Merge branch 'c8-beta' into a8-beta
This commit is contained in:
commit
d8c11f2651
SOURCES
0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch20-grub.installgrub.patches
SPECS
36
SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
Normal file
36
SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
From 8c74431327e0c7d7fe47462b0e69fcbe3bbac56e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 09:14:29 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
|
||||
index 855dbdd..f2281bc 100644
|
||||
--- a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
|
||||
+++ b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
|
||||
@@ -117,6 +117,18 @@ cat <<EOF
|
||||
# This section was generated by a script. Do not modify the generated file - all changes
|
||||
# will be lost the next time file is regenerated. Instead edit the BootLoaderSpec files.
|
||||
|
||||
+# The kernelopts variable should be defined in the grubenv file. But to ensure that menu
|
||||
+# entries populated from BootLoaderSpec files that use this variable work correctly even
|
||||
+# without a grubenv file, define a fallback kernelopts variable if this has not been set.
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+# The kernelopts variable in the grubenv file can be modified using the grubby tool or by
|
||||
+# executing the grub2-mkconfig tool. For the latter, the values of the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
|
||||
+# and GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT options from /etc/default/grub file are used to set both
|
||||
+# the kernelopts variable in the grubenv file and the fallback kernelopts variable.
|
||||
+if [ -z "\${kernelopts}" ]; then
|
||||
+ set kernelopts="root=${linux_root_device_thisversion} ro ${args}"
|
||||
+fi
|
||||
+
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.1
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 12:21:55 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
|
||||
of fadump
|
||||
|
||||
This is a backport of the patch with the same name to grub 2.02.
|
||||
|
||||
When a kernel dump is present then restrict the high memory regions to
|
||||
avoid allocating memory where the kernel dump resides. Use the
|
||||
ibm,kernel-dump node under /rtas to determine whether a kernel dump exists
|
||||
and up to which limit grub can use available memory. Set the
|
||||
upper_mem_limit to the size of the kernel dump section of type
|
||||
'REAL_MODE_REGION' and therefore only allow grub's memory usage for high
|
||||
addresses from 768MB to 'upper_mem_limit'. This means that grub can
|
||||
use high memory in the range of 768MB to upper_mem_limit and
|
||||
the kernel-dump memory regions above 'upper_mem_limit' remain untouched.
|
||||
This change has no effect on memory allocations below 640MB.
|
||||
|
||||
Also, fall back to allocating below 640MB in case the chunk of
|
||||
memory there would be larger than the chunk of memory above 768MB.
|
||||
This can for example occur if a free memory area is found starting at 300MB
|
||||
extending up to 1GB but a kernel dump is located at 768MB and therefore
|
||||
does not allow the allocation of the high memory area but requiring to use
|
||||
the chunk starting at 300MB to avoid an unnecessary out-of-memory
|
||||
condition.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
|
||||
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
||||
Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
|
||||
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 139 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
|
||||
index 1fae84440403..31843ab70a62 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
|
||||
* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
+#include <stddef.h> /* offsetof() */
|
||||
+
|
||||
#include <grub/kernel.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/dl.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/disk.h>
|
||||
@@ -180,6 +182,97 @@ grub_claim_heap (void)
|
||||
+ GRUB_KERNEL_MACHINE_STACK_SIZE), 0x200000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/* ibm,kernel-dump data structures */
|
||||
+struct kd_section
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ grub_uint32_t flags;
|
||||
+ grub_uint16_t src_datatype;
|
||||
+#define KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION 0x0011
|
||||
+ grub_uint16_t error_flags;
|
||||
+ grub_uint64_t src_address;
|
||||
+ grub_uint64_t num_bytes;
|
||||
+ grub_uint64_t act_bytes;
|
||||
+ grub_uint64_t dst_address;
|
||||
+} GRUB_PACKED;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define MAX_KD_SECTIONS 10
|
||||
+
|
||||
+struct kernel_dump
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ grub_uint32_t format;
|
||||
+ grub_uint16_t num_sections;
|
||||
+ grub_uint16_t status_flags;
|
||||
+ grub_uint32_t offset_1st_section;
|
||||
+ grub_uint32_t num_blocks;
|
||||
+ grub_uint64_t start_block;
|
||||
+ grub_uint64_t num_blocks_avail;
|
||||
+ grub_uint32_t offet_path_string;
|
||||
+ grub_uint32_t max_time_allowed;
|
||||
+ struct kd_section kds[MAX_KD_SECTIONS]; /* offset_1st_section should point to kds[0] */
|
||||
+} GRUB_PACKED;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Determine if a kernel dump exists and if it does, then determine the highest
|
||||
+ * address that grub can use for memory allocations.
|
||||
+ * The caller must have initialized *highest to ~0. *highest will not
|
||||
+ * be modified if no kernel dump is found.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+check_kernel_dump (grub_uint64_t *highest)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ struct kernel_dump kernel_dump;
|
||||
+ grub_ssize_t kernel_dump_size;
|
||||
+ grub_ieee1275_phandle_t rtas;
|
||||
+ struct kd_section *kds;
|
||||
+ grub_size_t i;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* If there's a kernel-dump it must have at least one section */
|
||||
+ if (grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/rtas", &rtas) ||
|
||||
+ grub_ieee1275_get_property (rtas, "ibm,kernel-dump", &kernel_dump,
|
||||
+ sizeof (kernel_dump), &kernel_dump_size) ||
|
||||
+ kernel_dump_size <= (grub_ssize_t) offsetof (struct kernel_dump, kds[1]))
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ kernel_dump_size = grub_min (kernel_dump_size, (grub_ssize_t) sizeof (kernel_dump));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format) != 1)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_printf (_("Error: ibm,kernel-dump has an unexpected format version '%u'\n"),
|
||||
+ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format));
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections) > MAX_KD_SECTIONS)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_printf (_("Error: Too many kernel dump sections: %d\n"),
|
||||
+ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.num_sections));
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections); i++)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ kds = (struct kd_section *) ((grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump +
|
||||
+ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.offset_1st_section) +
|
||||
+ i * sizeof (struct kd_section));
|
||||
+ /* sanity check the address is within the 'kernel_dump' struct */
|
||||
+ if ((grub_addr_t) kds > (grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump + kernel_dump_size + sizeof (*kds))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_printf (_("Error: 'kds' address beyond last available section\n"));
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((grub_be_to_cpu16 (kds->src_datatype) == KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION) &&
|
||||
+ (grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->src_address) == 0))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ *highest = grub_min (*highest, grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->num_bytes));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Helper for grub_claim_heap on powerpc. */
|
||||
static int
|
||||
heap_size (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
|
||||
@@ -207,7 +300,9 @@ static int
|
||||
heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
|
||||
void *data)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ grub_uint64_t upper_mem_limit = ~0;
|
||||
grub_uint32_t total = *(grub_uint32_t *)data;
|
||||
+ int has_kernel_dump;
|
||||
|
||||
if (type != GRUB_MEMORY_AVAILABLE)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@@ -243,6 +338,50 @@ heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
|
||||
len = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ has_kernel_dump = check_kernel_dump (&upper_mem_limit);
|
||||
+ if (has_kernel_dump)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_uint64_t lo_len = 0, hi_len = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (addr > upper_mem_limit || upper_mem_limit == (grub_uint64_t)~0)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* limit len to stay below upper_mem_limit */
|
||||
+ if (addr < upper_mem_limit && (addr + len) > upper_mem_limit)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ len = grub_min (len, upper_mem_limit - addr);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* We can allocate below 640MB or above 768MB.
|
||||
+ * Choose the bigger chunk below 640MB or above 768MB.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (addr < 0x28000000)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ lo_len = grub_min (len, 0x28000000 - addr);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (addr + len > 0x30000000)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (addr < 0x30000000)
|
||||
+ hi_len = len - (0x30000000 - addr);
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ hi_len = len;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (hi_len > lo_len)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ len = hi_len;
|
||||
+ if (addr < 0x30000000)
|
||||
+ addr = 0x30000000;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ len = lo_len;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (len == 0)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* If this block contains 0x30000000 (768MB), do not claim below that.
|
||||
Linux likes to claim memory at min(RMO top, 768MB) and works down
|
||||
without reference to /memory/available. */
|
34
SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
Normal file
34
SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 11:22:47 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] util: Enable default kernel for updates
|
||||
|
||||
Several kernel variants can be installed on a system in parallel.
|
||||
In order to allow the user to choose which kernel will be set to
|
||||
default after an update, re-enable grub's usage of DEFAULTKERNEL as
|
||||
set in /etc/sysconfig/kernel
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
|
||||
index 7e87dfccc0e4..f71bc64360b0 100644
|
||||
--- a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
|
||||
+++ b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
|
||||
@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@ if test -f /etc/sysconfig/kernel ; then
|
||||
. /etc/sysconfig/kernel
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
+GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${DEFAULTKERNEL/-core/}
|
||||
+if [ "$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE" != "kernel" ]; then
|
||||
+ echo GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL=true
|
||||
+ echo export GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL
|
||||
+ GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE/kernel-/}
|
||||
+fi
|
||||
+echo GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
|
||||
+echo export GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
|
||||
if [ "$MAKEDEBUG" = "yes" ]; then
|
||||
echo GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG=true
|
||||
echo export GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG
|
@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
|
||||
From 9ca4c3fe1c7dbd62e8ad6a23cb1b1fda695fdb44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:39:41 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] grub-set-bootflag: Conservative partial fix for
|
||||
CVE-2024-1048
|
||||
|
||||
Following up on CVE-2019-14865 and taking a fresh look at
|
||||
grub2-set-bootflag now (through my work at CIQ on Rocky Linux), I saw some
|
||||
other ways in which users could still abuse this little program:
|
||||
|
||||
1. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag no longer rewrites the
|
||||
grubenv file in-place, but writes into a temporary file and renames it
|
||||
over the original, checking for error returns from each call first.
|
||||
This prevents the original file truncation vulnerability, but it can
|
||||
leave the temporary file around if the program is killed before it can
|
||||
rename or remove the file. There are still many ways to get the program
|
||||
killed, such as through RLIMIT_FSIZE triggering SIGXFSZ (tested,
|
||||
reliable) or by careful timing (tricky) of signals sent by process group
|
||||
leader, pty, pre-scheduled timers, SIGXCPU (probably not an exhaustive
|
||||
list). Invoking the program multiple times fills up /boot (or if /boot
|
||||
is not separate, then it can fill up the root filesystem). Since the
|
||||
files are tiny, the filesystem is likely to run out of free inodes
|
||||
before it'd run out of blocks, but the effect is similar - can't create
|
||||
new files after this point (but still can add data to existing files,
|
||||
such as logs).
|
||||
|
||||
2. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag naively tries to protect
|
||||
itself from signals by becoming full root. (This does protect it from
|
||||
signals sent by the user directly to the PID, but e.g. "kill -9 -1" by
|
||||
the user still works.) A side effect of such "protection" is that it's
|
||||
possible to invoke more concurrent instances of grub2-set-bootflag than
|
||||
the user's RLIMIT_NPROC would normally permit (as specified e.g. in
|
||||
/etc/security/limits.conf, or say in Apache httpd's RLimitNPROC if
|
||||
grub2-set-bootflag would be abused by a website script), thereby
|
||||
exhausting system resources (e.g., bypassing RAM usage limit if
|
||||
RLIMIT_AS was also set).
|
||||
|
||||
3. umask is inherited. Again, due to how the CVE-2019-14865 fix creates
|
||||
a new file, and due to how mkstemp() works, this affects grubenv's new
|
||||
file permissions. Luckily, mkstemp() forces them to be no more relaxed
|
||||
than 0600, but the user ends up being able to set them e.g. to 0.
|
||||
Luckily, at least in my testing GRUB still works fine even when the file
|
||||
has such (lack of) permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
This commit deals with the abuses above as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
1. RLIMIT_FSIZE is pre-checked, so this specific way to get the process
|
||||
killed should no longer work. However, this isn't a complete fix
|
||||
because there are other ways to get the process killed after it has
|
||||
created the temporary file.
|
||||
|
||||
The commit also fixes bug 1975892 ("RFE: grub2-set-bootflag should not
|
||||
write the grubenv when the flag being written is already set") and
|
||||
similar for "menu_show_once", which further reduces the abuse potential.
|
||||
|
||||
2. RLIMIT_NPROC bypass should be avoided by not becoming full root (aka
|
||||
dropping the partial "kill protection").
|
||||
|
||||
3. A safe umask is set.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a partial fix (temporary files can still accumulate, but this is
|
||||
harder to trigger).
|
||||
|
||||
While at it, this commit also fixes potential 1- or 2-byte over-read of
|
||||
env[] if its content is malformed - this was not a security issue since the
|
||||
grubenv file is trusted input, and the fix is just for robustness.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
index a85f11fceacb..5b932f76b6f4 100644
|
||||
--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
+#include <sys/stat.h>
|
||||
+#include <sys/resource.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#define GRUBENV "/" GRUB_BOOT_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_ENVBLK_DEFCFG
|
||||
#define GRUBENV_SIZE 1024
|
||||
@@ -54,12 +56,17 @@ static void usage(void)
|
||||
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
|
||||
- char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1], buf[64], *s;
|
||||
+ char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
|
||||
/* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
|
||||
char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
|
||||
const char *bootflag;
|
||||
int i, fd, len, ret;
|
||||
FILE *f;
|
||||
+ struct rlimit rlim;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ umask(077);
|
||||
|
||||
if (argc != 2)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -81,20 +88,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
len = strlen (bootflag);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
- * Really become root. setuid avoids an user killing us, possibly leaking
|
||||
- * the tmpfile. setgid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
|
||||
+ * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- ret = setuid(0);
|
||||
- if (ret)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- perror ("Error setuid(0) failed");
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- ret = setgid(0);
|
||||
- if (ret)
|
||||
+ if (setegid(0))
|
||||
{
|
||||
- perror ("Error setgid(0) failed");
|
||||
+ perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -123,6 +121,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
|
||||
/* 0 terminate env */
|
||||
env[GRUBENV_SIZE] = 0;
|
||||
+ /* not a valid flag value */
|
||||
+ env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1] = 0;
|
||||
+ env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 2] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (strncmp (env, GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE, strlen (GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -158,6 +159,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
|
||||
/* The grubenv is not 0 terminated, so memcpy the name + '=' , '1', '\n' */
|
||||
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s=1\n", bootflag);
|
||||
+ if (!memcmp(s, buf, len + 3))
|
||||
+ return 0; /* nothing to do */
|
||||
memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
|
||||
From f4c7783c2b695794938748a6567e86456ed2314a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:56:21 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] grub-set-bootflag: More complete fix for CVE-2024-1048
|
||||
|
||||
Switch to per-user fixed temporary filenames along with a weird locking
|
||||
mechanism, which is explained in source code comments. This is a more
|
||||
complete fix than the previous commit (temporary files can't accumulate).
|
||||
Unfortunately, it introduces new risks (by working on a temporary file
|
||||
shared between the user's invocations), which are _hopefully_ avoided by
|
||||
the patch's elaborate logic. I actually got it wrong at first, which
|
||||
suggests that this logic is hard to reason about, and more errors or
|
||||
omissions are possible. It also relies on the kernel's primitives' exact
|
||||
semantics to a greater extent (nothing out of the ordinary, though).
|
||||
|
||||
Remaining issues that I think cannot reasonably be fixed without a
|
||||
redesign (e.g., having per-flag files with nothing else in them) and
|
||||
without introducing new issues:
|
||||
|
||||
A. A user can still revert a concurrent user's attempt of setting the
|
||||
other flag - or of making other changes to grubenv by means other than
|
||||
this program.
|
||||
|
||||
B. One leftover temporary file per user is still possible.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
|
||||
1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
index 5b932f76b6f4..698b55a1ab93 100644
|
||||
--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
+#include <sys/file.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/resource.h>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -57,15 +58,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
|
||||
char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
|
||||
- /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
|
||||
- char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
|
||||
+ /* +1 for 0 termination, +11 for ".%u" in tmp filename */
|
||||
+ char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 11 + 1];
|
||||
const char *bootflag;
|
||||
int i, fd, len, ret;
|
||||
FILE *f;
|
||||
- struct rlimit rlim;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
umask(077);
|
||||
|
||||
if (argc != 2)
|
||||
@@ -92,7 +90,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (setegid(0))
|
||||
{
|
||||
- perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
|
||||
+ perror ("setegid(0) failed");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -163,19 +161,82 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
return 0; /* nothing to do */
|
||||
memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
|
||||
|
||||
+ struct rlimit rlim;
|
||||
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ fprintf (stderr, "Resource limits undetermined or too low\n");
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Here we work under the premise that we shouldn't write into the target
|
||||
+ * file directly because we might not be able to have all of our changes
|
||||
+ * written completely and atomically. That was CVE-2019-14865, known to
|
||||
+ * have been triggerable via RLIMIT_FSIZE. While we've dealt with that
|
||||
+ * specific attack via the check above, there may be other possibilities.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Create a tempfile for writing the new env. Use the canonicalized filename
|
||||
* for the template so that the tmpfile is in the same dir / on same fs.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We now use per-user fixed temporary filenames, so that a user cannot cause
|
||||
+ * multiple files to accumulate.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We don't use O_EXCL so that a stale temporary file doesn't prevent further
|
||||
+ * usage of the program by the user.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%sXXXXXX", env_filename);
|
||||
- fd = mkstemp(tmp_filename);
|
||||
+ snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%s.%u", env_filename, getuid());
|
||||
+ fd = open(tmp_filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
|
||||
if (fd == -1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
perror ("Creating tmpfile failed");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * The lock prevents the same user from reaching further steps ending in
|
||||
+ * rename() concurrently, in which case the temporary file only partially
|
||||
+ * written by one invocation could be renamed to the target file by another.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * The lock also guards the slow fsync() from concurrent calls. After the
|
||||
+ * first time that and the rename() complete, further invocations for the
|
||||
+ * same flag become no-ops.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We lock the temporary file rather than the target file because locking the
|
||||
+ * latter would allow any user having SIGSTOP'ed their process to make all
|
||||
+ * other users' invocations fail (or lock up if we'd use blocking mode).
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We use non-blocking mode (LOCK_NB) because the lock having been taken by
|
||||
+ * another process implies that the other process would normally have already
|
||||
+ * renamed the file to target by the time it releases the lock (and we could
|
||||
+ * acquire it), so we'd be working directly on the target if we proceeded,
|
||||
+ * which is undesirable, and we'd kind of fail on the already-done rename.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ perror ("Locking tmpfile failed");
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Deal with the potential that another invocation proceeded all the way to
|
||||
+ * rename() and process exit while we were between open() and flock().
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ struct stat st1, st2;
|
||||
+ if (fstat(fd, &st1) || stat(tmp_filename, &st2))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ perror ("stat of tmpfile failed");
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (st1.st_dev != st2.st_dev || st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ fprintf (stderr, "Another invocation won race\n");
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
f = fdopen (fd, "w");
|
||||
if (!f)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -200,23 +261,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- ret = fsync (fileno (f));
|
||||
+ ret = ftruncate (fileno (f), GRUBENV_SIZE);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
|
||||
+ perror ("Error truncating tmpfile");
|
||||
unlink(tmp_filename);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- ret = fclose (f);
|
||||
+ ret = fsync (fileno (f));
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- perror ("Error closing tmpfile");
|
||||
+ perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
|
||||
unlink(tmp_filename);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
+ * We must not close the file before rename() as that would remove the lock.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
* And finally rename the tmpfile with the new env over the old env, the
|
||||
* linux kernel guarantees that this is atomic (from a syscall pov).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
|
||||
From a7192a650c1e94221a86b49f5132fb47a4dda6ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 22:05:45 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] grub-set-bootflag: Exit calmly when not running as root
|
||||
|
||||
Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root. This
|
||||
allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
|
||||
supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 11 +++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
index 698b55a1ab93..a51805fa8cec 100644
|
||||
--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
@@ -85,6 +85,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
bootflag = bootflags[i];
|
||||
len = strlen (bootflag);
|
||||
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root. This
|
||||
+ * allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
|
||||
+ * supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (geteuid())
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ printf ("grub-set-bootflag not running as root, no action taken\n");
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
||||
From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the
|
||||
$ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute for the $MFT file
|
||||
|
||||
When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
|
||||
using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
|
||||
containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
|
||||
which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
|
||||
|
||||
These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
|
||||
offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
|
||||
the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
|
||||
|
||||
However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
|
||||
the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
|
||||
causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
|
||||
values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
|
||||
|
||||
Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
|
||||
assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
|
||||
|
||||
This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
|
||||
written beyond the boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index bbdbe24ada83..c3c4db117bba 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (at->attr_end)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- grub_uint8_t *pa;
|
||||
+ grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
|
||||
|
||||
at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
|
||||
if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
|
||||
@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
|
||||
at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
|
||||
+ pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
|
||||
at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
|
||||
+ pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
|
||||
}
|
||||
at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
|
||||
while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
|
||||
@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
|
||||
at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
|
||||
pa = at->attr_cur;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
|
||||
grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
|
||||
grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
|
||||
@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (*pa != attr)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (read_attr
|
||||
(at, pa + 0x10,
|
||||
u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
||||
From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the
|
||||
resident $DATA attribute
|
||||
|
||||
When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
|
||||
the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
|
||||
there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
|
||||
file record segment.
|
||||
|
||||
When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
|
||||
read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
|
||||
arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
|
||||
|
||||
This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
|
||||
contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
|
||||
obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
|
||||
|
||||
This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
|
||||
corresponding file record segment only.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index c3c4db117bba..a68e173d8285 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
|
||||
- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
|
||||
+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
||||
From 7e5f031a6a6a3decc2360a7b0c71abbe598e7354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:17 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing directory entries
|
||||
from resident and non-resident index attributes
|
||||
|
||||
This fix introduces checks to ensure that index entries are never read
|
||||
beyond the corresponding directory index.
|
||||
|
||||
The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 +++++++++++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index a68e173d8285..2d78b96e19fb 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ get_utf8 (grub_uint8_t *in, grub_size_t len)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
-list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
|
||||
+list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos, grub_uint8_t *end_pos,
|
||||
grub_fshelp_iterate_dir_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
|
||||
{
|
||||
grub_uint8_t *np;
|
||||
@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
|
||||
grub_uint8_t namespace;
|
||||
char *ustr;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if ((pos >= end_pos) || (end_pos - pos < 0x52))
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (pos[0xC] & 2) /* end signature */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -617,6 +620,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
|
||||
ns = *(np++);
|
||||
namespace = *(np++);
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (2 * ns > end_pos - pos - 0x52)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Ignore files in DOS namespace, as they will reappear as Win32
|
||||
* names.
|
||||
@@ -806,7 +812,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cur_pos += 0x10; /* Skip index root */
|
||||
- ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0), hook, hook_data);
|
||||
+ ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0),
|
||||
+ at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
|
||||
+ hook, hook_data);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -893,6 +901,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
(const grub_uint8_t *) "INDX")))
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
ret = list_file (mft, &indx[0x18 + u16at (indx, 0x18)],
|
||||
+ indx + (mft->data->idx_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
|
||||
hook, hook_data);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
||||
From 7a5a116739fa6d8a625da7d6b9272c9a2462f967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:44 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing bitmaps for index
|
||||
attributes
|
||||
|
||||
This fix introduces checks to ensure that bitmaps for directory indices
|
||||
are never read beyond their actual sizes.
|
||||
|
||||
The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index 2d78b96e19fb..bb70c89fb803 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -843,6 +843,25 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
|
||||
if (is_resident)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ if (bitmap_len > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap too large");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (cur_pos >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
|
||||
+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
|
||||
bitmap_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
||||
From 1fe82c41e070385e273d7bb1cfb482627a3c28e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:38:19 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing a volume label
|
||||
|
||||
This fix introduces checks to ensure that an NTFS volume label is always
|
||||
read from the corresponding file record segment.
|
||||
|
||||
The current NTFS code allows the volume label string to be read from an
|
||||
arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory location. However, the bytes read are
|
||||
always treated as UTF-16LE. So, the final string displayed is mostly
|
||||
unreadable and it can't be easily converted back to raw bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not causing a significant
|
||||
data leak.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index bb70c89fb803..ff5e3740f0dd 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -1213,13 +1213,29 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
|
||||
|
||||
init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
|
||||
pa = find_attr (&mft->attr, GRUB_NTFS_AT_VOLUME_NAME);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (pa >= mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
|
||||
+ goto fail;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa < 0x16)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
|
||||
+ goto fail;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
|
||||
len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
|
||||
pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
|
||||
- *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
|
||||
+ if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
|
||||
+ *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fail:
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
159
SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
Normal file
159
SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
|
||||
From e58b870ff926415e23fc386af41ff81b2f588763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:40:07 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fs/ntfs: Make code more readable
|
||||
|
||||
Move some calls used to access NTFS attribute header fields into
|
||||
functions with human-readable names.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index ff5e3740f0dd..de435aa14d85 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ u64at (void *ptr, grub_size_t ofs)
|
||||
return grub_le_to_cpu64 (grub_get_unaligned64 ((char *) ptr + ofs));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static grub_uint16_t
|
||||
+first_attr_off (void *mft_buf_ptr)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return u16at (mft_buf_ptr, 0x14);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static grub_uint16_t
|
||||
+res_attr_data_off (void *res_attr_ptr)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return u16at (res_attr_ptr, 0x14);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static grub_uint32_t
|
||||
+res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
grub_ntfscomp_func_t grub_ntfscomp_func;
|
||||
|
||||
static grub_err_t
|
||||
@@ -106,7 +124,7 @@ init_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft)
|
||||
{
|
||||
at->mft = mft;
|
||||
at->flags = (mft == &mft->data->mmft) ? GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT : 0;
|
||||
- at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + u16at (mft->buf, 0x14);
|
||||
+ at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + first_attr_off (mft->buf);
|
||||
at->attr_end = at->emft_buf = at->edat_buf = at->sbuf = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -154,7 +172,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- new_pos = &at->emft_buf[u16at (at->emft_buf, 0x14)];
|
||||
+ new_pos = &at->emft_buf[first_attr_off (at->emft_buf)];
|
||||
while (*new_pos != 0xFF)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if ((*new_pos == *at->attr_cur)
|
||||
@@ -213,7 +231,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
- at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
|
||||
+ at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + res_attr_data_off (pa);
|
||||
at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
|
||||
pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -399,20 +417,20 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
|
||||
|
||||
if (pa[8] == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
|
||||
+ if (ofs + len > res_attr_data_len (pa))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
|
||||
|
||||
- if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ if (res_attr_data_len (pa) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
|
||||
|
||||
if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
|
||||
|
||||
- if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
|
||||
+ if (res_attr_data_off (pa) + res_attr_data_len (pa) >
|
||||
(grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
|
||||
|
||||
- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
|
||||
+ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + res_attr_data_off (pa) + ofs, len);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -556,7 +574,7 @@ init_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, grub_uint64_t mftno)
|
||||
(unsigned long long) mftno);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pa[8])
|
||||
- mft->size = u32at (pa, 0x10);
|
||||
+ mft->size = res_attr_data_len (pa);
|
||||
else
|
||||
mft->size = u64at (pa, 0x30);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -805,7 +823,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
(u32at (cur_pos, 0x18) != 0x490024) ||
|
||||
(u32at (cur_pos, 0x1C) != 0x300033))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
- cur_pos += u16at (cur_pos, 0x14);
|
||||
+ cur_pos += res_attr_data_off (cur_pos);
|
||||
if (*cur_pos != 0x30) /* Not filename index */
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -834,7 +852,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
{
|
||||
int is_resident = (cur_pos[8] == 0);
|
||||
|
||||
- bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) :
|
||||
+ bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) :
|
||||
u32at (cur_pos, 0x28));
|
||||
|
||||
bmp = grub_malloc (bitmap_len);
|
||||
@@ -855,14 +873,14 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
|
||||
+ if (res_attr_data_off (cur_pos) + res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) >
|
||||
(grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
|
||||
+ grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + res_attr_data_off (cur_pos),
|
||||
bitmap_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
@@ -1226,12 +1244,12 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
|
||||
+ if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (res_attr_data_len (pa)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
|
||||
- len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
|
||||
- pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
|
||||
+ len = res_attr_data_len (pa) / 2;
|
||||
+ pa += res_attr_data_off (pa);
|
||||
if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
|
||||
*label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
|
||||
else
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
@ -109,7 +109,11 @@ case "$COMMAND" in
|
||||
sed -i -e "s,^initrd.*,initrd ${BOOTPREFIX}${INITRD},g" "${BLS_TARGET}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *\+* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ]; then
|
||||
if ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" != *${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE}* ]] && \
|
||||
[ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" == "xtrue" ] ) || \
|
||||
( echo "$KERNEL_VERSION" | grep -E -q "64k|auto|rt|uki" && \
|
||||
[ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" != "xtrue" ] ) || \
|
||||
( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *debug* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ] ); then
|
||||
GRUB_UPDATE_DEFAULT_KERNEL=false
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -576,3 +576,15 @@ Patch0575: 0575-Enable-shared-processor-mode-in-vector-5.patch
|
||||
Patch0576: 0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch
|
||||
Patch0577: 0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch
|
||||
Patch0578: 0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch
|
||||
Patch0579: 0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
|
||||
Patch0580: 0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
|
||||
Patch0581: 0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
|
||||
Patch0582: 0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
|
||||
Patch0583: 0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
|
||||
Patch0584: 0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
|
||||
Patch0585: 0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
|
||||
Patch0586: 0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
|
||||
Patch0587: 0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
|
||||
Patch0588: 0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
|
||||
Patch0589: 0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
|
||||
Patch0590: 0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
|
||||
Name: grub2
|
||||
Epoch: 1
|
||||
Version: 2.02
|
||||
Release: 150%{?dist}.alma.1
|
||||
Release: 156%{?dist}.alma.1
|
||||
Summary: Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Base
|
||||
License: GPLv3+
|
||||
@ -526,14 +526,43 @@ fi
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Tue Aug 08 2023 Andrew Lukoshko <alukoshko@almalinux.org> - 2.02-150.alma.1
|
||||
- efi/http: change uint32_t to uintn_t for grub_efi_http_message_t
|
||||
- Resolves: #2178388
|
||||
* Wed Apr 10 2024 Andrew Lukoshko <alukoshko@almalinux.org> - 2.02-156.alma.1
|
||||
- Debrand for AlmaLinux
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Feb 20 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-156
|
||||
- fs/ntfs: OOB write fix
|
||||
- (CVE-2023-4692)
|
||||
- Resolves: #RHEL-11566
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Feb 8 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.06-155
|
||||
- grub-set-bootflag: Fix for CVE-2024-1048
|
||||
- (CVE-2024-1048)
|
||||
- Resolves: #RHEL-20746
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Nov 27 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-154
|
||||
- Missing install script for previous commit
|
||||
- Related: #RHEL-4343
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Nov 24 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-153
|
||||
- util: Enable default kernel for updates
|
||||
- Resolves: #RHEL-4343
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Oct 20 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-152
|
||||
- kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
|
||||
of fadump
|
||||
- Resolves: #RHEL-14283
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Aug 28 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-151
|
||||
- util: Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
|
||||
- Resolves: #2051889
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jun 16 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-150
|
||||
- kern/ieee1275/init: sync vec5 patchset with upstream
|
||||
- Resolves: #2172111
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed May 17 2023 Andrew Lukoshko <alukoshko@almalinux.org> - 2.02-148.alma
|
||||
- Debrand for AlmaLinux
|
||||
* Wed Jun 14 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-149
|
||||
- efi/http: change uint32_t to uintn_t for grub_efi_http_message_t
|
||||
- Resolves: #2178388
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Feb 06 2023 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-148
|
||||
- ppc64le: cas5, take 3
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user