From e4149436b88989cfd1ecc7ba02c95f66b9a767e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olivier Fourdan Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2023 10:39:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478 Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-18323 Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-18328 --- ...te-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch | 77 +++++++++++++++++++ ...ger-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch | 61 +++++++++++++++ xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec | 12 ++- 3 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch create mode 100644 0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch diff --git a/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch b/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..111f095 --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 19e9f199950aaa4b9b7696936d1b067475da999c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons + +button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all +our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating +insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in +XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with, +leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies. + +CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd) +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------ + dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c +index dcd4efb3b..54ea11a93 100644 +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ b/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + } + + if (from->button->xkb_acts) { +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) { +- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction)); +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) +- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n"); +- } ++ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons); ++ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts, +- sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + } + else { + free(to->button->xkb_acts); +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index 7150734a5..20fef1692 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -2530,6 +2530,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + + if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) { + int i; ++ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons; ++ + DeviceChangedEvent event = { + .header = ET_Internal, + .type = ET_DeviceChanged, +@@ -2540,6 +2542,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + }; + + master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons; ++ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) { ++ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons], ++ 0, ++ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ } + + memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons * + sizeof(Atom)); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch b/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..430ead8 --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From aaf854fb25541380cc38a221c15f0e8372f48872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of + ProcRRChange*Property + +Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty. +See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core +protocol and XI. + +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. + +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With +the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. + +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least +stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB. + +CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632) +--- + randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +- + randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index 25469f57b..c4fef8a1f 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq); +diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +index b79c17f9b..90c5a9a93 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec b/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec index 82af6b8..4d70344 100644 --- a/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec +++ b/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Summary: Xwayland Name: xorg-x11-server-Xwayland Version: 21.1.3 -Release: 13%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist} +Release: 14%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist} URL: http://www.x.org %if 0%{?gitdate} @@ -61,8 +61,11 @@ Patch10026: 0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch # CVE-2023-1393 Patch10027: 0001-composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW.patch # CVE-2023-5367 -Patch10028: 0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch - +Patch10028: 0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch +# CVE-2023-6478 +Patch10029: 0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch +# CVE-2023-6377 +Patch10030: 0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch License: MIT @@ -170,6 +173,9 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc %changelog +* Wed Dec 13 2023 Olivier Fourdan - 21.1.3-14 +- Fix for CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478 + * Wed Oct 25 2023 Olivier Fourdan - 21.1.3-13 - Fix for CVE-2023-5367