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Fix 13 more Important CVEs ahead of RHEL; bump to 211.34.3

Browse Source 
Backport upstream stable fixes for newly RHEL-Affected Important CVEs
(patches 1113-1120, 1122-1126), closest-to-6.12 base, verified zero-fuzz full %prep replay:
CVE-2026-63886 63887 63888 (iscsi target), 63899 63956 (usb-serial),
63917 (ip6 vti), 63922 63924 (ipv6 exthdrs), 63939 (kvm sev),
63994 (tunnels), 64017 (blk-mq), 64026 (rxrpc), 64030 (mac80211)

CVE-2026-63950 (mm/rmap) dropped: not applicable to el10 (try_to_unmap_one has
no nr_pages batching variable; the stale-nr_pages bug the fix targets cannot occur).
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Lukoshko 2026-07-22 12:21:08 +00:00
parent e44942141f
commit 9eb71456e2
14 changed files with 1748 additions and 2 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

95
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From bf154c657828ed05399bca5d98cf1611bb048b12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 17:11:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64
decode
commit 85db7391310b1304d2dc8ae3b0b12105a9567147 upstream.
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as
kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,
passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether
the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long
as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and
the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters
can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256
(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5
(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length
up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing
base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length
exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and
unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',
so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is
kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1
base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,
DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is
added at the call site to document this.
Fixes: 1e5733883421 ("scsi: target: iscsi: Support base64 in CHAP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521151121.808477-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ CVE-2026-63886: backported to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2) from linux-6.12.y commit bf154c657828ed05399bca5d98cf1611bb048b12; applies cleanly, zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
index c8a248bd11be..02a4c9aff98d 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
@@ -339,13 +339,22 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
goto out;
}
break;
- case BASE64:
+ case BASE64: {
+ size_t r_len = strlen(chap_r);
+
+ while (r_len > 0 && chap_r[r_len - 1] == '=')
+ r_len--;
+ if (r_len > DIV_ROUND_UP(chap->digest_size * 4, 3)) {
+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R: base64 payload too long\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (chap_base64_decode(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)) !=
chap->digest_size) {
pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R: invalid BASE64\n");
goto out;
}
break;
+ }
default:
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R\n");
goto out;
@@ -472,6 +481,14 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
}
break;
case BASE64:
+ /*
+ * No overflow check needed: initiatorchg_binhex is
+ * CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN bytes and extract_param() caps
+ * initiatorchg at CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so
+ * the decoded output is at most DIV_ROUND_UP(
+ * (CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN - 1) * 3, 4) bytes, which is
+ * less than CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN.
+ */
initiatorchg_len = chap_base64_decode(initiatorchg_binhex,
initiatorchg,
strlen(initiatorchg));
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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From 30bf335e8fe170322080ee001f05ca29c50680b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 14:49:14 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends
to rsp_buf
commit bf33e01f88388c43e285492a63e539df6ffed64c upstream.
iscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates "key=value\0" records into
login->rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer
allocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call
sites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check
the remaining buffer capacity:
*length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value);
*length += 1;
output_buf = textbuf + *length;
The 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the
*input* Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal
four-byte "a=b\0" pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte
"a=NotUnderstood\0" output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response().
2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB
heap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab.
The fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses
snprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer,
and threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through
iscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in
iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and
iscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls
iscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1;
both caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR /
ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning,
so the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a
silent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL
caller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same
shape.)
Fixes: e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Tested-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ CVE-2026-63887: backported to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2) from linux-6.12.y commit 30bf335e8fe170322080ee001f05ca29c50680b3; applies cleanly, zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c
index fa3fb5f4e6bc..f98734524693 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c
@@ -899,10 +899,14 @@ static int iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero(
SENDER_TARGET,
login->rsp_buf,
&login->rsp_length,
+ MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS,
conn->param_list,
conn->tpg->tpg_attrib.login_keys_workaround);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ iscsit_tx_login_rsp(conn, ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR,
+ ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR);
return -1;
+ }
if (!iscsi_check_negotiated_keys(conn->param_list)) {
bool auth_required = iscsi_conn_auth_required(conn);
@@ -986,6 +990,7 @@ static int iscsi_target_handle_csg_one(struct iscsit_conn *conn, struct iscsi_lo
SENDER_TARGET,
login->rsp_buf,
&login->rsp_length,
+ MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS,
conn->param_list,
conn->tpg->tpg_attrib.login_keys_workaround);
if (ret < 0) {
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c
index 5b90c22ee3dc..5e15c2ea7d65 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c
@@ -1419,19 +1419,42 @@ int iscsi_decode_text_input(
return -1;
}
+/*
+ * Append "key=value" plus a trailing NUL into @textbuf at *@length.
+ * Returns 0 on success and advances *@length, or -EMSGSIZE if the
+ * record (including the NUL) would not fit in the remaining buffer.
+ */
+static int iscsi_encode_text_record(char *textbuf, u32 *length,
+ u32 textbuf_size,
+ const char *key, const char *value)
+{
+ int n;
+ u32 avail;
+
+ if (*length >= textbuf_size)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+ avail = textbuf_size - *length;
+ n = snprintf(textbuf + *length, avail, "%s=%s", key, value);
+ if (n < 0 || (u32)n + 1 > avail)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+ *length += n + 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int iscsi_encode_text_output(
u8 phase,
u8 sender,
char *textbuf,
u32 *length,
+ u32 textbuf_size,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list,
bool keys_workaround)
{
- char *output_buf = NULL;
struct iscsi_extra_response *er;
struct iscsi_param *param;
-
- output_buf = textbuf + *length;
+ int ret;
if (iscsi_enforce_integrity_rules(phase, param_list) < 0)
return -1;
@@ -1443,10 +1466,12 @@ int iscsi_encode_text_output(
!IS_PSTATE_RESPONSE_SENT(param) &&
!IS_PSTATE_REPLY_OPTIONAL(param) &&
(param->phase & phase)) {
- *length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s",
- param->name, param->value);
- *length += 1;
- output_buf = textbuf + *length;
+ ret = iscsi_encode_text_record(textbuf, length,
+ textbuf_size,
+ param->name,
+ param->value);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_overflow;
SET_PSTATE_RESPONSE_SENT(param);
pr_debug("Sending key: %s=%s\n",
param->name, param->value);
@@ -1456,10 +1481,12 @@ int iscsi_encode_text_output(
!IS_PSTATE_ACCEPTOR(param) &&
!IS_PSTATE_PROPOSER(param) &&
(param->phase & phase)) {
- *length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s",
- param->name, param->value);
- *length += 1;
- output_buf = textbuf + *length;
+ ret = iscsi_encode_text_record(textbuf, length,
+ textbuf_size,
+ param->name,
+ param->value);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_overflow;
SET_PSTATE_PROPOSER(param);
iscsi_check_proposer_for_optional_reply(param,
keys_workaround);
@@ -1469,14 +1496,21 @@ int iscsi_encode_text_output(
}
list_for_each_entry(er, &param_list->extra_response_list, er_list) {
- *length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value);
- *length += 1;
- output_buf = textbuf + *length;
+ ret = iscsi_encode_text_record(textbuf, length, textbuf_size,
+ er->key, er->value);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_overflow;
pr_debug("Sending key: %s=%s\n", er->key, er->value);
}
iscsi_release_extra_responses(param_list);
return 0;
+
+err_overflow:
+ pr_err("iSCSI login response buffer (%u bytes) exhausted, dropping login.\n",
+ textbuf_size);
+ iscsi_release_extra_responses(param_list);
+ return -1;
}
int iscsi_check_negotiated_keys(struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.h b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.h
index 00fbbebb8c75..d6cbe5dd4b00 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.h
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.h
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ extern struct iscsi_param *iscsi_find_param_from_key(char *, struct iscsi_param_
extern int iscsi_extract_key_value(char *, char **, char **);
extern int iscsi_update_param_value(struct iscsi_param *, char *);
extern int iscsi_decode_text_input(u8, u8, char *, u32, struct iscsit_conn *);
-extern int iscsi_encode_text_output(u8, u8, char *, u32 *,
+extern int iscsi_encode_text_output(u8, u8, char *, u32 *, u32,
struct iscsi_param_list *, bool);
extern int iscsi_check_negotiated_keys(struct iscsi_param_list *);
extern void iscsi_set_connection_parameters(struct iscsi_conn_ops *,
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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From ec9f19d52074a191ed1756ed4a7d39fff1a2085c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 22:47:23 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in
iscsit_handle_text_cmd()
[ Upstream commit 778c2ab142c625a8a8afa570e0f9b7873f445d99 ]
Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the
original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add
iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"):
1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).
text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then
incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest
in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the
buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
...
rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;
}
...
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);
iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so
when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the
text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched
mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text
PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against
the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to
the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text
PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.
Fix by passing the actual padded payload length
(ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc().
2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest
drop.
On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler
silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap:
kfree(text_in);
return 0;
cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text
Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which
unconditionally does
kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr);
cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL;
freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via
iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free
if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives.
On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on
the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so
#4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this
patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three
relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of
this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after
login produces two back-to-back splats:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x??
BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x??
showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in
iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once
more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels
with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free
becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts
the slab freelist.
Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop
path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock
tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4
less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together.
Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and
the wire protocol is unaffected.
Fixes: e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Tested-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ CVE-2026-63888: backported to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2) from linux-6.12.y commit ec9f19d52074a191ed1756ed4a7d39fff1a2085c; applies cleanly, zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
index 68bbdf3ee101..8a7d308da991 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -2329,8 +2329,9 @@ iscsit_handle_text_cmd(struct iscsit_conn *conn, struct iscsit_cmd *cmd,
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
iscsit_do_crypto_hash_buf(conn->conn_rx_hash,
- text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL,
- &data_crc);
+ text_in,
+ ALIGN(payload_length, 4),
+ 0, NULL, &data_crc);
if (checksum != data_crc) {
pr_err("Text data CRC32C DataDigest"
@@ -2350,6 +2351,7 @@ iscsit_handle_text_cmd(struct iscsit_conn *conn, struct iscsit_cmd *cmd,
" Command CmdSN: 0x%08x due to"
" DataCRC error.\n", hdr->cmdsn);
kfree(text_in);
+ cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL;
return 0;
}
} else {
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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From e906545641d34fb1a09a65b4b5cfdff40eb09681 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 16:19:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] USB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small
endpoint
commit 4085f0dbb1ce2251c9a5938d693de6593f0ab2bd upstream.
Make sure that the bulk-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight
bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device
report a smaller size.
Fixes: ee467a1f2066 ("USB: serial: add Moxa UPORT 12XX/14XX/16XX driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CVE-2026-63899
[ Backported from linux-6.12.y commit e906545641d34fb1a09a65b4b5cfdff40eb09681 (mainline 4085f0dbb1ce2251c9a5938d693de6593f0ab2bd); applies cleanly to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2), zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/mxuport.c b/drivers/usb/serial/mxuport.c
index ad5fdf55a02e..c9b9928c473a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/mxuport.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/mxuport.c
@@ -962,6 +962,14 @@ static int mxuport_calc_num_ports(struct usb_serial *serial,
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(epds->bulk_out) < 16);
+ /*
+ * The bulk-out buffers must be large enough for the four-byte header
+ * (and following data), but assume anything smaller than eight bytes
+ * is broken.
+ */
+ if (usb_endpoint_maxp(epds->bulk_out[0]) < 8)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
for (i = 1; i < num_ports; ++i)
epds->bulk_out[i] = epds->bulk_out[0];
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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From 225b467e3b631f38be22e4b38062a1fed02fdd21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 21:05:54 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_changelink().
commit 11b326fb0a374f4654f9be22d0f0f7abd9f7d3fe upstream.
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip -n ns1 link add vti6_test type vti6 remote ::1 local ::2 key 7
ip -n ns1 link set vti6_test netns ns2
ip -n ns2 link set vti6_test type vti6 remote ::3 local ::4 key 9
ip netns del ns2
ip netns del ns1
[ 132.495484] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 132.497609] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12376!
Commit 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing") dropped
NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL from vti6 devices. A vti6 tunnel can then
move through IFLA_NET_NS_FD. After the move dev_net(dev) points
at the new netns while t->net stays at the creation netns.
vti6_changelink() and vti6_update() still use dev_net(dev) and
dev_net(t->dev). They unlink from one per netns hash and relink
into another. The creation netns is left with a stale entry.
cleanup_net() of that netns later walks freed memory.
Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user
--map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts.
Fixes: 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing")
Reported-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyi.xie@ntu.edu.sg>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521130555.3421684-2-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ CVE-2026-63917: backported to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2) from linux-6.12.y commit 225b467e3b631f38be22e4b38062a1fed02fdd21; applies cleanly, zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
index b931092da512..2ac88593a954 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
@@ -722,10 +722,11 @@ vti6_tnl_change(struct ip6_tnl *t, const struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p,
static int vti6_update(struct ip6_tnl *t, struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p,
bool keep_mtu)
{
- struct net *net = dev_net(t->dev);
- struct vti6_net *ip6n = net_generic(net, vti6_net_id);
+ struct net *net = t->net;
+ struct vti6_net *ip6n;
int err;
+ ip6n = net_generic(net, vti6_net_id);
vti6_tnl_unlink(ip6n, t);
synchronize_net();
err = vti6_tnl_change(t, p, keep_mtu);
@@ -1036,11 +1037,12 @@ static int vti6_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[],
struct nlattr *data[],
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
- struct ip6_tnl *t;
+ struct ip6_tnl *t = netdev_priv(dev);
+ struct net *net = t->net;
struct __ip6_tnl_parm p;
- struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
- struct vti6_net *ip6n = net_generic(net, vti6_net_id);
+ struct vti6_net *ip6n;
+ ip6n = net_generic(net, vti6_net_id);
if (dev == ip6n->fb_tnl_dev)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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From 72af7beae774e46ed543f3f2f267bf0a141bfcdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 13:20:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo()
commit d47548a36639095939f4747d4c43f2271366f565 upstream.
ipv6_hop_jumbo() calls pskb_trim_rcsum(), which can change skb pointers.
Let's recompute nh pointer to make sure any change won't mess things up.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522112013.12342-1-justin.iurman@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CVE-2026-63924
Backported from linux-6.12.y commit 72af7beae774e46ed543f3f2f267bf0a141bfcdd
(mainline d47548a36639095939f4747d4c43f2271366f565); applies cleanly to the
a10 kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2 tree, zero-fuzz (line offset only). Must be
applied before CVE-2026-63922 (HAO) and after the already-shipped
CVE-2026-64132 (1111, ipv6 ioam), matching upstream order.
diff --git a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
index 43e34fe448ff..d179077a2955 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ static bool ip6_parse_tlv(bool hopbyhop,
case IPV6_TLV_JUMBO:
if (!ipv6_hop_jumbo(skb, off))
return false;
+
+ nh = skb_network_header(skb);
break;
case IPV6_TLV_CALIPSO:
if (!ipv6_hop_calipso(skb, off))
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From ff375ed1cba81392346c5bfbf0bb7a13b2946f99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 17:42:26 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh after handling HAO option
commit f7b52afe3592eae66e160586b45a3f2242972c63 upstream.
ip6_parse_tlv() caches skb_network_header(skb) in nh while walking
IPv6 TLVs.
ipv6_dest_hao() may call pskb_expand_head() for a cloned skb, which can
move the skb head and invalidate the cached network header pointer.
Refresh nh after ipv6_dest_hao() returns so any trailing padding or TLVs
are parsed from the current skb head.
This matches the existing pattern used in ip6_parse_tlv() after helpers
that can modify skb header storage.
Fixes: a831f5bbc89a ("[IPV6] MIP6: Add inbound interface of home address option.")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7aba1debc2196189172499e5769802b026f8caf8.1779247873.git.zcliangcn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CVE-2026-63922
Backported from linux-6.12.y commit ff375ed1cba81392346c5bfbf0bb7a13b2946f99
(mainline f7b52afe3592eae66e160586b45a3f2242972c63); applies cleanly to the
a10 kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2 tree, zero-fuzz (line offset only). Must be
applied after CVE-2026-63924 (JUMBO) and the already-shipped CVE-2026-64132
(1111, ipv6 ioam), matching upstream order.
diff --git a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
index d179077a2955..e91afe5ec0b5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
@@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ static bool ip6_parse_tlv(bool hopbyhop,
case IPV6_TLV_HAO:
if (!ipv6_dest_hao(skb, off))
return false;
+
+ nh = skb_network_header(skb);
break;
#endif
default:
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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From 6ca9400d36005ffdca25f80186bea781c7e1dc4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2026 13:22:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB
scratch area
commit 5867d7e202e09f037cefe77f7af4413c7c0fa088 upstream.
When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the
GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max
possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of
the shared buffer.
The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the
length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always
specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len
is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know
the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).
Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.
Fixes: 9b54e248d264 ("KVM: SEV: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20260501202250.2115252-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CVE-2026-63939
Backported from linux-6.12.y commit 6ca9400d36005ffdca25f80186bea781c7e1dc4c
(mainline 5867d7e202e09f037cefe77f7af4413c7c0fa088). Adapted to the a10
kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2 tree: the hunk that adds the in-GHCB
ghcb_sa_len assignment had its trailing context adjusted because the a10
setup_vmgexit_scratch() else-branch lacks the upstream "GHCB v2 requires the
scratch area to be within the GHCB" check. Applies on top of CVE-2026-63794
(1102, sev_dbg_crypt) which touches a different function. Zero-fuzz.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 3ff71ce..d218568 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3521,7 +3521,7 @@ int pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
}
#define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT (16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
-static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
+static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 min_len)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
@@ -3534,10 +3534,10 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
goto e_scratch;
}
- scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
+ scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + min_len;
if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
- len, scratch_gpa_beg);
+ min_len, scratch_gpa_beg);
goto e_scratch;
}
@@ -3561,21 +3561,23 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
+
+ svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = ghcb_scratch_end - scratch_gpa_beg;
} else {
/*
* The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
* limit the size
*/
- if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
+ if (min_len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
- len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
+ min_len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
goto e_scratch;
}
- scratch_va = kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ scratch_va = kvzalloc(min_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!scratch_va)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
+ if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, min_len)) {
/* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
@@ -3591,11 +3593,10 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
*/
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = true;
+ svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = min_len;
}
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
- svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = len;
-
return 0;
e_scratch:
--
2.50.1

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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 1ef25704bd3b625fd151c09feee459479f71ee64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 10:36:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] USB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small
endpoint
commit e1a9d791fd66ab2431b9e6f6f835823809869047 upstream.
Make sure that the interrupt-out endpoint max packet size is at least
eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption or NULL-pointer
dereference should a malicious device report a smaller size.
Fixes: 3416eaa1f8f8 ("USB: cypress_m8: Packet format is separate from characteristic size")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.26
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
[ johan: adjust context for 6.18 ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
CVE-2026-63956
[ Backported from linux-6.12.y commit 1ef25704bd3b625fd151c09feee459479f71ee64 (mainline e1a9d791fd66ab2431b9e6f6f835823809869047); applies cleanly to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2), zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c b/drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c
index eb47f35aab0c..905f6a560e04 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c
@@ -445,6 +445,14 @@ static int cypress_generic_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
return -ENODEV;
}
+ /*
+ * The buffer must be large enough for the one or two-byte header (and
+ * following data), but assume anything smaller than eight bytes is
+ * broken.
+ */
+ if (port->interrupt_out_size < 8)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cypress_private), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
From 50750d86a2e5266aba0c295483b3397843198b11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 20:13:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in
iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]()
[ Upstream commit b4bc94353050b1fa7b702bd4c6600710dd926cff ]
Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and
iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr()
before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head.
Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables
after the skb_cow() call.
Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed.
Fixes: 4cb47a8644cc ("tunnels: PMTU discovery support for directly bridged IP packets")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260525201335.2361845-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
CVE-2026-63994
[ Backported from linux-6.12.y commit 50750d86a2e5266aba0c295483b3397843198b11 (mainline b4bc94353050b1fa7b702bd4c6600710dd926cff); applies cleanly to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2), zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c
index 507f2f9ec400..cf496644d3df 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iptunnel_handle_offloads);
*/
static int iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp(struct sk_buff *skb, int mtu)
{
- const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
+ const struct iphdr *iph;
struct icmphdr *icmph;
struct iphdr *niph;
struct ethhdr eh;
@@ -224,7 +224,6 @@ static int iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp(struct sk_buff *skb, int mtu)
skb_copy_bits(skb, skb_mac_offset(skb), &eh, ETH_HLEN);
pskb_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN);
- skb_reset_network_header(skb);
err = pskb_trim(skb, 576 - sizeof(*niph) - sizeof(*icmph));
if (err)
@@ -234,7 +233,7 @@ static int iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp(struct sk_buff *skb, int mtu)
err = skb_cow(skb, sizeof(*niph) + sizeof(*icmph) + ETH_HLEN);
if (err)
return err;
-
+ iph = ip_hdr(skb);
icmph = skb_push(skb, sizeof(*icmph));
*icmph = (struct icmphdr) {
.type = ICMP_DEST_UNREACH,
@@ -306,7 +305,7 @@ static int iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp(struct sk_buff *skb, int mtu)
*/
static int iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6(struct sk_buff *skb, int mtu)
{
- const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+ const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h;
struct icmp6hdr *icmp6h;
struct ipv6hdr *nip6h;
struct ethhdr eh;
@@ -321,7 +320,6 @@ static int iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6(struct sk_buff *skb, int mtu)
skb_copy_bits(skb, skb_mac_offset(skb), &eh, ETH_HLEN);
pskb_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN);
- skb_reset_network_header(skb);
err = pskb_trim(skb, IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(*nip6h) - sizeof(*icmp6h));
if (err)
@@ -332,6 +330,7 @@ static int iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6(struct sk_buff *skb, int mtu)
if (err)
return err;
+ ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
icmp6h = skb_push(skb, sizeof(*icmp6h));
*icmp6h = (struct icmp6hdr) {
.icmp6_type = ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG,
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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From dc278e9bf2b9513a763353e6b9cc21e0f532954e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 12:02:53 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable
When submitting a bio to blk-mq, if the task should sleep after peeking
a cached request, but before it pops it, the plug flushes and calls
blk_mq_free_plug_rqs, freeing the cached_rqs. This creates a
use-after-free bug. Fix this by popping the cached request before any
possible blocking calls if it is suitable for use.
Popping this request first holds a queue reference, so avoid any
serialization races with queue freezes and can safely proceed with
dispatching that request to the driver. This potentially increases a
timing window from when a driver wants to freeze its queue to when
requests stop being dispatched. That scenario is off the fast path
though, and drivers need to appropriately handle requests during a
freeze request anyway.
The downside is the popped element needs to be individually freed when
we performed a bio plug merge. The cached request would have had to be
freed later anyway, but this patch does it inline with building the plug
list instead of after flushing it.
Fixes: b0077e269f6c1 ("blk-mq: make sure active queue usage is held for bio_integrity_prep()")
Fixes: 7b4f36cd22a65 ("block: ensure we hold a queue reference when using queue limits")
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521190253.242065-1-kbusch@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CVE-2026-64017
[ Backported from mainline commit dc278e9bf2b9513a763353e6b9cc21e0f532954e; applies cleanly to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2), zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c
index d0c37daf568f..28c2d931e75e 100644
--- a/block/blk-mq.c
+++ b/block/blk-mq.c
@@ -3077,7 +3077,7 @@ static struct request *blk_mq_get_new_requests(struct request_queue *q,
/*
* Check if there is a suitable cached request and return it.
*/
-static struct request *blk_mq_peek_cached_request(struct blk_plug *plug,
+static struct request *blk_mq_get_cached_request(struct blk_plug *plug,
struct request_queue *q, blk_opf_t opf)
{
enum hctx_type type = blk_mq_get_hctx_type(opf);
@@ -3093,27 +3093,10 @@ static struct request *blk_mq_peek_cached_request(struct blk_plug *plug,
return NULL;
if (op_is_flush(rq->cmd_flags) != op_is_flush(opf))
return NULL;
+ rq_list_pop(&plug->cached_rqs);
return rq;
}
-static void blk_mq_use_cached_rq(struct request *rq, struct blk_plug *plug,
- struct bio *bio)
-{
- if (rq_list_pop(&plug->cached_rqs) != rq)
- WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
-
- /*
- * If any qos ->throttle() end up blocking, we will have flushed the
- * plug and hence killed the cached_rq list as well. Pop this entry
- * before we throttle.
- */
- rq_qos_throttle(rq->q, bio);
-
- blk_mq_rq_time_init(rq, blk_time_get_ns());
- rq->cmd_flags = bio->bi_opf;
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->queuelist);
-}
-
static bool bio_unaligned(const struct bio *bio, struct request_queue *q)
{
unsigned int bs_mask = queue_logical_block_size(q) - 1;
@@ -3152,7 +3135,7 @@ void blk_mq_submit_bio(struct bio *bio)
/*
* If the plug has a cached request for this queue, try to use it.
*/
- rq = blk_mq_peek_cached_request(plug, q, bio->bi_opf);
+ rq = blk_mq_get_cached_request(plug, q, bio->bi_opf);
/*
* A BIO that was released from a zone write plug has already been
@@ -3211,7 +3194,10 @@ void blk_mq_submit_bio(struct bio *bio)
new_request:
if (rq) {
- blk_mq_use_cached_rq(rq, plug, bio);
+ rq_qos_throttle(rq->q, bio);
+ blk_mq_rq_time_init(rq, blk_time_get_ns());
+ rq->cmd_flags = bio->bi_opf;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->queuelist);
} else {
rq = blk_mq_get_new_requests(q, plug, bio);
if (unlikely(!rq)) {
@@ -3257,12 +3243,10 @@ void blk_mq_submit_bio(struct bio *bio)
return;
queue_exit:
- /*
- * Don't drop the queue reference if we were trying to use a cached
- * request and thus didn't acquire one.
- */
if (!rq)
blk_queue_exit(q);
+ else
+ blk_mq_free_request(rq);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_MQ_STACKING
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

654
1125-rxrpc-fix-data-decrypt-vs-splice-by-copying-data-to.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,654 @@
From b94a6ccbaf1104dd980150a65fdeb2f69d17d2f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 17:42:07 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer
in recvmsg
[ Upstream commit d2bc90cf6c75cb96d2ce549be6c35efa3099d25b ]
This improves the fix for CVE-2026-43500.
Fix the pagecache corruption from in-place decryption of a DATA packet
transmitted locally by splice() by getting rid of the packet sharing in the
I/O thread and unconditionally extracting the packet content into a bounce
buffer in which the buffer is decrypted. recvmsg() (or the kernel
equivalent) then copies the data from the bounce buffer to the destination
buffer. The sk_buff then remains unmodified.
This has an additional advantage in that the packet is then arranged in the
buffer with the correct alignment required for the crypto algorithms to
process directly. The performance of the crypto does seem to be a little
faster and, surprisingly, the unencrypted performance doesn't seem to
change much - possibly due to removing complexity from the I/O thread.
Yet another advantage is that the I/O thread doesn't have to copy packets
which would slow down packet distribution, ACK generation, etc..
The buffer belongs to the call and is allocated initially at 2K,
sufficiently large to hold a whole jumbo subpacket, but the buffer will be
increased in size if needed. However, to take this work, MSG_PEEK may
cause a later packet to be decrypted into the buffer, in which case the
earlier one will need re-decrypting for a subsequent recvmsg().
Note that rx_pkt_offset may legitimately see 0 as a valid offset now, so
switch to using USHRT_MAX to indicate an invalid offset.
Note also that I would generally prefer to replace the buffers of the
current sk_buff with a new kmalloc'd buffer of the right size, ditching the
old data and frags as this makes the handling of MSG_PEEK easier and
removes the re-decryption issue, but this looks like quite a complicated
thing to achieve. skb_morph() looks half way to what I want, but I don't
want to have to allocate a new sk_buff.
Fixes: d0d5c0cd1e71 ("rxrpc: Use skb_unshare() rather than skb_cow_data()")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/afKV2zGR6rrelPC7@v4bel/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515230516.2718212-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 8bfab4b6ffc2 ("rxrpc: Fix RESPONSE packet verification to extract skb to a linear buffer")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CVE-2026-64026
Backported from linux-6.12.y commit b94a6ccbaf1104dd980150a65fdeb2f69d17d2f5
(mainline d2bc90cf6c75cb96d2ce549be6c35efa3099d25b).
Adaptations for the a10 kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2 tree:
- rxgk: The 6.12.y stable commit touches only 6 files because the yfs-rxgk
(GSSAPI) security class does not exist in 6.12.y stable. a10 DOES ship a
functional rxgk security class, so the rxgk.c and rxgk_common.h hunks from
the mainline commit are included as well (otherwise rxgk DATA would be read
undecrypted from the bounce buffer and remain vulnerable to the splice
corruption). rxgk_verify_packet_encrypted() is adapted to a10, which lacks
the upstream crypto_krb5_check_data_len() pre-check (separate commit).
- net/rxrpc/call_event.c: a10 carries the newer rx_queue batching rework, so
the packet-unshare block that this fix removes has a different shape
(skb_cloned() only, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx); it is collapsed to a plain
rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb) as upstream does.
- net/rxrpc/rxkad.c: a10's rxkad_verify_packet_2() lacks the upstream
round_down() length alignment and the crypto_skcipher_decrypt() return-value
check (separate commits); those are preserved as-is (not introduced here).
- net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c: a10 lacks the upstream kdebug("verify = %d") line;
preserved as-is.
- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h, call_object.c: context differs only by a10's extra
rx_queue field/init and the rxrpc_cleanup_rx_buffers() rename.
Vulnerable pre-image confirmed present in a10 (in-place skb decryption via
skb_to_sgvec in rxkad/rxgk, RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED, rx_pkt_offset==0 recvmsg path,
call_event unshare copy). Applies zero-fuzz on the a10 tree.
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
index 2baa99b..a08e45c 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
@@ -213,8 +213,6 @@ struct rxrpc_skb_priv {
struct {
u16 offset; /* Offset of data */
u16 len; /* Length of data */
- u8 flags;
-#define RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED 0x01
};
struct {
rxrpc_seq_t first_ack; /* First packet in acks table */
@@ -774,6 +772,11 @@ struct rxrpc_call {
struct sk_buff_head recvmsg_queue; /* Queue of packets ready for recvmsg() */
struct sk_buff_head rx_queue; /* Queue of packets for this call to receive */
struct sk_buff_head rx_oos_queue; /* Queue of out of sequence packets */
+ void *rx_dec_buffer; /* Decryption buffer */
+ unsigned short rx_dec_bsize; /* rx_dec_buffer size */
+ unsigned short rx_dec_offset; /* Decrypted packet data offset */
+ unsigned short rx_dec_len; /* Decrypted packet data len */
+ rxrpc_seq_t rx_dec_seq; /* Packet in decryption buffer */
rxrpc_seq_t rx_highest_seq; /* Higest sequence number received */
rxrpc_seq_t rx_consumed; /* Highest packet consumed */
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
index fdd6832..fec59d9 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
@@ -332,25 +332,7 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpc_call *call)
saw_ack |= sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ACK;
- if (sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_DATA &&
- sp->hdr.securityIndex != 0 &&
- skb_cloned(skb)) {
- /* Unshare the packet so that it can be
- * modified by in-place decryption.
- */
- struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
-
- if (nskb) {
- rxrpc_new_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared);
- rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, nskb);
- rxrpc_free_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx);
- } else {
- /* OOM - Drop the packet. */
- rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem);
- }
- } else {
- rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb);
- }
+ rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb);
rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx);
did_receive = true;
}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
index 918f41d..ffe0a89 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_alloc_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, gfp_t gfp,
spin_lock_init(&call->notify_lock);
refcount_set(&call->ref, 1);
call->debug_id = debug_id;
+ call->rx_pkt_offset = USHRT_MAX;
call->tx_total_len = -1;
call->tx_jumbo_max = 1;
call->next_rx_timo = 20 * HZ;
@@ -553,6 +554,7 @@ static void rxrpc_cleanup_rx_buffers(struct rxrpc_call *call)
rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->recvmsg_queue);
rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->rx_queue);
rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->rx_oos_queue);
+ kfree(call->rx_dec_buffer);
}
/*
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
index 0a260df..7a26c60 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ static int none_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb)
static int none_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
-
- sp->flags |= RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
index 7fa7e77..fc01ee3 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
@@ -147,15 +147,52 @@ static void rxrpc_rotate_rx_window(struct rxrpc_call *call)
}
/*
- * Decrypt and verify a DATA packet.
+ * Decrypt and verify a DATA packet. The content of the packet is pulled out
+ * into a flat buffer rather than decrypting in place in the skbuff. This also
+ * has the advantage of aligning the buffer correctly for the crypto routines.
+ *
+ * We keep track of the sequence number of the packet currently decrypted into
+ * the buffer in ->rx_dec_seq. If MSG_PEEK is used and steps onto a new
+ * packet, subsequent recvmsg() calls will have to go back and re-decrypt the
+ * current packet.
*/
static int rxrpc_verify_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+ int ret;
- if (sp->flags & RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED)
- return 0;
- return call->security->verify_packet(call, skb);
+ if (sp->len > call->rx_dec_bsize) {
+ /* Make sure we can hold a 1412-byte jumbo subpacket and make
+ * sure that the buffer size is aligned to a crypto blocksize.
+ */
+ size_t size = clamp(round_up(sp->len, 32), 2048, 65535);
+ void *buffer = krealloc(call->rx_dec_buffer, size, GFP_NOFS);
+
+ if (!buffer)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ call->rx_dec_buffer = buffer;
+ call->rx_dec_bsize = size;
+ }
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, call->rx_dec_buffer, sp->len) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ call->rx_dec_offset = 0;
+ call->rx_dec_len = sp->len;
+ call->rx_dec_seq = sp->hdr.seq;
+ ret = call->security->verify_packet(call, skb);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err;
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ kfree(call->rx_dec_buffer);
+ call->rx_dec_buffer = NULL;
+ call->rx_dec_bsize = 0;
+ call->rx_dec_offset = 0;
+ call->rx_dec_len = 0;
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -283,16 +320,21 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call,
if (msg)
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sock->sk, skb);
- if (rx_pkt_offset == 0) {
+ if (call->rx_dec_seq != sp->hdr.seq ||
+ !call->rx_dec_buffer) {
ret2 = rxrpc_verify_data(call, skb);
trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_next, seq,
- sp->offset, sp->len, ret2);
+ call->rx_dec_offset,
+ call->rx_dec_len, ret2);
if (ret2 < 0) {
ret = ret2;
goto out;
}
- rx_pkt_offset = sp->offset;
- rx_pkt_len = sp->len;
+ }
+
+ if (rx_pkt_offset == USHRT_MAX) {
+ rx_pkt_offset = call->rx_dec_offset;
+ rx_pkt_len = call->rx_dec_len;
} else {
trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_cont, seq,
rx_pkt_offset, rx_pkt_len, 0);
@@ -304,10 +346,10 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call,
if (copy > remain)
copy = remain;
if (copy > 0) {
- ret2 = skb_copy_datagram_iter(skb, rx_pkt_offset, iter,
- copy);
- if (ret2 < 0) {
- ret = ret2;
+ ret2 = copy_to_iter(call->rx_dec_buffer + rx_pkt_offset,
+ copy, iter);
+ if (ret2 != copy) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
@@ -328,7 +370,7 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call,
/* The whole packet has been transferred. */
if (sp->hdr.flags & RXRPC_LAST_PACKET)
ret = 1;
- rx_pkt_offset = 0;
+ rx_pkt_offset = USHRT_MAX;
rx_pkt_len = 0;
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &call->recvmsg_queue);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
index 8d17b49..b9d2da9 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
@@ -473,8 +473,9 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxgk_header *hdr;
struct krb5_buffer metadata;
- unsigned int offset = sp->offset, len = sp->len;
+ unsigned int len = call->rx_dec_len;
size_t data_offset = 0, data_len = len;
+ void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer, *p = data;
u32 ac = 0;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -496,16 +497,15 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(struct rxrpc_call *call,
metadata.len = sizeof(*hdr);
metadata.data = hdr;
- ret = rxgk_verify_mic_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_Kc, &metadata,
- skb, &offset, &len, &ac);
+ ret = rxgk_verify_mic(gk->krb5, gk->rx_Kc, &metadata, &p, &len, &ac);
kfree(hdr);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != -ENOMEM)
rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, ac,
rxgk_abort_1_verify_mic_eproto);
} else {
- sp->offset = offset;
- sp->len = len;
+ call->rx_dec_offset = p - data;
+ call->rx_dec_len = len;
}
put_gk:
@@ -522,49 +522,46 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_encrypted(struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
- struct rxgk_header hdr;
- unsigned int offset = sp->offset, len = sp->len;
+ struct rxgk_header *hdr;
+ unsigned int offset = 0, len = call->rx_dec_len;
+ void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer, *p = data;
int ret;
u32 ac = 0;
_enter("");
- ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_enc, skb, &offset, &len, &ac);
+ ret = rxgk_decrypt(gk->krb5, gk->rx_enc, &p, &len, &ac);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != -ENOMEM)
rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, ac, rxgk_abort_2_decrypt_eproto);
goto error;
}
+ offset = p - data;
- if (len < sizeof(hdr)) {
+ if (len < sizeof(*hdr)) {
ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT,
rxgk_abort_2_short_header);
goto error;
}
/* Extract the header from the skb */
- ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
- if (ret < 0) {
- ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT,
- rxgk_abort_2_short_encdata);
- goto error;
- }
- offset += sizeof(hdr);
- len -= sizeof(hdr);
-
- if (ntohl(hdr.epoch) != call->conn->proto.epoch ||
- ntohl(hdr.cid) != call->cid ||
- ntohl(hdr.call_number) != call->call_id ||
- ntohl(hdr.seq) != sp->hdr.seq ||
- ntohl(hdr.sec_index) != call->security_ix ||
- ntohl(hdr.data_len) > len) {
+ hdr = data + offset;
+ offset += sizeof(*hdr);
+ len -= sizeof(*hdr);
+
+ if (ntohl(hdr->epoch) != call->conn->proto.epoch ||
+ ntohl(hdr->cid) != call->cid ||
+ ntohl(hdr->call_number) != call->call_id ||
+ ntohl(hdr->seq) != sp->hdr.seq ||
+ ntohl(hdr->sec_index) != call->security_ix ||
+ ntohl(hdr->data_len) > len) {
ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_SEALEDINCON,
rxgk_abort_2_short_data);
goto error;
}
- sp->offset = offset;
- sp->len = ntohl(hdr.data_len);
+ call->rx_dec_offset = offset;
+ call->rx_dec_len = ntohl(hdr->data_len);
ret = 0;
error:
rxgk_put(gk);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h
index 80164d8..bae8b98 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h
@@ -104,6 +104,49 @@ int rxgk_decrypt_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Apply decryption and checksumming functions a flat data buffer. The data
+ * point and length are updated to reflect the actual content of the encrypted
+ * region.
+ */
+static inline int rxgk_decrypt(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ struct crypto_aead *aead,
+ void **_data, unsigned int *_len,
+ int *_error_code)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ size_t offset = 0, len = *_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, *_data, len);
+
+ ret = crypto_krb5_decrypt(krb5, aead, sg, 1, &offset, &len);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0:
+ if (offset & 3) {
+ *_error_code = RXGK_INCONSISTENCY;
+ ret = -EPROTO;
+ break;
+ }
+ *_data += offset;
+ *_len = len;
+ break;
+ case -EBADMSG: /* Checksum mismatch. */
+ case -EPROTO:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_SEALEDINCON;
+ break;
+ case -EMSGSIZE:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_PACKETSHORT;
+ break;
+ case -ENOPKG: /* Would prefer RXGK_BADETYPE, but not available for YFS. */
+ default:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_INCONSISTENCY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Check the MIC on a region of an skbuff. The offset and length are updated
* to reflect the actual content of the secure region.
@@ -147,3 +190,42 @@ int rxgk_verify_mic_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
return ret;
}
+
+/*
+ * Check the MIC on a flat buffer. The data pointer and length are updated to
+ * reflect the actual content of the secure region.
+ */
+static inline
+int rxgk_verify_mic(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ struct crypto_shash *shash,
+ const struct krb5_buffer *metadata,
+ void **_data, unsigned int *_len,
+ u32 *_error_code)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ size_t offset = 0, len = *_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, *_data, len);
+
+ ret = crypto_krb5_verify_mic(krb5, shash, metadata, sg, 1, &offset, &len);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0:
+ *_data += offset;
+ *_len = len;
+ break;
+ case -EBADMSG: /* Checksum mismatch */
+ case -EPROTO:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_SEALEDINCON;
+ break;
+ case -EMSGSIZE:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_PACKETSHORT;
+ break;
+ case -ENOPKG: /* Would prefer RXGK_BADETYPE, but not available for YFS. */
+ default:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_INCONSISTENCY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index 3657c06..cf780ba 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -425,27 +425,24 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
rxrpc_seq_t seq,
struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
+ struct rxkad_level1_hdr *sechdr;
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
- struct scatterlist sg[16];
- u32 data_size, buf;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer;
+ u32 len = sp->len, data_size, buf;
u16 check;
- int ret;
_enter("");
- if (sp->len < 8)
+ if (len < 8)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
rxkad_abort_1_short_header);
/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
* directly into the target buffer.
*/
- sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg));
- ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sp->offset, 8);
- if (unlikely(ret < 0))
- return ret;
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, len);
/* start the decryption afresh */
memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
@@ -457,13 +454,11 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
skcipher_request_zero(req);
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
- return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN,
- rxkad_abort_1_short_encdata);
- sp->offset += sizeof(sechdr);
- sp->len -= sizeof(sechdr);
+ sechdr = data;
+ call->rx_dec_offset = sizeof(*sechdr);
+ len -= sizeof(*sechdr);
- buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
+ buf = ntohl(sechdr->data_size);
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
check = buf >> 16;
@@ -472,10 +467,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (check != 0)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
rxkad_abort_1_short_check);
- if (data_size > sp->len)
+ if (data_size > len)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN,
rxkad_abort_1_short_data);
- sp->len = data_size;
+ call->rx_dec_len = data_size;
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
return 0;
@@ -489,40 +484,24 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct skcipher_request *req)
{
const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
- struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr;
+ struct rxkad_level2_hdr *sechdr;
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
- struct scatterlist _sg[4], *sg;
- u32 data_size, buf;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer;
+ u32 len = sp->len, data_size, buf;
u16 check;
- int nsg, ret;
- _enter(",{%d}", sp->len);
+ _enter(",{%d}", len);
- if (sp->len < 8)
+ if (len < 8)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
rxkad_abort_2_short_header);
- /* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
- * directly into the target buffer.
+ /* Decrypt in place in the call's decryption buffer. TODO: We really
+ * want to decrypt directly into the target buffer.
*/
- sg = _sg;
- nsg = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags + 1;
- if (nsg <= 4) {
- nsg = 4;
- } else {
- sg = kmalloc_array(nsg, sizeof(*sg), GFP_NOIO);
- if (!sg)
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
- ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sp->offset, sp->len);
- if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
- if (sg != _sg)
- kfree(sg);
- return ret;
- }
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, len);
/* decrypt from the session key */
token = call->conn->key->payload.data[0];
@@ -530,20 +509,16 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sp->len, iv.x);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
- if (sg != _sg)
- kfree(sg);
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
- return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN,
- rxkad_abort_2_short_len);
- sp->offset += sizeof(sechdr);
- sp->len -= sizeof(sechdr);
+ sechdr = data;
+ call->rx_dec_offset = sizeof(*sechdr);
+ len -= sizeof(*sechdr);
- buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
+ buf = ntohl(sechdr->data_size);
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
check = buf >> 16;
@@ -553,17 +528,18 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
rxkad_abort_2_short_check);
- if (data_size > sp->len)
+ if (data_size > len)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN,
rxkad_abort_2_short_data);
- sp->len = data_size;
+ call->rx_dec_len = data_size;
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
return 0;
}
/*
- * Verify the security on a received packet and the subpackets therein.
+ * Verify the security on a received (sub)packet. If the packet needs
+ * modifying (e.g. decrypting), it must be copied.
*/
static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
{

51
1126-wifi-mac80211-bounds-check-link-id-in-ieee80211-ml-e.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From f718506edd2d9c6a308ded9d13c632bf7b7d5a2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 12:29:08 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] wifi: mac80211: bounds-check link_id in ieee80211_ml_epcs
IEEE80211_MLE_STA_EPCS_CONTROL_LINK_ID is 0x000f, so link_id extracted
from a PRIO_ACCESS ML element PER_STA_PROFILE subelement can be 0..15.
sdata->link[] has IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS (15) entries (indices 0..14),
making index 15 out-of-bounds.
A connected WiFi 7 AP can trigger this by sending an EPCS Enable Response
action frame with a PER_STA_PROFILE subelement where link_id = 15. The
unsolicited-notification path (dialog_token = 0) is reachable any time
EPCS is already enabled, without any prior client request.
sdata->link[15] reads into the first word of sdata->activate_links_work
(a wiphy_work whose embedded list_head is non-NULL after INIT_LIST_HEAD),
so the NULL check on the result does not catch the invalid access. The
garbage pointer is then passed to ieee80211_sta_wmm_params(), which
dereferences link->sdata and crashes the kernel.
The same class of bug was fixed for ieee80211_ml_reconfiguration() by
commit 162d331d833d ("wifi: mac80211: bounds-check link_id in
ieee80211_ml_reconfiguration").
Fixes: de86c5f60839 ("wifi: mac80211: Add support for EPCS configuration")
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515102908.1653088-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CVE-2026-64030
[ Backported from mainline commit f718506edd2d9c6a308ded9d13c632bf7b7d5a2c; applies cleanly to AlmaLinux 10 (kernel-6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2), zero-fuzz. ]
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
index 0a0f27836d57..ca1d29daf019 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
@@ -11232,6 +11232,9 @@ static void ieee80211_ml_epcs(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
control = get_unaligned_le16(pos);
link_id = control & IEEE80211_MLE_STA_EPCS_CONTROL_LINK_ID;
+ if (link_id >= IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS)
+ continue;
+
link = sdata_dereference(sdata->link[link_id], sdata);
if (!link)
continue;
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

45
kernel.spec
View File

@ -176,13 +176,13 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
%define specrpmversion 6.12.0
%define specversion 6.12.0
%define patchversion 6.12
%define pkgrelease 211.34.2
%define pkgrelease 211.34.3
%define kversion 6
%define tarfile_release 6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2
# This is needed to do merge window version magic
%define patchlevel 12
# This allows pkg_release to have configurable %%{?dist} tag
%define specrelease 211.34.2%{?buildid}%{?dist}
%define specrelease 211.34.3%{?buildid}%{?dist}
# This defines the kabi tarball version
%define kabiversion 6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2
@ -1152,6 +1152,19 @@ Patch1109: 1109-netfs-fix-early-put-of-sink-folio-in-netfs-read-gaps.patch
Patch1110: 1110-ixgbevf-fix-use-after-free-in-vepa-multicast-source-pru.patch
Patch1111: 1111-ipv6-ioam-refresh-hdr-pointer-before-ioam6-event.patch
Patch1112: 1112-i2c-stub-reject-i2c-block-transfers-with-invalid-length.patch
Patch1113: 1113-scsi-target-iscsi-validate-chap-r-length-before-base.patch
Patch1114: 1114-scsi-target-iscsi-bound-iscsi-encode-text-output-app.patch
Patch1115: 1115-scsi-target-iscsi-fix-crc-overread-and-double-free-i.patch
Patch1116: 1116-usb-serial-mxuport-fix-memory-corruption-with-small.patch
Patch1117: 1117-ip6-vti-use-ip6-tnl-net-in-vti6-changelink.patch
Patch1118: 1118-ipv6-exthdrs-refresh-nh-pointer-after-ipv6-hop-jumbo.patch
Patch1119: 1119-ipv6-exthdrs-refresh-nh-after-handling-hao-option.patch
Patch1120: 1120-kvm-sev-compute-the-correct-max-length-of-the-in-ghc.patch
Patch1122: 1122-usb-serial-cypress-m8-fix-memory-corruption-with-sma.patch
Patch1123: 1123-tunnels-load-network-headers-after-skb-cow-in.patch
Patch1124: 1124-blk-mq-pop-cached-request-if-it-is-usable.patch
Patch1125: 1125-rxrpc-fix-data-decrypt-vs-splice-by-copying-data-to.patch
Patch1126: 1126-wifi-mac80211-bounds-check-link-id-in-ieee80211-ml-e.patch
# END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
%description
@ -2026,6 +2039,19 @@ ApplyPatch 1109-netfs-fix-early-put-of-sink-folio-in-netfs-read-gaps.patch
ApplyPatch 1110-ixgbevf-fix-use-after-free-in-vepa-multicast-source-pru.patch
ApplyPatch 1111-ipv6-ioam-refresh-hdr-pointer-before-ioam6-event.patch
ApplyPatch 1112-i2c-stub-reject-i2c-block-transfers-with-invalid-length.patch
ApplyPatch 1113-scsi-target-iscsi-validate-chap-r-length-before-base.patch
ApplyPatch 1114-scsi-target-iscsi-bound-iscsi-encode-text-output-app.patch
ApplyPatch 1115-scsi-target-iscsi-fix-crc-overread-and-double-free-i.patch
ApplyPatch 1116-usb-serial-mxuport-fix-memory-corruption-with-small.patch
ApplyPatch 1117-ip6-vti-use-ip6-tnl-net-in-vti6-changelink.patch
ApplyPatch 1118-ipv6-exthdrs-refresh-nh-pointer-after-ipv6-hop-jumbo.patch
ApplyPatch 1119-ipv6-exthdrs-refresh-nh-after-handling-hao-option.patch
ApplyPatch 1120-kvm-sev-compute-the-correct-max-length-of-the-in-ghc.patch
ApplyPatch 1122-usb-serial-cypress-m8-fix-memory-corruption-with-sma.patch
ApplyPatch 1123-tunnels-load-network-headers-after-skb-cow-in.patch
ApplyPatch 1124-blk-mq-pop-cached-request-if-it-is-usable.patch
ApplyPatch 1125-rxrpc-fix-data-decrypt-vs-splice-by-copying-data-to.patch
ApplyPatch 1126-wifi-mac80211-bounds-check-link-id-in-ieee80211-ml-e.patch
# END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS
# Any further pre-build tree manipulations happen here.
@ -4537,6 +4563,21 @@ fi\
#
#
%changelog
* Wed Jul 22 2026 Andrew Lukoshko <alukoshko@almalinux.org> - 6.12.0-211.34.3
- scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode (Alexandru Hossu) {CVE-2026-63886}
- scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf (Michael Bommarito) {CVE-2026-63887}
- scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd() (Michael Bommarito) {CVE-2026-63888}
- USB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small endpoint (Johan Hovold) {CVE-2026-63899}
- ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_changelink() (Kuniyuki Iwashima) {CVE-2026-63917}
- ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo() (Justin Iurman) {CVE-2026-63924}
- ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh after handling HAO option (Zhengchuan Liang) {CVE-2026-63922}
- KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area (Sean Christopherson) {CVE-2026-63939}
- USB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small endpoint (Johan Hovold) {CVE-2026-63956}
- tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]() (Eric Dumazet) {CVE-2026-63994}
- blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable (Keith Busch) {CVE-2026-64017}
- rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg (David Howells) {CVE-2026-64026}
- wifi: mac80211: bounds-check link_id in ieee80211_ml_epcs (Alexandru Hossu) {CVE-2026-64030}
* Tue Jul 21 2026 Andrew Lukoshko <alukoshko@almalinux.org> - 6.12.0-211.34.2
- NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup (Guannan Wang) {CVE-2026-53398}
- nfsd: release layout stid on setlease failure (Chris Mason) {CVE-2026-53399}