rpms/kernel
9
2
Fork 4
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity

Merge branch 'master' of ssh://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/kernel

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Justin M. Forbes 2012-10-05 15:39:05 -05:00
commit ed866e8086
2 changed files with 47 additions and 24 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

5
kernel.spec
View File

@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
# For non-released -rc kernels, this will be appended after the rcX and
# gitX tags, so a 3 here would become part of release "0.rcX.gitX.3"
#
%global baserelease 3
%global baserelease 4
%global fedora_build %{baserelease}
# base_sublevel is the kernel version we're starting with and patching
@ -2314,6 +2314,9 @@ fi
# ||----w |
# || ||
%changelog
* Fri Oct 05 2012 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
- Adjust secure boot modsign patch
* Fri Oct 05 2012 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com>
- Fix handle-efi-roms.patch

66
secure-boot-20120924.patch
View File

@ -650,44 +650,64 @@ index 93978d5..e3e5f8c 100644
1.7.11.4
From d1a225668878a3339adcd7ce0be256e857360ada Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 1cc529e97756554953187fe48b9b8cf0e24b9bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 16:27:26 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 14/14] modsign: Reject unsigned modules in a Secure Boot
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] modsign: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
environment
If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed
with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. We add a
capability check and reject modules that are not signed.
with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. The checks for
this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter. Make
this visible within the kernel and force it to be true.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
kernel/cred.c | 8 ++++++++
kernel/module.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 7e6e83f..2b0b980 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -623,11 +623,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+extern bool sig_enforce;
+#endif
+
void __init secureboot_enable()
{
pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+ /* Enable module signature enforcing */
+ sig_enforce = true;
+#endif
}
/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index de16959..5af69cc 100644
index de16959..7d4c50a 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2463,7 +2463,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info,
}
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
- if (!err && !info->sig_ok && sig_enforce)
+ if (!err && !info->sig_ok && (sig_enforce || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
err = -EKEYREJECTED;
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
-static bool sig_enforce = true;
+bool sig_enforce = true;
#else
-static bool sig_enforce = false;
+bool sig_enforce = false;
@@ -2475,7 +2475,7 @@ found_marker:
if (err < 0 && fips_enabled)
panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n",
err);
- if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+ if (err == -ENOKEY && (!sig_enforce && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
err = 0;
return err;
}
static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
--
1.7.11.4