ptrace: replace get_dumpable() fix with kABI-safe variant

The previous commit shipped upstream 31e62c2ebbfd as-is, which adds an
'unsigned user_dumpable:1' bit to task_struct. That layout change
breaks kABI: the symtype signature of struct task_struct is referenced
by hundreds of stablelist exports.

Replace with a minimal kABI-safe slice that only touches
kernel/ptrace.c: when task->mm == NULL, require CAP_SYS_PTRACE in
init_user_ns unconditionally. This closes the Qualys advisory hole
without modifying task_struct or exit_mm(). The behavioural delta vs
upstream is that an already-exited user task whose mm has been
cleared now also requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Lukoshko 2026-05-15 09:04:36 +00:00 committed by Andrew Lukoshko
parent 55ac995a97
commit 3261b114d4
3 changed files with 57 additions and 111 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From: Andrew Lukoshko <alukoshko@almalinux.org>
Subject: [PATCH AlmaLinux 10s] ptrace: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE when task has no mm
kABI-safe AlmaLinux backport of upstream commit 31e62c2ebbfd
("ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic") posted at
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/31e62c2ebbfdc3fe3dbdf5e02c92a9dc67087a3a
The upstream fix adds a 'user_dumpable:1' bit to task_struct and
caches the last dumpability in exit_mm() so __ptrace_may_access()
can require CAP_SYS_PTRACE when the target has no mm (e.g. kernel
threads or already-exited user tasks). That layout change to
task_struct breaks kABI on AlmaLinux 10s (the symtype
signature of struct task_struct is referenced by hundreds of
stablelist exports), so we cannot import the field/exit_mm hunks
as-is.
Take the minimal kABI-safe slice instead: when task->mm == NULL,
require CAP_SYS_PTRACE in init_user_ns unconditionally. This closes
the Qualys Security Advisory hole -- mm-less targets no longer pass
the dumpability check by default -- without touching task_struct or
exit.c. The only behavioural delta versus upstream is that a user
task that has already cleared its mm in exit_mm() (a dying/zombie
task) now also requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE to attach, instead of being
remembered as previously dumpable. Such targets are rarely ptraced
in practice.
Verified to apply with `patch -p1 -F0` (no offset, no fuzz, no rejects)
against kernel-6.12.0-227.el10.
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lukoshko <alukoshko@almalinux.org>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -339,8 +339,11 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
smp_rmb();
mm = task->mm;
- if (mm &&
- ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (mm) {
+ if ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+ !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))
+ return -EPERM;
+ } else if (!ptrace_has_cap(&init_user_ns, mode)) {
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
--
2.43.0

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@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH AlmaLinux 10s] ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic
Backport of upstream commit 31e62c2ebbfd ("ptrace: slightly saner
'get_dumpable()' logic") posted at
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/31e62c2ebbfdc3fe3dbdf5e02c92a9dc67087a3a
The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of
the task -- the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not --
and makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.
And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the
task has a mm pointer.
But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable'
to check various other things entirely independently of the MM
(typically explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS).
Including for threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did,
like most kernel threads).
The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have
to be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the
traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference
for this all.
Make it all make a bit more sense by saying that if you don't have a
MM pointer, we use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread
ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never
set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override.
Verified to apply with `patch -p1 -F0` (no offset, no fuzz, no rejects)
against kernel-6.12.0-227.el10.
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/sched.h | 3 +++
kernel/exit.c | 1 +
kernel/ptrace.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1005,6 +1005,9 @@ struct task_struct {
unsigned sched_rt_mutex:1;
#endif
+ /* Save user-dumpable when mm goes away */
+ unsigned user_dumpable:1;
+
/* Bit to tell TOMOYO we're in execve(): */
unsigned in_execve:1;
unsigned in_iowait:1;
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -563,6 +563,7 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
*/
smp_mb__after_spinlock();
local_irq_disable();
+ current->user_dumpable = (get_dumpable(mm) == SUID_DUMP_USER);
current->mm = NULL;
membarrier_update_current_mm(NULL);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -272,11 +272,24 @@ static bool ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
}
+static bool task_still_dumpable(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
+ if (mm) {
+ if (get_dumpable(mm) == SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ return true;
+ return ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode);
+ }
+
+ if (task->user_dumpable)
+ return true;
+ return ptrace_has_cap(&init_user_ns, mode);
+}
+
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
- struct mm_struct *mm;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;
@@ -337,11 +350,8 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
* Pairs with a write barrier in commit_creds().
*/
smp_rmb();
- mm = task->mm;
- if (mm &&
- ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!task_still_dumpable(task, mode))
+ return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
--
2.43.0

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@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ Patch2010: 0001-Keep-fs-btrfs-files-in-modules-package.patch
Patch1100: 1100-xfrm-esp-avoid-in-place-decrypt-shared-skb-frags.patch
Patch1101: 1101-rxrpc-linearize-paged-frags.patch
Patch1102: 1102-net-skbuff-propagate-shared-frag-marker.patch
Patch1103: 1103-ptrace-saner-get_dumpable-logic.patch
Patch1103: 1103-ptrace-require-cap-on-mm-less-task.patch
# END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@ ApplyPatch 0001-Keep-fs-btrfs-files-in-modules-package.patch
ApplyPatch 1100-xfrm-esp-avoid-in-place-decrypt-shared-skb-frags.patch
ApplyPatch 1101-rxrpc-linearize-paged-frags.patch
ApplyPatch 1102-net-skbuff-propagate-shared-frag-marker.patch
ApplyPatch 1103-ptrace-saner-get_dumpable-logic.patch
ApplyPatch 1103-ptrace-require-cap-on-mm-less-task.patch
%{log_msg "End of patch applications"}
# END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS