Fix CVE-2026-55693: out-of-bounds write in tree_count_words()

Backport upstream patch 9.2.0653 (commit a80874d9) to fix
CVE-2026-55693 — an out-of-bounds write in tree_count_words()
in src/spellfile.c. A crafted spell file could drive the
function past its MAXWLEN-sized depth arrays. The fix adds
depth bound checks in tree_count_words() and sug_filltree(),
along with a new test case in test_spellfile.vim.

CVE: CVE-2026-55693
Upstream patches:
 - a80874d9b8.patch
Resolves: RHEL-194056

This commit was backported by Ymir, a Red Hat Enterprise Linux software maintenance AI agent.

Assisted-by: Ymir
This commit is contained in:
RHEL Packaging Agent 2026-07-29 14:14:30 +00:00 committed by Zdenek Dohnal
parent 636b8cbcfc
commit e28b8ae4ff
2 changed files with 90 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From 3dd65dfa11beb1328ec6376f836a0e3bf1356c9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 19:39:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0653: [security]: out-of-bounds write in
tree_count_words()
Problem: [security]: a crafted spell file can drive tree_count_words()
past the end of its MAXWLEN-sized depth arrays; the descent
loop has no depth bound.
Solution: only descend while depth < MAXWLEN - 1, as the sibling trie
walkers already do; apply the same guard to sug_filltree().
Github Security Advisory:
https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-wgh4-64f7-q3jq
Supported by AI.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
---
src/spellfile.c | 4 ++--
src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/spellfile.c b/src/spellfile.c
index 24df042b7..988bb56c0 100644
--- a/src/spellfile.c
+++ b/src/spellfile.c
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ tree_count_words(char_u *byts, idx_T *idxs)
++curi[depth];
}
}
- else
+ else if (depth < MAXWLEN - 1)
{
// Normal char, go one level deeper to count the words.
++depth;
@@ -5648,7 +5648,7 @@ sug_filltree(spellinfo_T *spin, slang_T *slang)
++curi[depth];
}
}
- else
+ else if (depth < MAXWLEN - 1)
{
// Normal char, go one level deeper.
tword[depth++] = c;
diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim
index 547748db2..2367f6c20 100644
--- a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim
+++ b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim
@@ -1174,3 +1174,30 @@ func Test_soundfold_overflow()
endfunc
+func Test_spell_sug_tree_count_words_overflow()
+ " A crafted .spl/.sug pair with a BY_INDEX self-cycle in the fold word tree
+ " parses cleanly (shared refs aren't recursed, so read_tree_node()'s depth
+ " cap never trips), but drove tree_count_words() past its MAXWLEN-sized depth
+ " arrays -> stack out-of-bounds write. The walk only happens when
+ " spellsuggest() loads the matching .sug. Reaching the assert == no OOB.
+ call mkdir('Xrtp/spell', 'pR')
+ " VIMspell + v50, SN_SUGFILE(ts), SN_END, LWORDTREE{node:1,BY_INDEX->0,'A'},
+ " empty KWORDTREE/PREFIXTREE
+ let spl = eval('0z56494D7370656C6C320B0000000008000000001234'
+ \ .. '5678FF000000020101000000410000000000000000')
+ " VIMsug + v1, matching ts, SUGWORDTREE word "a", empty SUGTABLE
+ let sug = 0z56494D737567010000000012345678000000040161010000000000
+ call writefile(spl, 'Xrtp/spell/xx.utf-8.spl', 'b')
+ call writefile(sug, 'Xrtp/spell/xx.utf-8.sug', 'b')
+
+ new
+ set runtimepath+=./Xrtp
+ set spelllang=xx
+ set spell
+ " Unpatched: OOB write here (ASan abort, or crash). Patched: returns a list.
+ call assert_equal(v:t_list, type(spellsuggest('helloo')))
+
+ set spell& spelllang& runtimepath&
+ bwipe!
+endfunc
+
" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab

View File

@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Summary: The VIM editor
URL: http://www.vim.org/
Name: vim
Version: %{baseversion}.%{patchlevel}
Release: 18%{?dist}
Release: 19%{?dist}
Epoch: 2
# swift.vim contains Apache 2.0 with runtime library exception:
# which is taken as Apache-2.0 WITH Swift-exception - reported to legal as https://gitlab.com/fedora/legal/fedora-license-data/-/issues/188
@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ Patch3026: 0001-patch-9.2.0698-security-Out-of-bounds-write-with-sou.patch
# https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/d9ec67691170cd3764cbf767636305e47987340f
Patch3027: 0001-patch-9.2.0735-security-arbitrary-Ex-command-executi.patch
Patch3028: 0001-runtime-ccomplete-fix-type-mismatch-error.patch
# RHEL-194056 CVE-2026-55693 [security]: out-of-bounds write in tree_count_words()
# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-194056
# https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/a80874d9b84a01040e3d1aef2d4a59e1934dafb7
Patch3029: 0001-patch-9.2.0653-security-out-of-bounds-write-in-tree_.patch
# uses autoconf in spec file
@ -519,6 +523,7 @@ perl -pi -e "s,bin/nawk,bin/awk,g" runtime/tools/mve.awk
%patch -P 3026 -p1 -b .soundfold-overflow
%patch -P 3027 -p1 -b .ccomplete-ex-inject
%patch -P 3028 -p1 -b .runtime-ccomplete
%patch -P 3029 -p1 -b .tree-count-words-oob
%build
cd src
@ -1149,6 +1154,10 @@ touch %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/%{name}/vimfiles/doc/tags
%changelog
* Wed Jul 29 2026 RHEL Packaging Agent <redhat-ymir-agent@redhat.com> - 2:9.1.083-19
- RHEL-194056 CVE-2026-55693 vim: out-of-bounds write in
tree_count_words()
* Wed Jul 29 2026 RHEL Packaging Agent <redhat-ymir-agent@redhat.com> - 2:9.1.083-18
- RHEL-203886 CVE-2026-59858 vim: arbitrary Ex command execution in C
omni-completion