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Address various spoofing attacks (CVE-2025-40778)

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https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2025-40778

Modified upstream patch adapted to 9.16

Resolves: RHEL-123318
This commit is contained in:
Petr Menšík 2025-10-23 16:48:19 +02:00
parent dbbedd4d99
commit a7abeea3c3
2 changed files with 474 additions and 0 deletions
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469
bind-9.18-CVE-2025-40778.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
From 83cc066e52542d3f52db98b02da33121b316f4be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 09:37:36 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Tighten restrictions on caching NS RRsets in authority
section
To prevent certain spoofing attacks, a new check has been added
to the existing rules for whether NS data can be cached: the owner
name of the NS RRset must be an ancestor of the name being queried.
(cherry picked from commit fa153f791f9324bf84abf8d259e11c0531fe6e25)
(cherry picked from commit 025d61bacd0f57f994a631654aff7a933d89a547)
Further restrict addresses that are cached when processing referrals
Use the owner name of the NS record as the bailwick apex name
when determining which additional records to cache, rather than
the name of the delegating zone (or a parent thereof).
(cherry picked from commit a41054e9e606a61f1b3c8bc0c54e2f1059347165)
(cherry picked from commit cd17dfe696cdf9b8ef23fbc8738de7c79f957846)
Retry lookups with unsigned DNAME over TCP
To prevent spoofed unsigned DNAME responses being accepted retry
response with unsigned DNAMEs over TCP if the response is not TSIG
signed or there isn't a good DNS CLIENT COOKIE.
To prevent test failures, this required adding TCP support to the
ans3 and ans4 servers in the chain system test.
(cherry picked from commit 2e40705c06831988106335ed77db3cf924d431f6)
(cherry picked from commit 4c6d03b0bb2ffbafcde8e8a5bc0e49908b978a72)
---
bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py | 58 +++++++++++++---
lib/dns/include/dns/message.h | 8 +++
lib/dns/message.c | 12 ++++
lib/dns/resolver.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
lib/dns/validator.c | 33 ++++++---
5 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py
index 45d6504..e4fc15a 100755
--- a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py
+++ b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py
@@ -276,16 +276,30 @@ except: port=5300
try: ctrlport=int(os.environ['EXTRAPORT1'])
except: ctrlport=5300
-query4_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
-query4_socket.bind((ip4, port))
+query4_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+query4_udp.bind((ip4, port))
+
+query4_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+query4_tcp.bind((ip4, port))
+query4_tcp.listen(1)
+query4_tcp.settimeout(1)
havev6 = True
try:
- query6_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+ query6_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+ try:
+ query6_udp.bind((ip6, port))
+ except:
+ query6_udp.close()
+ havev6 = False
+
+ query6_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
try:
- query6_socket.bind((ip6, port))
+ query6_tcp.bind((ip4, port))
+ query6_tcp.listen(1)
+ query6_tcp.settimeout(1)
except:
- query6_socket.close()
+ query6_tcp.close()
havev6 = False
except:
havev6 = False
@@ -310,9 +324,9 @@ print ("Control channel on %s port %d" % (ip4, ctrlport))
print ("Ctrl-c to quit")
if havev6:
- input = [query4_socket, query6_socket, ctrl_socket]
+ input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp, query6_udp, query6_tcp, ctrl_socket]
else:
- input = [query4_socket, ctrl_socket]
+ input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp, ctrl_socket]
while running:
try:
@@ -335,13 +349,37 @@ while running:
break
ctl_channel(msg)
conn.close()
- if s == query4_socket or s == query6_socket:
- print ("Query received on %s" %
- (ip4 if s == query4_socket else ip6))
+ elif s == query4_udp or s == query6_udp:
+ print("Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_udp else ip6))
# Handle incoming queries
msg = s.recvfrom(65535)
rsp = create_response(msg[0])
if rsp:
s.sendto(rsp, msg[1])
+ elif s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp:
+ try:
+ conn, _ = s.accept()
+ if s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp:
+ print(
+ "TCP Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_tcp else ip6),
+ end=" ",
+ )
+ # get TCP message length
+ msg = conn.recv(2)
+ if len(msg) != 2:
+ print("couldn't read TCP message length")
+ continue
+ length = struct.unpack(">H", msg[:2])[0]
+ msg = conn.recv(length)
+ if len(msg) != length:
+ print("couldn't read TCP message")
+ continue
+ rsp = create_response(msg)
+ if rsp:
+ conn.send(struct.pack(">H", len(rsp)))
+ conn.send(rsp)
+ conn.close()
+ except socket.error as e:
+ print("error: %s" % str(e))
if not running:
break
diff --git a/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h b/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
index 68c13ee..d321a58 100644
--- a/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
+++ b/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ struct dns_message {
unsigned int cc_bad : 1;
unsigned int tkey : 1;
unsigned int rdclass_set : 1;
+ unsigned int has_dname : 1;
unsigned int opt_reserved;
unsigned int sig_reserved;
@@ -1449,4 +1450,11 @@ dns_message_clonebuffer(dns_message_t *msg);
* \li msg be a valid message.
*/
+bool
+dns_message_hasdname(dns_message_t *msg);
+/*%<
+ * Return whether a DNAME was detected in the ANSWER section of a QUERY
+ * message when it was parsed.
+ */
+
ISC_LANG_ENDDECLS
diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c
index 04315bc..aa434a7 100644
--- a/lib/dns/message.c
+++ b/lib/dns/message.c
@@ -438,6 +438,7 @@ msginit(dns_message_t *m) {
m->cc_bad = 0;
m->tkey = 0;
m->rdclass_set = 0;
+ m->has_dname = 0;
m->querytsig = NULL;
m->indent.string = "\t";
m->indent.count = 0;
@@ -1717,6 +1718,11 @@ getsection(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg, dns_decompress_t *dctx,
*/
msg->tsigname->attributes |= DNS_NAMEATTR_NOCOMPRESS;
free_name = false;
+ } else if (rdtype == dns_rdatatype_dname &&
+ sectionid == DNS_SECTION_ANSWER &&
+ msg->opcode == dns_opcode_query)
+ {
+ msg->has_dname = 1;
}
rdataset = NULL;
@@ -4750,3 +4756,9 @@ dns_message_clonebuffer(dns_message_t *msg) {
msg->free_query = 1;
}
}
+
+bool
+dns_message_hasdname(dns_message_t *msg) {
+ REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg));
+ return msg->has_dname;
+}
diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c
index ad0a1b8..c284b67 100644
--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c
+++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c
@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ typedef struct respctx {
bool get_nameservers; /* get a new NS rrset at
* zone cut? */
bool resend; /* resend this query? */
+ bool secured; /* message was signed or had a valid cookie */
bool nextitem; /* invalid response; keep
* listening for the correct one */
bool truncated; /* response was truncated */
@@ -7155,7 +7156,8 @@ mark_related(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, bool external,
* locally served zone.
*/
static inline bool
-name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, respctx_t *rctx) {
+ fetchctx_t *fctx = rctx->fctx;
isc_result_t result;
dns_forwarders_t *forwarders = NULL;
dns_fixedname_t fixed, zfixed;
@@ -7167,7 +7169,8 @@ name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, fetchctx_t *fctx) {
unsigned int labels;
dns_namereln_t rel;
- apex = ISFORWARDER(fctx->addrinfo) ? fctx->fwdname : &fctx->domain;
+ apex = ISFORWARDER(fctx->addrinfo) ? fctx->fwdname :
+ (rctx->ns_name != NULL) ? rctx->ns_name : &fctx->domain;
/*
* The name is outside the queried namespace.
@@ -7275,7 +7278,7 @@ check_section(void *arg, const dns_name_t *addname, dns_rdatatype_t type,
result = dns_message_findname(rctx->query->rmessage, section, addname,
dns_rdatatype_any, 0, &name, NULL);
if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
- external = name_external(name, type, fctx);
+ external = name_external(name, type, rctx);
if (type == dns_rdatatype_a) {
for (rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list);
rdataset != NULL;
@@ -7884,6 +7887,47 @@ betterreferral(respctx_t *rctx) {
return (false);
}
+static bool
+rctx_need_tcpretry(respctx_t *rctx) {
+ resquery_t *query = rctx->query;
+ if ((rctx->retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) != 0) {
+ /* TCP is already in the retry flags */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the message was secured, no need to continue.
+ */
+ if (rctx->secured) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Currently the only extra reason why we might need to
+ * retry a UDP response over TCP is a DNAME in the message.
+ */
+ if (dns_message_hasdname(query->rmessage)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static isc_result_t
+rctx_tcpretry(respctx_t *rctx) {
+ /*
+ * Do we need to retry a UDP response over TCP?
+ */
+ if (rctx_need_tcpretry(rctx)) {
+ rctx->retryopts |= DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP;
+ rctx->resend = true;
+ rctx_done(rctx, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+ return ISC_R_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ return ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/*
* resquery_response():
* Handles responses received in response to iterative queries sent by
@@ -8069,15 +8113,23 @@ resquery_response(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
* ensured by the dispatch code).
*/
+ /*
+ * Remember whether this message was signed or had a
+ * valid client cookie; if not, we may need to retry over
+ * TCP later.
+ */
+ if (query->rmessage->cc_ok || query->rmessage->tsig != NULL ||
+ query->rmessage->sig0 != NULL)
+ {
+ rctx.secured = true;
+ }
+
/*
* If we have had a server cookie and don't get one retry over TCP.
* This may be a misconfigured anycast server or an attempt to send
* a spoofed response. Skip if we have a valid tsig.
*/
- if (dns_message_gettsig(query->rmessage, NULL) == NULL &&
- !query->rmessage->cc_ok && !query->rmessage->cc_bad &&
- (rctx.retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0)
- {
+ if (!rctx.secured && (rctx.retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0) {
unsigned char cookie[COOKIE_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (dns_adb_getcookie(fctx->adb, query->addrinfo, cookie,
sizeof(cookie)) > CLIENT_COOKIE_SIZE)
@@ -8103,6 +8155,17 @@ resquery_response(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
*/
}
+ /*
+ * Check whether we need to retry over TCP for some other reason.
+ */
+ result = rctx_tcpretry(&rctx);
+ if (result == ISC_R_COMPLETE) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check for EDNS issues.
+ */
rctx_edns(&rctx);
/*
@@ -8830,8 +8893,8 @@ rctx_answer_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
}
/*
- * Cache records in the authority section, if
- * there are any suitable for caching.
+ * Cache records in the authority section, if there are
+ * any suitable for caching.
*/
rctx_authority_positive(rctx);
@@ -8902,7 +8965,7 @@ rctx_answer_scan(respctx_t *rctx) {
/*
* Don't accept DNAME from parent namespace.
*/
- if (name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_dname, fctx)) {
+ if (name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_dname, rctx)) {
continue;
}
@@ -9200,14 +9263,14 @@ rctx_answer_dname(respctx_t *rctx) {
/*
* rctx_authority_positive():
- * Examine the records in the authority section (if there are any) for a
- * positive answer. We expect the names for all rdatasets in this section
- * to be subdomains of the domain being queried; any that are not are
- * skipped. We expect to find only *one* owner name; any names
- * after the first one processed are ignored. We expect to find only
- * rdatasets of type NS, RRSIG, or SIG; all others are ignored. Whatever
- * remains can be cached at trust level authauthority or additional
- * (depending on whether the AA bit was set on the answer).
+ * If a positive answer was received over TCP or secured with a cookie
+ * or TSIG, examine the authority section. We expect names for all
+ * rdatasets in this section to be subdomains of the domain being queried;
+ * any that are not are skipped. We expect to find only *one* owner name;
+ * any names after the first one processed are ignored. We expect to find
+ * only rdatasets of type NS; all others are ignored. Whatever remains can
+ * be cached at trust level authauthority or additional (depending on
+ * whether the AA bit was set on the answer).
*/
static void
rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
@@ -9215,6 +9278,11 @@ rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
bool done = false;
isc_result_t result;
+ /* If it's spoofable, don't cache it. */
+ if (!rctx->secured && (rctx->query->options & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
result = dns_message_firstname(rctx->query->rmessage,
DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY);
while (!done && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
@@ -9223,7 +9291,9 @@ rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
dns_message_currentname(rctx->query->rmessage,
DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, &name);
- if (!name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_ns, fctx)) {
+ if (!name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_ns, rctx) &&
+ dns_name_issubdomain(&fctx->name, name))
+ {
dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = NULL;
/*
diff --git a/lib/dns/validator.c b/lib/dns/validator.c
index e416cc9..37ddd26 100644
--- a/lib/dns/validator.c
+++ b/lib/dns/validator.c
@@ -1344,17 +1344,17 @@ compute_keytag(dns_rdata_t *rdata) {
/*%
* Is the DNSKEY rrset in val->event->rdataset self-signed?
*/
-static bool
+static isc_result_t
selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = val->event->rdataset;
dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset = val->event->sigrdataset;
dns_name_t *name = val->event->name;
isc_result_t result;
isc_mem_t *mctx = val->view->mctx;
- bool answer = false;
+ bool match = false;
if (rdataset->type != dns_rdatatype_dnskey) {
- return (false);
+ return DNS_R_NOKEYMATCH;
}
for (result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset); result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
@@ -1390,10 +1390,24 @@ selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
continue;
}
+ /*
+ * If the REVOKE bit is not set we have a
+ * theoretically self-signed DNSKEY RRset;
+ * this will be verified later.
+ *
+ * We don't return the answer yet, though,
+ * because we need to check the remaining keys
+ * and possbly remove them if they're revoked.
+ */
+ if ((key.flags & DNS_KEYFLAG_REVOKE) == 0) {
+ match = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
result = dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(name, &keyrdata, mctx,
&dstkey);
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
- continue;
+ break;
}
result = dns_dnssec_verify(name, rdataset, dstkey, true,
@@ -1404,16 +1418,15 @@ selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
continue;
}
- if ((key.flags & DNS_KEYFLAG_REVOKE) == 0) {
- answer = true;
- continue;
- }
-
dns_view_untrust(val->view, name, &key);
}
}
- return (answer);
+ if (!match) {
+ return DNS_R_NOKEYMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return ISC_R_SUCCESS;
}
/*%
--
2.51.0

5
bind9.16.spec
View File

@ -176,6 +176,10 @@ Patch216: bind-9.18-CVE-2024-11187.patch
Patch217: bind-9.16-update-b.root-servers.net.patch
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/8330b49fb90bfeae14b47b7983e9459cc2bbaffe
Patch225: bind-9.18-CVE-2025-40780.patch
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/025d61bacd0f57f994a631654aff7a933d89a547
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/cd17dfe696cdf9b8ef23fbc8738de7c79f957846
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/4c6d03b0bb2ffbafcde8e8a5bc0e49908b978a72
Patch224: bind-9.18-CVE-2025-40778.patch
%{?systemd_ordering}
Requires: coreutils
@ -1257,6 +1261,7 @@ fi;
%changelog
* Wed Oct 29 2025 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.16.23-0.22.4
- Prevent cache poisoning due to weak PRNG (CVE-2025-40780)
- Address various spoofing attacks (CVE-2025-40778)
* Wed Aug 13 2025 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com>
- Update addresses of b.root-servers.net (RHEL-18449) - 32:9.16.23-0.22.3