 4 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-7
+- Add sk-keys to configuration parsing allowing to turn on-off by config
+- Related: rhbz#2026449
 
-* Thu Apr 27 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-7
-- Fix NULL dereference during rekeying with algorithm guessing
-  GHSL-2023-032 / CVE-2023-1667
-- Fix possible authentication bypass
-  GHSL 2023-085 / CVE-2023-2283
-- Resolves: rhbz#2182251, rhbz#2189742
+* Thu Dec 1 2022 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-6
+- Fix covscan error
+- Remove unwanted test with yet unimplemented feature
+- Related: rhbz#2137839, rhbz#2136824
 
-* Fri Jan 06 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-6
-- Enable client and server testing build time
-- Fix failing rekey test on arch s390x
-- Resolves: rhbz#2126342
+* Thu Dec 01 2022 Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-5
++ libssh-0.10.4-5
+- Fixed CI configuration due to TMT changes
 
-* Mon Dec 05 2022 Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-5
-- Fix CI configuration for new TMT
-- Resolves: rhbz#2149910
+* Wed Nov 30 2022 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-4
+- Move loglevel closer to openssh loglevel
+- Add openssh config feature of +,-,^ for algorithm lists
+- Fix memory leaks of bignum
+- Prevent multiple expansion of escape characters
+- Resolves: rhbz#2132407, rhbz#2137839, rhbz#2144795, rhbz#2136824
 
-* Mon Nov 28 2022 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-4
-- Make VERBOSE and lower log levels less verbose
-- Resolves: rhbz#2091512
+* Tue Oct 4 2022 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-3
+- Enable pkcs11 support
+- Fix broken libsofthsm path on i686
+- Add missing bugzilla references from the rebase commit
+- Related: rhbz#2026449
+- Resolves: rhbz#1977913, rhbz#1975500
 
-* Fri Nov 05 2021 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-3
-- Remove STI tests
+* Tue Sep 27 2022 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-2
+- Fix coverity scan issues
+- Resolves: rhbz#2130126
 
-* Thu Oct 21 2021 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-2
-- Remove bad patch causing errors
-- Adding BuildRequires for openssh (SSHD support)
+* Mon Sep 19 2022 Norbert pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-1
+- Rebase to version 0.10.4
+- Add pkcs11 support
+- Disallow ssh-rsa key in FIPS mode
+- Fix openssl KDF check at build
+- ChangeLog was renamed to CHANGELOG
+- Resolves: rhbz#2068475, rhbz#2026449, rhbz#2004021,
+            rhbz#1977913, rhbz#1975500
 
-* Thu Oct 14 2021 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-1
-- Fix CVE-2021-3634: Fix possible heap-buffer overflow when
-  rekeying with different key exchange mechanism
+* Fri Nov 12 2021 Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-3
++ libssh-0.9.6-3
+- Disabled gating on osci.brew-build.revdeps.integration
+  Related: rhbz#2022034
+
+* Thu Nov 11 2021 Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-2
+- STI, FMF, and gating fixes
+  Resolves: rhbz#2022034
+
+* Tue Oct 05 2021 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-1
+- Fix CVE-CVE-2021-3634 libssh: possible heap-based buffer
+  overflow when rekeying
+- Fix static analyzer issues in rhbz#1938795
 - Rebase to version 0.9.6
-- Rename SSHD_EXECUTABLE to SSH_EXECUTABLE in tests/torture.c
-- Resolves: rhbz#1896651, rhbz#1994600
+- Resolves: rhbz#1994607, rhbz#1938795, rhbz#2009669
 
-* Thu Oct 14 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 0.9.4-4
-- Revert previous commit as it is incorrect.
+* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 0.9.5-6
+- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
+  Related: rhbz#1991688
 
-* Thu Oct 14 2021 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.9.6-1
-- Fix CVE-2021-3634: Fix possible heap-buffer overflow when
-  rekeying with different key exchange mechanism (#1978810)
+* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 0.9.5-5
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
+  Related: rhbz#1971065
 
-* Wed Apr 21 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 0.9.4-3
-- Fix CVE-2020-16135 NULL pointer dereference in sftpserver.c if
-  ssh_buffer_new returns NULL (#1862646)
+* Tue Apr 27 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 0.9.5-4
+- Change crypto-policies from recommends to requires
+  Resolves: rhbz#1947863
 
-* Wed Jun 24 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.4-2
-- Do not return error when server properly closed the channel (#1849071)
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 0.9.5-3
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
+
+* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.9.5-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Sep 10 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.5-1
+- Update to version 0.9.5
+  https://www.libssh.org/2020/09/10/libssh-0-9-5/
+- Removed patch to re-enable algorithms using sha1 in sshd for testing
+- The algorithms supported by sshd are now automatically detected for testing
+- Resolves: #1862457 - CVE-2020-16135
+
+* Sat Aug 01 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.9.4-5
+- Second attempt - Rebuilt for
+  https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jul 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.9.4-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jun 22 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.4-3
+- Do not return error when server properly closed the channel (#1849069)
 - Add a test for CVE-2019-14889
 - Do not parse configuration file in torture_knownhosts test
 
-* Tue May 26 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.4-1
+* Wed Apr 15 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.4-2
+- Added patch to fix returned version
+
+* Thu Apr 09 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.4-1
 - Update to version 0.9.4
   https://www.libssh.org/2020/04/09/libssh-0-9-4-and-libssh-0-8-9-security-release/
-- Fixed CVE-2019-14889 (#1781782)
-- Fixed CVE-2020-1730 (#1802422)
-- Create missing directories in the path provided for known_hosts files (#1733914)
 - Removed inclusion of OpenSSH server configuration file from
-  libssh_server.config (#1821339)
+  libssh_server.config
+- Added patch to re-enable algorithms using sha1 in sshd for testing
+- resolves: #1822529 - CVE-2020-1730
 
-* Mon Aug 05 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-4
-- Skip 1024 bits RSA key generation test in FIPS mode (#1734485)
+* Wed Jan 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.9.3-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
 
-* Thu Jul 11 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-3
+* Tue Dec 10 2019 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.9.3-1
+- Update to version 0.9.3
+- resolves: #1781780 - Fixes CVE-2019-14889
+
+* Thu Nov 07 2019 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.9.2-1
+- Upate to version 0.9.2
+- resolves #1769370 - Remove the docs, they can be found on https://api.libssh.org/
+
+* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.9.0-6
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jul 11 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-5
 - Add Obsoletes in libssh-config to avoid conflict with old libssh which
   installed the configuration files.
 
-* Wed Jul 10 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-2
+* Wed Jul 10 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-4
 - Eliminate circular dependency with libssh-config subpackage
 
-* Wed Jul 10 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-1
-- Update to version 0.9.0
-  https://www.libssh.org/2019/06/28/libssh-0-9-0/
-- Added explicit Requires for crypto-policies
-- Do not ignore known_hosts keys when SSH_OPTIONS_HOSTKEYS is set
+* Wed Jul 10 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-3
 - Provide the configuration files in a separate libssh-config subpackage
 
-* Mon Jun 17 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.91-0.1
+* Thu Jul 04 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-2
+- Do not ignore keys from known_hosts when SSH_OPTIONS_HOSTKEYS is set
+
+* Fri Jun 28 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-1
+- Fixed Release number to released format
+
+* Fri Jun 28 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.9.0-0.1
+- Update to version 0.9.0
+  https://www.libssh.org/2019/06/28/libssh-0-9-0/
+
+* Wed Jun 19 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.91-0.1
 - Update to 0.9.0 pre release version (0.8.91)
 - Added default configuration files for client and server
-- Removed unused patch files left behind
-- Fixed issues found to run upstream test suite with SELinux
+- Follow system-wide crypto configuration (crypto-policies)
+- Added Recommends for crypto-policies
+- Use OpenSSL implementation for KDF, DH, and signatures.
+- Detect FIPS mode and use only allowed algorithms
+- Run client and server tests during build
 
-* Fri Dec 14 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.5-2
-- Fix more regressions introduced by the fixes for CVE-2018-10933
+* Mon Feb 25 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.7-1
+- Update to version 0.8.7
+  https://www.libssh.org/2019/02/25/libssh-0-8-7/
 
-* Thu Nov 29 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.5-1
+* Fri Feb 01 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.8.6-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jan 15 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.6-2
+- Fix rsa-sha2 extension handling (#1666342)
+
+* Thu Jan 03 2019 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.6-1
+- Update to version 0.8.6
+  https://www.libssh.org/2018/12/24/libssh-0-8-6-xmas-edition/
+
+* Mon Oct 29 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.5-1
 - Update to version 0.8.5
-  * Fixed an issue where global known_hosts file was ignored (#1649321)
-  * Fixed ssh_get_fd() to return writable file descriptor (#1649319)
-  * Fixed regression introduced in known_hosts parsing (#1649315)
-  * Fixed a regression which caused only the first algorithm in known_hosts to
-    be considered (#1638790)
+  https://www.libssh.org/2018/10/29/libssh-0-8-5-and-libssh-0-7-7/
 
-* Thu Nov 08 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.3-5
-- Fix regressions introduced by the fixes for CVE-2018-10933
+* Tue Oct 16 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.4-1
+- Update to version 0.8.4
+  https://www.libssh.org/2018/10/16/libssh-0-8-4-and-0-7-6-security-and-bugfix-release
+- Fixes CVE-2018-10933
 
-* Wed Oct 17 2018 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> - 0.8.3-4
-- Fix for authentication bypass issue in server implementation (#1639926)
+* Mon Oct 01 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.3-3
+- Fixed errors found by static code analysis
 
-* Tue Oct 02 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.3-3
-- Fixed errors found by static code analysis (#1602594)
+* Tue Sep 25 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.3-2
+- Add missing libssh_threads.so link to libssh-devel package
 
-* Fri Sep 21 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.3-1
+* Fri Sep 21 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.3-1
 - Update to version 0.8.3
-  * Added support for rsa-sha2 (#1610882)
-  * Added support to parse private keys in openssh container format (other than
-    ed25519) (#1622983)
-  * Added support for diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 and
-    diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (#1610885)
-  * Added ssh_get_fingerprint_hash()
-  * Added ssh_pki_export_privkey_base64()
-  * Added support for Match keyword in config file
-  * Improved performance and reduced memory footprint for sftp
-  * Fixed ecdsa publickey auth
-  * Fixed reading a closed channel
-  * Added support to announce posix-rename@openssh.com and hardlink@openssh.com
-    in the sftp server
-  * Use -fstack-protector-strong if possible (#1624135)
+  https://www.libssh.org/2018/09/21/libssh-0-8-3/
 
-* Wed Aug 15 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.1-4
-- Fix the creation of symbolic links for libssh_threads.so.4
+* Thu Aug 30 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.2-1
+- Update to version 0.8.2
+  https://www.libssh.org/2018/08/30/libssh-0-8-2
 
-* Wed Aug 15 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.1-3
-- Add missing Provides for libssh_threads.so.4
+* Thu Aug 16 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.1-4
+- Fix link creation or RPM doesn't install it
 
-* Tue Aug 14 2018 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 0.8.1-2
+* Wed Aug 15 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.1-3
+- Add missing so version for libssh_threads.so.4
+
+* Tue Aug 14 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.1-2
 - Add Provides for libssh_threads.so to unbreak applications
-- Fix ABIMap detection to not depend on python to build
 
 * Mon Aug 13 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.1-1
 - Update to version 0.8.1
-  https://www.libssh.org/2018/08/13/libssh-0-8-1/
+  https://www.libssh.org/2018/08/13/libssh-0-8-1
+- resolves: #1615248 - pkg-config --modversion
+- resolves: #1615132 - library initialization
 
 * Fri Aug 10 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.8.0-1
 - Update to version 0.8.0
@@ -333,7 +429,6 @@ popd
 
 * Wed Feb 07 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.7.5-7
 - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild
-- Related: bug#1614611
 
 * Thu Feb 01 2018 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 0.7.5-6
 - resolves: #1540021 - Build against OpenSSL 1.1