libreswan/SOURCES/libreswan-3.29-1714331-nss-kdf.patch

diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/lib/libswan/ike_alg_aes.c libreswan-3.29/lib/libswan/ike_alg_aes.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/lib/libswan/ike_alg_aes.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/lib/libswan/ike_alg_aes.c	2019-08-11 13:31:13.849294693 -0400
@@ -23,14 +23,21 @@
 
 #include "constants.h"		/* for BYTES_FOR_BITS() */
 #include "ietf_constants.h"
+
 #include "ike_alg.h"
+#include "ike_alg_encrypt.h"
+#include "ike_alg_integ.h"
+#include "ike_alg_prf.h"
+
 #include "ike_alg_encrypt_nss_cbc_ops.h"
 #include "ike_alg_encrypt_nss_ctr_ops.h"
 #include "ike_alg_encrypt_nss_gcm_ops.h"
+#ifdef CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC
+#include "ike_alg_prf_nss_ops.h"
+#else
 #include "ike_alg_prf_nss_xcbc_ops.h"
-#include "ike_alg_encrypt.h"
-#include "ike_alg_integ.h"
-#include "ike_alg_prf.h"
+#endif
+
 #include "sadb.h"
 
 const struct encrypt_desc ike_alg_encrypt_aes_cbc = {
@@ -313,6 +320,7 @@
 	.encrypt_kernel_audit_name = "AES_CCM_C",
 };
 
+#ifdef USE_PRF_AES_XCBC
 const struct prf_desc ike_alg_prf_aes_xcbc = {
 	.common = {
 		.name = "aes_xcbc",
@@ -326,14 +334,23 @@
 		},
 		.fips = false,
 	},
+#ifdef CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC
+	.nss = {
+		.mechanism = CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC,
+	},
+	.prf_ops = &ike_alg_prf_nss_ops,
+#else
+	/* XXX: NSS encryption algorithm used by custom XCBC */
 	.nss = {
 		.mechanism = CKM_AES_ECB,
 	},
+	.prf_ops = &ike_alg_prf_nss_xcbc_ops,
+#endif
 	.prf_key_size = BYTES_FOR_BITS(128),
 	.prf_output_size = BYTES_FOR_BITS(128),
-	.prf_ops = &ike_alg_prf_nss_xcbc_ops,
 	.prf_ike_audit_name = "aes_xcbc",
 };
+#endif
 
 const struct integ_desc ike_alg_integ_aes_xcbc = {
 	.common = {
@@ -351,7 +368,7 @@
 	.integ_keymat_size = AES_XCBC_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	.integ_output_size = AES_XCBC_DIGEST_SIZE_TRUNC, /* XXX 96 */
 	.integ_ikev1_ah_transform = AH_AES_XCBC_MAC,
-#ifdef USE_XCBC
+#ifdef USE_PRF_AES_XCBC
 	.prf = &ike_alg_prf_aes_xcbc,
 #endif
 #ifdef SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/lib/libswan/ike_alg.c libreswan-3.29/lib/libswan/ike_alg.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/lib/libswan/ike_alg.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/lib/libswan/ike_alg.c	2019-08-11 13:31:13.850294706 -0400
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@
 	&ike_alg_prf_sha2_384,
 	&ike_alg_prf_sha2_512,
 #endif
-#ifdef USE_XCBC
+#ifdef USE_PRF_AES_XCBC
 	&ike_alg_prf_aes_xcbc,
 #endif
 };
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/lib/libswan/ike_alg_md5.c libreswan-3.29/lib/libswan/ike_alg_md5.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/lib/libswan/ike_alg_md5.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/lib/libswan/ike_alg_md5.c	2019-08-11 13:31:13.851294720 -0400
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 #include "ike_alg_hash.h"
 #include "ike_alg_prf.h"
 #include "ike_alg_hash_nss_ops.h"
-#include "ike_alg_prf_hmac_ops.h"
+#include "ike_alg_prf_nss_ops.h"
 #include "sadb.h"
 
 const struct hash_desc ike_alg_hash_md5 = {
@@ -63,10 +63,13 @@
 			[IKEv2_ALG_ID] = IKEv2_PRF_HMAC_MD5,
 		},
 	},
+	.nss = {
+		.mechanism = CKM_MD5_HMAC,
+	},
 	.prf_key_size = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	.prf_output_size = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	.hasher = &ike_alg_hash_md5,
-	.prf_ops = &ike_alg_prf_hmac_ops,
+	.prf_ops = &ike_alg_prf_nss_ops,
 	.prf_ike_audit_name = "md5",
 };
 
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/mk/config.mk libreswan-3.29/mk/config.mk
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/mk/config.mk	2019-08-11 13:30:45.756906229 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/mk/config.mk	2019-08-11 13:31:13.852294734 -0400
@@ -239,6 +239,18 @@
 NSS_UTIL_LDFLAGS ?= -lnssutil3
 NSPR_LDFLAGS ?= -lnspr4
 
+# Use the NSS Key Derivation Function (KDF) instead of using the NSS
+# secure hash functions to build our own PRF. With this enabled,
+# libreswan itself no longer needs to be FIPS validated.
+# Requires NSS >= 3.44
+USE_NSS_PRF?=false
+ifeq ($(USE_NSS_PRF),true)
+NSSFLAGS+=-DUSE_NSS_PRF
+USE_NSS_AVA_COPY=false
+endif
+
+#
+#
 # Use local copy of nss function CERT_CompareAVA
 # See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1336487
 # This work-around is needed with nss versions before 3.30.
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/mk/userland-cflags.mk libreswan-3.29/mk/userland-cflags.mk
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/mk/userland-cflags.mk	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/mk/userland-cflags.mk	2019-08-11 13:31:13.853294748 -0400
@@ -269,9 +269,10 @@
 LIBTWOFISH= ${OBJDIRTOP}/lib/libcrypto/libtwofish/libtwofish.a
 endif
 
-USE_XCBC ?= true
-ifeq ($(USE_XCBC),true)
-USERLAND_CFLAGS += -DUSE_XCBC
+# Requires NSS >= 3.44 or backport
+USE_PRF_AES_XCBC ?= true
+ifeq ($(USE_PRF_AES_XCBC),true)
+USERLAND_CFLAGS += -DUSE_PRF_AES_XCBC
 endif
 
 #
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/crypt_symkey.c libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/crypt_symkey.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/crypt_symkey.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/crypt_symkey.c	2019-08-11 13:31:13.854294762 -0400
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
  * for more details.
  */
 
-#include "libreswan.h"
 #include "lswalloc.h"
 #include "lswlog.h"
 #include "ike_alg.h"
@@ -23,6 +22,7 @@
 #include "crypto.h"
 #include "lswfips.h"
 #include "lswnss.h"
+#include "crypt_prf.h"		/* hack */
 
 #define SPACES "    "
 
@@ -590,9 +590,51 @@
 
 PK11SymKey *prf_key_from_symkey_bytes(const char *name,
 				      const struct prf_desc *prf,
-				      size_t symkey_start_byte, size_t sizeof_symkey,
+				      size_t symkey_start_byte, size_t symkey_size,
 				      PK11SymKey *source_key)
 {
+#ifdef CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC
+	if (prf->nss.mechanism == CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC &&
+	    symkey_size != prf->prf_key_size) {
+		PK11SymKey *tmp = symkey_from_symkey("tmp", source_key,
+						     CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED, /*flags*/0,
+						     symkey_start_byte, symkey_size);
+		/*
+		 * code lifted from ike_alg_prf_nss_xcbc_ops.c
+		 */
+		size_t dkey_sz = sizeof_symkey(tmp);
+		if (dkey_sz < prf->prf_key_size) {
+			DBGF(DBG_CRYPT, "XCBC: Key %zd<%zd too small, padding with zeros",
+			     dkey_sz, prf->prf_key_size);
+			/*
+			 * right pad with zeros
+			 */
+			chunk_t zeros = alloc_chunk(prf->prf_key_size - dkey_sz, "zeros");
+			append_symkey_chunk(&tmp, zeros);
+			freeanychunk(zeros);
+		} else {
+			pexpect(dkey_sz > prf->prf_key_size);
+			DBGF(DBG_CRYPT, "XCBC: Key %zd>%zd too big, rehashing to size",
+			     dkey_sz, prf->prf_key_size);
+			/*
+			 * put the key through the mac with a zero
+			 * key; recursive
+			 */
+			chunk_t zeros = alloc_chunk(prf->prf_key_size, "zeros");
+			PK11SymKey *zero_key = prf_key_from_bytes("zeros", prf, zeros.ptr, zeros.len);
+			freeanychunk(zeros);
+			struct crypt_prf *xmac = crypt_prf_init_symkey("xmac", prf, "zero", zero_key);
+			crypt_prf_update_symkey(xmac, "tmp", tmp);
+			PK11SymKey *tmp2 = crypt_prf_final_symkey(&xmac);
+			release_symkey(name, "tmp2", &tmp);
+			tmp = tmp2;
+		}
+		PK11SymKey *key = symkey_from_symkey(name, tmp, CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC, CKF_SIGN,
+						     0, prf->prf_key_size);
+		release_symkey(name, "tmp", &tmp);
+		return key;
+	}
+#endif
 	/*
 	 * NSS expects a key's mechanism to match the NSS algorithm
 	 * the key is intended for.  If this is wrong then the
@@ -614,7 +656,7 @@
 		mechanism = prf->nss.mechanism;
 	}
 	return symkey_from_symkey(name, source_key, mechanism, flags,
-				  symkey_start_byte, sizeof_symkey);
+				  symkey_start_byte, symkey_size);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -656,9 +698,13 @@
 PK11SymKey *key_from_symkey_bytes(PK11SymKey *source_key,
 				  size_t next_byte, size_t sizeof_key)
 {
-	return symkey_from_symkey("result", source_key,
-				  CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY,
-				  0, next_byte, sizeof_key);
+	if (sizeof_key == 0) {
+		return NULL;
+	} else {
+		return symkey_from_symkey("result", source_key,
+					  CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY,
+					  0, next_byte, sizeof_key);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/ikev1_prf.c libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/ikev1_prf.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/ikev1_prf.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/ikev1_prf.c	2019-08-11 13:31:13.855294776 -0400
@@ -17,8 +17,11 @@
  * for more details.
  */
 
+#include "lswlog.h"	/* for LSWLOG_PEXPECT() */
+
 #include "ikev1_prf.h"
 
+#include "ike_alg.h"
 #include "crypt_prf.h"
 #include "crypt_symkey.h"
 
@@ -32,6 +35,25 @@
 				   const chunk_t Nr,
 				   /*const*/ PK11SymKey *dh_secret /* NSS doesn't do const */)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf_params = {
+		.prfMechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism,
+		.bDataAsKey = CK_TRUE,
+		.bRekey = CK_FALSE,
+		.pNi = Ni.ptr,
+		.ulNiLen = Ni.len,
+		.pNr = Nr.ptr,
+		.ulNrLen = Nr.len,
+	};
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&ike_prf_params,
+		.len = sizeof(ike_prf_params),
+	};
+
+        return PK11_Derive(dh_secret, CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, &params,
+			    CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE,
+			     0);
+#else
 	/* key = Ni|Nr */
 	chunk_t key = clone_chunk_chunk(Ni, Nr, "key = Ni|Nr");
 	struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_chunk("SKEYID sig",
@@ -42,6 +64,7 @@
 	crypt_prf_update_symkey(prf, "g^xy", dh_secret);
 	/* generate */
 	return crypt_prf_final_symkey(&prf);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -51,6 +74,33 @@
 					chunk_t pre_shared_key,
 					chunk_t Ni, chunk_t Nr)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	PK11SymKey *psk = prf_key_from_bytes("psk", prf_desc,
+                                     pre_shared_key.ptr, pre_shared_key.len);
+	PK11SymKey *skeyid;
+	if (psk == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf_params = {
+		.prfMechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism,
+		.bDataAsKey = CK_FALSE,
+		.bRekey = CK_FALSE,
+		.pNi = Ni.ptr,
+		.ulNiLen = Ni.len,
+		.pNr = Nr.ptr,
+		.ulNrLen = Nr.len,
+	};
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&ike_prf_params,
+		.len = sizeof(ike_prf_params),
+	};
+	skeyid = PK11_Derive(psk, CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, &params,
+			      CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE,
+			      0 );
+	release_symkey("SKEYID psk", "psk", &psk);
+	return skeyid;
+#else
 	/* key = pre-shared-key */
 	struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_chunk("SKEYID psk", prf_desc,
 						     "psk", pre_shared_key);
@@ -59,6 +109,7 @@
 	crypt_prf_update_chunk(prf, "Nr", Nr);
 	/* generate */
 	return crypt_prf_final_symkey(&prf);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -69,6 +120,26 @@
 			   PK11SymKey *dh_secret,
 			   chunk_t cky_i, chunk_t cky_r)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike1_prf_params = {
+		.prfMechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism,
+		.bHasPrevKey = CK_FALSE,
+		.hKeygxy = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(dh_secret),
+		.pCKYi = cky_i.ptr,
+		.ulCKYiLen = cky_i.len,
+		.pCKYr = cky_r.ptr,
+		.ulCKYrLen = cky_r.len,
+		.keyNumber = 0,
+	};
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&ike1_prf_params,
+		.len = sizeof(ike1_prf_params),
+	};
+
+	return PK11_Derive(skeyid, CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, &params,
+			    CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY, CKA_DERIVE,
+			    0);
+#else
 	/* key = SKEYID */
 	struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_symkey("SKEYID_d", prf_desc,
 						      "SKEYID", skeyid);
@@ -79,6 +150,7 @@
 	crypt_prf_update_byte(prf, "0", 0);
 	/* generate */
 	return crypt_prf_final_symkey(&prf);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -89,6 +161,27 @@
 			   PK11SymKey *skeyid_d, PK11SymKey *dh_secret,
 			   chunk_t cky_i, chunk_t cky_r)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike1_prf_params = {
+		.prfMechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism,
+		.bHasPrevKey = CK_TRUE,
+		.hKeygxy = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(dh_secret),
+		.hPrevKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(skeyid_d),
+		.pCKYi = cky_i.ptr,
+		.ulCKYiLen = cky_i.len,
+		.pCKYr = cky_r.ptr,
+		.ulCKYrLen = cky_r.len,
+		.keyNumber = 1,
+	};
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&ike1_prf_params,
+		.len = sizeof(ike1_prf_params),
+	};
+
+	return PK11_Derive(skeyid, CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, &params,
+			    CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY, CKA_DERIVE,
+			    0);
+#else
 	/* key = SKEYID */
 	struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_symkey("SKEYID_a", prf_desc,
 						      "SKEYID", skeyid);
@@ -100,6 +193,7 @@
 	crypt_prf_update_byte(prf, "1", 1);
 	/* generate */
 	return crypt_prf_final_symkey(&prf);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -110,6 +204,27 @@
 			   PK11SymKey *skeyid_a, PK11SymKey *dh_secret,
 			   chunk_t cky_i, chunk_t cky_r)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike1_prf_params = {
+		.prfMechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism,
+		.bHasPrevKey = CK_TRUE,
+		.hKeygxy = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(dh_secret),
+		.hPrevKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(skeyid_a),
+		.pCKYi = cky_i.ptr,
+		.ulCKYiLen = cky_i.len,
+		.pCKYr = cky_r.ptr,
+		.ulCKYrLen = cky_r.len,
+		.keyNumber = 2,
+	};
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&ike1_prf_params,
+		.len = sizeof(ike1_prf_params),
+	};
+
+	return PK11_Derive(skeyid, CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, &params,
+			    CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY, CKA_DERIVE,
+			    0);
+#else
 	/* key = SKEYID */
 	struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_symkey("SKEYID_e", prf_desc,
 						      "SKEYID", skeyid);
@@ -121,6 +236,7 @@
 	crypt_prf_update_byte(prf, "2", 2);
 	/* generate */
 	return crypt_prf_final_symkey(&prf);
+#endif
 }
 
 PK11SymKey *appendix_b_keymat_e(const struct prf_desc *prf_desc,
@@ -128,6 +244,20 @@
 				PK11SymKey *skeyid_e,
 				unsigned required_keymat)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target = encrypter->nss.mechanism;
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&mechanism,
+		.len = sizeof(mechanism),
+	};
+	/* for when ENCRYPTER isn't NSS */
+	if (target == 0) target = CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY;
+
+	return PK11_DeriveWithFlags(skeyid_e, CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE,
+			    &params, target, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+			    required_keymat, CKF_DECRYPT);
+#else
 	if (sizeof_symkey(skeyid_e) >= required_keymat) {
 		return encrypt_key_from_symkey_bytes("keymat", encrypter,
 						     0, required_keymat,
@@ -160,4 +290,5 @@
 							     keymat);
 	release_symkey(__func__, "keymat", &keymat);
 	return cryptkey;
+#endif
 }
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/ikev2_prf.c libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/ikev2_prf.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/ikev2_prf.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/ikev2_prf.c	2019-08-11 13:33:13.680951735 -0400
@@ -32,12 +32,44 @@
 /*
  * IKEv2 - RFC4306 2.14 SKEYSEED - calculation.
  */
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+static PK11SymKey *ikev2_prfplus_key_data(
+					  const struct prf_desc *prf_desc,
+					  PK11SymKey *key,
+					  PK11SymKey *seed_key,
+					  chunk_t    seed_data,
+					  size_t required_keymat)
+{
+	CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf_plus_params = {
+		.pSeedData = seed_data.ptr,
+		.ulSeedDataLen = seed_data.len,
+		.prfMechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism,
+	};
+	if (seed_key == NULL) {
+		ike_prf_plus_params.bHasSeedKey = CK_FALSE;
+	} else {
+		ike_prf_plus_params.bHasSeedKey = CK_TRUE;
+		ike_prf_plus_params.hSeedKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(seed_key);
+	}
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&ike_prf_plus_params,
+		.len = sizeof(ike_prf_plus_params),
+	};
+
+        return PK11_Derive(key, CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, &params,
+			    CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY, CKA_DERIVE,
+			    required_keymat);
+}
+#endif
 
 PK11SymKey *ikev2_prfplus(const struct prf_desc *prf_desc,
 			PK11SymKey *key,
 			PK11SymKey *seed,
 			size_t required_keymat)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	return ikev2_prfplus_key_data(prf_desc, key, seed, empty_chunk, required_keymat);
+#else
 	uint8_t count = 1;
 
 	/* T1(prfplus) = prf(KEY, SEED|1) */
@@ -66,6 +98,7 @@
 	}
 	release_symkey(__func__, "old_t[final]", &old_t);
 	return prfplus;
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -77,6 +110,33 @@
 				  const chunk_t Ni, const chunk_t Nr,
 				  PK11SymKey *dh_secret)
 {
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	int is_aes_prf = 0;
+	switch (prf_desc->common.id[IKEv2_ALG_ID]) {
+	case IKEv2_PRF_AES128_CMAC:
+	case IKEv2_PRF_AES128_XCBC:
+		is_aes_prf = 1;
+	}
+
+	CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf_params = {
+		.prfMechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism,
+		.bDataAsKey = CK_TRUE,
+		.bRekey = CK_FALSE,
+		.pNi = Ni.ptr,
+		.ulNiLen = is_aes_prf ? BYTES_FOR_BITS(64) : Ni.len,
+		.pNr = Nr.ptr,
+		.ulNrLen = is_aes_prf ? BYTES_FOR_BITS(64) : Nr.len,
+	};
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&ike_prf_params,
+		.len = sizeof(ike_prf_params),
+	};
+
+	return PK11_Derive(dh_secret, CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, &params,
+			    CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE,
+			    0);
+#else
 	/*
 	 * 2.14.  Generating Keying Material for the IKE SA
 	 *
@@ -117,6 +177,7 @@
 	crypt_prf_update_symkey(prf, "g^ir", dh_secret);
 	/* generate */
 	return crypt_prf_final_symkey(&prf);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -127,6 +188,26 @@
 					PK11SymKey *new_dh_secret,
 					const chunk_t Ni, const chunk_t Nr)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf_params = {
+		.prfMechanism = prf_desc->nss.mechanism,
+		.bDataAsKey = CK_FALSE,
+		.bRekey = CK_TRUE,
+		.hNewKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(new_dh_secret),
+		.pNi = Ni.ptr,
+		.ulNiLen = Ni.len,
+		.pNr = Nr.ptr,
+		.ulNrLen = Nr.len,
+	};
+	SECItem params = {
+		.data = (unsigned char *)&ike_prf_params,
+		.len = sizeof(ike_prf_params),
+	};
+
+	return PK11_Derive(SK_d_old, CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, &params,
+			    CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE,
+			    0);
+#else
 	/* key = SK_d (old) */
 	struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_symkey("ike sa rekey skeyseed", prf_desc,
 						      "SK_d (old)", SK_d_old);
@@ -141,6 +222,7 @@
 	crypt_prf_update_chunk(prf, "Nr", Nr);
 	/* generate */
 	return crypt_prf_final_symkey(&prf);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -152,6 +234,17 @@
 				const ike_spis_t *SPIir,
 				size_t required_bytes)
 {
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	chunk_t seed_data;
+	PK11SymKey *prf_plus;
+
+	seed_data = clone_chunk_chunk(Ni, Nr, "seed_data = Ni || Nr");
+	append_chunk_bytes("seed_data = Nir || SPIi", &seed_data, &SPIir->initiator, sizeof(SPIir->initiator));
+	append_chunk_bytes("seed_data = Nir || SPIir", &seed_data, &SPIir->responder, sizeof(SPIir->responder));
+	prf_plus = ikev2_prfplus_key_data(prf_desc, skeyseed, NULL, seed_data, required_bytes);
+	freeanychunk(seed_data);
+	return prf_plus;
+#else
 	PK11SymKey *data = symkey_from_chunk("data", Ni);
 	append_symkey_chunk(&data, Nr);
 	append_symkey_bytes(&data, &SPIir->initiator, sizeof(SPIir->initiator));
@@ -161,6 +254,7 @@
 					    required_bytes);
 	release_symkey(__func__, "data", &data);
 	return prfplus;
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -172,6 +266,24 @@
 				  const chunk_t Ni, const chunk_t Nr,
 				  size_t required_bytes)
 {
+	if (required_bytes == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * For instance esp=null-none.  Caller should
+		 * interpret NULL to mean empty (NSS doesn't create
+		 * zero length keys).
+		 */
+		dbg("No CHILD SA KEMAT is required");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	chunk_t seed_data;
+	PK11SymKey *prf_plus;
+
+	seed_data = clone_chunk_chunk(Ni, Nr, "seed_data = Ni || Nr");
+	prf_plus = ikev2_prfplus_key_data(prf_desc, SK_d, new_dh_secret, seed_data, required_bytes);
+	freeanychunk(seed_data);
+	return prf_plus;
+#else
 	PK11SymKey *data;
 	if (new_dh_secret == NULL) {
 		data = symkey_from_chunk("data", Ni);
@@ -185,4 +297,5 @@
 					    required_bytes);
 	release_symkey(__func__, "data", &data);
 	return prfplus;
+#endif
 }
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/ikev2_psk.c libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/ikev2_psk.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/ikev2_psk.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/ikev2_psk.c	2019-08-11 13:31:13.858294817 -0400
@@ -181,6 +181,36 @@
 	PK11SymKey *prf_psk;
 
 	{
+		static const char psk_key_pad_str[] = "Key Pad for IKEv2";  /* RFC 4306  2:15 */
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+		CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf_params;
+		SECItem params;
+		CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prf_mech = st->st_oakley.ta_prf->nss.mechanism;
+		PK11SymKey *pss_key = prf_key_from_bytes("pss", st->st_oakley.ta_prf,
+                                     pss->ptr, pss->len);
+		if (pss_key == NULL) {
+			if (libreswan_fipsmode()) {
+				PASSERT_FAIL("FIPS: failure creating %s PRF context for digesting PSK",
+					     st->st_oakley.ta_prf->common.name);
+			}
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+			       "failure creating %s PRF context for digesting PSK",
+			       st->st_oakley.ta_prf->common.name);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		ike_prf_params.prfMechanism = prf_mech;
+		ike_prf_params.bDataAsKey = CK_FALSE;
+		ike_prf_params.bRekey = CK_FALSE;
+		ike_prf_params.pNi = (CK_BYTE_PTR) psk_key_pad_str;
+		ike_prf_params.ulNiLen = sizeof(psk_key_pad_str) - 1;
+		ike_prf_params.pNr = NULL;
+		ike_prf_params.ulNrLen = 0;
+		params.data = (unsigned char *)&ike_prf_params;
+		params.len = sizeof(ike_prf_params);
+		prf_psk = PK11_Derive(pss_key, CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, &params, prf_mech, CKA_SIGN, 0);
+		release_symkey("psk pss_key", "pss_key", &pss_key);
+#else
 		struct crypt_prf *prf =
 			crypt_prf_init_chunk("<prf-psk> = prf(<psk>,\"Key Pad for IKEv2\")",
 					     st->st_oakley.ta_prf,
@@ -196,12 +226,11 @@
 			return FALSE;
 		}
 
-		static const char psk_key_pad_str[] = "Key Pad for IKEv2";  /* RFC 4306  2:15 */
-
 		crypt_prf_update_bytes(prf, psk_key_pad_str, /* name */
 				       psk_key_pad_str,
 				       sizeof(psk_key_pad_str) - 1);
 		prf_psk = crypt_prf_final_symkey(&prf);
+#endif
 	}
 
 	/* calculate outer prf */
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/plutomain.c libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/plutomain.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/plutomain.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/plutomain.c	2019-08-11 13:31:13.859294831 -0400
@@ -189,6 +189,11 @@
 #ifdef NSS_IPSEC_PROFILE
 	" (IPsec profile)"
 #endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS_PRF
+	" (NSS-PRF)"
+#else
+	" (native-PRF)"
+#endif
 #ifdef USE_DNSSEC
 	" DNSSEC"
 #endif
diff -Naur libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/prf_test_vectors.c libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/prf_test_vectors.c
--- libreswan-3.29-orig/programs/pluto/prf_test_vectors.c	2019-06-10 10:22:04.000000000 -0400
+++ libreswan-3.29/programs/pluto/prf_test_vectors.c	2019-08-11 13:31:13.860294845 -0400
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
  * Ref: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4435: Test Vectors
  */
 
+#ifdef USE_PRF_AES_XCBC
 const struct prf_test_vectors aes_xcbc_prf_tests = {
 	.prf = &ike_alg_prf_aes_xcbc,
 	.tests = {
@@ -105,6 +106,10 @@
 			.message = "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213",
 			.prf_output = "0x47f51b4564966215b8985c63055ed308",
 		},
+		/*
+		 * XXX: for some reason NSS explodes when trying to
+		 * create a non-standard AES_XCBC_MAC key.
+		 */
 		{
 			.description = "Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10)",
 			.key = "0x00010203040506070809",
@@ -124,7 +129,9 @@
 		}
 	},
 };
+#endif
 
+/* So far we only have AES_XCBC PRF test vectors :/ */
 static bool test_prf_vector(const struct prf_desc *prf,
 			    const struct prf_test_vector *test)
 {
@@ -137,7 +144,6 @@
 		: alloc_chunk(test->message_size, __func__);
 	chunk_t prf_output = decode_to_chunk(__func__, test->prf_output);
 
-
 	/* chunk interface */
 	struct crypt_prf *chunk_prf = crypt_prf_init_chunk("PRF chunk interface", prf,
 							   "key", chunk_key);