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Update secure boot support for UEFI cert importing

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This commit is contained in:
Josh Boyer 2012-10-27 09:26:27 -04:00
parent faa8d0c2d9
commit 5e72ee302b
3 changed files with 683 additions and 3 deletions
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2
config-x86-generic
View File

@ -430,3 +430,5 @@ CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y
# CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1 is not set
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256=y
# CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not set
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST=y
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI=y

9
kernel.spec
View File

@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
# For non-released -rc kernels, this will be appended after the rcX and
# gitX tags, so a 3 here would become part of release "0.rcX.gitX.3"
#
%global baserelease 1
%global baserelease 2
%global fedora_build %{baserelease}
# base_sublevel is the kernel version we're starting with and patching
@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ Patch800: linux-2.6-crash-driver.patch
Patch900: modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch
# secure boot
Patch1000: secure-boot-20120924.patch
Patch1000: secure-boot-20121026.patch
# Improve PCI support on UEFI
Patch1100: handle-efi-roms.patch
@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ ApplyPatch linux-2.6-e1000-ich9-montevina.patch
ApplyPatch modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch
# secure boot
ApplyPatch secure-boot-20120924.patch
ApplyPatch secure-boot-20121026.patch
# Improved PCI support for UEFI
ApplyPatch handle-efi-roms.patch
@ -2317,6 +2317,9 @@ fi
# ||----w |
# || ||
%changelog
* Sat Oct 27 2012 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
- Update secure boot support for UEFI cert importing
* Fri Oct 26 2012 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org>
- The initial ARM unified kernel support (vexpress, highbank, mvebu to begin). WOO HOO!!!

675
secure-boot-20120924.patch → secure-boot-20121026.patch
View File

@ -711,3 +711,678 @@ index de16959..7d4c50a 100644
--
1.7.11.4
From 945f3829d0d376c5e0c790b57c4fa9e875d602d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Add EFI signature data types, such as are used for
containing hashes, keys and certificates for
cryptographic verification.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/efi.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 8670eb1..836c797 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -312,6 +312,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
#define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \
EFI_GUID( 0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b )
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28 )
+
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
+
typedef struct {
efi_guid_t guid;
u64 table;
@@ -447,6 +453,20 @@ typedef struct {
#define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR (~0UL)
+typedef struct {
+ efi_guid_t signature_owner;
+ u8 signature_data[];
+} efi_signature_data_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ efi_guid_t signature_type;
+ u32 signature_list_size;
+ u32 signature_header_size;
+ u32 signature_size;
+ u8 signature_header[];
+ /* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */
+} efi_signature_list_t;
+
/*
* All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
*/
--
1.7.12.1
From 5934634101936bc4ee4636df7269e00c4979911c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader. X.509
certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as
asymmetric type keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 7 +++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/efi.h | 4 ++
4 files changed, 119 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 6d2c2ea..eb53fc3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -35,4 +35,11 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
public key packet found inside the certificate.
+config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
+ bool "EFI signature list parser"
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ help
+ This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
+ X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
+
endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 0727204..cd8388e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
#
# X.509 Certificate handling
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59b859a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
+
+/**
+ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates
+ * @data: The data blob to parse
+ * @size: The size of the data blob
+ * @keyring: The keyring to add extracted keys to
+ */
+int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, struct key *keyring)
+{
+ unsigned offs = 0;
+ size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize;
+
+ pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size);
+
+ while (size > 0) {
+ efi_signature_list_t list;
+ const efi_signature_data_t *elem;
+ key_ref_t key;
+
+ if (size < sizeof(list))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list));
+ pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n",
+ offs,
+ list.signature_type.b, list.signature_list_size,
+ list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size);
+
+ lsize = list.signature_list_size;
+ hsize = list.signature_header_size;
+ esize = list.signature_size;
+ elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize;
+
+ if (lsize > size) {
+ pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n",
+ __func__, offs);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ if (lsize < sizeof(list) ||
+ lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize ||
+ esize < sizeof(*elem) ||
+ elsize < esize ||
+ elsize % esize != 0) {
+ pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) {
+ data += lsize;
+ size -= lsize;
+ offs += lsize;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ data += sizeof(list) + hsize;
+ size -= sizeof(list) + hsize;
+ offs += sizeof(list) + hsize;
+
+ for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) {
+ elem = data;
+
+ pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs);
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(
+ make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ &elem->signature_data,
+ esize - sizeof(*elem),
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(key));
+ else
+ pr_notice("Loaded cert '%s'\n",
+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+
+ data += esize;
+ size -= esize;
+ offs += esize;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 836c797..9cc3250 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -536,6 +536,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void);
extern struct efi_memory_map memmap;
+struct key;
+extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size,
+ struct key *keyring);
+
/**
* efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
* @start: starting kvirt address
--
1.7.12.1
From 84d11d541cc039e8561d06deab5f9b700f12f246 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:29:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] EFI: Add in-kernel variable to determine if Secure Boot
is enabled
There are a few cases where in-kernel functions may need to know if
Secure Boot is enabled. The added capability check cannot be used as the
kernel can't drop it's own capabilites, so we add a global variable
similar to efi_enabled so they can determine if Secure Boot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 ++
include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 51f6970..d5b9548 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -961,8 +961,10 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
io_delay_init();
- if (boot_params.secure_boot)
+ if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
secureboot_enable();
+ secure_boot_enabled = 1;
+ }
/*
* Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index aded2a9..e57320b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
int efi_enabled;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi_enabled);
+int secure_boot_enabled;
+
struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
.mps = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
.acpi = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 9cc3250..ff72468 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -573,11 +573,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
# ifdef CONFIG_X86
extern int efi_enabled;
extern bool efi_64bit;
+ extern int secure_boot_enabled;
# else
# define efi_enabled 1
+# define secure_boot_enabled 0
# endif
#else
# define efi_enabled 0
+# define secure_boot_enabled 0
#endif
/*
--
1.7.12.1
From 2a5f33b264daffd717b509bc5ac3cdc060b5573e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring
This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that
are blacklisted. This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules
and if the module's certificate is found, it will refuse to load. This is
useful in cases where third party certificates are used for module signing.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
init/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
kernel/module-internal.h | 3 +++
kernel/module_signing.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 6fdd6e3..7a9bf00 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1602,6 +1602,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
+config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+ bool "Support for blacklisting module signature certificates"
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
+ help
+ This adds support for keeping a blacklist of certificates that
+ should not pass module signature verification. If a module is
+ signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
+
choice
prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
index 4646eb2..6d70783 100644
--- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
+++ b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
#include "module-internal.h"
struct key *modsign_keyring;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+struct key *modsign_blacklist;
+#endif
extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[];
extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[];
@@ -52,6 +55,20 @@ static __init int module_verify_init(void)
if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0)
panic("Can't instantiate module signing keyring\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+ modsign_blacklist = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".modsign_blacklist",
+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
+ current_cred(),
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ if (IS_ERR(modsign_blacklist))
+ panic("Can't allocate module signing blacklist keyring\n");
+
+ if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_blacklist, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0)
+ panic("Can't instantiate module signing blacklist keyring\n");
+#endif
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 24f9247..51a8380 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -10,5 +10,8 @@
*/
extern struct key *modsign_keyring;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+extern struct key *modsign_blacklist;
+#endif
extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index ea1b1df..602aa24 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len)
{
- key_ref_t key;
+ key_ref_t key, blacklist;
size_t i;
char *id, *q;
@@ -157,6 +157,18 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+ blacklist = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_blacklist, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+ if (!IS_ERR(blacklist)) {
+ /* module is signed with a cert in the blacklist. reject */
+ pr_err("Module key '%s' is in blacklist\n", id);
+ /*key_put(blacklist);*/
+ kfree(id);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+ }
+#endif
+
key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
&key_type_asymmetric, id);
if (IS_ERR(key))
--
1.7.12.1
From ddd5e2e1b775fb19aeec7fb842e707fc35347bc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This imports those certificates into the module signing keyring. This
allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction
with signed modules. By importing the public certificate into the 'db'
variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
load.
In the opposite case, Secure Boot maintains a list of disallowed
certificates in the 'dbx' variable. We load those certificates into
the newly introduced module blacklist keyring and forbid any module
signed with those from loading.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/efi.h | 3 ++
init/Kconfig | 9 ++++++
kernel/Makefile | 3 ++
kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index ff72468..509755e 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -318,6 +318,9 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f )
+
typedef struct {
efi_guid_t guid;
u64 table;
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 7a9bf00..9c4c529 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1610,6 +1610,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
should not pass module signature verification. If a module is
signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
+config MODULE_SIG_UEFI
+ bool "Allow modules signed with certs stored in UEFI"
+ depends on MODULE_SIG && MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST && EFI
+ select EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
+ help
+ This will import certificates stored in UEFI and allow modules
+ signed with those to be loaded. It will also disallow loading
+ of modules stored in the UEFI dbx variable.
+
choice
prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 0dfeca4..ff1468f 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o
$(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
+$(obj)/modsign_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
+
# config_data.h contains the same information as ikconfig.h but gzipped.
# Info from config_data can be extracted from /proc/config*
targets += config_data.gz
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..049669d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "module-internal.h"
+
+static void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long *size)
+{
+ efi_status_t status;
+ unsigned long lsize = 4;
+ unsigned long tmpdb[4];
+ void *db = NULL;
+
+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!db) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ kfree(db);
+ db = NULL;
+ pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
+ }
+out:
+ *size = lsize;
+ return db;
+}
+
+/*
+ * * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
+ * */
+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+{
+ efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */
+ if (!secure_boot_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
+ if (!db) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't get db list\n");
+ rc = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get dbx. It might not exist, so it isn't an error if we can't
+ * get it.
+ */
+ dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
+ if (!dbx) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't get dbx list\n");
+ }
+
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, modsign_keyring);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
+
+ if (dbx) {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize,
+ modsign_blacklist);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ }
+
+err:
+ kfree(db);
+ kfree(dbx);
+ return rc;
+}
+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
--
1.7.12.1
From d037dc552a62b1dd39b457e10c133a4509b0efc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate. This might compromise the secure boot trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in
a Secure Boot environment.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
kernel/power/hibernate.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
kernel/power/main.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index b26f5f1..f04343b 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ int hibernate(void)
{
int error;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
lock_system_sleep();
/* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
@@ -723,7 +727,7 @@ static int software_resume(void)
/*
* If the user said "noresume".. bail out early.
*/
- if (noresume)
+ if (noresume || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
return 0;
/*
@@ -889,6 +893,11 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
int i;
char *start = buf;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
+ buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled");
+ return buf-start;
+ }
+
for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) {
if (!hibernation_modes[i])
continue;
@@ -923,6 +932,9 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
char *p;
int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
p = memchr(buf, '\n', n);
len = p ? p - buf : n;
diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c
index f458238..72580c1 100644
--- a/kernel/power/main.c
+++ b/kernel/power/main.c
@@ -301,7 +301,9 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
- s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
+ if (capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
+ s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
+ }
#else
if (s != buf)
/* convert the last space to a newline */
--
1.7.12.1