CVE fixes
This commit is contained in:
Olivier Fourdan
root
parent
654730036b
commit
8c212218f8
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19ccc8ae5920620db725a08ee65d8b64c521d766 xwayland-22.1.9.tar.xz
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From b5cb27032d3e486ba84a491e1420e85171c4c0a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/9] dix: allocate enough space for logical button
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maps
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Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
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each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
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to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
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CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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(cherry picked from commit 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3)
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---
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Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
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dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++--
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2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
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index 5b77b1a44..2b05ac5f3 100644
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--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
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+++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
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@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
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if (pDev->button) {
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int i;
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- rep.buttons_len =
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- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
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+ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
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rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
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buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
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if (!buttons)
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diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
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index 867ec7436..ded8679d7 100644
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--- a/dix/enterleave.c
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+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
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@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
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mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
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- /* XI 2 event */
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- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
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+ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
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+ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
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+ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
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btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
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len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
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--
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2.43.0
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From 9105be1c51d6973dc8d7806108349bc152029ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/9] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our
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DeviceStateNotify
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If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
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zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
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This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
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both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
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they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
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A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
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one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
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once per type. So effectively this logic code:
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int count = 1;
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if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
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if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
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if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
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// count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
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ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
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FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
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if (button)
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FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
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if (key)
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FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
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If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
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off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
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written instead.
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Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
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Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
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patch fixes only the allocation issue.
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Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
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button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
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buttons, it is very unlikely.
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CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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(cherry picked from commit ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5)
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---
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dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
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index ded8679d7..17964b00a 100644
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--- a/dix/enterleave.c
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+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
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@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void
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DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
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{
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int evcount = 1;
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- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev;
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+ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
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+ deviceStateNotify *ev;
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deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
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deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
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@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
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}
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}
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- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent));
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+ ev = sev;
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FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
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if (b != NULL) {
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@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
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DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
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DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab);
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- free(sev);
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}
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void
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--
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2.43.0
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@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
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From ee5377d94ea587f584adbc9ab8372b3842cfa149 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/9] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation
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The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
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be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
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a number of issues.
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This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
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send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple
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32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
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deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
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deviceValuator events.
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The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
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of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
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protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
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Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
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and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
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valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
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per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
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troughput.
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CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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(cherry picked from commit 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5)
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---
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dix/enterleave.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
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1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
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index 17964b00a..7b7ba1098 100644
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--- a/dix/enterleave.c
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+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
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@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
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ev->type = DeviceValuator;
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ev->deviceid = dev->id;
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- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3;
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+ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6;
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ev->first_valuator = first;
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switch (ev->num_valuators) {
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+ case 6:
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+ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
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+ case 5:
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+ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
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+ case 4:
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+ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
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case 3:
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ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
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case 2:
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@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
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ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first];
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break;
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}
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- first += ev->num_valuators;
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}
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static void
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@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
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ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons;
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memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4);
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}
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- else if (k) {
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+ if (k) {
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ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass);
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ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code -
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k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
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@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
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}
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}
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-
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+/**
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+ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events.
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+ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32
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+ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values.
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+ *
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+ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out:
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+ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above
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+ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above
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+ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4
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+ *
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+ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS,
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+ */
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static void
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DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
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{
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+ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify
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+ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */
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+ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6];
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int evcount = 1;
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- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
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- deviceStateNotify *ev;
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- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
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- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
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+ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev;
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KeyClassPtr k;
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ButtonClassPtr b;
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@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
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if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) {
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nbuttons = b->numButtons;
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- if (nbuttons > 32)
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+ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
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evcount++;
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}
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if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) {
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nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
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- if (nkeys > 32)
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+ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
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evcount++;
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- if (nbuttons > 0) {
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- evcount++;
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- }
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}
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if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) {
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nval = v->numAxes;
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-
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- if (nval > 3)
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- evcount++;
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- if (nval > 6) {
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- if (!(k && b))
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- evcount++;
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- if (nval > 9)
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- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3);
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- }
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+ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then
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+ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */
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+ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6;
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}
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- ev = sev;
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- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
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-
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- if (b != NULL) {
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- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first);
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- first += 3;
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- nval -= 3;
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- if (nbuttons > 32) {
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- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
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- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++;
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- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
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- bev->deviceid = dev->id;
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- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
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- DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
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- }
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- if (nval > 0) {
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- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
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- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
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- first += 3;
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- nval -= 3;
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- }
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+ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev));
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+
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+ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first);
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+
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+ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) {
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+ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev;
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+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
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+ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
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+ bev->deviceid = dev->id;
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+ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
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+ DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
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}
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- if (k != NULL) {
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- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first);
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- first += 3;
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- nval -= 3;
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- if (nkeys > 32) {
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- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
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- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++;
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- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
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- kev->deviceid = dev->id;
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- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
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- }
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- if (nval > 0) {
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- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
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- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
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- first += 3;
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- nval -= 3;
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- }
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+ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) {
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+ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev;
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+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
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+ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
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+ kev->deviceid = dev->id;
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+ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
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}
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+ first = 3;
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+ nval -= 3;
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while (nval > 0) {
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- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first);
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- first += 3;
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- nval -= 3;
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- if (nval > 0) {
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- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
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- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
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- first += 3;
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- nval -= 3;
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- }
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+ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
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+ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first);
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+ first += 6;
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+ nval -= 6;
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}
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DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
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--
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2.43.0
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
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From 1c22e4a35e71d98a082ad2f8f7bc778a8859e18d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/9] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the
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number of buttons
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There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
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from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
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device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
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Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
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don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
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with more than this number of buttons anyway.
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CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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(cherry picked from commit df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74)
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---
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Xi/exevents.c | 1 +
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
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diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
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index 54ea11a93..e16171468 100644
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--- a/Xi/exevents.c
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+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
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@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
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to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec));
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if (!to->button)
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FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n");
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+ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons;
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}
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else
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classes->button = NULL;
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--
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2.43.0
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@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
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From 7efd09cdb13ae1a4100f68a11947afe581fa1ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/9] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing
|
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master devices
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The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
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to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
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If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
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ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
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two info structures being written to `info`.
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Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
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times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
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To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
|
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device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
|
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thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
|
||||
optionally slave attached/detached).
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1)
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
|
||||
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
||||
index d2d985848..72d00451e 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
||||
@@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
|
||||
int rc = Success;
|
||||
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ enum {
|
||||
+ NO_CHANGE,
|
||||
+ FLUSH,
|
||||
+ CHANGED,
|
||||
+ } changes = NO_CHANGE;
|
||||
|
||||
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
|
||||
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
|
||||
@@ -465,8 +470,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
goto unwind;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ changes = FLUSH;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
case XIRemoveMaster:
|
||||
{
|
||||
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
|
||||
@@ -475,8 +481,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
goto unwind;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ changes = FLUSH;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
case XIDetachSlave:
|
||||
{
|
||||
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
|
||||
@@ -485,8 +492,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
goto unwind;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ changes = CHANGED;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
case XIAttachSlave:
|
||||
{
|
||||
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
|
||||
@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
goto unwind;
|
||||
+ changes = CHANGED;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (changes == FLUSH) {
|
||||
+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
||||
+ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags));
|
||||
+ changes = NO_CHANGE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
len -= any->length * 4;
|
||||
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
unwind:
|
||||
-
|
||||
- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
||||
+ if (changes != NO_CHANGE)
|
||||
+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
|||
From 01cd3a72858ccc1afb0b42ace92263f2912619a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/9] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during
|
||||
recursion
|
||||
|
||||
The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
|
||||
is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
|
||||
list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
|
||||
|
||||
However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
|
||||
call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
|
||||
removed device.
|
||||
|
||||
This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
|
||||
devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
|
||||
overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
|
||||
|
||||
Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
|
||||
`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
|
||||
previous device after the recursion.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b)
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
index 8fe4a341c..f3db37203 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
@@ -453,14 +453,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DeviceIntPtr *prev, other;
|
||||
BOOL enabled;
|
||||
+ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE;
|
||||
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
|
||||
|
||||
if (!dev->enabled)
|
||||
return TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
|
||||
- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
|
||||
- if (*prev != dev)
|
||||
+ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
||||
+ if (other == dev) {
|
||||
+ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!dev_in_devices_list)
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev);
|
||||
@@ -511,6 +517,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
||||
LeaveWindow(dev);
|
||||
SetFocusOut(dev);
|
||||
|
||||
+ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
|
||||
+ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
|
||||
+
|
||||
*prev = dev->next;
|
||||
dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices;
|
||||
inputInfo.off_devices = dev;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
|||
From 42f8d1828b4fc1e0b8165a767a0b74edcdbf3806 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/9] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled
|
||||
slaved devices too
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
|
||||
to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
|
||||
reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
|
||||
memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
|
||||
device.
|
||||
|
||||
And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
|
||||
CloseDownDevices().
|
||||
|
||||
Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8)
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
index f3db37203..95190b5b7 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
@@ -483,6 +483,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
||||
flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
||||
+ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) {
|
||||
+ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL);
|
||||
+ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
||||
@@ -1080,6 +1087,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void)
|
||||
dev->master = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
|
||||
+ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev))
|
||||
+ dev->master = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices);
|
||||
CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices);
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
|||
From 4093057b98bc5a178f130c9ba6b0b28385e24ae5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 12:09:41 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 8/9] glx: Call XACE hooks on the GLX buffer
|
||||
|
||||
The XSELINUX code will label resources at creation by checking the
|
||||
access mode. When the access mode is DixCreateAccess, it will call the
|
||||
function to label the new resource SELinuxLabelResource().
|
||||
|
||||
However, GLX buffers do not go through the XACE hooks when created,
|
||||
hence leaving the resource actually unlabeled.
|
||||
|
||||
When, later, the client tries to create another resource using that
|
||||
drawable (like a GC for example), the XSELINUX code would try to use
|
||||
the security ID of that object which has never been labeled, get a NULL
|
||||
pointer and crash when checking whether the requested permissions are
|
||||
granted for subject security ID.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, make sure to call the XACE hooks when creating the
|
||||
GLX buffers.
|
||||
|
||||
Credit goes to Donn Seeley <donn@xmission.com> for providing the patch.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-0408
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3)
|
||||
---
|
||||
glx/glxcmds.c | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c
|
||||
index fc26a2e34..1e46d0c72 100644
|
||||
--- a/glx/glxcmds.c
|
||||
+++ b/glx/glxcmds.c
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
|
||||
#include "indirect_util.h"
|
||||
#include "protocol-versions.h"
|
||||
#include "glxvndabi.h"
|
||||
+#include "xace.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static char GLXServerVendorName[] = "SGI";
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1392,6 +1393,13 @@ DoCreatePbuffer(ClientPtr client, int screenNum, XID fbconfigId,
|
||||
if (!pPixmap)
|
||||
return BadAlloc;
|
||||
|
||||
+ err = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, glxDrawableId, RT_PIXMAP,
|
||||
+ pPixmap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
|
||||
+ if (err != Success) {
|
||||
+ (*pGlxScreen->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap);
|
||||
+ return err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Assign the pixmap the same id as the pbuffer and add it as a
|
||||
* resource so it and the DRI2 drawable will be reclaimed when the
|
||||
* pbuffer is destroyed. */
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
|||
From 51be9e767a02cdc6a524dc895dcc81abb689d50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 11:51:56 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 9/9] ephyr,xwayland: Use the proper private key for
|
||||
cursor
|
||||
|
||||
The cursor in DIX is actually split in two parts, the cursor itself and
|
||||
the cursor bits, each with their own devPrivates.
|
||||
|
||||
The cursor itself includes the cursor bits, meaning that the cursor bits
|
||||
devPrivates in within structure of the cursor.
|
||||
|
||||
Both Xephyr and Xwayland were using the private key for the cursor bits
|
||||
to store the data for the cursor, and when using XSELINUX which comes
|
||||
with its own special devPrivates, the data stored in that cursor bits'
|
||||
devPrivates would interfere with the XSELINUX devPrivates data and the
|
||||
SELINUX security ID would point to some other unrelated data, causing a
|
||||
crash in the XSELINUX code when trying to (re)use the security ID.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-0409
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7)
|
||||
---
|
||||
hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
|
||||
index e3c1aaa50..bd94b0cfb 100644
|
||||
--- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
|
||||
+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c
|
||||
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static miPointerScreenFuncRec xwl_pointer_screen_funcs = {
|
||||
Bool
|
||||
xwl_screen_init_cursor(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR_BITS, 0))
|
||||
+ if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR, 0))
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
return miPointerInitialize(xwl_screen->screen,
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
|
|||
Summary: Xwayland
|
||||
Name: xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
|
||||
Version: 22.1.9
|
||||
Release: 4%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
|
||||
Release: 5%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
|
||||
|
||||
URL: http://www.x.org
|
||||
%if 0%{?gitdate}
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ Patch1: 0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch
|
|||
Patch2: 0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch
|
||||
# Fix for CVE-2023-6377
|
||||
Patch3: 0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch
|
||||
# Fix for CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
|
||||
Patch4: 0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch
|
||||
# Fix for CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
|
||||
Patch5: 0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch
|
||||
Patch6: 0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch
|
||||
Patch7: 0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch
|
||||
# Fix for CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
|
||||
Patch8: 0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch
|
||||
# Fix for CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
|
||||
Patch9: 0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch
|
||||
Patch10: 0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch
|
||||
# Fix for CVE-2024-0408
|
||||
Patch11: 0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch
|
||||
# Fix for CVE-2024-0409
|
||||
Patch12: 0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch
|
||||
|
||||
License: MIT
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -130,6 +145,10 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb
|
|||
%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Tue Jan 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.9-5
|
||||
Fix for CVE-2023-6816, CVE-2024-0229, CVE-2024-21885, CVE-2024-21886,
|
||||
CVE-2024-0408, CVE-2024-0409
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Dec 13 2023 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.9-4
|
||||
- Fix for CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue