SOURCES/0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Hsiao <matt.hsiao@hpe.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2023 13:39:05 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] efi/http: change uint32_t to uintn_t for
+ grub_efi_http_message_t
+
+Modify UINT32 to UINTN in EFI_HTTP_MESSAGE to be UEFI 2.9 compliant.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matt Hsiao <matt.hsiao@hpe.com>
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/grub/efi/http.h | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/http.h b/include/grub/efi/http.h
+index c5e9a89f5050..ad164ba1913d 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/http.h
++++ b/include/grub/efi/http.h
+@@ -171,9 +171,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     grub_efi_http_request_data_t *request;
+     grub_efi_http_response_data_t *response;
+   } data;
+-  grub_efi_uint32_t header_count;
++  grub_efi_uintn_t header_count;
+   grub_efi_http_header_t *headers;
+-  grub_efi_uint32_t body_length;
++  grub_efi_uintn_t body_length;
+   void *body;
+ } grub_efi_http_message_t;
+ 

SOURCES/0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 08:16:25 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] ieee1275 : Converting plain numbers to constants in Vec5
+
+This patch converts the plain numbers used in Vec5 properties to
+constants.
+
+1. LPAR : Client program supports logical partitioning and
+   associated hcall()s.
+2. SPLPAR : Client program supports the Shared
+   Processor LPAR Option.
+3. CMO : Enables the Cooperative Memory Over-commitment Option.
+4. MAX_CPU : Defines maximum number of CPUs supported.
+
+Signed-off-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 3ea9b73b2a59..2516e02091cb 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@ extern char _end[];
+ grub_addr_t grub_ieee1275_original_stack;
+ #endif
+ 
++#define LPAR     0x80
++#define SPLPAR   0x40
++#define BYTE2    (LPAR | SPLPAR)
++#define CMO      0x80
++#define MAX_CPU  256
++
+ void
+ grub_exit (int rc __attribute__((unused)))
+ {
+@@ -372,7 +378,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
+     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
+     .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
+     .vec5 = {
+-	0, 192, 0, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 256
++        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, 0, 0, 0, 0, MAX_CPU	
+     }
+   };
+ 

SOURCES/0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 08:33:12 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] ieee1275 : extended support in options vector5
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch enables the multiple options in Options Vector5 which are
+required and solves the boot issue seen on some machines which are looking for these specific options.
+
+1. LPAR : Client program supports logical partitioning and
+   associated hcall()s.
+2. SPLPAR : Client program supports the Shared
+   Processor LPAR Option.
+3. DYN_RCON_MEM : Client program supports the
+   “ibm,dynamic-reconfiguration-memory” property and it may be
+   presented in the device tree.
+4. LARGE_PAGES : Client supports pages larger than 4 KB.
+5. DONATE_DCPU_CLS : Client supports donating dedicated processor cycles.
+6. PCI_EXP : Client supports PCI Express implementations
+   utilizing Message Signaled Interrupts (MSIs).
+
+7. CMOC : Enables the Cooperative Memory Over-commitment Option.
+8. EXT_CMO : Enables the Extended Cooperative Memory Over-commit
+   Option.
+
+9. ASSOC_REF : Enables “ibm,associativity” and
+   “ibm,associativity-reference-points” properties.
+10. AFFINITY : Enables Platform Resource Reassignment Notification.
+11. NUMA : Supports NUMA Distance Lookup Table Option.
+
+12. HOTPLUG_INTRPT : Supports Hotplug Interrupts.
+13. HPT_RESIZE : Enable Hash Page Table Resize Option.
+
+14. MAX_CPU : Defines maximum number of CPUs supported.
+
+15. PFO_HWRNG : Supports Random Number Generator.
+16. PFO_HW_COMP : Supports Compression Engine.
+17. PFO_ENCRYPT : Supports Encryption Engine.
+
+18. SUB_PROCESSORS : Supports Sub-Processors.
+
+19. DY_MEM_V2 : Client program supports the “ibm,dynamic-memory-v2” property in the
+    “ibm,dynamic-reconfiguration-memory” node and it may be presented in the device tree.
+20. DRC_INFO : Client program supports the “ibm,drc-info” property definition and it may be
+    presented in the device tree.
+
+Signed-off-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 2516e02091cb..1fae84440403 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -56,11 +56,41 @@ extern char _end[];
+ grub_addr_t grub_ieee1275_original_stack;
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define LPAR     0x80
+-#define SPLPAR   0x40
+-#define BYTE2    (LPAR | SPLPAR)
+-#define CMO      0x80
+-#define MAX_CPU  256
++/* Options vector5 properties */
++
++#define LPAR                0x80
++#define SPLPAR              0x40
++#define DYN_RCON_MEM        0x20
++#define LARGE_PAGES         0x10
++#define DONATE_DCPU_CLS     0x02
++#define PCI_EXP             0x01
++#define BYTE2               (LPAR | SPLPAR | DYN_RCON_MEM | LARGE_PAGES | DONATE_DCPU_CLS | PCI_EXP)
++
++#define CMOC                0x80
++#define EXT_CMO             0x40
++#define CMO                 (CMOC | EXT_CMO)
++
++#define ASSOC_REF           0x80
++#define AFFINITY            0x40
++#define NUMA                0x20
++#define ASSOCIATIVITY       (ASSOC_REF | AFFINITY | NUMA)
++
++#define HOTPLUG_INTRPT      0x04
++#define HPT_RESIZE          0x01
++#define BIN_OPTS            (HOTPLUG_INTRPT | HPT_RESIZE)
++
++#define MAX_CPU             256
++
++#define PFO_HWRNG           0x80000000
++#define PFO_HW_COMP         0x40000000
++#define PFO_ENCRYPT         0x20000000
++#define PLATFORM_FACILITIES (PFO_HWRNG | PFO_HW_COMP | PFO_ENCRYPT)
++
++#define SUB_PROCESSORS      1
++
++#define DY_MEM_V2           0x80
++#define DRC_INFO            0x40
++#define BYTE22              (DY_MEM_V2 | DRC_INFO)
+ 
+ void
+ grub_exit (int rc __attribute__((unused)))
+@@ -323,6 +353,11 @@ struct option_vector5 {
+         grub_uint8_t micro_checkpoint;
+         grub_uint8_t reserved0;
+         grub_uint32_t max_cpus;
++        grub_uint16_t base_PAPR;
++        grub_uint16_t mem_reference;
++        grub_uint32_t platform_facilities;
++        grub_uint8_t sub_processors;
++        grub_uint8_t byte22;
+ } __attribute__((packed));
+ 
+ struct pvr_entry {
+@@ -378,7 +413,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
+     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
+     .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
+     .vec5 = {
+-        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, 0, 0, 0, 0, MAX_CPU	
++        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, ASSOCIATIVITY, BIN_OPTS, 0, 0, MAX_CPU, 0, 0, PLATFORM_FACILITIES, SUB_PROCESSORS, BYTE22
+     }
+   };
+ 

SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 8c74431327e0c7d7fe47462b0e69fcbe3bbac56e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 09:14:29 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
+
+Signed-off-by: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
+---
+ util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
+index 855dbdd..f2281bc 100644
+--- a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
++++ b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
+@@ -117,6 +117,18 @@ cat <<EOF
+ # This section was generated by a script. Do not modify the generated file - all changes
+ # will be lost the next time file is regenerated. Instead edit the BootLoaderSpec files.
+ 
++# The kernelopts variable should be defined in the grubenv file. But to ensure that menu
++# entries populated from BootLoaderSpec files that use this variable work correctly even
++# without a grubenv file, define a fallback kernelopts variable if this has not been set.
++#
++# The kernelopts variable in the grubenv file can be modified using the grubby tool or by
++# executing the grub2-mkconfig tool. For the latter, the values of the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
++# and GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT options from /etc/default/grub file are used to set both
++# the kernelopts variable in the grubenv file and the fallback kernelopts variable.
++if [ -z "\${kernelopts}" ]; then
++  set kernelopts="root=${linux_root_device_thisversion} ro ${args}"
++fi
++
+ EOF
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 12:21:55 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
+ of fadump
+
+This is a backport of the patch with the same name to grub 2.02.
+
+When a kernel dump is present then restrict the high memory regions to
+avoid allocating memory where the kernel dump resides. Use the
+ibm,kernel-dump node under /rtas to determine whether a kernel dump exists
+and up to which limit grub can use available memory. Set the
+upper_mem_limit to the size of the kernel dump section of type
+'REAL_MODE_REGION' and therefore only allow grub's memory usage for high
+addresses from 768MB to 'upper_mem_limit'. This means that grub can
+use high memory in the range of 768MB to upper_mem_limit and
+the kernel-dump memory regions above 'upper_mem_limit' remain untouched.
+This change has no effect on memory allocations below 640MB.
+
+Also, fall back to allocating below 640MB in case the chunk of
+memory there would be larger than the chunk of memory above 768MB.
+This can for example occur if a free memory area is found starting at 300MB
+extending up to 1GB but a kernel dump is located at 768MB and therefore
+does not allow the allocation of the high memory area but requiring to use
+the chunk starting at 300MB to avoid an unnecessary out-of-memory
+condition.
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
+Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
+Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 139 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 1fae84440403..31843ab70a62 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
+  *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+  */
+ 
++#include <stddef.h> /* offsetof() */
++
+ #include <grub/kernel.h>
+ #include <grub/dl.h>
+ #include <grub/disk.h>
+@@ -180,6 +182,97 @@ grub_claim_heap (void)
+ 				 + GRUB_KERNEL_MACHINE_STACK_SIZE), 0x200000);
+ }
+ #else
++
++/* ibm,kernel-dump data structures */
++struct kd_section
++{
++  grub_uint32_t flags;
++  grub_uint16_t src_datatype;
++#define KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION  0x0011
++  grub_uint16_t error_flags;
++  grub_uint64_t src_address;
++  grub_uint64_t num_bytes;
++  grub_uint64_t act_bytes;
++  grub_uint64_t dst_address;
++} GRUB_PACKED;
++
++#define MAX_KD_SECTIONS 10
++
++struct kernel_dump
++{
++  grub_uint32_t format;
++  grub_uint16_t num_sections;
++  grub_uint16_t status_flags;
++  grub_uint32_t offset_1st_section;
++  grub_uint32_t num_blocks;
++  grub_uint64_t start_block;
++  grub_uint64_t num_blocks_avail;
++  grub_uint32_t offet_path_string;
++  grub_uint32_t max_time_allowed;
++  struct kd_section kds[MAX_KD_SECTIONS]; /* offset_1st_section should point to kds[0] */
++} GRUB_PACKED;
++
++/*
++ * Determine if a kernel dump exists and if it does, then determine the highest
++ * address that grub can use for memory allocations.
++ * The caller must have initialized *highest to ~0. *highest will not
++ * be modified if no kernel dump is found.
++ */
++static int
++check_kernel_dump (grub_uint64_t *highest)
++{
++  struct kernel_dump kernel_dump;
++  grub_ssize_t kernel_dump_size;
++  grub_ieee1275_phandle_t rtas;
++  struct kd_section *kds;
++  grub_size_t i;
++
++  /* If there's a kernel-dump it must have at least one section */
++  if (grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/rtas", &rtas) ||
++      grub_ieee1275_get_property (rtas, "ibm,kernel-dump", &kernel_dump,
++                                  sizeof (kernel_dump), &kernel_dump_size) ||
++      kernel_dump_size <= (grub_ssize_t) offsetof (struct kernel_dump, kds[1]))
++    return 0;
++
++  kernel_dump_size = grub_min (kernel_dump_size, (grub_ssize_t) sizeof (kernel_dump));
++
++  if (grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format) != 1)
++    {
++      grub_printf (_("Error: ibm,kernel-dump has an unexpected format version '%u'\n"),
++                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format));
++      return 0;
++    }
++
++  if (grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections) > MAX_KD_SECTIONS)
++    {
++      grub_printf (_("Error: Too many kernel dump sections: %d\n"),
++                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.num_sections));
++      return 0;
++    }
++
++  for (i = 0; i < grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections); i++)
++    {
++      kds = (struct kd_section *) ((grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump +
++                                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.offset_1st_section) +
++                                   i * sizeof (struct kd_section));
++      /* sanity check the address is within the 'kernel_dump' struct */
++      if ((grub_addr_t) kds > (grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump + kernel_dump_size + sizeof (*kds))
++        {
++          grub_printf (_("Error: 'kds' address beyond last available section\n"));
++          return 0;
++        }
++
++      if ((grub_be_to_cpu16 (kds->src_datatype) == KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION) &&
++          (grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->src_address) == 0))
++        {
++          *highest = grub_min (*highest, grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->num_bytes));
++          break;
++        }
++    }
++
++  return 1;
++}
++
+ /* Helper for grub_claim_heap on powerpc. */
+ static int
+ heap_size (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+@@ -207,7 +300,9 @@ static int
+ heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+ 	   void *data)
+ {
++  grub_uint64_t upper_mem_limit = ~0;
+   grub_uint32_t total = *(grub_uint32_t *)data;
++  int has_kernel_dump;
+ 
+   if (type != GRUB_MEMORY_AVAILABLE)
+     return 0;
+@@ -243,6 +338,50 @@ heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+       len = 0;
+     }
+ 
++  has_kernel_dump = check_kernel_dump (&upper_mem_limit);
++  if (has_kernel_dump)
++    {
++      grub_uint64_t lo_len = 0, hi_len = 0;
++
++      if (addr > upper_mem_limit || upper_mem_limit == (grub_uint64_t)~0)
++        return 0;
++
++      /* limit len to stay below upper_mem_limit */
++      if (addr < upper_mem_limit && (addr + len) > upper_mem_limit)
++        {
++           len = grub_min (len, upper_mem_limit - addr);
++        }
++
++      /* We can allocate below 640MB or above 768MB.
++       * Choose the bigger chunk below 640MB or above 768MB.
++       */
++      if (addr < 0x28000000)
++        {
++           lo_len = grub_min (len, 0x28000000 - addr);
++        }
++      if (addr + len > 0x30000000)
++        {
++           if (addr < 0x30000000)
++             hi_len = len - (0x30000000 - addr);
++           else
++             hi_len = len;
++        }
++
++      if (hi_len > lo_len)
++        {
++           len = hi_len;
++           if (addr < 0x30000000)
++             addr = 0x30000000;
++        }
++      else
++        {
++           len = lo_len;
++        }
++
++      if (len == 0)
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+   /* If this block contains 0x30000000 (768MB), do not claim below that.
+      Linux likes to claim memory at min(RMO top, 768MB) and works down
+      without reference to /memory/available. */

SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 11:22:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] util: Enable default kernel for updates
+
+Several kernel variants can be installed on a system in parallel.
+In order to allow the user to choose which kernel will be set to
+default after an update, re-enable grub's usage of DEFAULTKERNEL as
+set in /etc/sysconfig/kernel
+
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
+---
+ util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
+index 7e87dfccc0e4..f71bc64360b0 100644
+--- a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
++++ b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
+@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@ if test -f /etc/sysconfig/kernel ; then
+     . /etc/sysconfig/kernel
+ fi
+ 
++GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${DEFAULTKERNEL/-core/}
++if [ "$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE" != "kernel" ]; then
++    echo GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL=true
++    echo export GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL
++    GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE/kernel-/}
++fi
++echo GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
++echo export GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
+ if [ "$MAKEDEBUG" = "yes" ]; then
+     echo GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG=true
+     echo export GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG

SOURCES/0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From 9ca4c3fe1c7dbd62e8ad6a23cb1b1fda695fdb44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:39:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] grub-set-bootflag: Conservative partial fix for
+ CVE-2024-1048
+
+Following up on CVE-2019-14865 and taking a fresh look at
+grub2-set-bootflag now (through my work at CIQ on Rocky Linux), I saw some
+other ways in which users could still abuse this little program:
+
+1. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag no longer rewrites the
+grubenv file in-place, but writes into a temporary file and renames it
+over the original, checking for error returns from each call first.
+This prevents the original file truncation vulnerability, but it can
+leave the temporary file around if the program is killed before it can
+rename or remove the file.  There are still many ways to get the program
+killed, such as through RLIMIT_FSIZE triggering SIGXFSZ (tested,
+reliable) or by careful timing (tricky) of signals sent by process group
+leader, pty, pre-scheduled timers, SIGXCPU (probably not an exhaustive
+list).  Invoking the program multiple times fills up /boot (or if /boot
+is not separate, then it can fill up the root filesystem).  Since the
+files are tiny, the filesystem is likely to run out of free inodes
+before it'd run out of blocks, but the effect is similar - can't create
+new files after this point (but still can add data to existing files,
+such as logs).
+
+2. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag naively tries to protect
+itself from signals by becoming full root.  (This does protect it from
+signals sent by the user directly to the PID, but e.g. "kill -9 -1" by
+the user still works.)  A side effect of such "protection" is that it's
+possible to invoke more concurrent instances of grub2-set-bootflag than
+the user's RLIMIT_NPROC would normally permit (as specified e.g. in
+/etc/security/limits.conf, or say in Apache httpd's RLimitNPROC if
+grub2-set-bootflag would be abused by a website script), thereby
+exhausting system resources (e.g., bypassing RAM usage limit if
+RLIMIT_AS was also set).
+
+3. umask is inherited.  Again, due to how the CVE-2019-14865 fix creates
+a new file, and due to how mkstemp() works, this affects grubenv's new
+file permissions.  Luckily, mkstemp() forces them to be no more relaxed
+than 0600, but the user ends up being able to set them e.g. to 0.
+Luckily, at least in my testing GRUB still works fine even when the file
+has such (lack of) permissions.
+
+This commit deals with the abuses above as follows:
+
+1. RLIMIT_FSIZE is pre-checked, so this specific way to get the process
+killed should no longer work.  However, this isn't a complete fix
+because there are other ways to get the process killed after it has
+created the temporary file.
+
+The commit also fixes bug 1975892 ("RFE: grub2-set-bootflag should not
+write the grubenv when the flag being written is already set") and
+similar for "menu_show_once", which further reduces the abuse potential.
+
+2. RLIMIT_NPROC bypass should be avoided by not becoming full root (aka
+dropping the partial "kill protection").
+
+3. A safe umask is set.
+
+This is a partial fix (temporary files can still accumulate, but this is
+harder to trigger).
+
+While at it, this commit also fixes potential 1- or 2-byte over-read of
+env[] if its content is malformed - this was not a security issue since the
+grubenv file is trusted input, and the fix is just for robustness.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index a85f11fceacb..5b932f76b6f4 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/resource.h>
+ 
+ #define GRUBENV "/" GRUB_BOOT_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_ENVBLK_DEFCFG
+ #define GRUBENV_SIZE 1024
+@@ -54,12 +56,17 @@ static void usage(void)
+ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+   /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
+-  char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1], buf[64], *s;
++  char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
+   /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
+   char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
+   const char *bootflag;
+   int i, fd, len, ret;
+   FILE *f;
++  struct rlimit rlim;
++
++  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
++    return 1;
++  umask(077);
+ 
+   if (argc != 2)
+     {
+@@ -81,20 +88,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+   len = strlen (bootflag);
+ 
+   /*
+-   * Really become root. setuid avoids an user killing us, possibly leaking
+-   * the tmpfile. setgid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
++   * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
+    */
+-  ret = setuid(0);
+-  if (ret)
+-    {
+-      perror ("Error setuid(0) failed");
+-      return 1;
+-    }
+-
+-  ret = setgid(0);
+-  if (ret)
++  if (setegid(0))
+     {
+-      perror ("Error setgid(0) failed");
++      perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -123,6 +121,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 
+   /* 0 terminate env */
+   env[GRUBENV_SIZE] = 0;
++  /* not a valid flag value */
++  env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1] = 0;
++  env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 2] = 0;
+ 
+   if (strncmp (env, GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE, strlen (GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE)))
+     {
+@@ -158,6 +159,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 
+   /* The grubenv is not 0 terminated, so memcpy the name + '=' , '1', '\n' */
+   snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s=1\n", bootflag);
++  if (!memcmp(s, buf, len + 3))
++    return 0; /* nothing to do */
+   memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From f4c7783c2b695794938748a6567e86456ed2314a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:56:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] grub-set-bootflag: More complete fix for CVE-2024-1048
+
+Switch to per-user fixed temporary filenames along with a weird locking
+mechanism, which is explained in source code comments.  This is a more
+complete fix than the previous commit (temporary files can't accumulate).
+Unfortunately, it introduces new risks (by working on a temporary file
+shared between the user's invocations), which are _hopefully_ avoided by
+the patch's elaborate logic.  I actually got it wrong at first, which
+suggests that this logic is hard to reason about, and more errors or
+omissions are possible.  It also relies on the kernel's primitives' exact
+semantics to a greater extent (nothing out of the ordinary, though).
+
+Remaining issues that I think cannot reasonably be fixed without a
+redesign (e.g., having per-flag files with nothing else in them) and
+without introducing new issues:
+
+A. A user can still revert a concurrent user's attempt of setting the
+other flag - or of making other changes to grubenv by means other than
+this program.
+
+B. One leftover temporary file per user is still possible.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index 5b932f76b6f4..698b55a1ab93 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/file.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <sys/resource.h>
+ 
+@@ -57,15 +58,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+   /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
+   char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
+-  /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
+-  char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
++  /* +1 for 0 termination, +11 for ".%u" in tmp filename */
++  char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 11 + 1];
+   const char *bootflag;
+   int i, fd, len, ret;
+   FILE *f;
+-  struct rlimit rlim;
+ 
+-  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
+-    return 1;
+   umask(077);
+ 
+   if (argc != 2)
+@@ -92,7 +90,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+    */
+   if (setegid(0))
+     {
+-      perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
++      perror ("setegid(0) failed");
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -163,19 +161,82 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+     return 0; /* nothing to do */
+   memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
+ 
++  struct rlimit rlim;
++  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
++    {
++      fprintf (stderr, "Resource limits undetermined or too low\n");
++      return 1;
++    }
++
++  /*
++   * Here we work under the premise that we shouldn't write into the target
++   * file directly because we might not be able to have all of our changes
++   * written completely and atomically.  That was CVE-2019-14865, known to
++   * have been triggerable via RLIMIT_FSIZE.  While we've dealt with that
++   * specific attack via the check above, there may be other possibilities.
++   */
+ 
+   /*
+    * Create a tempfile for writing the new env.  Use the canonicalized filename
+    * for the template so that the tmpfile is in the same dir / on same fs.
++   *
++   * We now use per-user fixed temporary filenames, so that a user cannot cause
++   * multiple files to accumulate.
++   *
++   * We don't use O_EXCL so that a stale temporary file doesn't prevent further
++   * usage of the program by the user.
+    */
+-  snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%sXXXXXX", env_filename);
+-  fd = mkstemp(tmp_filename);
++  snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%s.%u", env_filename, getuid());
++  fd = open(tmp_filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+   if (fd == -1)
+     {
+       perror ("Creating tmpfile failed");
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
++  /*
++   * The lock prevents the same user from reaching further steps ending in
++   * rename() concurrently, in which case the temporary file only partially
++   * written by one invocation could be renamed to the target file by another.
++   *
++   * The lock also guards the slow fsync() from concurrent calls.  After the
++   * first time that and the rename() complete, further invocations for the
++   * same flag become no-ops.
++   *
++   * We lock the temporary file rather than the target file because locking the
++   * latter would allow any user having SIGSTOP'ed their process to make all
++   * other users' invocations fail (or lock up if we'd use blocking mode).
++   *
++   * We use non-blocking mode (LOCK_NB) because the lock having been taken by
++   * another process implies that the other process would normally have already
++   * renamed the file to target by the time it releases the lock (and we could
++   * acquire it), so we'd be working directly on the target if we proceeded,
++   * which is undesirable, and we'd kind of fail on the already-done rename.
++   */
++  if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB))
++    {
++      perror ("Locking tmpfile failed");
++      return 1;
++    }
++
++  /*
++   * Deal with the potential that another invocation proceeded all the way to
++   * rename() and process exit while we were between open() and flock().
++   */
++  {
++    struct stat st1, st2;
++    if (fstat(fd, &st1) || stat(tmp_filename, &st2))
++      {
++        perror ("stat of tmpfile failed");
++        return 1;
++      }
++    if (st1.st_dev != st2.st_dev || st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino)
++      {
++        fprintf (stderr, "Another invocation won race\n");
++        return 1;
++      }
++  }
++
+   f = fdopen (fd, "w");
+   if (!f)
+     {
+@@ -200,23 +261,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+       return 1;     
+     }
+ 
+-  ret = fsync (fileno (f));
++  ret = ftruncate (fileno (f), GRUBENV_SIZE);
+   if (ret)
+     {
+-      perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
++      perror ("Error truncating tmpfile");
+       unlink(tmp_filename);
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+-  ret = fclose (f);
++  ret = fsync (fileno (f));
+   if (ret)
+     {
+-      perror ("Error closing tmpfile");
++      perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
+       unlink(tmp_filename);
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+   /*
++   * We must not close the file before rename() as that would remove the lock.
++   *
+    * And finally rename the tmpfile with the new env over the old env, the
+    * linux kernel guarantees that this is atomic (from a syscall pov).
+    */
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From a7192a650c1e94221a86b49f5132fb47a4dda6ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 22:05:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] grub-set-bootflag: Exit calmly when not running as root
+
+Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root.  This
+allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
+supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index 698b55a1ab93..a51805fa8cec 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+   bootflag = bootflags[i];
+   len = strlen (bootflag);
+ 
++  /*
++   * Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root.  This
++   * allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
++   * supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
++   */
++  if (geteuid())
++    {
++      printf ("grub-set-bootflag not running as root, no action taken\n");
++      return 0;
++    }
++
+   /*
+    * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
+    */
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the
+ $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute for the $MFT file
+
+When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
+using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
+containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
+which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
+
+These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
+offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
+the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
+
+However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
+the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
+causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
+values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
+
+Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
+assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
+written beyond the boundary.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index bbdbe24ada83..c3c4db117bba 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+     }
+   if (at->attr_end)
+     {
+-      grub_uint8_t *pa;
++      grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
+ 
+       at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+       if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
+@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	    }
+ 	  at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
+ 	  at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
++	  pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	{
+ 	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
+ 	  at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
++	  pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ 	}
+       at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
+       while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
+@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	  at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
+ 	  at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
+ 	  pa = at->attr_cur;
++
++	  if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
++	    {
++	      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
++	      return NULL;
++	    }
++
+ 	  grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
+ 				grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
+ 	  grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
+@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (*pa != attr)
+ 		break;
++
++              if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
++                {
++	          grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
++	          return NULL;
++	        }
++
+ 	      if (read_attr
+ 		  (at, pa + 0x10,
+ 		   u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the
+ resident $DATA attribute
+
+When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
+the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
+there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
+file record segment.
+
+When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
+read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
+arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
+
+This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
+contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
+obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
+
+This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
+corresponding file record segment only.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index c3c4db117bba..a68e173d8285 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
+     {
+       if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
+-      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
++
++      if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
++
++      if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
++
++      if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
++	  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
++	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
++
++      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
+       return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 7e5f031a6a6a3decc2360a7b0c71abbe598e7354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:17 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing directory entries
+ from resident and non-resident index attributes
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that index entries are never read
+beyond the corresponding directory index.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index a68e173d8285..2d78b96e19fb 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ get_utf8 (grub_uint8_t *in, grub_size_t len)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
++list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos, grub_uint8_t *end_pos,
+ 	   grub_fshelp_iterate_dir_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
+ {
+   grub_uint8_t *np;
+@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
+       grub_uint8_t namespace;
+       char *ustr;
+ 
++      if ((pos >= end_pos) || (end_pos - pos < 0x52))
++        break;
++
+       if (pos[0xC] & 2)		/* end signature */
+ 	break;
+ 
+@@ -617,6 +620,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
+       ns = *(np++);
+       namespace = *(np++);
+ 
++      if (2 * ns > end_pos - pos - 0x52)
++        break;
++
+       /*
+        *  Ignore files in DOS namespace, as they will reappear as Win32
+        *  names.
+@@ -806,7 +812,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+     }
+ 
+   cur_pos += 0x10;		/* Skip index root */
+-  ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0), hook, hook_data);
++  ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0),
++                   at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
++                   hook, hook_data);
+   if (ret)
+     goto done;
+ 
+@@ -893,6 +901,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 			     (const grub_uint8_t *) "INDX")))
+ 		goto done;
+ 	      ret = list_file (mft, &indx[0x18 + u16at (indx, 0x18)],
++			       indx + (mft->data->idx_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
+ 			       hook, hook_data);
+ 	      if (ret)
+ 		goto done;
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 7a5a116739fa6d8a625da7d6b9272c9a2462f967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing bitmaps for index
+ attributes
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that bitmaps for directory indices
+are never read beyond their actual sizes.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index 2d78b96e19fb..bb70c89fb803 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -843,6 +843,25 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 
+ 	  if (is_resident)
+ 	    {
++              if (bitmap_len > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++		{
++		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap too large");
++		  goto done;
++		}
++
++              if (cur_pos >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++		{
++		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
++		  goto done;
++		}
++
++              if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
++		  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
++		{
++		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
++		  goto done;
++		}
++
+               grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
+                            bitmap_len);
+ 	    }
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 1fe82c41e070385e273d7bb1cfb482627a3c28e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:38:19 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing a volume label
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that an NTFS volume label is always
+read from the corresponding file record segment.
+
+The current NTFS code allows the volume label string to be read from an
+arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory location. However, the bytes read are
+always treated as UTF-16LE. So, the final string displayed is mostly
+unreadable and it can't be easily converted back to raw bytes.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not causing a significant
+data leak.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index bb70c89fb803..ff5e3740f0dd 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -1213,13 +1213,29 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
+ 
+   init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
+   pa = find_attr (&mft->attr, GRUB_NTFS_AT_VOLUME_NAME);
++
++  if (pa >= mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++    {
++      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
++      goto fail;
++    }
++
++  if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa < 0x16)
++    {
++      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
++      goto fail;
++    }
++
+   if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
+     {
+       int len;
+ 
+       len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
+       pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
+-      *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
++      if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
++        *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
++      else
++        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
+     }
+ 
+ fail:
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+From e58b870ff926415e23fc386af41ff81b2f588763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:40:07 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fs/ntfs: Make code more readable
+
+Move some calls used to access NTFS attribute header fields into
+functions with human-readable names.
+
+Suggested-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index ff5e3740f0dd..de435aa14d85 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ u64at (void *ptr, grub_size_t ofs)
+   return grub_le_to_cpu64 (grub_get_unaligned64 ((char *) ptr + ofs));
+ }
+ 
++static grub_uint16_t
++first_attr_off (void *mft_buf_ptr)
++{
++  return u16at (mft_buf_ptr, 0x14);
++}
++
++static grub_uint16_t
++res_attr_data_off (void *res_attr_ptr)
++{
++  return u16at (res_attr_ptr, 0x14);
++}
++
++static grub_uint32_t
++res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr)
++{
++  return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10);
++}
++
+ grub_ntfscomp_func_t grub_ntfscomp_func;
+ 
+ static grub_err_t
+@@ -106,7 +124,7 @@ init_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft)
+ {
+   at->mft = mft;
+   at->flags = (mft == &mft->data->mmft) ? GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT : 0;
+-  at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + u16at (mft->buf, 0x14);
++  at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + first_attr_off (mft->buf);
+   at->attr_end = at->emft_buf = at->edat_buf = at->sbuf = NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -154,7 +172,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 		    return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 
+-	      new_pos = &at->emft_buf[u16at (at->emft_buf, 0x14)];
++	      new_pos = &at->emft_buf[first_attr_off (at->emft_buf)];
+ 	      while (*new_pos != 0xFF)
+ 		{
+ 		  if ((*new_pos == *at->attr_cur)
+@@ -213,7 +231,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	{
+-	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
++	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + res_attr_data_off (pa);
+ 	  at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
+ 	  pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ 	}
+@@ -399,20 +417,20 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
+ 
+   if (pa[8] == 0)
+     {
+-      if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
++      if (ofs + len > res_attr_data_len (pa))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
+ 
+-      if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++      if (res_attr_data_len (pa) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
+ 
+       if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
+ 
+-      if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
++      if (res_attr_data_off (pa) + res_attr_data_len (pa) >
+ 	  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
+ 
+-      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
++      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + res_attr_data_off (pa) + ofs, len);
+       return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -556,7 +574,7 @@ init_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, grub_uint64_t mftno)
+ 			   (unsigned long long) mftno);
+ 
+       if (!pa[8])
+-	mft->size = u32at (pa, 0x10);
++	mft->size = res_attr_data_len (pa);
+       else
+ 	mft->size = u64at (pa, 0x30);
+ 
+@@ -805,7 +823,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 	  (u32at (cur_pos, 0x18) != 0x490024) ||
+ 	  (u32at (cur_pos, 0x1C) != 0x300033))
+ 	continue;
+-      cur_pos += u16at (cur_pos, 0x14);
++      cur_pos += res_attr_data_off (cur_pos);
+       if (*cur_pos != 0x30)	/* Not filename index */
+ 	continue;
+       break;
+@@ -834,7 +852,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 	{
+           int is_resident = (cur_pos[8] == 0);
+ 
+-          bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) :
++          bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) :
+                         u32at (cur_pos, 0x28));
+ 
+           bmp = grub_malloc (bitmap_len);
+@@ -855,14 +873,14 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 		  goto done;
+ 		}
+ 
+-              if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
++              if (res_attr_data_off (cur_pos) + res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) >
+ 		  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
+ 		{
+ 		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
+ 		  goto done;
+ 		}
+ 
+-              grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
++              grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + res_attr_data_off (cur_pos),
+                            bitmap_len);
+ 	    }
+           else
+@@ -1226,12 +1244,12 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
+       goto fail;
+     }
+ 
+-  if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
++  if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (res_attr_data_len (pa)))
+     {
+       int len;
+ 
+-      len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
+-      pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
++      len = res_attr_data_len (pa) / 2;
++      pa += res_attr_data_off (pa);
+       if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
+         *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
+       else
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/20-grub.install

@@ -109,7 +109,11 @@ case "$COMMAND" in
                 sed -i -e "s,^initrd.*,initrd ${BOOTPREFIX}${INITRD},g" "${BLS_TARGET}"
             fi
 
-            if [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *\+* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ]; then
+            if ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" != *${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE}* ]] && \
+                     [ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" == "xtrue" ] ) || \
+                   ( echo "$KERNEL_VERSION" | grep -E -q "64k|auto|rt|uki" && \
+                    	[ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" != "xtrue" ] ) || \
+                   ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *debug* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ] ); then
                 GRUB_UPDATE_DEFAULT_KERNEL=false
             fi
 

SOURCES/grub.macros

@@ -285,7 +285,13 @@ Requires:	%{name}-common = %{evr}					\
 Requires:	%{name}-tools-minimal >= %{evr}				\
 Requires:	%{name}-tools-extra = %{evr}				\
 Requires:	%{name}-tools = %{evr}					\
+Requires:	%{efi_esp_dir}/shim%%(echo %{1} | cut -d- -f2).efi	\
 Provides:	%{name}-efi = %{evr}					\
+Provides:	almalinux(grub2-sig-key) = 202303				\
+%{expand:%%ifarch x86_64						\
+Conflicts:	shim-x64 <= 15.6-1.el8.alma					\
+Conflicts:	shim-ia32 <= 15.6-1.el8.alma				\
+%%endif}										\
 %{?legacy_provides:Provides:	%{name} = %{evr}}			\
 %{-o:Obsoletes:	%{name}-efi < %{evr}}					\
 									\
@@ -540,7 +546,7 @@ install -D -m 700 unicode.pf2					\\\
 	$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{efi_esp_dir}/fonts/unicode.pf2		\
 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_bindir}/%{name}-editenv			\\\
 	${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{efi_esp_dir}/grubenv create		\
-ln -sf ../efi/EFI/%{efi_vendor}/grubenv				\\\
+ln -sf ../efi/EFI/%{efidir}/grubenv				\\\
 	$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/boot/grub2/grubenv			\
 cd ..								\
 %{nil}

SOURCES/grub.patches

@@ -573,3 +573,18 @@ Patch0572: 0572-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch
 Patch0573: 0573-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch
 Patch0574: 0574-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch
 Patch0575: 0575-Enable-shared-processor-mode-in-vector-5.patch
+Patch0576: 0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch
+Patch0577: 0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch
+Patch0578: 0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch
+Patch0579: 0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
+Patch0580: 0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
+Patch0581: 0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
+Patch0582: 0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
+Patch0583: 0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
+Patch0584: 0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
+Patch0585: 0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
+Patch0586: 0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
+Patch0587: 0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
+Patch0588: 0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
+Patch0589: 0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
+Patch0590: 0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch

SOURCES/sbat.csv.in

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
 grub,3,Free Software Foundation,grub,@@VERSION@@,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/
-grub.rh,2,Red Hat,grub2,@@VERSION_RELEASE@@,mailto:secalert@redhat.com
+grub.rh,2,Red Hat,grub2,@@RHEL_VERSION_RELEASE@@,mailto:secalert@redhat.com
+grub.almalinux,2,AlmaLinux,grub2,@@VERSION_RELEASE@@,mail:security@almalinux.org

SPECS/grub2.spec

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+%global efi_vendor almalinux
+%global efidir almalinux
+%global efi_esp_dir /boot/efi/EFI/%{efidir}
+
 %undefine _hardened_build
 
 %global tarversion 2.02
@@ -7,7 +11,7 @@
 Name:		grub2
 Epoch:		1
 Version:	2.02
-Release:	148%{?dist}
+Release:	156%{?dist}.alma.1
 Summary:	Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
 Group:		System Environment/Base
 License:	GPLv3+
@@ -24,31 +28,29 @@ Source6:	gitignore
 Source8:	strtoull_test.c
 Source9:	20-grub.install
 Source12:	99-grub-mkconfig.install
-Source13:	redhatsecurebootca3.cer
-Source14:	redhatsecureboot301.cer
-Source15:	redhatsecurebootca5.cer
-Source16:	redhatsecureboot502.cer
-Source17:	redhatsecureboot601.cer
-Source18:	redhatsecureboot701.cer
+Source13:	almalinuxsecurebootca0.cer
 Source19:	sbat.csv.in
 
 %include %{SOURCE1}
 
 %if 0%{with_efi_arch}
 %define old_sb_ca	%{SOURCE13}
-%define old_sb_cer	%{SOURCE14}
-%define old_sb_key	redhatsecureboot301
-%define sb_ca		%{SOURCE15}
-%define sb_cer		%{SOURCE16}
-%define sb_key		redhatsecureboot502
+%define old_sb_cer	%{SOURCE13}
+%define old_sb_key	almalinuxsecurebootca0
+%define sb_ca		%{SOURCE13}
+%define sb_cer		%{SOURCE13}
+%define sb_key		almalinuxsecurebootca0
 %endif
 
 %ifarch ppc64le
-%define old_sb_cer	%{SOURCE17}
-%define sb_cer		%{SOURCE18}
-%define sb_key		redhatsecureboot702
+%define old_sb_cer	%{SOURCE13}
+%define sb_cer		%{SOURCE13}
+%define sb_key		almalinuxsecurebootca0
 %endif
 
+# AlmaLinux: keep upstream EVR for RHEL SBAT entry
+%define rhel_version_release $(echo %{version}-%{release} | sed 's/\.alma.*//')
+
 # generate with do-rebase
 %include %{SOURCE2}
 
@@ -166,7 +168,7 @@ This subpackage provides tools for support of all platforms.
 mkdir grub-%{grubefiarch}-%{tarversion}
 grep -A100000 '# stuff "make" creates' .gitignore > grub-%{grubefiarch}-%{tarversion}/.gitignore
 cp %{SOURCE4} grub-%{grubefiarch}-%{tarversion}/unifont.pcf.gz
-sed -e "s,@@VERSION@@,%{version},g" -e "s,@@VERSION_RELEASE@@,%{version}-%{release},g" \
+sed -e "s,@@VERSION@@,%{version},g" -e "s,@@VERSION_RELEASE@@,%{version}-%{release},g" -e "s,@@RHEL_VERSION_RELEASE@@,%{rhel_version_release},g" \
     %{SOURCE19} > grub-%{grubefiarch}-%{tarversion}/sbat.csv
 git add grub-%{grubefiarch}-%{tarversion}
 %endif
@@ -341,6 +343,20 @@ if [ "$1" = 0 ]; then
 	/sbin/install-info --delete --info-dir=%{_infodir} %{_infodir}/%{name}-dev.info.gz || :
 fi
 
+%if 0%{with_efi_arch}
+%posttrans %{package_arch}
+if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && [ ! -f %{efi_esp_dir}/grub.cfg ]; then
+    grub2-mkconfig -o %{efi_esp_dir}/grub.cfg || :
+fi
+%endif
+
+%if 0%{with_alt_efi_arch}
+%posttrans %{alt_package_arch}
+if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && [ ! -f %{efi_esp_dir}/grub.cfg ]; then
+    grub2-mkconfig -o %{efi_esp_dir}/grub.cfg || :
+fi
+%endif
+
 %files common -f grub.lang
 %dir %{_libdir}/grub/
 %dir %{_datarootdir}/grub/
@@ -510,6 +526,44 @@ fi
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Apr 10 2024 Andrew Lukoshko <alukoshko@almalinux.org> - 2.02-156.alma.1
+- Debrand for AlmaLinux
+
+* Tue Feb 20 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-156
+- fs/ntfs: OOB write fix
+- (CVE-2023-4692)
+- Resolves: #RHEL-11566
+
+* Thu Feb 8 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.06-155
+- grub-set-bootflag: Fix for CVE-2024-1048
+- (CVE-2024-1048)
+- Resolves: #RHEL-20746
+
+* Mon Nov 27 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-154
+- Missing install script for previous commit
+- Related: #RHEL-4343
+
+* Fri Nov 24 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-153
+- util: Enable default kernel for updates
+- Resolves: #RHEL-4343
+
+* Fri Oct 20 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-152
+- kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
+  of fadump
+- Resolves: #RHEL-14283
+
+* Mon Aug 28 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-151
+- util: Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
+- Resolves: #2051889
+
+* Fri Jun 16 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-150
+- kern/ieee1275/init: sync vec5 patchset with upstream
+- Resolves: #2172111
+
+* Wed Jun 14 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-149
+- efi/http: change uint32_t to uintn_t for grub_efi_http_message_t
+- Resolves: #2178388
+
 * Mon Feb 06 2023 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-148
 - ppc64le: cas5, take 3
 - Resolves: #2139508