Add patch to fix remote code execution vulnerability

- Resolves: CVE-2014-0107
This commit is contained in:
Mikolaj Izdebski 2014-03-27 10:02:28 +01:00
parent 17c578d667
commit a4caac49eb
2 changed files with 158 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
diff --git a/src/org/apache/xalan/processor/TransformerFactoryImpl.java b/src/org/apache/xalan/processor/TransformerFactoryImpl.java
index 1298943..96a5e58 100644
--- a/src/org/apache/xalan/processor/TransformerFactoryImpl.java
+++ b/src/org/apache/xalan/processor/TransformerFactoryImpl.java
@@ -335,6 +335,10 @@ public class TransformerFactoryImpl extends SAXTransformerFactory
reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
}
+ if(m_isSecureProcessing)
+ {
+ reader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities",false);
+ }
// Need to set options!
reader.setContentHandler(handler);
reader.parse(isource);
diff --git a/src/org/apache/xalan/processor/XSLTElementProcessor.java b/src/org/apache/xalan/processor/XSLTElementProcessor.java
index b946743..17b7395 100644
--- a/src/org/apache/xalan/processor/XSLTElementProcessor.java
+++ b/src/org/apache/xalan/processor/XSLTElementProcessor.java
@@ -338,17 +338,31 @@ public class XSLTElementProcessor extends ElemTemplateElement
}
else
{
- // Can we switch the order here:
-
- boolean success = attrDef.setAttrValue(handler, attrUri, attrLocalName,
- attributes.getQName(i), attributes.getValue(i),
- target);
-
- // Now we only add the element if it passed a validation check
- if (success)
- processedDefs.add(attrDef);
- else
- errorDefs.add(attrDef);
+ //handle secure processing
+ if(handler.getStylesheetProcessor()==null)
+ System.out.println("stylesheet processor null");
+ if(attrDef.getName().compareTo("*")==0 && handler.getStylesheetProcessor().isSecureProcessing())
+ {
+ //foreign attributes are not allowed in secure processing mode
+ // Then barf, because this element does not allow this attribute.
+ handler.error(XSLTErrorResources.ER_ATTR_NOT_ALLOWED, new Object[]{attributes.getQName(i), rawName}, null);//"\""+attributes.getQName(i)+"\""
+ //+ " attribute is not allowed on the " + rawName
+ // + " element!", null);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+
+
+ boolean success = attrDef.setAttrValue(handler, attrUri, attrLocalName,
+ attributes.getQName(i), attributes.getValue(i),
+ target);
+
+ // Now we only add the element if it passed a validation check
+ if (success)
+ processedDefs.add(attrDef);
+ else
+ errorDefs.add(attrDef);
+ }
}
}
diff --git a/src/org/apache/xalan/transformer/TransformerImpl.java b/src/org/apache/xalan/transformer/TransformerImpl.java
index dd0d4d9..0906d24 100644
--- a/src/org/apache/xalan/transformer/TransformerImpl.java
+++ b/src/org/apache/xalan/transformer/TransformerImpl.java
@@ -438,7 +438,9 @@ public class TransformerImpl extends Transformer
try
{
if (sroot.getExtensions() != null)
- m_extensionsTable = new ExtensionsTable(sroot);
+ //only load extensions if secureProcessing is disabled
+ if(!sroot.isSecureProcessing())
+ m_extensionsTable = new ExtensionsTable(sroot);
}
catch (javax.xml.transform.TransformerException te)
{te.printStackTrace();}
diff --git a/src/org/apache/xpath/functions/FuncSystemProperty.java b/src/org/apache/xpath/functions/FuncSystemProperty.java
index 4bea356..78ac980 100644
--- a/src/org/apache/xpath/functions/FuncSystemProperty.java
+++ b/src/org/apache/xpath/functions/FuncSystemProperty.java
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ public class FuncSystemProperty extends FunctionOneArg
String fullName = m_arg0.execute(xctxt).str();
int indexOfNSSep = fullName.indexOf(':');
- String result;
+ String result = null;
String propName = "";
// List of properties where the name of the
@@ -98,14 +98,20 @@ public class FuncSystemProperty extends FunctionOneArg
try
{
- result = System.getProperty(propName);
-
- if (null == result)
- {
-
- // result = System.getenv(propName);
- return XString.EMPTYSTRING;
- }
+ //if secure procession is enabled only handle required properties do not not map any valid system property
+ if(!xctxt.isSecureProcessing())
+ {
+ result = System.getProperty(propName);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ warn(xctxt, XPATHErrorResources.WG_SECURITY_EXCEPTION,
+ new Object[]{ fullName }); //"SecurityException when trying to access XSL system property: "+fullName);
+ }
+ if (null == result)
+ {
+ return XString.EMPTYSTRING;
+ }
}
catch (SecurityException se)
{
@@ -120,14 +126,20 @@ public class FuncSystemProperty extends FunctionOneArg
{
try
{
- result = System.getProperty(fullName);
-
- if (null == result)
- {
-
- // result = System.getenv(fullName);
- return XString.EMPTYSTRING;
- }
+ //if secure procession is enabled only handle required properties do not not map any valid system property
+ if(!xctxt.isSecureProcessing())
+ {
+ result = System.getProperty(fullName);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ warn(xctxt, XPATHErrorResources.WG_SECURITY_EXCEPTION,
+ new Object[]{ fullName }); //"SecurityException when trying to access XSL system property: "+fullName);
+ }
+ if (null == result)
+ {
+ return XString.EMPTYSTRING;
+ }
}
catch (SecurityException se)
{

View File

@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
Name: xalan-j2
Version: 2.7.1
Release: 21%{?dist}
Release: 22%{?dist}
Epoch: 0
Summary: Java XSLT processor
# src/org/apache/xpath/domapi/XPathStylesheetDOM3Exception.java is W3C
@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ Patch0: %{name}-noxsltcdeps.patch
# Fix the serializer JAR filename in xalan-j2's MANIFEST.MF
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=718738
Patch1: %{name}-serializerJARname.patch
# Fix CVE-2014-0107: insufficient constraints in secure processing
# feature (oCERT-2014-002). Generated form upstream revisions 1581058
# and 1581426.
Patch2: %{name}-CVE-2014-0107.patch
URL: http://xalan.apache.org/
Group: Development/Libraries
@ -116,6 +120,7 @@ Demonstrations and samples for %{name}.
%setup -q -n xalan-j_%{cvs_version}
%patch0 -p0
%patch1 -p0
%patch2 -p1
# Remove all binary libs, except ones needed to build docs and N/A elsewhere.
for j in $(find . -name "*.jar"); do
mv $j $j.no
@ -244,6 +249,10 @@ update-alternatives --install %{_javadir}/jaxp_transform_impl.jar \
%{_datadir}/%{name}
%changelog
* Thu Mar 27 2014 Mikolaj Izdebski <mizdebsk@redhat.com> - 0:2.7.1-22
- Add patch to fix remote code execution vulnerability
- Resolves: CVE-2014-0107
* Mon Aug 19 2013 Mikolaj Izdebski <mizdebsk@redhat.com> - 0:2.7.1-21
- Move depmaps to appropriate packages
- Resolves: rhbz#998594