CVE-2015-2150 xen: NMIs triggerable by guests (rhbz 1196266 1200397)
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Josh Boyer
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@ -651,6 +651,9 @@ Patch26162: Input-synaptics-remove-X1-Carbon-3rd-gen-from-the-to.patch
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Patch26163: Input-synaptics-remove-X250-from-the-topbuttonpad-li.patch
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Patch26164: Revert-Input-synaptics-use-dmax-in-input_mt_assign_s.patch
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#CVE-2015-2150 rhbz 1196266 1200397
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Patch26165: xen-pciback-limit-guest-control-of-command-register.patch
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# git clone ssh://git.fedorahosted.org/git/kernel-arm64.git, git diff master...devel
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Patch30000: kernel-arm64.patch
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@ -1406,6 +1409,9 @@ ApplyPatch Input-synaptics-remove-X1-Carbon-3rd-gen-from-the-to.patch
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ApplyPatch Input-synaptics-remove-X250-from-the-topbuttonpad-li.patch
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ApplyPatch Revert-Input-synaptics-use-dmax-in-input_mt_assign_s.patch
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#CVE-2015-2150 rhbz 1196266 1200397
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ApplyPatch xen-pciback-limit-guest-control-of-command-register.patch
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%if 0%{?aarch64patches}
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ApplyPatch kernel-arm64.patch
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%ifnarch aarch64 # this is stupid, but i want to notice before secondary koji does.
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@ -2265,6 +2271,7 @@ fi
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%changelog
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* Wed Mar 11 2015 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> - 4.0.0-0.rc3.git1.1
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- Linux v4.0-rc3-111-gaffb8172de39
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- CVE-2015-2150 xen: NMIs triggerable by guests (rhbz 1196266 1200397)
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- Patch series to fix Lenovo *40 and Carbon X1 touchpads (rhbz 1200777 1200778)
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- Revert commit that added bad rpath to cpupower (rhbz 1199312)
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- Reenable debugging options.
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156
xen-pciback-limit-guest-control-of-command-register.patch
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156
xen-pciback-limit-guest-control-of-command-register.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
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From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
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Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 13:51:17 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
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Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
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Unsupported Request responses (by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
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and subsequently causing [CPU side] accesses to the respective address
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ranges), which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
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host.
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Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
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PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
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globally or on the specific device.
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This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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---
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drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c | 2 +-
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drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h | 2 +
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drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_header.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
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3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c
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index 46ae0f9f02ad..75fe3d466515 100644
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--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c
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+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
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#include "conf_space.h"
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#include "conf_space_quirks.h"
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-static bool permissive;
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+bool permissive;
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module_param(permissive, bool, 0644);
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/* This is where xen_pcibk_read_config_byte, xen_pcibk_read_config_word,
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diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h
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index e56c934ad137..2e1d73d1d5d0 100644
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--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h
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+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h
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@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct config_field_entry {
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void *data;
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};
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+extern bool permissive;
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+
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#define OFFSET(cfg_entry) ((cfg_entry)->base_offset+(cfg_entry)->field->offset)
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/* Add fields to a device - the add_fields macro expects to get a pointer to
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diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_header.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_header.c
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index c5ee82587e8c..2d7369391472 100644
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--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_header.c
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+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_header.c
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@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
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#include "pciback.h"
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#include "conf_space.h"
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+struct pci_cmd_info {
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+ u16 val;
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+};
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+
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struct pci_bar_info {
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u32 val;
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u32 len_val;
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@@ -20,22 +24,36 @@ struct pci_bar_info {
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#define is_enable_cmd(value) ((value)&(PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY|PCI_COMMAND_IO))
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#define is_master_cmd(value) ((value)&PCI_COMMAND_MASTER)
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-static int command_read(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 *value, void *data)
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+/* Bits guests are allowed to control in permissive mode. */
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+#define PCI_COMMAND_GUEST (PCI_COMMAND_MASTER|PCI_COMMAND_SPECIAL| \
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+ PCI_COMMAND_INVALIDATE|PCI_COMMAND_VGA_PALETTE| \
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+ PCI_COMMAND_WAIT|PCI_COMMAND_FAST_BACK)
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+
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+static void *command_init(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset)
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{
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- int i;
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- int ret;
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-
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- ret = xen_pcibk_read_config_word(dev, offset, value, data);
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- if (!pci_is_enabled(dev))
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- return ret;
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-
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- for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++) {
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- if (dev->resource[i].flags & IORESOURCE_IO)
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- *value |= PCI_COMMAND_IO;
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- if (dev->resource[i].flags & IORESOURCE_MEM)
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- *value |= PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY;
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+ struct pci_cmd_info *cmd = kmalloc(sizeof(*cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
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+ int err;
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+
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+ if (!cmd)
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+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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+
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+ err = pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &cmd->val);
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+ if (err) {
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+ kfree(cmd);
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+ return ERR_PTR(err);
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}
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+ return cmd;
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+}
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+
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+static int command_read(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 *value, void *data)
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+{
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+ int ret = pci_read_config_word(dev, offset, value);
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+ const struct pci_cmd_info *cmd = data;
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+
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+ *value &= PCI_COMMAND_GUEST;
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+ *value |= cmd->val & ~PCI_COMMAND_GUEST;
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+
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return ret;
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}
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@@ -43,6 +61,8 @@ static int command_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 value, void *data)
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{
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struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data;
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int err;
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+ u16 val;
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+ struct pci_cmd_info *cmd = data;
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dev_data = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
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if (!pci_is_enabled(dev) && is_enable_cmd(value)) {
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@@ -83,6 +103,19 @@ static int command_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 value, void *data)
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}
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}
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+ cmd->val = value;
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+
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+ if (!permissive && (!dev_data || !dev_data->permissive))
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ /* Only allow the guest to control certain bits. */
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+ err = pci_read_config_word(dev, offset, &val);
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+ if (err || val == value)
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+ return err;
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+
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+ value &= PCI_COMMAND_GUEST;
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+ value |= val & ~PCI_COMMAND_GUEST;
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+
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return pci_write_config_word(dev, offset, value);
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}
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@@ -282,6 +315,8 @@ static const struct config_field header_common[] = {
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{
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.offset = PCI_COMMAND,
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.size = 2,
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+ .init = command_init,
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+ .release = bar_release,
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.u.w.read = command_read,
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.u.w.write = command_write,
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},
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--
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2.1.0
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