import xorg-x11-server-Xwayland-21.1.3-10.el8
This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources
Stepan Oksanichenko
parent
df8ce985b8
commit
d43c7c6d4d
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
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From 8660dd164882ce5fc1f274427e2ff3dc020d6273 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 11:41:40 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: fix potential use-after-free in
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DeepCopyPointerClasses
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CVE-2023-0494, ZDI-CAN-19596
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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(cherry picked from commit 0ba6d8c37071131a49790243cdac55392ecf71ec)
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---
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Xi/exevents.c | 4 +++-
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
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index 217baa956..dcd4efb3b 100644
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--- a/Xi/exevents.c
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+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
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@@ -619,8 +619,10 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
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memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
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sizeof(XkbAction));
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}
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- else
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+ else {
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free(to->button->xkb_acts);
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+ to->button->xkb_acts = NULL;
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+ }
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memcpy(to->button->labels, from->button->labels,
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from->button->numButtons * sizeof(Atom));
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--
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2.39.1
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
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From 8dba686dc277d6d262ad0c77b4632a5b276697ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/7] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in
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XTestSwapFakeInput
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XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
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sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
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However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
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so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
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misparsed.
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Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
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xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
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swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
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Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
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Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
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doesn't support GenericEvent.
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CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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---
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Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
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index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644
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--- a/Xext/xtest.c
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+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
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@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
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nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
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for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
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+ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
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/* Swap event */
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- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
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+ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
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/* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
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- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
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+ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
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client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
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return BadValue;
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}
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--
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2.38.1
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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
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From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
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GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
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fail somewhere.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
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1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
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index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644
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--- a/xkb/xkb.c
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+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
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@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
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xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
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status = Success;
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str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
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- if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status)) /* keymap, unsupported */
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- return BadMatch;
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+ {
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+ char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); /* keymap, unsupported */
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+ if (keymap) {
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+ free(keymap);
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+ return BadMatch;
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+ }
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+ }
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names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
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names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
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names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
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names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
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names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
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- if (status != Success)
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+ if (status == Success) {
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+ len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
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+ if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
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+ status = BadLength;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (status != Success) {
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+ free(names.keycodes);
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+ free(names.types);
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+ free(names.compat);
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+ free(names.symbols);
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+ free(names.geometry);
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return status;
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- len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
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- if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
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- return BadLength;
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+ }
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CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
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CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
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--
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2.38.1
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length
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attacks
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GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
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request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
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field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
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swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
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index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
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--- a/xkb/xkb.c
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+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
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@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
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CARD16 len;
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wire = *wire_inout;
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+
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+ if (client->req_len <
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+ bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
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+ return BadValue;
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+
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len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
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if (client->swapped) {
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swaps(&len);
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--
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2.38.1
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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
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From c5ff57676698f19ed3a1402aef58a15552e32d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/7] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if
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verification failed
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Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the
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property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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---
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Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644
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--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
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+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
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rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
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stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits);
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+ if (rc != Success)
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+ return rc;
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len = stuff->nUnits;
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if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq))))
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@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
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rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
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stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items);
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+ if (rc != Success)
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+ return rc;
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+
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len = stuff->num_items;
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if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq)))
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return BadLength;
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--
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2.38.1
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@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
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From f9c435822c852659e3926502829f1b13ce6efc37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/7] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
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ProcXIChangeProperty
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This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
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Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
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the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
|
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truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
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The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
|
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(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
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finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
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stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
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The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
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so let's fix that too.
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|
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CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405
|
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|
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
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|
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
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Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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---
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Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
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dix/property.c | 3 ++-
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2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
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diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
|
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index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644
|
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--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
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+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
|
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@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
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REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
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DeviceIntPtr dev;
|
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unsigned long len;
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- int totalSize;
|
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
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int rc;
|
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|
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REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
|
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@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
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{
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int rc;
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DeviceIntPtr dev;
|
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- int totalSize;
|
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
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unsigned long len;
|
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|
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REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
|
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diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
|
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index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644
|
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--- a/dix/property.c
|
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+++ b/dix/property.c
|
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@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
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WindowPtr pWin;
|
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char format, mode;
|
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unsigned long len;
|
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- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
|
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+ int sizeInBytes, err;
|
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
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|
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REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
|
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|
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--
|
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2.38.1
|
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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
|
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From 0dab0b527ac5c4fe0272ea679522bd87238a733b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
|
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/7] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
|
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|
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The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
|
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255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
|
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to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
|
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anyway.
|
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|
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This fixes an OOB write:
|
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|
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ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
|
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temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
|
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For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
|
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stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
|
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representing stuff->detail cleared.
|
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|
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However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
|
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thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
|
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|
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CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381
|
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|
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
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|
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
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Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
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---
|
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Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 12 ++++++++++++
|
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
|
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|
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diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
|
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index 65d5870f6f..89a591098a 100644
|
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--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
|
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+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
|
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@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
|
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return BadValue;
|
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}
|
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|
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+ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
|
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+ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
|
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+ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
|
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+ if (stuff->detail > 255)
|
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+ return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
|
||||
stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
|
||||
return BadValue;
|
||||
@@ -313,6 +319,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
return BadValue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
|
||||
+ if (stuff->detail > 255) {
|
||||
+ client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.38.1
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
||||
From 94f6fe99d87cf6ba0adadd95c595158c345b7d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/7] Xext: free the screen saver resource when
|
||||
replacing it
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes a use-after-free bug:
|
||||
|
||||
When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
|
||||
ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
|
||||
resources.
|
||||
|
||||
When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
|
||||
struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
|
||||
old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
|
||||
|
||||
Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
|
||||
ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
|
||||
index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xext/saver.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xext/saver.c
|
||||
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
pVlist++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (pPriv->attr)
|
||||
- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
|
||||
+ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
|
||||
pPriv->attr = pAttr;
|
||||
pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
|
||||
if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.38.1
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
||||
From a42635ee3c01f71a49052d83a372933504c9db04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/7] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off
|
||||
from the same client
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes a use-after-free bug:
|
||||
|
||||
When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
|
||||
TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
|
||||
is added twice to the resources:
|
||||
- as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
|
||||
drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
|
||||
- as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
|
||||
|
||||
The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
|
||||
client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
|
||||
all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
|
||||
the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
|
||||
and free the whole list.
|
||||
|
||||
However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
|
||||
same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
|
||||
existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
|
||||
client's resources.
|
||||
|
||||
If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
|
||||
XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
|
||||
- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
|
||||
for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
|
||||
|
||||
Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
|
||||
XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
|
||||
a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
|
||||
setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
|
||||
resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
|
||||
again when the client quits.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
|
||||
XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
|
||||
clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
|
||||
index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xext/xvmain.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
|
||||
@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
|
||||
tpn = pn;
|
||||
while (tpn) {
|
||||
if (tpn->client == client) {
|
||||
- if (!onoff)
|
||||
+ if (!onoff) {
|
||||
tpn->client = NULL;
|
||||
+ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
return Success;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!tpn->client)
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.38.1
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
From 774260dbae1fa505cd2848c786baed9a8db5179d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/7] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after
|
||||
freeing it
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
|
||||
reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
|
||||
already freed memory.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2022-46283, ZDI-CAN-19530
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
|
||||
index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644
|
||||
--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
|
||||
+++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
|
||||
@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
free(dst->names->radio_groups);
|
||||
+ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.38.1
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
From bb1711b7fba42f2a0c7d1c09beee241a1b2bcc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 10:06:45 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xext: fix invalid event type mask in
|
||||
XTestSwapFakeInput
|
||||
|
||||
In commit b320ca0 the mask was inadvertently changed from octal 0177 to
|
||||
hexadecimal 0x177.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes commit b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63
|
||||
Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
|
||||
|
||||
Found by Stuart Cassoff
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xext/xtest.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
|
||||
index 2985a4ce6e..dde5c4cf9d 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xext/xtest.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
|
||||
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
|
||||
|
||||
nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
|
||||
for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
|
||||
- int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
|
||||
+ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0177;
|
||||
/* Swap event */
|
||||
proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
|
||||
/* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.38.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
|
||||
Summary: Xwayland
|
||||
Name: xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
|
||||
Version: 21.1.3
|
||||
Release: 6%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
|
||||
Release: 10%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
|
||||
|
||||
URL: http://www.x.org
|
||||
%if 0%{?gitdate}
|
||||
@ -35,6 +35,28 @@ Patch10004: 0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch
|
||||
Patch10005: 0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch
|
||||
Patch10006: 0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch
|
||||
Patch10007: 0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2022-3550
|
||||
Patch10008: 0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2022-3551
|
||||
Patch10009: 0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2022-46340
|
||||
Patch10018: 0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
|
||||
# related to CVE-2022-46344
|
||||
Patch10019: 0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2022-46344
|
||||
Patch10020: 0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2022-46341
|
||||
Patch10021: 0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2022-46343
|
||||
Patch10022: 0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2022-46342
|
||||
Patch10023: 0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2022-4283
|
||||
Patch10024: 0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
|
||||
# Follow-up to CVE-2022-46340
|
||||
Patch10025: 0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2023-0494
|
||||
Patch10026: 0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch
|
||||
|
||||
License: MIT
|
||||
|
||||
@ -142,6 +164,21 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb
|
||||
%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Tue Feb 7 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-10
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2023-0494 (#2166972)
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Dec 19 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-9
|
||||
- Follow-up fix for CVE-2022-46340 (#2151777)
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Dec 13 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-8
|
||||
- CVE fix for: CVE-2022-4283 (#2151802), CVE-2022-46340 (#2151777),
|
||||
CVE-2022-46341 (#2151782), CVE-2022-46342 (#2151785),
|
||||
CVE-2022-46343 (#2151792), CVE-2022-46344 (#2151795)
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Nov 14 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-7
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551
|
||||
Resolves: rhbz#2140767, rhbz#2140774
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 29 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-6
|
||||
- CVE fix for: CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070
|
||||
Resolves: rhbz#2110442, rhbz#2110437
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user