diff --git a/0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch b/0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6568dc --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 5b093570dca1855c5bf40bcbd8d149fa6f8ea8ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <5b093570dca1855c5bf40bcbd8d149fa6f8ea8ff.1650620058.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Lubomir Rintel +Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 09:54:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] D-Bus: Add 'wep_disabled' capability + +Since commit 200c7693c9a1 ('Make WEP functionality an optional build +parameter'), WEP support is optional and, indeed, off by default. + +The distributions are now catching up and disabling WEP in their builds. +Unfortunately, there's no indication prior to an attempt to connect to a +WEP network that it's not going to work. Add a capability to communicate +that. + +Unlike other capabilities, this one is negative. That is, it indicates +lack of a WEP support as opposed to its presence. This is necessary +because historically there has been no capability to indicate presence +of WEP support and therefore NetworkManager (and probably others) just +assumes it's there. + +Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel +Acked-by: Davide Caratti +--- + wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c +index 1c9ded09a..0b1002bf1 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c +@@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ dbus_bool_t wpas_dbus_getter_global_capabilities( + const struct wpa_dbus_property_desc *property_desc, + DBusMessageIter *iter, DBusError *error, void *user_data) + { +- const char *capabilities[13]; ++ const char *capabilities[14]; + size_t num_items = 0; + struct wpa_global *global = user_data; + struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s; +@@ -1177,6 +1177,9 @@ dbus_bool_t wpas_dbus_getter_global_capabilities( + #endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 */ + if (ext_key_id_supported) + capabilities[num_items++] = "extended_key_id"; ++#ifndef CONFIG_WEP ++ capabilities[num_items++] = "wep_disabled"; ++#endif /* !CONFIG_WEP */ + + return wpas_dbus_simple_array_property_getter(iter, + DBUS_TYPE_STRING, +-- +2.35.1 + diff --git a/0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch b/0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a2ffaf --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 566ce69a8d0e64093309cbde80235aa522fbf84e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <566ce69a8d0e64093309cbde80235aa522fbf84e.1652450572.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 00:07:44 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP peer: Workaround for servers that do not support safe TLS + renegotiation + +The TLS protocol design for renegotiation was identified to have a +significant security flaw in 2009 and an extension to secure this design +was published in 2010 (RFC 5746). However, some old RADIUS +authentication servers without support for this are still used commonly. + +This is obviously not good from the security view point, but since there +are cases where the user of a network service has no realistic means for +getting the authentication server upgraded, TLS handshake may still need +to be allowed to be able to use the network. + +OpenSSL 3.0 disabled the client side workaround by default and this +resulted in issues connection to some networks with insecure +authentication servers. With OpenSSL 3.0, the client is now enforcing +security by refusing to authenticate with such servers. The pre-3.0 +behavior of ignoring this issue and leaving security to the server can +now be enabled with a new phase1 parameter allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1. +This should be used only when having to connect to a network that has an +insecure authentication server that cannot be upgraded. + +The old (pre-2010) TLS renegotiation mechanism might open security +vulnerabilities if the authentication server were to allow TLS +renegotiation to be initiated. While this is unlikely to cause real +issues with EAP-TLS, there might be cases where use of PEAP or TTLS with +an authentication server that does not support RFC 5746 might result in +a security vulnerability. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/crypto/tls.h | 1 + + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 5 +++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 4 ++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 5 +++++ + 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls.h b/src/crypto/tls.h +index ccaac94c9..7ea32ee4a 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls.h ++++ b/src/crypto/tls.h +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct tls_config { + #define TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1 BIT(15) + #define TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2 BIT(16) + #define TLS_CONN_TEAP_ANON_DH BIT(17) ++#define TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION BIT(18) + + /** + * struct tls_connection_params - Parameters for TLS connection +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index 388c6b0f4..0d23f44ad 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -3081,6 +3081,11 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags, + SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); + #endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET */ + ++#ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT ++ if (flags & TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION) ++ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT); ++#endif /* SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT */ ++ + #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 + if (flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0) + SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1); +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +index 06c9b211e..6193b4bdb 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ static void eap_tls_params_flags(struct tls_connection_params *params, + params->flags |= TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH; + if (os_strstr(txt, "tls_suiteb_no_ecdh=0")) + params->flags &= ~TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH; ++ if (os_strstr(txt, "allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1")) ++ params->flags |= TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION; ++ if (os_strstr(txt, "allow_unsafe_renegotiation=0")) ++ params->flags &= ~TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +index a1dc769c9..b5304a77e 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1370,6 +1370,11 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # tls_suiteb=0 - do not apply Suite B 192-bit constraints on TLS (default) + # tls_suiteb=1 - apply Suite B 192-bit constraints on TLS; this is used in + # particular when using Suite B with RSA keys of >= 3K (3072) bits ++# allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1 - allow connection with a TLS server that does ++# not support safe renegotiation (RFC 5746); please note that this ++# workaround should be only when having to authenticate with an old ++# authentication server that cannot be updated to use secure TLS ++# implementation. + # + # Following certificate/private key fields are used in inner Phase2 + # authentication when using EAP-TTLS or EAP-PEAP. +-- +2.35.1 + diff --git a/0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch b/0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06807ee --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +From a561d12d24c2c8bb0f825d4a3a55a5e47e845853 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 23:55:38 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP peer status notification for server not supporting RFC + 5746 + +Add a notification message to indicate reason for TLS handshake failure +due to the server not supporting safe renegotiation (RFC 5746). + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/ap/authsrv.c | 3 +++ + src/crypto/tls.h | 3 ++- + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- + src/eap_peer/eap.c | 5 +++++ + 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/authsrv.c b/src/ap/authsrv.c +index 516c1da74..fd9c96fad 100644 +--- a/src/ap/authsrv.c ++++ b/src/ap/authsrv.c +@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@ static void authsrv_tls_event(void *ctx, enum tls_event ev, + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "authsrv: remote TLS alert: %s", + data->alert.description); + break; ++ case TLS_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED: ++ /* Not applicable to TLS server */ ++ break; + } + } + #endif /* EAP_TLS_FUNCS */ +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls.h b/src/crypto/tls.h +index 7ea32ee4a..7a2ee32df 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls.h ++++ b/src/crypto/tls.h +@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ enum tls_event { + TLS_CERT_CHAIN_SUCCESS, + TLS_CERT_CHAIN_FAILURE, + TLS_PEER_CERTIFICATE, +- TLS_ALERT ++ TLS_ALERT, ++ TLS_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED, + }; + + /* +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index 0d23f44ad..912471ba2 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -4443,6 +4443,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_eap_fast_key(void *tls_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn, + static struct wpabuf * + openssl_handshake(struct tls_connection *conn, const struct wpabuf *in_data) + { ++ struct tls_context *context = conn->context; + int res; + struct wpabuf *out_data; + +@@ -4472,7 +4473,19 @@ openssl_handshake(struct tls_connection *conn, const struct wpabuf *in_data) + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: SSL_connect - want to " + "write"); + else { ++ unsigned long error = ERR_peek_last_error(); ++ + tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, "SSL_connect"); ++ ++ if (context->event_cb && ++ ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_SSL && ++ ERR_GET_REASON(error) == ++ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { ++ context->event_cb( ++ context->cb_ctx, ++ TLS_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED, ++ NULL); ++ } + conn->failed++; + if (!conn->server && !conn->client_hello_generated) { + /* The server would not understand TLS Alert +@@ -4495,8 +4508,6 @@ openssl_handshake(struct tls_connection *conn, const struct wpabuf *in_data) + if ((conn->flags & TLS_CONN_SUITEB) && !conn->server && + os_strncmp(SSL_get_cipher(conn->ssl), "DHE-", 4) == 0 && + conn->server_dh_prime_len < 3072) { +- struct tls_context *context = conn->context; +- + /* + * This should not be reached since earlier cert_cb should have + * terminated the handshake. Keep this check here for extra +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap.c +index 429b20d3a..729388f4f 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap.c +@@ -2172,6 +2172,11 @@ static void eap_peer_sm_tls_event(void *ctx, enum tls_event ev, + eap_notify_status(sm, "remote TLS alert", + data->alert.description); + break; ++ case TLS_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED: ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "TLS handshake failed due to the server not supporting safe renegotiation (RFC 5746); phase1 parameter allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1 can be used to work around this"); ++ eap_notify_status(sm, "unsafe server renegotiation", "failure"); ++ break; + } + + os_free(hash_hex); +-- +2.35.1 + diff --git a/gating.yaml b/gating.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ca9235 --- /dev/null +++ b/gating.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +--- !Policy +product_versions: + - rhel-10 +decision_context: osci_compose_gate +rules: + - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build.tier0.functional} diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch b/wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24956a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +From 46c635910a724ed14ee9ace549fed9790ed5980b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <46c635910a724ed14ee9ace549fed9790ed5980b.1706279119.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: leiwei +Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 18:22:19 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] MACsec: Support GCM-AES-256 cipher suite + +Allow macsec_csindex to be configured and select the cipher suite when +the participant acts as a key server. + +Signed-off-by: leiwei +--- + hostapd/config_file.c | 10 ++++++++++ + hostapd/hostapd.conf | 4 ++++ + src/ap/ap_config.h | 7 +++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c | 4 +++- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c | 8 ++++---- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 3 ++- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config_file.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h | 7 +++++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 4 ++-- + 11 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h ++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h +@@ -849,6 +849,13 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config { + int mka_priority; + + /** ++ * macsec_csindex - Cipher suite index for MACsec ++ * ++ * Range: 0-1 (default: 0) ++ */ ++ int macsec_csindex; ++ ++ /** + * mka_ckn - MKA pre-shared CKN + */ + #define MACSEC_CKN_MAX_LEN 32 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c +@@ -329,7 +329,9 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm_hapd(struct + hapd->conf->macsec_replay_protect, + hapd->conf->macsec_replay_window, + hapd->conf->macsec_port, +- hapd->conf->mka_priority, hapd->conf->iface, ++ hapd->conf->mka_priority, ++ hapd->conf->macsec_csindex, ++ hapd->conf->iface, + hapd->own_addr); + /* ieee802_1x_kay_init() frees kay_ctx on failure */ + if (!res) +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c +@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ + #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm + #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "CP" + +-static u64 default_cs_id = CS_ID_GCM_AES_128; ++static u64 cs_id[] = { CS_ID_GCM_AES_128, CS_ID_GCM_AES_256 }; + + /* The variable defined in clause 12 in IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 */ + enum connect_type { PENDING, UNAUTHENTICATED, AUTHENTICATED, SECURE }; +@@ -210,7 +210,6 @@ SM_STATE(CP, SECURED) + sm->replay_protect = sm->kay->macsec_replay_protect; + sm->validate_frames = sm->kay->macsec_validate; + +- /* NOTE: now no other than default cipher suite (AES-GCM-128) */ + sm->current_cipher_suite = sm->cipher_suite; + secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(sm->kay, sm->current_cipher_suite); + +@@ -473,8 +472,8 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_ + sm->orx = false; + sm->otx = false; + +- sm->current_cipher_suite = default_cs_id; +- sm->cipher_suite = default_cs_id; ++ sm->current_cipher_suite = cs_id[kay->macsec_csindex]; ++ sm->cipher_suite = cs_id[kay->macsec_csindex]; + sm->cipher_offset = CONFIDENTIALITY_OFFSET_0; + sm->confidentiality_offset = sm->cipher_offset; + sm->transmit_delay = MKA_LIFE_TIME; +@@ -491,6 +490,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_ + secy_cp_control_enable_port(sm->kay, sm->controlled_port_enabled); + secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(sm->kay, + sm->confidentiality_offset); ++ secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(sm->kay, sm->current_cipher_suite); + + SM_STEP_RUN(CP); + +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c +@@ -221,8 +221,16 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_dump_dist_sak_body(struct + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "\tKey Number............: %d", + be_to_host32(body->kn)); +- /* TODO: Other than GCM-AES-128 case: MACsec Cipher Suite */ +- wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "\tAES Key Wrap of SAK...:", body->sak, 24); ++ if (body_len == 28) { ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "\tAES Key Wrap of SAK...:", ++ body->sak, 24); ++ } else if (body_len > CS_ID_LEN - sizeof(body->kn)) { ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "\tMACsec Cipher Suite...:", ++ body->sak, CS_ID_LEN); ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "\tAES Key Wrap of SAK...:", ++ body->sak + CS_ID_LEN, ++ body_len - CS_ID_LEN - sizeof(body->kn)); ++ } + } + + +@@ -3456,7 +3464,8 @@ static void kay_l2_receive(void *ctx, co + struct ieee802_1x_kay * + ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy, + bool macsec_replay_protect, u32 macsec_replay_window, +- u16 port, u8 priority, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr) ++ u16 port, u8 priority, u32 macsec_csindex, ++ const char *ifname, const u8 *addr) + { + struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay; + +@@ -3493,7 +3502,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_ka + kay->dist_time = 0; + + kay->pn_exhaustion = PENDING_PN_EXHAUSTION; +- kay->macsec_csindex = DEFAULT_CS_INDEX; ++ kay->macsec_csindex = macsec_csindex; + kay->mka_algindex = DEFAULT_MKA_ALG_INDEX; + kay->mka_version = MKA_VERSION_ID; + +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h +@@ -240,7 +240,8 @@ u64 mka_sci_u64(struct ieee802_1x_mka_sc + struct ieee802_1x_kay * + ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy, + bool macsec_replay_protect, u32 macsec_replay_window, +- u16 port, u8 priority, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr); ++ u16 port, u8 priority, u32 macsec_csindex, ++ const char *ifname, const u8 *addr); + void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay); + + struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant * +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2612,6 +2612,7 @@ static const struct parse_data ssid_fiel + { INT(macsec_replay_window) }, + { INT_RANGE(macsec_port, 1, 65534) }, + { INT_RANGE(mka_priority, 0, 255) }, ++ { INT_RANGE(macsec_csindex, 0, 1) }, + { FUNC_KEY(mka_cak) }, + { FUNC_KEY(mka_ckn) }, + #endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */ +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ static void wpa_config_write_network(FIL + INT(macsec_replay_window); + INT(macsec_port); + INT_DEF(mka_priority, DEFAULT_PRIO_NOT_KEY_SERVER); ++ INT(macsec_csindex); + #endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */ + #ifdef CONFIG_HS20 + INT(update_identifier); +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h +@@ -912,6 +912,13 @@ struct wpa_ssid { + int mka_priority; + + /** ++ * macsec_csindex - Cipher suite index for MACsec ++ * ++ * Range: 0-1 (default: 0) ++ */ ++ int macsec_csindex; ++ ++ /** + * mka_ckn - MKA pre-shared CKN + */ + #define MACSEC_CKN_MAX_LEN 32 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c +@@ -241,8 +241,8 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_s + + res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, ssid->macsec_replay_protect, + ssid->macsec_replay_window, ssid->macsec_port, +- ssid->mka_priority, wpa_s->ifname, +- wpa_s->own_addr); ++ ssid->mka_priority, ssid->macsec_csindex, ++ wpa_s->ifname, wpa_s->own_addr); + /* ieee802_1x_kay_init() frees kay_ctx on failure */ + if (res == NULL) + return -1; diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch b/wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf3d8ed --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +From 8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.1708356763.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements + +The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 +authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated +during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP +specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front +is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than +the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when +unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed +devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the +user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. + +Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 +authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session +resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been +configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed +authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more +strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability +issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS +session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. + +Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1 +configuration parameter option: +'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS +tunnel) behavior for PEAP: + * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication + * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate + (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was + not used (default) + * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 +++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 ++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 ++++++ + 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config { + * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + * 2 = require cryptobinding + * ++ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++ * not used (default) ++ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases ++ * + * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and + * uuid=Device_UUID + * +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data { + u8 cmk[20]; + int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP) + * is enabled. */ ++ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth; + }; + + +@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding"); + } + ++ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases"); ++ } + #ifdef EAP_TNC + if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) { + data->soh = 2; +@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_s + data->force_peap_version = -1; + data->peap_outer_success = 2; + data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING; ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; + + if (config && config->phase1) + eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1); +@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobindin + } + + ++static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm, ++ struct eap_peap_data *data) ++{ ++ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS || ++ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL && ++ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && ++ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) || ++ data->phase2_eap_started) && ++ !data->phase2_eap_success) ++ return false; ++ return true; ++} ++ ++ + /** + * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response + * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init() +@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm + " - force failed Phase 2"); + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; + ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; ++ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed"); ++ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; ++ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; + } else { + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS; + ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC; +@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req: + /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate + * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has + * been completed. */ +- if (data->phase2_eap_started && +- !data->phase2_eap_success) { ++ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 " + "Success used to indicate success, " + "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet " +@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process( + static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) + { + struct eap_peap_data *data = priv; ++ + return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && +- data->phase2_success; ++ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS; + } + + +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(stru + + sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK); + ++ if (!phase2) ++ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert || ++ params->client_cert_blob || ++ params->private_key || ++ params->private_key_blob; ++ + return 0; + } + +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data { + * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used + */ + int tls_v13; ++ ++ /** ++ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured ++ */ ++ bool client_cert_conf; + }; + + +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1330,6 +1330,13 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default) + # * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + # * 2 = require cryptobinding ++# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++# tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++# not used (default) ++# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + # EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin= or + # pbc=1. + # diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-allow-legacy-renegotiation.patch b/wpa_supplicant-allow-legacy-renegotiation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cbfd9ca..0000000 --- a/wpa_supplicant-allow-legacy-renegotiation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -diff -up wpa_supplicant-2.10/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.legacy-server-connect wpa_supplicant-2.10/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ---- wpa_supplicant-2.10/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.legacy-server-connect 2022-01-16 15:51:29.000000000 -0500 -+++ wpa_supplicant-2.10/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c 2022-04-28 02:47:26.863529683 -0400 -@@ -1049,6 +1049,16 @@ - SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); - SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3); - -+ /* Many enterprise PEAP server implementations (e.g. used in large -+ corporations and universities) do not support RFC5746 secure -+ renegotiation, and starting with OpenSSL 3.0, -+ SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT is no longer set as part of SSL_OP_ALL. -+ So until we implement a way to request SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT -+ only in EAP peer mode, just set SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT -+ globally. */ -+ -+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT); -+ - SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); - - #ifdef SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-keep-options-we-ve-traditionally-used-enab.patch b/wpa_supplicant-config.patch similarity index 69% rename from wpa_supplicant-defconfig-keep-options-we-ve-traditionally-used-enab.patch rename to wpa_supplicant-config.patch index ad5ce2f..5e47fe0 100644 --- a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-keep-options-we-ve-traditionally-used-enab.patch +++ b/wpa_supplicant-config.patch @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -From 060c09b4704ac84502df5321ec4073c062923128 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 72ee1e934e98ea87e4de292958817e724114703e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lubomir Rintel -Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2022 18:33:15 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 1/5] defconfig: keep options we've traditionally used enabled +Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 09:46:00 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] defconfig: Fedora configuration -These are deviations from the upstream defconfig we've inherited when we -switched to basing our configuration on upstream defconfig. --- - wpa_supplicant/defconfig | 9 +++++---- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + wpa_supplicant/defconfig | 16 +++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -index a4719db..85a50e9 100644 --- a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig +++ b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ CONFIG_EAP_PAX=y @@ -30,6 +26,15 @@ index a4719db..85a50e9 100644 # If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are # needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of +@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y + #CONFIG_DYNAMIC_EAP_METHODS=y + + # IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 (Fast BSS Transition) for station mode +-CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y ++#CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y + + # Add support for writing debug log to a file (/tmp/wpa_supplicant-log-#.txt) + CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y @@ -469,7 +470,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y # Should we attempt to use the getrandom(2) call that provides more reliable # yet secure randomness source than /dev/random on Linux 3.17 and newer. @@ -57,6 +62,11 @@ index a4719db..85a50e9 100644 # Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP) (also known as Wi-Fi Easy Connect) CONFIG_DPP=y --- -2.35.1 - +@@ -633,3 +634,7 @@ CONFIG_DPP2=y + # design is still subject to change. As such, this should not yet be enabled in + # production use. + #CONFIG_PASN=y ++# ++CONFIG_SUITEB192=y ++CONFIG_IPV6=y ++ diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-OCV-support.patch b/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-OCV-support.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ce4c46d..0000000 --- a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-OCV-support.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -From 6da60b83423a882c376374d83d01cca3591a6000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Lubomir Rintel -Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2022 18:31:11 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 4/5] defconfig: enable OCV support - -This was enabled in rpms/wpa_supplicant.git in commit b0ac7025d794 -('defconfig: enable OCV support'), without further explanation. - -FIXME: It needs to be either upstreamed or dropped. ---- - wpa_supplicant/defconfig | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -index 3f73282..efdfa81 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ CONFIG_BACKEND=file - #CONFIG_NO_LINUX_PACKET_SOCKET_WAR=y - - # Support Operating Channel Validation --#CONFIG_OCV=y -+CONFIG_OCV=y - - # Select TLS implementation - # openssl = OpenSSL (default) --- -2.35.1 - diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-WPA-EAP-SUITE-B-192-ciphers.patch b/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-WPA-EAP-SUITE-B-192-ciphers.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5955120..0000000 --- a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-WPA-EAP-SUITE-B-192-ciphers.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -From 3bdbf450e736ca831733fbb899e046769942c6df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Lubomir Rintel -Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2022 18:32:20 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 3/5] defconfig: enable WPA-EAP-SUITE-B-192 ciphers - -This was enabled in wpa_supplicant.git in commit 6cc245db1770 -('Enable WPA-EAP-SUITE-B-192 ciphers'), without further explanation. - -FIXME: It needs to be either upstreamed or dropped. ---- - wpa_supplicant/defconfig | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -index 07d9752..3f73282 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -@@ -634,3 +634,6 @@ CONFIG_WEP=y - # design is still subject to change. As such, this should not yet be enabled in - # production use. - #CONFIG_PASN=y -+# -+CONFIG_SUITEB192=y -+ --- -2.35.1 - diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-ipv6.patch b/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-ipv6.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 50f4a01..0000000 --- a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-ipv6.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ ---- a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -@@ -637,3 +637,5 @@ CONFIG_WEP=y - # - CONFIG_SUITEB192=y - -+# Support IPv6 -+CONFIG_IPV6=y diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-keep-CONFIG_WEP-enabled.patch b/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-keep-CONFIG_WEP-enabled.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 31b2d8b..0000000 --- a/wpa_supplicant-defconfig-keep-CONFIG_WEP-enabled.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -From bcf14fa3f3075bb212a77b3e874438588314fa98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Lubomir Rintel -Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2022 18:31:56 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 2/5] defconfig: keep CONFIG_WEP enabled - -We intentionally deviate from upstream here. If we disabled WEP at this -point, we'd likely break a lot of user installations. - -We'd likely end up eventually phasing WEP out, but before that we need -to adjust the rest of userspace to communicate that we're doing that and -why we're doing that. ---- - wpa_supplicant/defconfig | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -index 85a50e9..07d9752 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig -@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ CONFIG_DPP2=y - # functionality needed to use WEP is available in the current wpa_supplicant - # release under this optional build parameter. This functionality is subject to - # be completely removed in a future release. --#CONFIG_WEP=y -+CONFIG_WEP=y - - # Remove all TKIP functionality - # TKIP is an old cryptographic data confidentiality algorithm that is not --- -2.35.1 - diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch b/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be32491 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +From 40c139664439b2576e1506fbca14a7b79425a9dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <40c139664439b2576e1506fbca14a7b79425a9dd.1706279171.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Emeel Hakim +Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 10:26:57 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] macsec_linux: Add support for MACsec hardware offload + +This uses libnl3 to communicate with the macsec module available on +Linux. A recent enough version of libnl is needed for the hardware +offload support. + +Signed-off-by: Emeel Hakim +--- + src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c +index b609bbf38..c79e8733a 100644 +--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c ++++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c +@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ + + #define UNUSED_SCI 0xffffffffffffffff + ++#if LIBNL_VER_NUM >= LIBNL_VER(3, 6) ++#define LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD ++#endif ++ + struct cb_arg { + struct macsec_drv_data *drv; + u32 *pn; +@@ -73,6 +77,11 @@ struct macsec_drv_data { + bool replay_protect; + bool replay_protect_set; + ++#ifdef LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD ++ enum macsec_offload offload; ++ bool offload_set; ++#endif /* LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD */ ++ + u32 replay_window; + + u8 encoding_sa; +@@ -228,6 +237,15 @@ static int try_commit(struct macsec_drv_data *drv) + drv->replay_window); + } + ++#ifdef LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD ++ if (drv->offload_set) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, DRV_PREFIX ++ "%s: try_commit offload=%d", ++ drv->ifname, drv->offload); ++ rtnl_link_macsec_set_offload(drv->link, drv->offload); ++ } ++#endif /* LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD */ ++ + if (drv->encoding_sa_set) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, DRV_PREFIX + "%s: try_commit encoding_sa=%d", +@@ -455,6 +473,36 @@ static int macsec_drv_set_replay_protect(void *priv, bool enabled, + } + + ++/** ++ * macsec_drv_set_offload - Set offload status ++ * @priv: Private driver interface data ++ * @offload: 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF ++ * 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++ * 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported) ++ */ ++static int macsec_drv_set_offload(void *priv, u8 offload) ++{ ++#ifdef LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD ++ struct macsec_drv_data *drv = priv; ++ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s -> %02" PRIx8, __func__, offload); ++ ++ drv->offload_set = true; ++ drv->offload = offload; ++ ++ return try_commit(drv); ++#else /* LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD */ ++ if (offload == 0) ++ return 0; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "%s: libnl version does not include support for MACsec offload", ++ __func__); ++ return -1; ++#endif /* LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD */ ++} ++ ++ + /** + * macsec_drv_set_current_cipher_suite - Set current cipher suite + * @priv: Private driver interface data +@@ -1648,6 +1696,7 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_macsec_linux_ops = { + .enable_protect_frames = macsec_drv_enable_protect_frames, + .enable_encrypt = macsec_drv_enable_encrypt, + .set_replay_protect = macsec_drv_set_replay_protect, ++ .set_offload = macsec_drv_set_offload, + .set_current_cipher_suite = macsec_drv_set_current_cipher_suite, + .enable_controlled_port = macsec_drv_enable_controlled_port, + .get_receive_lowest_pn = macsec_drv_get_receive_lowest_pn, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch b/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eef0aa9 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From 7e941e7a1560699a18c5890cb6e1309161bc01af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <7e941e7a1560699a18c5890cb6e1309161bc01af.1706279136.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: leiwei +Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 18:43:33 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] macsec_linux: Support cipher suite configuration + +Set the cipher suite for the link. Unlike the other parameters, this +needs to be done with the first rtnl_link_add() call (NLM_F_CREATE)) +instead of the update in try_commit() since the kernel is rejecting +changes to the cipher suite after the link is first added. + +Signed-off-by: leiwei +--- + src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c ++++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c +@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ struct macsec_drv_data { + + u8 encoding_sa; + bool encoding_sa_set; ++ ++ u64 cipher_suite; ++ bool cipher_suite_set; + }; + + +@@ -460,8 +463,14 @@ static int macsec_drv_set_replay_protect + */ + static int macsec_drv_set_current_cipher_suite(void *priv, u64 cs) + { ++ struct macsec_drv_data *drv = priv; ++ + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s -> %016" PRIx64, __func__, cs); +- return 0; ++ ++ drv->cipher_suite_set = true; ++ drv->cipher_suite = cs; ++ ++ return try_commit(drv); + } + + +@@ -1063,7 +1072,8 @@ static int macsec_drv_disable_receive_sa + } + + +-static struct rtnl_link * lookup_sc(struct nl_cache *cache, int parent, u64 sci) ++static struct rtnl_link * lookup_sc(struct nl_cache *cache, int parent, u64 sci, ++ u64 cs) + { + struct rtnl_link *needle; + void *match; +@@ -1074,6 +1084,8 @@ static struct rtnl_link * lookup_sc(stru + + rtnl_link_set_link(needle, parent); + rtnl_link_macsec_set_sci(needle, sci); ++ if (cs) ++ rtnl_link_macsec_set_cipher_suite(needle, cs); + + match = nl_cache_find(cache, (struct nl_object *) needle); + rtnl_link_put(needle); +@@ -1098,6 +1110,7 @@ static int macsec_drv_create_transmit_sc + char *ifname; + u64 sci; + int err; ++ u64 cs = 0; + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, DRV_PREFIX + "%s: create_transmit_sc -> " SCISTR " (conf_offset=%d)", +@@ -1122,6 +1135,12 @@ static int macsec_drv_create_transmit_sc + + drv->created_link = true; + ++ if (drv->cipher_suite_set) { ++ cs = drv->cipher_suite; ++ drv->cipher_suite_set = false; ++ rtnl_link_macsec_set_cipher_suite(link, cs); ++ } ++ + err = rtnl_link_add(drv->sk, link, NLM_F_CREATE); + if (err == -NLE_BUSY) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, +@@ -1137,7 +1156,7 @@ static int macsec_drv_create_transmit_sc + rtnl_link_put(link); + + nl_cache_refill(drv->sk, drv->link_cache); +- link = lookup_sc(drv->link_cache, drv->parent_ifi, sci); ++ link = lookup_sc(drv->link_cache, drv->parent_ifi, sci, cs); + if (!link) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, DRV_PREFIX "couldn't find link"); + return -1; diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch b/wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5755cd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +From 6d24673ab89d9002990ee51e7c87d308ca07cd01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <6d24673ab89d9002990ee51e7c87d308ca07cd01.1706279162.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Emeel Hakim +Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 10:26:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] mka: Allow configuration of MACsec hardware offload + +Add new configuration parameter macsec_offload to allow user to set up +MACsec hardware offload feature. + +Signed-off-by: Emeel Hakim +--- + hostapd/config_file.c | 10 ++++++++++ + hostapd/hostapd.conf | 8 ++++++++ + src/ap/ap_config.h | 13 +++++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c | 1 + + src/drivers/driver.h | 10 ++++++++++ + src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c | 7 +++++++ + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 7 +++++-- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 6 ++++-- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config_file.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h | 12 ++++++++++++ + wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 8 ++++++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 9 +++++++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 10 +++++++++- + 17 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h ++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h +@@ -833,6 +833,19 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config { + u32 macsec_replay_window; + + /** ++ * macsec_offload - Enable MACsec offload ++ * ++ * This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e., ++ * - macsec_policy is enabled ++ * - the key server has decided to enable MACsec ++ * ++ * 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF (default) ++ * 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++ * 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++ */ ++ int macsec_offload; ++ ++ /** + * macsec_port - MACsec port (in SCI) + * + * Port component of the SCI. +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c +@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm_hapd(struct + res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, + hapd->conf->macsec_replay_protect, + hapd->conf->macsec_replay_window, ++ hapd->conf->macsec_offload, + hapd->conf->macsec_port, + hapd->conf->mka_priority, + hapd->conf->macsec_csindex, +--- a/src/drivers/driver.h ++++ b/src/drivers/driver.h +@@ -4168,6 +4168,16 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops { + int (*set_replay_protect)(void *priv, bool enabled, u32 window); + + /** ++ * set_offload - Set MACsec hardware offload ++ * @priv: Private driver interface data ++ * @offload: 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF ++ * 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++ * 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported) ++ */ ++ int (*set_offload)(void *priv, u8 offload); ++ ++ /** + * set_current_cipher_suite - Set current cipher suite + * @priv: Private driver interface data + * @cs: EUI64 identifier +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c +@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm { + + /* not defined IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 */ + struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay; ++ u8 offload; + }; + + static void ieee802_1x_cp_retire_when_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, +@@ -188,6 +189,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, AUTHENTICATED) + sm->protect_frames = false; + sm->replay_protect = false; + sm->validate_frames = Checked; ++ sm->offload = sm->kay->macsec_offload; + + sm->port_valid = false; + sm->controlled_port_enabled = true; +@@ -197,6 +199,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, AUTHENTICATED) + secy_cp_control_encrypt(sm->kay, sm->kay->macsec_encrypt); + secy_cp_control_validate_frames(sm->kay, sm->validate_frames); + secy_cp_control_replay(sm->kay, sm->replay_protect, sm->replay_window); ++ secy_cp_control_offload(sm->kay, sm->offload); + } + + +@@ -208,6 +211,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, SECURED) + + sm->protect_frames = sm->kay->macsec_protect; + sm->replay_protect = sm->kay->macsec_replay_protect; ++ sm->offload = sm->kay->macsec_offload; + sm->validate_frames = sm->kay->macsec_validate; + + sm->current_cipher_suite = sm->cipher_suite; +@@ -223,6 +227,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, SECURED) + secy_cp_control_encrypt(sm->kay, sm->kay->macsec_encrypt); + secy_cp_control_validate_frames(sm->kay, sm->validate_frames); + secy_cp_control_replay(sm->kay, sm->replay_protect, sm->replay_window); ++ secy_cp_control_offload(sm->kay, sm->offload); + } + + +@@ -462,6 +467,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_ + sm->validate_frames = kay->macsec_validate; + sm->replay_protect = kay->macsec_replay_protect; + sm->replay_window = kay->macsec_replay_window; ++ sm->offload = kay->macsec_offload; + + sm->controlled_port_enabled = false; + +@@ -491,6 +497,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_ + secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(sm->kay, + sm->confidentiality_offset); + secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(sm->kay, sm->current_cipher_suite); ++ secy_cp_control_offload(sm->kay, sm->offload); + + SM_STEP_RUN(CP); + +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c +@@ -3464,8 +3464,8 @@ static void kay_l2_receive(void *ctx, co + struct ieee802_1x_kay * + ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy, + bool macsec_replay_protect, u32 macsec_replay_window, +- u16 port, u8 priority, u32 macsec_csindex, +- const char *ifname, const u8 *addr) ++ u8 macsec_offload, u16 port, u8 priority, ++ u32 macsec_csindex, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr) + { + struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay; + +@@ -3524,6 +3524,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_ka + kay->macsec_validate = Disabled; + kay->macsec_replay_protect = false; + kay->macsec_replay_window = 0; ++ kay->macsec_offload = 0; + kay->macsec_confidentiality = CONFIDENTIALITY_NONE; + kay->mka_hello_time = MKA_HELLO_TIME; + } else { +@@ -3540,6 +3541,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_ka + kay->macsec_validate = Strict; + kay->macsec_replay_protect = macsec_replay_protect; + kay->macsec_replay_window = macsec_replay_window; ++ kay->macsec_offload = macsec_offload; + kay->mka_hello_time = MKA_HELLO_TIME; + } + +@@ -3740,6 +3742,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_create_mka(struct ieee802 + secy_cp_control_protect_frames(kay, kay->macsec_protect); + secy_cp_control_replay(kay, kay->macsec_replay_protect, + kay->macsec_replay_window); ++ secy_cp_control_offload(kay, kay->macsec_offload); + if (secy_create_transmit_sc(kay, participant->txsc)) + goto fail; + +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h +@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx { + int (*delete_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa); + int (*enable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa); + int (*disable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa); ++ int (*set_offload)(void *ctx, u8 offload); + }; + + struct ieee802_1x_kay { +@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay { + bool is_key_server; + bool is_obliged_key_server; + char if_name[IFNAMSIZ]; ++ u8 macsec_offload; + + unsigned int macsec_csindex; /* MACsec cipher suite table index */ + int mka_algindex; /* MKA alg table index */ +@@ -240,8 +242,8 @@ u64 mka_sci_u64(struct ieee802_1x_mka_sc + struct ieee802_1x_kay * + ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy, + bool macsec_replay_protect, u32 macsec_replay_window, +- u16 port, u8 priority, u32 macsec_csindex, +- const char *ifname, const u8 *addr); ++ u8 macsec_offload, u16 port, u8 priority, ++ u32 macsec_csindex, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr); + void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay); + + struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant * +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c +@@ -85,6 +85,26 @@ int secy_cp_control_replay(struct ieee80 + } + + ++int secy_cp_control_offload(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u8 offload) ++{ ++ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops; ++ ++ if (!kay) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: %s params invalid", __func__); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ ops = kay->ctx; ++ if (!ops || !ops->set_offload) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "KaY: secy set_offload operation not supported"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ return ops->set_offload(ops->ctx, offload); ++} ++ ++ + int secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u64 cs) + { + struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops; +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ int secy_cp_control_validate_frames(stru + int secy_cp_control_protect_frames(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, bool flag); + int secy_cp_control_encrypt(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, bool enabled); + int secy_cp_control_replay(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, bool flag, u32 win); ++int secy_cp_control_offload(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u8 offload); + int secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u64 cs); + int secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, + enum confidentiality_offset co); +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2610,6 +2610,7 @@ static const struct parse_data ssid_fiel + { INT_RANGE(macsec_integ_only, 0, 1) }, + { INT_RANGE(macsec_replay_protect, 0, 1) }, + { INT(macsec_replay_window) }, ++ { INT_RANGE(macsec_offload, 0, 2) }, + { INT_RANGE(macsec_port, 1, 65534) }, + { INT_RANGE(mka_priority, 0, 255) }, + { INT_RANGE(macsec_csindex, 0, 1) }, +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c +@@ -808,6 +808,7 @@ static void wpa_config_write_network(FIL + INT(macsec_integ_only); + INT(macsec_replay_protect); + INT(macsec_replay_window); ++ INT(macsec_offload); + INT(macsec_port); + INT_DEF(mka_priority, DEFAULT_PRIO_NOT_KEY_SERVER); + INT(macsec_csindex); +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h +@@ -896,6 +896,18 @@ struct wpa_ssid { + u32 macsec_replay_window; + + /** ++ * macsec_offload - Enable MACsec hardware offload ++ * ++ * This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e., ++ * - the key server has decided to enable MACsec ++ * ++ * 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF (default) ++ * 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++ * 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++ */ ++ int macsec_offload; ++ ++ /** + * macsec_port - MACsec port (in SCI) + * + * Port component of the SCI. +--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h +@@ -804,6 +804,14 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_set_replay_pro + window); + } + ++static inline int wpa_drv_set_offload(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, u8 offload) ++{ ++ if (!wpa_s->driver->set_offload) ++ return -1; ++ return wpa_s->driver->set_offload(wpa_s->drv_priv, offload); ++ ++} ++ + static inline int wpa_drv_set_current_cipher_suite(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + u64 cs) + { +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c +@@ -1473,6 +1473,7 @@ static const char *network_fields[] = { + "macsec_integ_only", + "macsec_replay_protect", + "macsec_replay_window", ++ "macsec_offload", + "macsec_port", + "mka_priority", + #endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */ +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1094,6 +1094,15 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # 0: No replay window, strict check (default) + # 1..2^32-1: number of packets that could be misordered + # ++# macsec_offload - Enable MACsec hardware offload ++# ++# This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e., ++# - the key server has decided to enable MACsec ++# ++# 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF (default) ++# 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++# 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++# + # macsec_port: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec port + # Port component of the SCI + # Range: 1-65534 (default: 1) +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c +@@ -98,6 +98,12 @@ static int wpas_set_receive_lowest_pn(vo + } + + ++static int wpas_set_offload(void *wpa_s, u8 offload) ++{ ++ return wpa_drv_set_offload(wpa_s, offload); ++} ++ ++ + static unsigned int conf_offset_val(enum confidentiality_offset co) + { + switch (co) { +@@ -220,6 +226,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_s + kay_ctx->enable_protect_frames = wpas_enable_protect_frames; + kay_ctx->enable_encrypt = wpas_enable_encrypt; + kay_ctx->set_replay_protect = wpas_set_replay_protect; ++ kay_ctx->set_offload = wpas_set_offload; + kay_ctx->set_current_cipher_suite = wpas_set_current_cipher_suite; + kay_ctx->enable_controlled_port = wpas_enable_controlled_port; + kay_ctx->get_receive_lowest_pn = wpas_get_receive_lowest_pn; +@@ -240,7 +247,8 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_s + kay_ctx->disable_transmit_sa = wpas_disable_transmit_sa; + + res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, ssid->macsec_replay_protect, +- ssid->macsec_replay_window, ssid->macsec_port, ++ ssid->macsec_replay_window, ++ ssid->macsec_offload, ssid->macsec_port, + ssid->mka_priority, ssid->macsec_csindex, + wpa_s->ifname, wpa_s->own_addr); + /* ieee802_1x_kay_init() frees kay_ctx on failure */ diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-sae-pass-sae-password-on-connect-for-sae-authentication-offload-support.patch b/wpa_supplicant-sae-pass-sae-password-on-connect-for-sae-authentication-offload-support.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2a465eb..0000000 --- a/wpa_supplicant-sae-pass-sae-password-on-connect-for-sae-authentication-offload-support.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -diff -Naur a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h ---- a/src/drivers/driver.h 2022-01-16 15:51:29.000000000 -0500 -+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h 2023-08-30 10:22:48.193810598 -0400 -@@ -1015,6 +1015,14 @@ - const u8 *psk; - - /** -+ * sae_password - Password for SAE authentication -+ * -+ * This value is made available only for WPA3-Personal (SAE) and only -+ * for drivers that set WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS2_SAE_OFFLOAD. -+ */ -+ const char *sae_password; -+ -+ /** - * drop_unencrypted - Enable/disable unencrypted frame filtering - * - * Configure the driver to drop all non-EAPOL frames (both receive and -diff -Naur a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c ---- a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c 2022-01-16 15:51:29.000000000 -0500 -+++ b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c 2023-08-30 10:22:48.195810610 -0400 -@@ -6173,8 +6173,12 @@ - - if (params->wpa_proto & WPA_PROTO_WPA) - ver |= NL80211_WPA_VERSION_1; -- if (params->wpa_proto & WPA_PROTO_RSN) -- ver |= NL80211_WPA_VERSION_2; -+ if (params->wpa_proto & WPA_PROTO_RSN) { -+ if (params->key_mgmt_suite == WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE) -+ ver |= NL80211_WPA_VERSION_3; -+ else -+ ver |= NL80211_WPA_VERSION_2; -+ } - - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " * WPA Versions 0x%x", ver); - if (nla_put_u32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WPA_VERSIONS, ver)) -@@ -6304,6 +6308,22 @@ - return -1; - } - -+ /* add SAE password in case of SAE authentication offload */ -+ if ((params->sae_password || params->passphrase) && -+ (drv->capa.flags2 & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS2_SAE_OFFLOAD)) { -+ const char *password; -+ size_t pwd_len; -+ -+ password = params->sae_password; -+ if (!password) -+ password = params->passphrase; -+ pwd_len = os_strlen(password); -+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, " * SAE password", -+ (u8 *) password, pwd_len); -+ if (nla_put(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SAE_PASSWORD, pwd_len, password)) -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - if (nla_put_flag(msg, NL80211_ATTR_CONTROL_PORT)) - return -1; - -@@ -6419,6 +6439,8 @@ - algs++; - if (params->auth_alg & WPA_AUTH_ALG_FT) - algs++; -+ if (params->auth_alg & WPA_AUTH_ALG_SAE) -+ algs++; - if (algs > 1) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " * Leave out Auth Type for automatic " - "selection"); -diff -Naur a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c ---- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c 2023-08-30 10:18:04.154061324 -0400 -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c 2023-08-30 10:24:53.619588124 -0400 -@@ -1537,7 +1537,8 @@ - - sel = ie.key_mgmt & ssid->key_mgmt; - #ifdef CONFIG_SAE -- if (!(wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_SAE)) -+ if (!(wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_SAE) && -+ !(wpa_s->drv_flags2 & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS2_SAE_OFFLOAD)) - sel &= ~(WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE | WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE); - #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R -@@ -3919,6 +3920,18 @@ - params.psk = ssid->psk; - } - -+ if ((wpa_s->drv_flags2 & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS2_SAE_OFFLOAD) && -+ wpa_key_mgmt_sae(params.key_mgmt_suite)) { -+ params.auth_alg = WPA_AUTH_ALG_SAE; -+ if (ssid->sae_password) -+ params.sae_password = ssid->sae_password; -+ else if (ssid->passphrase) -+ params.passphrase = ssid->passphrase; -+ -+ if (ssid->psk_set) -+ params.psk = ssid->psk; -+ } -+ - params.drop_unencrypted = use_crypt; - - params.mgmt_frame_protection = wpas_get_ssid_pmf(wpa_s, ssid); diff --git a/wpa_supplicant.spec b/wpa_supplicant.spec index 722b193..b181c6d 100644 --- a/wpa_supplicant.spec +++ b/wpa_supplicant.spec @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Source4: wpa_supplicant.logrotate # Distro specific customization and not suitable for upstream, # Fedora-specific updates to defconfig -Patch0: wpa_supplicant-defconfig-keep-options-we-ve-traditionally-used-enab.patch +Patch0: wpa_supplicant-config.patch # Works around busted drivers Patch1: wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch # Ensures that debug output gets flushed immediately to help diagnose driver @@ -29,22 +29,18 @@ Patch2: wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch Patch3: wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch # Distro specific customization for Qt4 build tools, not suitable for upstream Patch4: wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch -# We keep WEP enabled for now to avoid breaking user setups -Patch6: wpa_supplicant-defconfig-keep-CONFIG_WEP-enabled.patch -# FIXME: Explain why are these two here -Patch7: wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-WPA-EAP-SUITE-B-192-ciphers.patch -Patch8: wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-OCV-support.patch -# Allow legacy renegotiation with openssl 3.0 to fix connection to -# PEAP/Radius servers that don't support secure renegotiation: -# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2072070 -# From James Ralston in comment #24, thanks to James -Patch9: wpa_supplicant-allow-legacy-renegotiation.patch -# Add WPA3 support for Broadcom device -# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2226569 -Patch10: wpa_supplicant-nl80211-check-sae-authentication-offload-support.patch -Patch11: wpa_supplicant-sae-pass-sae-password-on-connect-for-sae-authentication-offload-support.patch -# Enable IPv6 (#2095296) -Patch12: wpa_supplicant-defconfig-enable-ipv6.patch +# backport fix for bz2063730 +Patch5: 0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch +# backport fix for bz2077973 +Patch6: 0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch +Patch7: 0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch +# support macsec HW offload +Patch8: wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch +Patch9: wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch +Patch10: wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch +Patch11: wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch +# fix PEAP client to require successful Phase2 authentication when needed (CVE-2023-52160) +Patch12: wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch URL: http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/