kernel/secure-boot-20121026.patch

From 57c0dbcbafaa724313c672830ff0087f56a84c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 01/14] Secure boot: Add new capability

Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability
and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial
capability set if required.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index d10b7ed..4345bc8 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 
 #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND    36
 
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
+/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */
+
+#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL  37
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
 
 #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
 
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 95fd8148be46036e20fc64c480104d2a2b454e27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 02/14] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause
arbitrary kernel behaviour. Default to paranoid - in future we can
potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
 drivers/pci/proc.c      | 8 +++++++-
 drivers/pci/syscall.c   | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 6869009..c03fb85 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	loff_t init_off = off;
 	u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -844,6 +847,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
 	resource_size_t start, end;
 	int i;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
 			break;
@@ -951,6 +957,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 		      struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
 		      loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 27911b5..ac8c9a5 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
 	int size = dp->size;
 	int cnt;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -211,6 +214,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -251,7 +257,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
 	int i, ret;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
 	u32 dword;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 2d23d2726583d79062e58abcc32c7dd027d312aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 03/14] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
 environments

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
it down by default.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
 drivers/char/mem.c       | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 8c96897..a2578c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
 
 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ long sys_iopl(unsigned int level, struct pt_regs *regs)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
 	if (level > old) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index e5eedfa..1e0a660 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
 	const char __user * tmp = buf;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
-- 
1.7.11.4


From e063cb2f3a667d2540682d4bdbef91fdb23b1a84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method

It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index 5d42c24..247d58b 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
 	struct acpi_table_header table;
 	acpi_status status;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!(*ppos)) {
 		/* parse the table header to get the table length */
 		if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
-- 
1.7.11.4


From a1cccbd084c7355dcb2be7ae2934f168ce9ba9d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 05/14] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface

We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
kernel. Add a capability check to prevent that.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
index 2eb9fe8..61e055d 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
@@ -1523,6 +1523,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	int err;
 	u32 retval = -1;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
 
 	if (err < 0)
@@ -1539,6 +1542,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	int err;
 	u32 retval = -1;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
 				    &retval);
 
@@ -1563,6 +1569,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	union acpi_object *obj;
 	acpi_status status;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
 				     1, asus->debug.method_id,
 				     &input, &output);
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 1c9e53b626268f82509062751eda14e8572717cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 06/14] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 1e0a660..33eb947 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long copied;
 	void *ptr;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
-- 
1.7.11.4


From fbf919bf372b9a7a08bdacac8129d47ced1b1f19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 07/14] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
 switch on Secure Boot mode

This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset
in the init_cred struct, which everything else inherits from.  This works on
any machine and can be used to develop even if the box doesn't have UEFI.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |  7 +++++++
 kernel/cred.c                       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 9b2b8d3..93978d5 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2562,6 +2562,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be
 			enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads.
 
+	secureboot_enable=
+			[KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode.  This
+			locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the
+			CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability.  This includes things
+			like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas.  It can
+			be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes.
+
 	security=	[SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot.
 			If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first
 			security module asking for security registration will be
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index de728ac..7e6e83f 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -623,6 +623,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
 				     0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
 
+void __init secureboot_enable()
+{
+	pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+	cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
+	cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
+static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str)
+{
+	int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+	if (sb_enable)
+		secureboot_enable();
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt);
+
 /**
  * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
  * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 43ed7865d867ae692e30227d66fa58cdecbd9269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
 enabled in firmware

The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself
down.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c          |  3 +++
 include/linux/cred.h             |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index cf5437d..7f9ed48 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
 1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
 1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
 				(below)
+1EB/001	ALL	kbd_status	Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001	ALL	secure_boot	Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns
 290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
 2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
 				(array of struct e820entry)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index b3e0227..3789356 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -724,6 +724,36 @@ fail:
 	return status;
 }
 
+static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
+{
+	u8 sb, setup;
+	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
+	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+	efi_status_t status;
+
+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sb == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+
+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
+				&setup);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (setup == 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
  * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
@@ -1018,6 +1048,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
 	if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
 		goto fail;
 
+	boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table);
+
 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
 
 	status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
index 2ad874c..c7338e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ struct boot_params {
 	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
 	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
 	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
-	__u8  _pad6[5];					/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  _pad6[4];					/* 0x1ed */
 	struct setup_header hdr;    /* setup header */	/* 0x1f1 */
 	__u8  _pad7[0x290-0x1f1-sizeof(struct setup_header)];
 	__u32 edd_mbr_sig_buffer[EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX];	/* 0x290 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index f4b9b80..239bf2a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -947,6 +947,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 	io_delay_init();
 
+	if (boot_params.secure_boot)
+		secureboot_enable();
+
 	/*
 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
 	 */
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index ebbed2c..a24faf1 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
 extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
 extern void __init cred_init(void);
 
+extern void secureboot_enable(void);
+
 /*
  * check for validity of credentials
  */
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 3acf1ceb5f6f3be9103c9da16ddc24afc6d8b02a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 09/14] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
 boot environment

This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel.  This
could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model.
We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
index 9eaf708..f94341b 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
 acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
-	if (acpi_rsdp)
+	if (acpi_rsdp && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
 		return acpi_rsdp;
 #endif
 
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 03fb06d272ddc1062e610521c5cfdbe42f251209 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 10/14] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability

Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability.  This allows SELinux
policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate
capability class.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index df2de54..70e2834 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
 	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
 	{ "capability2",
-	  { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
-	    NULL } },
+	  { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm",
+	    "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } },
 	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
 	{ "tun_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 0cfaa5ecf01f8eaaa2a84d88b7258a94ac9a1bfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 11/14] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment

kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable
loading entirely in that situation.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 0668d58..8b976a5 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
 	int result;
 
 	/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 895c46276788b3711aee05a1a1d685eff69d48b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 21:29:46 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 12/14] Documentation: kernel-parameters.txt remove
 capability.disable

Remove the documentation for capability.disable.  The code supporting this
parameter was removed with:

	commit 5915eb53861c5776cfec33ca4fcc1fd20d66dd27
	Author: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
	Date:   Thu Jul 3 20:56:05 2008 +0200

    	security: remove dummy module

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 93978d5..e3e5f8c 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -446,12 +446,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			possible to determine what the correct size should be.
 			This option provides an override for these situations.
 
-	capability.disable=
-			[SECURITY] Disable capabilities.  This would normally
-			be used only if an alternative security model is to be
-			configured.  Potentially dangerous and should only be
-			used if you are entirely sure of the consequences.
-
 	ccw_timeout_log [S390]
 			See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details.
 
-- 
1.7.11.4


From 1cc529e97756554953187fe48b9b8cf0e24b9bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] modsign: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
 environment

If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
protect the trust model.  This requires that all modules be signed
with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring.  The checks for
this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter.  Make
this visible within the kernel and force it to be true.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/cred.c   | 8 ++++++++
 kernel/module.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 7e6e83f..2b0b980 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -623,11 +623,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
 				     0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+extern bool sig_enforce;
+#endif
+
 void __init secureboot_enable()
 {
 	pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
 	cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
 	cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+	/* Enable module signature enforcing */
+	sig_enforce = true;
+#endif
 }
 
 /* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index de16959..7d4c50a 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
-static bool sig_enforce = true;
+bool sig_enforce = true;
 #else
-static bool sig_enforce = false;
+bool sig_enforce = false;
 
 static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
 				      const struct kernel_param *kp)
-- 
1.7.11.4

From 945f3829d0d376c5e0c790b57c4fa9e875d602d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Add EFI signature data types, such as are used for
 containing hashes, keys and certificates for
 cryptographic verification.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/efi.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 8670eb1..836c797 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -312,6 +312,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
 #define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \
     EFI_GUID(  0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b )
 
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \
+    EFI_GUID(  0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28 )
+
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
+    EFI_GUID(  0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
+
 typedef struct {
 	efi_guid_t guid;
 	u64 table;
@@ -447,6 +453,20 @@ typedef struct {
 
 #define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR		(~0UL)
 
+typedef struct  {
+	efi_guid_t signature_owner;
+	u8 signature_data[];
+} efi_signature_data_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+	efi_guid_t signature_type;
+	u32 signature_list_size;
+	u32 signature_header_size;
+	u32 signature_size;
+	u8 signature_header[];
+	/* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */
+} efi_signature_list_t;
+
 /*
  * All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
  */
-- 
1.7.12.1


From 5934634101936bc4ee4636df7269e00c4979911c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader.  X.509
 certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as
 asymmetric type keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig      |   7 +++
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile     |   1 +
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h                 |   4 ++
 4 files changed, 119 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 6d2c2ea..eb53fc3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -35,4 +35,11 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
 	  data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
 	  public key packet found inside the certificate.
 
+config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
+	bool "EFI signature list parser"
+	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	help
+	  This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
+	  X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
+
 endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 0727204..cd8388e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
 
 #
 # X.509 Certificate handling
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59b859a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
+
+/**
+ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates
+ * @data: The data blob to parse
+ * @size: The size of the data blob
+ * @keyring: The keyring to add extracted keys to
+ */
+int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, struct key *keyring)
+{
+	unsigned offs = 0;
+	size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size);
+
+	while (size > 0) {
+		efi_signature_list_t list;
+		const efi_signature_data_t *elem;
+		key_ref_t key;
+
+		if (size < sizeof(list))
+			return -EBADMSG;
+
+		memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list));
+		pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n",
+			 offs,
+			 list.signature_type.b, list.signature_list_size,
+			 list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size);
+
+		lsize = list.signature_list_size;
+		hsize = list.signature_header_size;
+		esize = list.signature_size;
+		elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize;
+
+		if (lsize > size) {
+			pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n",
+				 __func__, offs);
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		}
+		if (lsize < sizeof(list) ||
+		    lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize ||
+		    esize < sizeof(*elem) ||
+		    elsize < esize ||
+		    elsize % esize != 0) {
+			pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) {
+			data += lsize;
+			size -= lsize;
+			offs += lsize;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		data += sizeof(list) + hsize;
+		size -= sizeof(list) + hsize;
+		offs += sizeof(list) + hsize;
+
+		for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) {
+			elem = data;
+
+			pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs);
+
+			key = key_create_or_update(
+				make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+				"asymmetric",
+				NULL,
+				&elem->signature_data,
+				esize - sizeof(*elem),
+				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				KEY_USR_VIEW,
+				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+
+			if (IS_ERR(key))
+				pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+				       PTR_ERR(key));
+			else
+				pr_notice("Loaded cert '%s'\n",
+					  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+
+			data += esize;
+			size -= esize;
+			offs += esize;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 836c797..9cc3250 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -536,6 +536,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
 extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void);
 extern struct efi_memory_map memmap;
 
+struct key;
+extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size,
+					   struct key *keyring);
+
 /**
  * efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
  * @start: starting kvirt address
-- 
1.7.12.1

From 84d11d541cc039e8561d06deab5f9b700f12f246 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:29:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] EFI: Add in-kernel variable to determine if Secure Boot
 is enabled

There are a few cases where in-kernel functions may need to know if
Secure Boot is enabled.  The added capability check cannot be used as the
kernel can't drop it's own capabilites, so we add a global variable
similar to efi_enabled so they can determine if Secure Boot is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c     | 4 +++-
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 ++
 include/linux/efi.h         | 3 +++
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 51f6970..d5b9548 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -961,8 +961,10 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 	io_delay_init();
 
-	if (boot_params.secure_boot)
+	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
 		secureboot_enable();
+		secure_boot_enabled = 1;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index aded2a9..e57320b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
 int efi_enabled;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi_enabled);
 
+int secure_boot_enabled;
+
 struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
 	.mps        = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
 	.acpi       = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 9cc3250..ff72468 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -573,11 +573,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
 # ifdef CONFIG_X86
    extern int efi_enabled;
    extern bool efi_64bit;
+   extern int secure_boot_enabled;
 # else
 #  define efi_enabled 1
+#  define secure_boot_enabled 0
 # endif
 #else
 # define efi_enabled 0
+# define secure_boot_enabled 0
 #endif
 
 /*
-- 
1.7.12.1


From 2a5f33b264daffd717b509bc5ac3cdc060b5573e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring

This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that
are blacklisted.  This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules
and if the module's certificate is found, it will refuse to load.  This is
useful in cases where third party certificates are used for module signing.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 init/Kconfig             |  8 ++++++++
 kernel/modsign_pubkey.c  | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 kernel/module-internal.h |  3 +++
 kernel/module_signing.c  | 14 +++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 6fdd6e3..7a9bf00 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1602,6 +1602,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
 	  Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
 	  key.  Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
 
+config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+	bool "Support for blacklisting module signature certificates"
+	depends on MODULE_SIG
+	help
+	  This adds support for keeping a blacklist of certificates that
+	  should not pass module signature verification.  If a module is
+	  signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
+
 choice
 	prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
 	depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
index 4646eb2..6d70783 100644
--- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
+++ b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
 struct key *modsign_keyring;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+struct key *modsign_blacklist;
+#endif
 
 extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[];
 extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[];
@@ -52,6 +55,20 @@ static __init int module_verify_init(void)
 	if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0)
 		panic("Can't instantiate module signing keyring\n");
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+	modsign_blacklist = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".modsign_blacklist",
+				    KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
+				    current_cred(),
+				    (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				    KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(modsign_blacklist))
+		panic("Can't allocate module signing blacklist keyring\n");
+
+	if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_blacklist, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0)
+		panic("Can't instantiate module signing blacklist keyring\n");
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 24f9247..51a8380 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -10,5 +10,8 @@
  */
 
 extern struct key *modsign_keyring;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+extern struct key *modsign_blacklist;
+#endif
 
 extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index ea1b1df..602aa24 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
 static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
 					  const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len)
 {
-	key_ref_t key;
+	key_ref_t key, blacklist;
 	size_t i;
 	char *id, *q;
 
@@ -157,6 +157,18 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
 
 	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+	blacklist = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_blacklist, 1),
+				   &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+	if (!IS_ERR(blacklist)) {
+		/* module is signed with a cert in the blacklist.  reject */
+		pr_err("Module key '%s' is in blacklist\n", id);
+		key_ref_put(blacklist);
+		kfree(id);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+	}
+#endif
+	
 	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
 			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
 	if (IS_ERR(key))
-- 
1.7.12.1



From ddd5e2e1b775fb19aeec7fb842e707fc35347bc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot

Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This imports those certificates into the module signing keyring.  This
allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction
with signed modules.  By importing the public certificate into the 'db'
variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
load.

In the opposite case, Secure Boot maintains a list of disallowed
certificates in the 'dbx' variable.  We load those certificates into
the newly introduced module blacklist keyring and forbid any module
signed with those from loading.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/efi.h   |  3 ++
 init/Kconfig          |  9 ++++++
 kernel/Makefile       |  3 ++
 kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c

diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index ff72468..509755e 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -318,6 +318,9 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
 #define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
     EFI_GUID(  0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
 
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \
+    EFI_GUID(  0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f )
+
 typedef struct {
 	efi_guid_t guid;
 	u64 table;
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 7a9bf00..9c4c529 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1610,6 +1610,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
 	  should not pass module signature verification.  If a module is
 	  signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
 
+config MODULE_SIG_UEFI
+	bool "Allow modules signed with certs stored in UEFI"
+	depends on MODULE_SIG && MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST && EFI
+	select EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
+	help
+	  This will import certificates stored in UEFI and allow modules
+	  signed with those to be loaded.  It will also disallow loading
+	  of modules stored in the UEFI dbx variable.
+
 choice
 	prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
 	depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 0dfeca4..ff1468f 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o
 
 $(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
 
+$(obj)/modsign_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
+
 # config_data.h contains the same information as ikconfig.h but gzipped.
 # Info from config_data can be extracted from /proc/config*
 targets += config_data.gz
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..049669d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "module-internal.h"
+
+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long *size)
+{
+	efi_status_t status;
+	unsigned long lsize = 4;
+	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
+	void *db = NULL;
+
+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
+	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+		pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!db) {
+		pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+		kfree(db);
+		db = NULL;
+		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
+	}
+out:
+	*size = lsize;
+	return db;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
+ *   */
+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+{
+	efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
+	unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */
+	if (!secure_boot_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
+	if (!db) {
+		pr_err("Couldn't get db list\n");
+		rc = -1;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Get dbx.  It might not exist, so it isn't an error if we can't
+	 * get it.
+	 */
+	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
+	if (!dbx) {
+		pr_err("Couldn't get dbx list\n");
+	}
+
+	rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, modsign_keyring);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
+
+	if (dbx) {
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize,
+			modsign_blacklist);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
+	}
+
+err:
+	kfree(db);
+	kfree(dbx);
+	return rc;
+}
+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
-- 
1.7.12.1

From d037dc552a62b1dd39b457e10c133a4509b0efc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment

There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate.  This might compromise the secure boot trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in
a Secure Boot environment.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/power/hibernate.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 kernel/power/main.c      |  4 +++-
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index b26f5f1..f04343b 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ int hibernate(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	lock_system_sleep();
 	/* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
 	if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
@@ -723,7 +727,7 @@ static int software_resume(void)
 	/*
 	 * If the user said "noresume".. bail out early.
 	 */
-	if (noresume)
+	if (noresume || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -889,6 +893,11 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
 	int i;
 	char *start = buf;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
+		buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled");
+		return buf-start;
+	}
+
 	for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) {
 		if (!hibernation_modes[i])
 			continue;
@@ -923,6 +932,9 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
 	char *p;
 	int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	p = memchr(buf, '\n', n);
 	len = p ? p - buf : n;
 
diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c
index f458238..72580c1 100644
--- a/kernel/power/main.c
+++ b/kernel/power/main.c
@@ -301,7 +301,9 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
 	}
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
-	s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
+	if (capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
+		s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
+	}
 #else
 	if (s != buf)
 		/* convert the last space to a newline */
-- 
1.7.12.1