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3b20d297f9
libssh/SOURCES/null_dereference_rekey.patch

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import UBI libssh-0.10.4-11.el9
2023-11-07 11:17:57 +00:00
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/curve25519.h ./include/libssh/curve25519.h
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/curve25519.h 2022-07-07 15:53:51.000000000 +0200
+++ ./include/libssh/curve25519.h 2023-04-27 14:35:27.030113530 +0200
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
int ssh_client_curve25519_init(ssh_session session);
+void ssh_client_curve25519_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session);
#ifdef WITH_SERVER
void ssh_server_curve25519_init(ssh_session session);
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/dh-gex.h ./include/libssh/dh-gex.h
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/dh-gex.h 2022-07-07 15:53:51.000000000 +0200
+++ ./include/libssh/dh-gex.h 2023-04-27 14:35:27.030113530 +0200
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#define SRC_DH_GEX_H_
int ssh_client_dhgex_init(ssh_session session);
+void ssh_client_dhgex_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session);
#ifdef WITH_SERVER
void ssh_server_dhgex_init(ssh_session session);
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/dh.h ./include/libssh/dh.h
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/dh.h 2023-04-27 14:25:46.353381599 +0200
+++ ./include/libssh/dh.h 2023-04-27 14:36:02.691475297 +0200
@@ -73,8 +73,10 @@
ssh_key ssh_dh_get_next_server_publickey(ssh_session session);
int ssh_dh_get_next_server_publickey_blob(ssh_session session,
ssh_string *pubkey_blob);
+int dh_handshake(ssh_session session);
int ssh_client_dh_init(ssh_session session);
+void ssh_client_dh_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session);
#ifdef WITH_SERVER
void ssh_server_dh_init(ssh_session session);
#endif /* WITH_SERVER */
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/ecdh.h ./include/libssh/ecdh.h
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/ecdh.h 2022-07-07 15:53:51.000000000 +0200
+++ ./include/libssh/ecdh.h 2023-04-27 14:35:27.030113530 +0200
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
extern struct ssh_packet_callbacks_struct ssh_ecdh_client_callbacks;
/* Backend-specific functions. */
int ssh_client_ecdh_init(ssh_session session);
+void ssh_client_ecdh_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session);
int ecdh_build_k(ssh_session session);
#ifdef WITH_SERVER
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/kex.h ./include/libssh/kex.h
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/kex.h 2023-04-27 14:25:46.346381527 +0200
+++ ./include/libssh/kex.h 2023-04-27 14:34:36.438602800 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit);
-int ssh_send_kex(ssh_session session, int server_kex);
+int ssh_send_kex(ssh_session session);
void ssh_list_kex(struct ssh_kex_struct *kex);
int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session);
int ssh_kex_select_methods(ssh_session session);
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/session.h ./include/libssh/session.h
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/include/libssh/session.h 2023-04-27 14:25:46.361381682 +0200
+++ ./include/libssh/session.h 2023-04-27 14:36:02.692475307 +0200
@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@
/* Client successfully authenticated */
#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED 2
+/* The KEXINIT message can be sent first by either of the parties so this flag
+ * indicates that the message was already sent to make sure it is sent and avoid
+ * sending it twice during key exchange to simplify the state machine. */
+#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEXINIT_SENT 4
+
/* codes to use with ssh_handle_packets*() */
/* Infinite timeout */
#define SSH_TIMEOUT_INFINITE -1
@@ -138,10 +143,8 @@
/* Extensions negotiated using RFC 8308 */
uint32_t extensions;
- ssh_string banner; /* that's the issue banner from
- the server */
- char *discon_msg; /* disconnect message from
- the remote host */
+ ssh_string banner; /* that's the issue banner from the server */
+ char *discon_msg; /* disconnect message from the remote host */
char *disconnect_message; /* disconnect message to be set */
ssh_buffer in_buffer;
PACKET in_packet;
@@ -166,25 +169,33 @@
uint32_t current_method;
} auth;
+ /* Sending this flag before key exchange to save one round trip during the
+ * key exchange. This might make sense on high-latency connections.
+ * So far internal only for testing. Usable only on the client side --
+ * there is no key exchange method that would start with server message */
+ bool send_first_kex_follows;
/*
* RFC 4253, 7.1: if the first_kex_packet_follows flag was set in
* the received SSH_MSG_KEXINIT, but the guess was wrong, this
* field will be set such that the following guessed packet will
- * be ignored. Once that packet has been received and ignored,
- * this field is cleared.
+ * be ignored on the receiving side. Once that packet has been received and
+ * ignored, this field is cleared.
+ * On the sending side, this is set after we got peer KEXINIT message and we
+ * need to resend the initial message of the negotiated KEX algorithm.
*/
- int first_kex_follows_guess_wrong;
+ bool first_kex_follows_guess_wrong;
ssh_buffer in_hashbuf;
ssh_buffer out_hashbuf;
struct ssh_crypto_struct *current_crypto;
- struct ssh_crypto_struct *next_crypto; /* next_crypto is going to be used after a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS */
+ /* next_crypto is going to be used after a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS */
+ struct ssh_crypto_struct *next_crypto;
struct ssh_list *channels; /* linked list of channels */
uint32_t maxchannel;
ssh_agent agent; /* ssh agent */
-/* keyb interactive data */
+ /* keyboard interactive data */
struct ssh_kbdint_struct *kbdint;
struct ssh_gssapi_struct *gssapi;
@@ -201,7 +212,8 @@
/* auths accepted by server */
struct ssh_list *ssh_message_list; /* list of delayed SSH messages */
- int (*ssh_message_callback)( struct ssh_session_struct *session, ssh_message msg, void *userdata);
+ int (*ssh_message_callback)(struct ssh_session_struct *session,
+ ssh_message msg, void *userdata);
void *ssh_message_callback_data;
ssh_server_callbacks server_callbacks;
void (*ssh_connection_callback)( struct ssh_session_struct *session);
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/client.c ./src/client.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/client.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.339381455 +0200
+++ ./src/client.c 2023-04-27 14:36:02.692475307 +0200
@@ -246,10 +246,13 @@
* @warning this function returning is no proof that DH handshake is
* completed
*/
-static int dh_handshake(ssh_session session)
+int dh_handshake(ssh_session session)
{
int rc = SSH_AGAIN;
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE, "dh_handshake_state = %d, kex_type = %d",
+ session->dh_handshake_state, session->next_crypto->kex_type);
+
switch (session->dh_handshake_state) {
case DH_STATE_INIT:
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
@@ -392,96 +395,103 @@
{
int rc;
- switch(session->session_state) {
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_NONE:
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_CONNECTING:
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_SOCKET_CONNECTED:
- ssh_set_fd_towrite(session);
- ssh_send_banner(session, 0);
-
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_BANNER_RECEIVED:
- if (session->serverbanner == NULL) {
- goto error;
- }
- set_status(session, 0.4f);
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,
- "SSH server banner: %s", session->serverbanner);
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "session_state=%d", session->session_state);
- /* Here we analyze the different protocols the server allows. */
- rc = ssh_analyze_banner(session, 0);
- if (rc < 0) {
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
- "No version of SSH protocol usable (banner: %s)",
- session->serverbanner);
- goto error;
- }
+ switch (session->session_state) {
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_NONE:
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_CONNECTING:
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_SOCKET_CONNECTED:
+ ssh_set_fd_towrite(session);
+ ssh_send_banner(session, 0);
+
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_BANNER_RECEIVED:
+ if (session->serverbanner == NULL) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ set_status(session, 0.4f);
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "SSH server banner: %s", session->serverbanner);
+
+ /* Here we analyze the different protocols the server allows. */
+ rc = ssh_analyze_banner(session, 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "No version of SSH protocol usable (banner: %s)",
+ session->serverbanner);
+ goto error;
+ }
- ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
+ ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
+
+ ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(session);
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX;
+ rc = ssh_set_client_kex(session);
+ if (rc != SSH_OK) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ rc = ssh_send_kex(session);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ set_status(session, 0.5f);
- ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(session);
- session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX:
+ /* TODO: This state should disappear in favor of get_key handle */
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_KEXINIT_RECEIVED:
+ set_status(session, 0.6f);
+ ssh_list_kex(&session->next_crypto->server_kex);
+ if ((session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEXINIT_SENT) == 0) {
+ /* in rekeying state if next_crypto client_kex might be empty */
rc = ssh_set_client_kex(session);
if (rc != SSH_OK) {
goto error;
}
- rc = ssh_send_kex(session, 0);
+ rc = ssh_send_kex(session);
if (rc < 0) {
goto error;
}
- set_status(session, 0.5f);
+ }
+ if (ssh_kex_select_methods(session) == SSH_ERROR)
+ goto error;
+ set_status(session, 0.8f);
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH;
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX:
- /* TODO: This state should disappear in favor of get_key handle */
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_KEXINIT_RECEIVED:
- set_status(session,0.6f);
- ssh_list_kex(&session->next_crypto->server_kex);
- if (session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[0] == NULL) {
- /* in rekeying state if next_crypto client_kex is empty */
- rc = ssh_set_client_kex(session);
- if (rc != SSH_OK) {
- goto error;
- }
- rc = ssh_send_kex(session, 0);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
- }
- if (ssh_kex_select_methods(session) == SSH_ERROR)
- goto error;
- set_status(session,0.8f);
- session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH;
- if (dh_handshake(session) == SSH_ERROR) {
- goto error;
- }
- FALL_THROUGH;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH:
- if(session->dh_handshake_state==DH_STATE_FINISHED){
- set_status(session,1.0f);
- session->connected = 1;
- if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED)
- session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATED;
- else
- session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATING;
- }
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATING:
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR:
+ /* If the init packet was already sent in previous step, this will be no
+ * operation */
+ if (dh_handshake(session) == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
- default:
- ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Invalid state %d",session->session_state);
+ }
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH:
+ if (session->dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_FINISHED) {
+ set_status(session, 1.0f);
+ session->connected = 1;
+ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED)
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATED;
+ else
+ session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATING;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATING:
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR:
+ goto error;
+ default:
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Invalid state %d",
+ session->session_state);
}
return;
error:
ssh_socket_close(session->socket);
session->alive = 0;
- session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "%s", ssh_get_error(session));
+
}
/** @internal
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/curve25519.c ./src/curve25519.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/curve25519.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
+++ ./src/curve25519.c 2023-04-27 14:35:27.031113541 +0200
@@ -172,6 +172,11 @@
return rc;
}
+void ssh_client_curve25519_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session)
+{
+ ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(session, &ssh_curve25519_client_callbacks);
+}
+
static int ssh_curve25519_build_k(ssh_session session)
{
ssh_curve25519_pubkey k;
@@ -285,7 +290,7 @@
(void)type;
(void)user;
- ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(session, &ssh_curve25519_client_callbacks);
+ ssh_client_curve25519_remove_callbacks(session);
pubkey_blob = ssh_buffer_get_ssh_string(packet);
if (pubkey_blob == NULL) {
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/dh.c ./src/dh.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/dh.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
+++ ./src/dh.c 2023-04-27 14:35:27.032113551 +0200
@@ -352,6 +352,11 @@
return SSH_ERROR;
}
+void ssh_client_dh_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session)
+{
+ ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(session, &ssh_dh_client_callbacks);
+}
+
SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dh_reply){
struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto=session->next_crypto;
ssh_string pubkey_blob = NULL;
@@ -361,7 +366,7 @@
(void)type;
(void)user;
- ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(session, &ssh_dh_client_callbacks);
+ ssh_client_dh_remove_callbacks(session);
rc = ssh_buffer_unpack(packet, "SBS", &pubkey_blob, &server_pubkey,
&crypto->dh_server_signature);
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/dh-gex.c ./src/dh-gex.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/dh-gex.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
+++ ./src/dh-gex.c 2023-04-27 14:35:27.031113541 +0200
@@ -248,6 +248,11 @@
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
+void ssh_client_dhgex_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session)
+{
+ ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(session, &ssh_dhgex_client_callbacks);
+}
+
static SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_client_dhgex_reply)
{
struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto=session->next_crypto;
@@ -258,7 +263,7 @@
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY received");
- ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(session, &ssh_dhgex_client_callbacks);
+ ssh_client_dhgex_remove_callbacks(session);
rc = ssh_buffer_unpack(packet,
"SBS",
&pubkey_blob, &server_pubkey,
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/ecdh.c ./src/ecdh.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/ecdh.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
+++ ./src/ecdh.c 2023-04-27 14:35:27.032113551 +0200
@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@
.user = NULL
};
+void ssh_client_ecdh_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session)
+{
+ ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(session, &ssh_ecdh_client_callbacks);
+}
+
/** @internal
* @brief parses a SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY packet and sends back
* a SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS
@@ -55,7 +60,7 @@
(void)type;
(void)user;
- ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(session, &ssh_ecdh_client_callbacks);
+ ssh_client_ecdh_remove_callbacks(session);
pubkey_blob = ssh_buffer_get_ssh_string(packet);
if (pubkey_blob == NULL) {
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL, "No public key in packet");
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/gssapi.c ./src/gssapi.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/gssapi.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.333381393 +0200
+++ ./src/gssapi.c 2023-04-27 14:29:22.606512115 +0200
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@
"indicate mechs",
maj_stat,
min_stat);
+ gss_release_oid_set(&min_stat, &both_supported);
return SSH_ERROR;
}
@@ -265,8 +266,10 @@
return SSH_OK;
}
/* from now we have room for context */
- if (ssh_gssapi_init(session) == SSH_ERROR)
+ if (ssh_gssapi_init(session) == SSH_ERROR) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&min_stat, &both_supported);
return SSH_ERROR;
+ }
name_buf.value = service_name;
name_buf.length = strlen(name_buf.value) + 1;
@@ -278,6 +281,7 @@
"importing name",
maj_stat,
min_stat);
+ gss_release_oid_set(&min_stat, &both_supported);
return -1;
}
@@ -345,6 +349,7 @@
min_stat);
ptr = malloc(buffer.length + 1);
if (ptr == NULL) {
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &buffer);
return NULL;
}
memcpy(ptr, buffer.value, buffer.length);
@@ -428,6 +433,7 @@
"Gssapi error",
maj_stat,
min_stat);
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token);
ssh_auth_reply_default(session,0);
ssh_gssapi_free(session);
session->gssapi=NULL;
@@ -445,6 +451,9 @@
(size_t)output_token.length, output_token.value);
ssh_packet_send(session);
}
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token);
+
if(maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE){
session->gssapi->state = SSH_GSSAPI_STATE_RCV_MIC;
}
@@ -648,7 +657,7 @@
static int ssh_gssapi_match(ssh_session session, gss_OID_set *valid_oids)
{
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat, lifetime;
- gss_OID_set actual_mechs;
+ gss_OID_set actual_mechs = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
gss_buffer_desc namebuf;
gss_name_t client_id = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_OID oid;
@@ -710,6 +719,7 @@
ret = SSH_OK;
end:
+ gss_release_oid_set(&min_stat, &actual_mechs);
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &client_id);
return ret;
}
@@ -724,7 +734,7 @@
int ssh_gssapi_auth_mic(ssh_session session)
{
size_t i;
- gss_OID_set selected; /* oid selected for authentication */
+ gss_OID_set selected = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET; /* oid selected for authentication */
ssh_string *oids = NULL;
int rc;
size_t n_oids = 0;
@@ -801,6 +811,8 @@
SSH_STRING_FREE(oids[i]);
}
free(oids);
+ gss_release_oid_set(&min_stat, &selected);
+
if (rc != SSH_ERROR) {
return SSH_AUTH_AGAIN;
}
@@ -904,6 +916,8 @@
ssh_packet_send(session);
session->auth.state = SSH_AUTH_STATE_GSSAPI_TOKEN;
}
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token);
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
error:
@@ -933,8 +947,10 @@
maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat,session->gssapi->ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
&mic_buf, &mic_token_buf);
+
+ SSH_BUFFER_FREE(mic_buffer);
+
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)){
- SSH_BUFFER_FREE(mic_buffer);
ssh_gssapi_log_error(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,
"generating MIC",
maj_stat,
@@ -947,8 +963,10 @@
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
mic_token_buf.length,
(size_t)mic_token_buf.length, mic_token_buf.value);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &mic_token_buf);
+
if (rc != SSH_OK) {
- SSH_BUFFER_FREE(mic_buffer);
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
return SSH_ERROR;
}
@@ -1017,6 +1035,8 @@
ssh_packet_send(session);
}
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token);
+
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
ssh_gssapi_send_mic(session);
session->auth.state = SSH_AUTH_STATE_GSSAPI_MIC_SENT;
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/kex.c ./src/kex.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/kex.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.368381754 +0200
+++ ./src/kex.c 2023-04-27 14:36:02.692475307 +0200
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "libssh/libssh.h"
#include "libssh/priv.h"
#include "libssh/buffer.h"
#include "libssh/dh.h"
@@ -328,6 +329,10 @@
int is_wrong = 1;
+ if (client_str == NULL || server_str == NULL) {
+ return is_wrong;
+ }
+
colon = strchr(client_str, ',');
if (colon == NULL) {
client_kex_len = strlen(client_str);
@@ -354,6 +359,7 @@
SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit)
{
int i, ok;
+ struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto = session->next_crypto;
int server_kex = session->server;
ssh_string str = NULL;
char *strings[SSH_KEX_METHODS] = {0};
@@ -367,35 +373,67 @@
(void)type;
(void)user;
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE, "KEXINIT received");
+
if (session->session_state == SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATED) {
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Initiating key re-exchange");
+ if (session->dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_FINISHED) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Peer initiated key re-exchange");
+ /* Reset the sent flag if the re-kex was initiated by the peer */
+ session->flags &= ~SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEXINIT_SENT;
+ } else if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEXINIT_SENT &&
+ session->dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_INIT_SENT) {
+ /* This happens only when we are sending our-guessed first kex
+ * packet right after our KEXINIT packet. */
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Received peer kexinit answer.");
+ } else if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX) {
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "SSH_KEXINIT received in wrong state");
+ goto error;
+ }
} else if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX) {
- ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"SSH_KEXINIT received in wrong state");
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "SSH_KEXINIT received in wrong state");
goto error;
}
if (server_kex) {
- len = ssh_buffer_get_data(packet,session->next_crypto->client_kex.cookie, 16);
+#ifdef WITH_SERVER
+ len = ssh_buffer_get_data(packet, crypto->client_kex.cookie, 16);
if (len != 16) {
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "ssh_packet_kexinit: no cookie in packet");
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "ssh_packet_kexinit: no cookie in packet");
goto error;
}
- ok = ssh_hashbufin_add_cookie(session, session->next_crypto->client_kex.cookie);
+ ok = ssh_hashbufin_add_cookie(session, crypto->client_kex.cookie);
if (ok < 0) {
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "ssh_packet_kexinit: adding cookie failed");
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "ssh_packet_kexinit: adding cookie failed");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ok = server_set_kex(session);
+ if (ok == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
+#endif
} else {
- len = ssh_buffer_get_data(packet,session->next_crypto->server_kex.cookie, 16);
+ len = ssh_buffer_get_data(packet, crypto->server_kex.cookie, 16);
if (len != 16) {
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "ssh_packet_kexinit: no cookie in packet");
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "ssh_packet_kexinit: no cookie in packet");
goto error;
}
- ok = ssh_hashbufin_add_cookie(session, session->next_crypto->server_kex.cookie);
+ ok = ssh_hashbufin_add_cookie(session, crypto->server_kex.cookie);
if (ok < 0) {
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "ssh_packet_kexinit: adding cookie failed");
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "ssh_packet_kexinit: adding cookie failed");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ok = ssh_set_client_kex(session);
+ if (ok == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
}
@@ -408,7 +446,8 @@
rc = ssh_buffer_add_ssh_string(session->in_hashbuf, str);
if (rc < 0) {
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Error adding string in hash buffer");
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "Error adding string in hash buffer");
goto error;
}
@@ -421,14 +460,14 @@
str = NULL;
}
- /* copy the server kex info into an array of strings */
+ /* copy the peer kex info into an array of strings */
if (server_kex) {
for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
- session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[i] = strings[i];
+ crypto->client_kex.methods[i] = strings[i];
}
} else { /* client */
for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
- session->next_crypto->server_kex.methods[i] = strings[i];
+ crypto->server_kex.methods[i] = strings[i];
}
}
@@ -442,30 +481,48 @@
* that its value is included when computing the session ID (see
* 'make_sessionid').
*/
- if (server_kex) {
- rc = ssh_buffer_get_u8(packet, &first_kex_packet_follows);
- if (rc != 1) {
- goto error;
- }
+ rc = ssh_buffer_get_u8(packet, &first_kex_packet_follows);
+ if (rc != 1) {
+ goto error;
+ }
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->in_hashbuf, first_kex_packet_follows);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
+ rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->in_hashbuf, first_kex_packet_follows);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u32(session->in_hashbuf, kexinit_reserved);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
+ rc = ssh_buffer_add_u32(session->in_hashbuf, kexinit_reserved);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remember whether 'first_kex_packet_follows' was set and the client
+ * guess was wrong: in this case the next SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT message
+ * must be ignored on the server side.
+ * Client needs to start the Key exchange over with the correct method
+ */
+ if (first_kex_packet_follows || session->send_first_kex_follows) {
+ char **client_methods = crypto->client_kex.methods;
+ char **server_methods = crypto->server_kex.methods;
+ session->first_kex_follows_guess_wrong =
+ cmp_first_kex_algo(client_methods[SSH_KEX],
+ server_methods[SSH_KEX]) ||
+ cmp_first_kex_algo(client_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
+ server_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]);
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "The initial guess was %s.",
+ session->first_kex_follows_guess_wrong ? "wrong" : "right");
+ }
+ if (server_kex) {
/*
* If client sent a ext-info-c message in the kex list, it supports
* RFC 8308 extension negotiation.
*/
- ok = ssh_match_group(session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
+ ok = ssh_match_group(crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT);
if (ok) {
- const char *hostkeys = NULL;
+ const char *hostkeys = NULL, *wanted_hostkeys = NULL;
/* The client supports extension negotiation */
session->extensions |= SSH_EXT_NEGOTIATION;
@@ -475,14 +532,14 @@
* by the client and enable the respective extensions to provide
* correct signature in the next packet if RSA is negotiated
*/
- hostkeys = session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS];
+ hostkeys = crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS];
+ wanted_hostkeys = session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS];
ok = ssh_match_group(hostkeys, "rsa-sha2-512");
if (ok) {
/* Check if rsa-sha2-512 is allowed by config */
- if (session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS] != NULL) {
- char *is_allowed =
- ssh_find_matching(session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
- "rsa-sha2-512");
+ if (wanted_hostkeys != NULL) {
+ char *is_allowed = ssh_find_matching(wanted_hostkeys,
+ "rsa-sha2-512");
if (is_allowed != NULL) {
session->extensions |= SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA512;
}
@@ -492,10 +549,9 @@
ok = ssh_match_group(hostkeys, "rsa-sha2-256");
if (ok) {
/* Check if rsa-sha2-256 is allowed by config */
- if (session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS] != NULL) {
- char *is_allowed =
- ssh_find_matching(session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
- "rsa-sha2-256");
+ if (wanted_hostkeys != NULL) {
+ char *is_allowed = ssh_find_matching(wanted_hostkeys,
+ "rsa-sha2-256");
if (is_allowed != NULL) {
session->extensions |= SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA256;
}
@@ -511,7 +567,7 @@
(session->extensions & SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA512)) {
session->extensions &= ~(SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA256 | SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA512);
rsa_sig_ext = ssh_find_matching("rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256",
- session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]);
+ hostkeys);
if (rsa_sig_ext == NULL) {
goto error; /* should never happen */
} else if (strcmp(rsa_sig_ext, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0) {
@@ -530,24 +586,16 @@
session->extensions & SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA256 ? "SHA256" : "",
session->extensions & SSH_EXT_SIG_RSA_SHA512 ? " SHA512" : "");
}
-
- /*
- * Remember whether 'first_kex_packet_follows' was set and the client
- * guess was wrong: in this case the next SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT message
- * must be ignored.
- */
- if (first_kex_packet_follows) {
- session->first_kex_follows_guess_wrong =
- cmp_first_kex_algo(session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
- session->next_crypto->server_kex.methods[SSH_KEX]) ||
- cmp_first_kex_algo(session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
- session->next_crypto->server_kex.methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]);
- }
}
/* Note, that his overwrites authenticated state in case of rekeying */
session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_KEXINIT_RECEIVED;
- session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_INIT;
+ /* if we already sent our initial key exchange packet, do not reset the
+ * DH state. We will know if we were right with our guess only in
+ * dh_handshake_state() */
+ if (session->send_first_kex_follows == false) {
+ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_INIT;
+ }
session->ssh_connection_callback(session);
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
@@ -695,14 +743,18 @@
int i;
size_t kex_len, len;
+ /* Skip if already set, for example for the rekey or when we do the guessing
+ * it could have been already used to make some protocol decisions. */
+ if (client->methods[0] != NULL) {
+ return SSH_OK;
+ }
+
ok = ssh_get_random(client->cookie, 16, 0);
if (!ok) {
ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "PRNG error");
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- memset(client->methods, 0, SSH_KEX_METHODS * sizeof(char **));
-
/* Set the list of allowed algorithms in order of preference, if it hadn't
* been set yet. */
for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
@@ -772,15 +824,89 @@
return NULL;
}
+static enum ssh_key_exchange_e
+kex_select_kex_type(const char *kex)
+{
+ if (strcmp(kex, "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA256;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP16_SHA512;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP18_SHA512;
+#ifdef WITH_GEX
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
+#endif /* WITH_GEX */
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "ecdh-sha2-nistp256") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "ecdh-sha2-nistp384") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "ecdh-sha2-nistp521") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG;
+ } else if (strcmp(kex, "curve25519-sha256") == 0) {
+ return SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256;
+ }
+ /* should not happen. We should be getting only valid names at this stage */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/** @internal
+ * @brief Reverts guessed callbacks set during the dh_handshake()
+ * @param session session handle
+ * @returns void
+ */
+static void revert_kex_callbacks(ssh_session session)
+{
+ switch (session->next_crypto->kex_type) {
+ case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
+ case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
+ case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA256:
+ case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP16_SHA512:
+ case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP18_SHA512:
+ ssh_client_dh_remove_callbacks(session);
+ break;
+#ifdef WITH_GEX
+ case SSH_KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1:
+ case SSH_KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256:
+ ssh_client_dhgex_remove_callbacks(session);
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_GEX */
+#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
+ case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
+ case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384:
+ case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521:
+ ssh_client_ecdh_remove_callbacks(session);
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
+ case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256:
+ case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
+ ssh_client_curve25519_remove_callbacks(session);
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
/** @brief Select the different methods on basis of client's and
* server's kex messages, and watches out if a match is possible.
*/
int ssh_kex_select_methods (ssh_session session)
{
- struct ssh_kex_struct *server = &session->next_crypto->server_kex;
- struct ssh_kex_struct *client = &session->next_crypto->client_kex;
+ struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto = session->next_crypto;
+ struct ssh_kex_struct *server = &crypto->server_kex;
+ struct ssh_kex_struct *client = &crypto->client_kex;
char *ext_start = NULL;
const char *aead_hmac = NULL;
+ enum ssh_key_exchange_e kex_type;
int i;
/* Here we should drop the ext-info-c from the list so we avoid matching.
@@ -791,52 +917,41 @@
}
for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
- session->next_crypto->kex_methods[i]=ssh_find_matching(server->methods[i],client->methods[i]);
+ crypto->kex_methods[i] = ssh_find_matching(server->methods[i],
+ client->methods[i]);
if (i == SSH_MAC_C_S || i == SSH_MAC_S_C) {
- aead_hmac = ssh_find_aead_hmac(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[i-2]);
+ aead_hmac = ssh_find_aead_hmac(crypto->kex_methods[i - 2]);
if (aead_hmac) {
- free(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[i]);
- session->next_crypto->kex_methods[i] = strdup(aead_hmac);
+ free(crypto->kex_methods[i]);
+ crypto->kex_methods[i] = strdup(aead_hmac);
}
}
- if (session->next_crypto->kex_methods[i] == NULL && i < SSH_LANG_C_S){
- ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"kex error : no match for method %s: server [%s], client [%s]",
- ssh_kex_descriptions[i],server->methods[i],client->methods[i]);
+ if (crypto->kex_methods[i] == NULL && i < SSH_LANG_C_S) {
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "kex error : no match for method %s: server [%s], "
+ "client [%s]", ssh_kex_descriptions[i],
+ server->methods[i], client->methods[i]);
return SSH_ERROR;
- } else if ((i >= SSH_LANG_C_S) && (session->next_crypto->kex_methods[i] == NULL)) {
+ } else if ((i >= SSH_LANG_C_S) && (crypto->kex_methods[i] == NULL)) {
/* we can safely do that for languages */
- session->next_crypto->kex_methods[i] = strdup("");
+ crypto->kex_methods[i] = strdup("");
}
}
- if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA256;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP16_SHA512;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP18_SHA512;
-#ifdef WITH_GEX
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
-#endif /* WITH_GEX */
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "ecdh-sha2-nistp256") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "ecdh-sha2-nistp384") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "ecdh-sha2-nistp521") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG;
- } else if (strcmp(session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX], "curve25519-sha256") == 0){
- session->next_crypto->kex_type=SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256;
+
+ /* We can not set this value directly as the old value is needed to revert
+ * callbacks if we are client */
+ kex_type = kex_select_kex_type(crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX]);
+ if (session->client && session->first_kex_follows_guess_wrong) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Our guess was wrong. Restarting the KEX");
+ /* We need to remove the wrong callbacks and start kex again */
+ revert_kex_callbacks(session);
+ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_INIT;
+ session->first_kex_follows_guess_wrong = false;
}
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Negotiated %s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s",
+ crypto->kex_type = kex_type;
+
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Negotiated %s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s",
session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_KEX],
session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
session->next_crypto->kex_methods[SSH_CRYPT_C_S],
@@ -853,63 +968,116 @@
/* this function only sends the predefined set of kex methods */
-int ssh_send_kex(ssh_session session, int server_kex)
+int ssh_send_kex(ssh_session session)
{
- struct ssh_kex_struct *kex = (server_kex ? &session->next_crypto->server_kex :
- &session->next_crypto->client_kex);
- ssh_string str = NULL;
- int i;
- int rc;
-
- rc = ssh_buffer_pack(session->out_buffer,
- "bP",
- SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT,
- 16,
- kex->cookie); /* cookie */
- if (rc != SSH_OK)
- goto error;
- if (ssh_hashbufout_add_cookie(session) < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
+ struct ssh_kex_struct *kex = (session->server ?
+ &session->next_crypto->server_kex :
+ &session->next_crypto->client_kex);
+ ssh_string str = NULL;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+ int first_kex_packet_follows = 0;
+
+ /* Only client can initiate the handshake methods we implement. If we
+ * already received the peer mechanisms, there is no point in guessing */
+ if (session->client &&
+ session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_KEXINIT_RECEIVED &&
+ session->send_first_kex_follows) {
+ first_kex_packet_follows = 1;
+ }
+
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE,
+ "Sending KEXINIT packet, first_kex_packet_follows = %d",
+ first_kex_packet_follows);
+
+ rc = ssh_buffer_pack(session->out_buffer,
+ "bP",
+ SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT,
+ 16,
+ kex->cookie); /* cookie */
+ if (rc != SSH_OK)
+ goto error;
+ if (ssh_hashbufout_add_cookie(session) < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ssh_list_kex(kex);
- ssh_list_kex(kex);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
+ str = ssh_string_from_char(kex->methods[i]);
+ if (str == NULL) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ rc = ssh_buffer_add_ssh_string(session->out_hashbuf, str);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ rc = ssh_buffer_add_ssh_string(session->out_buffer, str);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ SSH_STRING_FREE(str);
+ str = NULL;
+ }
- for (i = 0; i < SSH_KEX_METHODS; i++) {
- str = ssh_string_from_char(kex->methods[i]);
- if (str == NULL) {
- goto error;
+ rc = ssh_buffer_pack(session->out_buffer,
+ "bd",
+ first_kex_packet_follows,
+ 0);
+ if (rc != SSH_OK) {
+ goto error;
}
- if (ssh_buffer_add_ssh_string(session->out_hashbuf, str) < 0) {
- goto error;
+ /* Prepare also the first_kex_packet_follows and reserved to 0 */
+ rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_hashbuf, first_kex_packet_follows);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ goto error;
}
- if (ssh_buffer_add_ssh_string(session->out_buffer, str) < 0) {
- goto error;
+ rc = ssh_buffer_add_u32(session->out_hashbuf, 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ goto error;
}
- SSH_STRING_FREE(str);
- str = NULL;
- }
- rc = ssh_buffer_pack(session->out_buffer,
- "bd",
- 0,
- 0);
- if (rc != SSH_OK) {
- goto error;
- }
+ rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+ return -1;
+ }
- if (ssh_packet_send(session) == SSH_ERROR) {
- return -1;
- }
+ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEXINIT_SENT;
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "SSH_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
+
+ /* If we indicated that we are sending the guessed key exchange packet,
+ * do it now. The packet is simple, but we need to do some preparations */
+ if (first_kex_packet_follows) {
+ char *list = kex->methods[SSH_KEX];
+ char *colon = strchr(list, ',');
+ size_t kex_name_len = colon ? (size_t)(colon - list) : strlen(list);
+ char *kex_name = calloc(kex_name_len + 1, 1);
+ if (kex_name == NULL) {
+ ssh_set_error_oom(session);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ snprintf(kex_name, kex_name_len + 1, "%.*s", (int)kex_name_len, list);
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_TRACE, "Sending the first kex packet for %s", kex_name);
+
+ session->next_crypto->kex_type = kex_select_kex_type(kex_name);
+ free(kex_name);
+
+ /* run the first step of the DH handshake */
+ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_INIT;
+ if (dh_handshake(session) == SSH_ERROR) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "SSH_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
- return 0;
error:
- ssh_buffer_reinit(session->out_buffer);
- ssh_buffer_reinit(session->out_hashbuf);
- SSH_STRING_FREE(str);
+ ssh_buffer_reinit(session->out_buffer);
+ ssh_buffer_reinit(session->out_hashbuf);
+ SSH_STRING_FREE(str);
- return -1;
+ return -1;
}
/*
@@ -952,7 +1120,7 @@
}
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_INIT;
- rc = ssh_send_kex(session, session->server);
+ rc = ssh_send_kex(session);
if (rc < 0) {
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "Failed to send kex");
return rc;
@@ -1142,33 +1310,6 @@
client_hash = session->in_hashbuf;
}
- /*
- * Handle the two final fields for the KEXINIT message (RFC 4253 7.1):
- *
- * boolean first_kex_packet_follows
- * uint32 0 (reserved for future extension)
- */
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(server_hash, 0);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u32(server_hash, 0);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- /* These fields are handled for the server case in ssh_packet_kexinit. */
- if (session->client) {
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(client_hash, 0);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u32(client_hash, 0);
- if (rc < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
- }
-
rc = ssh_dh_get_next_server_publickey_blob(session, &server_pubkey_blob);
if (rc != SSH_OK) {
goto error;
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c ./src/packet.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/packet.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.334381403 +0200
+++ ./src/packet.c 2023-04-27 14:34:36.432602740 +0200
@@ -366,6 +366,11 @@
* - session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT
* */
+ if (!session->server) {
+ rc = SSH_PACKET_DENIED;
+ break;
+ }
+
if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH) {
rc = SSH_PACKET_DENIED;
break;
@@ -1410,18 +1415,23 @@
}
}
-void ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(ssh_session session, ssh_socket s){
- session->socket_callbacks.data=ssh_packet_socket_callback;
- session->socket_callbacks.connected=NULL;
- session->socket_callbacks.controlflow = ssh_packet_socket_controlflow_callback;
- session->socket_callbacks.userdata=session;
- ssh_socket_set_callbacks(s,&session->socket_callbacks);
+void ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(ssh_session session, ssh_socket s)
+{
+ struct ssh_socket_callbacks_struct *callbacks = &session->socket_callbacks;
+
+ callbacks->data = ssh_packet_socket_callback;
+ callbacks->connected = NULL;
+ callbacks->controlflow = ssh_packet_socket_controlflow_callback;
+ callbacks->userdata = session;
+ ssh_socket_set_callbacks(s, callbacks);
}
/** @internal
* @brief sets the callbacks for the packet layer
*/
-void ssh_packet_set_callbacks(ssh_session session, ssh_packet_callbacks callbacks){
+void
+ssh_packet_set_callbacks(ssh_session session, ssh_packet_callbacks callbacks)
+{
if (session->packet_callbacks == NULL) {
session->packet_callbacks = ssh_list_new();
if (session->packet_callbacks == NULL) {
@@ -1435,8 +1445,11 @@
/** @internal
* @brief remove the callbacks from the packet layer
*/
-void ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session, ssh_packet_callbacks callbacks){
+void
+ssh_packet_remove_callbacks(ssh_session session, ssh_packet_callbacks callbacks)
+{
struct ssh_iterator *it = NULL;
+
it = ssh_list_find(session->packet_callbacks, callbacks);
if (it != NULL) {
ssh_list_remove(session->packet_callbacks, it);
@@ -1446,12 +1459,15 @@
/** @internal
* @brief sets the default packet handlers
*/
-void ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(ssh_session session){
- session->default_packet_callbacks.start=1;
- session->default_packet_callbacks.n_callbacks=sizeof(default_packet_handlers)/sizeof(ssh_packet_callback);
- session->default_packet_callbacks.user=session;
- session->default_packet_callbacks.callbacks=default_packet_handlers;
- ssh_packet_set_callbacks(session, &session->default_packet_callbacks);
+void ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(ssh_session session)
+{
+ struct ssh_packet_callbacks_struct *c = &session->default_packet_callbacks;
+
+ c->start = 1;
+ c->n_callbacks = sizeof(default_packet_handlers) / sizeof(ssh_packet_callback);
+ c->user = session;
+ c->callbacks = default_packet_handlers;
+ ssh_packet_set_callbacks(session, c);
}
/** @internal
@@ -1930,7 +1946,7 @@
memcpy(session->next_crypto->session_id,
session->current_crypto->session_id,
session_id_len);
- session->next_crypto->session_id_len = session_id_len;
+ session->next_crypto->session_id_len = session_id_len;
return SSH_OK;
}
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/packet_cb.c ./src/packet_cb.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/packet_cb.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.334381403 +0200
+++ ./src/packet_cb.c 2023-04-27 14:34:36.428602699 +0200
@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@
session->next_crypto->digest_len);
SSH_SIGNATURE_FREE(sig);
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+ ssh_set_error(session,
+ SSH_FATAL,
+ "Failed to verify server hostkey signature");
goto error;
}
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,"Signature verified and valid");
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/server.c ./src/server.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/server.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.347381537 +0200
+++ ./src/server.c 2023-04-27 14:35:27.041113642 +0200
@@ -92,7 +92,11 @@
size_t len;
int ok;
- ZERO_STRUCTP(server);
+ /* Skip if already set, for example for the rekey or when we do the guessing
+ * it could have been already used to make some protocol decisions. */
+ if (server->methods[0] != NULL) {
+ return SSH_OK;
+ }
ok = ssh_get_random(server->cookie, 16, 0);
if (!ok) {
@@ -336,116 +340,119 @@
* @brief A function to be called each time a step has been done in the
* connection.
*/
-static void ssh_server_connection_callback(ssh_session session){
+static void ssh_server_connection_callback(ssh_session session)
+{
int rc;
- switch(session->session_state){
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_NONE:
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_CONNECTING:
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_SOCKET_CONNECTED:
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_BANNER_RECEIVED:
- if (session->clientbanner == NULL) {
- goto error;
- }
- set_status(session, 0.4f);
- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,
- "SSH client banner: %s", session->clientbanner);
-
- /* Here we analyze the different protocols the server allows. */
- rc = ssh_analyze_banner(session, 1);
- if (rc < 0) {
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
- "No version of SSH protocol usable (banner: %s)",
- session->clientbanner);
- goto error;
- }
+ switch (session->session_state) {
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_NONE:
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_CONNECTING:
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_SOCKET_CONNECTED:
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_BANNER_RECEIVED:
+ if (session->clientbanner == NULL) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ set_status(session, 0.4f);
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "SSH client banner: %s", session->clientbanner);
+
+ /* Here we analyze the different protocols the server allows. */
+ rc = ssh_analyze_banner(session, 1);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "No version of SSH protocol usable (banner: %s)",
+ session->clientbanner);
+ goto error;
+ }
- /* from now, the packet layer is handling incoming packets */
- ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
+ /* from now, the packet layer is handling incoming packets */
+ ssh_packet_register_socket_callback(session, session->socket);
- ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(session);
- set_status(session, 0.5f);
- session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX;
- if (ssh_send_kex(session, 1) < 0) {
+ ssh_packet_set_default_callbacks(session);
+ set_status(session, 0.5f);
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX;
+ if (ssh_send_kex(session) < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX:
+ /* TODO: This state should disappear in favor of get_key handle */
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_KEXINIT_RECEIVED:
+ set_status(session, 0.6f);
+ if ((session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEXINIT_SENT) == 0) {
+ if (server_set_kex(session) == SSH_ERROR)
goto error;
- }
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_INITIAL_KEX:
- /* TODO: This state should disappear in favor of get_key handle */
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_KEXINIT_RECEIVED:
- set_status(session,0.6f);
- if(session->next_crypto->server_kex.methods[0]==NULL){
- if(server_set_kex(session) == SSH_ERROR)
- goto error;
- /* We are in a rekeying, so we need to send the server kex */
- if(ssh_send_kex(session, 1) < 0)
- goto error;
- }
- ssh_list_kex(&session->next_crypto->client_kex); // log client kex
- if (ssh_kex_select_methods(session) < 0) {
+ /* We are in a rekeying, so we need to send the server kex */
+ if (ssh_send_kex(session) < 0)
goto error;
- }
- if (crypt_set_algorithms_server(session) == SSH_ERROR)
+ }
+ ssh_list_kex(&session->next_crypto->client_kex); // log client kex
+ if (ssh_kex_select_methods(session) < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (crypt_set_algorithms_server(session) == SSH_ERROR)
+ goto error;
+ set_status(session, 0.8f);
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH:
+ if (session->dh_handshake_state == DH_STATE_FINISHED) {
+
+ rc = ssh_packet_set_newkeys(session, SSH_DIRECTION_IN);
+ if (rc != SSH_OK) {
goto error;
- set_status(session,0.8f);
- session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH;
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH:
- if(session->dh_handshake_state==DH_STATE_FINISHED){
-
- rc = ssh_packet_set_newkeys(session, SSH_DIRECTION_IN);
- if (rc != SSH_OK) {
- goto error;
- }
+ }
+ /*
+ * If the client supports extension negotiation, we will send
+ * our supported extensions now. This is the first message after
+ * sending NEWKEYS message and after turning on crypto.
+ */
+ if (session->extensions & SSH_EXT_NEGOTIATION &&
+ session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATED) {
/*
- * If the client supports extension negotiation, we will send
- * our supported extensions now. This is the first message after
- * sending NEWKEYS message and after turning on crypto.
+ * Only send an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message the first time the
+ * client undergoes NEWKEYS. It is unexpected for this message
+ * to be sent upon rekey, and may cause clients to log error
+ * messages.
+ *
+ * The session_state can not be used for this purpose because it
+ * is re-set to SSH_SESSION_STATE_KEXINIT_RECEIVED during rekey.
+ * So, use the connected flag which transitions from non-zero
+ * below.
+ *
+ * See also:
+ * - https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2929
*/
- if (session->extensions & SSH_EXT_NEGOTIATION &&
- session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATED) {
-
- /*
- * Only send an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message the first time the client
- * undergoes NEWKEYS. It is unexpected for this message to be sent
- * upon rekey, and may cause clients to log error messages.
- *
- * The session_state can not be used for this purpose because it is
- * re-set to SSH_SESSION_STATE_KEXINIT_RECEIVED during rekey. So,
- * use the connected flag which transitions from non-zero below.
- *
- * See also:
- * - https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2929
- */
- if (session->connected == 0) {
- ssh_server_send_extensions(session);
- }
+ if (session->connected == 0) {
+ ssh_server_send_extensions(session);
}
+ }
- set_status(session,1.0f);
- session->connected = 1;
- session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATING;
- if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED)
- session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATED;
+ set_status(session, 1.0f);
+ session->connected = 1;
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATING;
+ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED)
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATED;
- }
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATING:
- break;
- case SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR:
- goto error;
- default:
- ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Invalid state %d",session->session_state);
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_AUTHENTICATING:
+ break;
+ case SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR:
+ goto error;
+ default:
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Invalid state %d",
+ session->session_state);
}
return;
error:
ssh_socket_close(session->socket);
session->alive = 0;
- session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
+ session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
}
/**
@@ -459,16 +466,17 @@
* @param user is a pointer to session
* @returns Number of bytes processed, or zero if the banner is not complete.
*/
-static size_t callback_receive_banner(const void *data, size_t len, void *user) {
- char *buffer = (char *) data;
- ssh_session session = (ssh_session) user;
+static size_t callback_receive_banner(const void *data, size_t len, void *user)
+{
+ char *buffer = (char *)data;
+ ssh_session session = (ssh_session)user;
char *str = NULL;
size_t i;
size_t processed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
#ifdef WITH_PCAP
- if(session->pcap_ctx && buffer[i] == '\n') {
+ if (session->pcap_ctx && buffer[i] == '\n') {
ssh_pcap_context_write(session->pcap_ctx,
SSH_PCAP_DIR_IN,
buffer,
@@ -477,11 +485,11 @@
}
#endif
if (buffer[i] == '\r') {
- buffer[i]='\0';
+ buffer[i] = '\0';
}
if (buffer[i] == '\n') {
- buffer[i]='\0';
+ buffer[i] = '\0';
str = strdup(buffer);
/* number of bytes read */
@@ -494,10 +502,11 @@
return processed;
}
- if(i > 127) {
+ if (i > 127) {
/* Too big banner */
session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Receiving banner: too large banner");
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL,
+ "Receiving banner: too large banner");
return 0;
}
@@ -549,10 +558,14 @@
}
/* Do the banner and key exchange */
-int ssh_handle_key_exchange(ssh_session session) {
+int ssh_handle_key_exchange(ssh_session session)
+{
int rc;
- if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_NONE)
- goto pending;
+
+ if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_NONE) {
+ goto pending;
+ }
+
rc = ssh_send_banner(session, 1);
if (rc < 0) {
return SSH_ERROR;
@@ -563,27 +576,28 @@
session->ssh_connection_callback = ssh_server_connection_callback;
session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_SOCKET_CONNECTED;
ssh_socket_set_callbacks(session->socket,&session->socket_callbacks);
- session->socket_callbacks.data=callback_receive_banner;
- session->socket_callbacks.exception=ssh_socket_exception_callback;
- session->socket_callbacks.userdata=session;
+ session->socket_callbacks.data = callback_receive_banner;
+ session->socket_callbacks.exception = ssh_socket_exception_callback;
+ session->socket_callbacks.userdata = session;
rc = server_set_kex(session);
if (rc < 0) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- pending:
+pending:
rc = ssh_handle_packets_termination(session, SSH_TIMEOUT_USER,
- ssh_server_kex_termination,session);
+ ssh_server_kex_termination,session);
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "ssh_handle_key_exchange: current state : %d",
- session->session_state);
- if (rc != SSH_OK)
- return rc;
+ session->session_state);
+ if (rc != SSH_OK) {
+ return rc;
+ }
if (session->session_state == SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR ||
session->session_state == SSH_SESSION_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
- return SSH_ERROR;
+ return SSH_ERROR;
}
- return SSH_OK;
+ return SSH_OK;
}
/* messages */
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/token.c ./src/token.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/token.c 2023-04-27 14:25:46.346381527 +0200
+++ ./src/token.c 2023-04-27 14:34:36.426602679 +0200
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
return NULL;
}
- tokens->buffer= strdup(chain);
+ tokens->buffer = strdup(chain);
if (tokens->buffer == NULL) {
goto error;
}
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/src/wrapper.c ./src/wrapper.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/src/wrapper.c 2022-08-30 13:26:05.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/wrapper.c 2023-04-27 14:31:16.130584204 +0200
@@ -150,15 +150,16 @@
SAFE_FREE(cipher);
}
-struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto_new(void) {
- struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto;
+struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto_new(void)
+{
+ struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto;
- crypto = malloc(sizeof(struct ssh_crypto_struct));
- if (crypto == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
- ZERO_STRUCTP(crypto);
- return crypto;
+ crypto = malloc(sizeof(struct ssh_crypto_struct));
+ if (crypto == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ZERO_STRUCTP(crypto);
+ return crypto;
}
void crypto_free(struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto)
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/client/torture_rekey.c 2022-09-02 09:56:54.000000000 +0200
+++ ./tests/client/torture_rekey.c 2023-04-27 14:38:20.352896968 +0200
@@ -192,10 +192,11 @@
rc = ssh_userauth_publickey_auto(s->ssh.session, NULL, NULL);
assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
- /* send ignore packets of up to 1KB to trigger rekey */
+ /* send ignore packets of up to 1KB to trigger rekey. Send little bit more
+ * to make sure it completes with all different ciphers */
memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
memset(data, 'A', 128);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_RETRY; i++) {
ssh_send_ignore(s->ssh.session, data);
ssh_handle_packets(s->ssh.session, 50);
}
@@ -671,6 +672,92 @@
#endif /* WITH_SFTP */
+static void setup_server_for_good_guess(void *state)
+{
+ const char *default_sshd_config = "KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256";
+ const char *fips_sshd_config = "KexAlgorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp256";
+ const char *sshd_config = default_sshd_config;
+
+ if (ssh_fips_mode()) {
+ sshd_config = fips_sshd_config;
+ }
+ /* This sets an only supported kex algorithm that we do not have as a first
+ * option */
+ torture_update_sshd_config(state, sshd_config);
+}
+
+static void torture_rekey_guess_send(void **state)
+{
+ struct torture_state *s = *state;
+
+ setup_server_for_good_guess(state);
+
+ /* Make the client send the first_kex_packet_follows flag during key
+ * exchange as well as during the rekey */
+ s->ssh.session->send_first_kex_follows = true;
+
+ torture_rekey_send(state);
+}
+
+static void torture_rekey_guess_wrong_send(void **state)
+{
+ struct torture_state *s = *state;
+ const char *sshd_config = "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha256";
+
+ /* This sets an only supported kex algorithm that we do not have as a first
+ * option */
+ torture_update_sshd_config(state, sshd_config);
+
+ /* Make the client send the first_kex_packet_follows flag during key
+ * exchange as well as during the rekey */
+ s->ssh.session->send_first_kex_follows = true;
+
+ torture_rekey_send(state);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SFTP
+static void torture_rekey_guess_recv(void **state)
+{
+ struct torture_state *s = *state;
+ int rc;
+
+ setup_server_for_good_guess(state);
+
+ /* Make the client send the first_kex_packet_follows flag during key
+ * exchange as well as during the rekey */
+ s->ssh.session->send_first_kex_follows = true;
+
+ rc = ssh_options_set(s->ssh.session, SSH_OPTIONS_REKEY_DATA, &bytes);
+ assert_ssh_return_code(s->ssh.session, rc);
+
+ session_setup_sftp(state);
+
+ torture_rekey_recv(state);
+}
+
+static void torture_rekey_guess_wrong_recv(void **state)
+{
+ struct torture_state *s = *state;
+ const char *sshd_config = "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha256";
+ int rc;
+
+ /* This sets an only supported kex algorithm that we do not have as a first
+ * option */
+ torture_update_sshd_config(state, sshd_config);
+
+ /* Make the client send the first_kex_packet_follows flag during key
+ * exchange as well as during the rekey */
+ s->ssh.session->send_first_kex_follows = true;
+
+ rc = ssh_options_set(s->ssh.session, SSH_OPTIONS_REKEY_DATA, &bytes);
+ assert_ssh_return_code(s->ssh.session, rc);
+
+ session_setup_sftp(state);
+
+ torture_rekey_recv(state);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SFTP */
+
int torture_run_tests(void) {
int rc;
struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
@@ -704,6 +791,33 @@
session_setup,
session_teardown),
/* TODO verify the two rekey are possible and the states are not broken after rekey */
+
+ cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_different_kex,
+ session_setup,
+ session_teardown),
+ /* Note, that these tests modify the sshd_config so follow-up tests
+ * might get unexpected behavior if they do not update the server with
+ * torture_update_sshd_config() too */
+ cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_send,
+ session_setup,
+ session_teardown),
+ cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_guess_send,
+ session_setup,
+ session_teardown),
+ cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_guess_wrong_send,
+ session_setup,
+ session_teardown),
+#ifdef WITH_SFTP
+ cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_server_recv,
+ session_setup_sftp_server,
+ session_teardown),
+ cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_guess_recv,
+ session_setup,
+ session_teardown),
+ cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_rekey_guess_wrong_recv,
+ session_setup,
+ session_teardown),
+#endif /* WITH_SFTP */
};
ssh_init();
diff --color -ru ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/fuzz/ssh_server_fuzzer.c ./tests/fuzz/ssh_server_fuzzer.c
--- ../libssh-0.10.4/tests/fuzz/ssh_server_fuzzer.c 2022-07-07 15:53:51.000000000 +0200
+++ ./tests/fuzz/ssh_server_fuzzer.c 2023-04-27 14:28:50.620219301 +0200
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@
ssh_set_auth_methods(session, SSH_AUTH_METHOD_NONE);
ssh_callbacks_init(&server_cb);
+ ssh_set_server_callbacks(session, &server_cb);
rc = ssh_bind_accept_fd(sshbind, session, socket_fds[0]);
assert(rc == SSH_OK);
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