Drop six orphaned patches
Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
This commit is contained in:
Paul Bolle
Jeremy Cline
parent
6c72c6753e
commit
216317b0de
@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
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From 0de1315ee843713bafb9a59bc040a024f688c62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
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Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:56:47 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] Correct warning with gcc9
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Suggested from Arnd
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Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
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---
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include/linux/module.h | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
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index 8fa38d3e7538..f2a24b59cca4 100644
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--- a/include/linux/module.h
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+++ b/include/linux/module.h
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@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ extern void cleanup_module(void);
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#define module_init(initfn) \
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static inline initcall_t __maybe_unused __inittest(void) \
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{ return initfn; } \
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- int init_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#initfn)));
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+ int init_module(void) __attribute__((cold, alias(#initfn)));
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/* This is only required if you want to be unloadable. */
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#define module_exit(exitfn) \
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static inline exitcall_t __maybe_unused __exittest(void) \
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{ return exitfn; } \
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- void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#exitfn)));
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+ void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((cold, alias(#exitfn)));
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#endif
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--
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2.20.1
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@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
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From 6b6203b92cfb457a0669a9c87a29b360405bffc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 10/20] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
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when in Secure Boot mode
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UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
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only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
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require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
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that enforces this automatically when enabled.
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Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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---
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Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++
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arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 ++++++
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arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 +-
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arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++
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include/linux/module.h | 6 ++++
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kernel/module.c | 7 ++++
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7 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
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index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644
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--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
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+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
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@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
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1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
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1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
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(below)
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+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
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+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
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1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
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290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
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2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
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diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
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index bada636d1065..d666ef8b616c 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
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+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
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@@ -1786,6 +1786,17 @@ config EFI_MIXED
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If unsure, say N.
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+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
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+ def_bool n
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+ depends on EFI
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+ prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
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+ ---help---
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+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
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+ firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain
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+ use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed.
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+ Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement
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+ when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
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+
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config SECCOMP
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def_bool y
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prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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index cc69e37548db..ebc85c1eefd6 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
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#include <asm/efi.h>
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#include <asm/setup.h>
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#include <asm/desc.h>
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+#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
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#include "../string.h"
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#include "eboot.h"
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@@ -537,6 +538,67 @@ static void setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params)
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efi_call_early(free_pool, pci_handle);
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}
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+static int get_secure_boot(void)
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+{
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+ u8 sb, setup;
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+ unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
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+ efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
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+ efi_status_t status;
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+
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+ status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
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+ L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
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+
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+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ if (sb == 0)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+
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+ status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
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+ L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
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+ &setup);
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+
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+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ if (setup == 1)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ return 1;
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+}
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+
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+
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+/*
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+ * See if we have Graphics Output Protocol
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+ */
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+static efi_status_t setup_gop(struct screen_info *si, efi_guid_t *proto,
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+ unsigned long size)
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+{
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+ efi_status_t status;
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+ void **gop_handle = NULL;
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+
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+ status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
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+ size, (void **)&gop_handle);
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+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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+ return status;
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+
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+ status = efi_call_early(locate_handle,
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+ EFI_LOCATE_BY_PROTOCOL,
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+ proto, NULL, &size, gop_handle);
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+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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+ goto free_handle;
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+
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+ if (efi_early->is64)
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+ status = setup_gop64(si, proto, size, gop_handle);
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+ else
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+ status = setup_gop32(si, proto, size, gop_handle);
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+
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+free_handle:
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+ efi_call_early(free_pool, gop_handle);
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+ return status;
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+}
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+
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static efi_status_t
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setup_uga32(void **uga_handle, unsigned long size, u32 *width, u32 *height)
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{
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@@ -1094,6 +1156,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
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else
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setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
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+ sanitize_boot_params(boot_params);
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+
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+ boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot();
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+
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setup_graphics(boot_params);
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setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
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diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
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index c18ce67495fa..2b3e5427097b 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
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+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
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@@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ struct boot_params {
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__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
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__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
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__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
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- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
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+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
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+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
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/*
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* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
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*
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diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
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index bbfbca5fea0c..d40e961753c9 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
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+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
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@@ -1160,6 +1160,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
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io_delay_init();
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+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
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+ if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
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+ enforce_signed_modules();
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+ }
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+#endif
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+
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/*
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* Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
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*/
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diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
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index 05bd6c989a0c..32327704e18d 100644
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--- a/include/linux/module.h
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+++ b/include/linux/module.h
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@@ -260,6 +260,12 @@ extern const typeof(name) __mod_##type##__##name##_device_table \
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struct notifier_block;
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+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
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+extern void enforce_signed_modules(void);
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+#else
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+static inline void enforce_signed_modules(void) {};
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+#endif
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+
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#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
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extern int modules_disabled; /* for sysctl */
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diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
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index cb864505d020..cb1f1da69bf4 100644
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--- a/kernel/module.c
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+++ b/kernel/module.c
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@@ -4285,6 +4285,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
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#endif
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+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
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+void enforce_signed_modules(void)
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+{
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+ sig_enforce = true;
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+}
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+#endif
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+
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bool secure_modules(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
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--
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2.9.3
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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
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From a8883aff32f1e15b65e210462804aa2a9ab9a0b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 13/20] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
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UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
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for use with efi_enabled.
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Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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---
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arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++
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include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
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2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
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index d40e961753c9..b93183336674 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
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+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
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@@ -1162,7 +1162,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
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#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
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if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
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+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
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enforce_signed_modules();
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+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
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}
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#endif
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diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
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index ce943d5accfd..5af91b58afae 100644
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--- a/include/linux/efi.h
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+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
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@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
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#define EFI_ARCH_1 7 /* First arch-specific bit */
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#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
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#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
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+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 10 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
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#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
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/*
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--
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2.9.3
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@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
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From d687d79620ea20511b2dbf77e74fdcf4d94981f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 12/20] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
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A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
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images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
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MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the
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user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
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secure boot mode if that variable is set.
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Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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---
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arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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index ebc85c1eefd6..50e027f388d8 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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@@ -540,8 +540,9 @@ static void setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params)
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static int get_secure_boot(void)
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{
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- u8 sb, setup;
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+ u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
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unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
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+ u32 attr;
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efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
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efi_status_t status;
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@@ -565,6 +566,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(void)
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if (setup == 1)
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return 0;
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+ /* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode. If so, and the variable
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+ * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
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+ */
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+ var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
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+ status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
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+ L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
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+ &moksbstate);
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+
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+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
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+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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+ return 1;
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+
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+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
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+ if (moksbstate == 1)
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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return 1;
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}
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--
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2.9.3
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@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
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From patchwork Wed Jan 23 17:37:07 2019
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X-Patchwork-Submitter: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
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X-Patchwork-Id: 1034989
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Wed, 23 Jan 2019 09:38:25 -0800 (PST)
|
||||
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 18:37:07 +0100
|
||||
From: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
|
||||
To: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
||||
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
|
||||
Martin Sebor <msebor@gcc.gnu.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] include/linux/module.h: mark init/cleanup_module aliases as
|
||||
__cold
|
||||
Message-ID: <20190123173707.GA16603@gmail.com>
|
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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|
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|
||||
The upcoming GCC 9 release adds the -Wmissing-attributes warnings
|
||||
(enabled by -Wall), which trigger for all the init/cleanup_module
|
||||
aliases in the kernel (defined by the module_init/exit macros),
|
||||
ending up being very noisy.
|
||||
|
||||
These aliases point to the __init/__exit functions of a module,
|
||||
which are defined as __cold (among other attributes). However,
|
||||
the aliases themselves do not have the __cold attribute.
|
||||
|
||||
Since the compiler behaves differently when compiling a __cold
|
||||
function as well as when compiling paths leading to calls
|
||||
to __cold functions, the warning is trying to point out
|
||||
the possibly-forgotten attribute in the alias.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to keep the warning enabled, we choose to silence
|
||||
the warning by marking the aliases as __cold. This is possible
|
||||
marking either the extern declaration, the definition, or both.
|
||||
In order to avoid changing the behavior of callers, we do it
|
||||
only in the definition of the aliases (since those are not
|
||||
seen by any other TU).
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested-by: Martin Sebor <msebor@gcc.gnu.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Note that an alternative is using the new copy attribute
|
||||
introduced by GCC 9 (Martin told me about it, as well as the
|
||||
new warning).
|
||||
|
||||
What I am concerned about using __copy is that I am not sure
|
||||
we should be copying all the attributes (even if some are
|
||||
blacklisted by the copy itself), since:
|
||||
- We have unknown-to-GCC attributes (e.g. from plugins).
|
||||
- We wouldn't enjoy the fix for older compilers
|
||||
(e.g. if the fix had an actual impact).
|
||||
|
||||
So here I took the conservative approach for the moment,
|
||||
and we can discuss/apply whether another solution is best.
|
||||
|
||||
Jessica: please review what I explain in the commit message.
|
||||
Do we actually want the __cold attribute in the declaration
|
||||
as well? If yes, AFAIK, GCC would assume paths that end up
|
||||
calling the __init/__exit functions are not meant to be taken
|
||||
(but when we are asked to load modules, that is the expected
|
||||
path, no?).
|
||||
|
||||
I will put this in the compiler-attributes tree and get
|
||||
some time in linux-next, unless you want to pick it up!
|
||||
|
||||
include/linux/module.h | 4 ++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
|
||||
index 8fa38d3e7538..c4e805e87628 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/module.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
|
||||
@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ extern void cleanup_module(void);
|
||||
#define module_init(initfn) \
|
||||
static inline initcall_t __maybe_unused __inittest(void) \
|
||||
{ return initfn; } \
|
||||
- int init_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#initfn)));
|
||||
+ int init_module(void) __cold __attribute__((alias(#initfn)));
|
||||
|
||||
/* This is only required if you want to be unloadable. */
|
||||
#define module_exit(exitfn) \
|
||||
static inline exitcall_t __maybe_unused __exittest(void) \
|
||||
{ return exitfn; } \
|
||||
- void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#exitfn)));
|
||||
+ void cleanup_module(void) __cold __attribute__((alias(#exitfn)));
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From patchwork Thu Jan 24 15:44:20 2019
|
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
|
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
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X-Patchwork-Submitter: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
|
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X-Patchwork-Id: 1035252
|
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|
||||
Thu, 24 Jan 2019 07:44:24 -0800 (PST)
|
||||
Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 16:44:20 +0100
|
||||
From: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
|
||||
To: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
|
||||
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
|
||||
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
|
||||
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
|
||||
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
|
||||
Martin Sebor <msebor@gcc.gnu.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] lib/crc32.c: mark crc32_le_base/__crc32c_le_base aliases as
|
||||
__pure
|
||||
Message-ID: <20190124154420.GA11471@gmail.com>
|
||||
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|
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|
||||
The upcoming GCC 9 release extends the -Wmissing-attributes warnings
|
||||
(enabled by -Wall) to C and aliases: it warns when particular function
|
||||
attributes are missing in the aliases but not in their target.
|
||||
|
||||
In particular, it triggers here because crc32_le_base/__crc32c_le_base
|
||||
aren't __pure while their target crc32_le/__crc32c_le are.
|
||||
|
||||
These aliases are used by architectures as a fallback in accelerated
|
||||
versions of CRC32. See commit 9784d82db3eb ("lib/crc32: make core crc32()
|
||||
routines weak so they can be overridden").
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, being fallbacks, it is likely that even if the aliases
|
||||
were called from C, there wouldn't be any optimizations possible.
|
||||
Currently, the only user is arm64, which calls this from asm.
|
||||
|
||||
Still, marking the aliases as __pure makes sense and is a good idea
|
||||
for documentation purposes and possible future optimizations,
|
||||
which also silences the warning.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
I am picking this up through the compiler-attributes tree
|
||||
and putting it into -next along with the other cleanup
|
||||
for -Wmissing-attributes (unless some other maintainer wants it).
|
||||
|
||||
lib/crc32.c | 4 ++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/crc32.c b/lib/crc32.c
|
||||
index 45b1d67a1767..4a20455d1f61 100644
|
||||
--- a/lib/crc32.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/crc32.c
|
||||
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ u32 __pure __weak __crc32c_le(u32 crc, unsigned char const *p, size_t len)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(crc32_le);
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__crc32c_le);
|
||||
|
||||
-u32 crc32_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(crc32_le);
|
||||
-u32 __crc32c_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(__crc32c_le);
|
||||
+u32 __pure crc32_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(crc32_le);
|
||||
+u32 __pure __crc32c_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(__crc32c_le);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This multiplies the polynomials x and y modulo the given modulus.
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user