92 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff
92 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff
From a99c927aec4563101f574d0a65cd451dcdd7e012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 16:13:34 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/7] os: Do not overflow the integer size with
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BigRequest
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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The BigRequest extension allows requests larger than the 16-bit length
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limit.
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It uses integers for the request length and checks for the size not to
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exceed the maxBigRequestSize limit, but does so after translating the
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length to integer by multiplying the given size in bytes by 4.
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In doing so, it might overflow the integer size limit before actually
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checking for the overflow, defeating the purpose of the test.
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To avoid the issue, make sure to check that the request size does not
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overflow the maxBigRequestSize limit prior to any conversion.
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The caller Dispatch() function however expects the return value to be in
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bytes, so we cannot just return the converted value in case of error, as
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that would also overflow the integer size.
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To preserve the existing API, we use a negative value for the X11 error
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code BadLength as the function only return positive values, 0 or -1 and
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update the caller Dispatch() function to take that case into account to
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return the error code to the offending client.
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CVE-2025-49176
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This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
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reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 03731b326a80b582e48d939fe62cb1e2b10400d9)
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Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2025>
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---
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dix/dispatch.c | 9 +++++----
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os/io.c | 4 ++++
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2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
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index a33bfaa9e..14ccdc57a 100644
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--- a/dix/dispatch.c
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+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
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@@ -447,9 +447,10 @@ Dispatch(void)
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/* now, finally, deal with client requests */
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result = ReadRequestFromClient(client);
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- if (result <= 0) {
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- if (result < 0)
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- CloseDownClient(client);
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+ if (result == 0)
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+ break;
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+ else if (result == -1) {
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+ CloseDownClient(client);
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break;
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}
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@@ -470,7 +471,7 @@ Dispatch(void)
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client->index,
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client->requestBuffer);
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#endif
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- if (result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
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+ if (result < 0 || result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
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result = BadLength;
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else {
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result = XaceHookDispatch(client, client->majorOp);
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diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
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index 939f51743..a05300869 100644
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--- a/os/io.c
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+++ b/os/io.c
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@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
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needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
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}
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client->req_len = needed;
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+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2) {
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+ /* Check for potential integer overflow */
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+ return -(BadLength);
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+ }
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needed <<= 2; /* needed is in bytes now */
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}
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if (gotnow < needed) {
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--
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2.49.0
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