xorg-x11-server/SOURCES/0006-randr-Check-for-overflow-in-RRChangeProviderProperty.patch
2025-06-23 10:22:32 +00:00

44 lines
1.5 KiB
Diff

From 3d44c08d94e850769d7d16fce0596536370253b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 15:18:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/7] randr: Check for overflow in
RRChangeProviderProperty()
A client might send a request causing an integer overflow when computing
the total size to allocate in RRChangeProviderProperty().
To avoid the issue, check that total length in bytes won't exceed the
maximum integer value.
CVE-2025-49180
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 3c3a4b767b16174d3213055947ea7f4f88e10ec6)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2025>
---
randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
index b79c17f9b..7088570ee 100644
--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ RRChangeProviderProperty(RRProviderPtr provider, Atom property, Atom type,
if (mode == PropModeReplace || len > 0) {
void *new_data = NULL, *old_data = NULL;
-
+ if (total_len > MAXINT / size_in_bytes)
+ return BadValue;
total_size = total_len * size_in_bytes;
new_value.data = (void *) malloc(total_size);
if (!new_value.data && total_size) {
--
2.49.0