libreswan/libreswan-4.9-cve-2023-30570.patch
Sahana Prasad b46bfe6447 Fix CVE-2023-30570 Malicious IKEv1 Aggressive Mode packets can crash libreswan
Resolves: rhbz#2187179

Signed-off-by: Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com>
2023-05-04 11:22:54 +02:00

130 lines
4.0 KiB
Diff

diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
index e0615323ed..401618b6dd 100644
--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
@@ -1101,10 +1101,20 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
struct state *st = NULL;
enum state_kind from_state = STATE_UNDEFINED; /* state we started in */
+ /*
+ * For the initial responses, don't leak the responder's SPI.
+ * Hence the use of send_v1_notification_from_md().
+ *
+ * AGGR mode is a mess in that the R0->R1 transition happens
+ * well before the transition succeeds.
+ */
#define SEND_NOTIFICATION(t) \
{ \
pstats(ikev1_sent_notifies_e, t); \
- if (st != NULL) \
+ if (st != NULL && \
+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_AGGR_R0 && \
+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_AGGR_R1 && \
+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_MAIN_R0) \
send_v1_notification_from_state(st, from_state, t); \
else \
send_v1_notification_from_md(md, t); \
@@ -1168,17 +1178,26 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
from_state = (md->hdr.isa_xchg == ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT ?
STATE_MAIN_R0 : STATE_AGGR_R0);
} else {
- /* not an initial message */
+ /*
+ * Possibly not an initial message. Possibly
+ * from initiator. Possibly from responder.
+ *
+ * Possibly. Which is probably hopeless.
+ */
st = find_state_ikev1(&md->hdr.isa_ike_spis,
md->hdr.isa_msgid);
if (st == NULL) {
/*
- * perhaps this is a first message
+ * Perhaps this is a first message
* from the responder and contains a
* responder cookie that we've not yet
* seen.
+ *
+ * Perhaps this is a random message
+ * with a bogus non-zero responder IKE
+ * SPI.
*/
st = find_state_ikev1_init(&md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi,
md->hdr.isa_msgid);
@@ -1189,6 +1208,21 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
/* XXX Could send notification back */
return;
}
+ if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R0) {
+ /*
+ * The only way for this to
+ * happen is for the attacker
+ * to guess the responder's
+ * IKE SPI that hasn't been
+ * sent over the wire?
+ *
+ * Well that or played 1/2^32
+ * odds.
+ */
+ llog_pexpect(md->md_logger, HERE,
+ "phase 1 message matching AGGR_R0 state");
+ return;
+ }
}
from_state = st->st_state->kind;
}
@@ -2870,7 +2904,28 @@ void complete_v1_state_transition(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, stf_s
delete_state(st);
/* wipe out dangling pointer to st */
md->v1_st = NULL;
+ } else if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R0 ||
+ st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R1 ||
+ st->st_state->kind == STATE_MAIN_R0) {
+ /*
+ *
+ * Wipe out the incomplete larval state.
+ *
+ * ARGH! In <=v4.10, the aggr code flipped the
+ * larval state to R1 right at the start of
+ * the transition and not the end, so using
+ * state to figure things out is close to
+ * useless.
+ *
+ * Deleting the state means that pluto has no
+ * way to detect and ignore amplification
+ * attacks.
+ */
+ delete_state(st);
+ /* wipe out dangling pointer to st */
+ md->v1_st = NULL;
}
+
break;
}
}
diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
index 2732951beb..87be80cb6c 100644
--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ stf_status aggr_inI1_outR1(struct state *null_st UNUSED,
/* Set up state */
struct ike_sa *ike = new_v1_rstate(c, md);
md->v1_st = &ike->sa; /* (caller will reset cur_state) */
- change_v1_state(&ike->sa, STATE_AGGR_R1);
+ change_v1_state(&ike->sa, STATE_AGGR_R0);
/*
* Warn when peer is expected to use especially dangerous
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ stf_status aggr_inI1_outR1(struct state *null_st UNUSED,
if (!v1_decode_certs(md)) {
llog_sa(RC_LOG, ike, "X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked");
- return false;
+ /* XXX notification is in order! */
+ return STF_FAIL_v1N + v1N_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
/*