Import from CS git
This commit is contained in:
parent
1902d5ceb5
commit
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2
.gitignore
vendored
2
.gitignore
vendored
@ -1 +1 @@
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SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz
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SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz
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87
SOURCES/0001-render-Avoid-0-or-less-animated-cursors.patch
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87
SOURCES/0001-render-Avoid-0-or-less-animated-cursors.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
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From 1d154fa2d5c52fa144c9cf0499affeba7be4f29e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
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Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 09:43:52 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/6] render: Avoid 0 or less animated cursors
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MIME-Version: 1.0
|
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
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|
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Animated cursors use a series of cursors that the client can set.
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|
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By default, the Xserver assumes at least one cursor is specified
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while a client may actually pass no cursor at all.
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|
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That causes an out-of-bound read creating the animated cursor and a
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crash of the Xserver:
|
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|
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| Invalid read of size 8
|
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| at 0x5323F4: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
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| by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
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| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
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| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
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| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
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| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
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| Address 0x59aa010 is 0 bytes after a block of size 0 alloc'd
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| at 0x48468D3: reallocarray (vg_replace_malloc.c:1803)
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| by 0x52D3DA: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1802)
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| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
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| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
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| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
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| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
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|
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| Invalid read of size 2
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| at 0x5323F7: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
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| by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
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| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
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| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
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| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
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| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
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| Address 0x8 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd
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To avoid the issue, check the number of cursors specified and return a
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BadValue error in both the proc handler (early) and the animated cursor
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creation (as this is a public function) if there is 0 or less cursor.
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CVE-2025-49175
|
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|
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This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
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reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
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|
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 9304e31035f97ddbfcc1d5f3c178da1d04a472ad)
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---
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render/animcur.c | 3 +++
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render/render.c | 2 ++
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2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/render/animcur.c b/render/animcur.c
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index ef27bda27..77942d846 100644
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--- a/render/animcur.c
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+++ b/render/animcur.c
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@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@ AnimCursorCreate(CursorPtr *cursors, CARD32 *deltas, int ncursor,
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int rc = BadAlloc, i;
|
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AnimCurPtr ac;
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|
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+ if (ncursor <= 0)
|
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+ return BadValue;
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+
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for (i = 0; i < screenInfo.numScreens; i++)
|
||||
if (!GetAnimCurScreen(screenInfo.screens[i]))
|
||||
return BadImplementation;
|
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diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
|
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index 456f156d4..e9bbac62d 100644
|
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--- a/render/render.c
|
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+++ b/render/render.c
|
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@@ -1788,6 +1788,8 @@ ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor(ClientPtr client)
|
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ncursor =
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(client->req_len -
|
||||
(bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xRenderCreateAnimCursorReq)))) >> 1;
|
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+ if (ncursor <= 0)
|
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+ return BadValue;
|
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cursors = xallocarray(ncursor, sizeof(CursorPtr) + sizeof(CARD32));
|
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if (!cursors)
|
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return BadAlloc;
|
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--
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2.49.0
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@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
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From 6049e1b120c1aa93f23781c0976b1aad64f05f10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 16:13:34 +0200
|
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/6] os: Do not overflow the integer size with
|
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BigRequest
|
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MIME-Version: 1.0
|
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
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|
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The BigRequest extension allows request larger than the 16-bit length
|
||||
limit.
|
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|
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It uses integers for the request length and checks for the size not to
|
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exceed the maxBigRequestSize limit, but does so after translating the
|
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length to integer by multiplying the given size in bytes by 4.
|
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|
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In doing so, it might overflow the integer size limit before actually
|
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checking for the overflow, defeating the purpose of the test.
|
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|
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To avoid the issue, make sure to check that the request size does not
|
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overflow the maxBigRequestSize limit prior to any conversion.
|
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|
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The caller Dispatch() function however expects the return value to be in
|
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bytes, so we cannot just return the converted value in case of error, as
|
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that would also overflow the integer size.
|
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|
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To preserve the existing API, we use a negative value for the X11 error
|
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code BadLength as the function only return positive values, 0 or -1 and
|
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update the caller Dispatch() function to take that case into account to
|
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return the error code to the offending client.
|
||||
|
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CVE-2025-49176
|
||||
|
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This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
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reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
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|
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
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Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
|
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(cherry picked from commit b380b0a6c2022fbd3115552b1cd88251b5268daa)
|
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---
|
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dix/dispatch.c | 9 +++++----
|
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os/io.c | 4 ++++
|
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2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
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|
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diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
|
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index ba01de6cf..c71098ce9 100644
|
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--- a/dix/dispatch.c
|
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+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
|
||||
@@ -464,9 +464,10 @@ Dispatch(void)
|
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|
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/* now, finally, deal with client requests */
|
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result = ReadRequestFromClient(client);
|
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- if (result <= 0) {
|
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- if (result < 0)
|
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- CloseDownClient(client);
|
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+ if (result == 0)
|
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+ break;
|
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+ else if (result == -1) {
|
||||
+ CloseDownClient(client);
|
||||
break;
|
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}
|
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|
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@@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ Dispatch(void)
|
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client->index,
|
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client->requestBuffer);
|
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#endif
|
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- if (result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
|
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+ if (result < 0 || result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
|
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result = BadLength;
|
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else {
|
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result = XaceHookDispatch(client, client->majorOp);
|
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diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
|
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index 5b7fac349..5fc05821c 100644
|
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--- a/os/io.c
|
||||
+++ b/os/io.c
|
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@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
|
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needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
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}
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client->req_len = needed;
|
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+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2) {
|
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+ /* Check for potential integer overflow */
|
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+ return -(BadLength);
|
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+ }
|
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needed <<= 2; /* needed is in bytes now */
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}
|
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if (gotnow < needed) {
|
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--
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2.49.0
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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From 205be7f7bf6850b364e9f10fe9f27ce6360670c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:39:02 +0200
|
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/6] os: Check for integer overflow on BigRequest
|
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length
|
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|
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Check for another possible integer overflow once we get a complete xReq
|
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with BigRequest.
|
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|
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Related to CVE-2025-49176
|
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|
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
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Suggested-by: Peter Harris <pharris2@rocketsoftware.com>
|
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Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2028>
|
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(cherry picked from commit 4fc4d76b2c7aaed61ed2653f997783a3714c4fe1)
|
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---
|
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os/io.c | 2 ++
|
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
|
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|
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diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
|
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index 5fc05821c..064d69ea3 100644
|
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--- a/os/io.c
|
||||
+++ b/os/io.c
|
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@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
|
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needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
|
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}
|
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client->req_len = needed;
|
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+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2)
|
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+ return -(BadLength);
|
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needed <<= 2;
|
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}
|
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if (gotnow < needed) {
|
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--
|
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2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
||||
From 9cd6d7efb87d6d51a9ddce152d103ac087287c52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 10:46:03 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/6] os: Account for bytes to ignore when sharing
|
||||
input buffer
|
||||
|
||||
When reading requests from the clients, the input buffer might be shared
|
||||
and used between different clients.
|
||||
|
||||
If a given client sends a full request with non-zero bytes to ignore,
|
||||
the bytes to ignore may still be non-zero even though the request is
|
||||
full, in which case the buffer could be shared with another client who's
|
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request will not be processed because of those bytes to ignore, leading
|
||||
to a possible hang of the other client request.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, make sure we have zero bytes to ignore left in the
|
||||
input request when sharing the input buffer with another client.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-49178
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
||||
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit b0c1cbf4f8e6baa372b1676d2f30512de8ab4ed3)
|
||||
---
|
||||
os/io.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
|
||||
index 064d69ea3..83986af92 100644
|
||||
--- a/os/io.c
|
||||
+++ b/os/io.c
|
||||
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
gotnow -= needed;
|
||||
- if (!gotnow)
|
||||
+ if (!gotnow && !oci->ignoreBytes)
|
||||
AvailableInput = oc;
|
||||
if (move_header) {
|
||||
if (client->req_len < bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xBigReq) - sizeof(xReq))) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
From acc5a83e0d813403fa0377d9ed405c3ca2f9a39d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 11:47:15 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/6] record: Check for overflow in
|
||||
RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients()
|
||||
|
||||
The RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients() checks for the request length,
|
||||
but does not check for integer overflow.
|
||||
|
||||
A client might send a very large value for either the number of clients
|
||||
or the number of protocol ranges that will cause an integer overflow in
|
||||
the request length computation, defeating the check for request length.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, explicitly check the number of clients against the
|
||||
limit of clients (which is much lower than an maximum integer value) and
|
||||
the number of protocol ranges (multiplied by the record length) do not
|
||||
exceed the maximum integer value.
|
||||
|
||||
This way, we ensure that the final computation for the request length
|
||||
will not overflow the maximum integer limit.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-49179
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
||||
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit ea52403bf222f8bd6ee4c509bed5e34f0c789b00)
|
||||
---
|
||||
record/record.c | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c
|
||||
index e123867a7..018e53f81 100644
|
||||
--- a/record/record.c
|
||||
+++ b/record/record.c
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ and Jim Haggerty of Metheus.
|
||||
#include "inputstr.h"
|
||||
#include "eventconvert.h"
|
||||
#include "scrnintstr.h"
|
||||
+#include "opaque.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <assert.h>
|
||||
@@ -1298,6 +1299,13 @@ RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients(RecordContextPtr pContext, ClientPtr client,
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
XID recordingClient;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* LimitClients is 2048 at max, way less that MAXINT */
|
||||
+ if (stuff->nClients > LimitClients)
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (stuff->nRanges > (MAXINT - 4 * stuff->nClients) / SIZEOF(xRecordRange))
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (((client->req_len << 2) - SIZEOF(xRecordRegisterClientsReq)) !=
|
||||
4 * stuff->nClients + SIZEOF(xRecordRange) * stuff->nRanges)
|
||||
return BadLength;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
From b33673deffe92ff7d5b4be5dd944eed2718ee3a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 15:18:19 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/6] randr: Check for overflow in
|
||||
RRChangeProviderProperty()
|
||||
|
||||
A client might send a request causing an integer overflow when computing
|
||||
the total size to allocate in RRChangeProviderProperty().
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, check that total length in bytes won't exceed the
|
||||
maximum integer value.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-49180
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
||||
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 1b0bf563a3a76b06ddcd6fc4d8e72d81f6773699)
|
||||
---
|
||||
randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 3 ++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
index b79c17f9b..7088570ee 100644
|
||||
--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ RRChangeProviderProperty(RRProviderPtr provider, Atom property, Atom type,
|
||||
|
||||
if (mode == PropModeReplace || len > 0) {
|
||||
void *new_data = NULL, *old_data = NULL;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ if (total_len > MAXINT / size_in_bytes)
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
total_size = total_len * size_in_bytes;
|
||||
new_value.data = (void *) malloc(total_size);
|
||||
if (!new_value.data && total_size) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
|
||||
Summary: Xwayland
|
||||
Name: xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
|
||||
Version: 21.1.3
|
||||
Release: 17%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
|
||||
Release: 18%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
|
||||
|
||||
URL: http://www.x.org
|
||||
%if 0%{?gitdate}
|
||||
@ -94,6 +94,17 @@ Patch10043: 0004-render-fix-refcounting-of-glyphs-during-ProcRenderAd.patch
|
||||
Patch10044: 0001-render-Avoid-possible-double-free-in-ProcRenderAddGl.patch
|
||||
# Fix for CVE-2024-9632
|
||||
Patch10045: 0001-xkb-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-_XkbSetCompatMap.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2025-49175: Out-of-bounds access in X Rendering extension
|
||||
Patch10046: 0001-render-Avoid-0-or-less-animated-cursors.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2025-49176: Integer overflow in Big Requests Extension
|
||||
Patch10047: 0002-os-Do-not-overflow-the-integer-size-with-BigRequest.patch
|
||||
Patch10048: 0003-os-Check-for-integer-overflow-on-BigRequest-length.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2025-49178: Unprocessed client request via bytes to ignore
|
||||
Patch10049: 0004-os-Account-for-bytes-to-ignore-when-sharing-input-bu.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2025-49179: Integer overflow in X Record extension
|
||||
Patch10050: 0005-record-Check-for-overflow-in-RecordSanityCheckRegist.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2025-49180: Integer overflow in RandR extension
|
||||
Patch10051: 0006-randr-Check-for-overflow-in-RRChangeProviderProperty.patch
|
||||
|
||||
License: MIT
|
||||
|
||||
@ -201,6 +212,11 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb
|
||||
%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Wed Jun 18 2025 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-18
|
||||
- CVE fix for: CVE-2025-49175 (RHEL-97278), CVE-2025-49176 (RHEL-97299,
|
||||
CVE-2025-49178 (RHEL-97374), CVE-2025-49179 (RHEL-97417),
|
||||
CVE-2025-49180 (RHEL-97249)
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Oct 30 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-17
|
||||
- Fix for CVE-2024-9632 - (RHEL-61995)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
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