Backport fixes for CVE-2026-12413, CVE-2026-50721 and CVE-2026-50722
Resolves: RHEL-190146 Resolves: RHEL-190140 Resolves: RHEL-190132 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Daiki Ueno
Ondrej Moris
parent
de32bfbd16
commit
459896cfac
25
libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-12413.patch
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25
libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-12413.patch
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From b702e3bd21a86214d80305710ddebee8b806a9fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
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Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 14:49:51 +0900
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Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Fix for CVE-2026-12413
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---
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programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c b/programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c
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index 84b289ca8f..a691346218 100644
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--- a/programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c
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+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev2_message.c
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@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ struct msg_digest *reassemble_v2_incoming_fragments(struct v2_incoming_fragments
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passert(md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK] == NULL);
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passert(md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF] != NULL);
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pexpect(md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF]->payload.v2skf.isaskf_number == 1);
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- passert(md->digest_roof < elemsof(md->digest));
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+ passert(md->digest_roof <= elemsof(md->digest));
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/*
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* Pass 1: Compute the total payload size.
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--
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2.54.0
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83
libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50721.patch
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83
libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50721.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
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From c3d8386105c66636d7a47c0a3912389ff2fa0f7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
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Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 14:46:10 +0900
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Subject: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: in RSA_authenticate_hash_signature_raw_rsa() use
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PK11_Verify()
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---
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lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c | 52 ++++++----------------------------------
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c b/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
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index 38b44ab61d..d2f36cb3da 100644
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--- a/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
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+++ b/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
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@@ -402,58 +402,20 @@ static bool RSA_authenticate_signature_raw_rsa(const struct crypt_mac *expected_
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*expected_hash);
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}
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- /*
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- * Use the same space used by the out going hash.
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- */
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-
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- SECItem decrypted_signature = {
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- .type = siBuffer,
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- };
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-
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- if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &decrypted_signature, signature.len) == NULL) {
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- llog_nss_error(RC_LOG, logger, "allocating space for decrypted RSA signature");
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- return false;
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- }
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-
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/* NSS doesn't do const */
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- const SECItem encrypted_signature = {
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- .type = siBuffer,
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- .data = DISCARD_CONST(unsigned char *, signature.ptr),
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- .len = signature.len,
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- };
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-
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- if (PK11_VerifyRecover(seckey_public, &encrypted_signature, &decrypted_signature,
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- lsw_nss_get_password_context(logger)) != SECSuccess) {
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- SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
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- dbg("NSS RSA verify: decrypting signature is failed");
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- *fatal_diag = NULL;
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- return false;
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- }
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- if (DBGP(DBG_CRYPT)) {
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- LLOG_JAMBUF(DEBUG_STREAM, logger, buf) {
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- jam_string(buf, "NSS RSA verify: decrypted sig: ");
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- jam_nss_secitem(buf, &decrypted_signature);
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- }
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- }
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+ const SECItem signature_secitem =
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+ same_shunk_as_secitem(signature, siBuffer);
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+ const SECItem expected_hash_secitem =
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+ same_shunk_as_secitem(HUNK_AS_SHUNK(*expected_hash), siBuffer);
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- /*
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- * Expect the matching hash to appear at the end. See above
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- * for length check. It may, or may not, be prefixed by a
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- * PKCS#1 1.5 RSA ASN.1 blob.
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- */
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- passert(decrypted_signature.len >= expected_hash->len);
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- uint8_t *start = (decrypted_signature.data
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- + decrypted_signature.len
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- - expected_hash->len);
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- if (!memeq(start, expected_hash->ptr, expected_hash->len)) {
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- dbg("RSA Signature NOT verified");
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- SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
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+ if (PK11_Verify(seckey_public, &signature_secitem, &expected_hash_secitem,
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+ lsw_nss_get_password_context(logger)) != SECSuccess) {
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+ dbg("NSS RSA verify: decrypting signature is failed");
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*fatal_diag = NULL;
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return false;
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}
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- SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
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*fatal_diag = NULL;
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return true;
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}
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--
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2.54.0
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96
libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50722.patch
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96
libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50722.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
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From 26382ee5fd03ab850c01ba96055636743bbe9c2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
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Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 14:46:51 +0900
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Subject: [PATCH 2/3] crypto: in
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RSA_authenticate_hash_signature_pkcs1_1_5_rsa() use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect()
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---
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lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c | 58 +++++++++-------------------------------
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c b/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
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index d2f36cb3da..0c5a1c91e3 100644
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--- a/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
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+++ b/lib/libswan/pubkey_rsa.c
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@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static struct hash_signature RSA_sign_hash_pkcs1_1_5_rsa(const struct secret_stu
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static bool RSA_authenticate_signature_pkcs1_1_5_rsa(const struct crypt_mac *expected_hash,
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shunk_t signature,
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struct pubkey *pubkey,
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- const struct hash_desc *unused_hash_algo UNUSED,
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+ const struct hash_desc *hash_alg,
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diag_t *fatal_diag,
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struct logger *logger)
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{
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@@ -509,58 +509,24 @@ static bool RSA_authenticate_signature_pkcs1_1_5_rsa(const struct crypt_mac *exp
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*expected_hash);
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}
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- /*
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- * Use the same space used by the out going hash.
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- */
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-
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- SECItem decrypted_signature = {
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- .type = siBuffer,
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- };
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-
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- if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &decrypted_signature, signature.len) == NULL) {
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- llog_nss_error(RC_LOG, logger, "allocating space for decrypted RSA signature");
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- return false;
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- }
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+ SECItem hash_item =
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+ same_shunk_as_secitem(HUNK_AS_SHUNK(*expected_hash), siBuffer);
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/* NSS doesn't do const */
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- const SECItem encrypted_signature = {
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- .type = siBuffer,
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- .data = DISCARD_CONST(unsigned char *, signature.ptr),
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- .len = signature.len,
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- };
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-
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- if (PK11_VerifyRecover(seckey_public, &encrypted_signature, &decrypted_signature,
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- lsw_nss_get_password_context(logger)) != SECSuccess) {
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- SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
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- dbg("NSS RSA verify: decrypting signature is failed");
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- *fatal_diag = NULL;
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- return false;
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- }
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-
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- if (DBGP(DBG_CRYPT)) {
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- LLOG_JAMBUF(DEBUG_STREAM, logger, buf) {
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- jam_string(buf, "NSS RSA verify: decrypted sig: ");
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- jam_nss_secitem(buf, &decrypted_signature);
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- }
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- }
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+ SECItem signature_item =
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+ same_shunk_as_secitem(signature, siBuffer);
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- /*
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- * Expect the matching hash to appear at the end. See above
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- * for length check. It may, or may not, be prefixed by a
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- * PKCS#1 1.5 RSA ASN.1 blob.
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- */
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- passert(decrypted_signature.len >= expected_hash->len);
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- uint8_t *start = (decrypted_signature.data
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- + decrypted_signature.len
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- - expected_hash->len);
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- if (!memeq(start, expected_hash->ptr, expected_hash->len)) {
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- dbg("RSA Signature NOT verified");
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- SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
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+ if (VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hash_item,
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+ seckey_public,
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+ &signature_item,
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+ /*pubkey algorithm*/SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
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+ /*hash algorithm*/hash_alg->nss.oid_tag,
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+ lsw_nss_get_password_context(logger)) != SECSuccess) {
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+ ldbg_nss_error(logger, "NSS VFY_VerifyDigest() failed");
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*fatal_diag = NULL;
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return false;
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}
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- SECITEM_FreeItem(&decrypted_signature, PR_FALSE/*not-pointer*/);
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*fatal_diag = NULL;
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return true;
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}
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--
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2.54.0
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Name: libreswan
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Summary: IPsec implementation with IKEv1 and IKEv2 keying protocols
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# version is generated in the release script
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Version: 4.12
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Release: %{?prever:0.}2%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist}.4
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Release: %{?prever:0.}2%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist}.5
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License: GPLv2
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Url: https://libreswan.org/
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@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ Patch6: libreswan-4.3-1934186-config.patch
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Patch7: libreswan-4.9-2176248-authby-rsasig.patch
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Patch8: libreswan-4.12-ikev2-auth-delete-state.patch
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Patch9: libreswan-4.12-ikev1-compute-keymat-default.patch
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Patch10: libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-12413.patch
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Patch11: libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50721.patch
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Patch12: libreswan-4.12-CVE-2026-50722.patch
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BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel
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BuildRequires: bison
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@ -116,6 +119,9 @@ Libreswan is based on Openswan-2.6.38 which in turn is based on FreeS/WAN-2.04
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%patch7 -p1
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%patch8 -p1
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%patch9 -p1
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%patch10 -p1
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%patch11 -p1
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%patch12 -p1
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# linking to freebl is not needed
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sed -i "s/-lfreebl //" mk/config.mk
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@ -219,6 +225,9 @@ certutil -N -d sql:$tmpdir --empty-password
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%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/*/*
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%changelog
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* Thu Jul 09 2026 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2.5
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- Backport fixes for CVE-2026-12413, CVE-2026-50721 and CVE-2026-50722 (RHEL-190146, RHEL-190140, RHEL-190132)
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* Thu Jun 6 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-2.4
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- Fix CVE-2024-3652 (RHEL-32482)
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