forked from rpms/kernel
96 lines
3.5 KiB
Diff
96 lines
3.5 KiB
Diff
From 4758c1f8ad5385e53ea85739ad9f6fa6dfc0abda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Nagappan Ramasamy Palaniappan <nagappan.ramasamy.palaniappan@oracle.com>
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Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 12:55:46 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH 3/5] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
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spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.
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The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
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injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
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returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
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threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
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STIBP protects.
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Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
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enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
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selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).
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[ bp: Massage. ]
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Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
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Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@gmail.com>
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Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@kernelhacking.com>
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Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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Signed-off-by: Nagappan Ramasamy Palaniappan <nagappan.ramasamy.palaniappan@oracle.com>
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Reviewed-by: Laurence Rochfort <laurence.rochfort@oracle.com>
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---
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
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1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
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index da7c361f4..e13c4ecdc 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
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+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
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@@ -1095,14 +1095,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
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return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
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}
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-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
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+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
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{
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- return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
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- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
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+ return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
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mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
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mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
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}
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+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
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+{
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+ return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
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+}
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+
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static void __init
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spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
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{
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@@ -1165,12 +1169,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
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}
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/*
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- * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
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- * STIBP is not required.
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+ * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
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+ * is not required.
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+ *
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+ * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
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+ * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
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+ * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS
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+ * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
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+ * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection,
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+ * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case.
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*/
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if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
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!smt_possible ||
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- spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
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+ spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
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return;
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/*
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@@ -2295,7 +2306,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
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static char *stibp_state(void)
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{
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- if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
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+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
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return "";
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switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
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--
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2.31.1
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