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import CS libssh-0.10.4-13.el9

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This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2024-03-28 10:51:17 +00:00
parent 436ae8d33a
commit c737683ce8
5 changed files with 3532 additions and 1 deletions
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729
SOURCES/CVE-2023-48795.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,729 @@
From 4cef5e965a46e9271aed62631b152e4bd23c1e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:09:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] CVE-2023-48795: client side mitigation
Signed-off-by: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
---
include/libssh/packet.h | 1 +
include/libssh/session.h | 6 +++++
src/curve25519.c | 19 +++----------
src/dh-gex.c | 7 +----
src/dh.c | 17 +++---------
src/ecdh.c | 8 +-----
src/ecdh_crypto.c | 12 +++------
src/ecdh_gcrypt.c | 10 +++----
src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c | 11 +++-----
src/kex.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++----
src/packet.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/packet_cb.c | 12 +++++++++
12 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/libssh/packet.h b/include/libssh/packet.h
index 7f10a709..f0c8cb20 100644
--- a/include/libssh/packet.h
+++ b/include/libssh/packet.h
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_ext_info);
SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init);
#endif
+int ssh_packet_send_newkeys(ssh_session session);
int ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(ssh_session session, uint32_t seqnum);
int ssh_packet_parse_type(ssh_session session);
//int packet_flush(ssh_session session, int enforce_blocking);
diff --git a/include/libssh/session.h b/include/libssh/session.h
index eb14e97a..97936195 100644
--- a/include/libssh/session.h
+++ b/include/libssh/session.h
@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ enum ssh_pending_call_e {
* sending it twice during key exchange to simplify the state machine. */
#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEXINIT_SENT 4
+/* The current SSH2 session implements the "strict KEX" feature and should behave
+ * differently on SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS. */
+#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT 0x0010
+/* Unexpected packets have been sent while the session was still unencrypted */
+#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED 0x0020
+
/* codes to use with ssh_handle_packets*() */
/* Infinite timeout */
#define SSH_TIMEOUT_INFINITE -1
diff --git a/src/curve25519.c b/src/curve25519.c
index 66291b5f..4aeb4756 100644
--- a/src/curve25519.c
+++ b/src/curve25519.c
@@ -335,16 +335,10 @@ static SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_curve25519_reply){
}
/* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
- if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
-
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
@@ -502,18 +496,13 @@ static SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_curve25519_init){
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
error:
diff --git a/src/dh-gex.c b/src/dh-gex.c
index 91617081..642a88ae 100644
--- a/src/dh-gex.c
+++ b/src/dh-gex.c
@@ -297,15 +297,10 @@ static SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dhgex_reply)
}
/* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
- if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
diff --git a/src/dh.c b/src/dh.c
index 011d97b3..e19e43d1 100644
--- a/src/dh.c
+++ b/src/dh.c
@@ -398,16 +398,10 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dh_reply){
}
/* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
- if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
-
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
error:
@@ -551,15 +545,12 @@ int ssh_server_dh_process_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet)
}
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Sent KEX_DH_[GEX]_REPLY");
- if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
- ssh_buffer_reinit(session->out_buffer);
- goto error;
- }
session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
- if (ssh_packet_send(session) == SSH_ERROR) {
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
return SSH_OK;
error:
diff --git a/src/ecdh.c b/src/ecdh.c
index e5b11ba9..af80beec 100644
--- a/src/ecdh.c
+++ b/src/ecdh.c
@@ -93,16 +93,10 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_ecdh_reply){
}
/* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
- if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
-
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
diff --git a/src/ecdh_crypto.c b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
index 51084b7a..069b1372 100644
--- a/src/ecdh_crypto.c
+++ b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
@@ -619,18 +619,12 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_ecdh_init){
goto error;
}
- /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
- if (rc == SSH_ERROR){
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
error:
diff --git a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
index 235f2904..3d9d426f 100644
--- a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
+++ b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
@@ -372,17 +372,13 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_ecdh_init){
goto out;
}
-
+ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
/* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- if (rc != SSH_OK) {
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto out;
}
- session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
-
out:
gcry_sexp_release(param);
gcry_sexp_release(key);
diff --git a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
index cfe017a0..dda73922 100644
--- a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
+++ b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
@@ -318,16 +318,13 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_server_ecdh_init){
goto out;
}
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- if (rc < 0) {
- rc = SSH_ERROR;
+ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto out;
}
- session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
-
out:
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
index b9455d2d..3818297b 100644
--- a/src/kex.c
+++ b/src/kex.c
@@ -188,6 +188,9 @@
/* RFC 8308 */
#define KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT "ext-info-c"
+/* Strict kex mitigation against CVE-2023-48795 */
+#define KEX_STRICT_CLIENT "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"
+#define KEX_STRICT_SERVER "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"
/* Allowed algorithms in FIPS mode */
#define FIPS_ALLOWED_CIPHERS "aes256-gcm@openssh.com,"\
@@ -516,6 +519,27 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit)
session->first_kex_follows_guess_wrong ? "wrong" : "right");
}
+ /*
+ * handle the "strict KEX" feature. If supported by peer, then set up the
+ * flag and verify packet sequence numbers.
+ */
+ if (server_kex) {
+ ok = ssh_match_group(crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
+ KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
+ if (ok) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Client supports strict kex, enabling.");
+ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* client kex */
+ ok = ssh_match_group(crypto->server_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
+ KEX_STRICT_SERVER);
+ if (ok) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Server supports strict kex, enabling.");
+ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT;
+ }
+ }
+
if (server_kex) {
/*
* If client sent a ext-info-c message in the kex list, it supports
@@ -792,21 +816,21 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
return SSH_OK;
}
- /* Here we append ext-info-c to the list of kex algorithms */
+ /* Here we append ext-info-c and kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com to the list of kex algorithms */
kex = client->methods[SSH_KEX];
len = strlen(kex);
- if (len + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 2 < len) {
+ /* Comma, comma, nul byte */
+ kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 1 + strlen(KEX_STRICT_CLIENT ) + 1;
+ if (kex_len >= MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
/* Overflow */
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- kex_len = len + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 2; /* comma, NULL */
kex_tmp = realloc(kex, kex_len);
if (kex_tmp == NULL) {
- free(kex);
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s", KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT);
+ snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s,%s", KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT, KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
client->methods[SSH_KEX] = kex_tmp;
return SSH_OK;
diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c
index eb7eb42a..ea73f9ad 100644
--- a/src/packet.c
+++ b/src/packet.c
@@ -1314,6 +1314,19 @@ ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
}
#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
payloadsize = ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer);
+ if (session->recv_seq == UINT32_MAX) {
+ /* Overflowing sequence numbers is always fishy */
+ if (crypto == NULL) {
+ /* don't allow sequence number overflow when unencrypted */
+ ssh_set_error(session,
+ SSH_FATAL,
+ "Incoming sequence number overflow");
+ goto error;
+ } else {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARNING,
+ "Incoming sequence number overflow");
+ }
+ }
session->recv_seq++;
if (crypto != NULL) {
struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher = NULL;
@@ -1354,6 +1379,9 @@ ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
session->in_packet.type);
goto error;
case SSH_PACKET_UNKNOWN:
+ if (crypto == NULL) {
+ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
+ }
ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(session, session->recv_seq - 1);
break;
}
@@ -1529,7 +1557,33 @@ void ssh_packet_process(ssh_session session, uint8_t type)
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, "Failed to send unimplemented: %s",
ssh_get_error(session));
}
+ if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
+ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** @internal
+ * @brief sends a SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS when enabling the new negotiated ciphers
+ * @param session the SSH session
+ * @return SSH_ERROR on error, else SSH_OK
+ */
+int ssh_packet_send_newkeys(ssh_session session)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+ rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ return rc;
}
+
+ rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+ return rc;
+ }
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+ return rc;
}
/** @internal
@@ -1842,6 +1896,10 @@ int ssh_packet_send(ssh_session session)
if (rc == SSH_OK && type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
struct ssh_iterator *it;
+ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT) {
+ /* reset packet sequence number when running in strict kex mode */
+ session->send_seq = 0;
+ }
for (it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->out_queue);
it != NULL;
it = ssh_list_get_iterator(session->out_queue)) {
diff --git a/src/packet_cb.c b/src/packet_cb.c
index 0ecf8771..2f364c26 100644
--- a/src/packet_cb.c
+++ b/src/packet_cb.c
@@ -115,6 +115,18 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_newkeys){
goto error;
}
+ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT) {
+ /* reset packet sequence number when running in strict kex mode */
+ session->recv_seq = 0;
+ /* Check that we aren't tainted */
+ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED) {
+ ssh_set_error(session,
+ SSH_FATAL,
+ "Received unexpected packets in strict KEX mode.");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
if(session->server){
/* server things are done in server.c */
session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_FINISHED;
--
2.41.0
From 0870c8db28be9eb457ee3d4f9a168959d9507efd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:30:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] CVE-2023-48795: Server side mitigations
Signed-off-by: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
---
include/libssh/kex.h | 1 +
src/kex.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
src/server.c | 8 +++++++-
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/libssh/kex.h b/include/libssh/kex.h
index ede7fa8a..ba98fded 100644
--- a/include/libssh/kex.h
+++ b/include/libssh/kex.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit);
int ssh_send_kex(ssh_session session);
void ssh_list_kex(struct ssh_kex_struct *kex);
int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session);
+int ssh_kex_append_extensions(ssh_session session, struct ssh_kex_struct *pkex);
int ssh_kex_select_methods(ssh_session session);
int ssh_verify_existing_algo(enum ssh_kex_types_e algo, const char *name);
char *ssh_keep_known_algos(enum ssh_kex_types_e algo, const char *list);
diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
index 3818297b..9ad671db 100644
--- a/src/kex.c
+++ b/src/kex.c
@@ -763,11 +763,8 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
{
struct ssh_kex_struct *client = &session->next_crypto->client_kex;
const char *wanted;
- char *kex = NULL;
- char *kex_tmp = NULL;
int ok;
int i;
- size_t kex_len, len;
/* Skip if already set, for example for the rekey or when we do the guessing
* it could have been already used to make some protocol decisions. */
@@ -816,11 +813,33 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
return SSH_OK;
}
- /* Here we append ext-info-c and kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com to the list of kex algorithms */
- kex = client->methods[SSH_KEX];
+ ok = ssh_kex_append_extensions(session, client);
+ if (ok != SSH_OK){
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+ return SSH_OK;
+}
+
+int ssh_kex_append_extensions(ssh_session session, struct ssh_kex_struct *pkex)
+{
+ char *kex = NULL;
+ char *kex_tmp = NULL;
+ size_t kex_len, len;
+
+ /* Here we append ext-info-c and kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com for client
+ * and kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com for server to the list of kex algorithms
+ */
+ kex = pkex->methods[SSH_KEX];
len = strlen(kex);
- /* Comma, comma, nul byte */
- kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 1 + strlen(KEX_STRICT_CLIENT ) + 1;
+ if (session->server) {
+ /* Comma, nul byte */
+ kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_STRICT_SERVER) + 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Comma, comma, nul byte */
+ kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 1 +
+ strlen(KEX_STRICT_CLIENT) + 1;
+ }
if (kex_len >= MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
/* Overflow */
return SSH_ERROR;
@@ -830,9 +849,16 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s,%s", KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT, KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
- client->methods[SSH_KEX] = kex_tmp;
-
+ if (session->server){
+ snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s", KEX_STRICT_SERVER);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(kex_tmp + len,
+ kex_len - len,
+ ",%s,%s",
+ KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT,
+ KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
+ }
+ pkex->methods[SSH_KEX] = kex_tmp;
return SSH_OK;
}
diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
index dc070a73..70b90899 100644
--- a/src/server.c
+++ b/src/server.c
@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@ int server_set_kex(ssh_session session)
}
}
- return 0;
+ /* Do not append the extensions during rekey */
+ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED) {
+ return SSH_OK;
+ }
+
+ rc = ssh_kex_append_extensions(session, server);
+ return rc;
}
int ssh_server_init_kex(ssh_session session) {
--
2.41.0
From 5846e57538c750c5ce67df887d09fa99861c79c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 12:22:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] CVE-2023-48795: Strip extensions from both kex lists for
matching
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
---
src/kex.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
index 9ad671db..fbc70cf4 100644
--- a/src/kex.c
+++ b/src/kex.c
@@ -961,11 +961,19 @@ int ssh_kex_select_methods (ssh_session session)
enum ssh_key_exchange_e kex_type;
int i;
- /* Here we should drop the ext-info-c from the list so we avoid matching.
+ /* Here we should drop the extensions from the list so we avoid matching.
* it. We added it to the end, so we can just truncate the string here */
- ext_start = strstr(client->methods[SSH_KEX], ","KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT);
- if (ext_start != NULL) {
- ext_start[0] = '\0';
+ if (session->client) {
+ ext_start = strstr(client->methods[SSH_KEX], "," KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT);
+ if (ext_start != NULL) {
+ ext_start[0] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ if (session->server) {
+ ext_start = strstr(server->methods[SSH_KEX], "," KEX_STRICT_SERVER);
+ if (ext_start != NULL) {
+ ext_start[0] = '\0';
+ }
}
for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
--
2.41.0
From 89df759200d31fc79fbbe213d8eda0d329eebf6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 12:47:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] CVE-2023-48795: tests: Adjust calculation to strict kex
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
---
tests/client/torture_rekey.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/client/torture_rekey.c b/tests/client/torture_rekey.c
index ccd5ae2c..57e03e3f 100644
--- a/tests/client/torture_rekey.c
+++ b/tests/client/torture_rekey.c
@@ -148,6 +148,29 @@ static void torture_rekey_default(void **state)
ssh_disconnect(s->ssh.session);
}
+static void sanity_check_session(void **state)
+{
+ struct torture_state *s = *state;
+ struct ssh_crypto_struct *c = NULL;
+
+ c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
+ assert_non_null(c);
+ assert_int_equal(c->in_cipher->max_blocks,
+ bytes / c->in_cipher->blocksize);
+ assert_int_equal(c->out_cipher->max_blocks,
+ bytes / c->out_cipher->blocksize);
+ /* when strict kex is used, the newkeys reset the sequence number */
+ if ((s->ssh.session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT) != 0) {
+ assert_int_equal(c->out_cipher->packets, s->ssh.session->send_seq);
+ assert_int_equal(c->in_cipher->packets, s->ssh.session->recv_seq);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise we have less encrypted packets than transferred
+ * (first are not encrypted) */
+ assert_true(c->out_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->send_seq);
+ assert_true(c->in_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->recv_seq);
+ }
+}
+
/* We lower the rekey limits manually and check that the rekey
* really happens when sending data
*/
@@ -166,16 +189,10 @@ static void torture_rekey_send(void **state)
rc = ssh_connect(s->ssh.session);
assert_ssh_return_code(s->ssh.session, rc);
- /* The blocks limit is set correctly */
- c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
- assert_int_equal(c->in_cipher->max_blocks,
- bytes / c->in_cipher->blocksize);
- assert_int_equal(c->out_cipher->max_blocks,
- bytes / c->out_cipher->blocksize);
- /* We should have less encrypted packets than transfered (first are not encrypted) */
- assert_true(c->out_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->send_seq);
- assert_true(c->in_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->recv_seq);
+ sanity_check_session(state);
/* Copy the initial secret hash = session_id so we know we changed keys later */
+ c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
+ assert_non_null(c);
secret_hash = malloc(c->digest_len);
assert_non_null(secret_hash);
memcpy(secret_hash, c->secret_hash, c->digest_len);
@@ -468,15 +480,10 @@ static void torture_rekey_different_kex(void **state)
assert_ssh_return_code(s->ssh.session, rc);
/* The blocks limit is set correctly */
- c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
- assert_int_equal(c->in_cipher->max_blocks,
- bytes / c->in_cipher->blocksize);
- assert_int_equal(c->out_cipher->max_blocks,
- bytes / c->out_cipher->blocksize);
- /* We should have less encrypted packets than transfered (first are not encrypted) */
- assert_true(c->out_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->send_seq);
- assert_true(c->in_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->recv_seq);
+ sanity_check_session(state);
/* Copy the initial secret hash = session_id so we know we changed keys later */
+ c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
+ assert_non_null(c);
secret_hash = malloc(c->digest_len);
assert_non_null(secret_hash);
memcpy(secret_hash, c->secret_hash, c->digest_len);
--
2.41.0
diff -up libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c.CVE-2023-48795.patch libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c
--- libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c.CVE-2023-48795.patch 2024-01-09 05:46:53.064383034 +0100
+++ libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c 2024-01-09 05:48:28.360340184 +0100
@@ -1345,6 +1345,19 @@ size_t ssh_packet_socket_callback(const
"packet: read type %hhd [len=%d,padding=%hhd,comp=%d,payload=%d]",
session->in_packet.type, packet_len, padding, compsize, payloadsize);
+ if (crypto == NULL) {
+ /* In strict kex, only a few packets are allowed. Taint the session
+ * if we received packets that are normally allowed but to be
+ * refused if we are in strict kex when KEX is over.
+ */
+ uint8_t type = session->in_packet.type;
+
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS &&
+ (type < SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT ||
+ type > SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) {
+ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
+ }
+ }
/* Check if the packet is expected */
filter_result = ssh_packet_incoming_filter(session);
diff -up libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c.CVE-2023-48795.patch libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c
--- libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c.CVE-2023-48795.patch 2024-01-09 18:48:16.684366049 +0100
+++ libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c 2024-01-09 18:50:49.135897268 +0100
@@ -290,14 +290,10 @@ static void torture_rekey_recv(void **st
mode_t mask;
int rc;
- /* The blocks limit is set correctly */
- c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
- assert_int_equal(c->in_cipher->max_blocks, bytes / c->in_cipher->blocksize);
- assert_int_equal(c->out_cipher->max_blocks, bytes / c->out_cipher->blocksize);
- /* We should have less encrypted packets than transfered (first are not encrypted) */
- assert_true(c->out_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->send_seq);
- assert_true(c->in_cipher->packets < s->ssh.session->recv_seq);
+ sanity_check_session(state);
/* Copy the initial secret hash = session_id so we know we changed keys later */
+ c = s->ssh.session->current_crypto;
+ assert_non_null(c);
secret_hash = malloc(c->digest_len);
assert_non_null(secret_hash);
memcpy(secret_hash, c->secret_hash, c->digest_len);

1112
SOURCES/CVE-2023-6004.patch Normal file
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1581
SOURCES/CVE-2023-6918.patch Normal file
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94
SOURCES/escape-brackets-in-proxycommand.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
From bccb8513fa4a836aef0519d65eb33bb212606fe1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Baag <libssh-git@spam.b2ag.de>
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2022 20:55:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] config: Escape brackets in ProxyCommand build from ProxyJump
Missing escaping results in syntax errors in Zsh shell because of square
brackets getting interpreted as being a pattern for globbing.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Baag <libssh-git@spam.b2ag.de>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
src/config.c | 2 +-
tests/unittests/torture_config.c | 14 +++++++-------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/config.c b/src/config.c
index c048418ec..308928429 100644
--- a/src/config.c
+++ b/src/config.c
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ ssh_config_parse_proxy_jump(ssh_session session, const char *s, bool do_parsing)
if (hostname != NULL && do_parsing) {
char com[512] = {0};
- rv = snprintf(com, sizeof(com), "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s -W [%%h]:%%p %s",
+ rv = snprintf(com, sizeof(com), "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
username ? " -l " : "",
username ? username : "",
port ? " -p " : "",
diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
index 31dadae37..5ff20c99a 100644
--- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
+++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static void torture_config_unknown(void **state,
/* test corner cases */
_parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
- "ssh -W [%h]:%p many-spaces.com");
+ "ssh -W '[%h]:%p' many-spaces.com");
assert_string_equal(session->opts.host, "equal.sign");
ret = ssh_config_parse_file(session, "/etc/ssh/ssh_config");
@@ -945,28 +945,28 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state,
torture_reset_config(session);
ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "simple");
_parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
- assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand, "ssh -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
+ assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand, "ssh -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
/* With username */
torture_reset_config(session);
ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "user");
_parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
- "ssh -l user -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
+ "ssh -l user -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
/* With port */
torture_reset_config(session);
ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "port");
_parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
- "ssh -p 2222 -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
+ "ssh -p 2222 -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
/* Two step jump */
torture_reset_config(session);
ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "two-step");
_parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
- "ssh -l u1 -p 222 -J u2@second:33 -W [%h]:%p first");
+ "ssh -l u1 -p 222 -J u2@second:33 -W '[%h]:%p' first");
/* none */
torture_reset_config(session);
@@ -985,14 +985,14 @@ static void torture_config_proxyjump(void **state,
ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "only-jump");
_parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
- "ssh -W [%h]:%p jumpbox");
+ "ssh -W '[%h]:%p' jumpbox");
/* IPv6 address */
torture_reset_config(session);
ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "ipv6");
_parse_config(session, file, string, SSH_OK);
assert_string_equal(session->opts.ProxyCommand,
- "ssh -W [%h]:%p 2620:52:0::fed");
+ "ssh -W '[%h]:%p' 2620:52:0::fed");
/* Multiple @ is allowed in second jump */
config = "Host allowed-hostname\n"
--
GitLab

17
SPECS/libssh.spec
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Name: libssh Name: libssh
Version: 0.10.4 Version: 0.10.4
Release: 11%{?dist} Release: 13%{?dist}
Summary: A library implementing the SSH protocol Summary: A library implementing the SSH protocol
License: LGPLv2+ License: LGPLv2+
URL: http://www.libssh.org URL: http://www.libssh.org
@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ Patch9: auth_bypass.patch
Patch10: covscan23.patch Patch10: covscan23.patch
Patch11: rekey_test_fixup.patch Patch11: rekey_test_fixup.patch
Patch12: covscan23_1.patch Patch12: covscan23_1.patch
Patch13: CVE-2023-6004.patch
Patch14: CVE-2023-48795.patch
Patch15: CVE-2023-6918.patch
Patch16: escape-brackets-in-proxycommand.patch
%description %description
The ssh library was designed to be used by programmers needing a working SSH The ssh library was designed to be used by programmers needing a working SSH
@ -143,6 +147,17 @@ popd
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_server.config %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_server.config
%changelog %changelog
* Mon Feb 19 2024 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-13
- Bump up the version so that the version in 9.3 is lower.
- Resolves: RHEL-19310, RHEL-19691, RHEL-17245
* Tue Jan 09 2024 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-12
- Fix CVE-2023-48795 Prefix truncation attack on Binary Packet Protocol (BPP)
- Fix CVE-2023-6918 Missing checks for return values for digests
- Fix CVE-2023-6004 ProxyCommand/ProxyJump features allow injection
of malicious code through hostname
- Resolves: RHEL-19310, RHEL-19691, RHEL-17245
* Wed Jun 21 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-11 * Wed Jun 21 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 0.10.4-11
- Fix loglevel regression - Fix loglevel regression
- Related: rhbz#2182252, rhbz#2189740 - Related: rhbz#2182252, rhbz#2189740