Sync with stable
This commit is contained in:
parent
841aaa158c
commit
c48dde0be5
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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SOURCES/ikev1_dsa.fax.bz2
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SOURCES/ikev1_psk.fax.bz2
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SOURCES/ikev2.fax.bz2
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SOURCES/libreswan-4.9.tar.gz
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SOURCES/libreswan-4.12.tar.gz
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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b35cd50b8bc0a08b9c07713bf19c72d53bfe66bb SOURCES/ikev1_dsa.fax.bz2
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861d97bf488f9e296cad8c43ab72f111a5b1a848 SOURCES/ikev1_psk.fax.bz2
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fcaf77f3deae3d8e99cdb3b1f8abea63167a0633 SOURCES/ikev2.fax.bz2
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12b7351ca7e6ba1ac787239e67027a4d82f02f10 SOURCES/libreswan-4.9.tar.gz
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786c14a4755311ea3103683a3294e1536b1e44a6 SOURCES/libreswan-4.12.tar.gz
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@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
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From 7a6c217f47b1ae37e32b173dc6d3ea7fdb86d532 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
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Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 11:24:22 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] pluto: abort processing corrupt TS payloads
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CVE-2023-23009
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Latest updates on this issue at https://libreswan.org/security/CVE-2023-23009
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---
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programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c | 5 +++++
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c b/programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c
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index 3f7519ca38..f06c40ba46 100644
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--- a/programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c
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+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c
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@@ -437,6 +437,11 @@ static bool v2_parse_tss(struct payload_digest *const ts_pd,
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d = pbs_in_struct(&ts_pd->pbs, &ikev2_ts_header_desc,
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&ts_h, sizeof(ts_h), &ts_body_pbs);
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+ if (d != NULL) {
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+ llog_diag(RC_LOG, logger, &d, "%s", "");
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+
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switch (ts_h.isath_type) {
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case IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
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case IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
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--
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2.39.2
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From 52c19ccc9455ccd91fa4946b09f8e11222f1c923 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
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Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 14:10:44 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] ikev1: only clean up a connection when it isn't deleted
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fix #1018 reported by Wolfgang.
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see also ecb9c88910df1fb070488835bf3180096f3ccba3:
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IKEv1: Remove all IPsec SA's of a connection when newest SA is removed.
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---
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programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c | 14 ++++++++++----
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1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c
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index a616c5ccf3..21765d4002 100644
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--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c
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+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c
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@@ -2130,15 +2130,16 @@ bool accept_delete(struct msg_digest *md,
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ntohl(spi));
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}
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- struct connection *rc = dst->st_connection;
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+ /* save for post delete_state() code */
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+ co_serial_t rc_serialno = dst->st_connection->serialno;
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if (nat_traversal_enabled && dst->st_connection->ikev1_natt != NATT_NONE) {
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nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst);
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v1_maybe_natify_initiator_endpoints(st, HERE);
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}
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- if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno &&
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- (rc->policy & POLICY_UP)) {
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+ if (dst->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno &&
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+ (dst->st_connection->policy & POLICY_UP)) {
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/*
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* Last IPsec SA for a permanent
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* connection that we have initiated.
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@@ -2162,7 +2163,12 @@ bool accept_delete(struct msg_digest *md,
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md->v1_st = NULL;
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}
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- if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == SOS_NOBODY) {
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+ /*
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+ * Either .newest_ipsec_sa matches DST
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+ * and is cleared, or was never set.
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+ */
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+ struct connection *rc = connection_by_serialno(rc_serialno);
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+ if (rc != NULL && rc->newest_ipsec_sa == SOS_NOBODY) {
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dbg("%s() connection '%s' -POLICY_UP", __func__, rc->name);
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rc->policy &= ~POLICY_UP;
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if (!shared_phase1_connection(rc)) {
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--
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2.39.2
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@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
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diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
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index e0615323ed..401618b6dd 100644
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--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
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+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
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@@ -1101,10 +1101,20 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
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struct state *st = NULL;
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enum state_kind from_state = STATE_UNDEFINED; /* state we started in */
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+ /*
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+ * For the initial responses, don't leak the responder's SPI.
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+ * Hence the use of send_v1_notification_from_md().
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+ *
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+ * AGGR mode is a mess in that the R0->R1 transition happens
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+ * well before the transition succeeds.
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+ */
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#define SEND_NOTIFICATION(t) \
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{ \
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pstats(ikev1_sent_notifies_e, t); \
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- if (st != NULL) \
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+ if (st != NULL && \
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+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_AGGR_R0 && \
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+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_AGGR_R1 && \
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+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_MAIN_R0) \
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send_v1_notification_from_state(st, from_state, t); \
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else \
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send_v1_notification_from_md(md, t); \
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@@ -1168,17 +1178,26 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
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from_state = (md->hdr.isa_xchg == ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT ?
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STATE_MAIN_R0 : STATE_AGGR_R0);
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} else {
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- /* not an initial message */
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+ /*
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+ * Possibly not an initial message. Possibly
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+ * from initiator. Possibly from responder.
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+ *
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+ * Possibly. Which is probably hopeless.
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+ */
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st = find_state_ikev1(&md->hdr.isa_ike_spis,
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md->hdr.isa_msgid);
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if (st == NULL) {
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/*
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- * perhaps this is a first message
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+ * Perhaps this is a first message
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* from the responder and contains a
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* responder cookie that we've not yet
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* seen.
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+ *
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+ * Perhaps this is a random message
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+ * with a bogus non-zero responder IKE
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+ * SPI.
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*/
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st = find_state_ikev1_init(&md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi,
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md->hdr.isa_msgid);
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@@ -1189,6 +1208,21 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
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/* XXX Could send notification back */
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return;
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}
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+ if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R0) {
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+ /*
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+ * The only way for this to
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+ * happen is for the attacker
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+ * to guess the responder's
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+ * IKE SPI that hasn't been
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+ * sent over the wire?
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+ *
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+ * Well that or played 1/2^32
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+ * odds.
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+ */
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+ llog_pexpect(md->md_logger, HERE,
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+ "phase 1 message matching AGGR_R0 state");
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+ return;
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+ }
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}
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from_state = st->st_state->kind;
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}
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@@ -2870,7 +2904,28 @@ void complete_v1_state_transition(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, stf_s
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delete_state(st);
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/* wipe out dangling pointer to st */
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md->v1_st = NULL;
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+ } else if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R0 ||
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+ st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R1 ||
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+ st->st_state->kind == STATE_MAIN_R0) {
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+ /*
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+ *
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+ * Wipe out the incomplete larval state.
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+ *
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+ * ARGH! In <=v4.10, the aggr code flipped the
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+ * larval state to R1 right at the start of
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+ * the transition and not the end, so using
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+ * state to figure things out is close to
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+ * useless.
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+ *
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+ * Deleting the state means that pluto has no
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+ * way to detect and ignore amplification
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+ * attacks.
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+ */
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+ delete_state(st);
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+ /* wipe out dangling pointer to st */
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+ md->v1_st = NULL;
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}
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+
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break;
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}
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}
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diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
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index 2732951beb..87be80cb6c 100644
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--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
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+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
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@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ stf_status aggr_inI1_outR1(struct state *null_st UNUSED,
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/* Set up state */
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struct ike_sa *ike = new_v1_rstate(c, md);
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md->v1_st = &ike->sa; /* (caller will reset cur_state) */
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- change_v1_state(&ike->sa, STATE_AGGR_R1);
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+ change_v1_state(&ike->sa, STATE_AGGR_R0);
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/*
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* Warn when peer is expected to use especially dangerous
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@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ stf_status aggr_inI1_outR1(struct state *null_st UNUSED,
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if (!v1_decode_certs(md)) {
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llog_sa(RC_LOG, ike, "X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked");
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- return false;
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+ /* XXX notification is in order! */
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+ return STF_FAIL_v1N + v1N_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
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}
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/*
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@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
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Name: libreswan
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Summary: IPsec implementation with IKEv1 and IKEv2 keying protocols
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# version is generated in the release script
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Version: 4.9
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Release: %{?prever:0.}3%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist}
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Version: 4.12
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Release: %{?prever:0.}2%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist}
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License: GPLv2
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Url: https://libreswan.org/
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@ -52,9 +52,7 @@ Patch1: libreswan-4.3-maintain-different-v1v2-split.patch
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Patch2: libreswan-3.32-1861360-nodefault-rsa-pss.patch
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Patch3: libreswan-4.1-maintain-obsolete-keywords.patch
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Patch6: libreswan-4.3-1934186-config.patch
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Patch7: libreswan-4.9-cve-2023-23009.patch
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Patch8: libreswan-4.9-2176248-authby-rsasig.patch
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Patch9: libreswan-4.9-cve-2023-30570.patch
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Patch7: libreswan-4.9-2176248-authby-rsasig.patch
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BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel
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BuildRequires: bison
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@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ Libreswan is based on Openswan-2.6.38 which in turn is based on FreeS/WAN-2.04
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%patch3 -p1
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%patch6 -p1
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%patch7 -p1
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%patch8 -p1
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%patch9 -p1
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# linking to freebl is not needed
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sed -i "s/-lfreebl //" mk/config.mk
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@ -219,21 +215,17 @@ certutil -N -d sql:$tmpdir --empty-password
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%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/*/*
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%changelog
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* Fri May 05 2023 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 4.9-3
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- Fix CVE-2023-30570: Malicious IKEv1 Aggressive Mode packets can crash
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libreswan
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* Fri Aug 25 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2
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- Resolves: rhbz#2234731 authby=rsasig fails in FIPS policy
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* Wed Aug 9 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-1
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- Update to 4.12 to fix CVE-2023-38710, CVE-2023-38711, CVE-2023-38712
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- Resolves: rhbz#2215955
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* Thu May 04 2023 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 4.9-2
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- Fix CVE-2023-30570 Malicious IKEv1 Aggressive Mode packets can crash libreswan
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- Resolves: rhbz#2187179
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* Tue Apr 25 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.9-2.2
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- Update libreswan-4.9-2176248-authby-rsasig.patch
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* Fri Apr 14 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.9-2.1
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- Resolves: rhbz#2187647 authby=rsasig fails in FIPS policy
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* Tue Apr 4 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.9-2
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- Fix CVE-2023-23009: remote DoS via crafted TS payload with an
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incorrect selector length (rhbz#2186127)
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* Mon Jan 9 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.9-1
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- Resolves: rhbz#2128672 Rebase libreswan to 4.9
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- Remove libreswan-4.4-ikev1-disable-diagnostics.patch no longer necessary
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Reference in New Issue