From 36c61b90baa7dee63cc3a78e1beb80a550d4c637 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: eabdullin Date: Wed, 15 May 2024 09:09:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Import from AlmaLinux stable repository --- .gitignore | 2 +- .xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata | 2 +- ...te-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch | 77 ++++++ ...-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch | 36 --- ...x-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch | 81 +++++++ ...-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch | 52 ----- ...enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch | 54 +++++ ...ger-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch | 61 +++++ ...f-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch | 35 --- ...possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch | 59 ----- ...ntedString-against-request-length-at.patch | 35 --- ...array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch | 77 ------ ...ream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch | 43 ---- ...or-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch | 41 ---- ...ficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch | 86 +++++++ ...f-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch | 44 ---- ...DeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch | 180 -------------- ...or-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch | 88 ------- ...bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch | 34 --- ...-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch | 71 ------ ...-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch | 219 ++++++++++++++++++ ...length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch | 183 --------------- ...lamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch | 42 ---- ...llow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch | 82 ------- ...-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch | 39 ++++ ...f-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch | 53 ----- ...stream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch | 64 ----- ...reen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch | 48 ---- ...hy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch | 111 +++++++++ ...RTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch | 74 ------ ...linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch | 73 ++++++ ...ng-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch | 55 +++++ ...dio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch | 36 --- ...-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch | 35 --- ...lx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch | 61 +++++ ...se-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch | 44 ++++ SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec | 87 +++---- 37 files changed, 1007 insertions(+), 1457 deletions(-) create mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 9ae5e45..212bc42 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1 +1 @@ -SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz +SOURCES/xwayland-22.1.9.tar.xz diff --git a/.xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata b/.xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata index cebe01a..5df6a9b 100644 --- a/.xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata +++ b/.xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata @@ -1 +1 @@ -ae980a7deeb7cad9f3cd253f3b1ddca5bb26aafa SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz +19ccc8ae5920620db725a08ee65d8b64c521d766 SOURCES/xwayland-22.1.9.tar.xz diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch b/SOURCES/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..111f095 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 19e9f199950aaa4b9b7696936d1b067475da999c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons + +button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all +our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating +insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in +XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with, +leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies. + +CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd) +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------ + dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c +index dcd4efb3b..54ea11a93 100644 +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ b/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + } + + if (from->button->xkb_acts) { +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) { +- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction)); +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) +- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n"); +- } ++ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons); ++ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts, +- sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + } + else { + free(to->button->xkb_acts); +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index 7150734a5..20fef1692 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -2530,6 +2530,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + + if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) { + int i; ++ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons; ++ + DeviceChangedEvent event = { + .header = ET_Internal, + .type = ET_DeviceChanged, +@@ -2540,6 +2542,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + }; + + master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons; ++ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) { ++ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons], ++ 0, ++ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ } + + memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons * + sizeof(Atom)); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch b/SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 595f75e..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -From 8660dd164882ce5fc1f274427e2ff3dc020d6273 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 11:41:40 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: fix potential use-after-free in - DeepCopyPointerClasses - -CVE-2023-0494, ZDI-CAN-19596 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -(cherry picked from commit 0ba6d8c37071131a49790243cdac55392ecf71ec) ---- - Xi/exevents.c | 4 +++- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c -index 217baa956..dcd4efb3b 100644 ---- a/Xi/exevents.c -+++ b/Xi/exevents.c -@@ -619,8 +619,10 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) - memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts, - sizeof(XkbAction)); - } -- else -+ else { - free(to->button->xkb_acts); -+ to->button->xkb_acts = NULL; -+ } - - memcpy(to->button->labels, from->button->labels, - from->button->numButtons * sizeof(Atom)); --- -2.39.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch b/SOURCES/0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f98f71d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 1e8478455458e998dd366d2cd23d2aeab2bdeee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend + +The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at +least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new +part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P +existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements +instead of N + P. + +Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old +values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially +uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes. +For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would +result in this 8 value array: + [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P + ^OOB write + +The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in +both. + +CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +(cherry picked from commit 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a) +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- + randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index 066ba21fba..d315f04d0e 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch b/SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 017f247..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From 8dba686dc277d6d262ad0c77b4632a5b276697ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/7] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in - XTestSwapFakeInput - -XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are -sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments. -However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes, -so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be -misparsed. - -Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct -xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes, -swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast. - -Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent. -Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest -doesn't support GenericEvent. - -CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan ---- - Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++-- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c -index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644 ---- a/Xext/xtest.c -+++ b/Xext/xtest.c -@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req) - - nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent); - for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) { -+ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177; - /* Swap event */ -- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177]; -+ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype]; - /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */ -- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) { -+ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) { - client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type; - return BadValue; - } --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch b/SOURCES/0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..581756a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From b5cb27032d3e486ba84a491e1420e85171c4c0a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/9] dix: allocate enough space for logical button + maps + +Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for +each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped +to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping. + +CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3) +--- + Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +-- + dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c +index 5b77b1a44..2b05ac5f3 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c ++++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c +@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client) + if (pDev->button) { + int i; + +- rep.buttons_len = +- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons)); ++ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */ + rep.length += rep.buttons_len; + buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4); + if (!buttons) +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index 867ec7436..ded8679d7 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail, + + mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER); + +- /* XI 2 event */ +- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0; ++ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8 ++ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */ ++ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0; + btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen); + len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4; + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch b/SOURCES/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..430ead8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From aaf854fb25541380cc38a221c15f0e8372f48872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of + ProcRRChange*Property + +Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty. +See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core +protocol and XI. + +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. + +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With +the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. + +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least +stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB. + +CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632) +--- + randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +- + randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index 25469f57b..c4fef8a1f 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq); +diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +index b79c17f9b..90c5a9a93 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch b/SOURCES/0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 83e4ce2..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -From a8644465d98beb08759546711b77bb617861c67f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas -Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:00 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] record: Fix out of bounds access in - SwapCreateRegister() - -ZDI-CAN-14952, CVE-2021-4011 - -This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas -(cherry picked from commit e56f61c79fc3cee26d83cda0f84ae56d5979f768) ---- - record/record.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c -index be154525d..e123867a7 100644 ---- a/record/record.c -+++ b/record/record.c -@@ -2516,8 +2516,8 @@ SwapCreateRegister(ClientPtr client, xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff) - swapl(pClientID); - } - if (stuff->nRanges > -- client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq) -- - stuff->nClients) -+ (client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq) -+ - stuff->nClients) / bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRange)) - return BadLength; - RecordSwapRanges((xRecordRange *) pClientID, stuff->nRanges); - return Success; --- -2.33.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6e5ebb5..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName - -GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we -fail somewhere. - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer ---- - xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ - 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c -index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644 ---- a/xkb/xkb.c -+++ b/xkb/xkb.c -@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client) - xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc; - status = Success; - str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1]; -- if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status)) /* keymap, unsupported */ -- return BadMatch; -+ { -+ char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); /* keymap, unsupported */ -+ if (keymap) { -+ free(keymap); -+ return BadMatch; -+ } -+ } - names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); - names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); - names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); - names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); - names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); -- if (status != Success) -+ if (status == Success) { -+ len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff); -+ if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length) -+ status = BadLength; -+ } -+ -+ if (status != Success) { -+ free(names.keycodes); -+ free(names.types); -+ free(names.compat); -+ free(names.symbols); -+ free(names.geometry); - return status; -- len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff); -- if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length) -- return BadLength; -+ } - - CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask); - CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask); --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d358a32..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length - attacks - -GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the -request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length -field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a -swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory. - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer ---- - xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++ - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c -index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644 ---- a/xkb/xkb.c -+++ b/xkb/xkb.c -@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str) - CARD16 len; - - wire = *wire_inout; -+ -+ if (client->req_len < -+ bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer)) -+ return BadValue; -+ - len = *(CARD16 *) wire; - if (client->swapped) { - swaps(&len); --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch deleted file mode 100644 index be7b84f..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -From c9b379ec5a1a34692af06056925bd0fc5f809713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:40:47 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/3] xkb: switch to array index loops to moving - pointers - -Most similar loops here use a pointer that advances with each loop -iteration, let's do the same here for consistency. - -No functional changes. - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan -(cherry picked from commit f1070c01d616c5f21f939d5ebc533738779451ac) ---- - xkb/xkb.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c -index d056c698c..684394d77 100644 ---- a/xkb/xkb.c -+++ b/xkb/xkb.c -@@ -5372,16 +5372,16 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - row->left = rWire->left; - row->vertical = rWire->vertical; - kWire = (xkbKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1]; -- for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++) { -+ for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) { - XkbKeyPtr key; - - key = XkbAddGeomKey(row); - if (!key) - return BadAlloc; -- memcpy(key->name.name, kWire[k].name, XkbKeyNameLength); -- key->gap = kWire[k].gap; -- key->shape_ndx = kWire[k].shapeNdx; -- key->color_ndx = kWire[k].colorNdx; -+ memcpy(key->name.name, kWire->name, XkbKeyNameLength); -+ key->gap = kWire->gap; -+ key->shape_ndx = kWire->shapeNdx; -+ key->color_ndx = kWire->colorNdx; - if (key->shape_ndx >= geom->num_shapes) { - client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode3(0x10, key->shape_ndx, - geom->num_shapes); -@@ -5393,7 +5393,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - return BadMatch; - } - } -- rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *) &kWire[rWire->nKeys]; -+ rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *)kWire; - } - wire = (char *) rWire; - if (sWire->nDoodads > 0) { -@@ -5458,16 +5458,16 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - return BadAlloc; - ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius; - ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1]; -- for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++) { -- pt->x = ptWire[p].x; -- pt->y = ptWire[p].y; -+ for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) { -+ pt->x = ptWire->x; -+ pt->y = ptWire->y; - if (client->swapped) { - swaps(&pt->x); - swaps(&pt->y); - } - } - ol->num_points = olWire->nPoints; -- olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *) (&ptWire[olWire->nPoints]); -+ olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *)ptWire; - } - if (shapeWire->primaryNdx != XkbNoShape) - shape->primary = &shape->outlines[shapeWire->primaryNdx]; --- -2.36.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0114bc7..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From 0a7ed9ff7ea20f7b958a2ad9f9bd045080a3ad9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Olivier Fourdan -Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 16:02:34 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] xwayland/eglstream: Demote EGLstream device - warning -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -If no EGLstream capable device is found at startup, Xwayland's EGLstream -backend will log an error message "glamor: No eglstream capable devices -found". - -However, considering that the vast majority of drivers do not implement -EGLstream, the lack of EGLstream capable device is more of the norm than -the exception. - -Change the error message to a log verbose message. - -Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan -Reviewed-by: Simon Ser -Reviewed-by: Jonas Ådahl -(cherry picked from commit 96c82befa2c3f3dc3534743c67cc003c2106e9b0) ---- - hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c -index 8d18caaf5..93d192d58 100644 ---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c -+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c -@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ xwl_eglstream_get_device(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) - free(devices); - out: - if (!device) -- ErrorF("glamor: No eglstream capable devices found\n"); -+ LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: No eglstream capable devices found\n"); - return device; - } - --- -2.33.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch b/SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 72bcadb..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -From c5ff57676698f19ed3a1402aef58a15552e32d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/7] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if - verification failed - -Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the -property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error. - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan ---- - Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++ - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c -index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644 ---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c -+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c -@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) - - rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type, - stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits); -+ if (rc != Success) -+ return rc; - - len = stuff->nUnits; - if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq)))) -@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) - - rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type, - stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items); -+ if (rc != Success) -+ return rc; -+ - len = stuff->num_items; - if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq))) - return BadLength; --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch b/SOURCES/0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b108272 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 9105be1c51d6973dc8d7806108349bc152029ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/9] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our + DeviceStateNotify + +If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is +zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation. + +This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not +both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume +they're applying to the first event in the sequence. + +A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only +one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on +once per type. So effectively this logic code: + + int count = 1; + if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++; + if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++; + if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true + // count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device + + ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent)); + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev); + if (button) + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); + if (key) + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here + +If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're +off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is +written instead. + +Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate. +Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this +patch fixes only the allocation issue. + +Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one +button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero +buttons, it is very unlikely. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5) +--- + dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index ded8679d7..17964b00a 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void + DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + { + int evcount = 1; +- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev; ++ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3]; ++ deviceStateNotify *ev; + deviceKeyStateNotify *kev; + deviceButtonStateNotify *bev; + +@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + } + } + +- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent)); ++ ev = sev; + FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first); + + if (b != NULL) { +@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + + DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount, + DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab); +- free(sev); + } + + void +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch b/SOURCES/0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fe4f283..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -From 3eb5445f6f7fa9f86de87adc768105d42bdbcf74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas -Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:01 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] xfixes: Fix out of bounds access in - *ProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier() - -ZDI-CAN-14950, CVE-2021-4009 - -This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas -(cherry picked from commit b5196750099ae6ae582e1f46bd0a6dad29550e02) ---- - xfixes/cursor.c | 6 ++++-- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xfixes/cursor.c b/xfixes/cursor.c -index 60580b88f..c5d4554b2 100644 ---- a/xfixes/cursor.c -+++ b/xfixes/cursor.c -@@ -1010,7 +1010,8 @@ ProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client) - { - REQUEST(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq); - -- REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices)); -+ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, -+ pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices * sizeof(CARD16))); - LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->barrier, client); - - return XICreatePointerBarrier(client, stuff); -@@ -1027,7 +1028,8 @@ SProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client) - - swaps(&stuff->length); - swaps(&stuff->num_devices); -- REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices)); -+ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, -+ pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices * sizeof(CARD16))); - - swapl(&stuff->barrier); - swapl(&stuff->window); --- -2.33.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch b/SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 26cf147..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,180 +0,0 @@ -From 45a0af83129eb7dc244c5118360afc1972a686c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 09:50:41 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/3] xkb: swap XkbSetDeviceInfo and - XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck - -XKB often uses a FooCheck and Foo function pair, the former is supposed -to check all values in the request and error out on BadLength, -BadValue, etc. The latter is then called once we're confident the values -are good (they may still fail on an individual device, but that's a -different topic). - -In the case of XkbSetDeviceInfo, those functions were incorrectly -named, with XkbSetDeviceInfo ending up as the checker function and -XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck as the setter function. As a result, the setter -function was called before the checker function, accessing request -data and modifying device state before we ensured that the data is -valid. - -In particular, the setter function relied on values being already -byte-swapped. This in turn could lead to potential OOB memory access. - -Fix this by correctly naming the functions and moving the length checks -over to the checker function. These were added in 87c64fc5b0 to the -wrong function, probably due to the incorrect naming. - -Fixes ZDI-CAN 16070, CVE-2022-2320. - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Introduced in c06e27b2f6fd9f7b9f827623a48876a225264132 - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -(cherry picked from commit dd8caf39e9e15d8f302e54045dd08d8ebf1025dc) ---- - xkb/xkb.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- - 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c -index 684394d77..36464a770 100644 ---- a/xkb/xkb.c -+++ b/xkb/xkb.c -@@ -6554,7 +6554,8 @@ ProcXkbGetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client) - static char * - CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - DeviceIntPtr dev, -- int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client) -+ int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client, -+ xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) - { - xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *ledWire; - int i; -@@ -6562,6 +6563,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - - ledWire = (xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *) wire; - for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) { -+ *status_rtrn = BadLength; -+ return (char *) ledWire; -+ } -+ - if (client->swapped) { - swaps(&ledWire->ledClass); - swaps(&ledWire->ledID); -@@ -6589,6 +6595,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - atomWire = (CARD32 *) &ledWire[1]; - if (nNames > 0) { - for (n = 0; n < nNames; n++) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) { -+ *status_rtrn = BadLength; -+ return (char *) atomWire; -+ } -+ - if (client->swapped) { - swapl(atomWire); - } -@@ -6600,6 +6611,10 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - mapWire = (xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *) atomWire; - if (nMaps > 0) { - for (n = 0; n < nMaps; n++) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) { -+ *status_rtrn = BadLength; -+ return (char *) mapWire; -+ } - if (client->swapped) { - swaps(&mapWire->virtualMods); - swapl(&mapWire->ctrls); -@@ -6651,11 +6666,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *mapWire; - XkbSrvLedInfoPtr sli; - -- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) { -- *status_rtrn = BadLength; -- return (char *) ledWire; -- } -- - namec = mapc = statec = 0; - sli = XkbFindSrvLedInfo(dev, ledWire->ledClass, ledWire->ledID, - XkbXI_IndicatorMapsMask); -@@ -6674,10 +6684,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - memset((char *) sli->names, 0, XkbNumIndicators * sizeof(Atom)); - for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) { - if (ledWire->namesPresent & bit) { -- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) { -- *status_rtrn = BadLength; -- return (char *) atomWire; -- } - sli->names[n] = (Atom) *atomWire; - if (sli->names[n] == None) - ledWire->namesPresent &= ~bit; -@@ -6695,10 +6701,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - if (ledWire->mapsPresent) { - for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) { - if (ledWire->mapsPresent & bit) { -- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) { -- *status_rtrn = BadLength; -- return (char *) mapWire; -- } - sli->maps[n].flags = mapWire->flags; - sli->maps[n].which_groups = mapWire->whichGroups; - sli->maps[n].groups = mapWire->groups; -@@ -6734,13 +6736,17 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - } - - static int --_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, -+_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, - xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) - { - char *wire; - - wire = (char *) &stuff[1]; - if (stuff->change & XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask) { -+ int sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc); -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - if (!dev->button) { - client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(XkbErr_BadClass, ButtonClass); - return XkbKeyboardErrorCode; -@@ -6751,13 +6757,13 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, - dev->button->numButtons); - return BadMatch; - } -- wire += (stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc)); -+ wire += sz; - } - if (stuff->change & XkbXI_IndicatorsMask) { - int status = Success; - - wire = CheckSetDeviceIndicators(wire, dev, stuff->nDeviceLedFBs, -- &status, client); -+ &status, client, stuff); - if (status != Success) - return status; - } -@@ -6768,8 +6774,8 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, - } - - static int --_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, -- xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) -+_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, -+ xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) - { - char *wire; - xkbExtensionDeviceNotify ed; -@@ -6793,8 +6799,6 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, - if (stuff->firstBtn + stuff->nBtns > nBtns) - return BadValue; - sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc); -- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz)) -- return BadLength; - memcpy((char *) &acts[stuff->firstBtn], (char *) wire, sz); - wire += sz; - ed.reason |= XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask; --- -2.36.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch b/SOURCES/0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ea69f62..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -From a515f4f4336efb8a2adf9a3ac141129708297d80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Olivier Fourdan -Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:45:35 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] xwayland/glamor: Change errors to verbose - messages -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -On a normal startup sequence, the Xwayland glamor backend would log -an error whenever a required Wayland protocol is missing. - -Those are not really errors though, more informational messages along -the glamor backend selection process. - -Demote those errors to verbose messages to reduce the verbosity of -Xwayland at startup by default. - -Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan -Reviewed-by: Jonas Ådahl -(cherry picked from commit 30d0d4a19be61dd7b61f5ced992cb299e6a38068) ---- - hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c | 6 ++++-- - hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c | 2 +- - hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c | 6 ++++-- - 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c -index 93d192d58..5a20b452f 100644 ---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c -+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-eglstream.c -@@ -753,12 +753,14 @@ xwl_glamor_eglstream_has_wl_interfaces(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) - xwl_eglstream_get(xwl_screen); - - if (xwl_eglstream->display == NULL) { -- ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_eglstream_display' not supported\n"); -+ LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, -+ "glamor: 'wl_eglstream_display' not supported\n"); - return FALSE; - } - - if (xwl_eglstream->controller == NULL) { -- ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_eglstream_controller' not supported\n"); -+ LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, -+ "glamor: 'wl_eglstream_controller' not supported\n"); - return FALSE; - } - -diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c -index 466a1b052..e06b6f54b 100644 ---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c -+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor-gbm.c -@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ xwl_glamor_gbm_has_wl_interfaces(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) - struct xwl_gbm_private *xwl_gbm = xwl_gbm_get(xwl_screen); - - if (xwl_gbm->drm == NULL) { -- ErrorF("glamor: 'wl_drm' not supported\n"); -+ LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: 'wl_drm' not supported\n"); - return FALSE; - } - -diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -index deb398f91..541d5e923 100644 ---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -@@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) - return TRUE; - } - else -- ErrorF("Missing Wayland requirements for glamor GBM backend\n"); -+ LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, -+ "Missing Wayland requirements for glamor GBM backend\n"); - #endif - - return FALSE; -@@ -428,7 +429,8 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) - return TRUE; - } - else -- ErrorF("Missing Wayland requirements for glamor EGLStream backend\n"); -+ LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, -+ "Missing Wayland requirements for glamor EGLStream backend\n"); - #endif - - return FALSE; --- -2.33.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch b/SOURCES/0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 60f2218..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -From fe0c050276c09f43cc1ae80b4553db42398ca84c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas -Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:02 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] Xext: Fix out of bounds access in - SProcScreenSaverSuspend() - -ZDI-CAN-14951, CVE-2021-4010 - -This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas -(cherry picked from commit 6c4c53010772e3cb4cb8acd54950c8eec9c00d21) ---- - Xext/saver.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c -index 1d7e3cadf..f813ba08d 100644 ---- a/Xext/saver.c -+++ b/Xext/saver.c -@@ -1351,8 +1351,8 @@ SProcScreenSaverSuspend(ClientPtr client) - REQUEST(xScreenSaverSuspendReq); - - swaps(&stuff->length); -- swapl(&stuff->suspend); - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xScreenSaverSuspendReq); -+ swapl(&stuff->suspend); - return ProcScreenSaverSuspend(client); - } - --- -2.33.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch b/SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d3c6541..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -From f9c435822c852659e3926502829f1b13ce6efc37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/7] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of - ProcXIChangeProperty - -This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. - -Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With -the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was -truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. - -The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes -(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it -finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least -stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB. - -The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty, -so let's fix that too. - -CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan ---- - Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- - dix/property.c | 3 ++- - 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c -index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644 ---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c -+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c -@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) - REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); - DeviceIntPtr dev; - unsigned long len; -- int totalSize; -+ uint64_t totalSize; - int rc; - - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); -@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) - { - int rc; - DeviceIntPtr dev; -- int totalSize; -+ uint64_t totalSize; - unsigned long len; - - REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq); -diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c -index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644 ---- a/dix/property.c -+++ b/dix/property.c -@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) - WindowPtr pWin; - char format, mode; - unsigned long len; -- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err; -+ int sizeInBytes, err; -+ uint64_t totalSize; - - REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq); - --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch b/SOURCES/0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..add5867 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +From ee5377d94ea587f584adbc9ab8372b3842cfa149 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/9] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation + +The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to +be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing +a number of issues. + +This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to +send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple +32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional +deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple) +deviceValuator events. + +The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence +of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not +protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted. + +Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify +and then append the key state and button state, followed by the +valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators +per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that +troughput. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5) +--- + dix/enterleave.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- + 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index 17964b00a..7b7ba1098 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, + + ev->type = DeviceValuator; + ev->deviceid = dev->id; +- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3; ++ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6; + ev->first_valuator = first; + switch (ev->num_valuators) { ++ case 6: ++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5]; ++ case 5: ++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4]; ++ case 4: ++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3]; + case 3: + ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2]; + case 2: +@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, + ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first]; + break; + } +- first += ev->num_valuators; + } + + static void +@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k, + ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons; + memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4); + } +- else if (k) { ++ if (k) { + ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass); + ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - + k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code; +@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k, + } + } + +- ++/** ++ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events. ++ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32 ++ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values. ++ * ++ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out: ++ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above ++ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above ++ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4 ++ * ++ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS, ++ */ + static void + DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + { ++ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify ++ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */ ++ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6]; + int evcount = 1; +- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3]; +- deviceStateNotify *ev; +- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev; +- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev; ++ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev; + + KeyClassPtr k; + ButtonClassPtr b; +@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + + if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) { + nbuttons = b->numButtons; +- if (nbuttons > 32) ++ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */ + evcount++; + } + if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) { + nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code; +- if (nkeys > 32) ++ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */ + evcount++; +- if (nbuttons > 0) { +- evcount++; +- } + } + if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) { + nval = v->numAxes; +- +- if (nval > 3) +- evcount++; +- if (nval > 6) { +- if (!(k && b)) +- evcount++; +- if (nval > 9) +- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3); +- } ++ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then ++ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */ ++ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6; + } + +- ev = sev; +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first); +- +- if (b != NULL) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nbuttons > 32) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++; +- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify; +- bev->deviceid = dev->id; +- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4], +- DOWN_LENGTH - 4); +- } +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev)); ++ ++ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first); ++ ++ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) { ++ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev; ++ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify; ++ bev->deviceid = dev->id; ++ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4], ++ DOWN_LENGTH - 4); + } + +- if (k != NULL) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nkeys > 32) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++; +- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify; +- kev->deviceid = dev->id; +- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28); +- } +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) { ++ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev; ++ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify; ++ kev->deviceid = dev->id; ++ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28); + } + ++ first = 3; ++ nval -= 3; + while (nval > 0) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first); ++ first += 6; ++ nval -= 6; + } + + DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch b/SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4200896..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,183 +0,0 @@ -From bd134231e282d9eb126b6fdaa40bb383180fa72b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 11:11:06 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/3] xkb: add request length validation for - XkbSetGeometry - -No validation of the various fields on that report were done, so a -malicious client could send a short request that claims it had N -sections, or rows, or keys, and the server would process the request for -N sections, running out of bounds of the actual request data. - -Fix this by adding size checks to ensure our data is valid. - -ZDI-CAN 16062, CVE-2022-2319. - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -(cherry picked from commit 6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42) ---- - xkb/xkb.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- - 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c -index 36464a770..27d19793e 100644 ---- a/xkb/xkb.c -+++ b/xkb/xkb.c -@@ -5160,7 +5160,7 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str) - } - - static Status --_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, -+_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req, - XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client) - { - char *wire; -@@ -5171,6 +5171,9 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, - Status status; - - dWire = (xkbDoodadWireDesc *) (*wire_inout); -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, dWire, dWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - any = dWire->any; - wire = (char *) &dWire[1]; - if (client->swapped) { -@@ -5273,7 +5276,7 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, - } - - static Status --_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, -+_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req, - XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client) - { - register int r; -@@ -5284,6 +5287,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, - - wire = *wire_inout; - olWire = (xkbOverlayWireDesc *) wire; -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - if (client->swapped) { - swapl(&olWire->name); - } -@@ -5295,6 +5301,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, - xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *kWire; - XkbOverlayRowPtr row; - -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - if (rWire->rowUnder > section->num_rows) { - client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode4(0x20, r, section->num_rows, - rWire->rowUnder); -@@ -5303,6 +5312,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, - row = XkbAddGeomOverlayRow(ol, rWire->rowUnder, rWire->nKeys); - kWire = (xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1]; - for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - if (XkbAddGeomOverlayKey(ol, row, - (char *) kWire->over, - (char *) kWire->under) == NULL) { -@@ -5336,6 +5348,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - register int r; - xkbRowWireDesc *rWire; - -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, sWire, sWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - if (client->swapped) { - swapl(&sWire->name); - swaps(&sWire->top); -@@ -5361,6 +5376,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - XkbRowPtr row; - xkbKeyWireDesc *kWire; - -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - if (client->swapped) { - swaps(&rWire->top); - swaps(&rWire->left); -@@ -5375,6 +5393,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) { - XkbKeyPtr key; - -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - key = XkbAddGeomKey(row); - if (!key) - return BadAlloc; -@@ -5400,7 +5421,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - register int d; - - for (d = 0; d < sWire->nDoodads; d++) { -- status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, section, client); -+ status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, section, client); - if (status != Success) - return status; - } -@@ -5409,7 +5430,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - register int o; - - for (o = 0; o < sWire->nOverlays; o++) { -- status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, geom, section, client); -+ status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, req, geom, section, client); - if (status != Success) - return status; - } -@@ -5443,6 +5464,9 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - xkbOutlineWireDesc *olWire; - XkbOutlinePtr ol; - -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, shapeWire, shapeWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - shape = - XkbAddGeomShape(geom, shapeWire->name, shapeWire->nOutlines); - if (!shape) -@@ -5453,12 +5477,18 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom, - XkbPointPtr pt; - xkbPointWireDesc *ptWire; - -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - ol = XkbAddGeomOutline(shape, olWire->nPoints); - if (!ol) - return BadAlloc; - ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius; - ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1]; - for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, ptWire, ptWire + 1)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - pt->x = ptWire->x; - pt->y = ptWire->y; - if (client->swapped) { -@@ -5564,12 +5594,15 @@ _CheckSetGeom(XkbGeometryPtr geom, xkbSetGeometryReq * req, ClientPtr client) - return status; - - for (i = 0; i < req->nDoodads; i++) { -- status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, NULL, client); -+ status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, NULL, client); - if (status != Success) - return status; - } - - for (i = 0; i < req->nKeyAliases; i++) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, wire, wire + XkbKeyNameLength)) -+ return BadLength; -+ - if (XkbAddGeomKeyAlias(geom, &wire[XkbKeyNameLength], wire) == NULL) - return BadAlloc; - wire += 2 * XkbKeyNameLength; --- -2.36.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch b/SOURCES/0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3d231cd..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -From 3206e133cb768709d32f260ac4b1bb17a46141a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Olivier Fourdan -Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 13:09:58 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] xwayland/glamor: Log backend selected for debug -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -Add (verbose) statements to trace the actual backend used with glamor. - -That can be useful for debugging. - -Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan -Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer -(cherry picked from commit c5d1fed9fa32244739677ec5c58ea87b261e023b) ---- - hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c | 2 ++ - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -index 541d5e923..b34eafabb 100644 ---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) - if (xwl_screen->gbm_backend.is_available && - xwl_glamor_has_wl_interfaces(xwl_screen, &xwl_screen->gbm_backend)) { - xwl_screen->egl_backend = &xwl_screen->gbm_backend; -+ LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: Using GBM backend\n"); - return TRUE; - } - else -@@ -426,6 +427,7 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) - if (xwl_screen->eglstream_backend.is_available && - xwl_glamor_has_wl_interfaces(xwl_screen, &xwl_screen->eglstream_backend)) { - xwl_screen->egl_backend = &xwl_screen->eglstream_backend; -+ LogMessageVerb(X_INFO, 3, "glamor: Using EGLStream backend\n"); - return TRUE; - } - else --- -2.33.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch b/SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5b189ea..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -From 0dab0b527ac5c4fe0272ea679522bd87238a733b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/7] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255 - -The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above -255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche -to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero -anyway. - -This fixes an OOB write: - -ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a -temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail. -For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the -stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit -representing stuff->detail cleared. - -However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits, -thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write. - -CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan ---- - Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- - 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c -index 2769fb7c94..c9ac2f8553 100644 ---- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c -+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c -@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) - return BadValue; - } - -+ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never -+ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that -+ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */ -+ if (stuff->detail > 255) -+ return XIAlreadyGrabbed; -+ - if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1], - stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success) - return BadValue; -@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) - ¶m, XI2, &mask); - break; - case XIGrabtypeKeycode: -- /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never -- * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that -- * cannot work anyway */ -- if (stuff->detail > 255) -- status = XIAlreadyGrabbed; -- else -- status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, -- ¶m, XI2, &mask); -+ status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, -+ ¶m, XI2, &mask); - break; - case XIGrabtypeEnter: - case XIGrabtypeFocusIn: -@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) - return BadValue; - } - -+ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */ -+ if (stuff->detail > 255) { -+ client->errorValue = stuff->detail; -+ return BadValue; -+ } -+ - rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess); - if (rc != Success) - return rc; --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch b/SOURCES/0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f13a70 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 1c22e4a35e71d98a082ad2f8f7bc778a8859e18d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/9] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the + number of buttons + +There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class +from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a +device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid. + +Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we +don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices +with more than this number of buttons anyway. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74) +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c +index 54ea11a93..e16171468 100644 +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ b/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec)); + if (!to->button) + FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n"); ++ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons; + } + else + classes->button = NULL; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch b/SOURCES/0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 59c0762..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -From 59c977bff66de77bd93ce8853e33e1b4ca661a49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas -Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:03 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] render: Fix out of bounds access in - SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs() - -ZDI-CAN-14192, CVE-2021-4008 - -This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas -(cherry picked from commit ebce7e2d80e7c80e1dda60f2f0bc886f1106ba60) ---- - render/render.c | 9 +++++++++ - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c -index c376090ca..456f156d4 100644 ---- a/render/render.c -+++ b/render/render.c -@@ -2309,6 +2309,9 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client) - - i = elt->len; - if (i == 0xff) { -+ if (buffer + 4 > end) { -+ return BadLength; -+ } - swapl((int *) buffer); - buffer += 4; - } -@@ -2319,12 +2322,18 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client) - buffer += i; - break; - case 2: -+ if (buffer + i * 2 > end) { -+ return BadLength; -+ } - while (i--) { - swaps((short *) buffer); - buffer += 2; - } - break; - case 4: -+ if (buffer + i * 4 > end) { -+ return BadLength; -+ } - while (i--) { - swapl((int *) buffer); - buffer += 4; --- -2.33.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch b/SOURCES/0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a983979..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -From bdc00ba749ac6cde35c025f5f6b1a5b49c1f4960 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Olivier Fourdan -Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 09:56:52 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] xwayland/eglstream: Prefer EGLstream if available -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -Currently, when given the choice, Xwayland will pick the GBM backend -over the EGLstream backend if both are available, unless the command -line option “-eglstream” is specified. - -The NVIDIA proprietary driver had no support for GBM until driver series -495, but starting with the driver series 495, both can be used. - -But there are other requirements with the rest of the stack, typically -Mesa, egl-wayland, libglvnd as documented in the NVIDIA driver. - -So if the NVIDIA driver series 495 gets installed, Xwayland will pick -the GBM backend even if EGLstream is available and may fail to render -properly. - -To avoid that issue, prefer EGLstream if EGLstream and all the Wayland -interfaces are available, and fallback to GBM automatically unless -“-eglstream” was specified. - -With this, the compositor, given the choice, can decide which actual -backend Xwayland would use by advertising (or not) the Wayland -"wl_eglstream_controller" interface. - -This change has no impact on compositors which do not have support for -EGLstream in the first place. - -Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan -Acked-by: Michel Dänzer -(cherry picked from commit 6dd9709bd85cf5de4067887818c864220b951355) ---- - hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c | 8 ++------ - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -index b34eafabb..f46b677f5 100644 ---- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -+++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-glamor.c -@@ -441,14 +441,10 @@ xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) - void - xwl_glamor_select_backend(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen, Bool use_eglstream) - { -- if (use_eglstream) { -- if (!xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen)) -+ if (!xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen)) { -+ if (!use_eglstream) - xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(xwl_screen); - } -- else { -- if (!xwl_glamor_select_gbm_backend(xwl_screen)) -- xwl_glamor_select_eglstream_backend(xwl_screen); -- } - } - - Bool --- -2.33.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch b/SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch deleted file mode 100644 index dc2a9d9..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From 94f6fe99d87cf6ba0adadd95c595158c345b7d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/7] Xext: free the screen saver resource when - replacing it - -This fixes a use-after-free bug: - -When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct -ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's -resources. - -When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new -struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The -old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources. - -Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes -ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct. - -Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead. - -CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan ---- - Xext/saver.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c -index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644 ---- a/Xext/saver.c -+++ b/Xext/saver.c -@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client) - pVlist++; - } - if (pPriv->attr) -- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr); -+ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType); - pPriv->attr = pAttr; - pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index); - if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr)) --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch b/SOURCES/0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c760402 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +From 7efd09cdb13ae1a4100f68a11947afe581fa1ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/9] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing + master devices + +The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up +to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`. + +If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same +ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to +two info structures being written to `info`. + +Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two +times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation. + +To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the +device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event +thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and +optionally slave attached/detached). + +CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit 4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1) +--- + Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c +index d2d985848..72d00451e 100644 +--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c ++++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c +@@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */ + int rc = Success; + int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; ++ enum { ++ NO_CHANGE, ++ FLUSH, ++ CHANGED, ++ } changes = NO_CHANGE; + + REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); +@@ -465,8 +470,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = add_master(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = FLUSH; + break; ++ } + case XIRemoveMaster: + { + xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any; +@@ -475,8 +481,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = remove_master(client, r, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = FLUSH; + break; ++ } + case XIDetachSlave: + { + xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any; +@@ -485,8 +492,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = CHANGED; + break; ++ } + case XIAttachSlave: + { + xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any; +@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; ++ changes = CHANGED; ++ break; + } ++ default: + break; + } + ++ if (changes == FLUSH) { ++ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); ++ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags)); ++ changes = NO_CHANGE; ++ } ++ + len -= any->length * 4; + any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4); + } + + unwind: +- +- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); ++ if (changes != NO_CHANGE) ++ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); + return rc; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch b/SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ba8b8fa..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -From a42635ee3c01f71a49052d83a372933504c9db04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/7] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off - from the same client - -This fixes a use-after-free bug: - -When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a -TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct -is added twice to the resources: - - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per - drawable, subsequent calls append to this list. - - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client. - -The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a -client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove -all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting -the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove -and free the whole list. - -However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the -same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the -existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the -client's resources. - -If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes -XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable -- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource -for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL. - -Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes -XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On -a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon. - -Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely -setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client -resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed -again when the client quits. - -Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the -XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for -clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify. - -CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan ---- - Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c -index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644 ---- a/Xext/xvmain.c -+++ b/Xext/xvmain.c -@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff) - tpn = pn; - while (tpn) { - if (tpn->client == client) { -- if (!onoff) -+ if (!onoff) { - tpn->client = NULL; -+ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify); -+ } - return Success; - } - if (!tpn->client) --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch b/SOURCES/0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04ac195 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From 01cd3a72858ccc1afb0b42ace92263f2912619a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= +Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/9] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during + recursion + +The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device +is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked +list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list. + +However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive +call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a +removed device. + +This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of +devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap +overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation. + +Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to +`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the +previous device after the recursion. + +CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +(cherry picked from commit bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b) +--- + dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index 8fe4a341c..f3db37203 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -453,14 +453,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + { + DeviceIntPtr *prev, other; + BOOL enabled; ++ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE; + int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; + + if (!dev->enabled) + return TRUE; + +- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices; +- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next); +- if (*prev != dev) ++ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) { ++ if (other == dev) { ++ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (!dev_in_devices_list) + return FALSE; + + TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev); +@@ -511,6 +517,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + LeaveWindow(dev); + SetFocusOut(dev); + ++ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices; ++ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next); ++ + *prev = dev->next; + dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices; + inputInfo.off_devices = dev; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch b/SOURCES/0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7db7dbd --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 42f8d1828b4fc1e0b8165a767a0b74edcdbf3806 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/9] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled + slaved devices too + +Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this +to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their +reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed +memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave +device. + +And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during +CloseDownDevices(). + +Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 + +(cherry picked from commit 26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8) +--- + dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index f3db37203..95190b5b7 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -483,6 +483,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached; + } + } ++ ++ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) { ++ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) { ++ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL); ++ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached; ++ } ++ } + } + else { + for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) { +@@ -1080,6 +1087,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void) + dev->master = NULL; + } + ++ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) { ++ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev)) ++ dev->master = NULL; ++ } ++ + CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices); + CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices); + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch b/SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c6b2352..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -From 774260dbae1fa505cd2848c786baed9a8db5179d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/7] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after - freeing it - -Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not -reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access -already freed memory. - -CVE-2022-46283, ZDI-CAN-19530 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan ---- - xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c -index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644 ---- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c -+++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c -@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst) - } - else { - free(dst->names->radio_groups); -+ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL; - } - dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg; - --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch b/SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c84d387..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -From bb1711b7fba42f2a0c7d1c09beee241a1b2bcc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 10:06:45 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xext: fix invalid event type mask in - XTestSwapFakeInput - -In commit b320ca0 the mask was inadvertently changed from octal 0177 to -hexadecimal 0x177. - -Fixes commit b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 - Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput - -Found by Stuart Cassoff - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer ---- - Xext/xtest.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c -index 2985a4ce6e..dde5c4cf9d 100644 ---- a/Xext/xtest.c -+++ b/Xext/xtest.c -@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req) - - nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent); - for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) { -- int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177; -+ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0177; - /* Swap event */ - proc = EventSwapVector[evtype]; - /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */ --- -2.38.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch b/SOURCES/0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4071d27 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From 4093057b98bc5a178f130c9ba6b0b28385e24ae5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 12:09:41 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 8/9] glx: Call XACE hooks on the GLX buffer + +The XSELINUX code will label resources at creation by checking the +access mode. When the access mode is DixCreateAccess, it will call the +function to label the new resource SELinuxLabelResource(). + +However, GLX buffers do not go through the XACE hooks when created, +hence leaving the resource actually unlabeled. + +When, later, the client tries to create another resource using that +drawable (like a GC for example), the XSELINUX code would try to use +the security ID of that object which has never been labeled, get a NULL +pointer and crash when checking whether the requested permissions are +granted for subject security ID. + +To avoid the issue, make sure to call the XACE hooks when creating the +GLX buffers. + +Credit goes to Donn Seeley for providing the patch. + +CVE-2024-0408 + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Acked-by: Peter Hutterer +(cherry picked from commit e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3) +--- + glx/glxcmds.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c +index fc26a2e34..1e46d0c72 100644 +--- a/glx/glxcmds.c ++++ b/glx/glxcmds.c +@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ + #include "indirect_util.h" + #include "protocol-versions.h" + #include "glxvndabi.h" ++#include "xace.h" + + static char GLXServerVendorName[] = "SGI"; + +@@ -1392,6 +1393,13 @@ DoCreatePbuffer(ClientPtr client, int screenNum, XID fbconfigId, + if (!pPixmap) + return BadAlloc; + ++ err = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, glxDrawableId, RT_PIXMAP, ++ pPixmap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess); ++ if (err != Success) { ++ (*pGlxScreen->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap); ++ return err; ++ } ++ + /* Assign the pixmap the same id as the pbuffer and add it as a + * resource so it and the DRI2 drawable will be reclaimed when the + * pbuffer is destroyed. */ +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch b/SOURCES/0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69f70a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 51be9e767a02cdc6a524dc895dcc81abb689d50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 11:51:56 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 9/9] ephyr,xwayland: Use the proper private key for + cursor + +The cursor in DIX is actually split in two parts, the cursor itself and +the cursor bits, each with their own devPrivates. + +The cursor itself includes the cursor bits, meaning that the cursor bits +devPrivates in within structure of the cursor. + +Both Xephyr and Xwayland were using the private key for the cursor bits +to store the data for the cursor, and when using XSELINUX which comes +with its own special devPrivates, the data stored in that cursor bits' +devPrivates would interfere with the XSELINUX devPrivates data and the +SELINUX security ID would point to some other unrelated data, causing a +crash in the XSELINUX code when trying to (re)use the security ID. + +CVE-2024-0409 + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +(cherry picked from commit 2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7) +--- + hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c +index e3c1aaa50..bd94b0cfb 100644 +--- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c ++++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c +@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static miPointerScreenFuncRec xwl_pointer_screen_funcs = { + Bool + xwl_screen_init_cursor(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) + { +- if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR_BITS, 0)) ++ if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR, 0)) + return FALSE; + + return miPointerInitialize(xwl_screen->screen, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec b/SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec index 8a37113..8472ac0 100644 --- a/SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec +++ b/SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec @@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ Summary: Xwayland Name: xorg-x11-server-Xwayland -Version: 21.1.3 -Release: 7%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist} +Version: 22.1.9 +Release: 5%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist} URL: http://www.x.org %if 0%{?gitdate} @@ -18,45 +18,27 @@ Source0: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/%{pkgname}/-/archive/%{commit}/%{ Source0: https://www.x.org/pub/individual/xserver/%{pkgname}-%{version}.tar.xz %endif -Patch1: 0001-xwayland-eglstream-Demote-EGLstream-device-warning.patch -Patch2: 0002-xwayland-glamor-Change-errors-to-verbose-messages.patch -Patch3: 0003-xwayland-glamor-Log-backend-selected-for-debug.patch -Patch4: 0004-xwayland-eglstream-Prefer-EGLstream-if-available.patch - -# CVE-2021-4011 -Patch10001: 0001-record-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SwapCreateRegiste.patch -# CVE-2021-4009 -Patch10002: 0002-xfixes-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ProcXFixesCreateP.patch -# CVE-2021-4010 -Patch10003: 0003-Xext-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcScreenSaverSus.patch -# CVE-2021-4008 -Patch10004: 0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch -# CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070 -Patch10005: 0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch -Patch10006: 0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch -Patch10007: 0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch -# CVE-2022-3550 -Patch10008: 0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch -# CVE-2022-3551 -Patch10009: 0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch -# CVE-2022-46340 -Patch10010: 0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch -# related to CVE-2022-46344 -Patch10011: 0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch -# CVE-2022-46344 -Patch10012: 0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch -# CVE-2022-46341 -Patch10013: 0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch -# CVE-2022-46343 -Patch10014: 0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch -# CVE-2022-46342 -Patch10015: 0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch -# CVE-2022-46283 -Patch10016: 0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch -# Follow-up to CVE-2022-46340 -Patch10017: 0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch -# CVE-2023-0494 -Patch10018: 0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch +# Fix for CVE-2023-5367 +Patch1: 0001-Xi-randr-fix-handling-of-PropModeAppend-Prepend.patch +# Fix for CVE-2023-6478 +Patch2: 0001-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch +# Fix for CVE-2023-6377 +Patch3: 0001-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch +# Fix for CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665 +Patch4: 0001-dix-allocate-enough-space-for-logical-button-maps.patch +# Fix for CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 +Patch5: 0002-dix-Allocate-sufficient-xEvents-for-our-DeviceStateN.patch +Patch6: 0003-dix-fix-DeviceStateNotify-event-calculation.patch +Patch7: 0004-Xi-when-creating-a-new-ButtonClass-set-the-number-of.patch +# Fix for CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744 +Patch8: 0005-Xi-flush-hierarchy-events-after-adding-removing-mast.patch +# Fix for CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 +Patch9: 0006-Xi-do-not-keep-linked-list-pointer-during-recursion.patch +Patch10: 0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch +# Fix for CVE-2024-0408 +Patch11: 0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch +# Fix for CVE-2024-0409 +Patch12: 0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch License: MIT @@ -68,11 +50,10 @@ BuildRequires: git-core BuildRequires: meson BuildRequires: wayland-devel -BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-client) >= 1.3.0 +BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-client) >= 1.18.0 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-protocols) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(wayland-eglstream-protocols) -BuildRequires: pkgconfig(dmx) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(epoxy) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fontenc) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libdrm) >= 2.4.0 @@ -97,6 +78,7 @@ BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xshmfence) >= 1.1 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtrans) >= 1.3.2 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtst) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xv) +BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libxcvt) BuildRequires: xorg-x11-proto-devel >= 7.7-10 BuildRequires: mesa-libGL-devel >= 9.2 @@ -163,6 +145,25 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc %changelog +* Tue Jan 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan - 21.1.9-5 + Fix for CVE-2023-6816, CVE-2024-0229, CVE-2024-21885, CVE-2024-21886, + CVE-2024-0408, CVE-2024-0409 + +* Wed Dec 13 2023 Olivier Fourdan - 21.1.9-4 +- Fix for CVE-2023-6377, CVE-2023-6478 + +* Wed Oct 25 2023 Olivier Fourdan - 22.1.9-3 +- Fix for CVE-2023-5367 + +* Tue Apr 25 2023 Olivier Fourdan - 22.1.9-2 +- Rebuild (#2158761) + +* Mon Apr 3 2023 Olivier Fourdan - 22.1.9-1 +- xwayland 22.1.9 (#2158761) + +* Fri Mar 31 2023 Olivier Fourdan - 21.1.3-8 +- Fix CVE-2023-1393 (#2180299) + * Tue Feb 7 2023 Olivier Fourdan - 21.1.3-7 - Fix CVE-2023-0494 (#2166974)