.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz
+/xwayland-*.tar.xz

.xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-ae980a7deeb7cad9f3cd253f3b1ddca5bb26aafa SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz

0001-xkb-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-_XkbSetCompatMap.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 26120df7aae6b5bf8086fb4d871d3b1a07ddacdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
+Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 10:37:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in _XkbSetCompatMap()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The _XkbSetCompatMap() function attempts to resize the `sym_interpret`
+buffer.
+
+However, It didn't update its size properly. It updated `num_si` only,
+without updating `size_si`.
+
+This may lead to local privilege escalation if the server is run as root
+or remote code execution (e.g. x11 over ssh).
+
+CVE-2024-9632, ZDI-CAN-24756
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Tested-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 85b776571487f52e756f68a069c768757369bfe3)
+
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1735>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index 8d52e25df..8b63e34b5 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -2990,13 +2990,13 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
+         XkbSymInterpretPtr sym;
+         unsigned int skipped = 0;
+ 
+-        if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->num_si) {
+-            compat->num_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
++        if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) {
++            compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
+             compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret,
+-                                                 compat->num_si,
++                                                 compat->size_si,
+                                                  sizeof(XkbSymInterpretRec));
+             if (!compat->sym_interpret) {
+-                compat->num_si = 0;
++                compat->num_si = compat->size_si = 0;
+                 return BadAlloc;
+             }
+         }
+-- 
+2.47.0
+

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
+
+The xorg-x11-server-Xwayland package

SOURCES/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From 19e9f199950aaa4b9b7696936d1b067475da999c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
-
-button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
-our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
-insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
-XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
-leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
-
-CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd)
----
- Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
- dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
-index dcd4efb3b..54ea11a93 100644
---- a/Xi/exevents.c
-+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
-@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
-         }
- 
-         if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
--            if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
--                to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
--                if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
--                    FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
--            }
-+            size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
-+            to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
-+                                                   maxbuttons,
-+                                                   sizeof(XkbAction));
-+            memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
-             memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
--                   sizeof(XkbAction));
-+                   from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
-         }
-         else {
-             free(to->button->xkb_acts);
-diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
-index 7150734a5..20fef1692 100644
---- a/dix/devices.c
-+++ b/dix/devices.c
-@@ -2530,6 +2530,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
- 
-     if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
-         int i;
-+        int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
-+
-         DeviceChangedEvent event = {
-             .header = ET_Internal,
-             .type = ET_DeviceChanged,
-@@ -2540,6 +2542,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
-         };
- 
-         master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
-+        if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
-+            master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
-+                                                       maxbuttons,
-+                                                       sizeof(XkbAction));
-+            memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
-+                   0,
-+                   (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
-+        }
- 
-         memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
-                sizeof(Atom));
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 8660dd164882ce5fc1f274427e2ff3dc020d6273 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 11:41:40 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: fix potential use-after-free in
- DeepCopyPointerClasses
-
-CVE-2023-0494, ZDI-CAN-19596
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 0ba6d8c37071131a49790243cdac55392ecf71ec)
----
- Xi/exevents.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
-index 217baa956..dcd4efb3b 100644
---- a/Xi/exevents.c
-+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
-@@ -619,8 +619,10 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
-             memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
-                    sizeof(XkbAction));
-         }
--        else
-+        else {
-             free(to->button->xkb_acts);
-+            to->button->xkb_acts = NULL;
-+        }
- 
-         memcpy(to->button->labels, from->button->labels,
-                from->button->numButtons * sizeof(Atom));
--- 
-2.39.1
-

SOURCES/0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 1e8478455458e998dd366d2cd23d2aeab2bdeee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend
-
-The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
-least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
-part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
-existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
-instead of N + P.
-
-Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
-values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
-uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
-For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
-result in this 8 value array:
-  [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
-                            ^OOB write
-
-The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
-both.
-
-CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a)
----
- Xi/xiproperty.c    | 4 ++--
- randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-index 066ba21fba..d315f04d0e 100644
---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
-                 XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop);
-             return BadAlloc;
-         }
--        new_value.size = len;
-+        new_value.size = total_len;
-         new_value.type = type;
-         new_value.format = format;
- 
-@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
-         case PropModePrepend:
-             new_data = new_value.data;
-             old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
--                                  (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
-+                                  (len * size_in_bytes));
-             break;
-         }
-         if (new_data)
-diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
-index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644
---- a/randr/rrproperty.c
-+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
-@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
-                 RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop);
-             return BadAlloc;
-         }
--        new_value.size = len;
-+        new_value.size = total_len;
-         new_value.type = type;
-         new_value.format = format;
- 
-@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
-         case PropModePrepend:
-             new_data = new_value.data;
-             old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
--                                  (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
-+                                  (len * size_in_bytes));
-             break;
-         }
-         if (new_data)
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 8dba686dc277d6d262ad0c77b4632a5b276697ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/7] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in
- XTestSwapFakeInput
-
-XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
-sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
-However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
-so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
-misparsed.
-
-Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
-xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
-swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
-
-Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
-Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
-doesn't support GenericEvent.
-
-CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
-index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644
---- a/Xext/xtest.c
-+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
-@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
-
-     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
-     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
-+        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
-         /* Swap event */
--        proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
-+        proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
-         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
--        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
-+        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
-             client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
-             return BadValue;
-         }
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0001-composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 26ef545b3502f61ca722a7a3373507e88ef64110 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 11:08:47 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] composite: Fix use-after-free of the COW
-
-ZDI-CAN-19866/CVE-2023-1393
-
-If a client explicitly destroys the compositor overlay window (aka COW),
-we would leave a dangling pointer to that window in the CompScreen
-structure, which will trigger a use-after-free later.
-
-Make sure to clear the CompScreen pointer to the COW when the latter gets
-destroyed explicitly by the client.
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
----
- composite/compwindow.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/composite/compwindow.c b/composite/compwindow.c
-index 4e2494b86..b30da589e 100644
---- a/composite/compwindow.c
-+++ b/composite/compwindow.c
-@@ -620,6 +620,11 @@ compDestroyWindow(WindowPtr pWin)
-     ret = (*pScreen->DestroyWindow) (pWin);
-     cs->DestroyWindow = pScreen->DestroyWindow;
-     pScreen->DestroyWindow = compDestroyWindow;
-+
-+    /* Did we just destroy the overlay window? */
-+    if (pWin == cs->pOverlayWin)
-+        cs->pOverlayWin = NULL;
-+
- /*    compCheckTree (pWin->drawable.pScreen); can't check -- tree isn't good*/
-     return ret;
- }
--- 
-2.40.0
-

SOURCES/0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From b5cb27032d3e486ba84a491e1420e85171c4c0a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/9] dix: allocate enough space for logical button
- maps
-
-Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
-each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
-to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
-
-CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3)
----
- Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
- dix/enterleave.c    | 5 +++--
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
-index 5b77b1a44..2b05ac5f3 100644
---- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
-@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
-     if (pDev->button) {
-         int i;
- 
--        rep.buttons_len =
--            bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
-+        rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
-         rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
-         buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
-         if (!buttons)
-diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
-index 867ec7436..ded8679d7 100644
---- a/dix/enterleave.c
-+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
-@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
- 
-     mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
- 
--    /* XI 2 event */
--    btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
-+    /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
-+     * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
-+    btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
-     btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
-     len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0001-present-Send-a-PresentConfigureNotify-event-for-dest.patch

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-From b98fc07d3442a289c6bef82df50dd0a2d01de71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2023 12:26:27 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] present: Send a PresentConfigureNotify event for
- destroyed windows
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-This enables fixing a deadlock case on the client side, where the client
-ends up blocked waiting for a Present event that will never come because
-the window was destroyed. The new PresentWindowDestroyed flag allows the
-client to avoid blocking indefinitely.
-
-Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
-See-also: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/116
-See-also: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/6685
-Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 462b06033e66a32308d940eb5fc47f5e4c914dc0)
----
- present/present_event.c  |  5 +++--
- present/present_priv.h   |  7 ++++++-
- present/present_screen.c | 11 ++++++++++-
- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/present/present_event.c b/present/present_event.c
-index 435b26b70..849732dc8 100644
---- a/present/present_event.c
-+++ b/present/present_event.c
-@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ present_event_swap(xGenericEvent *from, xGenericEvent *to)
- }
- 
- void
--present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h, int bw, WindowPtr sibling)
-+present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h,
-+                           int bw, WindowPtr sibling, CARD32 flags)
- {
-     present_window_priv_ptr window_priv = present_window_priv(window);
- 
-@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h, int bw,
-             .off_y = 0,
-             .pixmap_width = w,
-             .pixmap_height = h,
--            .pixmap_flags = 0
-+            .pixmap_flags = flags
-         };
-         present_event_ptr event;
- 
-diff --git a/present/present_priv.h b/present/present_priv.h
-index 6ebd009a2..4ad729864 100644
---- a/present/present_priv.h
-+++ b/present/present_priv.h
-@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@
- #define DebugPresent(x)
- #endif
- 
-+/* XXX this belongs in presentproto */
-+#ifndef PresentWindowDestroyed
-+#define PresentWindowDestroyed (1 << 0)
-+#endif
-+
- extern int present_request;
- 
- extern DevPrivateKeyRec present_screen_private_key;
-@@ -307,7 +312,7 @@ void
- present_free_events(WindowPtr window);
- 
- void
--present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h, int bw, WindowPtr sibling);
-+present_send_config_notify(WindowPtr window, int x, int y, int w, int h, int bw, WindowPtr sibling, CARD32 flags);
- 
- void
- present_send_complete_notify(WindowPtr window, CARD8 kind, CARD8 mode, CARD32 serial, uint64_t ust, uint64_t msc);
-diff --git a/present/present_screen.c b/present/present_screen.c
-index 15684eda4..2c29aafd2 100644
---- a/present/present_screen.c
-+++ b/present/present_screen.c
-@@ -93,6 +93,15 @@ present_destroy_window(WindowPtr window)
-     present_screen_priv_ptr screen_priv = present_screen_priv(screen);
-     present_window_priv_ptr window_priv = present_window_priv(window);
- 
-+    present_send_config_notify(window,
-+                               window->drawable.x,
-+                               window->drawable.y,
-+                               window->drawable.width,
-+                               window->drawable.height,
-+                               window->borderWidth,
-+                               window->nextSib,
-+                               PresentWindowDestroyed);
-+
-     if (window_priv) {
-         present_clear_window_notifies(window);
-         present_free_events(window);
-@@ -123,7 +132,7 @@ present_config_notify(WindowPtr window,
-     ScreenPtr screen = window->drawable.pScreen;
-     present_screen_priv_ptr screen_priv = present_screen_priv(screen);
- 
--    present_send_config_notify(window, x, y, w, h, bw, sibling);
-+    present_send_config_notify(window, x, y, w, h, bw, sibling, 0);
- 
-     unwrap(screen_priv, screen, ConfigNotify);
-     if (screen->ConfigNotify)
--- 
-2.40.0
-

SOURCES/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From aaf854fb25541380cc38a221c15f0e8372f48872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
- ProcRRChange*Property
-
-Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
-See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
-protocol and XI.
-
-This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
-
-Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
-the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
-truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
-
-The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
-(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
-finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
-stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
-
-CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632)
----
- randr/rrproperty.c         | 2 +-
- randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
-index 25469f57b..c4fef8a1f 100644
---- a/randr/rrproperty.c
-+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
-@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     char format, mode;
-     unsigned long len;
-     int sizeInBytes;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     int err;
- 
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
-diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-index b79c17f9b..90c5a9a93 100644
---- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     char format, mode;
-     unsigned long len;
-     int sizeInBytes;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     int err;
- 
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From a8644465d98beb08759546711b77bb617861c67f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] record: Fix out of bounds access in
- SwapCreateRegister()
-
-ZDI-CAN-14952, CVE-2021-4011
-
-This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-(cherry picked from commit e56f61c79fc3cee26d83cda0f84ae56d5979f768)
----
- record/record.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c
-index be154525d..e123867a7 100644
---- a/record/record.c
-+++ b/record/record.c
-@@ -2516,8 +2516,8 @@ SwapCreateRegister(ClientPtr client, xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff)
-         swapl(pClientID);
-     }
-     if (stuff->nRanges >
--        client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)
--        - stuff->nClients)
-+        (client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)
-+        - stuff->nClients) / bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRange))
-         return BadLength;
-     RecordSwapRanges((xRecordRange *) pClientID, stuff->nRanges);
-     return Success;
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
-
-GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
-fail somewhere.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
-     xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
-     status = Success;
-     str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
--    if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status))  /* keymap, unsupported */
--        return BadMatch;
-+    {
-+        char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);  /* keymap, unsupported */
-+        if (keymap) {
-+            free(keymap);
-+            return BadMatch;
-+        }
-+    }
-     names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
--    if (status != Success)
-+    if (status == Success) {
-+        len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
-+        if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
-+            status = BadLength;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (status != Success) {
-+        free(names.keycodes);
-+        free(names.types);
-+        free(names.compat);
-+        free(names.symbols);
-+        free(names.geometry);
-         return status;
--    len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
--    if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
--        return BadLength;
-+    }
- 
-     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
-     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
--- 
-2.38.1
-

SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length
- attacks
-
-GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
-request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
-field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
-swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
-     CARD16 len;
- 
-     wire = *wire_inout;
-+
-+    if (client->req_len <
-+        bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
-+        return BadValue;
-+
-     len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
-     if (client->swapped) {
-         swaps(&len);
--- 
-2.38.1
-

SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From c9b379ec5a1a34692af06056925bd0fc5f809713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:40:47 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/3] xkb: switch to array index loops to moving
- pointers
-
-Most similar loops here use a pointer that advances with each loop
-iteration, let's do the same here for consistency.
-
-No functional changes.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit f1070c01d616c5f21f939d5ebc533738779451ac)
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index d056c698c..684394d77 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5372,16 +5372,16 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             row->left = rWire->left;
-             row->vertical = rWire->vertical;
-             kWire = (xkbKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1];
--            for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++) {
-+            for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
-                 XkbKeyPtr key;
- 
-                 key = XkbAddGeomKey(row);
-                 if (!key)
-                     return BadAlloc;
--                memcpy(key->name.name, kWire[k].name, XkbKeyNameLength);
--                key->gap = kWire[k].gap;
--                key->shape_ndx = kWire[k].shapeNdx;
--                key->color_ndx = kWire[k].colorNdx;
-+                memcpy(key->name.name, kWire->name, XkbKeyNameLength);
-+                key->gap = kWire->gap;
-+                key->shape_ndx = kWire->shapeNdx;
-+                key->color_ndx = kWire->colorNdx;
-                 if (key->shape_ndx >= geom->num_shapes) {
-                     client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode3(0x10, key->shape_ndx,
-                                                       geom->num_shapes);
-@@ -5393,7 +5393,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-                     return BadMatch;
-                 }
-             }
--            rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *) &kWire[rWire->nKeys];
-+            rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *)kWire;
-         }
-         wire = (char *) rWire;
-         if (sWire->nDoodads > 0) {
-@@ -5458,16 +5458,16 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-                     return BadAlloc;
-                 ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius;
-                 ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1];
--                for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++) {
--                    pt->x = ptWire[p].x;
--                    pt->y = ptWire[p].y;
-+                for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) {
-+                    pt->x = ptWire->x;
-+                    pt->y = ptWire->y;
-                     if (client->swapped) {
-                         swaps(&pt->x);
-                         swaps(&pt->y);
-                     }
-                 }
-                 ol->num_points = olWire->nPoints;
--                olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *) (&ptWire[olWire->nPoints]);
-+                olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *)ptWire;
-             }
-             if (shapeWire->primaryNdx != XkbNoShape)
-                 shape->primary = &shape->outlines[shapeWire->primaryNdx];
--- 
-2.36.1
-

SOURCES/0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 0a7ed9ff7ea20f7b958a2ad9f9bd045080a3ad9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 16:02:34 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] xwayland/eglstream: Demote EGLstream device
- warning
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-If no EGLstream capable device is found at startup, Xwayland's EGLstream
-backend will log an error message "glamor: No eglstream capable devices
-found".
-
-However, considering that the vast majority of drivers do not implement
-EGLstream, the lack of EGLstream capable device is more of the norm than
-the exception.
-
-Change the error message to a log verbose message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
-Reviewed-by: Jonas Ådahl <jadahl@gmail.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 96c82befa2c3f3dc3534743c67cc003c2106e9b0)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-index 8d18caaf5..93d192d58 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ xwl_eglstream_get_device(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-     free(devices);
- out:
-     if (!device)
--        ErrorF("glamor: No eglstream capable devices found\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: No eglstream capable devices found\n");
-     return device;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From c5ff57676698f19ed3a1402aef58a15552e32d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/7] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if
- verification failed
-
-Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the
-property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644
---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
-
-     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
-                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits);
-+    if (rc != Success)
-+        return rc;
-
-     len = stuff->nUnits;
-     if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq))))
-@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
-
-     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
-                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items);
-+    if (rc != Success)
-+        return rc;
-+
-     len = stuff->num_items;
-     if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq)))
-         return BadLength;
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From 9105be1c51d6973dc8d7806108349bc152029ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/9] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our
- DeviceStateNotify
-
-If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
-zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
-
-This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
-both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
-they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
-
-A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
-one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
-once per type. So effectively this logic code:
-
-   int count = 1;
-   if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
-   if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
-   if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
-   // count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
-
-   ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
-   FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
-   if (button)
-     FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
-   if (key)
-     FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);   // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
-
-If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
-off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
-written instead.
-
-Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
-Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
-patch fixes only the allocation issue.
-
-Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
-button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
-buttons, it is very unlikely.
-
-CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5)
----
- dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
-index ded8679d7..17964b00a 100644
---- a/dix/enterleave.c
-+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
-@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void
- DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
- {
-     int evcount = 1;
--    deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev;
-+    deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
-+    deviceStateNotify *ev;
-     deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
-     deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
- 
-@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
-         }
-     }
- 
--    sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent));
-+    ev = sev;
-     FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
- 
-     if (b != NULL) {
-@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
- 
-     DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
-                           DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab);
--    free(sev);
- }
- 
- void
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 3eb5445f6f7fa9f86de87adc768105d42bdbcf74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:01 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] xfixes: Fix out of bounds access in
- *ProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier()
-
-ZDI-CAN-14950, CVE-2021-4009
-
-This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-(cherry picked from commit b5196750099ae6ae582e1f46bd0a6dad29550e02)
----
- xfixes/cursor.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xfixes/cursor.c b/xfixes/cursor.c
-index 60580b88f..c5d4554b2 100644
---- a/xfixes/cursor.c
-+++ b/xfixes/cursor.c
-@@ -1010,7 +1010,8 @@ ProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client)
- {
-     REQUEST(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq);
- 
--    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices));
-+    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq,
-+                       pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices * sizeof(CARD16)));
-     LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->barrier, client);
- 
-     return XICreatePointerBarrier(client, stuff);
-@@ -1027,7 +1028,8 @@ SProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client)
- 
-     swaps(&stuff->length);
-     swaps(&stuff->num_devices);
--    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices));
-+    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq,
-+                       pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices * sizeof(CARD16)));
- 
-     swapl(&stuff->barrier);
-     swapl(&stuff->window);
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch

@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-From 45a0af83129eb7dc244c5118360afc1972a686c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 09:50:41 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/3] xkb: swap XkbSetDeviceInfo and
- XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck
-
-XKB often uses a FooCheck and Foo function pair, the former is supposed
-to check all values in the request and error out on BadLength,
-BadValue, etc. The latter is then called once we're confident the values
-are good (they may still fail on an individual device, but that's a
-different topic).
-
-In the case of XkbSetDeviceInfo, those functions were incorrectly
-named, with XkbSetDeviceInfo ending up as the checker function and
-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck as the setter function. As a result, the setter
-function was called before the checker function, accessing request
-data and modifying device state before we ensured that the data is
-valid.
-
-In particular, the setter function relied on values being already
-byte-swapped. This in turn could lead to potential OOB memory access.
-
-Fix this by correctly naming the functions and moving the length checks
-over to the checker function. These were added in 87c64fc5b0 to the
-wrong function, probably due to the incorrect naming.
-
-Fixes ZDI-CAN 16070, CVE-2022-2320.
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Introduced in c06e27b2f6fd9f7b9f827623a48876a225264132
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit dd8caf39e9e15d8f302e54045dd08d8ebf1025dc)
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index 684394d77..36464a770 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -6554,7 +6554,8 @@ ProcXkbGetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client)
- static char *
- CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-                          DeviceIntPtr dev,
--                         int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client)
-+                         int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client,
-+                         xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
- {
-     xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *ledWire;
-     int i;
-@@ -6562,6 +6563,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
- 
-     ledWire = (xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *) wire;
-     for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) {
-+            *status_rtrn = BadLength;
-+            return (char *) ledWire;
-+        }
-+
-         if (client->swapped) {
-             swaps(&ledWire->ledClass);
-             swaps(&ledWire->ledID);
-@@ -6589,6 +6595,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-             atomWire = (CARD32 *) &ledWire[1];
-             if (nNames > 0) {
-                 for (n = 0; n < nNames; n++) {
-+                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) {
-+                        *status_rtrn = BadLength;
-+                        return (char *) atomWire;
-+                    }
-+
-                     if (client->swapped) {
-                         swapl(atomWire);
-                     }
-@@ -6600,6 +6611,10 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-             mapWire = (xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *) atomWire;
-             if (nMaps > 0) {
-                 for (n = 0; n < nMaps; n++) {
-+                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) {
-+                        *status_rtrn = BadLength;
-+                        return (char *) mapWire;
-+                    }
-                     if (client->swapped) {
-                         swaps(&mapWire->virtualMods);
-                         swapl(&mapWire->ctrls);
-@@ -6651,11 +6666,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-         xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *mapWire;
-         XkbSrvLedInfoPtr sli;
- 
--        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) {
--            *status_rtrn = BadLength;
--            return (char *) ledWire;
--        }
--
-         namec = mapc = statec = 0;
-         sli = XkbFindSrvLedInfo(dev, ledWire->ledClass, ledWire->ledID,
-                                 XkbXI_IndicatorMapsMask);
-@@ -6674,10 +6684,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-             memset((char *) sli->names, 0, XkbNumIndicators * sizeof(Atom));
-             for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) {
-                 if (ledWire->namesPresent & bit) {
--                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) {
--                        *status_rtrn = BadLength;
--                        return (char *) atomWire;
--                    }
-                     sli->names[n] = (Atom) *atomWire;
-                     if (sli->names[n] == None)
-                         ledWire->namesPresent &= ~bit;
-@@ -6695,10 +6701,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
-         if (ledWire->mapsPresent) {
-             for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) {
-                 if (ledWire->mapsPresent & bit) {
--                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) {
--                        *status_rtrn = BadLength;
--                        return (char *) mapWire;
--                    }
-                     sli->maps[n].flags = mapWire->flags;
-                     sli->maps[n].which_groups = mapWire->whichGroups;
-                     sli->maps[n].groups = mapWire->groups;
-@@ -6734,13 +6736,17 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
- }
- 
- static int
--_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-+_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-                   xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
- {
-     char *wire;
- 
-     wire = (char *) &stuff[1];
-     if (stuff->change & XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask) {
-+        int sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc);
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz))
-+            return BadLength;
-+
-         if (!dev->button) {
-             client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(XkbErr_BadClass, ButtonClass);
-             return XkbKeyboardErrorCode;
-@@ -6751,13 +6757,13 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-                              dev->button->numButtons);
-             return BadMatch;
-         }
--        wire += (stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc));
-+        wire += sz;
-     }
-     if (stuff->change & XkbXI_IndicatorsMask) {
-         int status = Success;
- 
-         wire = CheckSetDeviceIndicators(wire, dev, stuff->nDeviceLedFBs,
--                                        &status, client);
-+                                        &status, client, stuff);
-         if (status != Success)
-             return status;
-     }
-@@ -6768,8 +6774,8 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
- }
- 
- static int
--_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
--                       xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
-+_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-+                  xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
- {
-     char *wire;
-     xkbExtensionDeviceNotify ed;
-@@ -6793,8 +6799,6 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-         if (stuff->firstBtn + stuff->nBtns > nBtns)
-             return BadValue;
-         sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc);
--        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz))
--            return BadLength;
-         memcpy((char *) &acts[stuff->firstBtn], (char *) wire, sz);
-         wire += sz;
-         ed.reason |= XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask;
--- 
-2.36.1
-

SOURCES/0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From a515f4f4336efb8a2adf9a3ac141129708297d80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:45:35 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] xwayland/glamor: Change errors to verbose
- messages
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-On a normal startup sequence, the Xwayland glamor backend would log
-an error whenever a required Wayland protocol is missing.
-
-Those are not really errors though, more informational messages along
-the glamor backend selection process.
-
-Demote those errors to verbose messages to reduce the verbosity of
-Xwayland at startup by default.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jonas Ådahl <jadahl@gmail.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 30d0d4a19be61dd7b61f5ced992cb299e6a38068)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c | 6 ++++--
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c       | 2 +-
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c           | 6 ++++--
- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-index 93d192d58..5a20b452f 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c
-@@ -753,12 +753,14 @@ xwl_glamor_eglstream_has_wl_interfaces(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-         xwl_eglstream_get(xwl_screen);
- 
-     if (xwl_eglstream->display == NULL) {
--        ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_eglstream_display' not supported\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3,
-+                       "glamor: 'wl_eglstream_display' not supported\n");
-         return FALSE;
-     }
- 
-     if (xwl_eglstream->controller == NULL) {
--        ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_eglstream_controller' not supported\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3,
-+                       "glamor: 'wl_eglstream_controller' not supported\n");
-         return FALSE;
-     }
- 
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c
-index 466a1b052..e06b6f54b 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c
-@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ xwl_glamor_gbm_has_wl_interfaces(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-     struct xwl_gbm_private *xwl_gbm = xwl_gbm_get(xwl_screen);
- 
-     if (xwl_gbm->drm == NULL) {
--        ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_drm' not supported\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: 'wl_drm' not supported\n");
-         return FALSE;
-     }
- 
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-index deb398f91..541d5e923 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-@@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-     else
--        ErrorF("Missing Wayland requirements for glamor GBM backend\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3,
-+                       "Missing Wayland requirements for glamor GBM backend\n");
- #endif
- 
-     return FALSE;
-@@ -428,7 +429,8 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-     else
--        ErrorF("Missing Wayland requirements for glamor EGLStream backend\n");
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3,
-+                       "Missing Wayland requirements for glamor EGLStream backend\n");
- #endif
- 
-     return FALSE;
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From fe0c050276c09f43cc1ae80b4553db42398ca84c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] Xext: Fix out of bounds access in
- SProcScreenSaverSuspend()
-
-ZDI-CAN-14951, CVE-2021-4010
-
-This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-(cherry picked from commit 6c4c53010772e3cb4cb8acd54950c8eec9c00d21)
----
- Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
-index 1d7e3cadf..f813ba08d 100644
---- a/Xext/saver.c
-+++ b/Xext/saver.c
-@@ -1351,8 +1351,8 @@ SProcScreenSaverSuspend(ClientPtr client)
-     REQUEST(xScreenSaverSuspendReq);
- 
-     swaps(&stuff->length);
--    swapl(&stuff->suspend);
-     REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xScreenSaverSuspendReq);
-+    swapl(&stuff->suspend);
-     return ProcScreenSaverSuspend(client);
- }
- 
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-From f9c435822c852659e3926502829f1b13ce6efc37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/7] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
- ProcXIChangeProperty
-
-This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
-
-Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
-the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
-truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
-
-The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
-(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
-finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
-stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
-
-The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
-so let's fix that too.
-
-CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
- dix/property.c  | 3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644
---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
-     DeviceIntPtr dev;
-     unsigned long len;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     int rc;
-
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
-@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
- {
-     int rc;
-     DeviceIntPtr dev;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     unsigned long len;
-
-     REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
-diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
-index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644
---- a/dix/property.c
-+++ b/dix/property.c
-@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     WindowPtr pWin;
-     char format, mode;
-     unsigned long len;
--    int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
-+    int sizeInBytes, err;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-
-     REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
-
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch

@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
-From ee5377d94ea587f584adbc9ab8372b3842cfa149 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/9] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation
-
-The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
-be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
-a number of issues.
-
-This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
-send the device state down the wire.  This is split across multiple
-32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
-deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
-deviceValuator events.
-
-The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
-of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
-protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
-
-Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
-and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
-valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
-per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
-troughput.
-
-CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5)
----
- dix/enterleave.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
-index 17964b00a..7b7ba1098 100644
---- a/dix/enterleave.c
-+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
-@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
- 
-     ev->type = DeviceValuator;
-     ev->deviceid = dev->id;
--    ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3;
-+    ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6;
-     ev->first_valuator = first;
-     switch (ev->num_valuators) {
-+    case 6:
-+        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
-+    case 5:
-+        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
-+    case 4:
-+        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
-     case 3:
-         ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
-     case 2:
-@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
-         ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first];
-         break;
-     }
--    first += ev->num_valuators;
- }
- 
- static void
-@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
-         ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons;
-         memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4);
-     }
--    else if (k) {
-+    if (k) {
-         ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass);
-         ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code -
-             k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
-@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
-     }
- }
- 
--
-+/**
-+ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events.
-+ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32
-+ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values.
-+ *
-+ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out:
-+ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above
-+ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above
-+ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4
-+ *
-+ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS,
-+ */
- static void
- DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
- {
-+    /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify
-+     * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */
-+    deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6];
-     int evcount = 1;
--    deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
--    deviceStateNotify *ev;
--    deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
--    deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
-+    deviceStateNotify *ev = sev;
- 
-     KeyClassPtr k;
-     ButtonClassPtr b;
-@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
- 
-     if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) {
-         nbuttons = b->numButtons;
--        if (nbuttons > 32)
-+        if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
-             evcount++;
-     }
-     if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) {
-         nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
--        if (nkeys > 32)
-+        if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
-             evcount++;
--        if (nbuttons > 0) {
--            evcount++;
--        }
-     }
-     if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) {
-         nval = v->numAxes;
--
--        if (nval > 3)
--            evcount++;
--        if (nval > 6) {
--            if (!(k && b))
--                evcount++;
--            if (nval > 9)
--                evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3);
--        }
-+        /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then
-+         * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */
-+        evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6;
-     }
- 
--    ev = sev;
--    FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
--
--    if (b != NULL) {
--        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first);
--        first += 3;
--        nval -= 3;
--        if (nbuttons > 32) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++;
--            bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
--            bev->deviceid = dev->id;
--            memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
--                   DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
--        }
--        if (nval > 0) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
--            first += 3;
--            nval -= 3;
--        }
-+    BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev));
-+
-+    FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first);
-+
-+    if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) {
-+        deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev;
-+        (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
-+        bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
-+        bev->deviceid = dev->id;
-+        memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
-+               DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
-     }
- 
--    if (k != NULL) {
--        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first);
--        first += 3;
--        nval -= 3;
--        if (nkeys > 32) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++;
--            kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
--            kev->deviceid = dev->id;
--            memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
--        }
--        if (nval > 0) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
--            first += 3;
--            nval -= 3;
--        }
-+    if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) {
-+        deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev;
-+        (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
-+        kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
-+        kev->deviceid = dev->id;
-+        memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
-     }
- 
-+    first = 3;
-+    nval -= 3;
-     while (nval > 0) {
--        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first);
--        first += 3;
--        nval -= 3;
--        if (nval > 0) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
--            first += 3;
--            nval -= 3;
--        }
-+        ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
-+        FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first);
-+        first += 6;
-+        nval -= 6;
-     }
- 
-     DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch

@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-From bd134231e282d9eb126b6fdaa40bb383180fa72b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 11:11:06 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/3] xkb: add request length validation for
- XkbSetGeometry
-
-No validation of the various fields on that report were done, so a
-malicious client could send a short request that claims it had N
-sections, or rows, or keys, and the server would process the request for
-N sections, running out of bounds of the actual request data.
-
-Fix this by adding size checks to ensure our data is valid.
-
-ZDI-CAN 16062, CVE-2022-2319.
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42)
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index 36464a770..27d19793e 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5160,7 +5160,7 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
- }
- 
- static Status
--_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
-+_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req,
-                 XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client)
- {
-     char *wire;
-@@ -5171,6 +5171,9 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
-     Status status;
- 
-     dWire = (xkbDoodadWireDesc *) (*wire_inout);
-+    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, dWire, dWire + 1))
-+        return BadLength;
-+
-     any = dWire->any;
-     wire = (char *) &dWire[1];
-     if (client->swapped) {
-@@ -5273,7 +5276,7 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
- }
- 
- static Status
--_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
-+_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req,
-                  XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client)
- {
-     register int r;
-@@ -5284,6 +5287,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
- 
-     wire = *wire_inout;
-     olWire = (xkbOverlayWireDesc *) wire;
-+    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1))
-+        return BadLength;
-+
-     if (client->swapped) {
-         swapl(&olWire->name);
-     }
-@@ -5295,6 +5301,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
-         xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *kWire;
-         XkbOverlayRowPtr row;
- 
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1))
-+            return BadLength;
-+
-         if (rWire->rowUnder > section->num_rows) {
-             client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode4(0x20, r, section->num_rows,
-                                               rWire->rowUnder);
-@@ -5303,6 +5312,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
-         row = XkbAddGeomOverlayRow(ol, rWire->rowUnder, rWire->nKeys);
-         kWire = (xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1];
-         for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
-+            if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1))
-+                return BadLength;
-+
-             if (XkbAddGeomOverlayKey(ol, row,
-                                      (char *) kWire->over,
-                                      (char *) kWire->under) == NULL) {
-@@ -5336,6 +5348,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-         register int r;
-         xkbRowWireDesc *rWire;
- 
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, sWire, sWire + 1))
-+            return BadLength;
-+
-         if (client->swapped) {
-             swapl(&sWire->name);
-             swaps(&sWire->top);
-@@ -5361,6 +5376,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             XkbRowPtr row;
-             xkbKeyWireDesc *kWire;
- 
-+            if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1))
-+                return BadLength;
-+
-             if (client->swapped) {
-                 swaps(&rWire->top);
-                 swaps(&rWire->left);
-@@ -5375,6 +5393,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
-                 XkbKeyPtr key;
- 
-+                if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1))
-+                    return BadLength;
-+
-                 key = XkbAddGeomKey(row);
-                 if (!key)
-                     return BadAlloc;
-@@ -5400,7 +5421,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             register int d;
- 
-             for (d = 0; d < sWire->nDoodads; d++) {
--                status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, section, client);
-+                status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, section, client);
-                 if (status != Success)
-                     return status;
-             }
-@@ -5409,7 +5430,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             register int o;
- 
-             for (o = 0; o < sWire->nOverlays; o++) {
--                status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, geom, section, client);
-+                status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, req, geom, section, client);
-                 if (status != Success)
-                     return status;
-             }
-@@ -5443,6 +5464,9 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-             xkbOutlineWireDesc *olWire;
-             XkbOutlinePtr ol;
- 
-+            if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, shapeWire, shapeWire + 1))
-+                return BadLength;
-+
-             shape =
-                 XkbAddGeomShape(geom, shapeWire->name, shapeWire->nOutlines);
-             if (!shape)
-@@ -5453,12 +5477,18 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
-                 XkbPointPtr pt;
-                 xkbPointWireDesc *ptWire;
- 
-+                if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1))
-+                    return BadLength;
-+
-                 ol = XkbAddGeomOutline(shape, olWire->nPoints);
-                 if (!ol)
-                     return BadAlloc;
-                 ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius;
-                 ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1];
-                 for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) {
-+                    if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, ptWire, ptWire + 1))
-+                        return BadLength;
-+
-                     pt->x = ptWire->x;
-                     pt->y = ptWire->y;
-                     if (client->swapped) {
-@@ -5564,12 +5594,15 @@ _CheckSetGeom(XkbGeometryPtr geom, xkbSetGeometryReq * req, ClientPtr client)
-         return status;
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < req->nDoodads; i++) {
--        status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, NULL, client);
-+        status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, NULL, client);
-         if (status != Success)
-             return status;
-     }
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < req->nKeyAliases; i++) {
-+        if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, wire, wire + XkbKeyNameLength))
-+                return BadLength;
-+
-         if (XkbAddGeomKeyAlias(geom, &wire[XkbKeyNameLength], wire) == NULL)
-             return BadAlloc;
-         wire += 2 * XkbKeyNameLength;
--- 
-2.36.1
-

SOURCES/0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 3206e133cb768709d32f260ac4b1bb17a46141a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 13:09:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] xwayland/glamor: Log backend selected for debug
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Add (verbose) statements to trace the actual backend used with glamor.
-
-That can be useful for debugging.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit c5d1fed9fa32244739677ec5c58ea87b261e023b)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-index 541d5e923..b34eafabb 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-     if (xwl_screen->gbm_backend.is_available &&
-         xwl_glamor_has_wl_interfaces(xwl_screen, &xwl_screen->gbm_backend)) {
-         xwl_screen->egl_backend = &xwl_screen->gbm_backend;
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: Using GBM backend\n");
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-     else
-@@ -426,6 +427,7 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
-     if (xwl_screen->eglstream_backend.is_available &&
-         xwl_glamor_has_wl_interfaces(xwl_screen, &xwl_screen->eglstream_backend)) {
-         xwl_screen->egl_backend = &xwl_screen->eglstream_backend;
-+        LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: Using EGLStream backend\n");
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-     else
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From 0dab0b527ac5c4fe0272ea679522bd87238a733b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/7] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
-
-The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
-255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
-to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
-anyway.
-
-This fixes an OOB write:
-
-ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
-temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
-For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
-stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
-representing stuff->detail cleared.
-
-However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
-thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
-
-CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-index 65d5870f6f..89a591098a 100644
---- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-         return BadValue;
-     }
-
-+    /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
-+     * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
-+     * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
-+    if (stuff->detail > 255)
-+        return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
-+
-     if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
-                                stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
-         return BadValue;
-@@ -313,6 +319,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-         return BadValue;
-     }
-
-+    /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
-+    if (stuff->detail > 255) {
-+        client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
-+        return BadValue;
-+    }
-+
-     rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
-     if (rc != Success)
-         return rc;
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 1c22e4a35e71d98a082ad2f8f7bc778a8859e18d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/9] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the
- number of buttons
-
-There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
-from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
-device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
-
-Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
-don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
-with more than this number of buttons anyway.
-
-CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74)
----
- Xi/exevents.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
-index 54ea11a93..e16171468 100644
---- a/Xi/exevents.c
-+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
-@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
-                 to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec));
-                 if (!to->button)
-                     FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n");
-+                to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons;
-             }
-             else
-                 classes->button = NULL;
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From 59c977bff66de77bd93ce8853e33e1b4ca661a49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:03 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] render: Fix out of bounds access in
- SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs()
-
-ZDI-CAN-14192, CVE-2021-4008
-
-This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
-(cherry picked from commit ebce7e2d80e7c80e1dda60f2f0bc886f1106ba60)
----
- render/render.c | 9 +++++++++
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
-index c376090ca..456f156d4 100644
---- a/render/render.c
-+++ b/render/render.c
-@@ -2309,6 +2309,9 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
- 
-         i = elt->len;
-         if (i == 0xff) {
-+            if (buffer + 4 > end) {
-+                return BadLength;
-+            }
-             swapl((int *) buffer);
-             buffer += 4;
-         }
-@@ -2319,12 +2322,18 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
-                 buffer += i;
-                 break;
-             case 2:
-+                if (buffer + i * 2 > end) {
-+                    return BadLength;
-+                }
-                 while (i--) {
-                     swaps((short *) buffer);
-                     buffer += 2;
-                 }
-                 break;
-             case 4:
-+                if (buffer + i * 4 > end) {
-+                    return BadLength;
-+                }
-                 while (i--) {
-                     swapl((int *) buffer);
-                     buffer += 4;
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From bdc00ba749ac6cde35c025f5f6b1a5b49c1f4960 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 09:56:52 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] xwayland/eglstream: Prefer EGLstream if available
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Currently, when given the choice, Xwayland will pick the GBM backend
-over the EGLstream backend if both are available, unless the command
-line option “-eglstream” is specified.
-
-The NVIDIA proprietary driver had no support for GBM until driver series
-495, but starting with the driver series 495, both can be used.
-
-But there are other requirements with the rest of the stack, typically
-Mesa, egl-wayland, libglvnd as documented in the NVIDIA driver.
-
-So if the NVIDIA driver series 495 gets installed, Xwayland will pick
-the GBM backend even if EGLstream is available and may fail to render
-properly.
-
-To avoid that issue, prefer EGLstream if EGLstream and all the Wayland
-interfaces are available, and fallback to GBM automatically unless
-“-eglstream” was specified.
-
-With this, the compositor, given the choice, can decide which actual
-backend Xwayland would use by advertising (or not) the Wayland
-"wl_eglstream_controller" interface.
-
-This change has no impact on compositors which do not have support for
-EGLstream in the first place.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 6dd9709bd85cf5de4067887818c864220b951355)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c | 8 ++------
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-index b34eafabb..f46b677f5 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c
-@@ -441,14 +441,10 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
- void
- xwl_glamor_select_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen, Bool use_eglstream)
- {
--    if (use_eglstream) {
--        if (!xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen))
-+    if (!xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen)) {
-+        if (!use_eglstream)
-             xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(xwl_screen);
-     }
--    else {
--        if (!xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(xwl_screen))
--            xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen);
--    }
- }
- 
- Bool
--- 
-2.33.1
-

SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 94f6fe99d87cf6ba0adadd95c595158c345b7d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/7] Xext: free the screen saver resource when
- replacing it
-
-This fixes a use-after-free bug:
-
-When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
-ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
-resources.
-
-When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
-struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
-old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
-
-Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
-ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
-
-Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
-
-CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
-index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644
---- a/Xext/saver.c
-+++ b/Xext/saver.c
-@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
-         pVlist++;
-     }
-     if (pPriv->attr)
--        FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
-+        FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
-     pPriv->attr = pAttr;
-     pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
-     if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-From 7efd09cdb13ae1a4100f68a11947afe581fa1ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/9] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing
- master devices
-
-The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
-to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
-
-If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
-ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
-two info structures being written to `info`.
-
-Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
-times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
-
-To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
-device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
-thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
-optionally slave attached/detached).
-
-CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1)
----
- Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
-index d2d985848..72d00451e 100644
---- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
-+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
-@@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-     size_t len;			/* length of data remaining in request */
-     int rc = Success;
-     int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
-+    enum {
-+        NO_CHANGE,
-+        FLUSH,
-+        CHANGED,
-+    } changes = NO_CHANGE;
- 
-     REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
-@@ -465,8 +470,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-             rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
-             if (rc != Success)
-                 goto unwind;
--        }
-+            changes = FLUSH;
-             break;
-+        }
-         case XIRemoveMaster:
-         {
-             xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
-@@ -475,8 +481,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-             rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
-             if (rc != Success)
-                 goto unwind;
--        }
-+            changes = FLUSH;
-             break;
-+        }
-         case XIDetachSlave:
-         {
-             xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
-@@ -485,8 +492,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-             rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
-             if (rc != Success)
-                 goto unwind;
--        }
-+            changes = CHANGED;
-             break;
-+        }
-         case XIAttachSlave:
-         {
-             xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
-@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-             rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
-             if (rc != Success)
-                 goto unwind;
-+            changes = CHANGED;
-+            break;
-         }
-+        default:
-             break;
-         }
- 
-+        if (changes == FLUSH) {
-+            XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
-+            memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags));
-+            changes = NO_CHANGE;
-+        }
-+
-         len -= any->length * 4;
-         any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
-     }
- 
-  unwind:
--
--    XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
-+    if (changes != NO_CHANGE)
-+        XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
-     return rc;
- }
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From a42635ee3c01f71a49052d83a372933504c9db04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/7] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off
- from the same client
-
-This fixes a use-after-free bug:
-
-When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
-TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
-is added twice to the resources:
-  - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
-    drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
-  - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
-
-The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
-client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
-all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
-the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
-and free the whole list.
-
-However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
-same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
-existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
-client's resources.
-
-If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
-- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
-for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
-
-Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
-a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
-
-Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
-setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
-resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
-again when the client quits.
-
-Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
-clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
-
-CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
-index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644
---- a/Xext/xvmain.c
-+++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
-@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
-         tpn = pn;
-         while (tpn) {
-             if (tpn->client == client) {
--                if (!onoff)
-+                if (!onoff) {
-                     tpn->client = NULL;
-+                    FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
-+                }
-                 return Success;
-             }
-             if (!tpn->client)
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From 01cd3a72858ccc1afb0b42ace92263f2912619a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/9] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during
- recursion
-
-The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
-is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
-list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
-
-However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
-call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
-removed device.
-
-This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
-devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
-overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
-
-Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
-`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
-previous device after the recursion.
-
-CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b)
----
- dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
-index 8fe4a341c..f3db37203 100644
---- a/dix/devices.c
-+++ b/dix/devices.c
-@@ -453,14 +453,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
- {
-     DeviceIntPtr *prev, other;
-     BOOL enabled;
-+    BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE;
-     int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
- 
-     if (!dev->enabled)
-         return TRUE;
- 
--    for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
--         *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
--    if (*prev != dev)
-+    for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
-+        if (other == dev) {
-+            dev_in_devices_list = TRUE;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    if (!dev_in_devices_list)
-         return FALSE;
- 
-     TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev);
-@@ -511,6 +517,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
-     LeaveWindow(dev);
-     SetFocusOut(dev);
- 
-+    for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
-+         *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
-+
-     *prev = dev->next;
-     dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices;
-     inputInfo.off_devices = dev;
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From 42f8d1828b4fc1e0b8165a767a0b74edcdbf3806 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/9] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled
- slaved devices too
-
-Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
-to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
-reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
-memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
-device.
-
-And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
-CloseDownDevices().
-
-Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
-
-(cherry picked from commit 26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8)
----
- dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
-index f3db37203..95190b5b7 100644
---- a/dix/devices.c
-+++ b/dix/devices.c
-@@ -483,6 +483,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
-                 flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
-             }
-         }
-+
-+        for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) {
-+            if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) {
-+                AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL);
-+                flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
-+            }
-+        }
-     }
-     else {
-         for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
-@@ -1080,6 +1087,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void)
-             dev->master = NULL;
-     }
- 
-+    for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
-+        if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev))
-+            dev->master = NULL;
-+    }
-+
-     CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices);
-     CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices);
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 774260dbae1fa505cd2848c786baed9a8db5179d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/7] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after
- freeing it
-
-Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
-reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
-already freed memory.
-
-CVE-2022-46283, ZDI-CAN-19530
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
----
- xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644
---- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
-         }
-         else {
-             free(dst->names->radio_groups);
-+            dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
-         }
-         dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
-
---
-2.38.1

SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From bb1711b7fba42f2a0c7d1c09beee241a1b2bcc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 10:06:45 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xext: fix invalid event type mask in
- XTestSwapFakeInput
-
-In commit b320ca0 the mask was inadvertently changed from octal 0177 to
-hexadecimal 0x177.
-
-Fixes commit b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63
-  Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
-
-Found by Stuart Cassoff
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- Xext/xtest.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
-index 2985a4ce6e..dde5c4cf9d 100644
---- a/Xext/xtest.c
-+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
-@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
- 
-     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
-     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
--        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
-+        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0177;
-         /* Swap event */
-         proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
-         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
--- 
-2.38.1
-

SOURCES/0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 4093057b98bc5a178f130c9ba6b0b28385e24ae5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 12:09:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 8/9] glx: Call XACE hooks on the GLX buffer
-
-The XSELINUX code will label resources at creation by checking the
-access mode. When the access mode is DixCreateAccess, it will call the
-function to label the new resource SELinuxLabelResource().
-
-However, GLX buffers do not go through the XACE hooks when created,
-hence leaving the resource actually unlabeled.
-
-When, later, the client tries to create another resource using that
-drawable (like a GC for example), the XSELINUX code would try to use
-the security ID of that object which has never been labeled, get a NULL
-pointer and crash when checking whether the requested permissions are
-granted for subject security ID.
-
-To avoid the issue, make sure to call the XACE hooks when creating the
-GLX buffers.
-
-Credit goes to Donn Seeley <donn@xmission.com> for providing the patch.
-
-CVE-2024-0408
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3)
----
- glx/glxcmds.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c
-index fc26a2e34..1e46d0c72 100644
---- a/glx/glxcmds.c
-+++ b/glx/glxcmds.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- #include "indirect_util.h"
- #include "protocol-versions.h"
- #include "glxvndabi.h"
-+#include "xace.h"
- 
- static char GLXServerVendorName[] = "SGI";
- 
-@@ -1392,6 +1393,13 @@ DoCreatePbuffer(ClientPtr client, int screenNum, XID fbconfigId,
-     if (!pPixmap)
-         return BadAlloc;
- 
-+    err = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, glxDrawableId, RT_PIXMAP,
-+                   pPixmap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
-+    if (err != Success) {
-+        (*pGlxScreen->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap);
-+        return err;
-+    }
-+
-     /* Assign the pixmap the same id as the pbuffer and add it as a
-      * resource so it and the DRI2 drawable will be reclaimed when the
-      * pbuffer is destroyed. */
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 51be9e767a02cdc6a524dc895dcc81abb689d50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 11:51:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 9/9] ephyr,xwayland: Use the proper private key for
- cursor
-
-The cursor in DIX is actually split in two parts, the cursor itself and
-the cursor bits, each with their own devPrivates.
-
-The cursor itself includes the cursor bits, meaning that the cursor bits
-devPrivates in within structure of the cursor.
-
-Both Xephyr and Xwayland were using the private key for the cursor bits
-to store the data for the cursor, and when using XSELINUX which comes
-with its own special devPrivates, the data stored in that cursor bits'
-devPrivates would interfere with the XSELINUX devPrivates data and the
-SELINUX security ID would point to some other unrelated data, causing a
-crash in the XSELINUX code when trying to (re)use the security ID.
-
-CVE-2024-0409
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
-index e3c1aaa50..bd94b0cfb 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
-@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static miPointerScreenFuncRec xwl_pointer_screen_funcs = {
- Bool
- xwl_screen_init_cursor(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
- {
--    if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR_BITS, 0))
-+    if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR, 0))
-         return FALSE;
- 
-     return miPointerInitialize(xwl_screen->screen,
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec

@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
-%global commit 280aac5a0ee09c45b17ec4be0681397f7c34c12e
-%global shortcommit %(c=%{commit}; echo ${c:0:7})
-
-#global gitdate 20210201
-%global pkgname %{?gitdate:xserver}%{!?gitdate:xwayland}
-
-%global default_font_path "catalogue:/etc/X11/fontpath.d,built-ins"
-
-Summary:   Xwayland
-Name:      xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
-Version:   21.1.3
-Release:   15%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
-
-URL:       http://www.x.org
-%if 0%{?gitdate}
-Source0:   https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/%{pkgname}/-/archive/%{commit}/%{pkgname}-%{shortcommit}.tar.gz
-%else
-Source0:   https://www.x.org/pub/individual/xserver/%{pkgname}-%{version}.tar.xz
-%endif
-
-Patch1: 0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch
-Patch2: 0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch
-Patch3: 0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch
-Patch4: 0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch
-Patch5: 0001-present-Send-a-PresentConfigureNotify-event-for-dest.patch
-
-# CVE-2021-4011
-Patch10001: 0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch
-# CVE-2021-4009
-Patch10002: 0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch
-# CVE-2021-4010
-Patch10003: 0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch
-# CVE-2021-4008
-Patch10004: 0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch
-# CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070
-Patch10005: 0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch
-Patch10006: 0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch
-Patch10007: 0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch
-# CVE-2022-3550
-Patch10008: 0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
-# CVE-2022-3551
-Patch10009: 0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
-# CVE-2022-46340
-Patch10018: 0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
-# related to CVE-2022-46344
-Patch10019: 0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
-# CVE-2022-46344
-Patch10020: 0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
-# CVE-2022-46341
-Patch10021: 0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
-# CVE-2022-46343
-Patch10022: 0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
-# CVE-2022-46342
-Patch10023: 0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
-# CVE-2022-4283
-Patch10024: 0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
-# Follow-up to CVE-2022-46340
-Patch10025: 0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch
-# CVE-2023-0494
-Patch10026: 0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch
-# CVE-2023-1393
-Patch10027: 0001-composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW.patch
-# CVE-2023-5367
-Patch10028: 0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch
-# CVE-2023-6478
-Patch10029: 0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch
-# CVE-2023-6377
-Patch10030: 0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
-Patch10031:   0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-Patch10032:   0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch
-Patch10033:   0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch
-Patch10034:   0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
-Patch10035:   0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
-Patch10036:   0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch
-Patch10037:   0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-0408
-Patch10038:   0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-0409
-Patch10039:   0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch
-
-License:   MIT
-
-Requires: xorg-x11-server-common
-Requires: libEGL
-Requires: libepoxy >= 1.5.5
-
-BuildRequires: gcc
-BuildRequires: git-core
-BuildRequires: meson
-
-BuildRequires: wayland-devel
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-client) >= 1.3.0
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-protocols)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-eglstream-protocols)
-
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(dmx)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(epoxy) >= 1.5.5
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fontenc)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libdrm) >= 2.4.0
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libssl)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libtirpc)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(pixman-1)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(x11)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xau)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xdmcp)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xext)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xfixes)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xfont2)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xi)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xinerama)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xkbfile)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xmu)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xorg-macros) >= 1.17
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xpm)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xrender)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xres)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xshmfence) >= 1.1
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtrans) >= 1.3.2
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtst)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xv)
-BuildRequires: xorg-x11-proto-devel >= 7.7-10
-
-BuildRequires: mesa-libGL-devel >= 9.2
-BuildRequires: mesa-libEGL-devel
-BuildRequires: mesa-libgbm-devel
-
-BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel
-BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 2.0.86-1
-
-# libunwind is Exclusive for the following arches
-%ifarch aarch64 %{arm} hppa ia64 mips ppc ppc64 %{ix86} x86_64
-%if !0%{?rhel}
-BuildRequires: libunwind-devel
-%endif
-%endif
-
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-aux)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-image)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-icccm)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-keysyms)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-renderutil)
-
-%description
-Xwayland is an X server for running X clients under Wayland.
-
-%package devel
-Summary: Development package
-Requires: pkgconfig
-
-%description devel
-The development package provides the developmental files which are
-necessary for developing Wayland compositors using Xwayland.
-
-%prep
-%autosetup -S git_am -n %{pkgname}-%{?gitdate:%{commit}}%{!?gitdate:%{version}}
-
-%build
-%meson \
-        -Dxwayland_eglstream=true \
-        -Ddefault_font_path=%{default_font_path} \
-        -Dbuilder_string="Build ID: %{name} %{version}-%{release}" \
-        -Dxkb_output_dir=%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb \
-        -Dxcsecurity=true \
-        -Dglamor=true \
-        -Ddri3=true
-
-%meson_build
-
-%install
-%meson_install
-
-# Remove unwanted files/dirs
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/Xserver.1*
-rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/xorg
-rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_includedir}/xorg
-rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/aclocal
-rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb
-
-%files
-%{_bindir}/Xwayland
-%{_mandir}/man1/Xwayland.1*
-
-%files devel
-%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
-
-%changelog
-* Tue Jan 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-15
-  Fix for CVE-2023-6816, CVE-2024-0229, CVE-2024-21885, CVE-2024-21886,
-  CVE-2024-0408, CVE-2024-0409
-
-* Wed Dec 13 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-14
-- Fix for CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478
-
-* Wed Oct 25 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-13
-- Fix for CVE-2023-5367
-
-* Tue Jun 13 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-12
-- Backport fix for a deadlock with DRI3
-  Resolves: rhbz#2212831
-
-* Fri Mar 31 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-11
-- Fix CVE-2023-1393 (#2180298)
-
-* Tue Feb  7 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-10
-- Fix CVE-2023-0494 (#2166972)
-
-* Mon Dec 19 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-9
-- Follow-up fix for CVE-2022-46340 (#2151777)
-
-* Tue Dec 13 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-8
-- CVE fix for: CVE-2022-4283 (#2151802), CVE-2022-46340 (#2151777),
-  CVE-2022-46341 (#2151782), CVE-2022-46342 (#2151785),
-  CVE-2022-46343 (#2151792), CVE-2022-46344 (#2151795)
-
-* Mon Nov 14 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> -  21.1.3-7
-- Fix CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551
-  Resolves: rhbz#2140767, rhbz#2140774
-
-* Fri Jul 29 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-6
-- CVE fix for: CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070
-  Resolves: rhbz#2110442, rhbz#2110437
-
-* Thu Jun 09 2022 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-5
-- Rebuild again for ipv6 xtrans fix
-  Related: #2075132
-
-* Tue May 24 2022 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-3
-- Rebuild for ipv6 xtrans fix
-  Related: #2075132
-
-* Fri Jan  7 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-2
-- CVE fix for: CVE-2021-4008 (#2038066), CVE-2021-4009 (#2038068),
-  CVE-2021-4010 (#2038071), CVE-2021-4011 (#2038073)
-
-* Thu Dec  2 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-1
-- Rebase to 21.1.3 (rhbz#2015842)
-- Prefer EGLstream if both EGLstream and GBM are usable
-
-* Mon Aug  9 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-6
-- Backport the latest fixes from Xwayland for EGLstream (rhbz#1977741)
-
-* Tue Jun 29 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-5
-- Require libepoxy >= 1.5.5 (rhbz#1976132)
-
-* Mon Jun 21 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-4
-- Fix a use-after-free in the previous changes for GLX
-
-* Mon Jun 14 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-3
-- Backport fixes for GLX and EGLstream (#1961981)
-
-* Thu Jun  03 2021 Tomas Pelka <tpelka@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-2
-- bump release and rebuild to correctly trigger gating
-
-* Wed Apr  14 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-1
-- xwayland 21.1.1 (CVE-2021-3472 / ZDI-CAN-1259)
-
-* Thu Mar  18 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.0-1
-- xwayland 21.1.0
-
-* Thu Mar  4 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.0.99.902-1
-- xwayland 21.0.99.902
-- Remove xdmcp, udev, udev_kms build options
-- Stop overriding the vendor name, same as xorg-x11-server
-
-* Thu Feb 18 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.0.99.901-1
-- xwayland 21.0.99.901
-
-* Mon Feb  1 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 1.20.99.1-0.1.20210201git5429791
-- Initial import (#1912335).

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+  - rhel-10
+decision_context: osci_compose_gate
+rules:
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: desktop-qe.desktop-ci.tier1-gating.functional}

sources

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA512 (xwayland-24.1.1.tar.xz) = e44f47adab3830846360fd05fdc06d9016832133c662f2e4b0763b98de0c9b48dbfce7d757ffea5538b5fabb68170e5d1057acc1b9a086e396b147deaa750998

xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+%global commit 9a55c402aa803fb10e39ab4fd18a709d0cd06fd4
+%global shortcommit %(c=%{commit}; echo ${c:0:7})
+
+#global gitdate 20230426
+%global pkgname %{?gitdate:xserver}%{!?gitdate:xwayland}
+
+%global default_font_path "catalogue:/etc/X11/fontpath.d,built-ins"
+
+Summary:   Xwayland
+Name:      xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
+Version:   24.1.1
+Release:   4%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
+
+URL:       http://www.x.org
+%if 0%{?gitdate}
+Source0:   https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/%{pkgname}/-/archive/%{commit}/%{pkgname}-%{shortcommit}.tar.gz
+%else
+Source0:   https://www.x.org/pub/individual/xserver/%{pkgname}-%{version}.tar.xz
+%endif
+
+# Fix for CVE-2024-9632
+Patch1:    0001-xkb-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-_XkbSetCompatMap.patch
+
+License:   MIT
+
+Requires: xkeyboard-config
+Requires: xkbcomp
+Requires: libEGL
+Requires: libepoxy >= 1.5.5
+
+BuildRequires: gcc
+BuildRequires: git-core
+BuildRequires: meson
+
+BuildRequires: wayland-devel
+BuildRequires: desktop-file-utils
+
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-client) >= 1.21.0
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-protocols) >= 1.34
+
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(epoxy) >= 1.5.5
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fontenc)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libdrm) >= 2.4.89
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libssl)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libtirpc)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(pixman-1)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(x11)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xau)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xdmcp)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xext)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xfixes)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xfont2)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xi)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xinerama)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xkbfile)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xmu)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xrender)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xres)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xshmfence) >= 1.1
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtrans) >= 1.3.2
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtst)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xv)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libxcvt)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libdecor-0) >= 0.1.1
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(liboeffis-1.0) >= 1.0.0
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libei-1.0) >= 1.0.0
+BuildRequires: xorg-x11-proto-devel >= 2024.1-1
+
+BuildRequires: mesa-libGL-devel >= 9.2
+BuildRequires: mesa-libEGL-devel
+BuildRequires: mesa-libgbm-devel
+
+BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel
+BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 2.0.86-1
+
+# libunwind is Exclusive for the following arches
+%ifarch aarch64 %{arm} hppa ia64 mips ppc ppc64 %{ix86} x86_64
+%if !0%{?rhel}
+BuildRequires: libunwind-devel
+%endif
+%endif
+
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-aux)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-image)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-icccm)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-keysyms)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcb-renderutil)
+
+%description
+Xwayland is an X server for running X clients under Wayland.
+
+%package devel
+Summary: Development package
+Requires: pkgconfig
+Requires: %{name}%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
+
+%description devel
+The development package provides the developmental files which are
+necessary for developing Wayland compositors using Xwayland.
+
+%prep
+%autosetup -S git_am -n %{pkgname}-%{?gitdate:%{commit}}%{!?gitdate:%{version}}
+
+%build
+%meson \
+	%{?gitdate:-Dxwayland=true -D{xorg,xnest,xvfb,udev}=false} \
+        -Ddefault_font_path=%{default_font_path} \
+        -Dbuilder_string="Build ID: %{name} %{version}-%{release}" \
+        -Dxkb_output_dir=%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb \
+        -Dserverconfigdir=%{_datadir}/xwayland \
+        -Dxcsecurity=true \
+        -Dglamor=true \
+        -Ddri3=true
+
+%meson_build
+
+%install
+%meson_install
+
+# Remove unwanted files/dirs
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/Xserver.1*
+rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_includedir}/xorg
+rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/aclocal
+
+%check
+desktop-file-validate %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/applications/*.desktop
+
+%files
+%dir %{_datadir}/xwayland
+%{_bindir}/Xwayland
+%{_mandir}/man1/Xwayland.1*
+%{_datadir}/applications/org.freedesktop.Xwayland.desktop
+%{_datadir}/xwayland/protocol.txt
+
+%files devel
+%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
+
+%changelog
+* Thu Nov  7 2024  Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 24.1.1-4
+- Remove unneeded build dependencies on xorg-x11-util-macros and libXpm
+- Remove unneeded build dependency on wayland-eglstream-protocols (RHEL-66317)
+
+* Wed Oct 30 2024  Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 24.1.1-3
+- Fix for CVE-2024-9632 - (RHEL-61994)
+
+* Tue Oct 29 2024 Troy Dawson <tdawson@redhat.com> - 24.1.1-2
+- Bump release for October 2024 mass rebuild:
+  Resolves: RHEL-64018
+
+* Wed Jul 10 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 24.1.1-1
+- xwayland 24.1.1 (RHEL-45260)
+
+* Mon Jun 24 2024 Troy Dawson <tdawson@redhat.com> - 24.1.0-2
+- Bump release for June 2024 mass rebuild
+
+* Wed May 15 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 24.1.0-1
+- xwayland 24.1.0 (RHEL-29911)
+
+* Thu Apr  4 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.2.4-4
+- CVE fix for: CVE-2024-31080, CVE-2024-31081, CVE-2024-31083
+
+* Mon Jan 29 2024 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 23.2.4-3
+- Fix C compatibility issue on i686
+
+* Sat Jan 27 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 23.2.4-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jan 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.2.4-1
+- xwayland 23.2.4 - (#2254280)
+  CVE fix for: CVE-2023-6816, CVE-2024-0229, CVE-2024-21885, CVE-2024-21886,
+  CVE-2024-0408, CVE-2024-0409
+
+* Wed Dec 13 2023 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 23.2.3-1
+- xwayland 23.2.3 
+  CVE fix for: CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478
+
+* Fri Nov 24 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.2.2-2
+- Drop dependency on xorg-x11-server-common
+
+* Thu Oct 26 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.2.2-1
+- xwayland 23.2.2 - (#2246029)
+
+* Wed Oct 25 2023 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 23.2.1-2
+- Fix for CVE-2023-5367
+
+* Wed Sep 20 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.2.1-1
+- xwayland 23.2.1 - (#2239813)
+
+* Mon Sep 11 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.2.0-2
+- migrated to SPDX license
+
+* Wed Aug 16 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.2.0-1
+- xwayland 23.2.0
+
+* Wed Aug  2 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.1.99.902-1
+- xwayland 23.1.99.902 (xwayland 23.2.0 rc2)
+
+* Mon Jul 31 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.1.99.901-2
+- Fix devel package requires.
+
+* Wed Jul 19 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.1.99.901-1
+- xwayland 23.1.99.901 (xwayland 23.2.0 rc1)
+
+* Tue Jun  6 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.1.2-1
+- xwayland 23.1.2
+
+* Thu Apr 27 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.1.1-2
+- Fix spec file to build from git upstream - (#2190211)
+
+* Wed Mar 29 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.1.1-1
+- xwayland 23.1.1 - (#2182734)
+  CVE fix for: CVE-2023-1393
+
+* Wed Mar 22 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.1.0-1
+- xwayland 23.1.0 - (#2180913)
+
+* Thu Mar  9 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.0.99.902-1
+- xwayland 23.0.99.902 (xwayland 23.1.0 rc2) - (#2172415, #2173201)
+
+* Wed Feb 22 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.0.99.901-1
+- xwayland 23.0.99.901 (xwayland 23.1.0 rc1) - (#2172415)
+
+* Tue Feb  7 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.8-1
+- xwayland 22.1.8
+  Fixes CVE-2023-0494 (#2165995, #2167566, #2167734)
+
+* Sun Jan 29 2023 Stefan Bluhm <stefan.bluhm@clacee.eu> - 22.1.7-4
+- Updated conditional Fedora statement.
+
+* Thu Jan 19 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.7-3
+- Use the recommended way to apply conditional patches without
+  conditionalizing the sources (for byte-swapped clients).
+
+* Tue Jan 17 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.7-2
+- Disallow byte-swapped clients on Fedora 38 and above (#2159489)
+
+* Mon Dec 19 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.7-1
+- xwayland 22.1.7
+
+* Wed Dec 14 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 22.1.6-1
+- xwayland 22.1.6
+  Fixes CVE-2022-46340, CVE-2022-46341, CVE-2022-46342, CVE-2022-46343,
+  CVE-2022-46344, CVE-2022-4283
+
+* Wed Nov  2 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.5-1
+- xwayland 22.1.5 (#2139387)
+
+* Thu Oct 20 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.4-1
+- xwayland 22.1.4 (#2136518)
+
+* Sat Jul 23 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 22.1.3-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jul 12 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.3-1
+- xwayland 22.1.3 - (#2106387)
+  Fix CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070
+
+* Wed May 25 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.2-1
+- xwayland 22.1.2 - (#2090172)
+
+* Thu Mar 31 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.1-1
+- xwayland 22.1.1 - (#2070435)
+
+* Wed Feb 16 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.1.0
+- xwayland 22.1.0 - (#2055270)
+
+* Wed Feb  2 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.0.99.902
+- xwayland 22.0.99.902 (xwayland 22.1.0 rc2) - (#2042521)
+
+* Tue Jan 25 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 22.0.99.901
+- xwayland 22.0.99.901 (xwayland 22.1.0 rc1) - (#2042521)
+
+* Sat Jan 22 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 21.1.4-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Dec 14 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.4
+- xwayland 21.1.4
+
+* Mon Nov  8 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3
+- xwayland 21.1.3 - (#2016468)
+
+* Thu Oct 21 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.2.901-1
+- xwayland 21.1.2.901 (aka 21.1.3 RC1) - (#2015413)
+
+* Tue Sep 14 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 21.1.2-3
+- Rebuilt with OpenSSL 3.0.0
+
+* Fri Jul 23 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 21.1.2-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_35_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jul 9 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.2-1
+- xwayland 21.1.2
+
+* Thu Jul 1 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1.901-1
+- xwayland 21.1.1.901
+
+* Mon Jun 21 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-3
+- Fix a use-after-free in the previous changes for GLX
+
+* Thu Jun 10 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-2
+- Backport fixes for GLX and EGLstream (#1948003)
+
+* Wed Apr  14 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.1-1
+- xwayland 21.1.1 (CVE-2021-3472 / ZDI-CAN-1259)
+
+* Thu Mar  18 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.0-1
+- xwayland 21.1.0
+
+* Thu Mar  4 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.0.99.902-1
+- xwayland 21.0.99.902
+- Remove xdmcp, udev, udev_kms build options
+- Stop overriding the vendor name, same as xorg-x11-server
+
+* Thu Feb 18 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.0.99.901-1
+- xwayland 21.0.99.901
+
+* Mon Feb  1 2021 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 1.20.99.1-0.1.20210201git5429791
+- Initial import (#1912335).