CVE fix for: CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478
Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-18322 Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-18329
This commit is contained in:
José Expósito
parent
67925c02b4
commit
25b764f1bd
77
0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch
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77
0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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From a7bda3080d2b44eae668cdcec7a93095385b9652 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
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button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
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our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
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insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
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XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
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leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
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CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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(cherry picked from commit 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd)
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---
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Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
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dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
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2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
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index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644
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--- a/Xi/exevents.c
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+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
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@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
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}
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if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
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- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
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- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
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- if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
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- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
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- }
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+ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
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+ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
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+ maxbuttons,
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+ sizeof(XkbAction));
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+ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
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memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
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- sizeof(XkbAction));
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+ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
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}
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else {
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free(to->button->xkb_acts);
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diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
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index 5bf956ead4..15e46a9a5f 100644
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--- a/dix/devices.c
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+++ b/dix/devices.c
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@@ -2525,6 +2525,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
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if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
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int i;
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+ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
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+
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DeviceChangedEvent event = {
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.header = ET_Internal,
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.type = ET_DeviceChanged,
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@@ -2535,6 +2537,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
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};
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master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
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+ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
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+ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
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+ maxbuttons,
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+ sizeof(XkbAction));
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+ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
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+ 0,
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+ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
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+ }
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memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
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sizeof(Atom));
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--
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2.43.0
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
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From 58e83c683950ac9e253ab05dd7a13a8368b70a3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
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ProcRRChange*Property
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Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
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See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
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protocol and XI.
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This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
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Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
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the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
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truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
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The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
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(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
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finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
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stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
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CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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(cherry picked from commit 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632)
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---
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randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +-
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randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
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2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
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index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644
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--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
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+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
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@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
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char format, mode;
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unsigned long len;
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int sizeInBytes;
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- int totalSize;
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
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int err;
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REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
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diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
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index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644
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--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
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+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
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@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
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char format, mode;
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unsigned long len;
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int sizeInBytes;
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- int totalSize;
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
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int err;
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REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
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--
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2.43.0
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@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
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Summary: X.Org X11 X server
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Name: xorg-x11-server
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Version: 1.20.11
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Release: 21%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}}%{?dist}
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Release: 22%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}}%{?dist}
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URL: http://www.x.org
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License: MIT
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@ -161,6 +161,10 @@ Patch10027: 0001-composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW.patch
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Patch10028: 0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch
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# CVE-2023-5380
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Patch10029: 0002-mi-reset-the-PointerWindows-reference-on-screen-swit.patch
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# CVE-2023-6377
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Patch10030: 0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch
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# CVE-2023-6478
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Patch10031: 0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch
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BuildRequires: make
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BuildRequires: systemtap-sdt-devel
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@ -570,6 +574,11 @@ find %{inst_srcdir}/hw/xfree86 -name \*.c -delete
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%changelog
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* Thu Dec 14 2023 José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com> - 1.20.11-22
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- CVE fix for: CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478
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Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-18322
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Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-18329
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* Wed Oct 25 2023 José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com> - 1.20.11-20
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- CVE fix for: CVE-2023-5380
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Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-14062
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