.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz
+SOURCES/xwayland-22.1.9.tar.xz

.xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-ae980a7deeb7cad9f3cd253f3b1ddca5bb26aafa SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz
+19ccc8ae5920620db725a08ee65d8b64c521d766 SOURCES/xwayland-22.1.9.tar.xz

SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 8660dd164882ce5fc1f274427e2ff3dc020d6273 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 11:41:40 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: fix potential use-after-free in
- DeepCopyPointerClasses
-
-CVE-2023-0494, ZDI-CAN-19596
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 0ba6d8c37071131a49790243cdac55392ecf71ec)
----
- Xi/exevents.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
-index 217baa956..dcd4efb3b 100644
---- a/Xi/exevents.c
-+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
-@@ -619,8 +619,10 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
-             memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
-                    sizeof(XkbAction));
-         }
--        else
-+        else {
-             free(to->button->xkb_acts);
-+            to->button->xkb_acts = NULL;
-+        }
- 
-         memcpy(to->button->labels, from->button->labels,
-                from->button->numButtons * sizeof(Atom));
--- 
-2.39.1
-

SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 8dba686dc277d6d262ad0c77b4632a5b276697ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/7] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in
- XTestSwapFakeInput
-
-XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
-sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
-However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
-so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
-misparsed.
-
-Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
-xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
-swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
-
-Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
-Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
-doesn't support GenericEvent.
-
-CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
-index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644
---- a/Xext/xtest.c
-+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
-@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
-
-     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
-     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
-+        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
-         /* Swap event */
--        proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
-+        proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
-         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
--        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
-+        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
-             client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
-             return BadValue;
-         }
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0001-composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 26ef545b3502f61ca722a7a3373507e88ef64110 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 11:08:47 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] composite: Fix use-after-free of the COW
-
-ZDI-CAN-19866/CVE-2023-1393
-
-If a client explicitly destroys the compositor overlay window (aka COW),
-we would leave a dangling pointer to that window in the CompScreen
-structure, which will trigger a use-after-free later.
-
-Make sure to clear the CompScreen pointer to the COW when the latter gets
-destroyed explicitly by the client.
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
----
- composite/compwindow.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/composite/compwindow.c b/composite/compwindow.c
-index 4e2494b86..b30da589e 100644
---- a/composite/compwindow.c
-+++ b/composite/compwindow.c
-@@ -620,6 +620,11 @@ compDestroyWindow(WindowPtr pWin)
-     ret = (*pScreen->DestroyWindow) (pWin);
-     cs->DestroyWindow = pScreen->DestroyWindow;
-     pScreen->DestroyWindow = compDestroyWindow;
-+
-+    /* Did we just destroy the overlay window? */
-+    if (pWin == cs->pOverlayWin)
-+        cs->pOverlayWin = NULL;
-+
- /*    compCheckTree (pWin->drawable.pScreen); can't check -- tree isn't good*/
-     return ret;
- }
--- 
-2.40.0
-

SOURCES/0001-present-Send-a-PresentConfigureNotify-event-for-dest.patch

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-From b98fc07d3442a289c6bef82df50dd0a2d01de71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2023 12:26:27 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] present: Send a PresentConfigureNotify event for
- destroyed windows
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-This enables fixing a deadlock case on the client side, where the client
-ends up blocked waiting for a Present event that will never come because
-the window was destroyed. The new PresentWindowDestroyed flag allows the
-client to avoid blocking indefinitely.
-
-Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
-See-also: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/116
-See-also: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/6685
-Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 462b06033e66a32308d940eb5fc47f5e4c914dc0)
----
- present/present_event.c  |  5 +++--
- present/present_priv.h   |  7 ++++++-
- present/present_screen.c | 11 ++++++++++-
- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/present/present_event.c b/present/present_event.c
-index 435b26b70..849732dc8 100644
---- a/present/present_event.c
-+++ b/present/present_event.c
-@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ present_event_swap(xGenericEvent *from, xGenericEvent *to)
- }
- 
- void
--present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h, int bw, WindowPtr sibling)
-+present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h,
-+                           int bw, WindowPtr sibling, CARD32 flags)
- {
-     present_window_priv_ptr window_priv = present_window_priv(window);
- 
-@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h, int bw,
-             .off_y = 0,
-             .pixmap_width = w,
-             .pixmap_height = h,
--            .pixmap_flags = 0
-+            .pixmap_flags = flags
-         };
-         present_event_ptr event;
- 
-diff --git a/present/present_priv.h b/present/present_priv.h
-index 6ebd009a2..4ad729864 100644
---- a/present/present_priv.h
-+++ b/present/present_priv.h
-@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@
- #define DebugPresent(x)
- #endif
- 
-+/* XXX this belongs in presentproto */
-+#ifndef PresentWindowDestroyed
-+#define PresentWindowDestroyed (1 << 0)
-+#endif
-+
- extern int present_request;
- 
- extern DevPrivateKeyRec present_screen_private_key;
-@@ -307,7 +312,7 @@ void
- present_free_events(WindowPtr window);
- 
- void
--present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h, int bw, WindowPtr sibling);
-+present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h, int bw, WindowPtr sibling, CARD32 flags);
- 
- void
- present_send_complete_notify(WindowPtr window, CARD8 kind, CARD8 mode, CARD32 serial, uint64_t ust, uint64_t msc);
-diff --git a/present/present_screen.c b/present/present_screen.c
-index 15684eda4..2c29aafd2 100644
---- a/present/present_screen.c
-+++ b/present/present_screen.c
-@@ -93,6 +93,15 @@ present_destroy_window(WindowPtr window)
-     present_screen_priv_ptr screen_priv = present_screen_priv(screen);
-     present_window_priv_ptr window_priv = present_window_priv(window);
- 
-+    present_send_config_notify(window,
-+                               window->drawable.x,
-+                               window->drawable.y,
-+                               window->drawable.width,
-+                               window->drawable.height,
-+                               window->borderWidth,
-+                               window->nextSib,
-+                               PresentWindowDestroyed);
-+
-     if (window_priv) {
-         present_clear_window_notifies(window);
-         present_free_events(window);
-@@ -123,7 +132,7 @@ present_config_notify(WindowPtr window,
-     ScreenPtr screen = window->drawable.pScreen;
-     present_screen_priv_ptr screen_priv = present_screen_priv(screen);
- 
--    present_send_config_notify(window, x, y, w, h, bw, sibling);
-+    present_send_config_notify(window, x, y, w, h, bw, sibling, 0);
- 
-     unwrap(screen_priv, screen, ConfigNotify);
-     if (screen->ConfigNotify)
--- 
-2.40.0
-

SOURCES/0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From a8644465d98beb08759546711b77bb617861c67f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] record: Fix out of bounds access in
- SwapCreateRegister()
-
-ZDI-CAN-14952, CVE-2021-4011
-
-This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-(cherry picked from commit e56f61c79fc3cee26d83cda0f84ae56d5979f768)
----
- record/record.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c
-index be154525d..e123867a7 100644
---- a/record/record.c
-+++ b/record/record.c
-@@ -2516,8 +2516,8 @@ SwapCreateRegister(ClientPtr client, xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff)
-         swapl(pClientID);
-     }
-     if (stuff->nRanges >
--        client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)
--        - stuff->nClients)
-+        (client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)
-+        - stuff->nClients) / bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRange))
-         return BadLength;
-     RecordSwapRanges((xRecordRange *) pClientID, stuff->nRanges);
-     return Success;
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
-
-GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
-fail somewhere.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
-     xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
-     status = Success;
-     str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
--    if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status))  /* keymap, unsupported */
--        return BadMatch;
-+    {
-+        char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);  /* keymap, unsupported */
-+        if (keymap) {
-+            free(keymap);
-+            return BadMatch;
-+        }
-+    }
-     names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
--    if (status != Success)
-+    if (status == Success) {
-+        len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
-+        if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
-+            status = BadLength;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (status != Success) {
-+        free(names.keycodes);
-+        free(names.types);
-+        free(names.compat);
-+        free(names.symbols);
-+        free(names.geometry);
-         return status;
--    len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
--    if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
--        return BadLength;
-+    }
- 
-     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
-     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
--- 
-2.38.1
-

SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length
- attacks
-
-GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
-request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
-field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
-swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
-     CARD16 len;
- 
-     wire = *wire_inout;
-+
-+    if (client->req_len <
-+        bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
-+        return BadValue;
-+
-     len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
-     if (client->swapped) {
-         swaps(&len);
--- 
-2.38.1
-

SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From c9b379ec5a1a34692af06056925bd0fc5f809713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:40:47 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/3] xkb: switch to array index loops to moving
- pointers
-
-Most similar loops here use a pointer that advances with each loop
-iteration, let's do the same here for consistency.
-
-No functional changes.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit f1070c01d616c5f21f939d5ebc533738779451ac)
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index d056c698c..684394d77 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5372,16 +5372,16 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             row->left = rWire->left;
-             row->vertical = rWire->vertical;
-             kWire = (xkbKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1];
--            for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++) {
-+            for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
-                 XkbKeyPtr key;
- 
-                 key = XkbAddGeomKey(row);
-                 if (!key)
-                     return BadAlloc;
--                memcpy(key->name.name, kWire[k].name, XkbKeyNameLength);
--                key->gap = kWire[k].gap;
--                key->shape_ndx = kWire[k].shapeNdx;
--                key->color_ndx = kWire[k].colorNdx;
-+                memcpy(key->name.name, kWire->name, XkbKeyNameLength);
-+                key->gap = kWire->gap;
-+                key->shape_ndx = kWire->shapeNdx;
-+                key->color_ndx = kWire->colorNdx;
-                 if (key->shape_ndx >= geom->num_shapes) {
-                     client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode3(0x10, key->shape_ndx,
-                                                       geom->num_shapes);
-@@ -5393,7 +5393,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-                     return BadMatch;
-                 }
-             }
--            rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *) &kWire[rWire->nKeys];
-+            rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *)kWire;
-         }
-         wire = (char *) rWire;
-         if (sWire->nDoodads > 0) {
-@@ -5458,16 +5458,16 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-                     return BadAlloc;
-                 ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius;
-                 ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1];
--                for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++) {
--                    pt->x = ptWire[p].x;
--                    pt->y = ptWire[p].y;
-+                for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) {
-+                    pt->x = ptWire->x;
-+                    pt->y = ptWire->y;
-                     if (client->swapped) {
-                         swaps(&pt->x);
-                         swaps(&pt->y);
-                     }
-                 }
-                 ol->num_points = olWire->nPoints;
--                olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *) (&ptWire[olWire->nPoints]);
-+                olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *)ptWire;
-             }
-             if (shapeWire->primaryNdx != XkbNoShape)
-                 shape->primary = &shape->outlines[shapeWire->primaryNdx];
--- 
-2.36.1
-

SOURCES/0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 0a7ed9ff7ea20f7b958a2ad9f9bd045080a3ad9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 16:02:34 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] xwayland/eglstream: Demote EGLstream device
- warning
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-If no EGLstream capable device is found at startup, Xwayland's EGLstream
-backend will log an error message "glamor: No eglstream capable devices
-found".
-
-However, considering that the vast majority of drivers do not implement
-EGLstream, the lack of EGLstream capable device is more of the norm than
-the exception.
-
-Change the error message to a log verbose message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
-Reviewed-by: Jonas Ådahl <jadahl@gmail.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 96c82befa2c3f3dc3534743c67cc003c2106e9b0)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-index 8d18caaf5..93d192d58 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ xwl_eglstream_get_device(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-     free(devices);
- out:
-     if (!device)
--        ErrorF("glamor: No eglstream capable devices found\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: No eglstream capable devices found\n");
-     return device;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From c5ff57676698f19ed3a1402aef58a15552e32d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/7] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if
- verification failed
-
-Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the
-property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644
---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
-
-     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
-                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits);
-+    if (rc != Success)
-+        return rc;
-
-     len = stuff->nUnits;
-     if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq))))
-@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
-
-     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
-                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items);
-+    if (rc != Success)
-+        return rc;
-+
-     len = stuff->num_items;
-     if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq)))
-         return BadLength;
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 3eb5445f6f7fa9f86de87adc768105d42bdbcf74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:01 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] xfixes: Fix out of bounds access in
- *ProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier()
-
-ZDI-CAN-14950, CVE-2021-4009
-
-This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-(cherry picked from commit b5196750099ae6ae582e1f46bd0a6dad29550e02)
----
- xfixes/cursor.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xfixes/cursor.c b/xfixes/cursor.c
-index 60580b88f..c5d4554b2 100644
---- a/xfixes/cursor.c
-+++ b/xfixes/cursor.c
-@@ -1010,7 +1010,8 @@ ProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client)
- {
-     REQUEST(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq);
- 
--    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices));
-+    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq,
-+                       pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices * sizeof(CARD16)));
-     LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->barrier, client);
- 
-     return XICreatePointerBarrier(client, stuff);
-@@ -1027,7 +1028,8 @@ SProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client)
- 
-     swaps(&stuff->length);
-     swaps(&stuff->num_devices);
--    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices));
-+    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq,
-+                       pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices * sizeof(CARD16)));
- 
-     swapl(&stuff->barrier);
-     swapl(&stuff->window);
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch

@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-From 45a0af83129eb7dc244c5118360afc1972a686c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 09:50:41 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/3] xkb: swap XkbSetDeviceInfo and
- XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck
-
-XKB often uses a FooCheck and Foo function pair, the former is supposed
-to check all values in the request and error out on BadLength,
-BadValue, etc. The latter is then called once we're confident the values
-are good (they may still fail on an individual device, but that's a
-different topic).
-
-In the case of XkbSetDeviceInfo, those functions were incorrectly
-named, with XkbSetDeviceInfo ending up as the checker function and
-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck as the setter function. As a result, the setter
-function was called before the checker function, accessing request
-data and modifying device state before we ensured that the data is
-valid.
-
-In particular, the setter function relied on values being already
-byte-swapped. This in turn could lead to potential OOB memory access.
-
-Fix this by correctly naming the functions and moving the length checks
-over to the checker function. These were added in 87c64fc5b0 to the
-wrong function, probably due to the incorrect naming.
-
-Fixes ZDI-CAN 16070, CVE-2022-2320.
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Introduced in c06e27b2f6fd9f7b9f827623a48876a225264132
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit dd8caf39e9e15d8f302e54045dd08d8ebf1025dc)
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index 684394d77..36464a770 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -6554,7 +6554,8 @@ ProcXkbGetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client)
- static char *
- CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-                          DeviceIntPtr dev,
--                         int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client)
-+                         int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client,
-+                         xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
- {
-     xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *ledWire;
-     int i;
-@@ -6562,6 +6563,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
- 
-     ledWire = (xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *) wire;
-     for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) {
-+            *status_rtrn = BadLength;
-+            return (char *) ledWire;
-+        }
-+
-         if (client->swapped) {
-             swaps(&ledWire->ledClass);
-             swaps(&ledWire->ledID);
-@@ -6589,6 +6595,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-             atomWire = (CARD32 *) &ledWire[1];
-             if (nNames > 0) {
-                 for (n = 0; n < nNames; n++) {
-+                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) {
-+                        *status_rtrn = BadLength;
-+                        return (char *) atomWire;
-+                    }
-+
-                     if (client->swapped) {
-                         swapl(atomWire);
-                     }
-@@ -6600,6 +6611,10 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-             mapWire = (xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *) atomWire;
-             if (nMaps > 0) {
-                 for (n = 0; n < nMaps; n++) {
-+                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) {
-+                        *status_rtrn = BadLength;
-+                        return (char *) mapWire;
-+                    }
-                     if (client->swapped) {
-                         swaps(&mapWire->virtualMods);
-                         swapl(&mapWire->ctrls);
-@@ -6651,11 +6666,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-         xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *mapWire;
-         XkbSrvLedInfoPtr sli;
- 
--        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) {
--            *status_rtrn = BadLength;
--            return (char *) ledWire;
--        }
--
-         namec = mapc = statec = 0;
-         sli = XkbFindSrvLedInfo(dev, ledWire->ledClass, ledWire->ledID,
-                                 XkbXI_IndicatorMapsMask);
-@@ -6674,10 +6684,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-             memset((char *) sli->names, 0, XkbNumIndicators * sizeof(Atom));
-             for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) {
-                 if (ledWire->namesPresent & bit) {
--                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) {
--                        *status_rtrn = BadLength;
--                        return (char *) atomWire;
--                    }
-                     sli->names[n] = (Atom) *atomWire;
-                     if (sli->names[n] == None)
-                         ledWire->namesPresent &= ~bit;
-@@ -6695,10 +6701,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-         if (ledWire->mapsPresent) {
-             for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) {
-                 if (ledWire->mapsPresent & bit) {
--                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) {
--                        *status_rtrn = BadLength;
--                        return (char *) mapWire;
--                    }
-                     sli->maps[n].flags = mapWire->flags;
-                     sli->maps[n].which_groups = mapWire->whichGroups;
-                     sli->maps[n].groups = mapWire->groups;
-@@ -6734,13 +6736,17 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
- }
- 
- static int
--_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-+_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-                   xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
- {
-     char *wire;
- 
-     wire = (char *) &stuff[1];
-     if (stuff->change & XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask) {
-+        int sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc);
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz))
-+            return BadLength;
-+
-         if (!dev->button) {
-             client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(XkbErr_BadClass, ButtonClass);
-             return XkbKeyboardErrorCode;
-@@ -6751,13 +6757,13 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-                              dev->button->numButtons);
-             return BadMatch;
-         }
--        wire += (stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc));
-+        wire += sz;
-     }
-     if (stuff->change & XkbXI_IndicatorsMask) {
-         int status = Success;
- 
-         wire = CheckSetDeviceIndicators(wire, dev, stuff->nDeviceLedFBs,
--                                        &status, client);
-+                                        &status, client, stuff);
-         if (status != Success)
-             return status;
-     }
-@@ -6768,8 +6774,8 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
- }
- 
- static int
--_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
--                       xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
-+_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-+                  xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
- {
-     char *wire;
-     xkbExtensionDeviceNotify ed;
-@@ -6793,8 +6799,6 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-         if (stuff->firstBtn + stuff->nBtns > nBtns)
-             return BadValue;
-         sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc);
--        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz))
--            return BadLength;
-         memcpy((char *) &acts[stuff->firstBtn], (char *) wire, sz);
-         wire += sz;
-         ed.reason |= XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask;
--- 
-2.36.1
-

SOURCES/0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From a515f4f4336efb8a2adf9a3ac141129708297d80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:45:35 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] xwayland/glamor: Change errors to verbose
- messages
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-On a normal startup sequence, the Xwayland glamor backend would log
-an error whenever a required Wayland protocol is missing.
-
-Those are not really errors though, more informational messages along
-the glamor backend selection process.
-
-Demote those errors to verbose messages to reduce the verbosity of
-Xwayland at startup by default.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jonas Ådahl <jadahl@gmail.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 30d0d4a19be61dd7b61f5ced992cb299e6a38068)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c | 6 ++++--
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c       | 2 +-
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c           | 6 ++++--
- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-index 93d192d58..5a20b452f 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-@@ -753,12 +753,14 @@ xwl_glamor_eglstream_has_wl_interfaces(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-         xwl_eglstream_get(xwl_screen);
- 
-     if (xwl_eglstream->display == NULL) {
--        ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_eglstream_display' not supported\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3,
-+                       "glamor: 'wl_eglstream_display' not supported\n");
-         return FALSE;
-     }
- 
-     if (xwl_eglstream->controller == NULL) {
--        ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_eglstream_controller' not supported\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3,
-+                       "glamor: 'wl_eglstream_controller' not supported\n");
-         return FALSE;
-     }
- 
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c
-index 466a1b052..e06b6f54b 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c
-@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ xwl_glamor_gbm_has_wl_interfaces(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-     struct xwl_gbm_private *xwl_gbm = xwl_gbm_get(xwl_screen);
- 
-     if (xwl_gbm->drm == NULL) {
--        ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_drm' not supported\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: 'wl_drm' not supported\n");
-         return FALSE;
-     }
- 
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-index deb398f91..541d5e923 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-@@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-     else
--        ErrorF("Missing Wayland requirements for glamor GBM backend\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3,
-+                       "Missing Wayland requirements for glamor GBM backend\n");
- #endif
- 
-     return FALSE;
-@@ -428,7 +429,8 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-     else
--        ErrorF("Missing Wayland requirements for glamor EGLStream backend\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3,
-+                       "Missing Wayland requirements for glamor EGLStream backend\n");
- #endif
- 
-     return FALSE;
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From fe0c050276c09f43cc1ae80b4553db42398ca84c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] Xext: Fix out of bounds access in
- SProcScreenSaverSuspend()
-
-ZDI-CAN-14951, CVE-2021-4010
-
-This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-(cherry picked from commit 6c4c53010772e3cb4cb8acd54950c8eec9c00d21)
----
- Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
-index 1d7e3cadf..f813ba08d 100644
---- a/Xext/saver.c
-+++ b/Xext/saver.c
-@@ -1351,8 +1351,8 @@ SProcScreenSaverSuspend(ClientPtr client)
-     REQUEST(xScreenSaverSuspendReq);
- 
-     swaps(&stuff->length);
--    swapl(&stuff->suspend);
-     REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xScreenSaverSuspendReq);
-+    swapl(&stuff->suspend);
-     return ProcScreenSaverSuspend(client);
- }
- 
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-From f9c435822c852659e3926502829f1b13ce6efc37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/7] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
- ProcXIChangeProperty
-
-This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
-
-Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
-the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
-truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
-
-The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
-(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
-finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
-stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
-
-The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
-so let's fix that too.
-
-CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
- dix/property.c  | 3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644
---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
-     DeviceIntPtr dev;
-     unsigned long len;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     int rc;
-
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
-@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
- {
-     int rc;
-     DeviceIntPtr dev;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     unsigned long len;
-
-     REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
-diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
-index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644
---- a/dix/property.c
-+++ b/dix/property.c
-@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     WindowPtr pWin;
-     char format, mode;
-     unsigned long len;
--    int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
-+    int sizeInBytes, err;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-
-     REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
-
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch

@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-From bd134231e282d9eb126b6fdaa40bb383180fa72b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 11:11:06 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/3] xkb: add request length validation for
- XkbSetGeometry
-
-No validation of the various fields on that report were done, so a
-malicious client could send a short request that claims it had N
-sections, or rows, or keys, and the server would process the request for
-N sections, running out of bounds of the actual request data.
-
-Fix this by adding size checks to ensure our data is valid.
-
-ZDI-CAN 16062, CVE-2022-2319.
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42)
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index 36464a770..27d19793e 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5160,7 +5160,7 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
- }
- 
- static Status
--_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
-+_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req,
-                 XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client)
- {
-     char *wire;
-@@ -5171,6 +5171,9 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
-     Status status;
- 
-     dWire = (xkbDoodadWireDesc *) (*wire_inout);
-+    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, dWire, dWire + 1))
-+        return BadLength;
-+
-     any = dWire->any;
-     wire = (char *) &dWire[1];
-     if (client->swapped) {
-@@ -5273,7 +5276,7 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
- }
- 
- static Status
--_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
-+_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req,
-                  XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client)
- {
-     register int r;
-@@ -5284,6 +5287,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
- 
-     wire = *wire_inout;
-     olWire = (xkbOverlayWireDesc *) wire;
-+    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1))
-+        return BadLength;
-+
-     if (client->swapped) {
-         swapl(&olWire->name);
-     }
-@@ -5295,6 +5301,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
-         xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *kWire;
-         XkbOverlayRowPtr row;
- 
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1))
-+            return BadLength;
-+
-         if (rWire->rowUnder > section->num_rows) {
-             client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode4(0x20, r, section->num_rows,
-                                               rWire->rowUnder);
-@@ -5303,6 +5312,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
-         row = XkbAddGeomOverlayRow(ol, rWire->rowUnder, rWire->nKeys);
-         kWire = (xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1];
-         for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
-+            if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1))
-+                return BadLength;
-+
-             if (XkbAddGeomOverlayKey(ol, row,
-                                      (char *) kWire->over,
-                                      (char *) kWire->under) == NULL) {
-@@ -5336,6 +5348,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-         register int r;
-         xkbRowWireDesc *rWire;
- 
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, sWire, sWire + 1))
-+            return BadLength;
-+
-         if (client->swapped) {
-             swapl(&sWire->name);
-             swaps(&sWire->top);
-@@ -5361,6 +5376,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             XkbRowPtr row;
-             xkbKeyWireDesc *kWire;
- 
-+            if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1))
-+                return BadLength;
-+
-             if (client->swapped) {
-                 swaps(&rWire->top);
-                 swaps(&rWire->left);
-@@ -5375,6 +5393,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
-                 XkbKeyPtr key;
- 
-+                if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1))
-+                    return BadLength;
-+
-                 key = XkbAddGeomKey(row);
-                 if (!key)
-                     return BadAlloc;
-@@ -5400,7 +5421,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             register int d;
- 
-             for (d = 0; d < sWire->nDoodads; d++) {
--                status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, section, client);
-+                status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, section, client);
-                 if (status != Success)
-                     return status;
-             }
-@@ -5409,7 +5430,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             register int o;
- 
-             for (o = 0; o < sWire->nOverlays; o++) {
--                status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, geom, section, client);
-+                status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, req, geom, section, client);
-                 if (status != Success)
-                     return status;
-             }
-@@ -5443,6 +5464,9 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             xkbOutlineWireDesc *olWire;
-             XkbOutlinePtr ol;
- 
-+            if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, shapeWire, shapeWire + 1))
-+                return BadLength;
-+
-             shape =
-                 XkbAddGeomShape(geom, shapeWire->name, shapeWire->nOutlines);
-             if (!shape)
-@@ -5453,12 +5477,18 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-                 XkbPointPtr pt;
-                 xkbPointWireDesc *ptWire;
- 
-+                if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1))
-+                    return BadLength;
-+
-                 ol = XkbAddGeomOutline(shape, olWire->nPoints);
-                 if (!ol)
-                     return BadAlloc;
-                 ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius;
-                 ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1];
-                 for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) {
-+                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, ptWire, ptWire + 1))
-+                        return BadLength;
-+
-                     pt->x = ptWire->x;
-                     pt->y = ptWire->y;
-                     if (client->swapped) {
-@@ -5564,12 +5594,15 @@ _CheckSetGeom(XkbGeometryPtr geom, xkbSetGeometryReq * req, ClientPtr client)
-         return status;
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < req->nDoodads; i++) {
--        status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, NULL, client);
-+        status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, NULL, client);
-         if (status != Success)
-             return status;
-     }
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < req->nKeyAliases; i++) {
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, wire, wire + XkbKeyNameLength))
-+                return BadLength;
-+
-         if (XkbAddGeomKeyAlias(geom, &wire[XkbKeyNameLength], wire) == NULL)
-             return BadAlloc;
-         wire += 2 * XkbKeyNameLength;
--- 
-2.36.1
-

SOURCES/0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 3206e133cb768709d32f260ac4b1bb17a46141a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 13:09:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] xwayland/glamor: Log backend selected for debug
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Add (verbose) statements to trace the actual backend used with glamor.
-
-That can be useful for debugging.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit c5d1fed9fa32244739677ec5c58ea87b261e023b)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-index 541d5e923..b34eafabb 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-     if (xwl_screen->gbm_backend.is_available &&
-         xwl_glamor_has_wl_interfaces(xwl_screen, &xwl_screen->gbm_backend)) {
-         xwl_screen->egl_backend = &xwl_screen->gbm_backend;
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: Using GBM backend\n");
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-     else
-@@ -426,6 +427,7 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-     if (xwl_screen->eglstream_backend.is_available &&
-         xwl_glamor_has_wl_interfaces(xwl_screen, &xwl_screen->eglstream_backend)) {
-         xwl_screen->egl_backend = &xwl_screen->eglstream_backend;
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: Using EGLStream backend\n");
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-     else
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From 0dab0b527ac5c4fe0272ea679522bd87238a733b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/7] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
-
-The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
-255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
-to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
-anyway.
-
-This fixes an OOB write:
-
-ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
-temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
-For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
-stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
-representing stuff->detail cleared.
-
-However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
-thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
-
-CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-index 65d5870f6f..89a591098a 100644
---- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-         return BadValue;
-     }
-
-+    /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
-+     * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
-+     * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
-+    if (stuff->detail > 255)
-+        return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
-+
-     if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
-                                stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
-         return BadValue;
-@@ -313,6 +319,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-         return BadValue;
-     }
-
-+    /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
-+    if (stuff->detail > 255) {
-+        client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
-+        return BadValue;
-+    }
-+
-     rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
-     if (rc != Success)
-         return rc;
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From 59c977bff66de77bd93ce8853e33e1b4ca661a49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:03 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] render: Fix out of bounds access in
- SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs()
-
-ZDI-CAN-14192, CVE-2021-4008
-
-This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-(cherry picked from commit ebce7e2d80e7c80e1dda60f2f0bc886f1106ba60)
----
- render/render.c | 9 +++++++++
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
-index c376090ca..456f156d4 100644
---- a/render/render.c
-+++ b/render/render.c
-@@ -2309,6 +2309,9 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
- 
-         i = elt->len;
-         if (i == 0xff) {
-+            if (buffer + 4 > end) {
-+                return BadLength;
-+            }
-             swapl((int *) buffer);
-             buffer += 4;
-         }
-@@ -2319,12 +2322,18 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
-                 buffer += i;
-                 break;
-             case 2:
-+                if (buffer + i * 2 > end) {
-+                    return BadLength;
-+                }
-                 while (i--) {
-                     swaps((short *) buffer);
-                     buffer += 2;
-                 }
-                 break;
-             case 4:
-+                if (buffer + i * 4 > end) {
-+                    return BadLength;
-+                }
-                 while (i--) {
-                     swapl((int *) buffer);
-                     buffer += 4;
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From bdc00ba749ac6cde35c025f5f6b1a5b49c1f4960 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 09:56:52 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] xwayland/eglstream: Prefer EGLstream if available
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Currently, when given the choice, Xwayland will pick the GBM backend
-over the EGLstream backend if both are available, unless the command
-line option “-eglstream” is specified.
-
-The NVIDIA proprietary driver had no support for GBM until driver series
-495, but starting with the driver series 495, both can be used.
-
-But there are other requirements with the rest of the stack, typically
-Mesa, egl-wayland, libglvnd as documented in the NVIDIA driver.
-
-So if the NVIDIA driver series 495 gets installed, Xwayland will pick
-the GBM backend even if EGLstream is available and may fail to render
-properly.
-
-To avoid that issue, prefer EGLstream if EGLstream and all the Wayland
-interfaces are available, and fallback to GBM automatically unless
-“-eglstream” was specified.
-
-With this, the compositor, given the choice, can decide which actual
-backend Xwayland would use by advertising (or not) the Wayland
-"wl_eglstream_controller" interface.
-
-This change has no impact on compositors which do not have support for
-EGLstream in the first place.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 6dd9709bd85cf5de4067887818c864220b951355)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c | 8 ++------
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-index b34eafabb..f46b677f5 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-@@ -441,14 +441,10 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
- void
- xwl_glamor_select_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen, Bool use_eglstream)
- {
--    if (use_eglstream) {
--        if (!xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen))
-+    if (!xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen)) {
-+        if (!use_eglstream)
-             xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(xwl_screen);
-     }
--    else {
--        if (!xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(xwl_screen))
--            xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen);
--    }
- }
- 
- Bool
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 94f6fe99d87cf6ba0adadd95c595158c345b7d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/7] Xext: free the screen saver resource when
- replacing it
-
-This fixes a use-after-free bug:
-
-When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
-ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
-resources.
-
-When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
-struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
-old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
-
-Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
-ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
-
-Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
-
-CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
-index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644
---- a/Xext/saver.c
-+++ b/Xext/saver.c
-@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
-         pVlist++;
-     }
-     if (pPriv->attr)
--        FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
-+        FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
-     pPriv->attr = pAttr;
-     pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
-     if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From a42635ee3c01f71a49052d83a372933504c9db04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/7] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off
- from the same client
-
-This fixes a use-after-free bug:
-
-When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
-TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
-is added twice to the resources:
-  - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
-    drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
-  - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
-
-The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
-client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
-all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
-the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
-and free the whole list.
-
-However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
-same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
-existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
-client's resources.
-
-If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
-- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
-for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
-
-Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
-a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
-
-Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
-setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
-resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
-again when the client quits.
-
-Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
-clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
-
-CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
-index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644
---- a/Xext/xvmain.c
-+++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
-@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
-         tpn = pn;
-         while (tpn) {
-             if (tpn->client == client) {
--                if (!onoff)
-+                if (!onoff) {
-                     tpn->client = NULL;
-+                    FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
-+                }
-                 return Success;
-             }
-             if (!tpn->client)
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 774260dbae1fa505cd2848c786baed9a8db5179d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/7] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after
- freeing it
-
-Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
-reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
-already freed memory.
-
-CVE-2022-46283, ZDI-CAN-19530
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644
---- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
-         }
-         else {
-             free(dst->names->radio_groups);
-+            dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
-         }
-         dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
-
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From bb1711b7fba42f2a0c7d1c09beee241a1b2bcc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 10:06:45 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xext: fix invalid event type mask in
- XTestSwapFakeInput
-
-In commit b320ca0 the mask was inadvertently changed from octal 0177 to
-hexadecimal 0x177.
-
-Fixes commit b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63
-  Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
-
-Found by Stuart Cassoff
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- Xext/xtest.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
-index 2985a4ce6e..dde5c4cf9d 100644
---- a/Xext/xtest.c
-+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
-@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
- 
-     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
-     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
--        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
-+        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0177;
-         /* Swap event */
-         proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
-         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
--- 
-2.38.1
-

SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
 
 Summary:   Xwayland
 Name:      xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
-Version:   21.1.3
-Release:   15%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
+Version:   22.1.9
+Release:   5%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
 
 URL:       http://www.x.org
 %if 0%{?gitdate}
@@ -18,87 +18,43 @@ Source0:   https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/%{pkgname}/-/archive/%{commit}/%{
 Source0:   https://www.x.org/pub/individual/xserver/%{pkgname}-%{version}.tar.xz
 %endif
 
-Patch1: 0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch
-Patch2: 0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch
-Patch3: 0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch
-Patch4: 0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch
-Patch5: 0001-present-Send-a-PresentConfigureNotify-event-for-dest.patch
-
-# CVE-2021-4011
-Patch10001: 0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch
-# CVE-2021-4009
-Patch10002: 0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch
-# CVE-2021-4010
-Patch10003: 0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch
-# CVE-2021-4008
-Patch10004: 0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch
-# CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070
-Patch10005: 0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch
-Patch10006: 0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch
-Patch10007: 0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch
-# CVE-2022-3550
-Patch10008: 0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
-# CVE-2022-3551
-Patch10009: 0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
-# CVE-2022-46340
-Patch10018: 0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
-# related to CVE-2022-46344
-Patch10019: 0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
-# CVE-2022-46344
-Patch10020: 0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
-# CVE-2022-46341
-Patch10021: 0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
-# CVE-2022-46343
-Patch10022: 0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
-# CVE-2022-46342
-Patch10023: 0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
-# CVE-2022-4283
-Patch10024: 0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
-# Follow-up to CVE-2022-46340
-Patch10025: 0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch
-# CVE-2023-0494
-Patch10026: 0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch
-# CVE-2023-1393
-Patch10027: 0001-composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW.patch
-# CVE-2023-5367
-Patch10028: 0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch
-# CVE-2023-6478
-Patch10029: 0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch
-# CVE-2023-6377
-Patch10030: 0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch
+# Fix for CVE-2023-5367
+Patch1:   0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch
+# Fix for CVE-2023-6478
+Patch2:   0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch
+# Fix for CVE-2023-6377
+Patch3:   0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch
 # Fix for CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
-Patch10031:   0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch
+Patch4:   0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch
 # Fix for CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-Patch10032:   0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch
-Patch10033:   0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch
-Patch10034:   0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch
+Patch5:   0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch
+Patch6:   0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch
+Patch7:   0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch
 # Fix for CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
-Patch10035:   0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch
+Patch8:   0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch
 # Fix for CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
-Patch10036:   0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch
-Patch10037:   0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch
+Patch9:   0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch
+Patch10:  0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch
 # Fix for CVE-2024-0408
-Patch10038:   0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch
+Patch11:  0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch
 # Fix for CVE-2024-0409
-Patch10039:   0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch
+Patch12:  0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch
 
 License:   MIT
 
 Requires: xorg-x11-server-common
 Requires: libEGL
-Requires: libepoxy >= 1.5.5
 
 BuildRequires: gcc
 BuildRequires: git-core
 BuildRequires: meson
 
 BuildRequires: wayland-devel
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-client) >= 1.3.0
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-client) >= 1.18.0
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-protocols)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-eglstream-protocols)
 
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(dmx)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(epoxy) >= 1.5.5
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(epoxy)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fontenc)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libdrm) >= 2.4.0
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libssl)
@@ -122,6 +78,7 @@ BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xshmfence) >= 1.1
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtrans) >= 1.3.2
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtst)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xv)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libxcvt)
 BuildRequires: xorg-x11-proto-devel >= 7.7-10
 
 BuildRequires: mesa-libGL-devel >= 9.2
@@ -188,75 +145,74 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
 
 %changelog
-* Tue Jan 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-15
+* Tue Jan 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.9-5
   Fix for CVE-2023-6816, CVE-2024-0229, CVE-2024-21885, CVE-2024-21886,
   CVE-2024-0408, CVE-2024-0409
 
-* Wed Dec 13 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-14
+* Wed Dec 13 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.9-4
 - Fix for CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478
 
-* Wed Oct 25 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-13
+* Wed Oct 25 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.9-3
 - Fix for CVE-2023-5367
 
-* Tue Jun 13 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-12
-- Backport fix for a deadlock with DRI3
-  Resolves: rhbz#2212831
+* Tue Apr 25 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.9-2
+- Rebuild (#2158761)
 
-* Fri Mar 31 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-11
-- Fix CVE-2023-1393 (#2180298)
+* Mon Apr  3 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.9-1
+- xwayland 22.1.9 (#2158761)
 
-* Tue Feb  7 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-10
-- Fix CVE-2023-0494 (#2166972)
+* Fri Mar 31 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-8
+- Fix CVE-2023-1393 (#2180299)
 
-* Mon Dec 19 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-9
-- Follow-up fix for CVE-2022-46340 (#2151777)
+* Tue Feb  7 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-7
+- Fix CVE-2023-0494 (#2166974)
 
-* Tue Dec 13 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-8
-- CVE fix for: CVE-2022-4283 (#2151802), CVE-2022-46340 (#2151777),
-  CVE-2022-46341 (#2151782), CVE-2022-46342 (#2151785),
-  CVE-2022-46343 (#2151792), CVE-2022-46344 (#2151795)
+* Mon Dec 19 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-6
+- Follow-up fix for CVE-2022-46340 (#2151778)
 
-* Mon Nov 14 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> -  21.1.3-7
+* Wed Dec 14 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-5
+- CVE fix for: CVE-2022-4283 (#2151803), CVE-2022-46340 (#2151778),
+  CVE-2022-46341 (#2151783), CVE-2022-46342 (#2151786),
+  CVE-2022-46343 (#2151793), CVE-2022-46344 (#2151796)
+
+* Mon Nov 14 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> -  21.1.3-4
 - Fix CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551
-  Resolves: rhbz#2140767, rhbz#2140774
+  Resolves: rhbz#2140769, rhbz#2140771
 
-* Fri Jul 29 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-6
+* Fri Jul 29 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-3
 - CVE fix for: CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070
-  Resolves: rhbz#2110442, rhbz#2110437
-
-* Thu Jun 09 2022 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-5
-- Rebuild again for ipv6 xtrans fix
-  Related: #2075132
-
-* Tue May 24 2022 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-3
-- Rebuild for ipv6 xtrans fix
-  Related: #2075132
+  Resolves: rhbz#2110440, rhbz#2110433
 
 * Fri Jan  7 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-2
-- CVE fix for: CVE-2021-4008 (#2038066), CVE-2021-4009 (#2038068),
-  CVE-2021-4010 (#2038071), CVE-2021-4011 (#2038073)
+- CVE fix for: CVE-2021-4008 (#2038067), CVE-2021-4009 (#2038070),
+  CVE-2021-4010 (#2038072), CVE-2021-4011 (#2038074)
 
 * Thu Dec  2 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-1
-- Rebase to 21.1.3 (rhbz#2015842)
+- Rebase to 21.1.3 (rhbz#2015839)
 - Prefer EGLstream if both EGLstream and GBM are usable
 
-* Mon Aug  9 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-6
-- Backport the latest fixes from Xwayland for EGLstream (rhbz#1977741)
+* Tue Aug 10 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-6
+- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
+  Related: rhbz#1991688
 
-* Tue Jun 29 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-5
-- Require libepoxy >= 1.5.5 (rhbz#1976132)
+* Mon Aug  9 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-5
+- Backport the latest fixes from Xwayland for EGLstream (rhbz#1977742)
 
-* Mon Jun 21 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-4
+* Tue Jun 22 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-4
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
+  Related: rhbz#1971065
+
+* Mon Jun 21 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-3
 - Fix a use-after-free in the previous changes for GLX
 
-* Mon Jun 14 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-3
-- Backport fixes for GLX and EGLstream (#1961981)
+* Thu Jun 17 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-2
+- Backport fixes for GLX and EGLstream (#1969486)
 
-* Thu Jun  03 2021 Tomas Pelka <tpelka@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-2
-- bump release and rebuild to correctly trigger gating
+* Thu Jun 17 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-1
+- xwayland 21.1.1 (#1952897)
 
-* Wed Apr  14 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-1
-- xwayland 21.1.1 (CVE-2021-3472 / ZDI-CAN-1259)
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 21.1.0-2
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
 
 * Thu Mar  18 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.0-1
 - xwayland 21.1.0