SOURCES/libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-12413.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From b702e3bd21a86214d80305710ddebee8b806a9fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
-Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 14:49:51 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Fix for CVE-2026-12413
-
----
- programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c b/programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c
-index 84b289ca8f..a691346218 100644
---- a/programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c
-@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ struct msg_digest *reassemble_v2_incoming_fragments(struct v2_incoming_fragments
- 	passert(md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK] == NULL);
- 	passert(md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF] != NULL);
- 	pexpect(md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF]->payload.v2skf.isaskf_number == 1);
--	passert(md->digest_roof < elemsof(md->digest));
-+	passert(md->digest_roof <= elemsof(md->digest));
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Pass 1: Compute the total payload size.
--- 
-2.54.0
-

SOURCES/libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-14957.patch

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From bb98559906f03b5d0eb5e598d36d6607f65dfa51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
-Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 19:02:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x509: tighten nss_compat BER check
-
----
- lib/libswan/x509dn.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib/libswan/x509dn.c b/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
-index 913b944b56..d01f794d7d 100644
---- a/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
-+++ b/lib/libswan/x509dn.c
-@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static err_t format_dn(struct jambuf *buf, asn1_t dn,
- 		     * #BER.
- 		     */
- 		    (nss_compatible &&
-+		     value_content.len > 0 &&
- 		     ((const char*)value_content.ptr)[0] == '#')) {
- 			/* BER */
- 			jam(buf, "#");
--- 
-2.54.0
-
-
-From 784a2d2bf54e38efdd2c6dd64835013c850ad1e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
-Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 19:04:01 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] ikev2: check the cert's pubkey unpacked before using it -
- cve-2026-14957
-
----
- programs/pluto/nss_cert_verify.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/nss_cert_verify.c b/programs/pluto/nss_cert_verify.c
-index 3e16566fb1..43af788cb8 100644
---- a/programs/pluto/nss_cert_verify.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/nss_cert_verify.c
-@@ -392,16 +392,23 @@ static void add_decoded_cert(CERTCertDBHandle *handle,
- 	 */
- 	if (libreswan_fipsmode()) {
- 		SECKEYPublicKey *pk = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
--		passert(pk != NULL);
--		unsigned key_bit_size = pk->u.rsa.modulus.len * BITS_PER_BYTE;
--		if (pk->keyType == rsaKey && key_bit_size < FIPS_MIN_RSA_KEY_SIZE) {
--			llog(RC_LOG, logger,
--			     "FIPS: rejecting peer cert with key size %u under %u: %s",
--			     key_bit_size, FIPS_MIN_RSA_KEY_SIZE,
--			     cert->subjectName);
--			SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pk);
--			CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
--			return;
-+		if (pk == NULL) {
-+			llog_nss_error(RC_LOG, logger,
-+				       "extracting certificate public key using CERT_ExtractPublicKey() failed");
-+ 			return;
-+ 		}
-+
-+		if (pk->keyType == rsaKey) {
-+			unsigned key_bit_size = pk->u.rsa.modulus.len * BITS_PER_BYTE;
-+			if (key_bit_size < FIPS_MIN_RSA_KEY_SIZE) {
-+				llog(RC_LOG, logger,
-+				     "FIPS: rejecting peer cert with key size %u under %u: %s",
-+				     key_bit_size, FIPS_MIN_RSA_KEY_SIZE,
-+				     cert->subjectName);
-+				SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pk);
-+				CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
-+				return;
-+			}
- 		}
- 		SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pk);
- 	}
--- 
-2.54.0
-

SOURCES/libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50721.patch

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-From c3d8386105c66636d7a47c0a3912389ff2fa0f7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
-Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 14:46:10 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: in RSA_authenticate_hash_signature_raw_rsa() use
- PK11_Verify()
-
----
- lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c | 52 ++++++----------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c b/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
-index 38b44ab61d..d2f36cb3da 100644
---- a/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
-+++ b/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
-@@ -402,58 +402,20 @@ static bool RSA_authenticate_signature_raw_rsa(const struct crypt_mac *expected_
- 			      *expected_hash);
- 	}
- 
--	/*
--	 * Use the same space used by the out going hash.
--	 */
--
--	SECItem decrypted_signature = {
--		.type = siBuffer,
--	};
--
--	if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &decrypted_signature, signature.len) == NULL) {
--		llog_nss_error(RC_LOG, logger, "allocating space for decrypted RSA signature");
--		return false;
--	}
--
- 	/* NSS doesn't do const */
--	const SECItem encrypted_signature = {
--		.type = siBuffer,
--		.data = DISCARD_CONST(unsigned char *, signature.ptr),
--		.len  = signature.len,
--	};
--
--	if (PK11_VerifyRecover(seckey_public, &encrypted_signature, &decrypted_signature,
--			       lsw_nss_get_password_context(logger)) != SECSuccess) {
--		SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
--		dbg("NSS RSA verify: decrypting signature is failed");
--		*fatal_diag = NULL;
--		return false;
--	}
- 
--	if (DBGP(DBG_CRYPT)) {
--		LLOG_JAMBUF(DEBUG_STREAM, logger, buf) {
--			jam_string(buf, "NSS RSA verify: decrypted sig: ");
--			jam_nss_secitem(buf, &decrypted_signature);
--		}
--	}
-+	const SECItem signature_secitem =
-+		same_shunk_as_secitem(signature, siBuffer);
-+	const SECItem expected_hash_secitem =
-+		same_shunk_as_secitem(HUNK_AS_SHUNK(*expected_hash), siBuffer);
- 
--	/*
--	 * Expect the matching hash to appear at the end.  See above
--	 * for length check.  It may, or may not, be prefixed by a
--	 * PKCS#1 1.5 RSA ASN.1 blob.
--	 */
--	passert(decrypted_signature.len >= expected_hash->len);
--	uint8_t *start = (decrypted_signature.data
--			  + decrypted_signature.len
--			  - expected_hash->len);
--	if (!memeq(start, expected_hash->ptr, expected_hash->len)) {
--		dbg("RSA Signature NOT verified");
--		SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
-+	if (PK11_Verify(seckey_public, &signature_secitem, &expected_hash_secitem,
-+			lsw_nss_get_password_context(logger)) != SECSuccess) {
-+		dbg("NSS RSA verify: decrypting signature is failed");
- 		*fatal_diag = NULL;
- 		return false;
- 	}
- 
--	SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
- 	*fatal_diag = NULL;
- 	return true;
- }
--- 
-2.54.0
-

SOURCES/libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50722.patch

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-From 26382ee5fd03ab850c01ba96055636743bbe9c2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
-Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 14:46:51 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] crypto: in
- RSA_authenticate_hash_signature_pkcs1_1_5_rsa() use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect()
-
----
- lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c | 58 +++++++++-------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c b/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
-index d2f36cb3da..0c5a1c91e3 100644
---- a/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
-+++ b/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
-@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static struct hash_signature RSA_sign_hash_pkcs1_1_5_rsa(const struct secret_stu
- static bool RSA_authenticate_signature_pkcs1_1_5_rsa(const struct crypt_mac *expected_hash,
- 						     shunk_t signature,
- 						     struct pubkey *pubkey,
--						     const struct hash_desc *unused_hash_algo UNUSED,
-+						     const struct hash_desc *hash_alg,
- 						     diag_t *fatal_diag,
- 						     struct logger *logger)
- {
-@@ -509,58 +509,24 @@ static bool RSA_authenticate_signature_pkcs1_1_5_rsa(const struct crypt_mac *exp
- 			      *expected_hash);
- 	}
- 
--	/*
--	 * Use the same space used by the out going hash.
--	 */
--
--	SECItem decrypted_signature = {
--		.type = siBuffer,
--	};
--
--	if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &decrypted_signature, signature.len) == NULL) {
--		llog_nss_error(RC_LOG, logger, "allocating space for decrypted RSA signature");
--		return false;
--	}
-+	SECItem hash_item =
-+		same_shunk_as_secitem(HUNK_AS_SHUNK(*expected_hash), siBuffer);
- 
- 	/* NSS doesn't do const */
--	const SECItem encrypted_signature = {
--		.type = siBuffer,
--		.data = DISCARD_CONST(unsigned char *, signature.ptr),
--		.len  = signature.len,
--	};
--
--	if (PK11_VerifyRecover(seckey_public, &encrypted_signature, &decrypted_signature,
--			       lsw_nss_get_password_context(logger)) != SECSuccess) {
--		SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
--		dbg("NSS RSA verify: decrypting signature is failed");
--		*fatal_diag = NULL;
--		return false;
--	}
--
--	if (DBGP(DBG_CRYPT)) {
--		LLOG_JAMBUF(DEBUG_STREAM, logger, buf) {
--			jam_string(buf, "NSS RSA verify: decrypted sig: ");
--			jam_nss_secitem(buf, &decrypted_signature);
--		}
--	}
-+	SECItem signature_item =
-+		same_shunk_as_secitem(signature, siBuffer);
- 
--	/*
--	 * Expect the matching hash to appear at the end.  See above
--	 * for length check.  It may, or may not, be prefixed by a
--	 * PKCS#1 1.5 RSA ASN.1 blob.
--	 */
--	passert(decrypted_signature.len >= expected_hash->len);
--	uint8_t *start = (decrypted_signature.data
--			  + decrypted_signature.len
--			  - expected_hash->len);
--	if (!memeq(start, expected_hash->ptr, expected_hash->len)) {
--		dbg("RSA Signature NOT verified");
--		SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
-+	if (VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hash_item,
-+				   seckey_public,
-+				   &signature_item,
-+				   /*pubkey algorithm*/SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
-+				   /*hash algorithm*/hash_alg->nss.oid_tag,
-+				   lsw_nss_get_password_context(logger)) != SECSuccess) {
-+		ldbg_nss_error(logger, "NSS VFY_VerifyDigest() failed");
- 		*fatal_diag = NULL;
- 		return false;
- 	}
- 
--	SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
- 	*fatal_diag = NULL;
- 	return true;
- }
--- 
-2.54.0
-

SOURCES/libreswan-4.12-ikev1-compute-keymat-default.patch

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-From 5101913b1e623121a9222f11eefa18f0a2708b00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
-Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 10:43:19 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] ikev1: in compute_proto_keymat() only allow explicitly
- handled ESP algorithms
-
----
- programs/pluto/ikev1_quick.c | 41 ++++++++++++++----------------------
- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1_quick.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1_quick.c
-index 81c522c148..22c346afb4 100644
---- a/programs/pluto/ikev1_quick.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1_quick.c
-@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static bool emit_subnet_id(enum perspective perspective,
-  * RFC 2409 "IKE" section 5.5
-  * specifies how this is to be done.
-  */
--static void compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st,
-+static bool compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st,
- 				 uint8_t protoid,
- 				 struct ipsec_proto_info *pi,
- 				 const char *satypename)
-@@ -297,27 +297,13 @@ static void compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st,
- 			}
- 			break;
- 
--		case ESP_CAST:
--		case ESP_TWOFISH:
--		case ESP_SERPENT:
--		/* ESP_SEED is for IKEv1 only and not supported. Its number in IKEv2 has been re-used */
--			bad_case(pi->attrs.transattrs.ta_ikev1_encrypt);
--
- 		default:
--			/* bytes */
--			needed_len = encrypt_max_key_bit_length(pi->attrs.transattrs.ta_encrypt) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
--			if (needed_len > 0) {
--				/* XXX: check key_len coupling with kernel.c's */
--				if (pi->attrs.transattrs.enckeylen) {
--					needed_len =
--						pi->attrs.transattrs.enckeylen
--						/ BITS_PER_BYTE;
--					dbg("compute_proto_keymat: key_len=%d from peer",
--					    (int)needed_len);
--				}
--				break;
--			}
--			bad_case(pi->attrs.transattrs.ta_ikev1_encrypt);
-+		{
-+			enum_buf eb;
-+			llog(RC_LOG, st->st_logger, "rejecting request for keymat for %s",
-+			     str_enum(&esp_transformid_names, protoid, &eb));
-+			return false;
-+		}
- 		}
- 		dbg("compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=%d", (int)needed_len);
- 		needed_len += pi->attrs.transattrs.ta_integ->integ_keymat_size;
-@@ -359,14 +345,17 @@ static void compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st,
- 		DBG_dump_hunk("  inbound:", pi->inbound.keymat);
- 		DBG_dump_hunk("  outbound:", pi->outbound.keymat);
- 	}
-+
-+	return true;
- }
- 
--static void compute_keymats(struct state *st)
-+static bool compute_keymats(struct state *st)
- {
- 	if (st->st_ah.present)
--		compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_AH, &st->st_ah, "AH");
-+		return compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_AH, &st->st_ah, "AH");
- 	if (st->st_esp.present)
--		compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, &st->st_esp, "ESP");
-+		return compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, &st->st_esp, "ESP");
-+	return false;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -1460,7 +1449,9 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_continue12_tail(struct state *st, struct msg_
- 	fixup_v1_HASH(st, &hash_fixup, st->st_v1_msgid.id, rbody.cur);
- 
- 	/* Derive new keying material */
--	compute_keymats(st);
-+	if (!compute_keymats(st)) {
-+		return STF_FATAL;
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Tell the kernel to establish the new inbound SA
- 	 * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
--- 
-2.45.0
-

SOURCES/libreswan-4.12-ikev2-auth-delete-state.patch

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From 2ec448884a7467743699803f8a36ee28d237666c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
-Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 08:29:53 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] ikev2: return STF_FATAL when initiator fails to emit AUTH
- packet
-
----
- programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c b/programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c
-index 192eb1b3b6..a54a109699 100644
---- a/programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c
-@@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@ static stf_status process_v2_IKE_AUTH_request_auth_signature_continue(struct ike
- 	/* now send AUTH payload */
- 
- 	if (!emit_local_v2AUTH(ike, auth_sig, &ike->sa.st_v2_id_payload.mac, response.pbs)) {
--		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+		return STF_FATAL;
- 	}
- 	ike->sa.st_v2_ike_intermediate.used = false;
- 
--- 
-2.44.0
-
-From 16272f2475d25baab58fbed2af7c67cfb459137f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
-Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 12:19:20 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] ikev2: always return STF_FATAL if emitting AUTH fails
-
-Fix:
-  ikev2: return STF_FATAL when initiator fails to emit AUTH packet
-which really fixed the responder.
----
- programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c b/programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c
-index a54a109699..491053fb10 100644
---- a/programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c
-+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev2_ike_auth.c
-@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ stf_status initiate_v2_IKE_AUTH_request_signature_continue(struct ike_sa *ike,
- 	/* send out the AUTH payload */
- 
- 	if (!emit_local_v2AUTH(ike, auth_sig, &ike->sa.st_v2_id_payload.mac, request.pbs)) {
--		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+		return STF_FATAL;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (LIN(POLICY_MOBIKE, ike->sa.st_connection->policy)) {
--- 
-2.44.0
-

SPECS/libreswan.spec

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Name: libreswan
 Summary: IPsec implementation with IKEv1 and IKEv2 keying protocols
 # version is generated in the release script
 Version: 4.12
-Release: %{?prever:0.}2%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist}.6
+Release: %{?prever:0.}2%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist}
 License: GPLv2
 Url: https://libreswan.org/
 
@@ -53,12 +53,6 @@ Patch2: libreswan-3.32-1861360-nodefault-rsa-pss.patch
 Patch3: libreswan-4.1-maintain-obsolete-keywords.patch
 Patch6: libreswan-4.3-1934186-config.patch
 Patch7: libreswan-4.9-2176248-authby-rsasig.patch
-Patch8: libreswan-4.12-ikev2-auth-delete-state.patch
-Patch9: libreswan-4.12-ikev1-compute-keymat-default.patch
-Patch10: libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-12413.patch
-Patch11: libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50721.patch
-Patch12: libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50722.patch
-Patch13: libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-14957.patch
 
 BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel
 BuildRequires: bison
@@ -118,12 +112,6 @@ Libreswan is based on Openswan-2.6.38 which in turn is based on FreeS/WAN-2.04
 %patch3 -p1
 %patch6 -p1
 %patch7 -p1
-%patch8 -p1
-%patch9 -p1
-%patch10 -p1
-%patch11 -p1
-%patch12 -p1
-%patch13 -p1
 
 # linking to freebl is not needed
 sed -i "s/-lfreebl //" mk/config.mk
@@ -227,24 +215,6 @@ certutil -N -d sql:$tmpdir --empty-password
 %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/*/*
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Jul 23 2026 Daiki Ueno  <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2.6
-- Backport fix for CVE-2026-14957 (RHEL-212498)
-
-* Thu Jul 09 2026 Daiki Ueno  <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2.5
-- Backport fixes for CVE-2026-12413, CVE-2026-50721 and CVE-2026-50722 (RHEL-190146, RHEL-190140, RHEL-190132)
-
-* Thu Jun  6 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2.4
-- Fix CVE-2024-3652 (RHEL-32482)
-
-* Wed Apr 17 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2.3
-- Bump release to ensure el8 package is greater than el8_* packages
-
-* Tue Apr 16 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2.2
-- Fix patch application in the previous change
-
-* Mon Apr 15 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2.1
-- Fix CVE-2024-2357 (RHEL-28742)
-
 * Fri Aug 25 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2
 - Resolves: rhbz#2234731 authby=rsasig fails in FIPS policy