make getting password from backed up secret FIPS compatible (RHEL-113242)
Resolves: RHEL-113242
This commit is contained in:
Michal Hlavinka
parent
0f4313def9
commit
389d663e1d
207
volume_key-0.3.12-fips2.patch
Normal file
207
volume_key-0.3.12-fips2.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
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diff --git a/lib/crypto.c b/lib/crypto.c
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index 7554f19..7b8dc39 100644
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--- a/lib/crypto.c
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+++ b/lib/crypto.c
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@@ -179,6 +179,150 @@ import_sym_key (PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, PK11Origin origin,
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}
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/* LIBVK_PACKET_FORMAT_ASYMMETRIC */
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+/*
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+ * FIPS compliant implementation of PK11_ExtractKeyValue() + PK11_GetKeyData().
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+ * Instead of directly extracting the key value (which is not allowed in FIPS mode),
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+ * we wrap the symmetric key with a temporary wrapping key, then decrypt the
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+ * wrapped data to get the raw key bytes.
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+ * Returns a newly allocated SECItem with the key data on success, NULL on failure.
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+ * The caller must free the result with SECITEM_FreeItem(result, PR_TRUE).
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+ */
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+static SECItem *
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+extract_sym_key (PK11SymKey *sym_key)
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+{
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+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrap_mechanism = 0UL;
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+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
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+ PK11SymKey *wrapping_key = NULL;
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+ SECItem tmp_sec_item, wrapped_key_item;
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+ PK11Context *wrap_key_crypt_context = NULL;
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+ int block_size = 0;
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+ size_t wrapped_key_size = 0;
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+ unsigned char *wrapped_key = NULL;
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+ SECItem *clear_key = NULL;
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+ int out_len = 0;
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+ unsigned int final_len = 0;
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+ SECStatus ret = 0;
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+ int key_len = 0;
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+
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+ /* Fall back to PK11_ExtractKeyValue() + PK11_GetKeyData() if FIPS mode is disabled. */
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+ if (PK11_IsFIPS () == PR_FALSE)
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+ {
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+ SECItem *key_data;
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+
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+ if (PK11_ExtractKeyValue (sym_key) != SECSuccess)
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+ return NULL;
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+ key_data = PK11_GetKeyData (sym_key);
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+ if (key_data == NULL)
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+ return NULL;
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+ return SECITEM_DupItem (key_data);
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+ }
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+
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+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey (sym_key);
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+ if (slot == NULL)
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+ return NULL;
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+
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+ /* Get the best mechanism for the wrapping operation. */
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+ wrap_mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism (slot);
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+
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+ /* Generate a symmetric wrapping key. */
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+ wrapping_key = PK11_KeyGen (slot, wrap_mechanism, NULL,
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+ PK11_GetBestKeyLength (slot, wrap_mechanism),
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+ NULL);
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+ PK11_FreeSlot (slot);
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+ if (wrapping_key == NULL)
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+ return NULL;
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+
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+ /* Get block size and key length. */
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+ block_size = PK11_GetBlockSize (wrap_mechanism, NULL);
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+ if (block_size == 0)
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+ block_size = 1;
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+ key_len = PK11_GetKeyLength (sym_key);
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+ if (key_len <= 0)
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+ {
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (wrapping_key);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Allocate space for the wrapped key.
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+ * Add extra space for padding (up to one block size).
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+ */
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+ wrapped_key_size = key_len + block_size;
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+ wrapped_key = g_try_malloc0 (wrapped_key_size);
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+ if (wrapped_key == NULL)
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+ {
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (wrapping_key);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ memset (&tmp_sec_item, 0, sizeof (tmp_sec_item));
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+ memset (&wrapped_key_item, 0, sizeof (wrapped_key_item));
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+ wrapped_key_item.data = wrapped_key;
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+ wrapped_key_item.len = wrapped_key_size;
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+
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+ /* Wrap the symmetric key using the wrapping key. */
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+ ret = PK11_WrapSymKey (wrap_mechanism, &tmp_sec_item, wrapping_key, sym_key,
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+ &wrapped_key_item);
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+ if (ret != SECSuccess)
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+ {
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+ g_free (wrapped_key);
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (wrapping_key);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Now decrypt the wrapped key to get the raw bytes.
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+ * Create a decryption context with the wrapping key.
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+ */
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+ wrap_key_crypt_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey (wrap_mechanism,
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+ CKA_DECRYPT,
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+ wrapping_key,
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+ &tmp_sec_item);
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+ if (wrap_key_crypt_context == NULL)
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+ {
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+ g_free (wrapped_key);
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (wrapping_key);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Allocate space for the decrypted (clear) key. */
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+ clear_key = SECITEM_AllocItem (NULL, NULL, wrapped_key_item.len);
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+ if (clear_key == NULL)
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+ {
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+ g_free (wrapped_key);
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+ PK11_DestroyContext (wrap_key_crypt_context, PR_TRUE);
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (wrapping_key);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Decrypt to get the raw key bytes. */
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+ ret = PK11_CipherOp (wrap_key_crypt_context, clear_key->data, &out_len,
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+ clear_key->len, wrapped_key_item.data,
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+ wrapped_key_item.len);
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+ if (ret != SECSuccess)
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+ {
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+ SECITEM_FreeItem (clear_key, PR_TRUE);
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+ g_free (wrapped_key);
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+ PK11_DestroyContext (wrap_key_crypt_context, PR_TRUE);
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (wrapping_key);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ ret = PK11_DigestFinal (wrap_key_crypt_context, clear_key->data + out_len,
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+ &final_len, clear_key->len - out_len);
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+ g_free (wrapped_key);
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+ PK11_DestroyContext (wrap_key_crypt_context, PR_TRUE);
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (wrapping_key);
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+ if (ret != SECSuccess)
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+ {
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+ SECITEM_FreeItem (clear_key, PR_TRUE);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Adjust the length to the actual key length (remove padding). */
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+ clear_key->len = key_len;
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+
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+ return clear_key;
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+}
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+
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/* Encrypt DATA of SIZE for CERT.
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Return encrypted data (for g_free()), setting RES_SIZE to the size of the
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@@ -532,20 +676,19 @@ unwrap_asymmetric (size_t *clear_secret_size, const void *wrapped_secret_data,
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error_from_pr (error);
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goto err;
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}
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- if (PK11_ExtractKeyValue (secret_key) != SECSuccess)
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+ clear_secret_item = extract_sym_key (secret_key);
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (secret_key);
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+ if (clear_secret_item == NULL)
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{
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error_from_pr (error);
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- goto err_secret_key;
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+ goto err;
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}
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- clear_secret_item = PK11_GetKeyData (secret_key);
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ret = g_memdup (clear_secret_item->data, clear_secret_item->len);
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*clear_secret_size = clear_secret_item->len;
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- PK11_FreeSymKey (secret_key);
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+ SECITEM_FreeItem (clear_secret_item, PR_TRUE);
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return ret;
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- err_secret_key:
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- PK11_FreeSymKey (secret_key);
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err:
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return NULL;
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}
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@@ -665,20 +808,19 @@ unwrap_symmetric (size_t *clear_secret_size, PK11SymKey *wrapping_key,
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error_from_pr (error);
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goto err;
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}
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- if (PK11_ExtractKeyValue (secret_key) != SECSuccess)
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+ clear_secret_item = extract_sym_key (secret_key);
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+ PK11_FreeSymKey (secret_key);
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+ if (clear_secret_item == NULL)
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{
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error_from_pr (error);
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- goto err_secret_key;
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+ goto err;
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}
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- clear_secret_item = PK11_GetKeyData (secret_key);
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ret = g_memdup (clear_secret_item->data, clear_secret_item->len);
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*clear_secret_size = clear_secret_item->len;
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- PK11_FreeSymKey (secret_key);
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+ SECITEM_FreeItem (clear_secret_item, PR_TRUE);
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return ret;
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- err_secret_key:
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- PK11_FreeSymKey (secret_key);
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err:
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return NULL;
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}
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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Summary: An utility for manipulating storage encryption keys and passphrases
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Name: volume_key
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Version: 0.3.11
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Release: 6%{?dist}
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Release: 7%{?dist}
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# lib/{SECerrs,SSLerrs}.h are both licensed under MPLv1.1, GPLv2 and LGPLv2
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License: GPLv2 and (MPLv1.1 or GPLv2 or LGPLv2)
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Group: Applications/System
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@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ Patch0: volume_key-0.3.11-support_LUKS_all.patch
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Patch1: volume_key-0.3.11-FIPS.patch
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# Diagnose patch to get more insight on whats wrong
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Patch2: volume_key-0.3.11-show_get_password_error.patch
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# fix getting backup password from secret the FIPS way, RHEL-113242
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Patch3: volume_key-0.3.12-fips2.patch
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BuildRequires: cryptsetup-luks-devel, gettext-devel, glib2-devel, /usr/bin/gpg2
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BuildRequires: gpgme-devel, libblkid-devel, nss-devel, python3-devel
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# Needed by %%check:
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@ -84,9 +86,10 @@ for other formats is possible, some formats are planned for future releases.
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%prep
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%setup -q
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%patch0 -p1
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%patch1 -p1
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%patch2 -p1
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%patch -P 0 -p1
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%patch -P 1 -p1
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%patch -P 2 -p1
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%patch -P 3 -p1 -b .fips2
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%build
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%configure
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@ -135,6 +138,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
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%{python3_sitearch}/__pycache__/volume_key.*
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%changelog
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* Thu Feb 12 2026 Michal Hlavinka <mhlavink@redhat.com> - 0.3.11-7
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- make getting password from backed up secret FIPS compatible (RHEL-113242)
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* Fri Jul 21 2023 Jiri Kucera <jkucera@redhat.com> - 0.3.11-6
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- Make volume_key working in FIPS mode
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Resolves: #2143223
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