import CS xorg-x11-server-Xwayland-23.2.7-1.el9

.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/xwayland-22.1.9.tar.xz
+SOURCES/xwayland-23.2.7.tar.xz

.xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-19ccc8ae5920620db725a08ee65d8b64c521d766 SOURCES/xwayland-22.1.9.tar.xz
+0dd118bd1d816c0407ab2c67971f70ec55f4b73c SOURCES/xwayland-23.2.7.tar.xz

SOURCES/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From 19e9f199950aaa4b9b7696936d1b067475da999c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
-
-button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
-our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
-insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
-XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
-leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
-
-CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd)
----
- Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
- dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
-index dcd4efb3b..54ea11a93 100644
---- a/Xi/exevents.c
-+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
-@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
-         }
- 
-         if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
--            if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
--                to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
--                if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
--                    FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
--            }
-+            size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
-+            to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
-+                                                   maxbuttons,
-+                                                   sizeof(XkbAction));
-+            memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
-             memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
--                   sizeof(XkbAction));
-+                   from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
-         }
-         else {
-             free(to->button->xkb_acts);
-diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
-index 7150734a5..20fef1692 100644
---- a/dix/devices.c
-+++ b/dix/devices.c
-@@ -2530,6 +2530,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
- 
-     if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
-         int i;
-+        int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
-+
-         DeviceChangedEvent event = {
-             .header = ET_Internal,
-             .type = ET_DeviceChanged,
-@@ -2540,6 +2542,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
-         };
- 
-         master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
-+        if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
-+            master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
-+                                                       maxbuttons,
-+                                                       sizeof(XkbAction));
-+            memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
-+                   0,
-+                   (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
-+        }
- 
-         memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
-                sizeof(Atom));
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 1e8478455458e998dd366d2cd23d2aeab2bdeee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend
-
-The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
-least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
-part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
-existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
-instead of N + P.
-
-Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
-values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
-uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
-For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
-result in this 8 value array:
-  [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
-                            ^OOB write
-
-The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
-both.
-
-CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a)
----
- Xi/xiproperty.c    | 4 ++--
- randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-index 066ba21fba..d315f04d0e 100644
---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
-                 XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop);
-             return BadAlloc;
-         }
--        new_value.size = len;
-+        new_value.size = total_len;
-         new_value.type = type;
-         new_value.format = format;
- 
-@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
-         case PropModePrepend:
-             new_data = new_value.data;
-             old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
--                                  (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
-+                                  (len * size_in_bytes));
-             break;
-         }
-         if (new_data)
-diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
-index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644
---- a/randr/rrproperty.c
-+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
-@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
-                 RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop);
-             return BadAlloc;
-         }
--        new_value.size = len;
-+        new_value.size = total_len;
-         new_value.type = type;
-         new_value.format = format;
- 
-@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
-         case PropModePrepend:
-             new_data = new_value.data;
-             old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
--                                  (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
-+                                  (len * size_in_bytes));
-             break;
-         }
-         if (new_data)
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From b5cb27032d3e486ba84a491e1420e85171c4c0a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/9] dix: allocate enough space for logical button
- maps
-
-Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
-each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
-to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
-
-CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3)
----
- Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
- dix/enterleave.c    | 5 +++--
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
-index 5b77b1a44..2b05ac5f3 100644
---- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
-@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
-     if (pDev->button) {
-         int i;
- 
--        rep.buttons_len =
--            bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
-+        rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
-         rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
-         buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
-         if (!buttons)
-diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
-index 867ec7436..ded8679d7 100644
---- a/dix/enterleave.c
-+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
-@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
- 
-     mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
- 
--    /* XI 2 event */
--    btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
-+    /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
-+     * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
-+    btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
-     btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
-     len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From aaf854fb25541380cc38a221c15f0e8372f48872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
- ProcRRChange*Property
-
-Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
-See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
-protocol and XI.
-
-This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
-
-Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
-the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
-truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
-
-The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
-(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
-finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
-stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
-
-CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632)
----
- randr/rrproperty.c         | 2 +-
- randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
-index 25469f57b..c4fef8a1f 100644
---- a/randr/rrproperty.c
-+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
-@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     char format, mode;
-     unsigned long len;
-     int sizeInBytes;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     int err;
- 
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
-diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-index b79c17f9b..90c5a9a93 100644
---- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     char format, mode;
-     unsigned long len;
-     int sizeInBytes;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     int err;
- 
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From 9105be1c51d6973dc8d7806108349bc152029ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/9] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our
- DeviceStateNotify
-
-If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
-zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
-
-This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
-both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
-they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
-
-A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
-one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
-once per type. So effectively this logic code:
-
-   int count = 1;
-   if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
-   if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
-   if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
-   // count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
-
-   ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
-   FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
-   if (button)
-     FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
-   if (key)
-     FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);   // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
-
-If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
-off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
-written instead.
-
-Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
-Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
-patch fixes only the allocation issue.
-
-Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
-button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
-buttons, it is very unlikely.
-
-CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5)
----
- dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
-index ded8679d7..17964b00a 100644
---- a/dix/enterleave.c
-+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
-@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void
- DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
- {
-     int evcount = 1;
--    deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev;
-+    deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
-+    deviceStateNotify *ev;
-     deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
-     deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
- 
-@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
-         }
-     }
- 
--    sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent));
-+    ev = sev;
-     FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
- 
-     if (b != NULL) {
-@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
- 
-     DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
-                           DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab);
--    free(sev);
- }
- 
- void
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch

@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
-From ee5377d94ea587f584adbc9ab8372b3842cfa149 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/9] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation
-
-The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
-be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
-a number of issues.
-
-This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
-send the device state down the wire.  This is split across multiple
-32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
-deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
-deviceValuator events.
-
-The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
-of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
-protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
-
-Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
-and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
-valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
-per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
-troughput.
-
-CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5)
----
- dix/enterleave.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
-index 17964b00a..7b7ba1098 100644
---- a/dix/enterleave.c
-+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
-@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
- 
-     ev->type = DeviceValuator;
-     ev->deviceid = dev->id;
--    ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3;
-+    ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6;
-     ev->first_valuator = first;
-     switch (ev->num_valuators) {
-+    case 6:
-+        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
-+    case 5:
-+        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
-+    case 4:
-+        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
-     case 3:
-         ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
-     case 2:
-@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
-         ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first];
-         break;
-     }
--    first += ev->num_valuators;
- }
- 
- static void
-@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
-         ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons;
-         memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4);
-     }
--    else if (k) {
-+    if (k) {
-         ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass);
-         ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code -
-             k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
-@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
-     }
- }
- 
--
-+/**
-+ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events.
-+ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32
-+ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values.
-+ *
-+ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out:
-+ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above
-+ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above
-+ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4
-+ *
-+ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS,
-+ */
- static void
- DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
- {
-+    /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify
-+     * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */
-+    deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6];
-     int evcount = 1;
--    deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
--    deviceStateNotify *ev;
--    deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
--    deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
-+    deviceStateNotify *ev = sev;
- 
-     KeyClassPtr k;
-     ButtonClassPtr b;
-@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
- 
-     if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) {
-         nbuttons = b->numButtons;
--        if (nbuttons > 32)
-+        if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
-             evcount++;
-     }
-     if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) {
-         nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
--        if (nkeys > 32)
-+        if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
-             evcount++;
--        if (nbuttons > 0) {
--            evcount++;
--        }
-     }
-     if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) {
-         nval = v->numAxes;
--
--        if (nval > 3)
--            evcount++;
--        if (nval > 6) {
--            if (!(k && b))
--                evcount++;
--            if (nval > 9)
--                evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3);
--        }
-+        /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then
-+         * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */
-+        evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6;
-     }
- 
--    ev = sev;
--    FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
--
--    if (b != NULL) {
--        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first);
--        first += 3;
--        nval -= 3;
--        if (nbuttons > 32) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++;
--            bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
--            bev->deviceid = dev->id;
--            memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
--                   DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
--        }
--        if (nval > 0) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
--            first += 3;
--            nval -= 3;
--        }
-+    BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev));
-+
-+    FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first);
-+
-+    if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) {
-+        deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev;
-+        (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
-+        bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
-+        bev->deviceid = dev->id;
-+        memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
-+               DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
-     }
- 
--    if (k != NULL) {
--        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first);
--        first += 3;
--        nval -= 3;
--        if (nkeys > 32) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++;
--            kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
--            kev->deviceid = dev->id;
--            memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
--        }
--        if (nval > 0) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
--            first += 3;
--            nval -= 3;
--        }
-+    if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) {
-+        deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev;
-+        (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
-+        kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
-+        kev->deviceid = dev->id;
-+        memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
-     }
- 
-+    first = 3;
-+    nval -= 3;
-     while (nval > 0) {
--        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first);
--        first += 3;
--        nval -= 3;
--        if (nval > 0) {
--            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
--            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
--            first += 3;
--            nval -= 3;
--        }
-+        ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
-+        FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first);
-+        first += 6;
-+        nval -= 6;
-     }
- 
-     DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 1c22e4a35e71d98a082ad2f8f7bc778a8859e18d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/9] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the
- number of buttons
-
-There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
-from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
-device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
-
-Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
-don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
-with more than this number of buttons anyway.
-
-CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74)
----
- Xi/exevents.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
-index 54ea11a93..e16171468 100644
---- a/Xi/exevents.c
-+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
-@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
-                 to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec));
-                 if (!to->button)
-                     FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n");
-+                to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons;
-             }
-             else
-                 classes->button = NULL;
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-From 7efd09cdb13ae1a4100f68a11947afe581fa1ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/9] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing
- master devices
-
-The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
-to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
-
-If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
-ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
-two info structures being written to `info`.
-
-Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
-times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
-
-To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
-device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
-thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
-optionally slave attached/detached).
-
-CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit 4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1)
----
- Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
-index d2d985848..72d00451e 100644
---- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
-+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
-@@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-     size_t len;			/* length of data remaining in request */
-     int rc = Success;
-     int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
-+    enum {
-+        NO_CHANGE,
-+        FLUSH,
-+        CHANGED,
-+    } changes = NO_CHANGE;
- 
-     REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
-@@ -465,8 +470,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-             rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
-             if (rc != Success)
-                 goto unwind;
--        }
-+            changes = FLUSH;
-             break;
-+        }
-         case XIRemoveMaster:
-         {
-             xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
-@@ -475,8 +481,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-             rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
-             if (rc != Success)
-                 goto unwind;
--        }
-+            changes = FLUSH;
-             break;
-+        }
-         case XIDetachSlave:
-         {
-             xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
-@@ -485,8 +492,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-             rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
-             if (rc != Success)
-                 goto unwind;
--        }
-+            changes = CHANGED;
-             break;
-+        }
-         case XIAttachSlave:
-         {
-             xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
-@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
-             rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
-             if (rc != Success)
-                 goto unwind;
-+            changes = CHANGED;
-+            break;
-         }
-+        default:
-             break;
-         }
- 
-+        if (changes == FLUSH) {
-+            XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
-+            memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags));
-+            changes = NO_CHANGE;
-+        }
-+
-         len -= any->length * 4;
-         any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
-     }
- 
-  unwind:
--
--    XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
-+    if (changes != NO_CHANGE)
-+        XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
-     return rc;
- }
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From 01cd3a72858ccc1afb0b42ace92263f2912619a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/9] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during
- recursion
-
-The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
-is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
-list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
-
-However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
-call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
-removed device.
-
-This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
-devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
-overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
-
-Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
-`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
-previous device after the recursion.
-
-CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(cherry picked from commit bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b)
----
- dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
-index 8fe4a341c..f3db37203 100644
---- a/dix/devices.c
-+++ b/dix/devices.c
-@@ -453,14 +453,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
- {
-     DeviceIntPtr *prev, other;
-     BOOL enabled;
-+    BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE;
-     int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
- 
-     if (!dev->enabled)
-         return TRUE;
- 
--    for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
--         *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
--    if (*prev != dev)
-+    for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
-+        if (other == dev) {
-+            dev_in_devices_list = TRUE;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    if (!dev_in_devices_list)
-         return FALSE;
- 
-     TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev);
-@@ -511,6 +517,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
-     LeaveWindow(dev);
-     SetFocusOut(dev);
- 
-+    for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
-+         *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
-+
-     *prev = dev->next;
-     dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices;
-     inputInfo.off_devices = dev;
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From 42f8d1828b4fc1e0b8165a767a0b74edcdbf3806 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/9] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled
- slaved devices too
-
-Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
-to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
-reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
-memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
-device.
-
-And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
-CloseDownDevices().
-
-Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
-
-(cherry picked from commit 26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8)
----
- dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
-index f3db37203..95190b5b7 100644
---- a/dix/devices.c
-+++ b/dix/devices.c
-@@ -483,6 +483,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
-                 flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
-             }
-         }
-+
-+        for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) {
-+            if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) {
-+                AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL);
-+                flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
-+            }
-+        }
-     }
-     else {
-         for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
-@@ -1080,6 +1087,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void)
-             dev->master = NULL;
-     }
- 
-+    for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
-+        if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev))
-+            dev->master = NULL;
-+    }
-+
-     CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices);
-     CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices);
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 4093057b98bc5a178f130c9ba6b0b28385e24ae5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 12:09:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 8/9] glx: Call XACE hooks on the GLX buffer
-
-The XSELINUX code will label resources at creation by checking the
-access mode. When the access mode is DixCreateAccess, it will call the
-function to label the new resource SELinuxLabelResource().
-
-However, GLX buffers do not go through the XACE hooks when created,
-hence leaving the resource actually unlabeled.
-
-When, later, the client tries to create another resource using that
-drawable (like a GC for example), the XSELINUX code would try to use
-the security ID of that object which has never been labeled, get a NULL
-pointer and crash when checking whether the requested permissions are
-granted for subject security ID.
-
-To avoid the issue, make sure to call the XACE hooks when creating the
-GLX buffers.
-
-Credit goes to Donn Seeley <donn@xmission.com> for providing the patch.
-
-CVE-2024-0408
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3)
----
- glx/glxcmds.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c
-index fc26a2e34..1e46d0c72 100644
---- a/glx/glxcmds.c
-+++ b/glx/glxcmds.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- #include "indirect_util.h"
- #include "protocol-versions.h"
- #include "glxvndabi.h"
-+#include "xace.h"
- 
- static char GLXServerVendorName[] = "SGI";
- 
-@@ -1392,6 +1393,13 @@ DoCreatePbuffer(ClientPtr client, int screenNum, XID fbconfigId,
-     if (!pPixmap)
-         return BadAlloc;
- 
-+    err = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, glxDrawableId, RT_PIXMAP,
-+                   pPixmap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
-+    if (err != Success) {
-+        (*pGlxScreen->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap);
-+        return err;
-+    }
-+
-     /* Assign the pixmap the same id as the pbuffer and add it as a
-      * resource so it and the DRI2 drawable will be reclaimed when the
-      * pbuffer is destroyed. */
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 51be9e767a02cdc6a524dc895dcc81abb689d50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 11:51:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 9/9] ephyr,xwayland: Use the proper private key for
- cursor
-
-The cursor in DIX is actually split in two parts, the cursor itself and
-the cursor bits, each with their own devPrivates.
-
-The cursor itself includes the cursor bits, meaning that the cursor bits
-devPrivates in within structure of the cursor.
-
-Both Xephyr and Xwayland were using the private key for the cursor bits
-to store the data for the cursor, and when using XSELINUX which comes
-with its own special devPrivates, the data stored in that cursor bits'
-devPrivates would interfere with the XSELINUX devPrivates data and the
-SELINUX security ID would point to some other unrelated data, causing a
-crash in the XSELINUX code when trying to (re)use the security ID.
-
-CVE-2024-0409
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7)
----
- hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
-index e3c1aaa50..bd94b0cfb 100644
---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
-+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
-@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static miPointerScreenFuncRec xwl_pointer_screen_funcs = {
- Bool
- xwl_screen_init_cursor(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
- {
--    if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR_BITS, 0))
-+    if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR, 0))
-         return FALSE;
- 
-     return miPointerInitialize(xwl_screen->screen,
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
 
 Summary:   Xwayland
 Name:      xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
-Version:   22.1.9
+Version:   23.2.7
-Release:   5%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
+Release:   1%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
 
 URL:       http://www.x.org
 %if 0%{?gitdate}
@@ -18,45 +18,26 @@ Source0:   https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/%{pkgname}/-/archive/%{commit}/%{
 Source0:   https://www.x.org/pub/individual/xserver/%{pkgname}-%{version}.tar.xz
 %endif
 
-# Fix for CVE-2023-5367
-Patch1:   0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2023-6478
-Patch2:   0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2023-6377
-Patch3:   0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
-Patch4:   0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
-Patch5:   0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch
-Patch6:   0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch
-Patch7:   0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
-Patch8:   0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
-Patch9:   0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch
-Patch10:  0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-0408
-Patch11:  0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-0409
-Patch12:  0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch
-
 License:   MIT
 
 Requires: xorg-x11-server-common
 Requires: libEGL
+Requires: libepoxy >= 1.5.5
 
 BuildRequires: gcc
 BuildRequires: git-core
 BuildRequires: meson
 
 BuildRequires: wayland-devel
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-client) >= 1.18.0
+BuildRequires: desktop-file-utils
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-protocols)
+
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-client) >= 1.21.0
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-protocols) >= 1.30
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-eglstream-protocols)
 
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(epoxy)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(epoxy) >= 1.5.5
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fontenc)
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libdrm) >= 2.4.0
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libdrm) >= 2.4.89
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libssl)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libtirpc)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(pixman-1)
@@ -79,7 +60,8 @@ BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtrans) >= 1.3.2
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtst)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xv)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libxcvt)
-BuildRequires: xorg-x11-proto-devel >= 7.7-10
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libdecor-0) >= 0.1.1
+BuildRequires: xorg-x11-proto-devel >= 2023.2-1
 
 BuildRequires: mesa-libGL-devel >= 9.2
 BuildRequires: mesa-libEGL-devel
@@ -107,6 +89,7 @@ Xwayland is an X server for running X clients under Wayland.
 %package devel
 Summary: Development package
 Requires: pkgconfig
+Requires: %{name}%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
 
 %description devel
 The development package provides the developmental files which are
@@ -121,6 +104,7 @@ necessary for developing Wayland compositors using Xwayland.
         -Ddefault_font_path=%{default_font_path} \
         -Dbuilder_string="Build ID: %{name} %{version}-%{release}" \
         -Dxkb_output_dir=%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb \
+        -Dserverconfigdir=%{_datadir}/xwayland \
         -Dxcsecurity=true \
         -Dglamor=true \
         -Ddri3=true
@@ -137,14 +121,29 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_includedir}/xorg
 rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/aclocal
 rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb
 
+%check
+desktop-file-validate %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/applications/*.desktop
+
 %files
+%dir %{_datadir}/xwayland
 %{_bindir}/Xwayland
 %{_mandir}/man1/Xwayland.1*
+%{_datadir}/applications/org.freedesktop.Xwayland.desktop
+%{_datadir}/xwayland/protocol.txt
 
 %files devel
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
 
 %changelog
+* Thu May 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 23.2.7-1
+- xwayland 23.2.7 - (RHEL-29912)
+
+* Thu Apr  4 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.9-7
+- CVE fix for: CVE-2024-31080, CVE-2024-31081, CVE-2024-31083
+
+* Wed Mar 13 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.9-6
+  New build to add xorg-x11-server-Xwayland-devel (RHEL-25083)
+
 * Tue Jan 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.9-5
   Fix for CVE-2023-6816, CVE-2024-0229, CVE-2024-21885, CVE-2024-21886,
   CVE-2024-0408, CVE-2024-0409