import xorg-x11-server-Xwayland-21.1.3-10.el8

SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 8660dd164882ce5fc1f274427e2ff3dc020d6273 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 11:41:40 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: fix potential use-after-free in
+ DeepCopyPointerClasses
+
+CVE-2023-0494, ZDI-CAN-19596
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+(cherry picked from commit 0ba6d8c37071131a49790243cdac55392ecf71ec)
+---
+ Xi/exevents.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
+index 217baa956..dcd4efb3b 100644
+--- a/Xi/exevents.c
++++ b/Xi/exevents.c
+@@ -619,8 +619,10 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
+             memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
+                    sizeof(XkbAction));
+         }
+-        else
++        else {
+             free(to->button->xkb_acts);
++            to->button->xkb_acts = NULL;
++        }
+ 
+         memcpy(to->button->labels, from->button->labels,
+                from->button->numButtons * sizeof(Atom));
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 8dba686dc277d6d262ad0c77b4632a5b276697ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/7] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in
+ XTestSwapFakeInput
+
+XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
+sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
+However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
+so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
+misparsed.
+
+Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
+xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
+swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
+
+Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
+Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
+doesn't support GenericEvent.
+
+CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
+index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644
+--- a/Xext/xtest.c
++++ b/Xext/xtest.c
+@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
+
+     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
+     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
++        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
+         /* Swap event */
+-        proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
++        proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
+         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
+-        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
++        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
+             client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
+             return BadValue;
+         }
+--
+2.38.1

SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
+
+GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
+fail somewhere.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
+     xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
+     status = Success;
+     str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
+-    if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status))  /* keymap, unsupported */
+-        return BadMatch;
++    {
++        char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);  /* keymap, unsupported */
++        if (keymap) {
++            free(keymap);
++            return BadMatch;
++        }
++    }
+     names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+-    if (status != Success)
++    if (status == Success) {
++        len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
++        if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
++            status = BadLength;
++    }
++
++    if (status != Success) {
++        free(names.keycodes);
++        free(names.types);
++        free(names.compat);
++        free(names.symbols);
++        free(names.geometry);
+         return status;
+-    len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
+-    if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
+-        return BadLength;
++    }
+ 
+     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length
+ attacks
+
+GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
+request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
+field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
+swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
+     CARD16 len;
+ 
+     wire = *wire_inout;
++
++    if (client->req_len <
++        bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
++        return BadValue;
++
+     len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
+     if (client->swapped) {
+         swaps(&len);
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From c5ff57676698f19ed3a1402aef58a15552e32d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/7] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if
+ verification failed
+
+Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the
+property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
+
+     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
+                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits);
++    if (rc != Success)
++        return rc;
+
+     len = stuff->nUnits;
+     if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq))))
+@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+
+     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
+                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items);
++    if (rc != Success)
++        return rc;
++
+     len = stuff->num_items;
+     if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq)))
+         return BadLength;
+--
+2.38.1

SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From f9c435822c852659e3926502829f1b13ce6efc37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/7] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
+ ProcXIChangeProperty
+
+This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
+
+Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
+the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
+truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
+
+The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
+(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
+finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
+stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
+
+The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
+so let's fix that too.
+
+CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
+ dix/property.c  | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+     unsigned long len;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int rc;
+
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
+@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+ {
+     int rc;
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     unsigned long len;
+
+     REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
+diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
+index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644
+--- a/dix/property.c
++++ b/dix/property.c
+@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     WindowPtr pWin;
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+-    int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
++    int sizeInBytes, err;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+
+     REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
+
+--
+2.38.1

SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 0dab0b527ac5c4fe0272ea679522bd87238a733b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/7] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
+
+The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
+255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
+to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
+anyway.
+
+This fixes an OOB write:
+
+ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
+temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
+For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
+stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
+representing stuff->detail cleared.
+
+However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
+thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
+
+CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+index 65d5870f6f..89a591098a 100644
+--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+         return BadValue;
+     }
+
++    /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
++     * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
++     * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
++    if (stuff->detail > 255)
++        return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
++
+     if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
+                                stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
+         return BadValue;
+@@ -313,6 +319,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+         return BadValue;
+     }
+
++    /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
++    if (stuff->detail > 255) {
++        client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
++        return BadValue;
++    }
++
+     rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
+     if (rc != Success)
+         return rc;
+--
+2.38.1

SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 94f6fe99d87cf6ba0adadd95c595158c345b7d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/7] Xext: free the screen saver resource when
+ replacing it
+
+This fixes a use-after-free bug:
+
+When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
+ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
+resources.
+
+When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
+struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
+old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
+
+Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
+ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
+
+Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
+
+CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
+index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644
+--- a/Xext/saver.c
++++ b/Xext/saver.c
+@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
+         pVlist++;
+     }
+     if (pPriv->attr)
+-        FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
++        FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
+     pPriv->attr = pAttr;
+     pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
+     if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
+--
+2.38.1

SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From a42635ee3c01f71a49052d83a372933504c9db04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/7] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off
+ from the same client
+
+This fixes a use-after-free bug:
+
+When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
+TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
+is added twice to the resources:
+  - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
+    drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
+  - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
+
+The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
+client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
+all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
+the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
+and free the whole list.
+
+However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
+same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
+existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
+client's resources.
+
+If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
+- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
+for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
+
+Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
+a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
+
+Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
+setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
+resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
+again when the client quits.
+
+Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
+clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
+
+CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
+index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644
+--- a/Xext/xvmain.c
++++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
+@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
+         tpn = pn;
+         while (tpn) {
+             if (tpn->client == client) {
+-                if (!onoff)
++                if (!onoff) {
+                     tpn->client = NULL;
++                    FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
++                }
+                 return Success;
+             }
+             if (!tpn->client)
+--
+2.38.1

SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 774260dbae1fa505cd2848c786baed9a8db5179d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/7] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after
+ freeing it
+
+Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
+reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
+already freed memory.
+
+CVE-2022-46283, ZDI-CAN-19530
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
++++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
+         }
+         else {
+             free(dst->names->radio_groups);
++            dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
+         }
+         dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
+
+--
+2.38.1

SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From bb1711b7fba42f2a0c7d1c09beee241a1b2bcc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 10:06:45 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xext: fix invalid event type mask in
+ XTestSwapFakeInput
+
+In commit b320ca0 the mask was inadvertently changed from octal 0177 to
+hexadecimal 0x177.
+
+Fixes commit b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63
+  Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
+
+Found by Stuart Cassoff
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xext/xtest.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
+index 2985a4ce6e..dde5c4cf9d 100644
+--- a/Xext/xtest.c
++++ b/Xext/xtest.c
+@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
+ 
+     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
+     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
+-        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
++        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0177;
+         /* Swap event */
+         proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
+         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 Summary:   Xwayland
 Name:      xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
 Version:   21.1.3
-Release:   6%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
+Release:   10%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
 
 URL:       http://www.x.org
 %if 0%{?gitdate}
@@ -35,6 +35,28 @@ Patch10004: 0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch
 Patch10005: 0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch
 Patch10006: 0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch
 Patch10007: 0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch
+# CVE-2022-3550
+Patch10008: 0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
+# CVE-2022-3551
+Patch10009: 0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
+# CVE-2022-46340
+Patch10018: 0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
+# related to CVE-2022-46344
+Patch10019: 0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
+# CVE-2022-46344
+Patch10020: 0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
+# CVE-2022-46341
+Patch10021: 0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
+# CVE-2022-46343
+Patch10022: 0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
+# CVE-2022-46342
+Patch10023: 0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
+# CVE-2022-4283
+Patch10024: 0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
+# Follow-up to CVE-2022-46340
+Patch10025: 0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch
+# CVE-2023-0494
+Patch10026: 0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch
 
 License:   MIT
 
@@ -142,6 +164,21 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Feb  7 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-10
+- Fix CVE-2023-0494 (#2166972)
+
+* Mon Dec 19 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-9
+- Follow-up fix for CVE-2022-46340 (#2151777)
+
+* Tue Dec 13 2022 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-8
+- CVE fix for: CVE-2022-4283 (#2151802), CVE-2022-46340 (#2151777),
+  CVE-2022-46341 (#2151782), CVE-2022-46342 (#2151785),
+  CVE-2022-46343 (#2151792), CVE-2022-46344 (#2151795)
+
+* Mon Nov 14 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> -  21.1.3-7
+- Fix CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551
+  Resolves: rhbz#2140767, rhbz#2140774
+
 * Fri Jul 29 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-6
 - CVE fix for: CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070
   Resolves: rhbz#2110442, rhbz#2110437